8
Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria
p. 158-191
Résumé
Over the last three years, Boko Haram has evolved from a sect that waged poorly planned hit-and-run attacks on state security establishments to one that increasingly mounts audacious attacks on diverse military and civilian targets. To reduce its operational capability, the Nigerian government has adopted several counter-insurgency measures. Notwithstanding the government efforts, the sect has continued to mount deadly (sometimes suicide) attacks in northern Nigeria with the potential to penetrate into the southern region. Why is the movement proving increasingly difficult for the Nigerian government to root out? This is the central concern of this chapter. The chapter therefore examines the threat posed by Boko Haram, arguing that its growing audacity and resiliency can better be understood within the context of the transnational flow of the global Salafi Jihadist ideology. Salafi jihadism focuses on the use of violence to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam practised by the “pious ancestors”, that is Mohammed and the early Islamic community. The transnational flow of this fringe and violent ideology is emboldening Boko Haram, and it poses significant threats to sub-regional and national security. To effectively counter the threat posed by Boko Haram, there is a need for a robust combination of the use of force and political dexterity. This will require, among other measures, a political strategy that builds government legitimacy and effectiveness in delivering public goods to citizens, strengthening support for moderate Islam, and implementing a robust programme on countering ideological support for extremism and terrorism.
Texte intégral
Introduction
1The violent activities of the extremist Islamic sect, Boko Haram, have made Nigeria a country of serious security concern for the international community and a subject of research interest for scholars focusing on terrorism and violent extremism. Although the sect incubated in northern Nigeria from the mid-1990s, very little academic and security attention was paid to it until July 2009, when it engaged state security forces in a major uprising in five states in northern Nigeria. The revolt ended when its charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally captured and later brutally murdered by the police.
2The events that occurred in 2009 are important for understanding the current phase of Boko Haram, particularly the cause of its grievance against the Nigerian government. The group felt that the killing of Yusuf in police custody was unjust and extrajudicial, and vied to avenge the death of their leader and other members who perished in police shooting during the 2009 uprising. To this end, over the past few years, the group’s tactics have evolved from poorly planned open confrontations with state security forces to increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, ambushes, drive-by shootings, and suicide bombings (Onuoha 2012a).
3In order to reduce its operational capability, the Nigerian government has adopted militarised counter-insurgency operations, which include legislative, prosecutorial, security, and bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Notwithstanding the government efforts, the sect has continued to mount attacks in northern Nigeria. Why is the group proving increasingly difficult for the Nigerian government to root out? This is the central concern of this chapter. In this light, the chapter is organised in seven parts. Following this introduction, the next section addresses the philosophy, organisation, and sources of funding for the sect. The third section discusses the evolution of the sect, while the fourth examines its operational tactics. The fifth part highlights government responses to the Boko Haram threat, and the sixth interrogates the transnational flow of Salafi Jihadist ideology and alliances that sustain the sect in spite of government repressive measures. The chapter ends with a conclusion.
Understanding Boko Haram
4The most common account of the origin of Boko Haram offered by local and foreign media traces it to 2002, when a charismatic preacher, Mohammed Yusuf, became the leader of the group. To the intelligence community in Nigeria, however, its true historical root harks back to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maiduguri, Borno State (Taiwo & Olugbode 2009; Adisa 2012). The group flourished as a non-violent movement until 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf assumed leadership of the sect. Over time, the group has metamorphosed under various names, such as the Yusufiyya sect, Nigerian Taliban, and lately as Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad.
Philosophy and ideology
5The sect considers “western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion’s weakness” (Sani 2011: 26). It opposes secular government, conventional banking, taxation, jurisprudence, and in particular Western education, which it believes is not founded on moral teachings. This explains why the sect is popularly known as Boko Haram (literally, “Western education is forbidden”). The term Boko Haram is derived from a combination of the Hausa word boko, meaning “book”, and the Arabic word haram, meaning “forbidden”. However, a statement released in August 2009 by a self-identified interim leader of the sect, Mallam Sanni Umaru, rejected the media description of it as Boko Haram:
Boko Haram does not in any way mean “Western Education is a forbidden” as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means “Western Civilisation” is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West … which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education. (Vanguard 2009)
6The sect instead prefers to be addressed as the Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, meaning a “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”. Its ideology is rooted in Salafi Jihadism and its actions are driven by Takfirism. Salafism seeks to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam practised by the “pious ancestors”, that is Mohammed and the early Islamic community (European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008). It stresses adherence to a rigorist interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith and aims at reforming the personal behaviour of every Muslim. It also involves the duty to advise other believers to change their way of life in the same sense. Only “one specific interpretation of Salafism focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change and is commonly known as Salafist Jihadism” (European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008: 6). Adding to the Salafi Jihadist strain is Takfirism. At the core of Takfirism is the Arabic word takfir – pronouncing an action or an individual un-Islamic (Mneimneh 2009). As noted by Shahzad (2007), Takfirism classifies all non-practising Muslims as kafirs (infidels) and calls upon its adherents to abandon existing Muslim societies, settle in isolated communities, and fight all Muslim infidels.
7Likewise, Boko Haram adherents are motivated by the conviction that the Nigerian state is a cesspit of social vices, and thus:
the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to ‘migrate’ from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political corruption and moral deprivation. (Akanji 2009: 60)
8For the sect, all those who do not subscribe to its strict interpretation of Islam are regarded as kuffar (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or fasiqun (wrong-doers), making such individuals and groups legitimate targets of attack by its members. Its mission is to overthrow the secular Nigerian state and impose its own interpretation of Islamic Shariah law in the country. It is reported that members wore long beards and red or black headscarves and shunned certain modern (purportedly Western) goods, such as wristwatches and safety helmets (Ajani 2011; Jimos 2011). The irony, however, is that they do not abhor or refuse to use Western products such as motorcycles, cars, cellular phones, AK-47 guns, and other innovations that have aided their violent operations.
Leadership, organisation, and membership
9Before his death in July 2009, Mohammed Yusuf was the spiritual leader as well as commander-in-chief (amir ul-aam) of the group. Under his leadership, an executive cabinet and a Shura (decision-making) Council was instituted to oversee the affairs of the group. Yusuf was then assisted by two deputies (na’ib amir ul-aam I and II). Each state where they existed had its own amir (commander/ leader), and each local government area where they operated also had an amir. The group appointed amirs in various locations across the area, including in the Kanuri regions of Niger and Chad, to oversee local activities. They also organised themselves according to various roles, such as soldiers and police (Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria 2009: 14). In its early stage, the sect was entrenched in Borno, Yobe, Katsina, and Bauchi states. Over time it has recruited more followers and established operating cells in almost all northern states, possibly nursing the intention to spread further south.
10In the aftermath of Yusuf’s death, one of his deputies, Abubakar Shekau, became the new spiritual leader of the sect. Abubakar Shekau inherited, if not modified, the organisational structure. Under Shekau, the sect maintains a loose command-and-control structure, which allows it to operate autonomously (Figure 7.1). Boko Haram now operates in cells and units that are interlinked; but generally, the cells take directives from one commander (Alli 2011). The Shura Council is Boko Haram’s apex council and highest decision-making organ, and all cells of the organisation are represented in the council (Marama 2013: 5). Currently, Shekau heads the Shura Consultative Council, which has authorised the more coordinated and sophisticated attacks by various cells of the sect since the July 2009 revolt.
11Boko Haram members come from diverse backgrounds: disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, former almajirai, and wealthy persons, mostly but not limited to northern Nigeria. It also draws members from beyond Nigeria: from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Sudan. Former almajirai (sing. almajiri) form a significant part of its foot soldiers. The term almajirai here refers to youths and sometimes children who, in pursuit of higher knowledge and Islamic purity, leave their homes and take up residency with a senior or elderly Islamic scholar. It is a popular and ancient Islamic practice whereby children are sent to live and study under renowned Islamic teachers in cities in northern Nigeria, such as Kaduna, Kano, Maiduguri, and Zaria (West Africa Insight 2010: 7). Sometimes this is voluntary, but in most cases children are forced into becoming almajirai by abject poverty or orphanhood. A study conducted by the Ministerial Committee on Almajiri Education in 2010 revealed that “there are 9.5 million Almajiris in Nigeria” (Ibrahim 2010: 11). Over 70 per cent of these almajirai are concentrated in northern Nigeria and they live and study in appalling social and economic conditions.
Figure 7.1. Hypothetical organisational structure of Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau

Source: Onuoha (2012b: 3).
12The practice of almajirci (living as almajirai) has been a contentious phenomenon which has generated different interpretations of its possible connections to insecurity in northern Nigeria. The almajirai have been rightly or wrongly associated with Islamic radicalisation, militancy, and the periodic religious riots that have blighted many northern Nigerian cities. The current menace of Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria has accentuated the concern. While some writers have questioned the unfounded stigmatisation of this religious practice of acquiring education (Hoechner 2013), others have raised serious concern over its vulnerability to exploitation by extremist groups. In this regard, four important features of the almajirci system that make it ideal for exploitation by terrorists or extremist ideologues have been identified:
First, it involves children being relocated or separated from their family and friends to the guardianship of Mallams in towns. Second, it is restricted almost exclusively to boys. Third, the curriculum of the schools is concerned primarily with teaching the sixty chapters of the Koran by rote memorization. Fourth, each school serves 25 to 500, from the ages 6 to 25. These schools are largely autonomous from government oversight. (Awofeso, Ritchie & Degeling 2003: 314)
13The almajirai are often cramped into shacks or makeshift homes and have little or no food or drinking water, forcing them to roam the streets begging for alms. Given their social and religious status, they are extremely vulnerable to religious extremism and financial influences.
14Besides almajirai, the sect also has some well-educated, wealthy, and influential people as members. For instance, Alhaji Buji Foi (an ex-commissioner in Borno State), Kadiru Atiku (a former university lecturer), and Bunu Wakil (a very rich Borno-based contractor) are known to be members of the sect (Mukairu & Muhammad 2009; Idris 2011a; Sani 2011). The exact strength of its membership is not known, although an analyst gave an outrageous figure of “about 1.5 million followers” (Adele 2011: 64). There is no evidence that suggests that Boko Haram has such a huge number of fighters. At best, its militants will be in the region of a couple of thousand. Its method of recruitment is largely through indoctrination. It has also recruited among the escapees of prison jail breaks it has mounted in the past, in addition to using the Internet for the propagation of its extremist ideologies.
Sources of funds
15Like other terrorist groups, Boko Haram sustains its operations through diverse sources of funding. However, four major financing streams stand out: membership dues, donations, external funding, and bank robberies. The payment of membership dues was initially the basic source of funding for the sect. Before Mohammed Yusuf was killed, members had to pay a daily levy of 100 naira to their leader. The known members then were predominantly peasant farmers, traders, road-side car washers, and commercial motorcycle riders or okadas. Some of the okadas were believed to be owned by Yusuf himself, who collected daily returns from them. But since the death of Yusuf, the activities of the sect have become more secretive, making it difficult for researchers to investigate the kinds of economic activities they are engaged in to generate funds and whether members still pay dues, as well as the significance of such dues to the group’s sustainability.
16Donations from businessmen, politicians, government officials, and other individuals and organisations within Nigeria have been another source of funding for the sect. On 5 January 2011, for instance, the Nigerian police celebrated what it described as a “landmark” achievement, when security operatives arrested Alhaji Bunu Wakil and 91 other persons. Alhaji Bunu Wakil, who is a contractor and an indigene of Borno State, was alleged to be a major financier of the Islamic sect (Idris 2011a). Also, on 21 November 2011, state security operatives arrested a serving senator representing Borno South Senatorial District, Mohammed Ali Ndume, who was subsequently arraigned before an Abuja High Court for ties with and sponsorship of Boko Haram (Abonyi 2011). Senator Ali Ndume is currently being tried under the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, and if convicted will serve a prison term of not more than twenty years.
17The sect is also alleged to receive financial assistance from foreign terrorist networks. In 2007, for instance, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Ilyas Damagun were tried for terrorism-related offences. Mohammed Damagun, the proprietor of the Daily Trust newspapers’ group, was arraigned before the Abuja High Court on three charges: namely, belonging to the Nigerian Taliban; receiving a total of 300,000 USD from Al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism; and aiding terrorists in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on five charges, which included receiving monies from Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to recruit terrorists to attack the residences of foreigners, especially Americans, living in Nigeria (Onuoha 2012c). However, the charges against Mohammed Bello Ilyas Damagun were later dropped by the court.
18In an interview in January 2012, a self-identified spokesman for Boko Haram, Abul Qaqa, informed the Guardian newspaper that they are spiritual followers of Al-Qaeda and the late Osama bin Laden, and that their leader Mohammed Abubakar Shekau had met Al-Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August 2011 and was able to obtain from Al-Qaeda whatever financial and technical support they needed (Mark 2012). It is very difficult to ascertain the veracity of the claims by Abul Qaqa. This could be one of the propaganda tools Boko Haram wants to use to attract more attention or even scare the West. Although the issue of external financial assistance to Boko Haram remains uncertain, US Homeland Security Department officials contend that “groups like Boko Haram are being influenced and financed by extremist foreign religious leaders and groups” (Offor, Ogbonnikan & Okoro 2011).1 Evidence in this regard emerged recently during the trial at the Federal High Court in Abuja of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, alias “Kabiru Sokoto”, who masterminded the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger State. A prosecution witness informed the court “that Sokoto included in his statement details of funding received by the insurgents from an Islamic group, Musilimi Yaa'maa, based in Algeria and how the funds led to the fragmentation of Boko Haram, following disagreements over the sharing of the money” (Soniyi, Bello & Akinsuyi 2013: 7).
19Of late, Boko Haram has relied largely on criminality, such as directly raiding banks or supporting robbery gangs to raid banks, to finance its operations. A member of a robbery gang arrested by the police in 2011, Sheriff Shettima, confessed that his gang was responsible for some robbery operations in Borno State to raise funds for Boko Haram. He claimed that his gang raided the Damboa branch of First Bank Nigeria Plc on 12 October 2011, during which a policeman was killed and 21 million naira stolen (Bwala 2011). It is noteworthy that of about 100 bank branches in Nigeria attacked by armed robbers and Boko Haram in 2011, “over 30 of the raids were attributed to Boko Haram” (ThisDay 2011: 6). In this regard, Boko Haram militants subscribe to the principle of Fa’i, the religious arguments used by extremists to justify the robbing of banks and jewellery shops to finance their jihadist operations. Indeed, some arrested Boko Haram members have been arraigned for bank robbery in Nigeria.
20Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar has also confirmed that the sect raises money for its operations through bank robbery. The loot is usually shared among five groups: the less privileged, widows of those that have died in the jihad, zakat, those that brought in the money, and the leadership (for use in prosecuting the jihad) (Alli 2012). As security agencies tighten the noose on its known funding streams, the sect may turn to other criminal activities, such as car theft, kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, illicit trafficking in arms and narcotics, and offering protection rackets for criminal networks to raise funds (Okereke & Omughelli 2012).
The evolution and incarnation of Boko Haram
21Although the movement had been incubating in north-eastern Nigeria since 1995, its transformation into an armed violent group can be traced to events leading up to the 2003 general elections in Nigeria. Shortly after the original founder of the sect, Abubakar Lawan, left for further studies in Saudi Arabia, a committee of clerics appointed Mohammad Yusuf as their leader in 2002. Afterwards, Mohammad Yusuf ousted the clerics who appointed him on allegations of their corruption and failure to properly interpret the teaching of the Quran. In its early years, the group under Yusuf’s spiritual leadership and command:
strove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order to intellectualise and radicalise the revolutionary process that would ultimately lead to violent overthrow of the Nigerian state. (Isa 2010: 333)
22Yusuf’s preaching attracted unemployed youths from Yobe and Borno states, and even from neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad. It was around this time that the group became known as the Yusufiyya movement.
23As the followership expanded, the group became very attractive to politicians in the build-up to the 2003 general elections (Monguno 2013). On the eve of the 2003 general elections, politicians who sought to outsmart their opponents in the north-eastern states used several youth groups and militias established or funded by them as political thugs. Ahead of the polls, youths belonging to the Yusufiyya movement, as well as others operating under titles such as Yan Kalare in Gombe and Sara Suka in Bauchi, were armed with sophisticated weapons by political leaders contesting gubernatorial elections in Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, and Yobe states (Ohia 2009; Idris & Adebayo 2012; Patrick 2013). In Yobe State, for instance, the Yusufiyya movement was invited to the state:
during the build-up to the 2003 elections in the wake of Sharia implementation in some northern states. But due to the fact that the election never took the shape that those that invited them thought it would, the then state government subsequently gave (the group) the ultimatum to immediately quit. (Ohia 2009: 3)
24In Borno State, however, it was reported that Ali Modu Sheriff employed the services of young men belonging to the ECOMOG and Yusufiyya movement during the 2003 election to snatch Borno State from then Governor Mala Kachalla. According to Monguno (2013), “Ali Modu Sheriff promised the group strict implementation of Shari’ah, 50 million naira reward, 50 motorcycles and the office of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs in exchange for their support”. The group then provided Sheriff with the name of Alhaji Buji Foi as their candidate for the position of the Commissioner for Islamic Affairs. After becoming governor, Sheriff created a Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed Alhaji Buji Foi, Yusufiyya’s national secretary, as its first commissioner (Idris & Adebayo 2012).
25Shortly after the election, there was a breakdown in the relationship between Governor Sheriff and the Mohammed Yusuf-led group over issues of strict implementation of the Shariah, although there could have been other personal reasons behind their parting company. Consequently, Mohammed Yusuf pressured Alhaji Buji Foi to resign from Sheriff’s cabinet along with most of the other staff brought by Foi to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. At this point, Sheriff used rival group ECOMOG to confront the Yusufiyya movement. As the relationship deteriorated, Mohammed Yusuf became more vocal and belligerent in his preaching against the government (Monguno 2013).
26The practice of arming youths, mainly unemployed, for electoral violence and subsequently dumping them after elections is a well-established electioneering habit of most Nigerian politicians. In this connection, Ojo (2013) has rightly noted that south-eastern politicians used Bakassi Boys and members of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and South-South politicians used the Egbesu Boys as well as members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), to deal with their political opponents. The political elite in the South-West used different factions of the Oodua Peoples Congress (remnants of the old Agbekoya Movement) and members of the Road Transport Workers Union, as well as street urchins known as ‘Area Boys’, to deal with their perceived political opponents.
27It is not surprising, therefore, that to influence or win elections:
Northern politicians used various groups such as Yan Sara-Suka in Bauchi, Yan Kalare in Gombe, Yan Daba and Yan daukan amarya in Kano and ECOMOG in Borno and Yobe states. In Adamawa State, the political thugs are known as Damagun Boys and Shinko Boys. In Taraba State, they are called Bani Israila. (Ojo 2013: 25)
28As is typical of Nigerian politicians, the northern youths and militia that were armed by politicians during the 2003 elections were eventually discarded by their sponsors after the election since they could not continue funding them. With no visible means of legitimate livelihood and frustrated over their fate in the aftermath of the elections, some of these disillusioned youth and militias in northern Nigeria became very susceptible to the radical brand of Islam preached at the time by Mohammed Yusuf (Patrick 2013).
29Mohammed Yusuf’s mosque complex, the Ibn Taimiyya Masjid, named after the medieval Islamic scholar who virulently condemned Shia, Sufis, and the ruling Sunni elite, was both a staging post for his virulent attack on government and a headquarters for his movement. By “naming his mosque after one of the Islamic scholars most often cited by Salafi jihadists, Yusuf signalled his hostility to the ruling Muslim elite as well as to traditional Nigerian Islam” (Tanchum 2012: 79). He ratcheted up his strident call for jihad to restore what he considered the pristine Islam of the early Islamic community as well as began the construction of an alternative society. The group also managed farmland and engaged in micro-financing, and Yusuf functioned as chief adjudicator of this miniature state-within-a-state (Tanchum 2012).
30Yusuf subsequently redefined the doctrine of the sect around an ideology that abhors Western education and the tenets of Western science. He centred his aspersion and criticisms on the failures and corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern elites trained at secular schools) who have acquired Western education and are currently in positions of power. In the sect’s view, “the system represented by the yan boko is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore unIslamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness” (Isa 2010: 332).
31Subsequently, the movement first took up arms against the state establishment when, on 24 December 2003, it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanama, Yobe State. Members occupied the two buildings for several days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement over the camps. A joint “operation of soldiers and police dislodged the group after killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members” (Suleiman 2007: 25). On 31 December 2003 the group left the village and dispersed into other northern states after inscribing the word “Taliban” on a captured vehicle (Morgan 2009). In 2004 it established a “base called ‘Afghanistan’ in Kanama village in northern Yobe State, on the border with the Republic of Niger” (Awofadeji 2009: 8). With these developments, the sect became known as the Nigerian Taliban, which was used in a derogatory sense by local people who despised the ideology and teachings of the sect.
32Yusuf’s radical ideology, however, generated friction between himself and other moderate northern-based Islamic scholars like the late Ja‘far Mahmud Adam, Sheik Abba Aji, and Yahaya Jingir. In particular, bitter theological disputes characterised the confrontation between Ja‘far Mahmud Adam and Mohammed Yusuf between 2004 and 2007 (the year of Ja‘far Mahmud Adam’s death). Ja‘far Adam criticised Mohammed Yusuf’s theological positions as “ignorant” and “stupid” and as dangerous for the political ambitions of Muslims in Nigeria. Contrary to Yusuf’s position, Ja‘far Adam advocated the importance of Western and secular education for Muslims, noting that “only the conscious adoption of Western and secular boko education would eventually enable Muslims to effectively fight the Western enemy” (Loimeier 2012: 149).
33The dispute notwithstanding, Yusuf’s charismatic skills endeared him to many young Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although Yusuf preached a simple, ascetic form of life for his followers, he enjoyed Western luxuries, including a Mercedes and imported delicacies (Onuoha 2012d: 27). The activities of his group became more worrisome from 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, who constituted the sect’s members, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates, and joined the group. By disassociating from society at large, members became more indoctrinated by the ideologues, who inculcated in them anti-secular ideologies. On 21 September 2004 members attacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition. It maintained intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe states until the famous July 2009 anti-government uprising.
34The root cause of the July 2009 revolt can be traced to the fatal shooting of members of the sect on 11 June 2009 by men of Operation Flush.2 Some members of the sect, riding on motorbikes on their way to a cemetery to bury four of their members that had died in a motor accident, were intercepted by a patrol team of Operation Flush. The affected members were temporarily detained for not wearing crash helmets as stipulated in the state traffic law. Other sect members were infuriated with the interception, which they interpreted as a provocation, given that they were in a funeral procession. The resultant altercation between the sect members and security forces led to the shooting of some of their members by men of Operation Flush. Reacting to this event, Mohammed Yusuf, though absent at the time:
made a pronouncement through his well circulated Friday sermon in Maiduguri to retaliate the shooting of his men, boasting that his group would be prepared to confront all security agencies in the State as well as government which he described as the enemies of Islam. (Sani 2011: 29)
35The security operatives later received a tip-off that the sect was planning to strike from their base in Dutsen Tanshi in Bauchi State. When “security operatives stormed the place, nine members of the group were arrested while items used in local production of bombs were recovered” (Ohia 2009: 6). In retaliation, the members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station on 26 July. This attack was the curtain raiser for a wave of unrest that manifested in Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe states. The revolt ended on 30 July 2009, when their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally captured in a goat pen in his residence in Maiduguri. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was murdered extrajudicially by the police, although police officials claimed that he was killed while trying to escape. Over 800 persons, mainly sect members, were killed during the revolt, and hundreds of its members were arrested and detained for formal trial (Adesoji 2010; Sampson 2013). The way the 2009 revolt was repressed by the Nigerian state proved to be a critical factor in the deadly escalation of Boko Haram’s violent attacks.
Operational tactics of Boko Haram
36Following the death of Yusuf and the mass killings and arrest of many of its members, the sect retreated and re-strategised in two ways. First was the adoption of Yusuf’s hard-line top deputy, Abubakar Shekau, alias “Darul Tawheed”, as the sect’s new spiritual leader. Second was the redefinition of its tactics, which involved perfecting its traditional hit-and-run attacks and adding new flexible violent tactics. As the sect retreated and regrouped, the new leadership began mobilising, recruiting, and radicalising members using martyrdom videos of the July 2009 revolt. They issued several radical messages in leaflets and audio and video tapes to the media, stating an intention to wage war on secular authorities and “enemies”, as well as claiming responsibilities for deadly attacks. The sect has continued to perpetrate acts of violence against diverse targets, such as state security personnel, community and religious leaders, politicians, worship centres (churches and mosques), the United Nations building in Abuja, telecommunication facilities, and media houses.
37Exact casualty figures of attacks since the July 2009 anti-government uprising are hard to come by. Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika claimed in November 2012 that the Islamic sect had killed no fewer than 3,000 people since it began its terror campaign (Iroegbu, Adedapo & Shittu 2012). This figure is not inclusive of those allegedly killed by security forces while fighting the sect. Innocent people, including women and children, have been killed as a result of these attacks. There are other inestimable costs to the nation due to these attacks, such as discouraging local and foreign investments, disruption of social and academic activities, destruction of property, and internal displacement of persons. Their activities have equally undermined religious harmony. For instance, suicide bombing attacks on churches by the sect have precipitated reprisal attacks on Muslims by Christian youths in Kaduna and Plateau states (Akogun et al. 2012; Alechenu, Chiedozie & Onwuamanam 2012; Wooden 2012). Other consequences include the fracturing of family structures (creating widows, widowers, and orphans) and damage to the country’s image.
38These attacks have occurred mainly in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno State. However, several such attacks for which the group has claimed responsibility have occurred in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe states, and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Figure 7.2). Although the sect has concentrated its attacks mainly in northern Nigeria, it is speculated that it may extend its attacks to the Christian-dominated South as security agencies firm up counter-insurgency operations in the northern states (Onuoha 2012b: 9). Tactics such as targeted assassination, drive-by-shooting, use of IEDs, and suicide bombing have been used in the campaign of terror.
39The choice of any of the above-mentioned tactics usually depends on the context, chosen target, and objective to be accomplished. The tactic of open armed confrontation is a key operational tactic Boko Haram has perfected since the July 2009 revolt. This is a modification of its traditional tactics of hit-and-run, which require appreciable numbers (10-60) of selected operatives engaging security forces in gun battles. The new method involves deploying large number of members to mount surprise attacks on security establishments (stations, barracks, or prisons) or ‘soft’ civilian targets (markets and churches), where there is usually a large number of forces or people who can overpower its operatives if it adopts any other means.
Figure 7.2. Locations of Boko Haram’s attacks and suicide bombings in Nigeria

Source: Author.
40Targeted assassination is another Boko Haram tactic. It is adopted when the sect is after a person(s) listed as an “enemy”. The usual mode entails the assigned operatives trailing the target to a place where the individual is most vulnerable to being successfully killed. Boko Haram members usually use cars or motorbikes in going after such targets and shoot at a very close range (usually at the head, chest, or abdomen) to ensure that the chances of the victim surviving are very slim. In this way, Boko Haram has been able to kill several civilians, politicians, religious leaders, security agents, and community leaders that were outspoken against its ideology and activities. A notable example was the killing of engineer Modu Fannami Gubio, the governorship candidate of All Nigerians Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno State for the April 2011 general elections. On 28 January 2011, Gubio, a cousin of then incumbent Governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sheriff, was killed along with Sheriff’s younger brother and six others in his residence in Maiduguri by Boko Haram operatives (Idris 2011b).
41Drive-by-shooting is a method that is very similar to targeted assassination in that some of the targets killed in the past have been executed through a process that involves operatives riding on a motorbike. It became a common tactic after the July 2009 revolt, and by mid-October 2010 no fewer than 21 people, including a top politician, had been killed by suspected members of the sect riding on a motorbike (The Nation 2010). One possible reason for adopting drive-by-shooting is to kill targets that have proven very difficult to track down to a spot where execution will be easy. It is a flexible method often adopted when operating in a built-up area or to kill target(s) that operate largely in the city centre. The convenience of this method is that the target can be shot at a very close range and the killers can easily manoeuvre their way out of the city without being apprehended by security agents.
42The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is another tactic that gained prominence after the July 2009 revolt. Such IEDs are configured in ways such that they can be detonated when thrown or can be set off through a timer or a remote control. Usually, the sect selects a particular place to plant the IED where it will have maximum effect upon explosion. They have been planted along roads, bridges, and rail lines, or deposited in bags or containers that are left behind in public places, including churches, drinking establishments, lecture halls, car parks, and bus stops. The size of the IEDs has ranged from small contraptions stuffed into used drink cans, to large containers such as drums fitted into the boot of a car if the intent is to mount a suicide attack.
43The US Joint IED Defeat Organization revealed that Nigeria witnessed a nearly fourfold jump in the number of IED attacks in 2011. Nigeria saw 196 bomb incidents in 2011, compared with 52 incidents in 2010 (Straziuso 2012). The operational sophistication Boko Haram has attained in constructing IEDs is one of the main reasons why security experts believe it is receiving enhanced foreign support in the area of training and acquisition of explosives, possibly from AQIM. The IEDs are usually constructed using powerful explosive substances, such as trinitrotoluene (TNT), pentaerythritol (PETN), and ammonia (fertilisers). The use of IEDs is one of the greatest challenges the security forces are confronting in regard to the sect.
44Particularly worrisome among the new tactics of Boko Haram is the adoption of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism refers to a form of extremely committed violence, carried out by someone who is intent on or deceived into taking his or her own life alongside killing or destroying the chosen target, in furtherance of a political, religious, or ideological goal. Seen in this light, the terrorist is fully aware that if he or she does not die, the planned attack will not be implemented. Thus the perpetrator’s ensured death is a precondition for the success of the mission (Ganor 2001; Gunaranta 2002; O’Connor 2011). The method of suicide terrorism adopted by the sect is suicide bombing, which refers to any politically or ideologically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual(s) who actively and purposely causes his or her own death through blowing himself or herself up along with the chosen target.
45Boko Haram is adept in mounting suicide bombing. At the time of writing, it has relied mainly on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), twice on body-borne improvised explosive devices (BBIED), and once each on a motorcycle-borne improvised explosive device (MBIED) and a tricycle (popularly known as Keke NAPEP)3-borne improvised explosive device (TBIED). Table 7.1 provides one example each of the suicide bombing modes.
46It has been noted that “between June 2011 and November 2012, the sect has staged at least 29 suicide attacks in northern Nigeria, with Borno State witnessing the highest number of attacks” (Onuoha 2012b: 7). Other acts of suicide bombing have been staged since then in northern Nigeria. While quite a number of these suicide attacks failed woefully, some were partially successful, and the majority have been largely successful when assessed on the basis of the number of lives lost, property damaged, and the international visibility they earned the sect. Its diverse targets of suicide attacks included security establishments (stations and barracks), international organisations, churches, mosques, telecom offices, and media houses. It is believed that some of the cars used in the suicide bombings were stolen.
47Four factors could account for the adoption of suicide terrorism by the sect: the emergence of a more radical and hard-line leadership of the sect in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt; the increased counter-insurgency measures put in place by the government to curtail its traditional tactics of open armed confrontation or placement of IEDs; improved funding from various sources within and outside Nigeria; and, more importantly, the sect’s bond with foreign terror groups, leading to increased fanatic indoctrination of its members by experienced ideologues skilled in evoking visions of martyrdom to radicalise recruits.
Table 7.1. Samples of suicide bombing modes mounted by Boko Haram (June 2011–November 2012)
Date | Attacker – Mode – Target(s) – Effects |
26 August 2011 | Attacker: Mohammed Abul Barra (27 years old) Mode: VBIED (Honda Accord car) Target(s): UN House, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Effects: The explosion killed 24 persons and injured over 100 others. The building houses over 400 staff of 26 UN humanitarian and development agencies. It was the sect’s first attack on an international organisation. |
30 April 2012 | Attacker: Names not disclosed or reported Mode: Motorcycle-borne (MBIED) Target(s): The convoy of Taraba State Police Commissioner, Jalingo, Taraba State Effects: Three suicide bombers riding motorbikes rammed into the convoy of the Police Commissioner, killing at least 11 people. |
3 August 2012 | Attacker: Name not disclosed or reported Mode: A suicide bomber packed his body with explosives (BBIED) Target(s): The Emir of Fika Alhaji Mohammed Abali Ibn Muhammadu Idrissa, at Potiskum mosque, Yobe State Effects: Six people including three civilians, the emir’s police orderly, and two other policemen sustained various degrees of injuries; the suicide bomber died in the incident. |
16 August 2012 | Attacker: Name not disclosed or reported Mode: Tricycle, popularly known as Keke NAPEP (TBIED) Target(s): A patrol vehicle of the JTF in Custom area of Maiduguri Effects: The suicide bomber on a bomb-laden tricycle missed his target and rode into a moving Mercedes Benz car. The blast killed the suicide bomber and a civilian, while two other people, including a soldier, sustained injuries. |
Source: Author’s compilation.
Government responses to the Boko Haram threat4
48To reduce the operational capability of the sect, the Nigerian government has adopted several measures, including prosecution of arrested members, deployment of special security forces, temporary closure of parts of borders in northern Nigeria, deportation of illegal immigrants, capacity building of security forces on counter-terrorism (CoT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, installation of surveillance equipment, and collaboration with foreign partners.
49The ramping up of violent attacks by the sect in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt played a critical role in the enactment of Nigeria’s first anti-terrorism legislation, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011. An important external factor that also contributed in this regard was the pressure from the US on the Nigerian government to expedite actions towards adopting comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation in the aftermath of the failed Christmas Day bombing of a US airliner by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Sampson & Onuoha 2011). The young Abdulmutallab, who had been trained in Yemen by Al-Qaeda, attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route to Detroit’s Metropolitan Airport on 25 December 2009.
50The establishment on 12 June 2011 of a Joint Military Task Force known as “Operation Restore Order” (JTORO) with headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, to counter the sect’s growing terrorist potentials is a prominent dimension of the government response to the Boko Haram threat. The deployment of the JTORO has been partly successful, especially the use of military patrol vehicles equipped to detect hidden bombs and other weapons within a radius of 50 meters. The special security forces have also registered successes in terms of arrest and killing of Boko Haram operational commanders and strategists.
51Notwithstanding the successes of the special security forces in northern Nigeria, their deployment has received criticism for harsh tactics that have injured civilians and damaged property. The approach taken by the security forces has led to unprecedented use of road blocks, cordon-and-search, and total blockade of some roads (especially those close to security establishments), often generating long traffic jams. Particularly worrisome is the accusation of unlawful killings, dragnet arrests, detention, intimidation, and extortion by the security forces. These real or alleged excesses undermine public support, especially in the area of providing tip-offs on Boko Haram members or hideouts. Sampson (2013: 17) has noted:
[As] a result of these human rights abuses, the JTF has been severely criticised by a section of the Nigerian public over its violent counter-terrorism operations. Its use of disproportionate force has forced people, otherwise critical of the sect’s activities, to renege on their earlier endorsement of military deployment.
52Therefore, if the security forces are to be successful in the future, they must strike the proper balance of winning the hearts and minds of local people by offering security and using the ‘stick’ to weaken Boko Haram’s operational capacity through arrests and prosecution.
53Given the discovery that Boko Haram moves weapons and fighters in and out of Nigeria through Nigeria’s porous international borders in the north, the federal government began an aggressive crackdown on illegal immigrants, repatriating around 11,000 foreigners as at 28 February 2012 (Vanguard 2012). Related to this was the decision to close part of Nigeria’s northern borders and the establishment of two new defence intelligence missions in Niger and Mali in February 2012 to ensure better monitoring of the security situation in the Sahara–Sahel region. The Nigerian government has also scaled up training in counter-terrorism (CoT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations for state security forces in response to the growing audacity of the sect (Omonobi 2012). Training in special reconnaissance, close-quarters combat, urban warfare, amphibious operation, information operation and management, tactical communication, civil-military relations, and forensic analysis have equally been expanded in the training curricula of the armed forces and other security agencies (Musa 2012). This intervention is also supported by the acquisition and installation of technical and surveillance equipment, such as closed-circuit televisions, identification equipment for post-bomb blast investigation, and military patrol vehicles equipped to detect hidden explosives and other weapons.
54The government has also embraced collaborative engagements with foreign states and international organisations to increase Nigeria’s capacity to combat the Boko Haram threat. These include collaborations with organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the International Civil Aviation Organisation, as well as states like the US, France, South Korea, and Israel, geared towards ensuring that terrorist organisations do not establish strong footholds in Nigeria. For example, Nigeria established a collaborative framework with the UN known as the ‘Integrated Assistance on Counter-Terrorism’ (I-ACT), under the aegis of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Although details of these collaborative efforts are not made public, they cover areas such as intelligence sharing, capacity building of security forces, and equipment support programmes.
55In spite of the various measures adopted by the Nigerian government to reduce the sect’s capability, Boko Haram continues to demonstrate resilience and modify its modus operandi. Since 2010, the sect has evolved into a more flexible, dynamic, and decentralised organisation, capable of changing and combining tactics as well as expanding or re-ordering target selection. This situation has prompted debates concerning Boko Haram’s ability to remain a potent force despite the losses it incurs from state security forces.
Boko Haram and the transnational Salafi Jihadist threat
56A fruitful way to understand Boko Haram’s ability to continue to mount audacious attacks is to view it within the context of the transnational flow of ideological influence from global Salafi Jihadist Islamism. The term ‘Islamism’ means different things to different people. A more precise and analytically useful definition of Islamism describes it thus:
a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition. (Denoeux 2002: 61)
57Certainly, Islamism is politically heterogeneous, in the sense that different Islamist movements specialise in qualitatively different political activities depending on the context that underpins their emergence (Hegghammer 2009). Some oppose local regimes by non-violent means (radical Islamist); others try to topple regimes with terrorist tactics (jihadi Islamist); and still others wage armed resistance against occupation by non-Muslim powers (expellist Islamist).
58Boko Haram belongs to the Salafi Jihadist Islamist stock, and it seeks to topple the secular Nigerian state. The sect’s ideology and operational tactics derive from the global Salafist Islamic ideology, which seeks the imposition of its own interpretation of Islamic Law and a safe haven for jihadists. The Salafiyya movement identifies the problems of the contemporary world with deviation from the correct path delineated in the holy scriptures. Therefore, Salafis describe their activities as a struggle against innovations and shirk, or heresy (Rasheed 2012). Salafi adherents insist on the right of believers to interpret the fundamental texts for themselves through independent reasoning. There is often an analytical distinction between the Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya, or “scholarly Salafis”, and the Salafiyya jihadiyya, or “fighting Salafis”. “Many Salafis are quite radical in their calls for a return to an authentic original form of Muslim practice without being at all oriented toward political activity, whether peaceful or violent” (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008: 6). However, Salafi Jihadism, as noted earlier, focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change. It refers to the merging of a Salafi outlook and a jihadi call to violence. In other words:
Salafi jihadi groups are motivated by a mix of religious and political objectives: they embrace a strict, literal interpretation of Islam, and combine it with an emphasis on jihad, understood here as holy war. They view jihad as the primary instrument through which their Salafi desire to ‘return’ to the original message of Islam will become reality. Unlike radical Islamists, they approach jihad as a global struggle that knows no borders, and that focuses on combating the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. They form an amorphous, transnational movement, and disseminate an ideology that is fundamentally hostile to modernity, to the secular, democratic nation-state, to the logic of globalization, and to peaceful coexistence of different cultures and religions. (Denoeux & Carter 2009: 86)
59In this light, Boko Haram’s Salafi Jihadist inclination became evident in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt. In March 2010, for instance, Boko Haram declared that it was “joining Al-Qaeda to avenge the murder of some of its members and leaders in a series of explosions across Nigeria” (The Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group 2010: 14). In an interview with Al Jazeera television on 14 June 2010, the AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, confirmed that his group has been talking to Boko Haram and intends to supply it with weapons to “defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a minority of Crusaders”. He further noted that Al-Qaeda has an interest in Sub-Saharan Africa for “its strategic depth that would give it a bigger scope for manoeuvres” (Stratfor 2010).
60Some analysts then dismissed AQIM’s intent to bond with Boko Haram as mere wishful thinking or rhetoric. It was argued instead that “issuing statements claiming an alliance is easier than actually creating a meaningful accord and several factors complicate AQIM’s intent to move into Nigeria” (ibid.). Indeed, there is clearly a distinction to be made not only between affiliation and solidarity, but also between tactics (common training and supply of weapons) and strategy (coordination of attacks under a central command). Notwithstanding, such a dismissive assessment downplayed the fact that both the AQIM and Boko Haram belong to the Salafi Jihadist ideological stock. Moreover, it overlooked the fact that global Al-Qaeda had attempted to draw localised conflicts (for instance, in Southeast Asia) into an evolving but loose network of transnational jihadism and may be bent on doing so in Nigeria. As Vidino, Pantucci and Kohlmann (2010: 224) have rightly observed:
Al-Qaeda and, more generally, the global jihadist movement, have repeatedly attempted to hijack conflicts that were largely nationalistic (local) in nature and turn them, both rhetorically and operationally, into battlefields of what they perceive to be a millenarian and global conflict between Islam and the world of infidelity. Local actors might maintain some of their parochial agendas, but by putting themselves under the banner of the global jihadist movement they benefit from outside support in terms of funding, recruits, propaganda, and military expertise. The global jihadist movement also benefits, as it can expand its influence and add credibility to its narrative that Islam is under attack from non-Muslims.
61Evidently, Boko Haram began in 2010 to recast its grievances within the narrative framework of global jihad and employ rhetoric common to Salafi Jihadist groups around the world: that Islam is under attack by infidels in Nigeria. Given Nigeria’s recent history of religious tension between Muslims and Christians, especially in northern Nigeria and the Middle Belt region, this was part of a strategy of whipping up religious sentiments to draw sympathy from impressionable Muslim youths to its cause. In February 2011, Boko Haram in a message sent to the media declared: “We are carrying out these attacks in order to propagate the name of Allah and to liberate ourselves and our religion from the hands of infidels and the Nigerian government” (Mshelizza 2011).
62Earlier, in a published manifesto in July 2010, Abubakar Shekau linked the jihad being fought by Boko Haram with jihadist efforts globally, especially that of “the soldiers of Allah in the Islamic State of Iraq” (Pham 2012: 4). Shekau expressed solidarity with Al-Qaeda and threatened the US: “Do not think jihad is over. Rather jihad has just begun”, he enthused (Pham 2012: 4). He also threatened attacks not only against the Nigerian state, but against “outposts of Western culture”. This propaganda is archetypical of Al-Qaeda’s global Islamist rhetoric of Islam being under attack by infidels. The ideological rhetoric signposts that Boko Haram aspires to share features of, and ties with, Al-Qaeda’s Salafi Jihadist orientation, while at the same time retaining its own distinctive local organisation, character, and practice in Nigeria.
63Given the brutal character of the Nigerian state, Boko Haram ideologues were convinced that the sect is largely impotent and must do the extraordinary to be able to liberate their religion from the hands of infidels in reference to the Nigerian state. As Ayoob has rightly noted:
When and where the sense of impotence becomes very acute, it provides extremist elements with the opportunity to exploit the prevailing climate of despair to undertake terrorist activities. Extremist groups that arrogate to themselves the right to speak in the name of ‘Islam’ justify terrorism as the … only strategy that can wrest the initiative from the hands of western powers and those perceived to be their surrogates in the Muslim world. (Ayoob 2005: 960)
64The sense of impotence drove Boko Haram ideologues to establish links with like-minded Salafi Jihadist groups in Africa – in particular AQIM and Al-Shabaab – in furtherance of its ideological goal of Islamisation of northern Nigeria. To this end, many of their members fled to North Africa to training with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt. The “Boko Haram men in the AQIM camp chose Abubakar Adam Kambar, as their leader” (Africa Confidential 2013: 5). During training with AQIM, Boko Haram members mastered the skills of bomb making:
Boko Haram militants also attended Al Shabaab-owned training camps in Somalia. Members were taught how to construct and detonate improvised explosive devices, as well as employ the use of suicide bombers, which until participating in the training camps, Boko Haram did not engage such practices. (Connell 2012: 89)
65In a statement released on 15 June 2011, Boko Haram boasted of its ties to the Somali-based terror group, Al-Shabaab:
We want to make it known that our Jihadists [warriors] have arrived [in] Nigeria from Somalia where they got serious training on warfare from our brethren (Al-Shabaab) who made the country of Somalia ungovernable. We want to assure all security agencies that we would frustrate their efforts. By the grace of God, despite the armored carriers that they are boasting of, they cannot match the training we acquired in Somalia. (Safeafricagroup.com 2011)
66The alignment and solidarity with AQIM and Al-Shabaab speaks for itself as a true shift of radical ideological expansion (Connell 2012). Having acquired the tactical and ideological tools, the sect began attacking targets it considers as infidels and surrogates: Christians, moderate Muslims, and secular (local and international) institutions in Nigeria. The suicide attack on a police headquarters on 16 June 2011 was a blatant signal of the training Boko Haram boasted it has acquired from established transnational jihadist movements in Africa. More than anything else, the 26 August 2011 suicide bombing of the UN building in Abuja was devastating evidence that the group aims to internationalise its acts of terror, in furtherance of the global jihadist agenda. In the aftermath of the UN bombing, a self-identified spokesman for Boko Haram claimed that they attacked the UN building because:
all over the world, the UN is a global partner in the oppression of believers. We are at war against infidels. In Nigeria, the federal government tries to perpetuate the agenda of the United Nations. (Bashir 2011)
67In another interview, Abu Qada disclosed Boko Haram’s emerging ties to Al-Qaeda:
Our relationship with Al Qaida is very strong. In fact, our leader [Shekau] and his team were in Mecca for the lesser Hajj to consolidate on that relationship. And we carried out the attack on the UN building when he was about to go into a meeting with Al Qaida leadership in order to strengthen our negotiation position. (Salkida 2011: 42)
68The UN bombing brought to the world’s attention the growing danger Boko Haram poses to regional and international security. Prior to the UN bombing, there was very little awareness of, or attention paid to, the ideology driving the sect. In particular, there existed a collective security nescience concerning the growing ideological links between Boko Haram and other transnational Salafi Jihadist networks in Africa. Unlike earlier years when the debate was whether Boko Haram had links to other Salafi Jihadist movements, the current concern is on the extent of established ties and the consequences for national and regional security in Africa. The intelligence community has confirmed that Africa’s top three Salafi Jihadist movements – Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram – are sharing funds, training, and explosive materials, which could possibly lead to the emergence of an ‘extremist triangle’ in Africa (Shaughnessy 2012). The US AFRICOM Commander, Gen Carter Ham, captured the threat thus:
What really concerns me are the indications that the three organizations are seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts, in other words to establish a cooperative effort amongst the three most violent organizations. And I think that’s a problem for America and for African security in general. (US Africa Command 2012)5
69Given that Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram subscribe to Salafi Jihadist ideology, it was possible for them to collaborate on certain areas of mutual interest such as training and weapons, while maintaining their distinctive local specificity and character shaped by the domestic environments in which they are operating. Recent developments in Mali confirm such connections. Mali slipped into instability after a coup led by Captain Amadou Sanogo overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré on 22 March 2012. The coup created a power vacuum that enabled Tuareg rebels in the North, backed by a patchwork of Islamist forces – Ansar Dine, AQIM, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) – to take control of nearly two-thirds of the country. These groups, particularly AQIM and Ansar Dine, belong to the Salafi Jihadist stock.
70Beginning from 11 January 2013, France deployed her forces in “Operation Serval” to stop the advance of Islamist groups who were intent on invading Bamako. French Mirage and Rafale fighter jets mounted air strikes across a wide belt of Islamist strongholds, from Gao and Kidal in the North-East, near the border with Algeria, to the western town of Lere, close to Mauritania. French air and ground assaults on rebel strongholds have enabled French and Malian forces to retake Konna, Douentza, Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal, with hopes of capturing more territories from the Islamists. Nigerian troops, in addition to other African forces, have joined French forces to roll back the Islamist occupation of northern Mali (Onuoha & Thurston 2013).
71Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, as well as Chief of Army Staff Lt-Gen Azubuike Ihejirika, have alleged that Boko Haram received training in Mali, making it imperative for Nigerian troops to join the international campaign to free northern Mali from Islamist militants. Some media reports carried further allegations:
Hundreds of Boko Haram members stayed at training camps with Malian militants for months in Timbuktu, learning to fix Kalashnikovs and launch shoulder-fired weapons … The Boko Haram members trained for about 10 months at what is now a bombed-out customs-police building on Timbuktu’s desert fringe, intermingling with a local al Qaeda offshoot called Ansar Dine … About 50 Boko Haram militants lived and trained at the customs building, and 50 more lived in an annex across a giant sandy lot, while others took up in other abandoned government buildings. (Pindiga 2013: 1)
72Although concerns may be raised on the credibility of these latest allegations, they should be read against the backdrop of revelations that many Boko Haram members fled to North Africa after the July 2009 revolt to receive training in AQIM’s camp (Africa Confidential 2013: 5). This evolving situation poses serious dangers to security in the Sahara–Sahel region, given possible fusion of movements that have strongholds or footprints in the region and share in the Salafi Jihadist ideology. In Niger, for instance, its southern part is dominated by the Hausa-speaking Izala-Salafi group, while its northern region, bordering Algeria and Libya, is dominated by the Tabligh Tuaregs. In Chad also, the Ansar al Sunna is an influential Salafi group which gets huge funding from donors in Sudan and Saudi Arabia (Rasheed 2012). As a result, the Sahara–Sahel region offers not only a potential safe haven and training ground for Salafi Jihadists, but also large ungoverned spaces for them to generate funds for their terrorist activities through complex shades of criminal activities such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling. Worse still, the existence of porous borders and ineffective national security forces facilitates the ease of movement of jihadists across borders and the exchange of ideas, resources, and training centres. As Nigeria is surrounded by intrusive Salafi movements or influences, Boko Haram is gaining support from some Al-Qaeda-linked Salafist groups in the form of training, weapons, and ideological radicalisation of impressionable youths in northern Nigeria.
73The tipping point in the radicalisation of Boko Haram has been traced to the extrajudicial killing of its charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, as well as the gruesome murder of some arrested members in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt. However, this factor rode on a groundswell of dissatisfaction, especially among Muslim youths in northern Nigeria, over governance failure on the part of the secular Nigerian state. Although political leaders from northern Nigeria dominated positions of leadership, such as presidents and heads of state, before the return to democracy in 1999 they did little or nothing to address the pervasive poverty and unemployment afflicting the northern region.
74The frustrations created by poverty and unemployment played a critical role in making some youth fall victim to the appeals of violent, extremist ideologies. As rightly argued by Isa (2010: 333), the “movement used the term Boko Haram to mobilise and radicalise unemployed, unskilled and poverty-stricken youths to join its cause (and) dislodge the secular, boko-controlled state in Nigeria”. The solution in the sect’s view, therefore, is to overthrow the secular Nigerian state and introduce strict application of Shariah Law as a moral societal cleanser to effectuate the creation of an Islamic state devoid of corruption.
75Boko Haram’s Takfirist approach of cleansing the secular Nigerian state of infidels, however, has contributed in part to the emergence of a splinter group known as the Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (abbreviated as Ansaru), which translates roughly as “The Supporters of Muslims in the Land of the Blacks”. Arguably, ideological and personal differences between top leaders of Boko Haram contributed to the breaking away of Ansaru. At the root of the ideological differences is the issue of Takfirism. The Ansaru offshoot is believed to have sprouted from Boko Haram in January 2012, following the 20 January 2012 Boko Haram attack in the city of Kano that resulted in the death of at least 180 people, mostly Muslims. The group’s existence, however, became more widely known from 2 June 2012, when its self-identified leader, Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, released a video proclaiming the creation of the sect and outlining its ideological stand (Onuoha 2013).
76Security agents suspect that the name ‘Abu Usamatul Ansari’ is a pseudonym for Khalid al-Barnawi, who is believed to be heading the group. As an erstwhile leader of Boko Haram, he is believed to have trained with AQIM in Algeria in the mid-2000s and led several AQIM-inspired kidnapping operations in Niger. It will be recalled that Khalid al-Barnawi was among the three leaders of Boko Haram designated as ‘global terrorists’ by the US State Department on 21 June 2012. The other two were Abubakar Shekau, the current spiritual leader of Boko Haram, and Abubakar Adam Kambar, who was later killed by Nigerian security forces during a raid on his hideout in Kano on 15 August 2012 (Africa Confidential 2013).
77Ansaru has become famous following a string of kidnappings of expatriates it has pulled off. Unlike the Shekau-led Boko Haram, which considers non-members as kuffar or fasiqun, making such individuals or groups legitimate targets of attack, Ansaru considers anybody that has accepted the khalimatush shahada (belief in one God and the Prophet Mohammed as the Messenger of Allah) as a Muslim who should not be killed, unless the person has committed an act that is punishable by death as stated in the Quran. In view of this, “Ansaru detests Boko Haram’s style of operations which it regards as inhuman to the Muslim Ummah. It claims that Islam forbids killing of innocent Muslims” (Mamu 2012). This philosophical position, however, flies in the face of reality given the way some innocent foreigners abducted by the sect have been killed. For instance, on 9 March 2013, Ansaru released a communiqué and video claiming that it had killed the seven foreign hostages abducted from a Lebanese construction company, Setraco, in Jamaare, Bauchi State, on 17 February 2013. Ansaru justified the killing of the hostages after British warplanes were reported to have been seen in the northern Nigeria city of Bauchi by local journalists, possibly on a rescue mission. In keeping with its philosophical standpoint, it is possible for the group to claim that it acted in ‘self-defence’.
78The kidnapping and murder of the seven expatriates by the group remains the largest of its kind since the outbreak of terrorist violence in northern Nigeria. Before the February 2013 kidnapping, Ansaru was linked to the May 2011 kidnapping of Christopher McManus (a Briton) and Franco Lamolinara (an Italian) from their home in Kebbi State. They were held for months, before their captors killed them in March 2012 during a failed rescue mission by Nigerian security forces and British special forces in Sokoto. Given its ideological and operational outlook, as well as the known history of its suspected leader, Khalid al-Barnawi, analysts believe that Ansaru is strongly connected to AQIM (Bay & Tack 2013; Zenn 2013).
79In terms of personal differences underling Ansaru’s emergence, it is alleged that:
one of the disputes between Al Barnawi and Shekau came over 40 million naira (US$ 250,000), which Al Barnawi donated to Boko Haram when he returned to Nigeria in early 2011. It was his share of an AQIM ransom. (Africa Confidential 2013: 5)
80The ransom caused fierce disagreements within Boko Haram, with Shekau reluctant to give al-Barnawi any say in how the money should be spent. This offered al-Barnawi a reason to create a parallel group to burnish his own ideological interpretation of the jihadist struggle. In spite of their ideological and personal differences, it seems that the two have lately been growing closer, given the crackdown by Nigerian security forces against their members and the Franco–African onslaught against Islamists forces such as AQIM in northern Mali that have aided them in the past with financial and training assistance. Faced with similar challenges, it is possible that Boko Haram and Ansaru will tend to cooperate rather than compete with each other. As speculated by Zenn (2013: 8), “they may also collaborate on refining their tactics as well as expanding their areas of operations to locate new targets and eliminate Western and Christian influence from Nigeria and the region”.
81In this context, Boko Haram still poses a serious threat to security and stability in Nigeria, given the possible consequences of any successful large-scale attack in southern Nigeria. Although some analysts view this situation as a high-impact but low probability risk (de Pontet & Sparks 2013), several factors can serve as enablers rather than limiters for Boko Haram’s penetration of the south-western zone. First, the substantial number of Muslim adherents in the zone offers Boko Haram broad room for incremental penetration. Second, and as a corollary to the above, the cosmopolitan nature of strategic economic cities such as Lagos, where substantial Hausa-speaking northerners tend to settle in particular communities, is another leverage for manoeuvre without being easily detected or suspected. Third, inchoate ideological rivalry between Islamic sects in the zone could be exploited to recruit impressionable youth into the Boko Haram fold. And fourth, the presence of strategic targets – embassies, oil tank farms, maritime assets, and international markets – could be so attractive that Boko Haram could partner with criminal or radical groups (such as Ansaru) to mount attacks. If successfully planned and executed:
[such an] attack in southern Nigeria would also render a psychological victory for Boko Haram because it would show that the group could strike anywhere in the country and that Lagos, Nigeria’s economic hub and Africa’s most populous city, is in Boko Haram’s targeting range. (Zenn 2012: 10)
82It is safe to expect that such attacks are more probable in the form of planted IED or suicide bombing attacks than coordinated gunfights with security forces.
83As hinted earlier, Boko Haram could also attempt to exploit incipient Islamo-ideological contestation between Sufi traditionalists and emerging Wahhabi Salafi adherents in the south-western zone to deepen its recruitment and radicalisation drives or establish a footprint in the zone. In recent times, Sufi traditionalists are being challenged by the emerging Wahhabi Salafis for the control of mosques across Yorubaland in the south-west zone (Rasheed 2012). The contest between the groups in the region is already evident in the struggles in mosques over how an imam or prayer leader should be chosen. Control over the mosques is critical in this respect, because the successful group stands in good stead to propagate its ideology in the region.
84Even though Salafi Jihadism has not manifested in overt violence in any area of southern Nigeria, intelligence reports show that the penetration of the ideology is gradually manifesting across the South-West and Middle Belt zones (Rasheed 2012). Already, there have been cases of clashes between Islamic sects in the South-West, as was the case between the Izala sect and Tijaniyya/Adriya group in the Sabo area of Ibadan, Oyo State. On 22 August 2010, disagreement on some Islamic doctrines saw the two groups using the public address systems to launch verbal attacks on each other. In the ensuing violent clashes, no fewer than 13 people were seriously injured and property, including buildings, three mosques, and four vehicles, was vandalised before policemen brought the situation under control (Adesuyi 2010: 6). As these confrontations unfurl over an environment of economic marginality, political exclusion, and social destitution, a potentially fertile ground for radicalisation and recruitment in the south-west zone is being created for Salafi Jihadist groups such as Boko Haram. The arrest of a top Boko Haram leader in Kano, who is believed to be a native of Ogbomoso, Oyo State (Salihu 2012), suggests that the sect can use such members as conduits to establish footprints in the South-West, where some young men are becoming very impatient with the secular Nigerian state over governance failure. Also, on 21 March 2013, security forces raided a hideout in Ijora, Lagos State, where some suspected Boko Haram members were arrested, and bombs, AK-47 rifles, cartridges, and daggers were recovered (Utebor & Akinkuotu 2013). Any evidence that proves that the suspects are indeed Boko Haram members would confirm its potential expansion into the south-west zone. Given that in 2009 Boko Haram had threatened to attack cities such as Lagos in southern Nigeria (Vanguard 2009; Olupohunda 2013), its potential foray into southern Nigeria remains a major concern for the security agencies.
Conclusion
85Although the Nigerian government has repeatedly promised to hold talks with Boko Haram if its leaders come forth, its kinetic response in the form of use of military force has recorded modest successes such as the arrest and killing of some of the sect’s members, strategists, and commanders. In spite of the government onslaught, Boko Haram has remained resilient, tapping strength from Salafi Jihadist ideology to further recruit and radicalise young impressionable minds and stage dramatic acts of terror in northern Nigeria. Evidently, Boko Haram is a manifestation of a fringe and violent ideology that underpinned many religious uprisings in the North in the past several decades, such as the Maitatsine revolt in the 1980s (Okanya 1995; Danjibo 2010). The problem is that even when the manifestation is destroyed, the ideology remains, leading to fears that in the future the ideology may sprout another manifestation with even more violent orientation (Rasheed 2012).
86Therefore, a more sustainable approach to addressing the challenge in Nigeria is to deal with the underlying ideology of the sect as well as the formative environment that enables such ideology to flourish. As one scholar has rightly noted, the underlying ideology of Boko Haram:
is framed around issues that appeal to the people’s grievances; hence, the environmental context is very critical to understanding what generates and sustains the grievances that are expressed through terrorists’ tactics. (Sampson 2013: 22)
87Defeating or countering such ideology could be achieved through the initiation of robust political, economic, and religious reforms. Political reforms would target strengthening governance processes and institutions to ensure transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in ways that increase the legitimacy of government at all levels in Nigeria. Economic reforms entail rolling out robust interventions that will drastically reduce the level of poverty, unemployment, and social destitution in northern Nigeria, which extremist ideologues have exploited in their recruitment and radicalisation drives. The religious aspect requires delivering a national project on countering ideological support for extremism and terrorism by the government, focusing on monitoring religious sermons, supporting moderate Islamic scholars to deliver enlightenment programmes, scrutinising foreign funding of religious undertakings, and encouraging the teaching of comparative religion in Nigerian schools – primary, secondary, and tertiary. If concerted efforts are not made to defeat the ideology behind the Boko Haram menace, the tendency for a different violent sect to emerge in the future is most probable, even if the Nigerian state succeeds in winning the fight against Boko Haram.
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Notes de bas de page
1 http://allafrica.com/stories/201101070435.html
2 Operation Flush was a Borno State-owned security outfit established to combat armed banditry in the state.
3 Keke NAPEP refers to the motorised tricycle (tuk tuk) used for commercial transportation in cities across Nigeria. It was introduced in 2000, when President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration, through the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), partnered with the Autobahn Techniques Limited (trademark owners of the name KEKE NAPEP) to roll out the tricycle project as an intervention tool for job creation and poverty alleviation.
4 This section benefited from Onuoha, F.C. (forthcoming), “Assessing the Implications of Counter Boko Haram Operations by the Nigerian Government”, commissioned by the Institute of Security Studies, South Africa.
5 http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=8039&lang=0 [archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20120715233427/https://www.africom.mil/getarticle.asp?art=8039&lang=0].
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