Introduction

1The north-east of Nigeria has been devastated by Boko Haram violence since July 2009, leading to thousands of lives and limbs lost, economic desolation, and a humanitarian disaster. However, the south-east of Niger, adjoining Nigeria’s Borno State, remained largely unscathed until early 2015. The peoples of Nigeria and Niger share common historical, sociological, geographical, economic, and linguistic features, but yet there are differences. Both Borno in Nigeria and Diffa in Niger are poverty stricken, politically marginal, largely ungoverned, and excluded from national power; however, these discontents have not been either channelled politically or exploited by Boko Haram. This is because Boko Haram has consistently denigrated and opposed the extant state system as un-Islamic and therefore a legitimate target for its attacks. There are differences in the influence and reach of Boko Haram in the two countries, with Nigeria being the epicentre and battleground, while Niger – as well as Nigeria’s near neighbours Chad and Cameroon – was gradually sucked into the conflict. This study looks at Boko Haram activities and their management by the state authorities in both countries. How similar or dissimilar were the responses? And how have these responses worked for each country? These are some of the major concerns we intend to address in this chapter.

2Our study is based on a fieldwork carried out over 12 months in the Nigerian state of Borno and its Nigérien counterpart, the adjoining prefecture of Diffa, both in the heartland of historical Borno. In both places a number of informants were interviewed, including government officials, security agents, religious leaders, politicians, civil society activists, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The interviews took place at different times due to changing levels of insecurity in the affected areas. Desk research was conducted to review extant work before embarking on fieldwork. Several informants spoke on condition of anonymity, for security reasons. Finally, the findings were analysed using a comparative study approach to the two regions.

Map 8. Geographical distribution of Kyari’s fieldworks

3The main finding of the research is that the Boko Haram insurgency in the Diffa Region of Niger and in the far north region of Cameroon were a direct extension of the fighting in Borno State of Nigeria. However, Niger still remains relatively less affected than Cameroon to the south. All Boko Haram activities in Diffa were organized and directed from the Nigerian side even though some Nigériens became foot soldiers in the movement. The increasingly recurring raids on Diffa and Bosso were all organized and coordinated from across the border in Nigeria, with Nigérien and Nigerian insurgents taking part. The state’s response to and management of the insurgency in the two countries are similar, including declaration of a state of emergency, forced displacements, excessive force, human rights abuses, and various draconian measures – for example, bans on the use of motorcycles and on the fish and pepper trade. These restrictions in both countries had deleterious consequences for the inhabitants and the displaced.

4We begin by outlining the similarities between the Borno and Diffa regions, indicating their strong historical links and economic ties. The evolution of Boko Haram and the movement’s deliberate attempts to preach and recruit in border areas are highlighted, as well as the similarities in the management of the insurgency in the two countries.

Background

5Nigeria and Niger share a very long and porous border, stretching from Say in the west to Baruwa in the east. Ethnic and religious groups along the border areas share the same history, sociology, ecology, environment, culture, and worldview. The Sokoto Caliphate and Kanem-Borno, the two major state systems astride what later became Nigeria and Niger, had influenced developments in this region before the colonial onslaught especially in the closing years of the 19^th century (Mohammed 1995). This intricate relationship along the border has impacted communities on both sides of the border, with implications for the politics, economy, society, and security of the two neighbouring states. What is today known as Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah li’l Da’wa wa’l Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) – popularly referred to as Boko Haram (roughly translated as ‘Western education is forbidden’) – evolved out of a tiny band of religious zealots influenced by takfiri ideology¹, who took up arms against the Nigerian state in 2003/2004 at Kanamma on the Nigeria-Niger border. Kanamma, though on Nigerian soil, is only a few kilometres away from the border with the Diffa prefecture of Niger. The choice of Kanamma, a rural border community, is significant to the development of the military strategy, tactics, and recruitment of this group. After they were dislodged from Kanamma by the Nigerian military, the insurgents took refuge in the Mandara mountains on the Nigeria-Cameroon border, before they were eventually flushed out. Thus, the choice of rural and often difficult border communities was deliberate and strategic to this evolving movement (Mohammed 2014: 12). Boko Haram chose its operational bases deliberately with a keen eye for battles, cross-border proselytization, recruitment, supplies, expansion, and retreat when necessary. Kanamma was chosen for its remoteness and defensibility. Other border communities, such as Gwoza, Bama, Banki, Gamboru Ngala, and Damasak, were all chosen for similar reasons. Gwoza is mountainous and remote on the Cameroon border; Banki and Gamboru Ngala are remote and stand astride the Nigeria-Cameroon and Niger-Cameroon-Chad borders. The long stretch of ungoverned spaces along the course of the Yobe River, stretching from Damasak through Abadam to Mallam Fatori on Lake Chad, has recently gained the attention of Boko Haram. This area, which had hitherto been relatively insulated from Boko Haram activities, has now become a hotbed of conflict and an operational base of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). This is as a result of the splintering of Boko Haram as a faction under Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who challenged the leadership of Abubakar Shekau and has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq since 2016.

6Nigeria and Niger are culturally, historically, geographically, and economically inextricably interwoven, such that developments in one country reverberate in the other. The basic characteristic of border communities in the north of Nigeria and the south of Niger is the glaring absence of development and the presence of grinding poverty and mass misery. The question as to why border communities are neglected in national planning has been posed several times over the decades at important local and international fora (Asiwaju 1993; Asiwaju & Barkindo 1993). The border separating the two countries is a colonial one, arising from the contest for supremacy between the British and French in the race for Lake Chad in the closing years of the 19^th century. This artificial border, which split the same ethnic and religious groups in the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno, created an anomalous situation by dividing the population into separate national states, while the communities carried on business as usual in their new nation-states. These boundaries were the result of numerous treaties, mostly signed first between 1890 and 1892 and then between 1904 and 1906, between the two colonial powers without any input from the colonized. In the Borno axis, the subject of this study, the new boundary split Borno between Britain and France along the northern and southern banks of the Komadugu Yobe, with all areas to the north passing into French hands (Inuwa 1993: 60).

The Kanuri factor

7The Kanuri are the largest ethnic group in Borno, comprising the Borno and Yobe states of Nigeria as well as the Diffa Region of Niger; however, they are minorities in both countries. The influence of the Kanuri group is not its size or political significance but the historical grandeur and sense of achievement that went with membership of the Kanem-Borno empire, which covered a large part of the central Bilad al-Sudan. The Nigeria-Niger boundary separated a ‘people with a common history, culture and tradition’ (Tijani 1993: 76). Tijani asserts that this boundary ‘not only divided up a people; it smashed up a cultural and political nexus which until hitherto was the most potent force that had cemented together the people of the entire sub region’ (1993: 76). Thus, the Kanem-Borno empire, even though balkanized, ‘continued to survive in the collective experience and psyche of its erstwhile citizens’ (Tijani 1993: 77). This sense of brotherhood, the existence of trans-border families and unrestricted commercial exchange, as well as sociological and geographic factors, ensured the survival of Borno-ness in both countries. This was particularly pronounced in Niger, as the Kanuri are truly a minority, accounting for only 500,000 of the country’s 12,500,000 population (Idrissa 2014: 6).

8The precolonial Kanem-Borno empire was based on a cultural foundation of Islamic principles, unlike its successors colonial and post-colonial states based on Euro-American secularism. Thus, the new state had a baggage of legitimation in the eyes of the inhabitants, particularly in border communities where the impact is greatest (Tijani 1993: 77). As a consequence, the Nigeria-Niger border is a meaningless construct in the day-to-day lives of the people, where it is mostly observed in the breach. In several communities, families are bisected across the borders or farmlands are in the other country. The historical town of Abadam is a good example: there is one each on either side of the border.

The rise of Boko Haram to 2

9Boko Haram began as a small, Nigeria-focused Salafi group on the Nigeria-Niger border at Kanamma in Yunusari LGA of Yobe State in December 2003. At this stage of their development they were known as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ and were led by Muhammad Ali, a Nigerian resident of Saudi Arabia who was radicalized abroad. Muhammad Ali was the one who converted Mohammed Yusuf to this new radical version of Islam. Their choice of isolated and rural Kanamma on the Niger border is remarkable for its strategic importance. Kanamma was chosen for its remoteness from the bases of power, whether in Abuja, Damaturu, or Maiduguri, far from the prying eyes of security and away from urban distractions. Kanamma was also easily defensible, as it was forested and located between two bodies of water. Its closeness to Niger, just 3 km from the border, may also have been a factor in the choice of site.

10The so-called Nigerian Taliban wreaked havoc on surrounding communities between December 2003 and January 2004, around Geidam, Yunusari, Yusufari, and Damaturu, and took refuge in the Mandara mountains at Gwoza. For most of 2004 they were in the Gwoza, Kala-Balge area on the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Therefore, the choice of remote, difficult, and inaccessible terrain along borders has been a deliberate policy of this group from its inception. They deliberately targeted border communities such as Kanamma, Damasak, Abadam, and Mallam Fatori on the Niger border, as well as Bama, Banki, Gamboru, Ngala, and Kala-Balge on the Cameroon and Chad corridor. These areas turned out to be the centres of Boko Haram’s post-2009 strength. Even though these border regions were used for recruitment, there was not much cross-border insurgent activity at this early stage. The remoteness from authority, the need to carry on activities undetected and unmolested, and the need for safe rear bases may have been the overriding concerns. However, trans-border recruitment did take place.

11The survivors of Kanamma joined Mohammed Yusuf, who had returned from self-exile in Saudi Arabia in 2005, to form the nucleus of Boko Haram as we know it today. Muhammad Ali had died of wounds sustained at Yajiwa in January or February 2004. Thus, when the Boko Haram crisis erupted in July 2009, its adherents came from all cities across northern Nigeria and some came from Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Kaka Bunu, the alleged leader of Boko Haram in Diffa, now in detention in Niamey, is believed to have fought in Maiduguri. He was arrested, interrogated, and released for lack of evidence by the Nigérien authorities. He was re-arrested following Boko Haram attacks on Bosso and Diffa in February 2015 (interview, BKH, Diffa, 6 November 2015).

12The presence of Boko Haram on the Borno and Yobe frontier with Niger dates back to the Kanamma uprising of December 2003. As Boko Haram had not yet made Niger an objective nor declared it an enemy, the country remained relatively immune to the devastating war on the Nigerian side. This may be related to the fact that most of the fighting was still concentrated in central and southern Borno, far from the border with Niger. However, Boko Haram’s presence in Niger was known to the security agencies of both countries. Muhammad Yusuf had repeatedly preached at Mustafa Jon’s house in the border town of Damasak prior to 2009 (interview, Mustafa Shettima, Sayam, Niger, 6 November 2015). Mustafa Jon and Abubakar Kilakam² were both deported to Niger by Nigerian authorities in late 2008 and in early 2009. The porosity of the border and kin relations across boundaries made deportations of religious scholars by secular authorities look like persecution. These people were deported, but they were not ostracized by either host or receiving communities, even if the latter did not agree with their doctrines and practices. Besides, at this time Boko Haram had not yet committed to violence nor antagonized the local populace.

13It is generally believed that Boko Haram presence was minimal on the Niger side prior to 2009. In fact, Boko Haram adherents were limited even in Nigeria before their forced dislodgement from urban Maiduguri in June 2013. The dispersal to rural areas created new problems for management of the insurgency. The insurgents turned on local populations, a group they had not targeted before then, for their lack of support or for their complicity with the Nigerian state. The dispersal led to massive recruitment in the outlying areas such as Bama, Banki, Gwoza, Damboa, New Marte, Kirenowa, and Gamboru Ngala. Early military successes against the insurgents in 2014 – which led to the routing of Boko Haram camps at Kirenowa, New Marte, Nguro-Soye, and the edge of the Sambisa National Park to the south – had the effect of pushing the insurgents further north towards the shores of Lake Chad. Thus, settlements such as Baga, Abadam, Mallam Fatori, and Damasak further north and beyond military purview became new theatres of Boko Haram recruitment. The Buduma (also known as Yedina), another ethnic group found in all countries sharing Lake Chad and never completely Islamized, became a new reservoir of recruitment into Boko Haram. They joined in large numbers mostly out of ignorance but perhaps also on account of economic and political reasons. Membership of Boko Haram conferred power and certain privileges, such as access to women, authority over others, and power to extract resources, including booty. These are significant factors for a hitherto powerless group such as the Buduma.

14On the Niger side, recruitment remained low-key, but the porosity of the border and the heavy admixture of peoples along the shores of Lake Chad made recruitment relatively easy when it commenced. There is no clearly discernible pattern in Boko Haram membership in Niger as there is in Nigeria. While there are estimates that the majority of Boko Haram in Nigeria, at least at leadership level, are of Kanuri extraction, the situation in Niger is slightly different, with a high proportion of the Buduma joining much later. However, the leadership seemed to be Kanuri even in Niger. Kaka Bunu, believed to be the amir in Diffa, is a local trader and sachet water producer, who was said to have taken part in the Maiduguri uprising in 2009. Alhaji Shettima Zainammi, a Kanuri native of Febulwa in Bosso, was believed to have led the Friday prayers when Boko Haram took over Mallam Fatori in November 2014. He was so influential as to be able to rescue his daughter from Boko Haram captivity. Ali Gana Nguldi, a Buduma language newscaster working for Radio Niger, is also in Nigérien detention for money laundering for, and membership of, Boko Haram. He is, as his name implies, Buduma. Aminu Dan Mallam, a local pick-up driver and transporter who had unrestricted access to Boko Haram-controlled territory across the border in Nigeria may be Hausa. Again, as in Nigeria, the leadership is predominantly Kanuri but the followership is mixed with a high preponderance of local inhabitants. As one moves progressively from west to east towards the lake, the ethnic composition of Boko Haram members changes from Manga to Mobbar to Buduma and Fulani, all of them speaking the Kanuri language.

15Our interviewees in Maine Soroa and Diffa mention Tam to the north of Geidam, Ba’ara, Diffa Kura, Bulonguri, Assaga, and Kanguri as settlements where Boko Haram has engaged in substantial recruitment on the Niger side. Tam was notorious for its unorthodox practices and anti-Western education preachers akin to Boko Haram as early as 2008. Their activities were reported to Nigérien authorities, but freedom of religion was cited as a reason for no action being taken. Kilakam in Goudoumaria was another centre of Boko Haram activity (interview, KGK, Maine Soroa, 4 November 2015). Most of these recruits were fighting on the Nigerian side between Damasak and Mallam Fatori (interview, BKH, Diffa, 6 November 2015; KGK, Maine Soroa, 4 November 2015). The Jetko, a tiny ethnic group, for some inexplicable reason did not join Boko Haram. Typical of Boko Haram, the Diffa attack on 6 and 7 February 2015 was led by Adam, a Diffa native, who had not only joined the insurgents in Damasak but had risen to some standing within the movement. He was said to have evacuated his mother out of Diffa shortly before the attack. The Boko Haram takeover of Damasak in November 2014 made it a safe haven as well as an operational base for cross-border attacks into Niger, as shown by the attack on Diffa.

Niger’s response to and management of Boko Haram

16Nigeria’s neighbours Niger, Chad, and Cameroon perceived and treated Boko Haram as a Nigerian problem. They were content to keep the insurgency at arm’s length as long it remained within the boundaries of Nigeria. However, their dependence on Nigerian markets for the supply of food and commodities brought to the fore the futility of their neutrality. By 2014 Boko Haram had transformed from a local Nigerian problem to a regional menace, threatening the peace of all neighbouring countries. There were sporadic attacks across the border into Niger from Abadam LGA to the south of Bosso in the second half of 2014, but the coordinated attacks on Bosso and Diffa on 5 and 6 February 2015 were the real wake-up call. Not unexpectedly, Niger reacted with a declaration of a state of emergency on 10 February 2015. Nigeria had early on declared an emergency in several LGAs and states in 2011 and 2013. The emergency laws merely empowered the military to curtail the rights of citizens, leading to serial human rights abuses in both countries.

17It is as yet unclear why Boko Haram attacked Bosso and Diffa. The attack on Bosso may have been to replenish their supply of arms and ammunition from the Nigérien military camped on the outskirts of the village; this is a strategy successfully used for procuring arms by the insurgents in Nigeria. Or it may have been to engage the Bosso cantonment and deter them from offering assistance to Diffa, which was attacked simultaneously. Or it may have been for both reasons. Diffa was attacked ostensibly to free some high-ranking Boko Haram captives held in the prison facility located in the township. The attackers successfully broke into the facility and killed the head of the prison, but they were unable to secure the release of their comrades. The attack on Diffa and the quick response with a state of emergency woke up the Nigérien government to the realization that Boko Haram had declared war on the state. At the time of writing, fighting is ongoing on both sides of the border around the banks of the Komadugu Yobe and the shores of Lake Chad, involving the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF comprises troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin Republic, under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Initially effective in halting Boko Haram on several fronts, the MNJTF was then beset by several problems, including funding constraints, national rivalries, and difficulties in coordination. These have affected its effectiveness in ending the conflict. In addition, Boko Haram’s attacks on south-eastern Niger, the extreme north of Cameroon, and N’Djaména (capital of Chad) have forced these countries to concentrate on their homeland security, to the detriment of the MNJTF.

18Niger, very much like Nigeria, securitized the Boko Haram insurgency. Nigeria’s response to the Boko Haram insurgency is fairly well known, but a brief recapitulation is not out of place (see Mohammed 2014). Since July 2009 the Nigerian state has fought the insurgents through the use of military force, and the declaration of a state of emergency at least twice, in 2012 and 2013. These measures led to documented human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, detention without trial, dragnet arrests, bulldozing and burning down of houses, arrests of wives and children of suspected Boko Haram members, etc. (see Amnesty International 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014; BELT 2012; Human Rights Watch 2012, 2013). The military operation against the insurgents has led to several successes as well as reverses. The successes led to the killing or capture of several leading commanders, overrunning of Boko Haram bases, and pushing the group out of urban areas of Maiduguri, Potiskum, Bama, etc. However, there were reverses when Nigerian military had to hastily retreat and cross the border into neighbouring countries, leading to desertion, demoralization, and court-marshalling of officers as well as of men. The Nigerian military became the butt of uncharitable comments by Nigérien military commanders and politicians insisting that their soldiers would not run away from battle, unlike the Nigerians (interview, DMM, Diffa, 3 November 2015). These comments had the effect of putting enormous pressure on the Nigérien military when it began to fight. So how did Niger manage the insurgency?

19The Nigérien authorities also securitized the insurgency and reacted in exactly the same way as their Nigerian counterparts. First they declared a state of emergency in the affected prefecture of Diffa, replacing the civilian governor with a military general, Abdou Kazah, in February 2015. The state of emergency came, not unexpectedly, with various draconian measures, including curtailing rights of movement, curtailing freedom of speech (hindering particularly the access of journalists to sites of conflict), banning the use of motorcycles as a means of transport, imposing curfew at night, banning the sale of petroleum products in plastic containers, banning the use of Nigerian-registered vehicles for public transportation, etc. Human rights abuses were widely carried out by the military and reported by Alternative Espaces Citoyen, leading to the arrest and detention of Moussa Tchangari, one of its leaders, for supposedly obstructing the fight against insurgency (Alternative, 2015; interview, Tchangari, Diffa, 3 November 2015).

20The most serious consequence of the state of emergency was the ban on the production and sale of fish and pepper, as well as on fishing and farming on the banks and courses of the Komadugu Yobe and Lake Chad in Diffa. This was followed by forced relocation of all inhabitants of the shores of Lake Chad in May 2015. Inhabitants of Kangarwa, Baruwa, Chukujani, Tuwo-Indi, Ali-Kurkuri, Chuwundi, Chari-Ngawuri, and several villages on the shores, islands, and islets of the lake were forced to evacuate further north and west. This forced eviction had the effect of dispossessing the displaced of their sources of livelihood, further impoverishing them and rendering them IDPs and refugees. Dr. Hadiza Kiari-Fougou argues that the fish trade is the single most important economic activity on Lake Chad for all its inhabitants, accounting for over 30 million lives (interview, Hadiza Kiari-Fougou, 4 November 2015). The ban on fish trade was a desperate measure, aimed at starving the insurgents of funds, as they were believed to have cornered the fish trade to fund their activities. In addition, it was generally believed that fish trucks passing in and out of Nigeria were used to launder money as well as smuggle arms and ammunition (interview, BKH, Diffa, 6 November 2015). While these allegations may appear plausible, none of them had been substantiated. The fish trade was transnational, a huge money-earner for traders and transporters, locals as well as foreigners, and a revenue earner for governments. According to Tchangari, the ban on fish trade has reduced the potency of the insurgency but visited heavy economic deprivations and hardship on the local populace (interview, Moussa Tchangari, Diffa, 2 November 2015). Hajja Falmata Mustafa, a 45-year-old female fish-merchant-turned-refugee, recounted how she was displaced from an island on the lake dubbed ‘Liberia’, in the process losing all her capital and life savings (interview, Hajja Falmata Mustafa, F., 45, Kablewa, 5 November 2015).

Photo 12. Kablewa refugee camp, Nguigmi, Diffa Region

Photo 13. Internal Displaced Persons’ tents in Kablewa Camp

21The fish and pepper trade were banned at the same time for the same reasons. Vegetable cultivation, a major occupation of the inhabitants on the courses of the Komadugu Yobe, was also banned, thus rendering large numbers of people destitute and jobless and further pauperizing an already poor population. The ban on pepper trade but not its cultivation has been lifted since August 2015. Security concerns had forced the military to prevent all activities along the river, such that all movements on the river were perceived as enemy movement. People were warned to keep away from the river or they would be shot on sight. The Komadugu Yobe flows right through Diffa and empties into Lake Chad after Bosso. It is also the boundary between Niger and Nigeria, and all adjoining settlements to the south of the river were still under Boko Haram control. Therefore, the military were wary of all movements on the river lest they would be surprise-attacked from that direction. The attackers of Diffa in February 2015 came from across the river. The ban on pepper trade was lifted primarily because, unlike the fish trade, this trade was local and not trans-border (interview, BKH, Diffa, 6 November 2015). Be that as it may, the trade ban has pauperized many farmers, deprived them of their sources of income, and taken a heavy toll on the local economy.

22Human rights abuses by security forces, excessive force, and repression arising from the imposition of a state of emergency have been referred to above. The Alternative Espaces Citoyen in its report entitled ‘État d’urgence dans la région de Diffa’ of April 2015 painted a grim picture of life in the emergency-affected areas and noted these widespread abuses (Diori 2015). The Alternative Espaces Citoyen report is akin to what Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch had done on the Nigerian side, documenting serial abuses by security agencies (see Amnesty International 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016; Human Rights Watch 2012, 2013). The aerial bombardment of a gathering of mourners in Nigérien Abadam by yet-to-be-identified aircraft, killing over 40 mourners, is an example of extrajudicial killing raised by Alternative Espaces Citoyen (Diori 2015).

23Diffa Region, our area of study, adjoins Borno to the east, the area worst hit by the Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram penetration of Niger has been relatively low and restricted to the easternmost shores of the Lake. The intensity of the conflict proportionally increases from west to east. The proximity to the Borno epicentre of the insurgency since 2009 may in part explain this. The areas of Boko Haram penetration and influence in all these countries – Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon, with the possible exception of Chad – are ungoverned spaces, with little or no government presence. The Diffa Region of Niger, the extreme north of Cameroon, and Borno and Yobe states of Nigeria are all too far from their respective central governments, creating a feeling of alienation from the national state, with weak regional and local governance structures. There are variations from one country to the other but the absence of governance cuts across all these states. Chad is a possible exception due to the proximity of the central government in N’Djaména to the area of insurgency operations, and this in part made it less prone to attacks. This sense of alienation, combined with ethnic and regional politics, has contributed, at least in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger, to creating a sense of exclusion. The perception of the insurgency as political – with ethnic, religious, or sectional undertones aimed at destabilizing a suspicious central government – has fed into the management, or lack thereof, of the insurgency in virtually all of these countries. Fortunately for Nigeria’s neighbours, the six years of conflict in Nigeria had prepared them for the eventuality.

24So why has the Diffa Region of Niger, in spite of its close resemblance and proximity to Borno, remained less affected and for so long? Diffa, and therefore the Republic of Niger, was relatively unaffected for the same reasons that the north-eastern fringes of Borno were relatively unscathed until mid-2012. This period coincided with the expulsion of Boko Haram from urban Maiduguri and their subsequent dispersion further north, following intensive military pressures in areas such as Marte, Kirenowa, and Bama. Remoteness from areas of military activity was the main reason. The fall of Baga in 2014 attracted more insurgents to the north, towards Abadam, Mallam Fatori, Arege, and other settlements on the shores of Lake Chad. Increased insurgent activities on the south banks of the Komadugu Yobe opposite Diffa exposed this part of Niger to higher risks. In addition, the Nigerian military’s concentrated efforts on Sambisa Forest to the south of Borno meant less attention was paid to this very rural and remote region in the so-called war against terror. The abduction of the Chibok girls in April 2014 and the general belief that they may have been hidden in this area aided this.

25A recent study by the Nigerian Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) describes Diffa as a ‘remote, sparsely populated, marginalized with no ethnic homogeneity, and marked by insecurity since the 1990s’ (ONSA 2015: 4). This statement can be applied to Borno, except for the ethnic plurality, which in any case is exaggerated, as most inhabitants of Diffa can get along using the Kanuri language even where they are not ethnically Kanuri, since the area is Kanuriphone. Other issues raised included the successful domestication of Islam and the entrenchment of secularism in Niger, unlike Nigeria where the concept is still being debated without a national consensus. This is in spite of the fact that Niger is 99% Muslim with less than 1% Christian population (ONSA 2015: 9). The ONSA study avers that while poverty levels are similar in Nigeria and Niger, national figures differ substantially. This is in part because ‘lower inequalities and higher levels of poverty, as in Niger, may not be as dangerous as the higher group and individual inequalities and relatively low levels of poverty, as in Nigeria’ (ONSA 2015: 6). Niger’s strong state, political centralization, and central control of regional governments, compared with Nigeria’s laissez faire and chaotic relationship between the state and society on the one hand, and lack of elite consensus in Nigeria as against Niger’s politics of consensus on the other – these factors in part explain Nigeria’s acrimonious religious politics. The study concludes that a more coherent state such as Niger has better capacity to regulate the religious space and contain discontent, unlike the situation in Nigeria (ONSA 2015: 3). However, these conclusions are tentative, as Boko Haram seems to be entrenching itself deeper in Diffa, thereby making the area increasingly insecure.

26In spite of Diffa’s proximity and close historical, geographical, and economic links to Borno, Boko Haram’s attempts quite early to proselytize and recruit in Diffa and its environs did not yield the anticipated results. The most important factors for radicalization in the Diffa area were the proximity to Boko Haram influences and activity and the continued access to Boko Haram tapes and sermons. Diffa is the nearest to the epicentre of Boko Haram influence just across the border from Damasak, and not far from Kanamma and Kilakam, both ideological centres of the sect. The suggestion that

political and economic factors are less important than ethnic and historical ones, especially because the latter create strong connections between Borno ideologues and the people of Manga, the Kanuri-speaking areas of the region of Diffa (ONSA 2015: 5)

27fails to answer the question: why Diffa? The Diffa Region is predominantly Mobbar and Kanuri, with a sprinkling of Fulbe and Tubu – all of whom speak Kanuri language. The Manga areas are further west, around Goure and Zinder.

Conclusion

28Boko Haram began as a local Nigerian group with distinctly local grievances but with aspirations to Islamic universalism, as expressed by violent jihadi groups such as the Taliban. It gradually expanded to become not only a security challenge to the Nigerian nation but a regional menace threatening all countries adjoining Lake Chad. In the course of the conflict, Nigeria’s near neighbours – Niger, Cameroon, and Chad – gradually became sucked into the Boko Haram maelstrom. Insecurity along the long and porous borders between these countries has been a recurring problem which has necessitated bilateral and multilateral action. The MNJTF, currently engaged in the counter-insurgency operations, is one such activity. The magnitude and intensity of the Boko Haram insurgency are unprecedented and require sustained regional action and coordination.

29Cross-border movements, trade, and cultural interaction have been aided by a common history, culture, tradition, and religious and ethnic affinity. This also aided Boko Haram’s recruitment and radicalization across borders, since they were not seen as foreigners in the real sense. Nigeria’s neighbours, which had earlier on maintained a seeming neutrality, had their relative peace and immunity broken once they became involved in the anti-terror fight as part of the MNJTF, effectively in 2014.

30Nigeria and Niger share the same characteristics and are exposed to the same risks on the Komadugu Yobe and Lake Chad axis of their borders. The response of state authorities in both Nigeria and Niger to the Boko Haram insurgency was similar in many respects. Both countries responded with coercion, and this remained the main instrument for dealing with the insurgency. There has been no attempt to apprehend the conflict in any non-military way. The use of force resulted in massive and documented human rights abuses and denial of livelihoods to residents of affected communities.

31Any sustainable resolution of the Boko Haram insurgency must involve all of Nigeria’s neighbours. This should involve not just military cooperation but also establishing sustainable and enduring peace and development based on justice. The reconstruction of the war-damaged areas of the Lake Chad Basin should be approached on a regional and multilateral rather than a country-specific basis. The future of inhabitants of the region and the health of Lake Chad itself are interlinked, as the lake remains their main source of livelihood. Therefore, recharging Lake Chad for fishing, agriculture, and animal husbandry should form a central part of any reconstruction process.