The National Conference as a Model for Transition
p. 27-36
Texte intégral
The Critical Factors
1Our discussion so far supports the proposition that successful transition from authoritarian rule in Africa depends on a number of factors peculiar to the specific country in transition. While it is true that the national conference succeeded in midwifing democracy in Benin, conditions in that country encouraged the successful completion of the process: the bankruptcy of the state, the low morale in the army, external pressures, the inability to sustain an established system of patronage and the unity of opposition groups. In addition, Kérékou was granted immunity from being probed by the conference.
2In many other African states where a national conference failed to lead to democracy or was stalemated, conditions were markedly different; the state of the economy was not as precarious as that of Bénin, support of the regime in the army had not declined significantly and the incumbent was not offered the kind of immunity given to Kérékou. Indeed constituent assemblies were often on a war path with the incumbent, e.g., in Zaire and Togo. The Nigerian case falls into a different category. Moreover, as an astute observer noted, ‘the political class lacked the organisation and vision to effect transformation.’43
3It seems clear, therefore, that for the national conference to work as an effective model for transition in Africa, three factors are crucial: the disposition of the incumbent to change, the state of the economy and the extent of the interests of external powers; and the position of the army.
4The disposition of the incumbent to change is critical to the success of any national conference and the subsequent transition to democracy. Where the incumbent is favourably disposed towards the conference, frank discussions of issues can take place and concrete results emerge. Where the incumbent is otherwise disposed towards the conference, however, he would most likely manipulate the deliberations. The extent of his success in this regard would be largely determined by his local following, both in the army and among key political allies and the extent of his leverage on external powers. In both Benin and Nigeria, incumbent leaders played important roles in determining the final outcome of the conferences. The Béninois leader, Mathieu Kérékou, convened the conference to discuss all the problems plaguing the state, but never envisaged that this would erode his powers, much less remove him from office. Yet, when the conference declared itself sovereign after a few days of deliberation, Kérékou did not resist the proclamation or use the armed forces to dissolve the conference. It could be argued that Kérékou’s influence in the military was on the decline as a result of progressive cuts in military allowances. Even so, Kérékou still retained the strong support of those members of the armed forces from his home region, but made no attempt to use them. Perhaps he did not fight back because the economy was in such terrible shape, literally bankrupt, and the international financial institutions and France, to whom he turned for assistance, made liberalization a precondition for assisting him.44 With virtually no mineral resources to fall back on, it seemed clear that the best option was to allow the conference to have its way.
5Even so, the delegates to the conference were fearful of a possible clash with the army. Mr. Nicéphore Soglo, the subsequent president, and former head of the interim administration later confessed, “when we started the conference everyone was anxious about a bloody confrontation with the army’.45 However, the army did not intervene, largely because Kérékou did not urge it to. Rather, President Kérékou complied with all the decisions of the conference and allowed the transition programme to run its course, even though it reduced him to a mere figurehead. Monsignor de Souza, the Catholic Bishop of Cotonou who served as president of the High Council of the Republic (HCR), the quasi-legislative body that supervised the interim government and the electoral process, admitted that were it not for Kérékou’s cooperative attitude it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the final outcome of the conference and the transition programme.46
6In the end, a combination of factors supported the conference process: a shift in the balance of power in Bénin due to economic bankruptcy, pressure from the International Financial Institutions (IFI) and France, and the diminished influence of Kérékou in the army. Again, the decision of the conference to give Kérékou immunity from probes into his 18 years in office helped to engender his positive attitude towards the conference.
7In Nigeria, on the other hand, as in many African countries that have adopted the national conference model, the experience of Bénin informed incumbent leaders that a cautionary approach should be used. Therefore, in spite of the fact that General Abacha promised a conference with full constituent powers, once the conference got underway, he reneged on his promise, and placed the conference under the close tutelage of the executive. The agenda of the conference was controlled and government ensured that almost a third of the delegates (almost the mandatory quorum) were its nominees. The design was to ensure that the interests of government would be given priority, in case the need arose. Several government acolytes were appointed to the headship of various conference committees and these scrupulously pursued government interests.
8The main hindrance to the regime at the conference, was retired General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, who had put together a formidable political opposition that pursued its own objectives. Yar’Adua’s strong political machinery demonstrated its power by setting a deadline, January 1996, for the military government of General Abacha to leave power. Considering the care that the government had put into writing the conference agenda and handpicking 96 nominees, this was a stupendous political coup. It set clear limits to what the government could do and gave it a rigid and constrained time frame within which to complete its transition programme. More significantly, Yar’Adua demonstrated his political acumen and knowledge and mastery of Nigerian politics. It was clear then that the only way in which the government could succeed with the stratagems and ploys that were a marked feature of Abacha’s military predecessor, was to disable Yar’Adua and remove him from the political arena. The government thus arrested him for being part of a ’coup plot’. With Yar’Adua out of circulation the road became clear for the open manipulation of the delegates. Enticements like the allocation of plots of land in the federal capital territory and the possibility of being part of a national consultative forum in future were offered. Membership of such a forum would guarantee the delegates a continuous monthly allowance of N25,000. In the end, the executive got the kind of report it wanted, which the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) endorsed without hesitation. Unlike Benin, the constitutional conference of Nigeria was subject to executive manipulation.
9Another critical factor for the success or otherwise of a national conference is the economic strength of the country, which is often related to the country’s mineral deposits. The possession of mineral wealth is usually a source of strength for the regime in power. It helps to silence the ‘hypocritical’ Western powers advocating reform.47 The geopolitical position of the country in the region may also be of strategic importance. Most of the African states that have refused to genuinely democratize or yield ground to opposition groups have been those with mineral deposits large enough to ensure a steady supply to Western nations. The lack of any vital mineral resources in Benin was a major reason for Kérékou’s helplessness at the conference table. On the other hand, Togo and Zaire have been able to defy external pressures to reform because of their important mineral exports and strategic geopolitical locations.48 It is unfortunate that Togo’s phosphate and Zaire’s copper and cobalt have had serious implications for their convoluted journeys towards democracy.49
10The ambiguous posture of Western powers, especially in states with vital mineral resources, was evident at the 1990 Franco-African summit in La Baule, France. The French had made political reform the basis of their assistance to their former colonies;50 this changed dramatically, however, in 1991 at the next meeting at Chaillot where each African state was to be allowed to democratize at its own pace without any dictation from France.51 Sudden departure from a policy announced just a year earlier should not be surprising, given the circumstances in which that decision was taken in the first place, and the fact that it was out of tune with orthodox French African policy.52 The reversal encouraged the derailment of the transition programme in Togo, as troops loyal to Eyadema launched a coup in Lomé six days after the meeting at Chaillot.
11In the same vein, the British started the delivery of tanks and other weapons to the Abacha regime, about mid-1994, shortly after he pulled down all democratic structures in the country, stifled his opposition and arrested and detained a number of leading opposition members, including Chief M. K. O. Abiola.53 The critical factors behind these political somersaults are the economic advantages which the Western powers are loathe to lose.
12The situation in Bénin was different. Benin did not have any resources which Kérékou could have used to his advantage to influence France; and by 1989 the country was bankrupt. Neither France nor any other major power saw any value in keeping Kérékou in power.
13The case of Chad would appear to be an exception to this rule. In reality, it simply substantiates it. Idris Debby, the Chadian President survived the sovereign national conference, even though the country did not have any mineral resources of immediate value. This was because he had already ceded fiscal power to his French advisers prior to the convening of the conference. Moreover, the perennial security problem in Chad has encouraged the use of force to tame the opposition without incurring the ire of France or any other power.54 The conference although it was called sovereign, had limited powers.
14The Congo, where the incumbent lost to the opposition in spite of the availability of mineral resources (oil) and the closeness of the leadership to Paris; and Niger, which has uranium, are exceptions. Their sovereign national conferences, however, were sovereign only insofar as French interests were not jeopardized by the deliberations.55 The Congo in particular, confirmed this provision. The former president. Dennis Sassou-Nguesso had mortgaged Congolese oil revenues till the year 1999 to the tune of FF 1,800 million besides accumulating a huge external debt of $5 billion.56 The economy of the Congo was thus in dire straits. It was therefore of little importance to France who was in power.57 The situation paved the way for the successful unseating of Nguesso via the national conference. The president had squandered the Congo’s vast oil resources, plunged the country into bankruptcy and proved himself a financial liability.
15The other critical factor that determines the success of the national conference as a mode for transition to democracy is the attitude of the army to the incumbent. The ability of the incumbent to get the army on his side greatly enhances his chances of defying the wishes of his people and sometimes those of external powers.58 If the incumbent is able to keep a system of patronage well oiled within the army, he is likely to enjoy their support. This translates as regular salaries and periodic bonuses and increases. This system of patronage encourages members of the armed forces to feel superior to their civilian counterparts, and acts as a guarantee of their ’ loyalty to the leader. The degeneration of African armies into ethnic segments manipulated by the president also reinforces this pattern of loyalty.
16Our analysis so far underlines the crucial role of the army. In Benin, the morale of the army was so low that it stood by and did nothing while the conference usurped Kérékou’s powers. The opposite was the case in Nigeria, Togo and Zaire where the army stood solidly behind the incumbent even though the civilian populace, in conjunction with sections of the political class, attempted to overthrow the military regime through strikes and uprisings. In Niger and the Congo, the army threatened to overturn the interim administrations put in place by the national conferences, if their immediate needs were not addressed. In Niger, the army complained about unpaid allowances and salaries, while in the Congo the army refused to accept the authority of the national conference over its affairs. Both cases were eventually settled in favour of the army. Prime Minister Cheiffou Amadou of Niger was forced to raise funds to clear the backlog of army salaries; the army in the Congo was allowed to hold its own conference in March 1992.59 The return of the military to power in Niger on 27 January 1996, therefore, should surprise no one. The major role of the army in any political transition programme is also due to the fact that even in situations where the civil society is hyperactive, it is unlikely to be able to overthrow a regime without the support of the army.60 The Malian case clearly illustrates this point. The army overthrew the government of General Moussa Traore, in order to actualize the goal of civilian rule.61
Notes de bas de page
43 Jinmi Adisa, Urban violence in Nigeria. Crime and Conflict 2, Winter 1995, Indicator Press, Durban.
44 Nwajiaku, The national conference in Benin and Togo, op. cit., p. 431.
45 West Africa 7-13 May 1990, p. 760.
46 Africa Report, op. cit., Msg. de Souza said Kérékou complied with conference decisions in spite of pressures from other heads of state on the continent to stay on.
47 See Blanca Benet Barrior, Democratisation in the context of international relations: Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau. M. A. dissertation. School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, 1995. Barrior argues that European powers often meddle in African affairs under the guise of urging democratic reforms and shifts in policies.
48 Zaire possesses copper and cobalt, important minerals for France. More significantly, Zaire has assumed added status and increasing significance because of the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region following the Rwandan crisis. Prior to the refugee crisis, the West had begun to see Mobutu as a pariah; even then, they did not seem to favour his removal. See Jinmi Adisa, Comfort of Strangers (UNCHS/IFRA Ibadan, 1996). See especially the chapter on Zaire.
49 It is important to note that Togo’s phosphate of cadmium is under restriction in Europe. Even so Togo and Morocco still supply 55 % of France’s total phosphate import (see Martin, Continuity and change in Franco-African relations. Journal of Modern African Studies 33 (1): 9; and Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 282). Again the clandestine financial contributions of African heads of state to the electoral campaigns of French presidential candidates is a factor in the French government’s support of incumbents. For details see Jean-Frangois Bayart, La politique africaine de François Mitterand. Editions Karthala, Paris, 1984, pp. 22 and 141; France: Let’s all open our purses. The Economist London, January 9, 1988, p. 36.
50 Guy Martin, Continuity and change in Franco-African relations, JMAS 33 (1) 1995: 15.
51 ibid.
52 For details see Robinson, op. cit., pp. 585-590.
53 Tempo (Lagos) 13 July 1995: 3.
54 William F. Miles, Tragic tradeoffs: Democracy and security in Chad. Journal of Modern African Studies, 31 (1) 1995.
55 Robinson, op. cit., p. 590. ’
56 Martin, Continuity and change, op. cit.
57 This explains the initial reluctance of France to come to the aid of Lissouba, the new president, when he requested for their assistance to pay workers’ salaries. The reluctance of France forced him to conclude what later came to be known as the Congo-Oxy deal with the assistance of former US President, Jimmy Carter. For details see Martin, op. cit.
58 Michael Chege, The military in the transition to democracy in Africa: Some preliminary observations. CODESRIA Bulletin No. 3, 1995.
59 Jean-Bruno Thiam, Congo: après les états généraux de l’armée. Jeune Afrique (1629) 26 mars – 1 avril 1992: 26-27.
60 Prominent political activists in Nigeria openly invited the military to take over at the peak of the June 12 crisis in 1993. See Adisa, Urban violence in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 168.
61 Nzouankey, op. cit.
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