4
‘Rapping Islam’: The Nigérien music scene and the challenges of religious reformism
p. 95-116
Texte intégral
1In Niger, since the democratic opening of the 1990s and the subsequent religious liberalism, the set of codes and rules defined by the Izala movement has competed with existing normative systems, which had until then been largely dominated by Sufi doctrines. Today, after thirty years of ideological opposition – sometimes violent – the Izala discourse has fully integrated into the Nigérien Islamic landscape, significantly changing the way people think and live Islam, thus normalizing the process of ‘re-Islamization’ in Niger.1
2The effects of the renewal of religious norms can be observed in everyday life – for example, through the transformation of liturgical practices. But they can also be measured through the analysis of cultural developments, and in particular at the level of artistic production. Among the creative spaces in which the impact of the Izala discourse is felt, ‘modern’ music is undoubtedly a domain that clearly reveals the dichotomy between what the Izala ideology defines as ‘hallal’ and ‘haram’, between what is considered acceptable and unacceptable. Over the past two decades, the Nigérien music scene has indeed been the theatre of opposition between artists and preachers, who have said they were acting, some for the promotion of Nigérien culture, others for the defence of the moral order. In addition, the hip-hop movement in Niger – which flourished in the early 2000s and was also highly criticized by religious leaders – has been a laboratory of experiences in which young artists, who wanted to pursue their careers while remaining ‘good’ Muslims, have put in place various coping strategies.
3The Nigérien musical sphere is therefore a place where popular expectations in terms of entertainment, professionalization requirements, and religious constraints converge, as well as a place that has been considerably transformed by the rise of the reformist movements.2 Studying the effects of the transmission of Izala standards on musical creation and production reveals the negotiation processes and compromises adopted by artists in the face of renewed religious directives. It also highlights the distinction between religious identity and religiosity among musicians,3 for whom artistic performance and spiritual quest are sometimes linked, sometimes in total opposition.
4Based on the individual career paths of several Nigérien musicians, the objective here is to understand, in the light of professional and artistic choices made in a disputed religious space, how these re-orientations reflect broader transformations within the Nigérien society and what they reveal, in particular, about transnational Islamic dynamics fostered by reformists.
Map 5. Geographical distribution of Apard’s fieldworks

The transnationalization of Izala dogma
5Originating from northern Nigeria, the Izala movement developed in the 1970s under the influence of Abubakar Gumi, former Grand Kadi of the Northern Region and promoter of the Salafi doctrine, inspired by the Saudi Wahhabi model.4 The Jama’atu Izalatul Bid’a wa Iqamatu Sunnah movement5 (‘Izala’ being the diminutive name) has as mission to reform an Islam perverted by ‘blameworthy innovations’ (bid’a in Arabic) not in conformity with the Prophetic tradition, including those introduced into Nigeria by Sufi brotherhoods such as the Tidjaniyya and Qadiriyya.
6Izala appeared in Niger in the early 1990s, as a result of the democratization process and the policy of openness enjoyed by religious associations. Created in 1974, the Association Islamique du Niger (AIN) was until then the only authorized structure, entrusted by the state with the management of the country’s religious affairs; but with the end of the state monopoly, many groups previously forced into clandestinity were formed as religious associations. This period of openness was particularly beneficial to the Izala trend, which first emerged in the major urban centres close to Nigeria.6
7While the term Izala is often used by critics of the movement, the faithful prefer the expression ‘Ahlus Sunnah’,7 in reference to the Prophetic tradition which, together with a series of texts interpreted and re-appropriated, constitutes the ‘Salafi canon’ on the basis of which the Izala ideology has been defined and disseminated.8 This gives rise to a set of norms, considered valid and universal, allowing the ‘Izala subject’ to define himself – in opposition to Sufism – as the guarantor of an authentic Islamic order and as the main actor in the process of ‘re-Islamization’.9 Since truth can emanate only from the Prophetic tradition, any idea or practice that deviates from it must, according to the reformist principles, be identified and rectified.10
8If the Izala ideology does not reject the idea of democracy and allows itself to be integrated into a secular framework, the objective remains, however, to transform society in depth and from inside, so that the state itself guarantees respect for the rules and precepts enacted, or even enforces them. The agenda of the Izala movement is therefore not strictly religious, and it aims, beyond Islamic reform, at a reform of the social order.11
9Like other reformist movements, Izala is characterized by an active proselytism and a multifaceted presence in the public space.12 Firmly established and institutionalized in Nigeria, it has developed effective communication tools, enabling it to reach far beyond the country’s borders. It is primarily the sermons that, in the form of public gatherings or on cassettes, CDs, and DVDs, have ensured the dissemination and popularization of the Izala discourse.
10Initially supported by traders in the Maradi Region,13 the establishment of Izala in Niger became visible during the 1990s, with the creation of organizations which were responsible for promoting the ideology of the movement and also distinguished themselves in non-religious activities: development, awareness-raising, and professional training activities.14 This is the case with the main Izala associations in Niger, such as Kitab Wa Sunnah and Iya’u Sunnah.
11The structuring of Izala in Niger also involves private radio and television stations, which have helped to broaden the audience of preachers. The example of Bonferey radio television,15 among others, particularly illustrates the link that has been established between the media and religious reformers in Niger. Founded and financed by Himadou Hamani ‘Sirignere’, a wealthy businessman from Kollo region, Bonferey radio television has been promoting Izala’s ideas, values, and principles since its creation. Unlike other stations characterized by the heterogeneity of their programmes, Bonferey does not broadcast any music programmes or Brazilian TV shows. South American soap operas, which are very popular in West Africa, have often been criticized by religious leaders for their staging of romance, considered as not adapted to Islamic culture.16 Music is banned by the Salafi dogma, which considers the use of instruments and rhythm as satanic diversions that keep the faithful away from devotion; the songs or video clips of Nigérien and international musicians are therefore also deprived of airtime on Bonferey. However, anasheed – a capella religious songs – are broadcast regularly and even constitute an important part of the programmes during the month of Ramadan. For Bonferey’s director, the programmes, essentially made up of preaching, correspond ‘to the founder’s aspirations’ but also ‘to the reality of the country and the public’s demand’.17 While the popularity of religious programmes can indeed be confirmed by a quick review of the programme schedules of competing radio and television stations, it remains difficult to determine whether this specifically concerns ‘Izala content’. On Bonferey, sermons are broadcast in the different languages spoken in Niger – Hausa, Zarma, Peul, French, but sometimes also Arabic and English – and therefore reach a wide audience. With airtime priority being given to Izala preachers, they benefit from a large audience. Moreover, Bonferey is not the only actor involved in the popularization of the Izala discourse, which is also broadcast by other private stations, such as Dounia radio television.18 However, whether the place of Izala preaching on Niger’s radio and television stations is due to the appetite of the Nigérien public or to a clever communication strategy, the result is the same: the reformist discourse has become familiar. Fully integrated into the religious, social, and media landscape of Niger, it is part of the habits of an audience that, even when it has not adopted it, has assimilated it.
12Northern Nigerian preachers have played and continue to play a major role in the dissemination and popularization of this discourse, not only on radio and television stations, but also through recorded sermons sold in markets and specialized shops – in the form of CDs, DVDs, or USB sticks19 – and through public wa’azi, the large preaching gatherings, the most important of which is the wa’azin kasa, an event that usually lasts several days.20 Many wa’azi organized in Niger’s main cities are performed by the great figures of Nigerian preaching, whose filmed sermons, widely consumed in Niger, have ensured their fame. Over the past ten years, one has seen the rise of Nigérien preachers, such as Sheikh Falalu Tassiou, who have also become very popular and ensure continuity in the dissemination of the Izala message, but the stars of the genre remain the Nigerian sheikhs. Mahmud Adam Ja’afar and Albani Zaria, both murdered by Boko Haram, are still widely listened to in Niger, as is Sheikh Issa Pantami, who, in 2005, challenged Mohammed Yusuf in a television debate that became famous. Among the Nigerian Izala – or Ahlus Sunnah – who are leading sales in Niger, Sheikh Kabiru Gombe enjoys great prominence, which is reflected both in the commercial success of his filmed sermons and in the attendance systematically drawn by his participation in wa’azi.21
Photo 5. A DVD Shop in Niamey

(Photo: Élodie Apard)
Photo 6. Islamic Sermons’ DVD for sale in Niamey

(Photo: Élodie Apard)
13Information collected from Islamic CD and DVD sellers in Niger reveals not only a market dominated by Ahlus Sunnah in general and the Nigerian sheikhs in particular, but also Nigeria’s major role in the preaching industry.22 While Niger’s production capacity has grown considerably over the past ten years, it remains relatively small-scale;23 it is still the studios and production houses in the major cities of northern Nigeria that supply the Nigérien market. In particular, Kaduna, a pioneer city in the spread of preaching,24 and Kano, the commercial capital of the north,25 occupy a central place in the regional circuits.
Moral norms and social order
14The content of the sermons varies according to the context, the target audience, or the news, which is sometimes used as a basis for the development of an argument. However, the vast majority of Izala sermons devote significant time to criticizing Sufi movements, their methods, beliefs, and representatives. Whether it concerns prayer, modes of celebration, or the amount of the dowry, Sufi brotherhoods’ practices are systematically rejected. The rules permitting the faithful to avoid making mistakes are then set out and justified using the texts and interpretations constituting the Izala dogma.
15Each DVD is a compilation of several sermons, given by one or several different preachers. The packaging indicates the title of each ‘album’; and while some titles are rather generic,26 others offer details on the content, as part of a commercial attractiveness strategy.27 The success of Izala sermons is partly based on their vehement character and the polemics they provoke, with the public sometimes seduced by the values promoted, sometimes simply curious about statements that directly challenge a formerly established religious and social order.
16The (re)definition and defence of moral values occupy a central place in the Izala discourse, which, by establishing a very clear dichotomy between what is ‘Islamically correct’ and what is not, between what is decency and what is perversion, offers the faithful the means to protect themselves against ‘moral chaos’.28 The actions to be taken, in public and in private, are the subject of many sermons, especially for women, and are mainly centred on the body, modesty, and sexuality. These themes attract a lot of interest, and sermons about conjugal relationships, for example, are in high demand.29 However, in the arguments of many Izala preachers, women are considered not only as inciters to depravity but also, paradoxically, as more reasonable than men in the management and suppression of impulses; they are therefore attributed, in large part, the responsibility for preserving good morals.
17During preaching sessions exclusively for women, the arguments in favour of their active involvement are widely developed. Abubakar Gero, a famous Izala preacher from Argungu, north-west Nigeria, regularly addresses these issues; in the DVD entitled Matan kwarai, Iyalin kwarai,30 which brings together several sermons dedicated to women, he presents reformism as an asset for the new generations:
Women who lived about fifty years ago did not have a good knowledge of Islam. Women then wore petticoats and short skirts. You can be proud to live in an era when Islam has evolved. You have to thank God for pulling you out of ignorance.31
18He thus compares ‘good’ morality with the practices developed since the introduction of the Islamic reform, which have corrected the mistakes of the past. As holders of in-depth religious knowledge, acquired through a process of self-training and ‘conscientization’32 guided by the Izala dogma, women integrate and then defend the moral values to which they have been sensitized. For example, by avoiding motorcycle taxis – a very economical, practical, and popular means of transport in Nigeria’s major cities – they are unlikely to expose the parts of their bodies that are supposed to be covered, such as ankles or calves, or to have physical contact with a man who is not only outside the family circle but sometimes also non-Muslim.33
19In Kano, the promotion of good morals is the objective set by the social and moral reorientation programme set up in 2004 by Governor Shekarau, which – by separating men and women in public transport and replacing motorcycle taxis with tricyles, in which passengers and drivers do not touch each other – echoes Izala’s argument for re-moralizing society. This programme, named ‘A daidaita sahu’,34 by imposing new regulations on urban mobility has therefore had a direct impact on the transformation of public space.35 While illustrating the convergence of religious and political agendas, the example of A daidaita sahu shows the level of mutual interpenetration and influence of religious, political, and social dynamics in a city such as Kano.36
20However, the Izala discourse of re-moralization of society also concerns the cultural field, and music plays an important role, as do other forms of entertainment, which are also subject to precise rules. The practice and consumption of music is a major subject of disagreement with the Sufi brotherhoods, since, for the reformists, the introduction of musical instruments and rhythm in the praises given to the Prophet, for example, is part of the bid’a. They emphasize the ability of music to divert the faithful from their devotion to God and consider, for example, zikiri – a liturgical practice of chanting God’s names or singing praises to the Prophet – as a perverted practice among the Sufis, who add music to it, sometimes even electronic music. In some contexts, such as in Mali, this practice has become more professional, giving rise to a new form of cultural production, reconciling Islam and popular music.37 This is an impossible compromise, according to the Izala dogma, since, as Sheikh Adam Ja’afar points out in one of his sermons, zikiri ‘cannot be done in the crowd and cannot be done with music or dancing’.38 If the practice itself is not rejected, it must be characterized by the sobriety and restraint specific to the individual spiritual approach of the faithful Izala.
21Another problem mentioned in the preaching about music concerns the behaviours that accompany it and supposedly encourage depravity. Abubakar Gero, for example, refers to the role of music in celebrations:
The festivities that accompany naming ceremonies and weddings are practices from the time of ignorance. Bringing in griots and dancing are negative practices. Marriages in the time of ignorance are ten days of festivities, music, dance, and expenses. The complicity between the bride and the musicians can lead to obscene gestures.39
22As questions of modesty and morality are at stake, women’s responsibility is once again invoked, both in the persistence of bad practices and in their necessary eradication.
Previously, young girls before getting married listened to music like Michael Jackson. These are Western practices; it’s not good. But Michael Jackson’s time is over. Now the time of Islam has come. Dan Ibro and dandalin soyeya’s CDs should be discarded. Quranic schools must be filled with women. The objective, the mission of women now, is total submission to God. Those who follow the good teachings and practices, God reserves Paradise for them.40
23By simultaneously condemning Michael Jackson, Dan Ibro – the famous Nigerian comedian – and the dandalin soyeya musical style, Gero rejects very different forms of entertainment.41 But what American pop music, Kannywood’s burlesque comedies,42 and the Hausa love songs characteristic of the dandalin soyeya have in common is the fact that they are extremely popular and, therefore, particularly likely to compromise total devotion to God. However, it is these two negative aspects of music that are alternately evoked by the Izala preachers: both entertainment that distances itself from God; and a way of expressing vulgarity, which leads to indecent behaviour. Questions linked to entertainment and music’s production and consumption are therefore at the heart of the re-Islamization issues and challenges in northern Nigeria – and, because of the transnationalization of discourses, also in Niger.
Religious norms and the Nigérien music scene: Contestation, adaptation, and re-appropriation
24While the impact of religious discourse on cultural life and artistic production in northern Nigeria has been the subject of academic research,43 the analysis of these phenomena in Niger has been less frequently conducted.44 The study of music itself is largely dominated by ethnomusicology studies – often conducted in nomadic societies45 – and hardly touches the field of Nigérien ‘modern music’.46
25Defined in contrast to the forms of ‘traditional’ music practised in specific communities, so-called ‘modern music’ in Niger emerged from the use of drums, keyboards, and electric guitars, combined with local percussion; it is first and foremost an urban phenomenon that developed in the wake of the Congolese orchestras of the 1950s.47 During the 1980s and 1990s, popular singers such as Moussa Poussi and Sani Aboussa embodied the evolution of Nigérien modern music, in which orchestras played a central role. Then, at the beginning of the 2000s, the emergence of hip-hop in Niger marked a major turning point, notably by renewing artistic and musical codes, but also by bringing forward a new generation of artists.
26Modern music in Niger is not particularly internationalized and primarily targets the local public, which is divided, according to age groups, between orchestra lovers and hip-hop fans. By performing in bars and dance halls of major cities, as well as at weddings and naming ceremonies, orchestras have led the way for the professionalization of the musical sphere. However, apart from the few international stars,48 few Nigérien musicians manage to make a living solely from their art and many also have a ‘real job’ on the side.
27Despite the difficulties of professionalization and the limited gains, musicians enjoy a large audience, particularly thanks to the broadcasting of their productions by Nigérien radio stations and television channels. In direct competition with preachers in the occupation of the soundscape, artists therefore use the same channels and often reach the same audience as their detractors.
28Based on the ‘perverted’ nature of music, as well as the ‘deviant’ social practices that accompany it, the recurring condemnations of Nigerian Izala preachers – echoed by their Nigérien peers – have been, like the whole Salafi discourse, gradually integrated and normalized. This has had a significant effect on the ways in which music is perceived, received, and produced in Niger. It is these changes that are studied here, illustrated by examples from the Niamey music scene, and which less reflect a global transformation of the artistic sphere or music market than a change in individual behaviours and intimate relationships with music.
29With regard to rappers and orchestras, the sermons of preachers and more particularly those of the Izala movement are often extremely critical and sometimes even violent. Hip-hop artists, pejoratively nicknamed ‘MCs’, were first accused of reproducing a perverting Western cultural model that was contrary to Islamic values. Then, at the end of the 2000s, when the hip-hop movement lost its dynamism while orchestras gained in popularity and audience, preachers reoriented their targets. They began to criticize the orchestras for the indecent lyrics of their songs, the vulgarity of the dances that accompanied the music and, more broadly, the way of life they encouraged: alcohol consumption, nightlife, and prostitution.
1. The experience of the Tal National group: Promotion through censorship
30In this context of sharp criticism launched by some religious actors, the experience of Tal National is particularly interesting. From the end of the 2000s until today, Tal National has been the most popular orchestra in Niger; it sold out at each of its concerts, and when not on tour in the United States or Europe, it performs every weekend in a dedicated concert hall in the centre of Niamey. In 2009, Tal National’s second album had great success, with songs playing on radio and television channels across the country. However, the songs, and especially the dance movements that accompanied them, provoked the indignation of religious actors. A group of Izala preachers operating on Dounia radio and television stations then mobilized, multiplying sermons, condemning Tal National’s songs and videos, and describing them as depraved and perverse. While Tal National was preparing its third album, the same group of preachers tried to ban the release of the album and prevent the group from performing, claiming in particular that the dancers were undressing on stage. They put together a file, with testimonies and photos to support their claim, which they brought to the presidency. An investigation was then opened, and the group leader, Almeida, was interviewed by the police several times, including by the ‘brigade des mœurs’ (vice squad). However, Almeida, a lawyer by training and a clerk at the Niamey High Court in his spare time, knew the accusations of indecent assault his orchestra was charged with, which was based in particular on the ‘exchange of loincloths’, allegedly practised on stage by the dancers.49 With the lack of evidence, the proceedings were dropped and the band’s activities continued.50 Faced with the failure of legal recourse, preachers intensified their sermons, calling on the faithful to boycott concerts, issuing a fatwa against its leader and encouraging people to fast to curse the artists.
31When he recounts this episode, Almeida denounces ‘the hypocrisy’ of preachers, their ‘purely defamatory approach’51, and in turn mobilizes the moral register. He refutes the accusations of the preachers and also suggests that they themselves ‘were not good examples’. He claims to have evidence of their inappropriate conduct but says he chose not to disclose it, in order ‘not to damage the image of Islam’52. Quoting from the Quran, he explains that God is always ‘beside the one who holds the truth’; that it was therefore useless to accuse, in return, the ‘marabouts’; and that it was better, faced with hypocrisy, to remain silent and ‘take the path of God’.53 For Almeida and the other members of the group, who are ‘all Muslims’, assuming the popular and entertaining character of their art does not require abandoning Islamic moral values. On the contrary, not responding to attacks and avoiding escalating the debate even allows Tal National to display a higher level of ethics than the preachers.
32Almeida uses a rhetoric in which the religious register occupies a deliberately and strategically reinforced role. If he puts forward his own morality and religiosity in the face of accusations from preachers, he also admits that the debates provoked by these attacks did not disadvantage his band. On the contrary, the reviews proved to be formidable advertising campaigns: the more Tal National was accused of perversion, the more popular it became, the more albums it sold, and the more concert halls it filled. This phenomenon, described by Almeida as ‘the attraction of the forbidden fruit’,54 has therefore become a real promotional tool.
33However, it is difficult to say that Tal National’s approach was to deliberately choose provocation for commercial purposes; it seems that the band has also developed the capacity to accommodate critics by using them to its advantage. This is an adaptation capacity forged by a long artistic experience of stigmatization – religious but also social – that accompanies any musical career in Niger. Reaffirming its own Islam, Tal National managed to legitimize its opposition to preachers.
2. (Dis)engaged rappers
34When the hip-hop movement emerged in Niger in the late 1990s, it was strongly influenced by American rap; over the next decade, it developed its own identity and became the main component of the Nigérien music scene, in the capital but also in the provincial cities, where dozens of hip-hop groups were formed. In the 2000s, rap represented the main part of the musical programming of radio stations, television channels, and theatres, in particular the Centre Culturel Franco-Nigérien, then known as ‘the temple of hip-hop’.
35By providing engaged texts, Nigérien rappers took part in the protest tradition of the hip-hop movement that developed elsewhere on the continent – in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon, for instance – where rap music offers youth a new way of expression.55 For about ten years, Niger’s pioneer groups (e.g. Lakal Kaney, Wassika, Wongari, Kaidan Gaskia, Djoro G), quickly followed by new bands (e.g. Sah Fonda, Wass Wong, Kaidan Gaskia 2, Metaphor, MTS Matassa), conveyed a political message, criticized neo-colonialism, bad governance, and injustice,56 taking very seriously the mission of ‘conscientization’ that is characteristic of an ‘authentic’ rap.57
36With regard to religion, on the other hand, and despite the attacks to which they were subjected, rappers remained quite silent. The texts themselves rarely refer to religion, and there are only a few symbolic markers of attachment to Islam (e.g. in some stage names).58 This does not prevent many artists from proclaiming their faith and easily assuming the reconciliation of their Muslim identity with their rapper status.
37In the Nigérien audiovisual landscape, the hip-hop movement is therefore developing in parallel with the re-Islamization process launched a few years earlier by the reformists. On the radio, sermons and musical programmes dominated by hip-hop follow one another, and the hosts – who play an essential role in promoting Nigérien rap – share airtime with preachers, especially Izala, whose speeches remain very critical of music and of rap in particular. Star hosts (‘Fan Flex’ on Dounia, ‘Do Masta’ on Saraounia FM, ‘K’stro’ on Radio-Television Ténéré, and ‘Big Posé’ on Radio Alternative) regularly meet their detractors, but generally maintain cordial relations with them – partly owing to the respect imposed by the age of the ‘marabouts’ and the social status granted to them by their religious knowledge. While the coexistence of hip-hop music and reformist discourse in Niger’s soundscape does not seem to be an apparent problem, it does expose the confrontation of two diverging registers and highlights the contradictions with which rappers must deal. As Adeline Masquelier has shown, most young artists manage to compartmentalize the different components of their identities and negotiate the terms of their own morality.59 For some, however, the irreconcilable nature of different moral and ethical registers reflects personal questions and profoundly disrupts their artistic approach; shaken in their Islamic identity, in search of meaning and coherence, some decide to abandon music.
38‘Jazz’, a member of the MTS Matassa group, for example, chose to put an end to his musical career at the very moment when interesting opportunities arose:
I was sent by UNICEF to represent Niger at a Forum in Addis Ababa. We were coming to the end of sufferings. Working with UNICEF is a great opportunity. But even then, changes had already begun in me. […] Back from touring, I started to feel disgust for what I was doing. My music no longer interested me; I no longer wanted the stage; my songs hurt me. […] So I directed myself to the mosque, into prayer and readings. I had the love of taking refuge in the mosque and learning. […] But then, it was the city that disgusted me; I didn’t want to stay there anymore. I left Niamey for Nigeria; I stayed there for a year. I received religious training there, a good foundation that I didn’t have before. I wanted to completely disappear from the world, from fame. I learned to understand my religion and its rules to practise it well. I understood, after returning home, that this music, hip-hop, is now prostituted. In concerts, young people meet up for alcohol, flirting, smoking weed, which doesn’t go with the original ideology. At first, hip-hop was about awareness. Today, young people gather to ‘délinquer’. […]
Music is a problem; there are debates, controversies. Some sects practise music, but normally instruments should not be used. For a Muslim, it’s hard to do hip-hop. Mixing hip-hop and religion is like mixing fire and water. […] Today, everything is prostituted. Orchestras are all about moving your buttocks, showing nakedness, whereas in religion, these are things that are banned. […] Art as such has no problem with religion. Not all art is prohibited; the problem is music and rhythm. The Prophet fought the rhythm; it is the rhythm that is satanic. If today I were asked, as a Muslim, what art form would I choose, I would do anything except music.60
39The choice of the term ‘prostituted’ to designate hip-hop marks the breaking point in Jazz’s musical career. Once the analogy is made between entertainment and debauchery, between music and deviant practices, the loss of moral values becomes a major risk for the artist. Religion then provides him with a protective frame of reference61 and allows him, strengthened by certainties of this ‘true’ acquired knowledge, to condemn artists as much as their public, for whom music would ultimately no longer be perceived as a form of art but simply as a support to ‘délinquer’.62 The Izala standards are very clearly reflected in Jazz’s self-formation process, characterized by the choice to go into exile in Nigeria, a country that, for many Nigériens, embodies the guarantee of authentic Islamic practices.
40The antagonism between religious and artistic fields can also be less linear, with episodes of spiritual quest, isolation, and intermittent musical activities. This is for example the experience of Bilal Keit, leader of Wass Wong hip-hop group, which in the early 2000s was a resounding success in Niger. After several artistically successful years, Bilal distanced himself from the rest of the group, rarely participating in rehearsals and devoting more time to prayer and reading the Quran. After an interlude of several months, he finally decided to move to London. There, he attended a mosque apparently close to Salafi movements and aroused suspicions from the British authorities.63 He then returned home and tried to re-launch a solo career. In 2014, for the release of his new song, he gave an interview in which he looked back at his artistic career and his years of interruption:
The main reason for this retirement is my relationship with God. We live in a predominantly Muslim society, and I did not have a deep understanding of the interpretation of the verses of the Quran. Spirituality, it has given me a lot, and it has given me more strength. It gave me a strong spirit, and faith. […] And for that reason I was ready to sacrifice this artistic side to show my gratitude to God. But over time, I came to understand that it was a matter of interpretation. It all depends on the way we use this music. It can be used by the devil, just as it can be used to do good.64
41His spiritual approach, like that of Jazz, responds to a quest for meaning that also finds answers in the reformist discourse. The argument on the rejection of music, however, did not find in him an echo strong enough to lead to a total abandonment of his artistic activities. His vision of music significantly changed, nevertheless, marked by a new puritanism, typical of the Izala discourse:
In Niger, we have a very decent culture. But I see that today, there are many things that are shown on television that can only negatively influence our youth. And I tell these young people to be very careful about what they see on television and not to forget where they come from. You shouldn’t think that making music is about showing naked women, or perversion. How many artists have succeeded in their careers without falling into this? We must keep this sense of scruples that we have, and we must avoid perversion, because when there is perversion, there is immorality. We must preserve our social values through the education of children to ensure a bright future for them.65
42As in Jazz’s testimony, Bilal’s reference to orchestra serves both to denounce their immorality and to enhance his own religiosity. The two rappers differ in their interpretation of the place of music in Islam but display a comparable ethical approach, both considering themselves more ‘responsible’ than their elders.
43Of course, religious discourse alone cannot explain all the transformations that have occurred in the hip-hop movement in recent years; the vicissitudes of artistic careers are also linked to the rare professional opportunities and the extremely constraining economic context, as well as to the emergence of new musical trends. Indeed, from 2010, the stars of Ivorian Coupé Décalé and Nigerian pop music posed serious competition to Nigérien hip-hop, which then showed signs of slowdown. Partly explained by economic constraints, the departure abroad of several emblematic rappers from the Nigérien scene contributed to the renewal of the musical landscape. Some leading groups have disappeared and new groups have emerged, somehow managing to keep the movement alive by integrating the codes of pop music, often at the expense of the political message that characterized the movement in its early days.
3. Islamic rap or religious performances?
44During this decade of change in the hip-hop sphere, new musical phenomena have emerged, revealing the persistence of moral contradictions and ethical questions among artists. Two examples illustrate this in particular, through the forms of musical creation chosen and the search for a compromise between artistic performance and religious injunctions.
45The first example is that of Bachirou Chitou Issa, a host on Al-Ummha, a private Islamic radio station, who released an album of religious songs in 2011. Although his artistic approach is clearly part of an Islamic agenda, Bachirou Chitou Issa produced his album with the support of structures traditionally devoted to the production and promotion of hip-hop: first, the CFPM (Centre pour la Formation et la Promotion Musicale) in Niamey, where recordings and arrangements were made, and then the Centre Culturel Franco-Nigérien, where the opening concert was organized. Moov, one of the African branches of the Emirati telecommunication operator Etisalat, sponsored the event. For the first time, a Nigérien artist followed the same creative process as hip-hop groups, received support from public structures66 and a private company, and delivered a musical product entirely dedicated to religion.
46On stage, Bachirou, accompanied by six back-up singers, performs all his pieces in Arabic and a capella, following the tradition of nasheed,67 a religious song without instruments, very popular among Muslims in countries like Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Indonesia. Until then, religious television channels such as Bonferey broadcast anasheed videos produced in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, which helped to popularize this exogenous musical genre. With Bachirou Shitou Issa’s album Niger witnessed the first local form of anasheed production, the only musical style permitted by the Izala canon. The fact that Bachirou was trained at the Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi College of Higher Islamic Studies in Zaria (northern Nigeria), and then at the Islamic University of Say, in Niger, probably explains why he developed this form of art rather than another. But the particularity of his approach lies in the fact that he has succeeded in integrating himself into a musical landscape strongly marked by hip-hop and that he has managed to negotiate a place for religious music with Nigérien cultural actors and audiences.
47The second example is that of the slam poet Goulam, whose career began in 2013 with the song ‘Mohammed Le Plus Grand’. Goulam claims slam – a form of poetry that comes directly from North American hip-hop culture – as his medium for artistic expression, while developing his texts based on a critique of Western culture and a return to Islamic values. His second track, released in 2014, ‘Ma Sœur’, is a plea for the wearing of the hijab, a track on which Goulam criticizes France in particular for its intolerance towards veiled women. Goulam then received the support of Bonferey television, which produced the video clip and broadcast it regularly on its channel, thus ensuring the success of the song. Phonically, this slam differs from the classics of the genre only by the total absence of musical instruments, the background melody being composed solely of voices. Visually, the music video of ‘Ma Sœur’ is comparable to any Nigérien rap video: shots taken in the streets of Niamey, special effects, and visual animations. It also includes excerpts from French TV shows and from an interview with Diam’s, the French rapper who has converted to Islam.68 The message focuses on the risk of perversion of moral values resulting from the abandonment of good religious practices:
48People point at you because debauchery you refuse
You refuse to be made into an object that people use
Because you do not want to be abused
Or for your voice to sing trivialities that just amuse
[…]
But if there is something that you should know,
It’s that you should never let go
Succeed, they will
If ever of your Islamic values you speak ill.
Let them say your hijab is a tarp or a mask
Remain calm and faithful to your task.
No to actresses and crazy female singers
Whom Satan holds by the collar:
A people that just holler.69
Photo 7. Screenshot of Goulam’s music video “Ma soeur”

49Like the preaching rappers studied by Abdoulaye Niang in Senegal,70 Goulam is at the crossroads of two important social dynamics: the strengthening of spirituality, on the one hand, and the use of hip-hop culture as a cultural and identity referent, on the other. He is also an actor – conscious or not – of the reinvention of popular culture in Niger who, by drawing on the hip-hop repertoire, renews the codes of religious performance.
Conclusion
50Over the past twenty years, preachers and musicians have shared the soundscape in Niger, using the same distribution channels, often addressing the same audiences and succeeding, alternately or simultaneously, in seducing them. Regularly targeted by harsh criticism, and even condemnation, by preachers, the artists have maintained ambiguous relationships with them – sometimes cordial, sometimes confrontational, but always competing for the mobilization of youth. Thus put in opposition, these actors have developed divergent strategies and used different moral registers, but have sometimes also mobilized the same notions, such as justice or truth.71
51The Izala reformist discourse and the renewal of norms that accompanied the re-Islamization process in Niger therefore had undeniable but multifaceted effects on the music scene. More or less sensitive to criticism, more or less affected in their work, artists have reacted according to their personality and individual stories, but reactions also have varied from one generation of musicians to another.
52Orchestras, which have been present on the Nigérien music scene since the 1960s, have negotiated their place in the country’s cultural landscape through different periods, facing all kinds of social, political, and religious constraints. Their long experience of the art scene and music-related issues in the contemporary context of Niger has undoubtedly helped to mitigate the impact of attacks against them. The rappers, on the other hand, arrived on the Nigérien music scene at a time when the re-appropriation of ethical and moral issues by religious reformists was already an advanced process and when the Izala rationale had already succeeded in imposing itself.
53However, it is interesting to note that, when explaining their career choices, orchestras’ musicians and rappers always mobilize the religious register, both to justify the morality of their approach and to reaffirm their own religiosity. Opposing, transforming, or re-appropriating Islamic norms, even if it means finding – or even inventing – a new mode of artistic expression, does not require artists to sacrifice their religious identity; on the contrary, in the face of adversity and contradiction, this identity tends to be reinforced. The musical innovations introduced by Nigérien artists in recent years reveal their ability to reconcile artistic creation and a reformist agenda, but also to define their own Islamic identity in a social space in crisis, economically and religiously competitive.
Bibliographie
Des DOI sont automatiquement ajoutés aux références bibliographiques par Bilbo, l’outil d’annotation bibliographique d’OpenEdition. Ces références bibliographiques peuvent être téléchargées dans les formats APA, Chicago et MLA.
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- APA
- Chicago
- MLA
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Brigaglia, Andrea (2007), ‘The Kaduna Radio Tafsir (1978-1992) and the construction of public images of Muslim scholars in the Nigerian’, Journal for Islamic Studies 27: 173-210.
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Notes de bas de page
1 See Abdoulaye Sounaye (2016), Islam and Modernity. Contribution à l’analyse de la ré-islamisation au Niger, Paris, Harmattant.
2 The fashion world has also been confronted with the coexistence of these contradictory dynamics. When in 1998 the designer Alphadi created the Festival International de la Mode Africaine (FIMA), he made Niger an international fashion hub, considerably increasing its visibility, but the organization of fashion shows provoked the anger of some religious groups – including Izala preachers – who regularly mobilized to prevent activities. The 2000 edition of the festival was marked by particularly violent riots, at the end of which several Islamic organizations were banned by the government. In 2018, FIMA was organized in Morocco.
3 Distinction established by Adeline Masquelier in her work on the relationship between youth and Islam in Dogondoutchi: ‘Securing futures: Youth, generation and Muslim identities in Niger’. In: Asef Bayat & Linda Herrera (2010), Being Young and Muslim. New Politics in the Global South and North, Oxford University Press, pp. 225-40.
4 Roman Loimeier (1997), Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, Northwestern University Press, pp. 50-52.
5 Movement for the Suppression of Innovation and the Establishment of Sunnah.
6 See Emmanuel Grégoire (1993), ‘Islam and identity of merchants in Maradi (Niger)’. In: Louis Brenner, ed., Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, London, Hurst & Company, pp. 106-15.
7 ‘The people of the Sunnah’
8 Alexander Thurston (2016), Salafism in Nigeria. Islam, Preaching and Politics, Cambridge University Press, p. 1.
9 Abdoulaye Sounaye (2016), Islam and Modernity. Contribution à l’analyse de la ré-islamisation au Niger, Paris, Harmattant, pp. 113-16.
10 Abdoulaye Sounaye (2009), ‘Izala au Niger: une alternative de communauté religieuse’. In: L. Fourchard, O. Goerg & M. Gomez-Perez, eds, Les lieux de sociabilité urbaine dans la longue durée en Afrique, Paris, Harmattan, pp. 481-500.
11 See Ousmane Kane (1998), ‘Le réformisme musulman au Nigeria du Nord’. In: Ousmane Kane, ed., Islam and Islamism in south of the Sahara, Karthala Editions, pp. 117-35.
12 On Pentecostal proselytism, see Olufunke Adeboye (2012), ‘A church in a cinema hall. Pentacostal appropriation of public space in Nigeria’, Journal of Religion in Africa 42(2): 145-71.
13 Olivier Meunier (2002), ‘Développement du wahhabisme au Niger: analyse socio-historique de la diffusion du mouvement Izala dans la ville de Maradi’, Revue africaine de recherche en éducation, ‘l’éducation dans la société africaine’, n°1, pp. 121-52.
14 Hassane Mouley, Marthe Diarra & Oumarou Makama (2005), Etude sur l’Islam au Niger, Danida, Niamey, p. 66.
15 Radio station created in 2001, television channel created in 2007.
16 Kadidia Touré (2006), ‘Telenovelas et dynamiques identitaires à Bouaké et Bamako’. In: Jean-François Werner, ed., Médias visuels et femmes en Afrique de l’Ouest, Paris, L’Harmattan, pp. 195-242.
17 Interview with the Director of Bonferey radio television, conducted in Niamey on 23 February 2015.
18 As preaching is systematically part of radio and television programmes in Niger, all channels and stations have more or less contributed to broadcasting the Izala discourse, including ‘liberal’ media such as the Alternative radio, which also offers airtime to Izala preachers.
19 Sound content on CD media, preaching filmed on DVD and USB sticks; a large number of audio (usually in MP3 format) or video files can be loaded at once.
20 The place of the wa’azi in the emergence of a Nigérien-Nigerian religious sphere is discussed in this volume by Abdoulaye Sounaye.
21 Another way to assess the popularity of preachers is to compare the number of views counted in the videos of their sermons posted on YouTube. Tassiou Falalu’s videos are viewed, on average, between 1,000 and 5,000 times, while Kabiru Gombe’s videos count, on average, between 60,000 and 200,000 views. While it has grown considerably in Niger, the audience for Nigerian preachers remains largely composed of the Nigerian public, which is proportionally about 10 times larger (190 million inhabitants in Nigeria compared with 21 million in Niger in 2018).
22 Survey conducted between 2014 and 2016 among 40 DVD sellers in the Nigérien cities of Zinder, Maradi, Agadez, and Arlit. In each city, the same questionnaire was submitted to ten different sellers: who are the best sellers? What are the best-selling themes? Who are the rising figures and the losing preachers? What is the origin of the DVDs and the distribution method?
23 Abdoulaye Sounaye (2011), ‘La “discothèque” islamique: CD et DVD au coeur de la réislamisation nigérienne’, Ethnographiques.org No. 22 (May), ‘les Outils d’un islam en mutation. Réislamisation et moralisation au sud du Sahara’.
24 Andrea Brigaglia (2007), ‘The Kaduna Radio Tafsir (1978-1992) and the construction of public images of Muslim scholars in the Nigerian media’, Journal for Islamic Studies 27: 173-210.
25 Brian Larkin (2008), Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria, pp. 148-70, Durham, Duke University Press.
26 They can indicate only the purpose of the sermon (e.g. ‘Ramadan Tasfir’) or the surah that is discussed (e.g. ‘Al Baqara’), or bear the name of the event at which they took place (e.g. ‘Waaz’in kasar Niger’). See some examples of wa’azi on DVD in the appendixes of this volume.
27 Since the beginning of the Boko Haram violence, for example, many DVDs of sermons capitalize on the debates generated by the presence of the jihadist group on the Nigerian Islamic scene.
28 Abdoulaye Sounaye, Islam and Modernity. Contribution à l’analyse de la ré-islamisation au Niger, op. cit. p. 115.
29 According to the survey conducted between 2014 and 2016 among 40 DVD sellers in the Nigérien cities of Zinder, Maradi, Agadez, and Arlit.
30 Title in Hausa which can be translated into English as ‘Good women, good family’.
31 Abubakar Gero, ‘Matan kwarai, Iyalin Kwarai’, Ramadan preaching held in Gwandu, Niger State, Nigeria, July 2012.
32 Abdoulaye Sounaye, Islam and Modernity. op. cit.
33 Abubakar Gero, ‘Matan kwarai, Iyalin Kwarai’, Ramadan preaching held in Gwandu, Niger State, Nigeria, July 2012.
34 Hausa expression for the alignment of the faithful at the mosque during collective prayers.
35 See the E-papers produced as part of the Masterclass ‘New Forms of Popular Transportation of Goods and Persons in Nigeria’, organized by IFRA-Nigeria, Science Po Paris, and Columbia University from 2 to 7 July 2018 in Kano. http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/training/masterclasses/261-report-new-forms-of-popular-transports-of-goods-and-persons-in-nigeria
36 Alexander Thurston (2014), ‘Muslim politics and Sharia in Kano State, northern Nigeria’, African Affairs 114(454): 28-51.
37 Pierre Prud’homme (2014), ‘Les griots d’Allah ou l’émergence d’une musique religieuse populaire’, Le Mali Contemporain, Marseille, IRD Editions, pp. 317-32.
38 Mahmud Adam Ja’afar, Tasfirin Suratul Nisa, Vol. 1, Tafsir of Ramadan 2005, Kano.
39 Abubakar Gero, ‘Matan kwarai, Iyalin Kwarai’, Ramadan preaching held in Gwandu, Niger State, Nigeria, July 2012.
40 Idem.
41 Dandali soyeya (lit. ‘platform of love’) is a very popular Hausa cultural movement (musical, literary, and video production), inspired by Indian musicals. The songs and videos of dandali soyeya celebrate love.
42 Name given to the north Nigerian film industry, based in Kano, of which Dan Ibro was one of the main figures. The Hausa cinema community has been regularly targeted by reformist preachers. See Carmen McCain (2013), ‘Nollywood, Kannywood and a decade of Hausa film censorship in Nigeria’. In: Daniel Biltereyst & Roel Winkel Vande , eds, Silencing Cinema: Film Censorship around the World, London, Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 223-40.
43 Matthias Krings (2008), ‘Conversion on screen: A glimpse at popular Islamic imaginations in northern Nigeria’, Africa Today 54(4): 45-68.
44 Adeline Masquelier tackles it in her 20-year work on religious and social transformations in Niger, and particularly in Dogondoutchi, studying in particular the link between hip-hop music and religious identity among young people. See Adeline Masquelier (2010), ‘God made me rap: Young men, Islam, and survival in an age of austerity’. In: Anne Haour & Benedetta Rossi, eds, Being and Becoming Hausa: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Brill, pp. 235-55; and Adeline Masquelier (2010), ‘Securing futures: Youth, generation, and Muslim identities in Niger’. In: Asef Bayat & Linda Herrera, Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Policies in the Global South and North, Oxford Press, pp. 225-39.
45 François Borel (1988), ‘Rythmes de passage chez les Touaregs de l’Azawagh (Niger)’, Ethnomusicology Notebooks 1: 28-38; Veit Erlmann (1982), ‘Trance and music in the Hausa Bòorii spirit possession cult in Niger’, Ethnomusicology 26(1): 49-58.
46 Adeline Masquelier’s work on the Nigérien hip-hop scene represents a major contribution to this little-investigated field. See Adeline Masquelier (2016), ‘The mouthpiece of an entire generation. Hip-Hop, truth and Islam in Niger’. In: Soares, B. & A. Masquelier, Muslim Youth and the 9/11 Generation, University of New Mexico Press, pp. 213-39.
47 François Bensignor (2005), ‘La création musicale au miroir de l’histoire’, Hommes et Migrations 1257: 125-33 (September-October).
48 Among the few Nigérien musicians who have succeeded in pursuing an international career, we can mention Moumouni ‘Denke-Denke’ and his group Mamar Kasey, or Tal National, the most famous band in Niger, mentioned further in this chapter and which regularly performs in Europe and the United States.
49 Dancers would have exchanged, and thus removed, their loincloths on stage, partially stripping their clothes in the process.
50 Interview with Almeida, leader of the Tal National group, in Niamey on 27 February 2015.
51 Interview with Almeida, leader of the Tal National group, in Niamey on 27 February 2015.
52 Idem
53 Idem.
54 Idem.
55 See the special issue: ‘Polyphonies du Rap’, Politique Africaine 141, 2016, 206 p.
56 In 2006, following the arrest of journalist Maman Abou and his sentence of 18 months in prison by the government, a group of rappers recorded the song ‘Changement’, denouncing violations of press freedom in Niger (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7AJYoZeOVoc).
57 Alice Aterianus-Owanga & Sophie Moulard (2016), ‘Cherchez le politique … Polyphonies, agencéité et stratégies du rap en Afrique’, Politique Africaine 141: 5-25.
58 One of the leaders of the Wass Wong group took, as stage name ‘Almami (Imam) Koye’.
59 Adeline Masquelier, ‘The mouthpiece of an entire generation’ ... op. cit.
60 Interview with Jazz, former member of the MTS Matassa group, conducted in Niamey on 29 June 2015.
61 Abdoulaye Sounaye, Islam and Modernity. Contribution à l’analyse de la ré-islamisation au Niger, op. cit. p. 115.
62 Neologism derived from the French noun ‘délinquance’ (delinquency).
63 Based on informal discussions with other Wass Wong members, close friends of Bilal and with Bilal himself, in Niamey between 2009 and 2011.
64 ‘Interview with Bilal Keit, Nigérien Hip-Hop and Reggae artist’, Le Sahel, 19 June 2014.
65 Idem.
66 ` The CFPM and the CCFN report respectively to the Niger Ministry of Culture and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
67 The nasheed (pl. anasheed) is a religious poem sung in Arabic a capella. Anasheed videos, produced in the Gulf countries but mainly in Malaysia and Indonesia, are broadcast by many Nigérien and Nigerian television channels, especially during Ramadan periods.
68 The clip ‘Ma Sœur’ can be viewed on the YouTube platform: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZGzKCvJ0rc
69 ‘Tu es indexée par qu’à la débauche tu te refuses, tu refuses que l’on fasse de toi un objet dont on use, Parce que tu ne veux pas que toi on abuse, Ou que ta voix chante des futilités que les amuse (…) Mais s’il y a une chose qu’il faut que tu saches, C’est qu’il ne faut jamais que tu lâche. Ils réussiront si jamais tu craches, Sur tes valeurs islamiques comme une lâche, Qu’ils traitent ton voile de masque ou de bâche, Reste calme et fidèle à la tâche. Non aux actrices et chanteuses folaches, Que Satan dirige par sa cravache: Un peuple qui beugle comme une vache.’
70 Abdoulaye Niang (2014), ‘Le rap prédicateur islamique au Sénégal: une musique “missionnaire”’, Volume! 10: 69-86.
71 Adeline Masquelier, ‘The mouthpiece of an entire generation’ ... op. cit.
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