Bénin and the National Conference
p. 3-9
Texte intégral
1The Republic of Benin, located to the west of Nigeria, is of particular relevance in any analysis of the conference model as a means for democratic transition, because the experience in Benin acted as a catalyst to events elsewhere. Benin can be seen, therefore, as the cradle of the conference model.3 The experiment was initiated there in 1990 and successfully paved the way for the emergence of a democratic regime. Benin, therefore, became the point of reference, or as André Salifou, the President of Niger’s National Conference described it, le Benin fait l’ecole,4 – a school, as proponents of democracy elsewhere struggled, often in vain, to replicate the experience. It has become obvious, as the ghost of failure has begun to haunt the system, that closer attention must be paid to the historical antecedents of the Benin experience in relation to other countries.
Background to the Conferences
Bénin
2By mid-1989, Bénin was already in an economic crisis that verged on bankruptcy. The renunciation of Marxism as the official state ideology later that year did little to alleviate the hardship of the people. Instead, the liberalization of political life, which the rejection of Marxism afforded, enabled thousands of disaffected public servants and employees of the private sector, who were being owed several months of unpaid salaries, to go into the streets and demand for pay. Chaos and the seeming impotence of the government in the face of the problem prompted Robert Dossou, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the Université Nationale du Benin and an elected member of the legislature, to meet with President Mathieu Kérékou on behalf of the concerned legislators and citizens to seek a solution to the crisis. It was the belief of the group that only through a:
... demonopolisation of political life by the Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin (PRPB, the country’s ruling party), a general amnesty, and an end to all repressive measures against striking teachers would Benin be able to avoid civil violence.5
3Kérékou seemed to have agreed with Dossou as he accepted the principle of a multi-party system. Moreover, he appointed Dossou as his Minister for Economic Planning, apparently to placate growing opposition. Also he promulgated a decree establishing a committee of eight ministers headed by Dossou to organize an assembly of forces vives de la nation, quelles que soient leurs affinites – all living forces of the nation whatever their political sensibilities – to contribute to the building of a new democratic process and to the fostering of a healthy and new political atmosphere in the country.6 A national preparatory committee for the conference was set up. The primary duty of this committee was to set the agenda for the conference, identify the groups and recommend the number of persons that would take part in its deliberations. The committee ended up with a list of 488 delegates, representing all shades of opinion7 within the Béninois state.
4The idea of convening a national conference was not new in Benin. In times of crisis, Kérékou would convene a conference to discuss the issue at stake, if only to silence his critics. A major characteristic of the earlier conferences was the restricted nature of the membership and the limitation of the agenda to the particular crisis. Given this background. President Kérékou did not have any cause to fear the outcome of a conference. What he failed to see was that this proposed national conference was different from previous ones in one main respect: all segments of the society were represented and it took place in a new liberal atmosphere.
Nigeria
5Unlike Benin, Nigeria’s need to convene a constitutional (national) conference emanated primarily from the crisis engendered by the annulment of the June 12th, 1993 presidential election, presumed to have been won by Chief M. K. O. Abiola. Yet the clamour for a national conference predated the 1993 crisis, which simply underlined the need for it. As far back as 1990, various interest groups had attempted to convene such a conference, but their efforts were frustrated by government. The former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo and a group of elder statesmen also tried to convene a national conference early in 1990, but their efforts were thwarted by the then military government of President Ibrahim Babangida. Following this, another group, led by Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, Dr. Olu Onagoruwa and the Movement for National Reformation, scheduled a conference between the 6th and 9th of September, 1990. However, state security officials sealed off the venue of the conference prior to the arrival of delegates.8
6The crisis that followed the annulment of the presidential election in 1993, prompted a renewed clamour for a national conference which was not heeded until the military regime of General Abacha saw wisdom in using it to buy time to consolidate its grip on power.
7The popular outcry resulting from the annulment forced the exit of President Ibrahim Babangida, who hand-picked Ernest Shonekan to head an interim government. It soon became clear, however, that Shonekan and his interim administration would not be able to withstand the weight of political opposition arising from the crisis. Thus, barely 82 days after his appointment as the head of the interim administration, Shonekan resigned.9 The military, once again, took over, this time under the leadership of General Sani Abacha, former Defence Minister under Babangida, and the most senior officer in the interim administration.
8On assumption of office, General Abacha dissolved all existing political institutions put in place by the aborted transition programme of General Babangida. To placate the restive pro-democracy groups he promised to convene a national constitutional conference ’with full constituent powers’10 to determine the future structure of the country. To further assuage the fears of the pro-June 12 agitators, he appointed Dr. Olu Onagoruwa, a leading member of the human rights’ group and a strong advocate of the sovereign national conference, as his Justice Minister. The Ministry of Justice was then saddled with the responsibility of convening the conference. This initial arrangement turned out to be a ploy by the regime to buy time and settle down in office. For, no sooner did the regime attain some stability than responsibility for the conference was taken away from the justice ministry, and the promise that the conference would have ‘full constituent powers’ withdrawn.
9Once the Abacha administration reneged on the pledge for a sovereign conference, it began to attract serious political opposition. Prominent Nigerians publicly declared that they had lost faith in the conference,11 and southern leaders, especially those from the southwest, called for a boycott of the elections of representatives to the conference. The call for a boycott was most vehement in the southwest region for obvious reasons. It is the home of Chief Abiola, presumed winner of the annulled election. The bulk of the electorate perceived participation in the national conference as a betrayal of their son and collusion with the military. Moreover the mood of the region, and indeed the entire nation, did not favour another election so soon after the June 12th debacle. The call for a boycott was, therefore, in consonance with the anti-government mood of the moment. Consequently, the boycott was almost total in the southwest and partial elsewhere. On the whole, there was voter apathy concerning conference delegate elections. Many voters nationwide did not see any reason for going to the polls after having just voted in a presidential election. This apathy was reflected in the turn out for that election, as just over 300,000 voters, compared to the 14 million that voted in the cancelled presidential elections of 1993, selected the 273 delegates nationwide. Yet these delegates were supposed to be representatives of the people who, among other things, had been denied the president they voted for, on the grounds of poor voter turn out.12 One thing the boycott achieved was to rob the conference of the high calibre delegates who would have come from the southwestern part of the country. Be that as it may, of the 369 delegates for the conference, 273 delegates were elected by the constitutional conference electoral committee and 96 delegates were nominated by the government.
Notes de bas de page
3 It is important to note that in December 1989 (Bénin’s conference started holding in February 1990) a conferencia national was held in the former Portuguese colony of Sao Tomé. Although it was not declared sovereign, the one party regime that organized it approved the introduction of parliamentary democracy just two weeks after a majority of participants at the gathering requested for it.
4 Le président du présidium, le professeur Andre Salifuo. Sahel Dimanche 9 Août 1991: 7, Niamey.
5 John R. Heilbrunn, Social origins of national conferences in Benin and Togo, Journal of Modern African Studies 31 (2) 1993: 285.
6 West Africa, 29 January-4 February 1990: 132.
7 The delegates were drawn mainly from the educated elite of the professional associations and the political class.
8 Abubakar Momoh, Some associational groups and the transition to civil rule in Nigeria. In: Democratization in Africa. Nigerian perspectives, Vol. 2, Omo Omoruyi et al., eds. Centre for Democratic Studies, Abuja, 1994: 195.
9 It is not clear whether Shonekan actually resigned of his own free will or was forced out by the military. Newswatch (Lagos) November 29,1993. The consensus of opinion is that he was forced out.
10 See text of the maiden broadcast of General Sani Abacha to the nation on the 18th of November 1993, which was carried by all national newspapers the following morning.
11 According to a survey conducted by a research group, Foundation for Economics Education (FEE) based in Ibadan, at the beginning, a majority of Nigerian opinion leaders (about 90 per cent) were in support of a national conference, with 70 per cent of this number in support of a sovereign conference. For details, see The National Conference: Issues, controversies and assessment. Foundation for Economics Education, Ibadan, 1994.
12 The Guardian (Lagos) 24 June 1993.
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