Introduction

1This paper is an attempt to sketch out and analyse the evolution and diverse patterns of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014.¹ Although this nationwide mapping offers representations of the broad spectrum and character of Muslim-Christian religious violence over the eight-year period in focus, it also includes the dynamics of violent deaths of a non-religious nature involving Muslims and Christians. Our assessment also considers the violent interaction between Muslim and Christian groups in relation to other protagonists associated with religious and non-religious issues. Without doubt, the religious institutions of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria are major rallying points for various social and political groups with disparate and sometimes obscure agendas. In fact, the almost ubiquitous use of religious pretexts in Nigeria has at several periods been appropriated by ‘non-conforming’ groups to instigate violence and inadvertently give the impression that religion is the paramount source of violence in the country.

2However, this study finds that while the factor of religion cannot be entirely disregarded, particularly in light of the character of recurrent crises in (northern) Nigeria, religious issues do not represent the only cause of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians in the country. Religion as a causal factor must be put in perspective and nuanced with other pertinent sources of violent deaths, such as issues related to land and territorial claims, ethnicity, and politics and elections, as well as community violence and crimes involving Muslims and Christians. In addition, this study finds that in cases where religion appears to be an underlying cause of violent deaths, such incidents can also be reflected in clashes between just one of the religious faiths and a non-religious protagonist, or in fact occur within the same religious faith.

3The study thus explores the aforementioned dimensions and causes of Muslim-Christian violent deaths, and our analysis is corroborated by maps and graphs of data drawn from the statistical records of Nigeria Watch. Our focus raises several important questions for this study, and three main ones are considered: First, what factors explain why the dynamics of Muslim-Christian religious violence appear to gain more local and international traction in academic and media circles, in contrast to the attention accorded to the narratives of intra-religious violence, for instance? Second, if religious issues are not the only cause of violent deaths between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, which other factor(s) also merit deeper investigation, based on the available data? Third, in connection with other key protagonists such as the security forces, to what extent are the Islamic and Christian faith blocs involved or implicated in incidences of violent deaths in Nigeria? We address these questions in the three main sections of this paper. Following this summary, a description of the general context of religion and violence in Nigeria will be provided and accompanied by brief reference to one of the major theoretical discourses ‑ the ‘clash of civilizations’ ‑ that continues to frame academic (and media) debates on inter-religious tensions in countries such as Nigeria. Bearing in mind the second question in this study, we then move on swiftly to the second part of this paper to characterize the distribution of data related to violent deaths between June 2006 and May 2014. This is done in an attempt to reveal in a statistical way the main causes of violent deaths and their correlation with both religious and non-religious issues involving Muslims and Christians.

4From this point, the third part of this study guides our focus in line with our third question. Based on the data presented, our statistical narrative here enables an understanding of the extent to which Islamic and Christian actors and groups are involved in the phenomenon of violent deaths. This is also examined in association with the role of other protagonist variables implicated in incidences of violent deaths where Muslims and Christians are involved. The concluding section will highlight our findings and underscore what is instructive for further research, based on the overall empirical content analysed in this study.

5In this paper, reference to violent deaths does not exclusively denote the act of perpetration of violence on the part of Muslims or Christians. Rather, the context of our interpretation of violent deaths refers to the involvement of Muslims and Christians also as victims. It should also be noted that the period under examination starts on 1 June 2006 and ends on 31 May 2014. Therefore, apart from the full years in between (2007-2013), data analysed in relation to either 2006 or 2014 should be considered in light of the stipulated period when data collation and analysis started and ended.

Religion and violence in Nigeria

6Violence in Nigeria has taken various forms over the decades, and the data in this study depicts its wide-ranging character expressed through the interactions between Muslims and Christians. Political issues, especially those associated with the struggle for elective offices and power allocation, remain a potent source of violence. This state of affairs is often catalyzed by a lethal infusion of interests rooted in deep socio-economic and ethnic concerns, some of which may be legitimate and others spuriously held by different actors and groups. In addition, the overall frequency of violent deaths in Nigeria owes much to a combination of other causes such as car accidents and crime. And certainly, not least, religious issues appear to also reinforce the collective tally of fatalities, particularly in terms of recurrence rates in regions such as northern Nigeria.

7Scholarly interpretations of this religious angle hold significance because of the added perspective they bring to our assessment of Muslim and Christian involvement in the trends of violent deaths. However, in instances where violent deaths are not underscored by religious issues between Muslims and Christians, or in cases where violent deaths transpire between groups of the same religious faith, it raises questions regarding the limits of certain theoretical paradigms and how effectively their frameworks capture the violent interaction between adherents of religious faiths in Nigeria. One such paradigm pertains to the ‘clash of civilizations’, which suggests that civilization identity, of which religion is a core component, will be increasingly important in the post-Cold War period. Samuel Huntington, the main proponent of this acclaimed yet widely criticized civilizational thesis went further to assert that the fundamental source of conflict and great divisions will be cultural and that the fault lines between civilizations, being the broadest level of cultural identity, will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington 1996).

8To a certain degree, some of the fundamental conflicts evident in the era Huntington prognosticated about have indeed found some expression along religious fault lines, and particularly in relation to Islam in countries such as Nigeria. The academic literature is also instructive in the way it guides our thoughts on the central role of religion. Ellis and Haar (2007) describe religion as an emerging political language whose pattern of interaction cannot be ignored in the study of African politics. For Matthew Kukah (1993), the process of political bargaining in Nigeria appears to increasingly embody the factor of religion. Toyin Falola (1998) pushes this further by underscoring the profundity of religious attachment expressed by both Muslims and Christians and its instrumentality in political life and leadership in Nigeria.

9In the overall estimation of various scholars writing on religion and politics in Nigeria, there appears to be an almost seamless connection between several violent incidents from the 1960s through the decades up to the current period. And at different phases in this historical trajectory, the controversy between Muslims and Christians over the definition and interpretation of ‘secularity’, for instance, has offered opportunities for analysts to gauge what they see as diametrically opposed platforms of Muslims against Christians in Nigeria. A typical instance appeared in 1976 during the drafting of Nigeria’s Constitution and then again in 1986 on the occasion of Nigeria’s admittance into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), which sparked off intense debates between Muslims and Christians. The common thread of ‘fundamentalism’ that also runs through these decades has often given way to militant expressions on both sides of the religious divide in Nigeria. On the one hand, for instance, northern Nigerian Christians, arguing self-defence, have in the past justified the use of militancy to protect their lives and defend their faith through the use of physical violence. On the other hand, however, Islam appears to have gained a wider reputation for militancy than Christianity, as clearly more cases of religious violence involving Islamist groups are reported (Falola 1998).

10The cumulative reality of these events appears to mirror the classical model of a religious clash involving Muslims and Christians in the country. Thus, when a superficial reading of the prevailing Boko Haram crisis is carried out, the penchant to anchor analysis exclusively on Huntington’s discourse and assume the reflection of a clash between a ‘Muslim North’ and ‘Christian South’ is reinforced. Besides, Boko Haram itself purportedly calls for a Sharia state, and the several incidences of violence instigated against Christians or representations of Western civilization in Nigeria tend to receive considerable media interest and hype both locally and internationally. The overall impression of a civilizational clash involving Muslims and Christians is also strengthened in some way by the phenomenon of the ‘youth bulge’ in Africa and particularly in the case of Nigeria where the demographic structure is characterized by nearly three-quarters of the population being under the age of 30 (Leahy et al. 2007). The portrayal of such a population trend in a country where there is an exceedingly large and mismanaged youth population invokes the notion of how easily violent deaths can be a consequence of youth vulnerability in the hands of radicalized (religious) groups. By extension, it also becomes easy to understand how much analysis of the violence involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria maintains intellectual currency within academic debates, policy circles, and the sensational projection of the global media.

11Beyond this, however, the connections between the aforementioned variables are far more complex than what fits perfectly into a single theoretical paradigm about a clash between religions. The religious divide between Muslims and Christians should not be overstated, because the monolithic perception held by many observers of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria should be balanced with the sense of caution expressed by scholars such as Pérouse de Montclos. He draws attention to the need to recognize the divisions within Islam as well as disruptive factors within the Muslim ummah, which crises such as that related to Boko Haram underscore (Pérouse de Montclos 2014). This kind of perspective holds merit as a safeguard against speculative counter-arguments about an inter-religious clash and also as a guide for other aspects of our study, which will permit a fuller understanding of the idea of divisions or schisms within religions such as Islam in Nigeria. Particularly in the third part of this paper, an appreciation of this will emerge through our statistical presentation of violent trends between rival groups aligned to the same religion. However, before reflection on this, we will proceed to present and analyse the distribution of data related to the causes of violent deaths and its relationship to religious and non-religious issues involving Muslims and Christians.

Frequency of violent deaths and their causes

12Between 1 June 2006 and 31 May 2014, the absolute number of violent deaths recorded by the Nigeria Watch database was over 61,000 (Figure 5.1). This staggering number is spread out over the period examined in this study. Although an observable feature of this data is the steady rise in the absolute yearly frequency of deaths from 2009 to 2013, a critical look at 2014 reveals a sharp increase in the measure of absolute frequency just within a period of five months. Furthermore, in less than a year’s span, the aggregation of violent deaths for the first five months of 2014 exceeds the absolute frequency of violent deaths for each of the preceding years, with the exception of 2013. Subsequent events confirmed this alarming trend.

Figure 5.1. Absolute number of violent deaths per year (June 2006-May 2014)

13Yet Figure 5.1 does not provide a clear enough impression of which factors act as instigators of lethal violent. Figure 1.2 takes us a little closer by fine-tuning our focus. Between June 2006 and May 2014, religious causes thus accounted for over 11,300 violent deaths. Some other causal factors registered higher frequencies, and two major variables were crime and car accidents, with over 27,000 and 15,000 fatalities, respectively. The data shows that religious issues did not constitute the main cause of violent deaths, taken in absolute terms, over the past eight years. However, if we focus on the data on absolute fatalities caused by religion and distribute it over the eight-year period, it will permit us to gauge the proportion of violent deaths attributable to religious issues on a yearly basis (Figure 5.2). This is possible when we compare the yearly data on religious causes of violent deaths (Figure 5.2) with the yearly data on absolute number of violent deaths (Figure 5.1). In the process, even though we are still unable to view proportions of Muslim and Christian involvement in violent deaths, we are able to detect the relative influence of religious issues, especially during years such as 2013 and 2014. If we consider 2014, for instance, not only did violent deaths rise dramatically, but religious issues accounted for nearly half the number of violent deaths in the first five months. The reason for this high proportion is closely associated with the dynamics of violent deaths caused by the Boko Haram crisis in northern Nigeria. We will shed some light here because the spikes in violent deaths for 2013 and 2014 are also linked to the involvement of Muslims and Christians in violence, either as perpetrators or victims.

Figure 5.2. Violent deaths caused by religious issues, per year (June 2006-May 2014)

Map 5.1. Fatalities caused by religious issues in Nigeria (June 2006-May 2014)

Violent deaths in 2013 and 2014

14The year 2013 had the highest frequency of violent deaths in the country, with an absolute figure of 10,486, while 2014 followed with a similar trend. Although factors such as crime are a foremost cause of violent deaths across the entire eight-year period, issues located within the context of religion were the underlying reasons for the escalation of violent deaths in 2013 and 2014. The religious issues in question here are attributable, of course, to the Boko Haram crisis, which at the same time explains the spike in violent death rates in places such as Borno State in 2013 and 2014 (Figures 5.2 and Map 5.1). These were particularly violent years, as the group calling itself the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (widely known as Boko Haram) was responsible for numerous attacks against the security forces and civilians, Muslim and Christian alike. It should be noted, however, that the death timeline as a result of Boko Haram attacks can be traced back to periods before 2013. In fact, in December 2003, members of the sect reportedly launched a series of deadly attacks on police stations in northern cities such as Kanama in Yobe State. However, such instances in the past pale in comparison with the sequence of violent onslaughts by the group in 2013 and 2014. While the generation of an entire list of these attacks is not the main focus of this section, some major incidents involving the fatalities of both Muslims and Christians stand out owing to the scale of the loss of lives involved.²

15In September 2013, approximately 50 students of the School of Agriculture in Guijba were reportedly killed in Yobe State. This event was preceded by the massacre of approximately 49 people in August following an attack on a mosque and several villages, including Konduga and Malari, in Borno State. The degree to which lives were lost in single attacks in 2014 was unprecedented, based on the fatality records in the Nigeria Watch database. In February 2014, gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members killed at least 47 people in Bama and Buratai in Borno State. Within the same state (and month), Boko Haram insurgents attacked Izghe village and killed 106 people. If there exist doubts regarding the identity of the perpetrators of some of these attacks, Boko Haram publicly claimed responsibility for the April 2014 bomb blast that claimed the lives of at least 70 people at a mass transport terminal in Nyanya, Abuja.

16A final example is that involving the death of hundreds of individuals during a clash between security operatives and Boko Haram members who launched an attack on Giwa Military Barracks in Borno State in March 2014. There were various casualty accounts rendered by the Nigerian press community, with the Vanguard newspaper suggesting 207 deaths, ThisDay reporting 350, and Daily Trust stating that as many as 500 lives were lost (Nigeria Watch database 2014). It should be noted, however, that exact figures remain a subject of debate and so also is the problematic issue of identifying the precise religious identity of some of the victims of these attacks. As a matter of research, Chouin, Reinert and Apard (2014) set out this thinking eloquently, and they attest to the particular difficulty in ascertaining the religious identities of several victims of Boko Haram attacks with complete accuracy. Notwithstanding, the findings of these scholars suggest that the majority of the victims of Boko Haram attacks ‑ around two-thirds ‑ are in fact Muslims. This of course challenges the commonplace temptation to understand the crisis as a war between religions. For our study’s focus, what is also not in doubt is the diverse range of actors who comprise the casualty figures: the fatality profiles consist of victims who are Boko Haram insurgents, members of the Nigerian government’s Joint Task Force (JTF), and Christian and Muslim civilians.

Frequencies of Muslim and Christian violent deaths

17We have been able to establish to some degree the impact of religious issues on the escalation in the number of violent fatalities in certain years, such as 2013 and 2014. The added bearing of the Boko Haram crisis on the connection between religious issues and fatalities has also been highlighted. Without disregarding the relevance of this link, we must at the same time keep in mind one of the questions of this study, which underscores the interrogation of non-religious causal factors of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians as well as the role of other non-religious protagonists that have at certain periods been implicated in the phenomenon of violent deaths involving either Christian or Islamic groups. Once again, we must emphasize that the frequency of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians does not always express a connection with religious issues only. One way to test this is to compare the data in the yearly frequencies of violent deaths linked to religious issues with the yearly frequencies of violent deaths linked to the involvement of Christians. In other words, compare the data presented in Figure 5.2 with that of Figure 5.3. By doing so, we can identify a year such as 2008, when the frequency of violent deaths involving Christians (605 fatalities) was higher than the frequency of violent deaths linked to religious issues (576 fatalities). This disparity can be understood, of course, in light of the fact that in November 2008, there were comparably higher numbers of Christian fatalities (protagonists and victims) following ethno-political clashes over local government election results in Plateau State.

18We can also apply this same principle of comparison to the Islamic context. To test this, we can compare the data in the yearly frequencies of violent deaths linked to religious issues with the yearly frequencies of violent deaths linked to the involvement of Muslims. While still drawing upon our comparative data in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, we can identify years such as 2012 when the frequency of violent deaths involving Muslims (2,033 fatalities) was higher than the frequency of violent deaths linked to religious issues (1,170 fatalities). Similar to the way we explained the case with Christian fatalities, the observed disparity here can also be understood against the background of violent clashes and deaths that involved Muslims or Muslim groups in relation to issues that are not necessarily religious in nature.

Figure 5.3. Violent deaths involving Islamic and Christian groups, per year (June 2006-May 2014)

19At the heart of these comparisons is the fact that there are certain fatalities which are attributable to entirely non-religious issues involving Muslims and Christians. This explains to an extent why there are certain years reflecting lower frequency bars for religious causes of violent deaths in comparison with higher frequency bars for either Islamic- or Christian-related violent deaths in the country. In other words, the existence of ‘excess’ fatalities explains why the frequency bars for Islamic and Christian groups are at certain periods higher than the frequency bars for religious causes.

20There were certainly other years that reflected higher frequencies of violent deaths involving Muslims in comparison with the frequencies of violent deaths linked to religious issues. These periods include 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2013. However, the fatalities that contributed to making these years particularly higher in frequency are, of course, not only linked to non-religious issues such as politics or land/territorial crisis; they are also linked to the role of what we referred to earlier as non-religious protagonists. In this regard, while the causes of violent deaths may indeed be religious, one of the actors involved in a violent encounter may be a Christian or Islamic group and the other a state security entity such as the police or the JTF.

21As it appears in our data and especially when we make reference to Figure 5.3, there are comparably more yearly periods that reflect higher frequency levels of violent deaths involving Muslims or Islamic groups. Typical cases include 2012 and 2013, which far outweigh the frequency of violent deaths involving Christians or Christian groups. Although, as we have noted all along, this high frequency on the Muslim side entails a combination of both perpetrators and victims of violence, it is the kind of disparity which has led scholars such as Falola (1998) to suggest that Islam has gained a wider reputation for militancy than Christianity. It is also the kind of disparity which in a metaphoric sense is a reminder of Huntington’s (1996: 254) analysis of the phenomenon he describes as ‘Islam’s bloody borders’.

Beyond frequencies: Dimensions of violent death incidents

22Returning to our data, we will try to expound further on these ‘excess’ fatalities involving Christian and Islamic groups, which appear to fall outside the scope of religious issues. We will expand our framework to also examine some of these non-religious protagonists implicated in the phenomenon of violent deaths involving Christian and, particularly, Islamic groups. In doing so, we will look beyond the frequency of violent deaths to examine more critically the nature of the issues themselves. The frequencies of violent deaths tell us one thing, but the frequencies of the violent incidents that produce these violent deaths reveal even more. This opens up in several interesting ways another dimension of our study. First, it facilitates our knowledge of the frequency of these incidents involving Christian and Islamic groups in addition to just the frequency of the violent deaths reflected in the graphs so far. Second, we will have more knowledge of the extent to which non-religious issues involving Christian and Islamic groups occur and recur each year. And third, we will further be able to gain a clearer sense of the proportions which these non-religious and religious issues hold in relation to each other, as well as the correlational dynamics between the different protagonists between June 2006 and May 2014.

23Table 5.1 is therefore an attempt to capture the aforementioned explanation through the display of various frequencies of violent death incidents of which religious and non-religious issues are casual factors with the involvement of Muslim and Christian groups, as well as their linkages with other key protagonists. The search method used in generating the data in this table employed the use of the key words ‘Islamic groups’ and ‘Churches’ in the Nigeria Watch database. When these specific key words are utilized in a search like this on the database, the data generated includes violent incidents involving Islamic groups and Christian groups, as well those incidents that share a nexus with intra-group violence within either of the religious faiths. Additional data generated through this search method includes incidents of both a religious and non-religious character which have a lethal connection between either of the religious faiths and other non-religious protagonists.

24For each year, all the data generated is classified under six main rubrics: Islamic group versus Christian group (religious issues); Islamic group versus Christian group (non-religious issues); Islamic group versus Islamic group (religious issues); Islamic group versus Security forces (JTF, police); Islamic group versus Vigilante group, Civilian JTF; and Other Violent Death Incidents involving Muslims and Christians (Community violence). With reference to specific incidents, where necessary we will analyse the data under each rubric one at a time.

Islamic group versus Christian group (religious issues)

25Under this rubric, we take into account the recurrence rate of violent incidents with manifestations inspired by religious issues involving Christian and Islamic groups. A total of 57 incidents are identified, and 2012 represents the year with the highest rate of this type of incident between June 2006 and May 2014. In comparison with some other rubrics that possess higher frequencies of incidents reflected in Table 5.1, this total figure of 57 is once again a reminder of how religious issues do not represent the only cause or pattern of violent deaths involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. These religious incidents are nonetheless significant and are mainly comprised of three forms of violent encounters: first, attacks instigated by the Islamist group Boko Haram against Christian groups, with churches being a prime target; second, attacks through series of assassinations targeted at Christian clerics; and third ‑ although to a lesser extent than the first and second forms ‑ reprisal attacks by Christians against Muslims.

26The geographical locations of the majority of these incidents include Niger, Kaduna, Yobe, and Borno states, all of which are in the northern region of the country. Regarding the first form of violent encounter, instances include the bomb attacks on churches, notably Saint Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State on 25 December 2011. Other events include the attack on Saint Rita’s Catholic Church, Kaduna State in October 2012, as well as numerous attacks on other church denominations in Borno State. Among several cases of assassinations, three clerical leaders affected were Reverend David Usman of the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Reverend Ilaisha Kabura of the same COCIN, and Reverend Bulus Marwa of Victory Baptist Church. Table 5.2 provides further insight into the trend of Islamist-motivated (mostly Boko Haram) attacks on Christian clerics between June 2006 and May 2014. Finally, in regard to reprisal attacks by Christians, a typical case transpired in June 2012 in Kaduna State when scores of Muslims were killed by Christians following suicide bomb attacks on churches a few days earlier in the state.

Islamic group versus Christian group (non-religious issues)

27With 42 incidents between June 2006 and May 2014, the details under this rubric attest to violent death dynamics typified by non-religious causes involving Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Although the non-religious causes may appear insubstantial in terms of recurrence rates, their importance can still not be ignored. Based on the data, they represent violent deaths connected with issues such as election to political office. The years 2008, 2010, and 2011 stand out in relation to these non-religious causes and, to various extents, states such as Plateau, Kaduna, Kano, and Bauchi bear witness to this. In Plateau State, for instance, November 2008 was a critical period for local government elections in Jos North, where a tense political struggle for power pitched the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) against the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP).

28In Jos North, voters were polarized because the PDP was made up of mostly Christian supporters and the ANPP largely comprised the Jasawa, who are mainly Muslims of Hausa/Fulani ethnic make-up. Only to this extent did this combination create an entry point for religion in the local government election crisis, because the crisis which led to a reported 350 to 500 deaths (some estimates are higher) in just two days was essentially political in nature. In fact, in the account rendered by Philip Ostien (2009), he explained that although religious difference adds fuel to the fire when things go wrong, it remains a secondary factor. Ostien thus emphasized that the underlying problem stems from the alleged rights of indigenes (meaning roughly ‘earliest extant occupiers’) to control particular locations, as opposed to the rights of ‘settlers’ or ‘strangers’ (or more generally ‘non-indigenes’), defined as everybody who came later.

29The violent fallout from election results recurred in April 2011. However, this time, clashes between Muslims and Christians were due to presidential elections in which the main opposition candidates, Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim from the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), lost to the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the Niger Delta in the South, who was the candidate for the ruling PDP. As with the previous crisis, the violence that ensued divided opposing parties and their supporters along ethnic and religious lines. However, the underlying cause was largely political and more widespread because violent deaths involved Muslims and Christians in places such as Zangon-Kataf and Kachia in Kaduna State, Alkaleri and Itas/Gadau in Bauchi State, and Kano Municipal in Kano State.

Islamic group versus Islamic group (religious issues)

30Our mapping study will not be complete without delving into the dimension of the violent interplay between and among Islamic groups. With a total of 60 incidents of intra-Islamic violent deaths, it is vital to consider the character of these events. They are divided into two broad categories: violent deaths due to clashes between Sufi brotherhoods such as the Tijaniyya and groups such as the Yan Izala; and, in the second case, violent deaths due to clashes involving either of these Islamic brotherhoods (and sects) and Boko Haram. The incidents involved in both categories are underpinned by religious issues and usually stem from differences in the interpretation of Islamic doctrines. However, the violent outcomes of these divergent interpretations of Islamic tenets are more pronounced in regard to the second category, that involving clashes between Islamic groups and Boko Haram. This is evident not only in the frequency of incidents but also in the number of fatalities as a result of incidents. These incidents also entail in some cases attacks on mosques by the rival Islamist sect Boko Haram. More significant in the second category is the nature of the fatalities involved, which include an increasing number of Islamic clerics. Table 5.3 is a list of some of these clerics reportedly attacked and killed by Boko Haram between June 2006 and May 2014.

31There are a few of these assassination cases, however, whose source of perpetration is still shrouded in controversy. An example is that related to the death of Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam. In such cases a direct link to Boko Haram remains inconclusive. The locations of most of these intra-Islamic violent death incidents include states such as Kaduna, Yobe, and Borno. Some of the inter-group clashes observed in the data tend to often involve the Shi’ite Islamic movement. There are three notable occurrences in regard to this: The first was in January 2009, when Shi’ite adherents in Zaria, Kaduna State clashed with a rival Islamic group following accusations by this group against the Shi’ites of attacking the convoy of the Emir of Zaria. In January 2011, violent encounters ensued again between the Shi’ites and members of the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood in Kaduna State. A third instance was in October 2013, when Shi’ite members clashed with Sunni youths in Sokoto State. These incidents, in which the Yan Shi’a movement led by Sheikh Ibrahim El Zakzaky was implicated, do not in any way downplay the violent complicity of groups such as the Yan Izala, which indeed clashed with members of the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood in October 2013 in Zamfara State.

32It was noted earlier that the second category of violent deaths caused by intra-Islamic clashes refers specifically to attacks instigated by Boko Haram against the entire cross-section of Islamic groups in Nigeria. Similar to the desire of several of these Islamic movements in the country, Boko Haram advocates a nationwide application of Sharia. However, the line of disparity between these Islamic groups and Boko Haram is drawn based on the aggressive modus operandi which Boko Haram adopts. As a result, it is indeed the case that the majority of these Islamic groups are in fundamental disagreement with Boko Haram, and it is this point of divergence that contributes to the provocation of violence. Consequently, while 2011 reflected the highest frequency of Boko Haram attacks against several members of these Islamic groups and their mosques, 2012 was replete with a record number of assassinations targeted at Islamic clerics perceived as ‘opponents’. Table 5.3, as already noted, lists some of these casualties.

Islamic group versus the security forces

33The security forces constitute what this study has so far described as non-religious protagonists. Although not the prime concern of this study, their role assumes some measure of significance owing to their violent interaction with one of the major variables (Islamic actors) examined in this paper. Thus, on the one hand we have the Islamist group Boko Haram, and on the other we have the security forces, comprised of members of the JTF, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and the State Security Service (SSS), among others. In addition, this rubric represents the highest number of violent death incidents (418) with which one of our major variables (Islamic actors) is connected. However, the lead-up to this high frequency of incidents appeared inconsequential until 2009, when figures (fatalities and incidents) began to accumulate.

34It should be noted that among the several deaths that occurred in 2009, that of the former leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, marked a turning point in the level of violent encounters involving the Islamist group and the security forces. Consequently, more clashes ensued in 2010 and particularly in (August) 2011, which was also the year when the UN building was attacked. Events reached a violent crescendo in 2012, when as many as 161 incidents transpired, in places such as Damaturu and Potiskum in Yobe State, Zaria in Kaduna State, Tarauni in Kano State, and Dikwa and Maiduguri in Borno State. As at May 2014, there have been 31 violent death incidents involving members of Boko Haram and the security forces since the start of the year. Although this may not reflect a high frequency in comparison with the two preceding years, the incidents in the first five months of 2014 led to well over 3,000 deaths (Figure 5.3).

Islamic group versus Vigilante group and Civilian Joint Task Force

35By mid-2013, when the Nigerian government imposed a state of emergency in north-eastern states such as Borno, the formation of what is now called the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) became very visible amidst the violence instigated by the Islamist group Boko Haram. Since 2013, the CJTF, comprised mainly of youths whose families and communities have been ravaged by the state of unrest in the North-East, has engaged Boko Haram in a number of violent encounters. By way of counter-reaction, Boko Haram insurgents have extended their scope of attacks beyond battles waged against the state, religious clerics, and the government’s JTF to engage members of the CJTF in several clashes. Although the CJTF does not constitute one of the leading variables of this study, their contribution to the overall frequency of violent deaths resulting from clashes with an Islamist group creates an entry point for them into the framework of our mapping study.

36Our data reflects a total of seven lethal incidents involving the CJTF, five of which occurred in 2013 and two as at May 2014. In spite of the presence of the CJTF in a number of states within the troubled North-East, these incidents all transpired in Borno State. The incidents have largely manifested in three forms: The first entails situations whereby members clash with Boko Haram insurgents resulting in casualties on both sides as well as affecting the civilian population, as occurred in July 2013 in Kaga, Borno State. The second is when members are attacked/ambushed by Boko Haram insurgents, as reported in January 2014 when four CJTF members were killed in Mafa, Borno State. The third is when efforts by CJTF members and the government’s JTF are jointly coordinated against Boko Haram insurgents. A case in point was in May 2014, when a Boko Haram attack was repelled and a reported 15 insurgents were killed in Konduga, Borno State.

Other fatal incidents involving Muslims and Christians (community violence)

37The final aspect of our discussion on the patterns of Muslim-Christian violence deals with what we refer to as ‘other violent death incidents involving Muslims and Christians’. The process of data generation for this rubric raises a slight methodological challenge, however, because it lends itself to the potential risk of including data from almost the entire spectrum of violent death incidents in the Nigeria Watch database. This is the case because nearly every individual (perpetrators and victims) connected with violent death incidents in the database most likely bears the identity of one of the two major religions in Nigeria-Islam and Christianity. Therefore, an effective definition of ‘other violent death incidents involving Muslims and Christians’ is accompanied by some level of difficulty and risk for meaningful analysis.

38Hence, in order to mitigate the chances of collating an unwieldy set of data under this rubric, this study still maintained the approach of searching through the database using the key words ‘Islamic groups’ and ‘Churches’. Thereafter, the violent death incidents which remained after data selection and classification under the five rubrics discussed earlier became defined as ‘other violent death incidents involving Muslims and Christians’. However, to further qualify and give meaning to the leftover data that fell under this last rubric, each incident was analysed based on the complicity of Muslims and Christians in issues described as community violence. In other words, these ‘other violent death incidents’ are not consequential to direct conflict between Muslims and Christians or between groups within either of the religions. A total of 332 incidents were identified (Table 5.1), and a few cases are briefly cited here to illustrate what exactly we label as community violence.

39In August 2006, the followers of a church known as Christian Praying Assembly, whose overseer was popularly known as Reverend King, clashed with a group of youths (Area Boys) in the Ebute-Metta area of Lagos State. Although this was a single incident, community violence can take other forms, however, and also involve other religious actors as well as more casualties. In February 2008, for instance, 60 individuals were reported to have been tortured to death in illegal detention camps described as ‘spiritual rehabilitation centres’, which were run by ‘Islamic clerics’ in Ibadan, Oyo State. A third form of community violence involved a town called Gobi in Adamawa State. It was the scene of two bank robbery attacks leading to the death of seven individuals and carried out by the Islamist group Boko Haram in August 2011. Indeed, while this type of bank raid may be linked to other sinister groups in the state, Boko Haram has attempted to justify such robberies in light of their accusation against Western banks of being owned by ‘big men’ who siphon public funds and charge usury (Pérouse de Montclos 2014). The group has also claimed responsibility for attacks on public spaces such as the Baga fish market, where dozens of innocent people were killed in February 2012 in Borno State. And in spite of a similarity with its style of attacks against Islamic clerics, it often seems that religious motives do not factor into Boko Haram’s targeting of communities and district heads in several parts of Borno State. The sheer increase in the number of violent death incidents in 2013 and 2014 reveals more and more non-religious community targets aimed at by the group, some of the incidents having included the killing of district heads in Dala Alamderi in Maiduguri and Lawanti in Damboa, and the invasion of villages in Gwoza, Konduga, and Bama in Borno State.

Conclusion

40Understanding the true character of Muslim-Christian violent deaths between June 2006 and May 2014 requires knowledge of not only the religious dimension of this linkage; intellectual inquiries must appreciate also the cases of violent deaths inspired by issues connected with ethnicity, crime, land, and politics. We have established in this study that the essence of the violent interaction between Muslims and Christians is not devoid of the non-religious factors highlighted. The statistics presented in this paper have also illustrated that even in cases where religious issues underlie causes of violent deaths, the associated incidents can also reflect the involvement of non-religious actors. Furthermore, our mapping demonstrates that religious causes of violent deaths can in fact manifest between groups belonging to the same religious faith. Within the context of geography, this paper finds that beyond any other region of Nigeria, the northern part embodies a preponderance of the violent interaction between Muslims and Christians. Finally, beyond local dynamics, global media perspectives consistently frame violence in Nigeria as largely religious and between Muslims and Christians, rather than adopting a more nuanced approach that enables a balanced interpretation of events.