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Reformist Islam, the state, and Muslims of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger
p. 11-38
Texte intégral
Introduction
1The Islamic reform well documented and often cited in this part of West Africa is the 1804 Jihad led by Shaykh Usman Ibn Fodio.1 This movement was clearly focused, well defined, and guided by the social and political roles of Sufi religious thought and doctrine.2 Studies have established that about 350 books were published by the three key 1804 Jihad leaders alone, explaining various aspects of the jihad’s requirements.3 These authoritative publications described the philosophy behind the jihad and established that it requires a special set of circumstances to call people to jihad or Islamic reform. In the first place, the leader must possess the vision to remove the ‘veil’ (kashf) that covers the sight, to clear away the darkness of the eye and the deafness of the ear so that the heart can cogitate clearly.4 This is the distinction between the 19th century reform movements and those of the 20th and indeed 21st centuries. This chapter examines the history of the 20th- and 21st-century Islamic reforms in Nigeria and the Republic of Niger and intends to show that the strong relationship between the two communities on matters of the economy, politics, and socio-cultural developments, as well as the historical experiences of these communities, shaped the environment and the forms of their relations, including those of scholarship and learning – and, more recently, their links within the militant insurgency.
Map 2. Geographical distribution of Gwabade’s fieldworks

Background
2William F. S. Miles provides a clear description of the relationship between the communities of Nigeria and Niger since precolonial times.5 For a very long period in their history, the peoples of Nigeria and Niger have lived together as members of the same socio-political and socio-economic community.6 Although divided by dissimilar colonial experiences and challenges of modernity, the social network that has bound them together over time remains functional and relevant.7 This therefore supports the context of this chapter, which postulates that there is an organic link between the two communities such that a strong wave of influence exists across the border.8 In addition to issues of socio-culture, there are interconnected scholarship and learning activities between the countries. Communities of western Sudan benefitted greatly by relating with one another and with centres of learning, particularly in Timbuktu and the Aïr region (Agadez). Knowledge about Islam received a boost when the published writings of leading Islamic scholars spread to most parts of the Sudan. It was indeed the time when Islamic scholarship and learning were clearly focused, with an emphasis on knowledge-building.9 The focus was not only on committing to memory the standard texts for the purposes of participation in competition; it also involved shaping and moulding of the student’s character by following a defined curriculum, uniformly used throughout the region.10 Thus, students overcame large distances to travel to renowned sheikhs to study and learn. Various categories of people traversed many cultures and land regions in order to receive instructions from different teachers, to learn a particular text, or even just to repeat a text already mastered under another teacher.11 This was in recognition of the fact that knowledge resides not just in a text; rather, it is with the scholar.12 Most leading scholarly families of Hausaland trace their origin and history of scholarship to this period and process, where they were found moving from one teaching centre (alim) to another. Kani (1997) is explicit on scholars of Yandoto and Birnin Katsina, who, by this time had gained renown in the fields of mathematics, occult sciences (i.e. magic squares, ulum al awfaq), and letter images (ulum al harif).13 Another dimension of the relationship lay in what Hunwick recorded: these communities have been profoundly influenced by the culture of Islam.14 Through the institution of hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and the participation of both individuals and states, an important catalyst was developed that strengthened relationships between the communities of Nigeria and Niger. Such remains the tradition among most West African countries, which made Kano a centre for pilgrimage assistance through the West African Pilgrims Agency.15 According to Hunwick, communities of western Sudan have therefore lived as members of a religious community sharing a common world view – one of Islamic notions of self-identity, of group inter-relationships, and of the relationship of the divine to the human.16 Consequent to these, therefore, to acquire a permit to move across the borders or to even expand the borders demands, at best, reasons of faith and not any particular document. Research on this phenomenon unequivocally emphasizes the point that the borders were not only porous but socio-culturally non-existent.17
3Important in this case is therefore the factor of Islam, which recognizes and respects hospitality and the requirement for public spaces for religious practice.18 In Islam, what matters is a free environment in which to practise one’s religion; thus, the focus is not so much on a political state but on the ummah (community of worshippers). A political state is about territory and people within the limits of that territory; this is contrary to the case of the ummah. The latter concerns the totality of culture and cultural outlook that creates the conditions in which Muslims can have the free space to practise their religion. Thus, when he strongly disagreed with the rulers of Tuat, Al Maghili, a 15th-century renowned Islamic scholar, relocated and settled in Bilad al-Sudan, which took him to Kano and Katsina.19 The result of this development attracted other famous scholars and produced a scholarly community and a tradition of learning, as well as a new socio-political culture – which helped to create a formidable Islamic state with well-defined institutions.20 As a result, a tradition of Islamic scholarship and reform continued in Hausaland and the rest of Bilad al-Sudan in the 16th century, with continued movement and settlement of scholars of repute – such as Shaykh Umar b. Aqit, the grandfather of Ahmad Baba al-Timbukti.21 Also present in the region at different times were Al-Shaykh al-Tadhikhti; Makhluf b. Salih al-Bilbali, who was in Katsina in 1509 and was persuaded to serve as Qadi; and Makhluf b. Salih al-Bilbali, a distinguished scholar from Timbuktu, who was also saddled with the responsibility of serving as Qadi. He died after 1533 at home in Timbuktu.22 Thus, by the 17th century, Hausaland and indeed Bilad al-Sudan had developed indigenous Islamic scholars on the basis of whose contributions the 19th century jihad of Usman Danfodio, comprising communities from both Nigeria and Nigérien areas, was made possible.23
4The discussion in this chapter is of the view that the socio-cultural, political, and economic dynamics that bound precolonial communities of western Sudan into a single system took their roots following these developments. The objective is to show that networks of relationships between the communities of the region have existed ever since, and these networks involve socio-cultural, political, and economic dimensions. This bond created significant religious harmony and a cultural bloc, a sense of reciprocity as well as of dependence, acculturation, enculturation, and assimilation.
British / French colonial policy on Islam, Islamic scholarship, and learning in Nigeria and Niger Republic
5The 1804 Jihad consolidated the gains of the pre-Jihad developments, creating a political territory – the Sokoto Caliphate – that extended over the current regions of southern Niger and northen Nigeria. Since the political entity that resulted was built on Islam, learning and scholarship in addition to territorial expansion constituted the dominant activities. Thus, communities – especially border towns in today’s Nigeria and Niger Republic – related as members of a common territorial entity.24 This remained the culture until colonial conquest by the British and French at the commencement of the 20th century. Colonial policy and borders were created to check movement but, ironically, these colonial policies facilitated movement of people across the borders. The British encouragement was not deliberate or intentional; rather, it was in response to the colonial policy design which recognized the existing authority.25 Such toleration created space for knowledge seekers and scholars from the Niger area to travel into parts of Nigeria, predominantly to Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Sokoto, and as far as Borno.26 Unlike the British, the uncompromising French policy on Islam and Islamic movements in Niger forced the scholarly population to travel elsewhere, and northern Nigeria was the natural solution.27 This viewpoint is also shared by Abdoulaye Sounaye, who noted that the colonial logic of governance greatly contributed to the spread of Islam in both French and British dominions in Africa.28
6The purpose of British and French colonizing missions was the same, although they differed in their tactics and approaches to policy implementation on governance. More specifically, their approaches to Islam and the attitudes of Islamic scholars differ noticeably.29 On the part of the British, as hitherto stated, some level of toleration was exhibited, whereby some sections of the Islamic scholarly community were tolerated and given autonomy, under conditions of appropriation, containment, and surveillance.30 The contrary applied in the case of the French, where clear distrust defined the relationship. The French exhibited unrelenting control and restrained the activities of Islamic scholars. Probably because of their difficult experiences of revolts and protests, especially in their North African colonies, the French maintained a strong control over Muslim activities, as well as a fear of Islam in general.31
7At a more philosophical level, the hostility of France to Islam can be traced to the French Revolution, during which an open aversion to religion was exhibited that separated church from state.32 As a result, the Roman Catholic Church was demystified and condemned as obscurantist, feudal, and authoritarian.33 It was within this same framework that the Islamic religion was viewed by the French authorities while they were establishing their hold on the colonies. The attempt by Muslim Brotherhoods in Algeria to resist French colonization in the 19th century further legitimized French anti-religious views on Islam. This was supported, moreover, by a publication from the French colonial office that served as a model for the administration of French Muslim-dominated colonies.34 Following the position of this model, all anti-colonial resistance movements were banned and fought against. This document terminated any permits for religious activities, especially those which challenged the colonial state. Thus, throughout the colonial period, the territory of Niger never had a full-blown brotherhood or marabout structure / culture comparable to the ones in Senegal or Nigeria.35 Indeed, the French were so careful that even the threat of an individual cleric was not permitted under their rule.36 As noted earlier, movement into Nigeria became the natural option for both Nigérien Islamic scholars and students seeking Islamic knowledge. From this point of view it is obvious that the French colonial policy on Islam also encouraged the relocation and settlement of the Muslim scholarly population from Niger into northern Nigeria. More specifically, a large number of both scholars and students were found settled in different places within Katsina, Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, and Borno. These communities were renowned for a well-developed culture of Islamic learning. Other salient factors that aided the continued movement into northern Nigeria from Niger included the threat of droughts and a number of basic socio-cultural ties.37 In summary, therefore, in addition to the precolonial historical unity of the territories, the French colonial antagonism to Islam and Islamic scholarship, coupled with the British colonial policy of toleration, contributed to the continued scholarly relationship between the communities of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger.
8Developments in Islamic scholarship and learning in northern Nigeria have been well studied by numerous researchers.38 The obvious historical fact is that the British met a well-established culture of scholarship and learning, one which it was difficult to abandon. The dominant culture was that of Sufi orientation, represented by Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods.39 Of significance in the Sufi tradition is the increasing search for knowledge and for closeness to God, and the purification of the heart for total submission to the will of God. To achieve this state of mind involves a constant search for knowledge, which explains the establishment of a number of schools and centres of worship (mosques / zawiyyah).40 It also demands getting closer to noted men of God (shuyukhs), for the purposes of prayer for success in business or to excel in one’s endeavours. Thus, from the ruling elites and the merchant or business classes down to the commoners, the population sought closeness to the scholarly class.41 It was partly this established culture that led the British into implementing their policy of appropriation, containment, and surveillance, a policy detailed by Umar.42 So expansive and generic was the policy that it provided an enabling environment that accommodated even scholars and students from neighbouring French colonies.43 Yet this was made possible only due to the unceasing surveillance and relentless intelligence reporting by colonial officials. Umar has documented some of these reports by Resident Palmer while he was in Borno and Mr Laing when he was Resident of Zaria Province. Indeed, such a policy was common practice throughout the region. It shows how tactfully the British pocketed a section of the Sufis (Qadiriyya) by accepting them as the official scholars of the ruling class.44 Not long afterwards, the scholarly class represented by the two Sufi brotherhoods became entangled in a contest with one another over their positions of authority in Islam. This gave the British confidence that the scholarly class were no longer a threat. This competition among the Sufis, in fact, has made the two brotherhoods less political and more spiritual. It was while under these conditions that more scholars of the Republic of Niger relocated to northern regions of Nigeria to make their living. Mallam Ibrahim Dantasawa was one such scholar; it was also around this time that Shaykh Abubakar Kiota lived in Zaria with the renowned Shaykh Yahuza Zaria, who died in 1958.45 Shaykh Abdulrazaq Kuso (Magarya) received most of his scholarly training under Shaykh Tijani Yan Mota and Shaykh Abubakar Atiku Sanka in Kano.46 Similarly, Nigérien students thronged into northern Nigeria for the same purpose. Liman Shafiú, the son of Liman Ishaq, the present chief imam of the central Maradi mosque, studied in Kano under these conditions.47 Most members of the scholarly family interviewed in Maradi (Shaykh Mallam Abba and Shaykh Ibrahim Danjiratawa), in Niamey, and beyond testified that they all studied in Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Zaria, or Borno during the colonial and postcolonial periods.48 Overall, therefore, although new barriers were put in place that clearly separated the territorial lands of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger as distinct political entities, the nature of the French colonial policy and its dislike for mixing religion and governance led many Nigérien scholars and students to move into the northern Nigerian area in search of Islamic knowledge.49
9Independent Niger did not change much when it came to the government’s relationship with Islam and Islamic scholarly culture. Secularization of the polity continued under Hamman Diori,50 who adopted an ambivalent posture particularly towards Islam in Niger. Under this policy, no room was afforded to Sharia law to operate, even though customary law was acknowledged in Niger’s civil code. The madrasahs (Quranic schools) were kept under state control through the Ministry of Interior, and the state played an active role in training the personnel responsible for running the madrasahs, ensuring thorough surveillance. The upgrade of the system, which rehabilitated Islamic education under the Seyni Kountché regime (1974-1987), was more for political reasons than spiritual. It gave the Republic of Niger international recognition and acceptability by Islamic countries. It was also during this period that Niger began to enjoy financial assistance for the building of mosques and Islamic schools. Niger started to experience so much external influence on its religious life that the government had to take a stand. The Nigérien government was compelled to come with a new form of secularization which instituted firm state control through the only recognized Association Islamique du Niger,51 an umbrella association under which all Islamic activities had to be conducted. It was at this point that Saudi Arabia’s Islamic influence started to gain ground in the republic. Saudi Arabian-educated technocrats were exported into especially Niger’s schools system. New model mosques equipped with loudspeakers and all sorts of modern gadgets began to be noticed in some select locations in Niger.52 This became the dominant culture in the history of Islam from the commencement of the 21st century, especially with the process of democratization in Niger. What remains unique in the case of the Republic of Niger, unlike the case in Nigeria, is that the state stands firm on the non-involvement of religion in politics. In Nigeria, possibly because of the complex socio-cultural setting and the lack of a shared national identity, government officials unofficially delved into religious activities – for political reasons and, indeed, manipulation.53 It was this that introduced the competition for the control and influence of religion in Nigeria, which then expressed itself in doctrinal division, conflict, and insurgency.
Islam and the reformist movements in Nigeria
10The achievement of Independence in Nigeria in 1960 was followed by more serious religious challenges, spearheaded by Shaykh Mahmoud Abu Bakr Gumi.54 This marked the beginning of a new reform movement for the revival of Islam after the 1804 Jihad.55 This reformist movement inevitably also had effects in Niger.56 Most of the leading religious preachers in Maradi, Niamey, and some other important towns in today’s Republic of Niger witnessed these developments while they were students in northern Nigeria. Shaykh Sani Dan’auta studied in Sokoto under the tutorship of a Sufi scholar (Shaykh Mallam Baba) of the Qadiriyya Tariqa. Sokoto was then the centre of the Qadiriyya Sufi order; indeed, Shaykh Usman Fodio himself was a Qadiriyya follower, as also were members of his family.57 Shaykh Sani stated that he undertook all his studies in Sokoto under the influence of Qadiriyya Sufi culture, and he returned to Maradi only after completion. Shaykh Mallam Yahaya, leader of Ih Ya’u Sunnah, had the same experience of studying in Nigeria, after which he returned and established his hold in Lakouroussou, a neighbourhood of Niamey. His reformist ideas can be traced to both Nigeria and Habib al Haq of Mali.58 Shaykh Malam Suleiman, leader of Kitab wa Sunnah, with headquarters in the Sonni area in Niamey, is a product of a similar experience of Nigerian orientation.
Photo 1. A Karatun Zaure session, in Katsina town, led by Sheikh Mohammad Awwal Zawiyya, the Chief Imam of Katsina Central Mosque, and a Tijaniyyah Tariqa scholar

(Photo: Mustapha Gwadabe)
Photo 2. Sheikh Sani Dan’auta, Maradi, Republic of Niger. He is a product of Karatun Zaure and still teaches in the same way in his house in Maradi

(Photo: Mustapha Gwadabe)
11This process of studying in Nigeria has established connections and influences between scholars of Nigeria and Niger, in addition to the fact that historical antecedents have also supported an organic link. As in Nigeria, the Sufi order was the line of thought along which Islam was established in Niger. In his very clear definition of Sufism, Shaykh Fodio identifies it with ihsan, which he defines as every Muslim imitating what the Prophet used to do. This is to worship God as if you see Him; for even if you do not see Him, He sees you.59 Though Shaykh Fodio did not discuss mysticism, he recognized it as one of the elements in Sufism reserved for contemplative gnostics.60 It is therefore sarcastic to associate the present claimants of Ah lul Sunnah as heirs of Shaykh Usman Fodio.61 But that has been the claim. For example, Shaykh Sani Dan Auta, a member of the Ah lul Sunnah preachers in Niger (Maradi), explained that his views against the Sufi order were derived from his ‘independent’ readings of the works of Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio.62 He detailed his transition more to the regular listening to the tafsir (exegesis) and other commentaries of Shaykh Gumi on the Federal Radio Kaduna. This is the same point that was raised by Shaykh Jafar Mahmoud, one of the noted preachers of the Ah lul Sunnah, who lost his life to gunmen.63 Rather than Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio, therefore, it was the radio programme of Gumi that waylaid most of these individuals into reformist Islam. As pointed out by Brigaglia, Shaykh Gumi monopolized the Kaduna Radio station to his advantage owing to his official position as Grand Khadi in the government of the Northern Region, as well as his being adviser on religious affairs to the premier of the then Northern Region. The strategic space he operated from, the Sultan Bello Mosque, was an added advantage to his clout, consisting of government officials of the then Northern Region, politicians, educated elites, and rich merchants. This was in addition to Shaykh Gumi’s position as a mediator of funds from the Gulf States, which he used in establishing Islamiyya schools and promoting radical change of the educational system.64 In addition to preaching, Shaykh Gumi also wrote a number of books to explain his position, one of which was published in 1972 with the title al Aqida al-Sahiha. Foremost in this book and most of his preaching were attacks on Sufi doctrine in the name of preaching Ah lul Sunnah. He condemned a number of the Sufi rituals as unbelief and demanded excommunication of all those involved. The result of Gumi’s outburst created division among scholars and also in mosques, and this affected all other Islamic institutions and relations, including the powers of the traditional rulers for approving the location, construction, and status of mosques.65
12The anti-Sufi ideas of Gumi can be traced to the training he received while a student at the School for Arabic Studies in Kano,66 one of the British educational institutions designed to transform Islamic learning away from the influence of the traditional scholars.67 Consequent to the unceasing criticisms of Sufi practices by Shaykh Gumi and his group, an association was established called Jama’atu Izalatul Bid’a wa Iqamatu Sunnah (JIBWIS). Registered during General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida’s regime, the association took upon itself not so much a reform of the religion but a contestation of all Sufi practices and pronouncements. Looking at the scene more critically, the study by Mustapha et al. makes clear that what obtained during this period was a competition for followers, for the prestige of the cleric.68 It was a conflict over how to become a good Muslim, not about disbelief, that split the Muslim community; this was not the case with the 1804 Jihad, which was more about reform. The differences so apparently noticed are those of interpretation of the text and the ritual practices, but not of what fundamentally approves or disapproves of one’s belief in the religion. Yet Muslims continue to get more divided, with greater sectarian fragmentation and accusations of unbelief (takfir). Thus, efforts at interpretation of texts and the claim for authority in the religion have created diverging views under which sin and unbelief are frequently blurred by sectarian beliefs. In this process, various groups emerged claiming more religious authority and integrity over others, justifying attacks, the perpetuation of violence, and the invasion of individuals’ privacy. It was following these developments that Muslim reformists in Nigeria demanded not just reform of the religion but of the Nigerian state, which translated into the introduction of a Sharia legal system in most northern states after the 1999 transition to civil rule.69
13Sokoto, one of the case studies for this work – and indeed most communities of the Nigerian area – experienced one form of such division or another. While on a larger scale there appeared a proliferation of mosques and Islamic organizations and centres of worship, the development also led to negative consequences. Dominant among these were the struggle for ownership and control of mosques, especially Friday mosques. There also emerged an organized body (Mosque Committee) to look after the mosques, and the yan agaji (aid group). Prior to these developments, only one Friday prayer mosque existed in most major towns, with a recognized imam respected by all members of the community. In some cases, smaller towns did not even have Friday mosques; they had to travel to a nearby town to observe congregational Friday prayer. Prayer (salat) is one of the five pillars of Islam, and it is prescribed to be observed in congregation in a mosque, at specific times, under the leadership of an imam. Most of the mosques in northern Nigeria since the 1804 Jihad were under the control of scholars of Sufi background. The emergence of the reformist Islam represented by the preaching of Shaykh Gumi condemned Sufi Islam and used power and influence to take over most such mosques, starting with the Sultan Bello Mosque in 1962.70 Wherever it proved difficult to hijack a mosque, new mosques were built, which led to the phenomenon of the proliferation of mosques within nearly every 100-metre range. So, while from 1809 – when the first Juma’a mosque was built in Sokoto – to 1972 there were only three Jumu’a mosques in the whole city, from 1972 to 2014 the number of Friday mosques increased to a total of 36. The number of non-Friday mosques (khamsa salawat) is uncountable; this is what now obtains in the areas studied in both Nigeria and Niger.71 More interesting, however, is that disagreement and conflict over the control of mosques in Sokoto and most other parts of Nigeria were not always peaceful. This development was not peculiar to Nigeria; rather, it was global.72 The most interesting development in Sokoto is the case of the Sultan Hassan Dan Mu’azu Juma’a mosque, located in the Runjin Sambo area.73 Built in 2001, the mosque was under the control of the Sufi Qadiriyya imam. In addition to the general public, this area is also the residence of staff of the Usman dan Fodio University in Sokoto. Disagreement over the leadership of the mosque came about when the senior imam, Mallam Usman Bakale, died and had to be replaced. Succession periods – due to the death of an imam, for example – were often periods of conflict and disagreement, especially in mosques where there were tendencies to a clear division based mostly on differences of interpretation. In the case of the Sultan Dan Mu’azu mosque, disagreement arose between members of the Mosque Committee (primarily members of the Usman dan Fodio University community) and the ordinary members of the larger community. The basis for the disagreement was ideological differences, but what is commonly reported is that the Sufi imam did not recite the Quran with an Arabic poetic tone and also that his weekly sermon (the Friday qutba) did not respond to contemporary issues.74 Since all public mosques are under the control of the traditional institutions of the respective localities, the matter came to the attention of the sultan (Sultan Abubakar Sa’ad), who invited the two groups for reconciliation. Consensus was not reached, and the best they could achieve was to share the time of the use of the mosque on a weekly basis.75 In the neighbouring community of Argungun, in Kebbi State in Nigeria, such a disagreement led to the division of a mosque by building a wall inside between the two Muslim groups.76
14In Katsina, another important town, similar developments occurred, although not quite the same as those in Sokoto. Katsina is a town in northern Nigeria that borders southern Niger, including Maradi, an equally important town in the Niger Republic. Although historically independent states, contacts between these towns on economic and socio-cultural matters are quite strong to date.77 These established relationships created the means through which influences were extended between especially Maradi and Katsina in the form of movement and settlement of people.
15As narrated by Imam Mallam Auwal (presently the chief imam in Katsina), reformist Islam (Izala or Wahhabi Islam) – as in most parts of northern Nigeria – came to Katsina in the late 1970s, when Shaykh Gumi visited the leading scholarly houses and requested their cooperation. Among his requests was one to allow local children to study under his tutorship in Kaduna, which would guarantee them scholarships to travel to Madinah in Saudi Arabia for advanced studies in their fields of endeavour. It was the same strategy he used in most other towns, but he did not succeed in Katsina, in spite of visiting the town over six times. When this strategy did not work to his advantage, a new approach was employed; this was by the unofficial use of official functions to organize a public lecture in the Katsina central mosque, without the knowledge and permission of the chief imam. Rather than informing the chief imam, Shaykh Gumi secured a written authorization from the State House of Kaduna to the Sarkin Katsina, Usman Nagogo.78 The logic for sending the letter through the emir was to psychologically weaken the chief imam and other ordinary members of the town so that they would not resist in any way. It was also to coerce the emir into accepting the membership of the new group, which was also the reason why the police were mobilized and deployed to provide protection. The lecture attracted a great number of participants transported from Kaduna. It was therefore a lecture to Kaduna people in Katsina. Efforts to make the lecture a permanent and consistent feature in the mosque failed. Thus, although the effort to take over the mosque did not succeed, it nevertheless introduced the presence of the Wahhabiya ideas into Katsina. Unlike in the case of Sokoto, which was Qadiriyya Sufi (pro-establishment), Katsina town was dominantly Tijaniyya Sufi; indeed, unlike the Qadiriyya, which was consumed and weakened by a feudal autocracy, the Tijaniyya in Katsina remained scholarly and therefore spiritually dynamic.
16According to Zaharaddeen, three scholarly families were the pillars that made it difficult for Izala to penetrate Katsina.79 They include the families of Shaykh Ahmadu Rufa’i, a leading Tijaniyya scholar connected to the Umarian branch of the brotherhood. He was also the chief imam of Katsina from 1962 until his death in 1977. He enjoyed a large following across Katsina emirate and Daura, which comprised the aristocracy, business class, civil servants, and the merchant class. His death in 1977 created a serious vacuum, especially among the Western-educated elements in the civil service class resident in Kaduna. The scholarly family of Shaykh Ja’afar was next in line; its Shaykh Ja’afar died in 1984. He was noted for his greater influence on most of the Tijaniyya leadership in Katsina. He had very extensive Islamic knowledge – for example, concerning the Quran and its exegesis, the hadith, jurisprudence, and Sufism; he was also noted and respected by the community for his good virtues, patience, sympathy, respect for people, punctuality in appointments, and reflecting true Islamic practices in his dealings with members of the general public.80 Shaykh Abba Abu Rafindadi was the next in line; he died in 1994. Like Shaykh Ahmad Rufa’i, he was of the Umarian Tijaniyya, and also a sharif (a descendant of a grandchild of the Prophet). Though the three families still have heirs engaged in scholarly activities, the powers and scholarly authority the parents wielded during their times could not be sustained by the younger generation.81 It was at this time that Izala found the opportunity to establish its influence in Katsina. It was also at this time that Katsina State was created from Kaduna State, a development that forced Katsina civil servants to relocate back home.82 The predominance of Katsina people in the civil service of Kaduna was due to the advantage of Western education which Katsina people had, as a result of the establishment of Katsina College in colonial days. This singular factor produced people open to new and modern ideas. Thus, most of the Katsina indigenes who settled as civil servants in Kaduna returned to Katsina as members of the Izala group. The advantage of their position as civil servants gave Izala the upper hand in regard to financial and moral support, through which they took over mosques and acquired new land for the construction of many mosques all over Katsina town. While this lessened the contestations and conflict over ownership and control of mosques in Katsina, it presented another dimension of the problem. This was in the form of the proliferation of mosques and contests for worshippers, especially in the residential areas. Like the Pentecostals, the various imams had to be creative either by eloquence in recitation of the Quran or in preaching to attract worshippers. The fitting out of mosques with modern facilities is another means, making the general environment very noisy during times of prayer. The worst are the traffic problems along most of the access roads, including on highways. This is in addition to the hijacking of road traffic control by members of aid groups (yan agaji), who have no form of training. The prevalence of aid groups as paramilitary groups is not only a security risk but is institutionalizing parallel state structures. This also represents a weakening of the Nigerian state and provides space for people to take the law into their own hands.
Democratic transition, the state, and Islamic reformism in the Republic of Niger
17It is clear from the foregoing account that scholarly relations between Nigeria and Niger have a very long history, such that various kinds of influence between the countries cannot be isolated or doubted. This is confirmed by Boukar’s study of the history of the evolution, development, and spread of Izala in the Republic of Niger.83 It was also the outcome of interviews with noted scholars of Maradi and Niamey, and indeed is very clear in the writings of Professors Maïkorema and Sounaye.84 In his study, Boukar commented on the influence of Nigérien deportees from Saudi Arabia (ethnic Kurtey from western Niger) who, ignoring the secular stand of the Nigérien government, began to preach a return to orthodox Islam (Wahhabism) and criticized the teachings of Sufi (Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya) scholars. Boukar further pointed out that the influence of these deportees was restricted to the rural areas, especially around the settlements along the border between Niger and Mali. Indeed, he stressed the point that the spread of this influence to other parts of the Republic of Niger can be attributed to the long-established relations between Nigerian and Nigérien scholars and students.85
18The Islamic reformist movement started active participation in the affairs of governance in Niger from the 1990s, following the establishment of a stable democratic structure. Then, less than ten years later, Nigeria also experienced a stable democracy, which saw the introduction of Sharia Islamic law in Zamfara State, a state neighbouring the Republic of Niger. According to unproven speculation, state funds were misused in financing unbudgeted religious activities for political purposes which had an enormous impact on the larger Muslim communities of the region. Like the developments in most Islamic communities of the 21st century Sahel, the Republic of Niger also experienced divisions and debates between the emerging rival organizations. This and the general instability that characterized the country’s first steps into democracy strongly influenced the decision-making bodies of the various governments and challenged the state authority. Thus, successive regimes defined themselves by the way and manner in which they unduly entertained Islamic associations.86 Much more than in the past, the religious exponent – more precisely, the Islamist exponent – became a political force to reckon with. What differentiated the Nigérien from the Nigerian experience was the lack of direct state involvement. The main actors in the case of the Republic of Niger were young aspiring scholars with little or no influence on the state. If anything, they benefitted only from a lax state that permitted direct external support (financial and scholarly / educational) from Middle Eastern countries – particularly Saudi Arabia – for the Nigérien scholarly community.
19Among the issues of concern in Niger were also the intra-religious squabbles between the respective divisions within Islam; but the most vivid challenge that fired all Muslim groups, as reported by Abdoulaye Sounaye, focused on the promotion of Islamic values.87 This was in respect not only of the dominance of Islam as a major religion in Niger, but the history of the long separation of the state and religious institutions in the country. Consistently, the state promoted a secular identity on matters of governance, similar to the trend during the colonial era and against the growing interests of the reformist Islamic culture that came to dominate the public space in Niger, especially in the more urbanized areas of Niamey and Maradi. The outcome, which was supported by the termination of Niger’s one-party system of political arrangements of the past, was the emergence of various pressure groups, including private media.88
20The support provided by the Islamic countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Sudan to funding and scholarships made a considerable difference to, and indeed shaped, the intra-religious contestations in Niger. As noted earlier, the secular nature of the state confined religion to the private lives of people, such that no organizational activities were permitted. This state of affairs, unlike that in Nigeria, has defined the limits of religious activities, so much so that it was never an issue of debate. Although mosques, as places of worship, have long been in existence in Niger, the culture of holding up religion as a mirror to explain social life was not permitted by the state. Thus, in the 1990s, when the democratic transition occurred and new religious groups emerged, as well as the culture of the politicization of religion, mosques remained a place of worship. Indeed, most of the mosques were directly owned by scholars (or associations of scholars) and not by the state or community, and as such the issue of taking over a mosque or conflict over a mosque was not pronounced. The influx of funds due to the contest between Saudi Arabia’s brand of Islam and that of Iran, supported by the democratic trend in Niger, created a new scene entirely. Rather than taking over older mosques, new and well-furnished mosques were built. In Maradi, Shaykh Sani Dan Auta revealed that based on such support, his mosque and house were built. Indeed, he subsists on such support especially when he goes out for the purposes of da’wa (preaching, lit. ‘issuing an invitation or summons’) to rural villages. Shaykh Falalu, a middle-aged scholar of the Ih’ya U’Sunnah in Maradi, was also building a new mosque and a school at the time of this field research in 2015, supposedly supported by such funding.89 The centre for Islamic learning popularly called ‘Moufidah’ in Maradi is also run by such a fund. Moufidah is composed of a mosque, and an Islamic school that trains young children in primary and secondary education to qualify them for tertiary institutions. Indeed, the dominant culture in the Republic of Niger today is that scholars look for resources to build mosques and schools. In some cases, wealthy individuals contribute to these initiatives of providing financial support, granting land, and sometimes building classrooms. Alhaji Rabé dan Tchadoua is very well noted for this effort. He is inclined to Wahhabi Islam and therefore gives the mosques he builds to the Izala group. His impact is noticeable even in Niamey; indeed, like Ahaji Ahmadu Chanchangi in Nigeria, wherever mosques are built in Niger the name of Dan Tchadoua is associated with them. According to one informant, Dan Tchadoua does not discriminate when it comes to building mosques; this is unlike the case of Chanchangi in northern Nigeria, who finances only the building of Izala mosques and other related activities. Among other individuals mentioned as performing the same function is Alhaji Mamman Jangile, whose impact is very pronounced in Maradi.90 Democratization has therefore transformed religious activities by liberalizing the political environment, such that without the backing of the state, an individual or association can relate directly to the outside world to access funds for religious activities, or for scholarships to further his studies abroad.91 The implications of this are obvious, and it is part of the challenge faced by the Nigérien people and society at this time of religious insurgency.
Conclusion
21Nigeria and the Republic of Niger share much in common, making it predictable that what obtains in Nigeria can also be found in Niger. This is seen by following the history of scholarship and learning between and across the borders of the two countries. By implication, therefore, a Boko Haram-type militancy, just like other scholarly relationships, is likely to be found among the communities of the Republic of Niger.92 Notwithstanding this analogy, the historical reality that produced French colonial policy in the Republic of Niger – especially the dislike for mixing politics, governance, and religion – has made a difference. The French influence led to the establishment of secularism to define and represent the nature, form, and character of the state in Niger, and this approach was adopted by the succeeding administrations after Independence. Although democratization of the Nigérien polity has relaxed the secular nature of the society, the long-established culture, the dynamic political organization, and the communality of socio-culture of the people have made it difficult for Islamist groups to instigate a serious challenge to the state. Such militant preaching as obtains in Nigeria is never permitted in Niger. Furthermore, elements of national unity and feelings of nationhood persist more in Niger than in Nigeria – and whatever the challenge, the forces that unite the people have so far always prevailed. Indeed, the general culture and contemporary development which made available resources to build new mosques have created a better solution and have made contestations over places of worship and learning irrelevant. What remains relevant, however, is that the manner in which Islam is taught in schools – due to the influence of the Wahhabi tradition – breeds tendencies to radicalism and militancy.
Acknowledgements
22I thank my research assistants Dr Murtala Rufa’i in Sokoto, Hon. Sani Musa Arkaf, and Mallam Aminu Zubairu Liman in Katsina, and Dr Aliyu Maradi and Mallam Noura in Maradi. Professor Seyni Moumouni was my contact in Niamey. I thank Professor Zakari Maïkorema for granting me interviews in addition to making available a number of his publications. Mallam Ango Saley translated all my French documents; I thank him greatly. I benefitted considerably from the scholars I interviewed in Katsina, Maradi, Sokoto, and Niamey.
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Notes de bas de page
1 Much has been written on this subject in Nigeria and abroad. The first Nigerian PhD from the Department of History at the University of Ibadan was on the Sokoto Caliphate. It was published in both English and Hausa by Longman and Ibrash Islamic Publication Centre, Lagos: M. Last (1967), The Sokoto Caliphate, Ibadan History Series, Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, London. Many such studies can be found at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria; Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto; Bayero University, Kano; University of Maiduguri; and many other Nigerian universities and research centres.
2 This point was raised and argued for by M.S. Umar, ‘Sufism and its opponents in Nigeria: The doctrinal and intellectual aspects’. In: Frederick de Jong & Bernd Radtke eds, (1999), Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, Brill, Leiden, p. 359. Umar quoted one of the authoritative writings of Fodio on the Jihad. For more information on this as quoted by Umar, see Uthman b. Fudi, kitab al-tafriqa bayn al-tasawwuf alladhi li’tahaqqaq wa’lladhi li’l-takhalluq, MS No. 121, Postgraduate Research Centre, Bayero University Library, Kano.
3 The writings of the 1804 Jihad (also called Sokoto Jihad) leaders are still available in their original texts and in English or Hausa translations at the Waziri Junaidu, Sokoto State History Bureau, Sokoto State, Nigeria. They are also available at the Northern History Research Scheme (NHRS) Library, Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria; Arewa House Centre for Documentation and Historical Research, Ahmadu Bello University, Kaduna; and at other locations within and outside Nigeria.
4 M.S. Umar, ‘Sufism and its opponents in Nigeria: The doctrinal and intellectual aspects’, in op. cit. p. 359.
5 W.F.S. Miles, (1994), Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger, The Wilder House Series in Politics, History and Culture, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, pp. xiii-xvii.
6 M.G.A Smith, ‘Hausa Kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore, 1854-75’. In: Daryll Forde & Kaberry, P.M., eds, West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century, International African Institute, Oxford University Press.
7 W.F.S. Miles, op. cit.
8 In Kani’s view, the relationship between Hausaland and the rest of Africa, especially North Africa, can be traced to the 15th century. This was when direct contact was established through the trans-Saharan route which connected Kano-Katsina with Tuwat, Ghadamas, and Ghat across Tripolitania and Egypt to Hijaz for the purposes of economic, cultural, diplomatic, and intellectual relations. For further reference, see A.M. Kani (2007), ‘The place of Katsina in the intellectual history of Bilad Al-Sudan up to 1800’. In: I.A. Tsiga & A.U. Adamu, eds, Islam and the History of Learning in Katsina, Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan, Nigeria, pp. 24-34
9 This is to borrow what Murray Last refers to as the ‘period of book-plenty and book-shortage’ to equally argue that the present book shortage could be due to the monopoly of Islamic book publication for political reasons by the Saudi government since the mid-20th century. As a result, Islamic books are published and sent out free, making competitive publication very challenging. It is therefore not a matter of a book famine or shortage but the politicizaton of Islamic book publication. Last also acknowledged the 15th and 16th centuries as periods of a book-boom that extended from Timbuktu as far as Hausaland and Borno. Similar experience was also noted in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Sokoto and in other areas around the Sokoto Caliphate. For details, refer to M. Last (2011), ‘The book and the nature of knowledge in Muslim northern Nigeria, 14572007’. In: Graziano Kratli & Ghislaine Lydon, eds, The Trans-Saharan Book Trade: Manuscript Culture, Arabic Literacy and Intellectual History in Muslim Africa, Brill, Leiden, Boston, pp. 175-212.
10 Bugaje presented an interesting discussion of some of the contents and outlook of such a type of scholarly tradition. It is this tradition that established Islam and Islamic culture in most parts of the Sudan. For details, see U.M. Bugaje, ‘Some reflections on the development of Islamic learning in Katsina 1300-1800 AD’. In: I.A. Tsiga et al., eds, ibid. pp. 80-82.
11 M.N. Katsina, ‘A discourse on the intellectual legacies of some pre-Jihad Muslim scholars of Katsina’. In: I.A. Tsiga et. al., eds, ibid. p. 37.
12 My attention was drawn to this by Professor M.S. Umar while he was describing the traditional schooling and learning methods in Hausaland. Umar is Professor of Islamic History at the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.
13 Kani, A.M. (1997), ‘The place of Katsina in the intellectual history of Bilad Al-Sudan up to 1800’. In: I.A. Tsiga & A.U. Adamu, eds, Islam and the History of Learning in Katsina, Ibadan, Spectrum Books. Among such individual scholars of Katsina was Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Al Katsinawi Al Fulani, praised by Abdul Rahman Al Jabarati as a cynosure, the theologian, the ocean of learning, the sea of knowledge, the unparalleled, the garden of science and discipline, the treasury of secrets and mysticism. See ibid. p. 30. See also U.M. Bugaje, ‘Some reflections on the development of Islamic learning in Katsina 1300-1800 AD’. In: ibid. pp. 79-80.
14 J. Hunwick (1989) ‘Borders, boundaries and the concept of State in the Islamic traditions’. In: A.I. Asiwaju & B.M. Barkindo, eds, The Nigeria-Niger Trans-Border Cooperation, Proceedings of the Workshop held at Bagauda Hotel, Kano, Research and Documentation Centre, National Boundary Commission, Malthouse Press, p. 331.
15 During some of these pilgrimages to Saudi, Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse served as the Amirul Hajj, leading the contingents of West Africa, including the political leaders. It was during one such trip that Shaykh Ibrahim, in the course of discussion, drew the attention of the Prime Minister of Nigeria to the relevance of celebrating the birth of the Prophet and the need for a public holiday to be attached to it. Since then the birth of the Prophet remains a public holiday recognized by the government of Nigeria. This regional outlook of pilgrimage remained the practice until some Islamic groups from Nigeria started to raise objections out of jealousy. This is accepting that religion has also played an important role in establishing the basis of unity in the region, as noted by Hunwick. See for details, J. Hunwick, ibid.
16 Ibid. p. 330.
17 A.I. Asiwaju et al. (1993), eds, ibid.
18 Hunwick made the point that Islam has legitimized hijra (migration), and thus Muslims always appreciate environments conducive to religious worship and do not respect boundaries. See ibid. p. 331.
19 Al Maghili was in Hausaland during the reigns of Muhammad Rumfa of Kano, Muhammad Korau of Katsina, and Muhammad Rabo of Zazzau. The three men were contemporaries and played significant roles in the domestication of Islam in their kingdoms. For details on Al Maghili’s intellectual contribution to Islam, see A.M. Kani in I.A. Tsiga & A.U. Adamu, ibid. pp. 24-34.
20 Another scholar with whom this community was built was Imam Jalal al-din al-Siyuti. He was noted to have contributed much to the consolidation of Islam Bilad al-Terur by issuing fatwas (legal verdicts) to the rulers and scholars on various socio-political and economic issues pertaining to Islam. Discussion on his contributions is well covered in A.M. Kani, op. cit. p. 27.
21 Shaykh Umar was in Hausaland before the death of Sunni Ali, the famous ruler of Songhai in 1492. See ibid. p. 28.
22 A.M. Kani, ibid. pp. 28-31.
23 See Map: The Caliphate area, c. 1800. In: M. Last (1962), The Sokoto Caliphate Area, Longman, Great Britain, p. Lxxi.
24 A.A. Kware, ‘Barriers or bridges: International border as an instrument of division or unity between the people of Sokoto State (Nigeria) and Konni area/Tahoua State (Niger Republic)’, Departmental Seminar, Department of History, Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto.
25 Miles, op. cit. p. 249.
26 M.S. Umar made a detailed study of the British policy in Islamic northern Nigeria that explains the various approaches employed. In his exhaustive study, unlike Miles, Umar shows that the British policy was not all about toleration; it also involved appropriation, containment, and surveillance. For a detailed explanation, see the chapter by M.S. Umar (2000), ‘The Tijaniyya and British colonial authorities in northern Nigeria’. In: Jean-Louis Triaud & David Robinson, eds, La Tijaniyya: Une confrérie musulumane à la conquete de l’Afrique, Karthala, pp. 327-56.
27 Unlike the British under Lugard, whose words helped heal the wounds, the French never expressed regret for the violence meted out on her colonies (Niger) and gave no explicit guarantee of post-conquest religious freedom. The scars left by Captain Voulet and Chanoine were left to fester. See Miles, op. cit. p. 250; L. Brenner (2001), Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in West African Muslim Society, Indiana University Press, Indiana University, Bloomington. Private discussions with some of the leading scholarly houses in Katsina, Zaria, Kano, Maradi, Niamey, Kuso, Konni, and Tahoua all testify to the hosting of students and scholars alike from Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.
28 A. Sounaye (2012), ‘Recognising religion in democratisation processes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A case from Niger’, Ciência & Trópico 36(1): 45-72.
29 W.S.F. Miles, op. cit. Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and independence in Nigeria and Niger, p. 249-51.
30 M.S. Umar, op. cit. p. 330.
31 J-L. Triaud (1995), La légende noire de la Sanûsiyya. Une confrérie saharienne sous le regard français, 1840-1930, Paris, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1154 p.
32 H. Gough (1998), The Terror in the French Revolution, Studies in European History, Macmillan Press Limited.
33 Triaud, op. cit.
34 This was from a book published in 1846 by a military officer (Capitaine de Neveu) of the Staff Head Quarters and a member of the Scientific Commission of Algeria. The book was titled Les khouans : ordres religieux musulmans d’Algérie.
35 R. Loimeier, (1999), ‘Political dimensions of the relationship between Sufi brotherhoods and the Islamic reform movements in Senegal’. In: Frederick de Jong & Bernd Radtke, Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, Brill, Leiden, pp. 341-56.
36 Miles, op. cit.
37 J.O. Odihi, ‘Nigeria-Niger trans-border crossing during environmental crisis: Towards planning for disaster migration’. In: Asiwaju, A.I. & Barkindo, B.M. The Nigeria-Niger Trans-Border Cooperation, Research and Publication Committee, National Boundary Commission, Proceedings of the Workshop held at Bagauda HotelKano, 2-8 July 1989, pp. 169-77.
38 M.S. Umar made a list of such research studies covering the subject and period. For details, refer to his chapter titled ‘Sufism and its opponents in Nigeria: The doctrinal and intellectual aspects’. In: Frederick de Jong & Bernd Radtke (1999), Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, Brill, Leiden, p. 357 (fn. 2).
39 A.R. Mustapha & M.U. Bunza (2014), ‘Contemporary Islamic sects and groups in northern Nigeria’. In: A.R. Mustapha, ed., Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities and Conflict in Northern Nigeria, James Currey, Western Africa Series, p. 56.
40 This was the period when Muslim communities were living as an entity without division. Towns and villages operated under an imam that served as the accepted religious leader. This common identity changed with the emergence of the claims of Ah lul Sunnah. Mustapha provided an interesting quotation from one of the noted scholars of northern Nigeria lamenting this change. He also quoted some of the views of the earlier scholars of Islam (e.g. Abu Hanifa) condemning any reform whose consequences produced more problems than solutions. Refer to the introductory part of A.R. Mustapha, ed., Sects and Social Disorder, op. cit.
41 Ibrahim Tahir (1975), ‘Scholars, Sufis, saints and capitalists in Kano’, PhD Dissertation, Cambridge University; Auwalu Anwar (1989), ‘Struggle for influence and identity: The ulama in Kano, 1937-1987’, MA Dissertation, University of Maiduguri.
42 M.S. Umar, op. cit. La Tijaniyya, p. 330.
43 All the interviews held in Niamey and Maradi testified to this; indeed, it became the common culture of all those who went through Islamic education. A number of the scholars remained in Nigeria until the late 1980s owing to the foreign policy shift in Nigeria during the Shagari regime. Mallam Ibrahim Dan Tasawa remained in Nigeria until during the Maitatsine crisis. Direct contact with the Saudi government and the scholarships to study in Medina have led to a significant shift. The tradition remains only with those within the Tijaniyya circle, who besides scholarship also encouraged visits for the purposes of blessing. The city of Kiota of Shaykh Abubakar is still one of the centres of regular visit, as also is Kuso of Shaykh Abdulrazaq. Indeed, the marriage between Shaykh Abdulrazaq Kuso and Sayyada Ramatoullah Ibrahim Nyass further solidified the relations, owing to her Nigerian parentage on her mother’s side. Regular visits of Ramatoullah from Kuso, since the death of Shaykh Abdulrazaq and her relocation back to Nigeria, have become like a festival.
44 M.S. Umar, op. cit. pp. 339-47; see also A.R. Mustapha et al., eds, op. cit.
45 Barhama Sheikh Abubakar Chiota explains that most of the scholars of Niger were taught in Nigeria. Barhama stated that his father, Sheikh Abubakar Chiota, a prominent Tijaniyya sheikh of the whole Republic of Niger, was a student of Sheikh Yahuza Ibn Abdullahi of Zaria.
46 Interview with Malam Tasi’u Danbatta, 2016.
47 Interview with Lliman Shafi’u Liman Ishaq, Maradi, 9 September 2015, chief imam of the Eid prayer mosque, Maradi.
48 Interview with Umar Abdulkadir Hassan, Khalifa of Shaykh Malam Abba, Mallam Banufe, Maradi, 2015.
49 A.R. Mustapha et al., eds, p. 67.
50 Hamman Diori was the first civilian leader in Niger after independence from the French. He was a Muslim and openly proclaimed the fact, attending all the Muslim festivals as well as the spiritual practices. The control was therefore for political gains as well as for religious cooperation. Under his care, the Islamic education system (madrasah) was placed under the Ministry of Interior and not of Education, providing a better opportunity for greater surveillance and ensuring state control and regulation. See ibid. p. 251.
51 F.S.W. Miles, op. cit. p. 253.
52 One of such examples is the mosque adjacent to Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines (IRSH) at Universite Abdou Moumouni, Niamey. The mosque is called Mosquee ibn Hambali (Petit marché) and was built by Himadou Hamani Sirignere, a businessman. He built many such mosques; for example, As Siddik in Kollo, and Imam Malik in Niamey (Wadata). Himadou owns a radio station (Radio Bonferey) and was among the earliest noted supporters of the Ah lul Sunnah followers. Interview with Fatouma Mamouda, Niamey, 6 August 2016.
53 Y.B. Usman (2014), The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria 1977-1987, Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training, printed by M.O. Press, Kaduna, pp. 5-22.
54 There is still an ongoing debate on who really was behind the Islamic reformist movement of the Jama’atu Izalatul Bid’a wa Iqamatu Sunnah, a development that divided the movement into two, the Jos- and Kaduna-based Izala. Ramzi Ben Amara undertook an interesting study worth referring to for details on the issue. R. Ben Amara (2011), ‘The Izala movement in Nigeria: Its split, relationship to Sufis and perception of Shari’a re-implementation’, DPhil. Dissertation, Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies, BIGSAS, University of Bayreuth, Germany. See also Takaitaccen Tarihin Kafuwar Kungiyar JIBWIS A Jihar Pilato (A short history of the establishment of JIBWIS in Plateau State), Ishaq Dan Jos, Dogon Agogo, Bauchi Road, Jos. For more on Abubakar Gumi, refer to U.A. Yar Tsakuwa (1999), ‘The contribution of Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi to the understanding of Islamic ideology in Nigeria’, BA Dissertation, Department of Islamic Studies, Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto; see also his biography, I.A. Tsiga (2001), Sheikh Abubakar Gumi: Where I Stand, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria.
55 It is relevant to make some points clear regarding the use of the term ‘Ah lul Sunnah’. The adherents of Ah lul Sunnah in Nigeria today share nothing with Shaykh Usman Fodio on matters of reform, because his understanding of the reform of Islam (Sunnah of the Prophet) was built on a Sufi orientation. As explained by M.S. Umar, a Sufi orientation (ethical Sufism) is concerned with preaching; acts of purification and improvement of one’s hal (condition) by cultivating praiseworthy attributes in the inner self and cleansing it of blameworthy features; improving one’s hal and relations with others; and learning and divine gnosis. On the other hand, the understanding of the present reformers (Ah lul Sunnah, also called Kitab wa Sunnah) is based on the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who abhorred Sufi doctrines.
56 A. Brigaglia (2007), ‘The Radio Kaduna Tafsir (1978-1992) and the construction of public images of Muslim scholars in the Nigerian media’, Journal of Islamic Studies 27: 173-210; M.S. Umar, ‘Sufism and its opponents’, op. cit.
57 Ibid. p. 358.
58 At his death, Shaykh Sidi Chaibou took over the leadership of the group with its headquarters in Boukoki, a suburb of Niamey.
59 Details of this are found in one of the Prophetic traditions (hadith). See also M.S. Umar, ibid. p. 359.
60 Fodio’s detailed position on mysticism is found in his book titled Wa lamma balagtu. M.S. Umar made a concise summary of it in ibid. p. 359.
61 A. Sounaye, ‘Heirs of the Sheikh: Izala and its appropriation of Usman Dan Fodio in Niger’.
62 Interview with Shaykh Sani Dan Auta, Maradi, 2005.
63 Jafar, in an interview with Brigaglia, mentioned that his first informal training in the discipline of Ah lul Sunnah came about from his listening to Gumi’s radio programmes. Details of the interview are quoted in A. Brigaglia, op. cit. p. 190.
64 Brigaglia’s study of Tafsir in Radio Kaduna elaborately discusses all that occurred, including the reasons for Gumi’s dominance of the station in op. cit. p. 182. Sheikh Mainasara of Sokoto, but resident in Zaria, who was a critic of Mallam Abu Bakar Gumi, recounted that all his efforts to pay for an advertisement to announce the hosting of Maulud Nabi (celebration of the Prophet’s birth) on Federal Radio Kaduna were frustrated in the 1970s by the students of Mallam Abu Bakr Gumi. It was not long before that jinx was broken, possibly around the 1990s, owing to the state policy of austerity measures, which forced all government establishments to source their finances internally.
65 A. Raufu Mustapha et al., eds, Sects and Social Disorder, op. cit., quoted Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi, one of the Tijaniyya sheikhs, lamenting: ‘Before the White man came, any town you went to, all you had to do was do ablution and go in to a mosque and say your prayers. You had no need to ask who the Imam was. [...] Gumi has brought his new religion which is called Izala and they say that we are infidel.’ Essentially Shaykh Dahiru was stressing the point that, rather than uniting the Muslims, Mallam Abu Bakr Gumi has further balkanised the Muslims into warring factions. See op. cit. p. 65; see also M. Wada & K.H. Isa (2015), ‘The proliferation of Jumu’at mosques in Kano Metropolis: A historical perspective’, Paper Presented at International Conference in Honour of Professor Muhammad Sani Zaharaddeen, Department of Islamic Studies and Shari’a, Bayero University, Kano, pp. 8-12.
66 This is not to suggest that training in the school breeds such tendencies, because others did not fall victim. For example, Shaykh Umaru Sanda was his schoolmate, but he never joined such a way of thinking. To understand Shaykh Gumi’s life and the possible reasons for his Wahhabiyya Islam, refer to his biography by I.A. Tsiga (2001), Sheikh Abubakar Gumi: Where I Stand, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria.
67 M.S. Umar, op. cit. pp. 372-73.
68 A.R. Mustapha, ed., op. cit. p. 5.
69 Y.B. Usman (2014), The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria 1977-1987, Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training, Zaria, pp. 5-22, 75-103, 104-136.
70 Brigaglia, op. cit. p. 185. The taking over of the Sultan mosque was not automatic; it had to await the death of the imam, his deputy, and the person calling the prayer. I was personally in the mosque when the person calling the prayer made the point that nobody could replace or remove him from performing his function of calling the prayer in the mosque, since it was the Premier of northern Nigeria (Sir Ahmadu Bello) who had appointed him. It was only after his death that the mosque became totally under the control of the Izala. Similar experiences were noted in many other parts of the northern region. Proliferation and contestations for the control of mosques continued in most parts of northern Nigeria. See for detail M. Kyari (2013), The Role of the Mosques in the Socio-Political Development of Maiduguri, Borno State, Ahmadu Bello University Press; I.A. Jawondo (2004), ‘The place of the mosque in the history of Ilorin Emirate, 1823-2000’, PhD Thesis, Department of History, Usman Danfodio University, Sokoto,
71 In Maradi, Shaykh Sani spoke vehemently on a radio programme to condemn the practice, as not going by the practice of the tenets of the religion, which provided a particular measurement within which mosques should be sited. My interview with him also revealed this point of view.
72 In their study, Wada et al. made reference to the study of West African experience by Cannone, which showed that the rush for control and ownership of mosques was facilitated by the rivalry and competition for the control of the minds of Muslims all over the world. As a result, Saudi Arabian oil wealth was used blindly to gain influence over Sub-Saharan Africa especially, to counteract Iranian influence. It was also with a view to promoting the Saudi brand of Islam (Wahhabiyyah), a development that promoted division among Muslims. For detailed information, refer to M. Wada & K.H. Isa, ‘The proliferation of Jumu’at mosques in Kano Metropolis: A historical perspective’, Paper Presented at International Conference in Honour of Professor Muhammad Sani Zaharaddeen, Department of Islamic Studies and Shari’a, Bayero University, Kano
73 Sultan Dan Mu’azu was the 16th Sultan of the Sokoto Caliphate. The mosque was named after him, but the controversy over its leadership can be linked to the interest of the elite members of the community against the Sufi link of the successor. A. Ibn Muhammad (2014), ‘The proliferation of Jumu’ah mosques in Sokoto Metropolis and its effects on Muslim unity 1808-2013’, MA Dissertation submitted to the Postgraduate School, Usmanu Danfodio University, Sokoto.
74 Interview with Professor A.M. Gada, Chairman Mosque Committee, Sultan Hassan Dan Mu’azu Mosque, Sokoto, 22 March 2015.
75 Ibid.
76 Interview with Imam Usman Aliyu, Second Imam, Sultan Hassan dan Muázu Mosque, Sokoto. For a similar experience in Kano, refer to M. Wada & K.H. Isa, ‘The proliferation of Jumu’at mosques in Kano Metropolis: A historical perspective’, op. cit.
77 Miles, op. cit.
78 Being a leading figure in the community of Muslims in northern Nigeria, Abubakar Gumi influenced the writing of the letter and sent it directly to the emir. This is one of the ways in which Gumi used his position to influence decisions in favour of his group. When approached by the chief imam for explanation, the only statement from the emir was that the chief imam and his people should stay away or support the activity. This was when Katsina was under Kaduna State, and indeed Kaduna was the main headquarters of the Izala.
79 Z. Suleiman (2015), ‘A history of the Tijaniyyah Brotherhood in Katsina, 1906-2009’, MA History, Bayero University, Kano; see also A.I. Yandaki (1990), ‘A history of the Izala movement in northern Nigeria up to 1989’, Unpublished MA (History) Dissertation, UDUS.
80 Z. Suleiman, op. cit.
81 Although Sheikh Ja’far’s son Sheikh Muhammad al-Hadi was appointed as the successor and new muqaddam of the movement, there were small-scale dissociations, especially among elderly followers who considered the new muqaddam too young to lead the movement. Sheikh Hadi, as he was popularly called, was indeed knowledgeable in the eyes of the followers of fayda in Katsina, for he studied Islamic sciences such as Quran, hadith, Sirah, and Sufism at the zawiya of Sheikh Ibrahim in Senegal, and he had wide connections to important Tijaniyya centres in Africa. Nonetheless, his age as the muqaddam became a serious issue for many of the followers of the fayda community. This factor had the effect of providing the basis for the establishment of other Tijaniyya enclaves or zawiyas in Katsina openly independent of the main zawiya of fayda under Sheikh Hadi.
82 Kaduna is the seat or headquarters of Shaykh Gumi’s group of Izala. The political status of Kaduna as regional headquarters as well as the capital of Kaduna State, which Katsina was part of in 1969-1987, gave Izala the upper hand. It was also because of the official position of Gumi as the Grand Mufti.
83 D. Elh. Boukar, ‘La Dynamique du Mouvment Izala dans le quarti Wadata (4e’me arrondissement de Niamey)’, Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Département de Sociologie, Universite Abdou Moumouni de Niamey, 2012-2013; see also the chapter by Zakari Maïkoréma (2007), ‘La naissance et le development du movement Izala au Niger’. In: Jean-Louis Triaud, ed., Islam: Societies et politique en Afrique subsaharianne, Les exemples du Sénégal, du Niger et du Nigeria.
84 Zakari Maïkoréma (2009), L’islam au Niger de 1960 au début des années 2000, Harmattan.
85 More specifically, it was the product of a very long contact with the teachings of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and a retired soldier named Shaykh Ismail Idris, from Jos. The influence penetrated into Niger, through the neighbouring towns of Maradi, Zinder, Diffa, and Birnin N’Konni, into the urban and commercial towns frequently visited by preachers, educated elites, and the business class. In Maradi, the activities were led by Rabe Dan Tchadoua, but that was at the time when the Nigérien government was intolerant of the activities of religious groups. This point was also echoed in strong terms by Professor Maïkoréma during an interview at his IRSH office, Niamey. In his chapter, « La naissance et le development du movement Izala au Niger », (in J.-L. Triaud, ed., Islam: Societies et politique en Afrique subsaharianne, Les exemples du Sénégal, du Niger et du Nigeria, 2007) Maïkorema is also categorical about the influence of Nigeria in the spread of the Wahhabi (Izala) Islam in most parts of the neighbouring towns and indeed in the hinterland of Niger. He also mentioned the influence of Sudan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
86 Interview with Zakari Maïkoréma, IRSH, Niamey, 2015.
87 A. Sounaye, ‘Recognizing religion in democratisation processes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A case from Niger’, p. 50. Sounaye is Professor of Philosophy, Religion and Development Studies at Abdou Moumini University of Niamey, Niger.
88 Sounaye noted the formation of more than 50 Islamic associations around this period. See ibid. p. 56 for details.
89 The source of funding for the mosque was not made clear, but general discussion with some staff and the leader clearly showed strong links with the proponents of the ‘anti-innovation’ groups (Ah lul Sunnah), and more specifically with the Moufidah Islamic group. Indeed, most of the staff and close associates at Sheikh Falalu School were graduates of Moufidah Secondary School in Maradi. Discussion with Sheikh Falalu, 12 September 2015, at his residence in Maradi.
90 It is speculated that most of these influential individuals act as fronts for some of these donor countries to avoid suspicion and also for diplomatic reasons.
91 A. Sounaye, ‘Recognising’, op. cit.
92 Group interview in Niamey with Dr Mahadi El Hadji Maazou, Dr Salao Alhassane, and Dr Ayouba Laouali, (IRSH) Jamiátu Attadamun, Université Privée Franco-Arab, Niamey, 2015.
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