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Inter-ethnic relations in a Nigerian city

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Isaac Olawale Albert

Inter-Ethnic relations in a Nigerian city

A Historical Perspective of the Hausa-lgbo Conflicts in Kano, 1953-1991

Texte intégral

Introduction

  • 1  Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a way of life. American Journal of Sociology (vol. 44, July 1938) p. l.

1The character of the problems faced by most urban centres of the world of over population, high criminal tendencies, shortage of social amenities and the like, can be explained within the context of Louis Wirth’s definition of ‘city’. According to Wirth, a city is ‘a relatively dense and permanent settlement of heterogenous individuals’.1 The heterogeneity of most Nigerian cities is largely due to population movement from the rural areas, or the in some cases, from one ‘disturbed’ urban centre to another. Cities consist of people of different ethnic, socio-cultural, religious, economic and political traditions. The nature of the relationship between urban immigrants and their host population often depends on the degree of competing claims between the two groups. Where one of the groups, especially the immigrants, Finds it easy to be assimilated into the systems of the other, peaceful co-existence normally results. But where the socio-cultural characteristics of the two groups are diametrically opposed to one another, the host-stranger relationship is often characterized by animosity. The condition of the Igbo in Kano typically illustrates this. This paper discusses the immigration of the Igbo into Kano; the context in which the hostility between them and the Hausa-Fulani host population was built up and the extent to which this could be said to have threatened the safety of the Igbo in Kano.

  • 2  For the origins of the Sabon Gari system in Kano see I. O. Albert, Urban migrant settlements in Ni (...)
  • 3  The word ‘Kanawa’ denotes Kano indigenes who are Hausa-Fulani.

2The Igbo in Kano, like the other largely Christian immigrants in the city, were settled in the Sabon Gari – a settlement established around 1911 for immigrant Africans from the Middle Belt (Nigeria), Southern Nigerian provinces, and other British West African colonies.2 The intention of the British colonial government was to use the segregated settlement pattern to prevent Christian and highly Westernized immigrants from interacting with the Muslim Kanawa3 in a manner that would endanger the colonial administration in Kano. The Sabon Gari system has consistently made it difficult for the settlers to assimilate into their host community. The system also prevented the Kanawa from understanding the socio-cultural orientation of the Sabon Gari settlers. The relationship between the two groups has been frequently characterized by violence. Between 1953 and 1991, various riots took place in Kano involving the Kanawa and the residents of Sabon Gari. In most cases, the Kanawa were the agressors. Until the 1982 religious riot, the Kanawa had often spared the lives of other non Igbo Sabon Gari immigrants.

Theoretical framework

  • 4  For example, see A. Adepoju, Migration surveys in Nigeria: An overview. Journal of Population Asso (...)
  • 5  J. Da Vanzo, Microeconomic approaches to studying migration decisions. In: Gordon F. de Jong and R (...)
  • 6  O. Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978.
  • 7  Samir Amin, Introduction. In: Samir Amin (ed.), Modern Migrations in Western Africa. London: Oxfor (...)

3Various studies conducted on migration and urbanization in Nigeria4 have clearly exhibited the predominance of economic considerations in the decision of people to migrate from one place to another. In most cases, migrants move from economically disadvantaged geographical locations. The decision to migrate could be taken for social, religious and political reasons; but in all cases, migration is undertaken to improve the condition and status of the affected person or persons. For example, Da Vanzo5 noted that ‘an individual migrates in the expectation of being better off by doing so’. It has been observed, however, that in the pursuit of economic improvement, the migrant often comes into conflict with his host population. As shown in Nnoli’s6 work, it is not the contact between groups that in itself breeds intergroup conflicts but rather the degree of competing claims among the groups. Such ‘conflicting claims’ according to another writer ‘are defined with reference to the economic and political problems of modern society, in which these groups are integrated’.7

The Igbo migration to Kano

  • 8  Robin Hallett, Africa Since 1875: A Modern History. London: Heinemann, 1975, pp. 414, 725.
  • 9  B. W. Hodder and U.l. Ukwu, Markets in West Africa. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1969, p. l 16

4Igboland has been said to be one of the most densely populated areas of modern Africa. Early in the twentieth century, the rural Igbo districts had about 800 people per square mile, whereas by contrast, many parts of Northern Nigeria did not have more than 25.8 In 1952, the population density in Igboland was 346 per square mile against Northern Nigeria’s density of 60.9

  • 10  I. Nzimiro, A study of mobility among the Ibos of southern Nigeria, International Journal of Compa (...)
  • 11  See A. E. Afigbo, Economic foundations of colonial Igbo society. In: I. A. Akinjogbin and S. O. Os (...)

5The Igbo of Eastern Nigeria are one of the most vibrant immigrant communities in Nigerian cities. Their presence in most major cities in the country has been credited to land hunger in the heavily populated eastern areas and scarcity of fertile land. Much of the arable land is unsuitable for cultivation due to high acidity and leaching and this demands a higher investment in agricultural production.10 These problems date back to the precolonial period. Population pressure has an adverse effect on agricultural production, particularly in northern Igboland.11

  • 12  Hodder and Ukwu, p. 117.

6Closely linked to declining agricultural production was the unfavorable land tenure system, under which many farmers were squatters on the land they farmed- as outright sale of agricultural land among them was virtually impossible.12 The end result of these problems was that many Igbo people took to trading and manufacturing which eventually required more market outlets than could be found in their home areas. The new economic activities engendered a migratory tradition among them.

  • 13  Ibid., 132-139; Afigbo, 12; Simon Ottenberg, Ibo oracles and intergroup relations. Southwestern Jo (...)

7In the precolonial era, the activities of Igbo traders were largely concentrated within Igboland and around the Niger Delta area. The most important of these Igbo trading communities, especially in the nineteenth century, were the Arochukwu and the Awka people who were supported by the Ibini Ukpabi and Agbala oracles respectively.13 These oracles were so feared in precolonial Igboland that their owners successfully dictated the pattern and direction of long-distance trade in Igboland. The Ibini-Ukpabi shrine of the Arochukwu which appeared to be the most powerful of such oracles was finally destroyed by the British in 1902, when it was found to be a threat to free trade and the movement of people. The effective occupation of Igboland in 1906 stimulated inter-regional trade between the Igbo and other Nigerian peoples. Those traders, hitherto confined to Igboland, now began to disperse to other parts of Nigeria to take advantage of the expanding Western style of capitalism introduced by the Europeans. At that time, many Hausa people were also settled in Eastern Nigeria. The contact between the Hausa and the Igbo pre-dated the presence of Europeans in the area. The earliest trading between the Hausa and the Igbo was in cattle and horses. These animals were used by the Igbo for ritual and ceremonial purposes. Some Hausa went to Eastern Nigeria to hunt for elephants and other animals, while others engaged in the ivory trade. They traded in beads, leatherwork and charms.

  • 14  lbid., 144-145; Simon Ottenberg, The development of local government in a Nigerian township. Anthr (...)

8The number of Hausa in Eastern Nigeria increased during the British colonial period and many of them enlisted in the colonial army. The Hausa were also traders, factory workers, craftsmen, contractors on the railway construction projects, as well as porters on the route from Oguta to Abonema. By the second decade of the twentieth century, Hausa settlements had been established at Ibagwa, Awka, Aguleri, Abakaliki, Aba, Umuahia-Ibeku, Omoba, Mbawsi and Afikpo.14 It was probably within this context of economic interaction that the Igbo began to migrate in increased numbers to northern Nigeria, not only as traders but also as employees to the railway corporation and the European trading companies.

  • 15  T. N. Tamuno, Genesis of the Nigerian Railway – II, Nigeria Magazine (no. 84, March 1965), pp.40-4 (...)
  • 16  Tamuno, 39.
  • 17  John Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973 (...)
  • 18  National Archives Kaduna (NAK), Kano Prof. 5/1 4292, Report on Native Reservations. R. L. B. Maide (...)
  • 19  John Paden, 315.

9Although Sabon Gari in Kano is presently predominantly occupied by the Igbo, this has not always been the case. The Yoruba were the first to arrive in the city in any substantial number. Some of them arrived with the British conquerors in 1903 as servants, clerks and artisans. The reason for this is obvious. The British colonialists who effectively occupied Lagos in 1861, and Ibadan in 1893, recruited their first batch of aides from among the Yoruba. Some of these people accompanied the British as they journeyed northwards into Hausaland. In addition to the personal staff of British officers, some Yoruba traders came to Kano in the early twentieth century. The railway system which connected Yorubaland with Kano by 1911, contributed to the earlier migration of Yoruba to the North; whereas the eastern railway line (from Igboland) only reached Kano via the Kaduna junction in 1927.15 This facilitated the earlier migration of the Yoruba to Kano. The journey to Kano from Lagos in 1911, which cost £9: 14s: 10d, took three days. This was considered to be reasonable for West Africans travelling at the time.16 Of the 2000 immigrants in the Kano Sabon Gari in 1921, 1478 were Yoruba. The Igbo were so few at this time that the 1921 census contained no data about them. After the Second World War, however the numerical strength of the Igbo began to surpass the Yoruba.17 This was in response to the industrial growth of Kano. Many industries were established in the city during the war, so that after the war, Kano became the most industrialized part of northern Nigeria. More skilled manpower had to be recruited. The Igbo rose to the occasion by migrating in greater numbers to the city. According to R. L. Maiden, a colonial official in Kano around this time, the city was to the ‘ubiquitous Ibo and the other tribes from the distant south’, an El Dorado.18 In 1954, they constituted about 60 per cent of the Sabon Gari population. This shot up to about 80 per cent in 1965.19

Background to the conflict

  • 20  O. Nnoli, 69-70.
  • 21  William Shack, Introduction, In: William A. Shack and Elliot P. Skinner (ed.) Strangers in African (...)

10The relationship between the Igbo immigrants in Kano and indigenous Kanawa has been characterized by intermittent conflict. Each defined its relationship with the other in purely ethnic and religious terms. According to Nnoli, contact between groups by itself, does not necessarily generate ethnicity. The socio-cultural characteristics of the involved parties before their contact; the context of their contact; and the extent of socio-economic competition between them, however do generate ethnicity.20 William Shack emphatically noted that more than other activities, the economic aggressiveness of strangers is often responsible for hostility to them by members of their host communities.21 How does this apply to Kano?

  • 22  For example see Alan Frishman, The impact of Islam on the urban structure and economy of Kano, Nig (...)
  • 23  John Paden, 315.

11Kano, which has been generally acknowledged as an Islamic centre22 in West Africa and the primary repository of northern Nigerian values and identities23 was forcefully occupied by the British colonial powers in 1903. The British, were by and large, Christian. It was as a result of British occupation that Christian immigrants like the Yoruba and Igbo came to the city of Kano. The Muslim Kanawa were intimidated by the British presence into playing the role of reluctant host to the immigrants.

  • 24  See C. Brown, Introduction, In: C. Brown (ed.) From Medina to Metropolis. Princeton: The Darwin Pr (...)

12Islamic urban centres were usually characterized by external walls, royal palaces, central mosques, specialized quarters, mixed land uses, bifurcated city traditions and residentials housing systems that could support the seclusion of women.24

  • 25  Abdullahi Smith, The early states of the Western Sudan to 1500. In: J. F. Ade Ajayi and M. Crowder (...)

13Three major factors seemed to have set the Igbo immigrants in Kano and their host population at variance. The first was their restriction to the Sabon Gari settlement, just like other southern Nigerian immigrants in Kano. This made it difficult for them to integrate with their host population, and achieve peaceful co-existence. There were other problems, however, engendered by the economic assertiveness of the Igbo and their socio-political and religious belief systems. While the dominant political system of the Hausa-Fulani was largely autocratic and essentially feudalist, the Igbo people were inclined towards democratic principles which respected the interests of the majority. The political administration of the Hausa centered very much around the Sarki and his feudal retinue. The rank and file of the Hausa depend on the wealth of their patrons, who in turn ensure their survival.25 The feudal system cuts across a broad spectrum in Hausaland, with many people having to depend on one patron (social, economic, religious, and political) or the other for their survival. On the other hand, the Igbo appreciate the social or economic status attained through hard work or individual effort. Unlike the average Hausa-Fulani, they attach little importance to subservience and obedience to superiors. Writing further on this, Nnoli noted that:

  • 26  0. Nnoli, p. 1,32. This issue was also alluded to by U. G. Damachi, Nigerian Modernization. New Yo (...)

... Igbo society looked down on people who accepted superiors, depended on them, or relied on them for their progress. Subservience and unquestioning obedience signified weakness and lack of masculinity. It placed a premium, instead, on occupational skill, enterprise and initiative. The man who was respected, powerful and influential was the one who was sufficiently self-motivated to work hard and to successfully compete with and challenge the power and wealth of his superiors. His success was basically self-made rather than attained through climbing the socio-economic and political apron-strings of his superiors.26

14Therefore, the average Igbo in Kano is an aggressive hardworking person. He features in all conceivable economic activities from the street hawking of a few bunches of chewing sticks, to the management of extensive motor spare-parts shops. To galvanize their economic potential in Kano, Igbo people formed a branch of the Ibo Union, a national body established in the 1940s to assist Igbo immigrants in different parts of Nigeria. A clause of the Union’s constitution stated that:

  • 27  I. Nzimiro, A study of mobility among the Ibo of Southern Nigeria, In: Ralph V\dA\ng{on (cdi.), Ki (...)

It shall be the duty of every member to assist any unemployed member in obtaining employment. Any such unemployed member who is proved to be without means of livelihood, may be granted a monthly subsistence of 7s 6d for a period not exceeding six months, within which period he may be repatriated or sent to a station, where he may obtain employment.27

  • 28  B. A. W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty-year Development Plan. 1963-1983, Gla (...)

15The Kano branch of the Ibo Union was so active in mobilizing the people that in the 1960s it had established a well-managed primary school and a secondary school.28 It was banned, along with other ethnic associations in 1966 by General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s administration. But in 1984, it was succeeded in Kano by the Ibo Community Association which has been equally active at uniting the Igbo elements. At various times before Nigerian Independence, the Kanawa had one reason or the other to complain that the Igbo dominated both the formal and informal sectors of the Kano economy. The Igbo controlled economic activity in both the Sabon Gari market and Kantin Kwari in Kano. This later led to conflict between the immigrants and their host population, though not as formidable as the religious conflict that also ensued.

  • 29  G. T. Basden, Among the I bos of Nigeria. Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1982, p. 303- 305.

16As mentioned earlier, Kano is a citadel of Islamic traditions. One could not, therefore, expect that the people would be friendly with people of different religious backgrounds. Islam has not recorded any substantial converts among the Igbo immigrants as it has among the Yoruba. There have been only few Muslims in Igboland.29 Writing on this, G. T. Basden who spent many years among the Igbo people noted that:

  • 30  Ibid., 304; The history of Islam in Yorubaland, however, contradicts ‘Basden’s observations. Islam (...)

The arrogance of the average Moslem, and the insolent contempt with which he treats the pagan are notorious. The result is that now that Mohammedanism cannot be spread by its former methods of fire and sword, converts are not readily won. The statement that ‘where the Negro is given the option he will invariably choose Christianity in preference to Mohammedanism’ has been amply justified in places where the two forces are at work side by side. Statistics irrefutably support this opinion. On examination of the figures available for the Ibo country we find them wholly in favour of Christianity.30

  • 31  The ‘People of the Book’ refers to the Bible, ie, those who practice Christianity and Judaism. To (...)
  • 32  NAK, Kano Prof. 5/1, 5908. Tribal Population Statistics. Communication between Wakilin Kano and Ka (...)
  • 33  Personal communication with Chief Benneth A. Anyanetu, Secretary, Ibo Community Association, Kano, (...)

17In addition, the Kanawa did not see the Igbo as true Christians who would normally, under Islamic religion deserve some accommodation by the Muslims, as people of the book (Alh lu’ l-kitab.)31 They rather saw the immigrants as polytheists.32 This conclusion must have been drawn from the various cultural activities of the Igbo in Kano. According to Chief Benneth Anyanetu, who is the General Secretary of the Ibo Community Association (ICA) in Kano, when an Igbo person in the city dies, the regular practice is to give him a ‘befitting’ burial ceremony involving various cultural activities. The town union (to which the deceased person belonged) notifies the ICA of the burial date. The ICA would then invite all the Igbo town unions affiliated to it for the ceremony.33 Each of the town unions would then decide on what contribution to make. Some might come to the ceremony with masquerades, some with acrobatic dancers, others with drummers, etc. They would sing, dance and pour libations to the gods using wine or locally brewed gin (ogogoro). To the Kanawa, this was regarded as evidence of polytheism, since such practices are neither recognized by the Koran nor the Bible. On the other hand, the Kanawa had a more cordial relationship with the Yoruba, a large number of whom are Muslims and whose socio-cultural norms are similar to those of the Hausa-Fulani.

The Igbo-Kanawa conflicts

18Kanawa hostility towards the Igbo immigrants in their midst before the 1950s, was mainly economic and religious. But starting from the 1950s, the relationship between the Kanawa and the southerners in their midst (not just the Igbo alone) assumed political dimensions. Probably because of their socio-economic background in the city, the Igbo have, however, suffered most during these ethnic conflicts. The first of such happened in 1953, as a result of general inter-ethnic tension in the country.

  • 34  Paden, 316.
  • 35  Ibid., 379.
  • 36  Before the Richards’ Constitution came into effect in 1947, northern and southern Nigeria were gov (...)
  • 37  Tor details on the failure of Western education in Northern Nigeria see S. F. Graham, Government a (...)

19The Richard’s Constitution of 1947 brought the three ethnic groups in Nigeria (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) under the same political umbrella, and as a result, the 1950s were years of acrimonious ethnic politics in Nigeria. During this period, the greatest immigration of southern Nigerians into Kano took place. Igbos formed the great majority of the immigrants. The Kanawa saw this unprecedented immigration of stranger elements into their midst as a political device by which southern Nigerians would take over Northern Nigeria.34 This suspicion helped to solidify the Hausa-Fulani identity in Kano as they began to see themselves in social, religious, economic and political competition with the southern Nigerian strangers in their midst.35 This was informed by the fact that the southerners were seen by themselves and by the Kanawa as politically,36 educationally37 and economically superior to the northerners.

  • 38  For detailed information on these political parties. See R. L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties. (...)
  • 39  Federal Government of Nigeria, House of Representatives. Official Report of Debates, March 31, 195 (...)

20The Arthur Richards’ Constitution divided Nigeria into three ethnic-based and distinct legislative regions: the Northern for the Hausa-Fulani, the Western for the Yoruba, and the Eastern for the Igbo. The three political parties that emerged at this moment represented these regions and their peoples: the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) for the North; Action Group (AG) for the West and National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) for the East.38 In March 1953, Chief Anthony Enahoro, an Action Group member, moved a motion on the floor of the House of Representatives asking that Britain should grant Nigeria her political independence in 1956.39 Members of the NPC easily imagined the disadvantaged position of the northerners under such an independent Nigeria and opposed the motion. The House, therefore, became divided into two: North against South.

21The southern lawmakers decried the action of their northern counterparts in disparaging language. The Lagos politicians also booed the northerners. This angered the Hausa-Fulani who felt the southerners wanted to drive them away from the Nigerian State.

  • 40  Northern Regional Government, Report on the Kano Disturbance 16lh, 17"’, 18’h and 19th May, 1953 L (...)
  • 41  NAK, Kano Prof. 4/1, 55801, Kano Riots 1953: compensation 1953-56, Petition to the D. O., Kano by (...)
  • 42  NAK, Kano Prof 4/1, 55801, pp. 35-37.
  • 43  Ibid. Extract from the conclusion of the Executive Council of the Northern Region, Report on Kano (...)
  • 44  NAK, Kano Prof 4/1, 55801, Petition to the D. O. p. 20.

22To worsen the already strained relationship between southerners and northerners, the Action Group members decided to carry their campaign for Nigerian independence in 1956 to the North. Kano was chosen as the venue for the campaign. Before it could start, the Kanawa rioted and attacked Sabon Gari residents. Though the problem that led to the riot was created by the Yoruba dominated Action Group, the rioters were out to eliminate the Igbo-speaking immigrants at Sabon Gari. At the end of the disorder, which lasted four days, thirty-six people were declared dead. Two hundred and forty-one were wounded.40 These were the official figures. The real number of casualties must have been greater than this figure. A petition by an Igbo group in Jos claimed that forty-six people lost their lives during the Kano disturbance.41 A careful look at the documents relating to the payment of compensation to the victims of the riots indicate that about 75 per cent of them were Igbo.42 Of those killed in the conflict, (whether official or unofficial) Mr. Sanyaolu, the AG leader in Kano could only identify three as Yoruba, though he claimed that four had lost their lives.43 One Igbo group (Omamman Community) alone lost eight members.44 Many of the Igbo groups in Kano and other parts of Northern Nigeria had to endow relief funds to rehabilitate the families of their colleagues affected by the riot in Kano.

  • 45  Paden, p. 325.

23The Kano riot of 1953 was immediately followed by a ‘northernization policy’ in Hausaland, as a result of which, many southerners employed in the northern civil service were removed.45 Many Igbo people, however, were employed by the post office, railway and other national government offices as clerks, against whom the northerners could not take any negative action. Between 1954 and 1962, many new industries were being established in Kano which meant more job openings for skilled workers. So, southerners kept on coming in greater numbers. The dominant influence of the Igbo on the formal sector of the economy had expanded into the informal sector by 1965, when economic activities in the Sabon Gari market had significantly reduced the importance of Kano city market, which had been popular throughout western and central Sudan from the nineteenth century.

  • 46  Paden, 317-319.

24The Hausa-Fulani, when they could neither make sufficient sales in Kano city market nor have a comfortable place in the Sabon Gari market, had to abandon retail trade in frustration and go into wholesale trade. While wealthy Hausa merchants went into wholesale trade in competition with European and Lebanese traders, their middle and lower class counterparts were left to suffer the bad effects of the declining economic situation.46 The Kanawa began to complain that the Igbo traders (who dominated the Sabon Gari market), were repatriating the profits made in Kano to develop Eastern Nigeria.

  • 47  For details see B. J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. Iba (...)
  • 48  This has been denied by the only surviving participant in the coup. For the basic motives of the c (...)
  • 49  Paden, 33-3.
  • 50  For more details on this read B. J. Dudley, 130-139.
  • 51  Robin Hallett, op. cit; Dudley, 69-170.

25Another opportunity to check the ascendancy of the Igbo in Kano occurred in early 1966. On January 15, 1966 a group of young military officers (led by an Igbo major) organized a coup d’état which resulted in the death of some eminent politicians. The two most prominent northerners killed, were Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was the Nigerian Prime Minister, and Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier, Northern Region.47 Though the coup led by Major Nzeogwu was generally seen in the North as a punitive measure against the Hausa-Fulani by the Igbo,48 it did not actually attract any immediate negative response from the Kanawa, as none of the northerners killed came from Kano. Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu who controlled the army unit in the city merely detained the Emir of Kano, probably for security reasons, and had him released shortly after. Events however took another turn when Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s successor, General Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, who surrounded himself with Igbo advisers, promulgated a decree changing Nigeria to a unitary state. This was seen in the North as an attempt by Ironsi to consolidate the Igbo domination of the Hausa-Fulani. The Kano elite saw the unification decree as a threat to their prospects in the civil service both in the North and at the national level. The attitude of the Sabon Gari residents was also interpreted by the Kanawa as a celebration of the Igbo victory over them.49 On March 29,1966, there was a demonstration in Kano against the unification decree. As usual, the rioters went to the Sabon Gari quarters where between 100 and 200 Igbo people were killed. On July 29, 1966 there was another military coup, headed by northern military officers in retaliation. The Head of State, General Ironsi, Military Governor of the Western Region, Lieutenant-Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi and some Igbo officers were killed during this coup.50 This was followed by the mass killing of Igbo immigrants in different parts of the North: an incident which led to the mass emigration of about 10,000 Igbo people from the North.51 This was a prelude to the secessionist move of the Igbo out of the Nigerian State. The civil war that resulted lasted from July 1967 to January 1970.

  • 52  Paden, 356.
  • 53  Communication with Chief Benneth Anyanetu.

26Most of the jobs vacated by the Igbo in Kano as a result of their mass emigration to Eastern Nigeria were taken over by the Hausa and the Yoruba. A caretaker committee was also inaugurated in the city to collect the rent on the houses abandoned by the Igbo. More than £100,000 was collected.52 When they began to return to Kano during the second half of 1970, one of the immediate problems the Igbo faced was that of reclaiming their abandoned houses. There were many claimants to each of the houses. At the end of the exercise, many legitimate house owners without relevant documents with which to establish ownership, lost their property.53 This and other losses notwithstanding, many of them chose to remain in Kano, while some returned to their places of origin after salvaging what was left of their property in the city.

  • 54  Daily Champion, (23 October 1991), p. 18.
  • 55  Newswatch (28 Oct. 1991) p. 15; Daily Champion, Ibid.

27In 1991, another riot took place in Kano involving Christians and Muslims. The Igbo were the worst victims of the civil disturbance. The crisis developed as a result of a religious crusade jointly organized by the Kano State branch of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Reinhard Bonnke Ministry from Germany. Among the objectives of the evangelistic Christian crusade was to pray for Nigerian leaders and their political transition programme; foster unity and love among the churches in Kano and expand the Christian population in Kano.54 The event which was to have taken place between 15-20 October 1991 was opposed by the Kanawa for two principal reasons. Prior to the Reinhard Bonnke crusade, Muslims had been denied the opportunity of hosting a South African Islamic Fundamentalist, Sheikh Ahmed Deedat, who was invited to preach in Kano. He was not allowed to enter the country.55 The theme of Evangelist Bonnke’s crusade: KANO FOR JESUS was considered provocative by the Kanawa. To avert the impending religious crisis in the city, the authorities in Kano denied the Christians the use of Kano Race Course as the venue for the crusade. Instead the evangelists used the compound of St. Thomas/St. Louis School in Sabon Gari. This did not appease the Muslims who were already determined to abort the function. Evangelist Bonnke and other pastors and evangelists, including some Americans, arrived in Kano on Sunday 13th October, 1991. The riot started the next day. Bonnke and his colleagues had to be flown out of Kano in a police jet on Tuesday, October 15, 1991.

  • 56  To write this aspect of the paper, many people were informally interviewed at Sabon Gari, Sarkin Y (...)
  • 57  Newswatch (28 Oct. 1991), p. 15.
  • 58  Ibid, 15-16.

28The leading role played by the Igbo in the riot was coincidental. The demonstrators who invaded Sabon Gari on the 14th October, 1991 entered the settlement from Fagge through Galadima Street across Court Road to France Street (Abuja road) where many Igbo people had their stalls. Because of the mass looting that had accompanied the past riots in the city, the Igbo traders rose up in unison to defend their property. In the process, some of the demonstrators were wounded. They then went back for reinforcements. Then, information spread to other parts of Kano that the Igbo (and now no longer the Christians) were at war with the Hausa-Fulani. At the initial stage of the crisis, the Kanawa did not kill any Muslim Yoruba caught. Such a person was simply asked to recite some portions of the Koran, if he was successful he was allowed to go. But if he failed, he was killed. Later on, the rumour spread to the Kanawa that the Yoruba were ‘assisting’ the Igbo to kill northern Muslims. The Yoruba were then hunted by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims.56 The Igbo and Yoruba then formed militia groups and hit-squads around the outer ring of the Sabon Gari settlement to defend it against the Hausa-Fulani attackers. So intense was the loss of lives and property in Kano during the riot that President Ibrahim Babangida, attending the Commonwealth Summit at Harare in Zimbabwe, had to return home.57 The crisis had abated by the 15th of October, but throughout the week most of the shops, banks and markets in the city remained closed. At the end of the crisis, more than 500 people Were recorded as dead; many shops, largely owned by the Igbo, along Galadima Street, Court Road, etc., were destroyed; about 300 vehicles, 400 motor cycles and many bicycles were burnt at different spots in the city.58

29Many southern Nigerians in Kano had to leave the city at the end of the 1991 riot. Most of those who remained behind only did so to ensure the smooth transfer of their businesses to their respective places of origin. Reacting to the immediate and remote problems that were likely to follow the inter-group conflict, a political analyst in Kano, Ali Abdullah, who was a close associate of late Mallam Aminu Kano noted that:

  • 59  Quoted in African Concord (25 Nov. 1991), p. 22.

... unless we take serious care we (Hausa) are isolating ourselves from other Nigerians, if such brutal and criminal activities continue, we shall reach a stage of the ‘Hausa vs. Nigeria’.59

30Another writer also noted that:

  • 60  Lewis Obi, The Kano Massacres, African Concord (25 Nov. 1991), p. 54.

The massacres as occurred in Kano, as had occurred in a dozen or so cities in the Northern parts of Nigeria will-continue until Nigeria defines itself. Right now, what we have is a broad description of intent to be one country. Even this intent is expressed so grudgingly and so riddled with conditionalities as to render the idea of one nation laughable.60

Conclusion

31An effort has been made in this paper to discuss the acrimonious nature of relationships between the Igbo immigrants in Kano and the Kanawa. The conflicts were largely caused by socio-cultural, religious and economic differences. The predicament of the Igbo immigrants is a graphic illustration of one of the nation questions in Nigeria: To what extent can a Nigerian move to any part of the country and have his basic social, economic and political rights adequately protected and respected? Until the broad national questions in the country are realistically addressed at the appropriate level, the relationship between southern Nigerians in Kano and their host population may continue to worsen.

32The escapist attitude of the government towards addressing important national problems in Nigeria does not help matters. Each time a civil disorder takes place in the North, the bureaucrats always create the impression that the problems were not what people thought them to be. While the Bauchi riots of 1991, like that in Kafanchan in 1987 were simply dismissed by President Babangida as the civilian equivalent of a coup d’état, the 1991 riot in Kano was dismissed by the Chief of Defence Staff, General Sani Abacha, as a non-issue. He noted that: ‘There is nothing religious about it. The situation was exploited by irresponsible elements to loot other people’s property and satisfy their selfish ends’.

33Ethnic and religious conflicts are part of the urban problem in Nigeria. Concrete solutions must be found for them, otherwise urban dwellers, whether indigenous or strangers will learn to take the law into their own hands. More studies should be undertaken to determine the nature of these conflicts; and the government should, rather than dismiss the problem, take necessary action to ameliorate the causes and effects of the conflicts.

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Adepoju, A. Migration surveys in Nigeria: An overview. Journal of Population Association of Nigeria (yo\. l, no.l, 1983).

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Notes

1  Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a way of life. American Journal of Sociology (vol. 44, July 1938) p. l.

2  For the origins of the Sabon Gari system in Kano see I. O. Albert, Urban migrant settlements in Nigeria: A historical comparison of the Sabon Garis in Kano and Ibadan, 1893-1991. Ph. D Thesis, Ibadan, 1993, Chap. 3.

3  The word ‘Kanawa’ denotes Kano indigenes who are Hausa-Fulani.

4  For example, see A. Adepoju, Migration surveys in Nigeria: An overview. Journal of Population Association of Nigeria (vol. 1, no. 1, 1983); T. T. O. Fadayomi, Rural out-migration in Nigeria: Its determinants and policy implications. Journal of Rural Economics and Development (vol. 12, no.2, 1979); P. O. Olusanya. . Socio-Economic Aspects of Rural-Urban Migration in IPest Africa. Ibadan: NISER, 1969

5  J. Da Vanzo, Microeconomic approaches to studying migration decisions. In: Gordon F. de Jong and Robert W. Gardner (eds). Migration Decision Making. New York: Pergamon Press. 1981. pp. 90-129.

6  O. Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978.

7  Samir Amin, Introduction. In: Samir Amin (ed.), Modern Migrations in Western Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 115-116.

8  Robin Hallett, Africa Since 1875: A Modern History. London: Heinemann, 1975, pp. 414, 725.

9  B. W. Hodder and U.l. Ukwu, Markets in West Africa. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1969, p. l 16.

10  I. Nzimiro, A study of mobility among the Ibos of southern Nigeria, International Journal of Comparative Sociology (vol. 6, no. 1, March 1965), pp. 53-54.

11  See A. E. Afigbo, Economic foundations of colonial Igbo society. In: I. A. Akinjogbin and S. O. Osoba (eds.). Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1980 pp.1-18; B. W. Hodder and U. I. Ukwu, 117; G. I. Jones, Ecology and social structure among the North Eastern Ibo, Africa (vol. 3, 1961), pp. 117-134.

12  Hodder and Ukwu, p. 117.

13  Ibid., 132-139; Afigbo, 12; Simon Ottenberg, Ibo oracles and intergroup relations. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology (vol: 14, 1958), pp. 295-307.

14  lbid., 144-145; Simon Ottenberg, The development of local government in a Nigerian township. Anthrupdlogia N. S. (vol. 4, no. 1, 1962), pp. 127-128.

15  T. N. Tamuno, Genesis of the Nigerian Railway – II, Nigeria Magazine (no. 84, March 1965), pp.40-41; S. O. Onakomaiya, Overland transport. In: J. S. Oguntoyinbo O. O. Areola and M. Filani (eds.) A Geography of Nigerian Development, 2nd ed., Ibadan: Heihemann, 1978, p. 350.

16  Tamuno, 39.

17  John Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, pp. 314-315.

18  National Archives Kaduna (NAK), Kano Prof. 5/1 4292, Report on Native Reservations. R. L. B. Maiden, (August 1939), p. 18.

19  John Paden, 315.

20  O. Nnoli, 69-70.

21  William Shack, Introduction, In: William A. Shack and Elliot P. Skinner (ed.) Strangers in African Societies. University of California Press, 1979, p. 6.

22  For example see Alan Frishman, The impact of Islam on the urban structure and economy of Kano, Nigeria. Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (vol. 7, no. 2, July 1986), pp. 464-475.

23  John Paden, 315.

24  See C. Brown, Introduction, In: C. Brown (ed.) From Medina to Metropolis. Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1973; R. B. Serjeant (ed.) The Islamic City. Paris: UNESCO, 1980.

25  Abdullahi Smith, The early states of the Western Sudan to 1500. In: J. F. Ade Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds.) History of West Africa, Vol. 1, second edition. London: Longman, 1976, p. 183.

26  0. Nnoli, p. 1,32. This issue was also alluded to by U. G. Damachi, Nigerian Modernization. New York. 1972, p. 12.

27  I. Nzimiro, A study of mobility among the Ibo of Southern Nigeria, In: Ralph V\dA\ng{on (cdi.), Kinship and Geographical Mobility. Leiden. Netherlands, 1965, p. 119.

28  B. A. W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty-year Development Plan. 1963-1983, Glasglow, Greater Kano Planning Authority, 1966, p. 38.

29  G. T. Basden, Among the I bos of Nigeria. Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1982, p. 303- 305.

30  Ibid., 304; The history of Islam in Yorubaland, however, contradicts ‘Basden’s observations. Islam was more popular among the Yoruba because of its tolerance of polygamy. See T. G. O. Gbadamosi, The Growth of Islam Among the Yoruba 1841-1908. London: Longman, 1978.

31  The ‘People of the Book’ refers to the Bible, ie, those who practice Christianity and Judaism. To these people, the Koran recommends a measure of contract relationship. See Yusuf Ali, The Holy Quran: Translation and Commentary, Chap. 6, Vs. 6.

32  NAK, Kano Prof. 5/1, 5908. Tribal Population Statistics. Communication between Wakilin Kano and Kano N. A. (161h October, 1953), p. 4; John Paden, 314.

33  Personal communication with Chief Benneth A. Anyanetu, Secretary, Ibo Community Association, Kano, August 5, 1992.

34  Paden, 316.

35  Ibid., 379.

36  Before the Richards’ Constitution came into effect in 1947, northern and southern Nigeria were governed under different political instruments. While the southerners had become politically sophisticated through their participation in the National Legislative Assembly and practice of Western democracy, the North was governed largely under the indirect rule system which was adequately manipulated to suit the feudalist interests of the emirs. See O. Udme. The establishment of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria. Tarikh (vol. 3, no. 3, 1970). p. 1-15.

37  Tor details on the failure of Western education in Northern Nigeria see S. F. Graham, Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria 1900-1919. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. 1966.

38  For detailed information on these political parties. See R. L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties. NeW Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963.

39  Federal Government of Nigeria, House of Representatives. Official Report of Debates, March 31, 1953, p. 985.

40  Northern Regional Government, Report on the Kano Disturbance 16lh, 17"’, 18’h and 19th May, 1953 Lagos: Government Printers, 1953, p. 21.

41  NAK, Kano Prof. 4/1, 55801, Kano Riots 1953: compensation 1953-56, Petition to the D. O., Kano by Deputy, President and Hon. Secretary. Awo-Omamma Progressive Union of Nigeria (APUNA) (Jos, 2 Nov. 1953), p. 20

42  NAK, Kano Prof 4/1, 55801, pp. 35-37.

43  Ibid. Extract from the conclusion of the Executive Council of the Northern Region, Report on Kano Disturbance, (23rd June, 1953), p. 3.

44  NAK, Kano Prof 4/1, 55801, Petition to the D. O. p. 20.

45  Paden, p. 325.

46  Paden, 317-319.

47  For details see B. J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1963, pp. 101-109.

48  This has been denied by the only surviving participant in the coup. For the basic motives of the coup initiators, see Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck: The story of the first Nigerian coup. Ibadan: Evans Brothers, 1981.

49  Paden, 33-3.

50  For more details on this read B. J. Dudley, 130-139.

51  Robin Hallett, op. cit; Dudley, 69-170.

52  Paden, 356.

53  Communication with Chief Benneth Anyanetu.

54  Daily Champion, (23 October 1991), p. 18.

55  Newswatch (28 Oct. 1991) p. 15; Daily Champion, Ibid.

56  To write this aspect of the paper, many people were informally interviewed at Sabon Gari, Sarkin Yaki and Fagge.

57  Newswatch (28 Oct. 1991), p. 15.

58  Ibid, 15-16.

59  Quoted in African Concord (25 Nov. 1991), p. 22.

60  Lewis Obi, The Kano Massacres, African Concord (25 Nov. 1991), p. 54.

© IFRA-Nigeria, 1993

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