8
Conclusions
p. 175-182
Texte intégral
1In recent years, anti-corruption campaigns have been embraced as a major challenge in a considerable number of countries, notably in the developing world. In Nigeria, this was one of the major policy priorities during the Olusegun Obasanjo administration, which came to office on 29 May 1999, after a successful transition that ended 16 years of corrupt military dictatorship. Under pressure from home and abroad, President Obasanjo embarked on a comprehensive anti-corruption agenda aimed at redressing Nigeria’s economic decline and badly tarnished international image. The measures implemented included the following policies: Reform of the public services; accelerated privatisation; reform of the management of public revenue and expenditures; design and implementation of new criteria for employment and remuneration for public service; reform of the judiciary; establishment of anti-corruption agencies (the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)); and a global campaign aimed at checking the diversion of public funds abroad and the recovery of assets already siphoned out of the country. Even though these measures are not new in global anti-corruption policy circles, they still raised unprecedented interest and attention abroad for at least two reasons.
2The first reason was because this was the first time a civilian regime took concrete action to fight corruption in Nigeria. All previous anti-corruption measures were initiated by military rulers, who had dominated politics in Nigeria for a long time. Most of these military-inspired anti-corruption campaigns were largely adopted to legitimise power or purge political rivals. They were also ad hoc in nature and limited in their scope and impact, aiming essentially to identify and punish a few corrupt officials, to be followed in some cases with the setting up of anti-corruption laws and institutions to calm public anger, only to be abandoned as soon as the regime was firmly entrenched. A second and perhaps more pertinent reason why the Obasanjo-led campaign against corruption attracted much global interest was because the fight was forged in an international context marked by the emergence of a ‘global coalition’ against corruption in all its ramifications and in all nations, a context which has produced a major re-orientation in the understanding of corruption and anti-corruption measures, with increasing emphasis on economic and institutional reforms.
3The aggressive application of these policies by the Obasanjo administration and the support it received both at home and abroad raised the prospects of a possible end to the endemic corruption which had for so long undermined the conduct of public affairs and development in Africa’s most populous nation. But by the end of Obasanjo’s tenure in 2007, this hope had all but evaporated. Despite the huge resources committed, the administration had obtained only modest results, notably in creating unprecedented awareness around the issue. According to public opinion surveys, media reports, and personal interviews conducted in the course of several field trips, corruption had subsisted in an endemic manner at all levels of government – federal, state, and local. Indeed, there was substantial evidence that corruption had increased at lower levels of government despite the elaborate measures put in place since 1999. Furthermore, very few individuals have been convicted despite the massive revelations and corruption scandals that have enveloped public life in the Fourth Republic.
4While it is true that a considerable number of the reforms introduced by the administration – privatisation of public enterprises and reform of the civil service and judiciary – are still ongoing and are reforms with long-term benefits (Whitehead 2000: 110), the application of several other measures with short-term gestation periods – for instance, adoption of anti-corruption laws and institutions and recovery of public funds held in foreign accounts – has not brought significant progress. On the contrary, implementation of these measures has proved extremely difficult for a number of reasons, three of which are particularly worthy of note.
Weak capacity and inadequate political support for anti-corruption institutions
5The establishment of specialised bodies to combat corruption is now generally considered as an essential step in all anti-corruption programmes. But at the same time, these institutions are expected to possess, particularly in countries where corruption is endemic, sufficient capacity (powers, resources, and expertise) and independence (Doig et al. 2005). During Obasanjo’s reign the wide powers given to anti-corruption agencies were undercut by capacity problems such as chronic underfunding and shortage of qualified manpower, as well as systemic problems such as an ineffective criminal justice system and, more importantly, a hostile political class.
6Inadequate funding was the first crucial challenge confronted by Nigeria’s anti-corruption institutions upon their establishment. The ICPC, which was the key anti-corruption agency until 2003 when the EFCC was established, has been the most affected by this problem. Between 2000 and 2005, it received an average of N500 million ($3.8 million) as yearly allocation from the government. In comparative terms this represented roughly 50% of the annual allocation to the EFCC between 2003 and 2005. Its financial situation was not helped by the fact that it was not a major beneficiary of international aid, as was the EFCC, whose creation was made possible thanks to pressures from the international community. As should be expected, the ICPC’s weak financial base had a direct impact on its human resource profile, as it struggled to pay for competent prosecutors or lawyers. Thus, in July 2005, it had only 32 investigators and 17 prosecutors, out of a total of 271 personnel.
7In contrast, the EFCC retained over 70 lawyers out of a total of 855 personnel in August 2006. This level of staffing ensured that it could, in addition to its headquarters in Abuja, run two regional offices, in Lagos and Port Harcourt. The much older ICPC operated until 2005 exclusively from its Abuja head office. Comparing both institutions with similar institutions elsewhere will help us better appreciate the extent of the problem. The ICAC in Hong Kong, often considered as a reference model, employed some 1,200 people, 70% of whom were investigators. It should be noted that Hong Kong has only six million inhabitants. In Tanzania, with some 35 million people, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) managed 714 personnel, spread out over its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, the country’s capital, and 21 regional and 110 district offices. Even if all other factors are ignored, discrepancies in funding and staffing on this scale are sufficient to explain why Nigeria’s anti-graft bodies, particularly the ICPC, have failed to deliver expected results.
8Of all the challenges that confronted Nigeria’s anti-corruption agencies, the inefficiencies of the criminal justice system were among the most serious. Anti-corruption agencies were frequently undermined by several loopholes in the Nigerian legal system, such as the anachronistic Evidence Act, the constitutional immunity against arrest and prosecution granted to the President, Vice-President, and the 36 state governors and their deputies, and the snail-speed of court trials. In its eight years in office, the Obasanjo government failed to take any concrete steps to reform the justice sector. The little progress observed in this area, which came through the efforts of the international community (UNODC) and the leadership of the judiciary, proved insufficient to strengthen the capacity, integrity, and more importantly the speed of the legal system. As a result, an overwhelming majority of corruption cases brought to court by the anti-corruption agencies were buried in endless delays. The consequence was that many accused persons roamed the streets freely after having been granted bail or even set free simply on technical grounds. The incapacity of these agencies to successfully prosecute a considerable number of the nation’s top officials, despite overwhelming evidence of corrupt practices on the part of these officials, contributed greatly to the poor image of these institutions.
9In the course of this book, we have shown how the problem of weak capacity of the anti-corruption agencies was linked in large part to the non-cooperative attitude of the political leadership in the country, which was responsible for the establishment of these agencies in the first place. The lack of political support from the leaders was demonstrated by the constant attacks launched against the ICPC by the National Assembly, all in a bid to intimidate the agency and sabotage investigations initiated against some key members of the federal legislature who had been implicated in serious corruption scandals. Indeed, when the bill for the establishment of the ICPC was submitted to the National Assembly in June 1999, it took the lawmakers over a year to consider it. The bill was passed only in July 2000, following intense lobbying and pressure from the President and critical sections of the public. In 2003, conflict between the federal legislature and the ICPC culminated in an unsuccessful attempt to pass a new ICPC law, which would have drastically reduced the powers of the ICPC and removed its then chairman, Justice Mustafa Akanbi. The National Assembly also ignored a bill seeking to strengthen the institutional capacity of the ICPC. The bill was prepared by the ICPC with the support of the executive arm of government and several civil society groups.
10As for the EFCC, Nigeria’s top political officials did not hide their surprise and dismay at the manner in which this institution ‘transformed’ itself into an anti-corruption body, contrary to their expectation that it would concern itself strictly with the arrest and prosecution of fraudulent bankers and individuals involved in the well-known 419 scam. As the EFCC’s profile rose, the politicians resorted to the stigmatisation and politicisation of this institution in a desperate attempt to weaken and discredit it. As in the case of the ICPC, the possibility of an amendment to the EFCC Act was frequently floated in the National Assembly. Similarly, frequent appeals for more budgetary allocations for the work of the organization received little or no attention, despite the relative success of the EFCC. Indeed, the N1.3 billion proposed by the Executive as the EFCC budget for 2005 was reduced to N1.1 billion by the National Assembly, making the EFCC the only institution whose budget was revised downwards.
11Thus, while the important role of top political actors in the successful application of anti-corruption policies and programmes is usually regarded as a critical condition for success, national anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria have been weakened and their powers undermined by national leaders who have refused to support them with the necessary financial resources and legal amendments that would have strengthened their capacities. Even then, their trajectories have been further complicated by Nigeria’s federal structure of government, which has encouraged the states and their local authorities to object to Obasanjo’s anti-corruption policy and programmes.
12The point here is simply that political will is essential. It is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programmes. No legislative or administrative changes can ever be effective unless there is commitment at all levels of government. It is one thing for the Obasanjo administration to establish anti-corruption agencies; it is quite another for the administration to provide the requisite political support (manifest and latent) for the agencies to succeed. Political will on the part of the international community is also crucial here. As we have seen, participation by the international community in Nigeria’s anti-corruption campaign has not been as forceful as should be expected. The pressure of the international community on the government of the Obasanjo administration in 1999 contributed greatly to the launching of an anti-corruption campaign by the administration. However, the same international community refused to offer concrete assistance to the administration in its quest for the repatriation of Abacha’s looted funds.
States’ and local governments’ resistance to the anti-corruption project
13Even though many of the reform measures embraced in pursuit of Obasanjo’s anti-corruption policy in Nigeria were often presented as ‘national policies’, applicable across the length and breadth of this vast nation, the reality in many of the 36 states and their 774 local governments pointed to the contrary. The little progress made in the struggle against corruption under Obasanjo was largely confined to the federal level of government. Some states tried to copy one or more aspects of the national anti-corruption policy or reforms which suited them. Others even went ahead to design their own unique strategies against corruption, a good example being Zamfara and other northern states which adopted Shari’ah law. Many of these measures, however, did not yield any tangible results. Even then, a great majority of the states, particularly the oil-rich Niger Delta states, were indifferent, if not hostile, to any idea of anti-corruption reform, especially the one proposed by the federal government. Their relationships with the federal anti-corruption bodies (the ICPC and EFCC) were very antagonistic and obstructive.
14The attitude of state governments to Obasanjo’s anti-corruption programme was first perceived in their reaction to the passage of the bill on the ICPC in July 2000 and the subsequent establishment of the ICPC in September 2000. As soon as the law was passed, 32 of the 36 state governments mounted a challenge before the Supreme Court seeking to invalidate the law on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, having encroached on their constitutional powers and the theory and practice of federalism in Nigeria. Even when their case was rejected by the Supreme Court, the states continued to obstruct the ICPC and the other national anti-corruption agencies. Nigerian states also took similar measures to challenge other laws passed by the federal government in its quest to fight corruption. A notable example was the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local Governments Act of 2005, which was invalidated by the Supreme Court on 7 July 2006 following a legal challenge mounted by three states of the federation. These cases showed clearly that the commitment of a central government is insufficient to guarantee the success of a public policy in a federal state. The support and commitment of sub-national authorities (states and local governments) are also crucial.
Weak civil society engagement in the war against corruption
15With the return of democracy in 1999, civil society in Nigeria witnessed considerable growth and dynamism. The sharp increase in the number of NGOs formed specifically to help combat corruption and the increased intervention in the domain of anti-corruption by other existing associations and movements illustrate this evolution. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to exaggerate the impact of the intervention of these non-state actors in the anti-corruption campaign. With the exception of Nigeria’s independent and indomitable media, many sections of the civil society have not gone beyond regular criticism and open call on the government to take its anti-corruption campaign more seriously. Some of these actors, such as anti-corruption NGOs that took a few concrete steps in the direction of promoting the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, found their efforts undermined by several internal and institutional challenges. Some of these hindrances included government’s unwillingness to adopt policies that could help strengthen CSOs (such as adoption of the Freedom of Information Bill), widespread corruption and rent-seeking behaviour within the CSOs themselves, and the incapacity of these organizations to go beyond sectional cleavages and ethno-religious solidarity. We also found that these problems have been compounded by unhealthy rivalry among civil society groups, which made networking impossible, and by the hardship of everyday life that has ensured that citizens are too concerned with everyday survival and too willing to serve as instruments for corrupt politicians, as we saw in the particular cases of Zamfara and Bayelsa States.
Direction for future reforms
16Corruption, especially the misappropriation of public funds, is no doubt an omnipresent phenomenon in many developing countries. However, in Africa the phenomenon is clearly part of the definition of the game of politics. In Nigeria, the legitimacy and fortune of regimes have often been shaped by the rise of corruption and the handling of corruption allegations. Many regimes fell amidst allegations of corruption within their regimes. Yet corruption remains, for Nigeria’s political class, a crucial factor in the construction of political power. The utility of corruption for the political class derives from its ability to serve both as the principal, if not the only, platform for the accumulation of wealth based on private appropriation of public resources and as a source of legitimisation of power through selective distribution of patronage. These practices are characteristics of a neo-patrimonial system, as we emphasised in the opening sections of this book. It is precisely because of this that Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign clashed with political interests, as seen in the collective opposition of the country’s political class to the anti-corruption policy initiated by the President following the inauguration of the Fourth Republic.
17Does this mean that building a less corrupt society is an illusory task in Nigeria? How can corruption be curbed in Nigeria’s political system? Most policy prescriptions and theoretical perspectives on anti-corruption programmes found in contemporary academic literature have tended to emphasise the importance and effectiveness of neo-liberal economic reforms (privatisation and deregulation) and public sector reforms (including adoption of anti-corruption regulations and institutions, reform of the civil service and judiciary, and strengthening of the civil society). The nature of politics and the roles of key political actors in recipient countries, that is to say, the potential local resistance to reforms, have most often been ignored or underestimated. Well-conceived economic and institutional reforms are necessary (Leiken 1996: 55; Kaufmann 1999: 89; Pope 1999: 98), but they can only be successful when and where their implementation is favourably received by the key stakeholders. Indeed, as Vendi Nadiz has pointed out with Indonesia in mind, in neo-patrimonial states “vested political interests have a stake in keeping monitoring institutions weak and in safeguarding conditions which make possible the plundering of state coffers” (Nadiz 2004: 21). Any successful anti-corruption programme means that this problem must first be resolved by those charged with implementing the anti-corruption project.
18One may, therefore, consider the anti-corruption campaign as a political struggle between ‘reformists’, or those who initiate and support an anti-corruption policy, and ‘vested political interests’, meaning those who organize and profit from the status quo (Whitehead 2000: 127). Nadiz has suggested that real progress in the struggle against corruption will depend “ultimately … on the ability of (the reformists) to organize coherently in order to capture the mainstream of political life” (Nadiz 2004: 21). The idea of a political victory of reformists over corrupt anti-reformist networks raises the question of relations of power.
19In our view, any successful campaign against corruption in Nigeria will require the prior existence or construction of a grand political coalition to support that campaign (Haarhuis 2005: 239). To put it differently, all the public bodies with responsibility for fighting corruption – prevention, investigation, research, education, and enforcement bodies – must work in concert, harmonise their efforts, and complement each other to develop one strategy. The difficulties the Obasanjo administration’s anti-corruption team encountered in their attempt to promote honesty and transparency in public institutions confirm to a large extent the hypothesis that where corruption is endemic, the struggle against corruption cannot be left to a small group of reformists. Rather, such a struggle will require the existence or construction of a grand coalition in favour of reforms. Unfortunately, up until the end of Obasanjo’s presidency, there was no sign suggesting that such a coalition was emerging. Nigeria certainly has a long way to go in its struggle against corruption in public life. The emergence of a government with strong political will, change in the attitude of the political class, and a more active and engaged civil society are required to move the war against corruption forward.

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