1The different phases of Boko Haram’s evolution¹ correspond to distinct stages in its ideological and military development,² but also to different motivating factors for joining as well as different recruitment techniques. The data collected by the researchers involved in the Trans-Islam project through the course of their fieldwork in Niger and Nigeria can shed light on these issues.

2Firstly, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos was able to meet with suspected members of Boko Haram who were detained in the high-security prisons of Kollo and Koutoukalé in Niger. He interviewed men who had joined the movement, whether on a voluntary basis or not, and who shared with him background information as well as their reasons for joining Boko Haram.³ Secondly, Kyari Mohammed met with victims of the conflict in IDP camps located in north-east Borno and in the south-east of the Diffa Region; they spoke about the pressure that the group exerted on people in the areas it controlled. Finally, thanks to the analysis of sermons and video messages analused by Élodie Apard and Abdoulaye Sounaye, the various arguments used by the group’s leaders and its detractors can be factored into our analysis of its attractiveness.

3The scale of the insurgency and the movement’s ability to mobilize combatants, either willingly or by force, have often been attributed to unemployment or poverty among the affected populations, or to the lack of education in northern Nigeria. Although street children – especially students of Quranic schools who are forced to panhandle – do seem like ideal recruits, this would be an extremely limited reading of the situation.⁴ Financial and material elements are often cited when analysing the spread of the conflict throughout the region and the recruitment of combatants outside of Nigeria. While economic motivations do play a significant role in Boko Haram’s ability to mobilize, these factors alone do not explain everything.

4Taking into account the different phases of the movement’s evolution makes it possible to discern differences in its construction, restructuring, and strengthening processes. Indeed, since its inception, the movement’s nature, methods, and objectives have continued to evolve. This type of analysis highlights the complex circumstances of a person’s recruitment as well as the diverse nature of the combatants’ profiles.

‘Peace of mind’

5One of the prisoners interviewed in Niger, who had joined the movement in 2006, said he had done so for ‘peace of mind’.⁵ While his choice of words may seem surprising today, it must be contextualized to be understood. In the early 2000s, implementation of Sharia law was extended to 12 states in northern Nigeria.⁶ This decision led to violence in some northern states, including in Kaduna State, which then escalated into Muslim-Christian riots. These were part of a long series of political clashes interpreted as inter-religious violence in Nigeria. For this prisoner, a multi-faith society is bound to be the site of conflict and violence, which could be avoided by separating religious communities. From his point of view, the solution lay in the creation of a self-governed, independent territorial entity made up of the Nigérien and Nigerian states: an exclusively Muslim space in which the lives of individuals would be governed by the law of God.

6This extended implementation of Sharia had been largely supported by the population of northern Nigeria, as people hoped for greater social justice – and for a more effective fight against corruption in particular. However, Sharia implementation proved to be a double failure. Firstly, it did not replace the secular legal system entirely, which means that it did not solve the problem of the coexistence, within the same political space, of secular and Islamic laws.⁷ Secondly, Sharia clearly did not solve problems of inequality, injustice, and corruption. Mohammed Yusuf’s political and religious project therefore attracted those who had been disappointed by this failed attempt to implement Sharia, as well as Muslims who believed that they would not be able to live and thrive in a state they considered to be unholy.

Mobilization (2005-2009)

7In a second phase, Mohammed Yusuf, founder of the movement, began actively proselytizing, using religious discourse in order to convince and mobilize people. His regular and frequent sermons – in Borno State, especially in Maiduguri, but also beyond – earned him a solid popularity. While his critics often decried his limited knowledge of Islam, he was a very charismatic public speaker. His sermons were always filmed and then shared on DVDs or as MP3 and MP4 files, which significantly helped with the spread of his message.⁸

8His sermons – usually delivered in Hausa, but also sometimes in Kanuri – were the main tool used in the dissemination of his ideology. In a region where Hausa was the predominant language, his word spread very easily, reaching beyond the Nigerian border. By the end of the 2000s, his sermons were very popular both in northern Nigeria and in Niger. One of the detainees interviewed in Koutoukalé explained: ‘I listened to his tapes. I listened to him a lot before I saw him in person’ – while another stated that it was ‘very difficult to find someone in northern Nigeria who has never listened to his sermons’.⁹

9Yusuf also wrote a book, a kind of theological essay that was largely inspired by other Salafist authors. It was, however, written in Arabic, which made it less accessible to the population, and was published only posthumously¹⁰, which limited its impact in the first phase of mobilization.

10His sermons focused primarily on the injustice which Muslims suffered both at the local and the international level. He would often mention inter-community massacres in Nigeria (in Kaduna in 2000, Onitsha in 2006), torture in Abu Ghraib, but also the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to illustrate his point¹¹. His goal was to use the crowd’s feeling of injustice to provoke anger and fuel a desire for revenge. Yusuf also developed a discourse that justified the use of violence against state officials, as he held the state responsible for the violence and injustices suffered by Muslims¹². His vitriolic anti-state positions were widely popular among a segment of the population with no access to basic services, for whom the state was represented only by an extremely rich and corrupt elite or, in rural areas, by the police.

11Yusuf therefore promoted a certain social justice and proposed a community project that would provide a protective structure for its members. The community that started growing around him was known as the Yusufiyya (Yusuf’s congregation), and many faithful moved into his markaz.¹³ It started as a simple mosque connected to his house, which then grew into a teaching centre and a living space where about a hundred people stayed on a permanent basis.¹⁴ According to one of the detainees met in Niger, the movement represented ‘the love of Islam and Muslims’, and Yusuf’s popularity at that time could be explained by the fact that ‘he (was) telling the truth’.¹⁵

12As his sermons intensified, tensions with the Borno State government as well as with the federal government increased. His followers, gathered in his markaz, began to physically oppose the police, who placed the neighbourhood under surveillance.

2009: The point of no return

13The crackdown that took place in Maiduguri in 2009 is a pivotal moment which is key to a proper understanding of the movement’s evolution. A series of acts of violence between members of the Yusufiyya and security forces led to a massive military crackdown in the town of Maiduguri, which resulted in hundreds of extrajudicial killings, including that of Yusuf. Having been arrested and interrogated at the police station, he was about to be transferred when he was intercepted – by members of the Mobile Police, presumably – and killed on the street¹⁶. Images of his dead body were widely shared on the Internet. His comments about injustices and police brutality suddenly took on a new dimension, turning him into a martyr.

14While it was meant to crush the movement, the crackdown proved counterproductive and ended up reinforcing it instead. Members of the movement subsequently went into hiding and kept a low profile. For about a year, they recruited in secret, especially people who had been the victims of the bloody July 2009 crackdown. They had seen in it the kind of threats that the state, which was supposed to protect them, represented for them. More than ever before, Yusuf’s supporters were then ready to fight the state.

Militarization of the movement

15In 2010, Abubakar Shekau – chosen by Yusuf to be his right-hand man just before he died – became the leader of the movement, which he named Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah li’l Da’wa wa’l Jihad (Sunni Group for the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). The movement then started getting constantly involved in armed confrontations with the state and its representatives, attacking Christian communities and assassinating its Muslim opponents. Resentment was still the main instrument used for recruitment, as well as a certain desire for revenge. In his filmed speeches, Shekau uses Yusuf’s rhetoric and brings up injustice, the need for revolt, and the legitimization of violence.¹⁷

16The group acquired weapons, particularly through targeted operations on barracks, police stations, and weapons depots. The number of attacks increased sharply, while targets changed and now included prisons. While these attacks were carried out in order to free incarcerated members of the group, they often resulted in massive releases. This proved an effective recruitment method; once released, ordinary prisoners were at risk of being arrested again if they returned home, so they joined the movement.¹⁸

17While the group reorganized and militarized, there were also organized and progressive recruitment processes similar to those of other criminal organizations: children who would monitor individuals, report information, transport small arms from one place to another, then carry out targeted executions, etc. – a series of small, recompensed tasks, gradually increasing in importance, which allowed recruits to earn a little money, but also to climb up the group’s hierarchy, gain some confidence, obtain a certain status and, ultimately, join the movement.¹⁹

18During this phase of rise in power and militarization, the Nigerian federal state responded exclusively through military action. However, as it lacked resources, the government decided to rely on the population and, in 2013, created civilian militias that would join the fight against Boko Haram. The Civilian JTF (Joint Task Force), made up of under-trained and under-armed young people, nevertheless proved to be effective, especially in the city of Maiduguri, which they were able to secure. But this system had a perverse effect in rural areas, where it created division. On the one hand, villages that supported the Civilian JTF or gave them new members were burned, razed, and their inhabitants massacred by Boko Haram. On the other hand, villages that did not provide members to militias or refused their presence were accused of supporting Boko Haram and were also burned, razed, and their inhabitants massacred, but by the army or the Civilian JTF themselves. Caught in a bind, the people sometimes had no other option than to join the movement as an act of survival: they would leave the village and join Boko Haram in order not to be killed, or to save their families.

19Another form of forced recruitment was the abduction of young people (girls and boys alike). This phenomenon, which received a great deal of attention with the kidnapping of the Chibok girls, actually began much earlier and then continued. Indeed, the group started making repeated use of this method in 2013. Gradually, by creating a climate of terror, the movement lost the popular support it had previously enjoyed and turned more and more to kidnappings as a method of forced recruitment.

Regionalization of the conflict

20In this fifth phase, new recruitment methods were developed. Economic factors played a more important role, and material and financial aspects emerged, which included Chinese motorcycles as well as the salaries offered to combatants in areas where Boko Haram had expanded its activities: south-east Niger and northern Cameroon.²⁰ It should be noted that motorcycles are not an anecdotal element, as they constitute the main means of travel in these regions, where roads are almost non-existent; they are also a means of transporting goods and are therefore used for trade.

21While the conflict was spreading to the peripheral areas of neighbouring countries, local crime was also being assimilated by the movement. The situation allowed small bandits or road robbers to operate within a new framework, one that could boost their influence and would sometimes offer also logistical support. Through opportunistic recruitments, the movement considerably strengthened its presence and power in these regions.²¹

22There were also non-criminal opportunistic recruitments. This was the case, in particular, for workers whose sector was in crisis and who were then able to find new professional opportunities in a devastated economic context. One of the prisoners interviewed was a mechanic who specialized in motorcycle repairs and who had lost his job when the Nigérien authorities banned the use of two-wheelers in the city of Diffa, owing to motorcycle attacks by Boko Haram. Approached by an intermediary, he was offered work with the group members to repair their equipment; he thus joined as a motorcycle mechanic.²²

23The governments of countries affected by the crisis unfortunately adopted coercive measures that played a role in worsening people’s livelihoods, which sometimes helped the group’s recruitment efforts. For example, when the Nigérien authorities banned the sale of fish and peppers – the two main economic activities in the Diffa Region – many households were deprived of their source of income. Similarly, the massive village evictions in the Lake Chad Basin plunged hundreds of villagers into a situation that was so dire that joining Boko Haram seemed to be one of the only ways to survive.²³

24Finally, other motivating factors should also be taken into account: the desire to avenge the death of a loved one, being able to marry, the possibility of settling a personal or family dispute with weapons.

25While all these elements contribute to a considerably richer analysis, they also reveal that no generalization can be made, that these phenomena can be read in a variety of ways, and that no sociological elements shared by all combatants can be identified.²⁴ Recruitment into Boko Haram – whether it is the result of ideological convictions, a response to state actions, a desire for revenge, a lack of option, or a threat – seems to be motivated by individual stories and life circumstances.²⁵ This multiplicity of situations, as well as the variety of methods used by the group to attract or coerce, make most responses inaccurate. ‘De-radicalization’ programmes, based on the assumption that the group uses religious indoctrination to recruit, have proved to be extremely difficult to define and implement.