3
Judicial and public service reform
p. 31-59
Texte intégral
Introduction
Over the years, the Public Service Commission at Federal and State Levels lost the values on which they were established. Merit was sacrificed for expediency and opportunism. Retraining of hired staff hardly took place. It allowed so-called “ghost workers” to infiltrate the service and ended up with a payroll that was totally at variance with output or productivity. Parastatals were mismanaged, looted, and so badly run that they became an embarrassment to norms of efficiency, productivity, management, and probity … The proliferation of parastatals as well as the creation of several agencies had resulted in unnecessary duplications of functions and in some cases mandates. —President Olusegun Obasanjo. (The Guardian, 3 August 2004)
A good, fair and fearless judiciary instils discipline in the people. A bad or corrupt judiciary is unworthy of a democratic society and is capable of destabilising the society and thus breeding anarchy. —Chief Justice Mohammed Uwais. (Daily Independent, 27 July 2004)
1Despite their vaunted potency, it is now widely assumed that specialised commissions against corruption are not sufficient alone for fighting corruption, especially where corruption is systemic or endemic (Gould & Amaro-Reyes 1983; Rose-Ackernan 1996; Mény 1997; Stapenhurst & Langseth 1997; World Bank 2000). Anti-corruption commissions—ex post curative measures—must be complemented by a general reform of the public bureaucracy, including the judiciary—ex ante preventive measures—if they are to be effective. The measures taken by the Obasanjo government to reform Nigeria’s public services and judiciary have been rooted in this logic. What exactly were the measures taken? And where did they originate from? In this chapter, two types of reforms will be considered. The first type involves all the major reforms directed at public agencies under the direct control of the executive arm of government. We will call these ‘public service reforms’. The second type concerns reforms taking place within agencies of the judicial arm of government, and we will refer to these as ‘judicial reforms’.
Public service reforms
2During the years that preceded President Obasanjo’s rise to power, Nigeria’s public services became plagued by various forms of inefficiency and corruption. These were not new phenomena. Three decades earlier, similar issues had provoked calls for reforms or restructuring, culminating in the ‘great purge’ of 197576 by the military government of General Murtala Mohammed, in which over 11,000 public servants lost their jobs (Ereho & Oladoyin 2000). Unfortunately, this purge and subsequent reforms failed to curtail the corruption and inefficiency of the public sector (Aina 1982). Many of the reforms proposed were not comprehensive enough—for instance, they often focussed merely on higher pay for civil servants (Mohammed 2003). Others were frequently abandoned midway through for political reasons. A typical example was the Shehu Shagari regime, which had, following a severe economic crisis in the early 1980s, constituted a panel on the reform/reorganization of public parastatals and companies in 1982. The commission recommended the privatisation of most state companies, to be quickly followed by an increase in the role of the private sector as a way of getting out of the crisis (Osaghae 1995: 24). These recommendations, like most others, were never implemented before the regime was toppled in a military coup on 31 December 1983. The subsequent implementation in the mid-1980s of the recommendations of Shagari’s panel, under the title of ‘Structural Adjustment Programme’, did little to alter the decay in Nigerian public services, a decay which had reached an unprecedented height in 1999 by the time President Obasanjo was elected.
3To correct these issues, the Obasanjo administration announced a new series of reform measures, to be coordinated by a permanent institution, the Public Service Reform Bureau (PSRB) (The Guardian, 12 February 2004). The goal of these reforms was first and foremost to reduce the incentives for corruption, through the elimination of monopolies by privatising and deregulating, the elimination of discretion by streamlining functions and reinforcing controls, and the removal of administrative opacity by increasing transparency and accountability, especially in public revenue collection and expenditure. The aggressive implementation of such policies was expected to reduce the opportunities for corruption among public officials. Our analysis in this section will not cover all aspects of the reforms implemented, but only the most important ones: Accelerated privatisation of public enterprises, reform of the management of public finance, and the adoption of a new policy on employment and compensation in the public service, also known as ‘professionalisation’ and ‘rightsizing’.
Privatisation of public enterprises
4One of the most important reform policies of the Obasanjo administration was privatisation of public enterprises, defined as the “divestment by the (Federal) Government of part or all of its ordinary shareholding in designated enterprises” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000b: 2). Privatisation of public enterprises was conceived not only as a strategy for promoting economic growth and rapid development but also as an effective means of fighting corruption. The argument of the government, according to Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, was that “a more efficient economy driven by the private sector would not give room for corrupt practices witnessed in the public sector” (The Guardian, 8 June 2004). Privatisation, according to the government,
permits governments to concentrate resources on their core functions and responsibilities, while enforcing the ‘rules of the game’ so that the markets can work efficiently, with provision of adequate security and basic infrastructure, as well as ensuring access to key services like education, health and environmental protection. The objective is to assist in restructuring the public sector in a manner that will affect a new synergy between a leaner and more efficient government and a revitalized, efficient and service-oriented private sector. (Obasanjo 1999: 4)
5Although the sale of government businesses is now commonly associated with the Obasanjo administration, privatisation is not a recent phenomenon in Nigeria. On the contrary, its origin goes back to the Ibrahim Babangida military regime (1985-93), which adopted the policy as part of a Structural Adjustment Programme imposed on developing countries by the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) as a conditionality for negotiating the debts which became unsustainable during the economic crises in the 1980s (Biersteker & Lewis 1997; Umoren 2001; Dibie 2004). Nigeria is believed to have invested over $100 billion in its diverse public enterprises, which numbered around 600 at federal level and employed some 420,000 persons by 1993 (Jerome 2003). Return on investments in these enterprises was said to be 10% at most. Indeed, these businesses were largely responsible for Nigeria’s external debt, which reached $36 billion in 2005. According to the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the institution charged with supervising the sale of these enterprises, $19.8 billion, representing 55% of Nigeria’s external debts, were in fact incurred to finance these enterprises. Of that sum, some $1.5 billion was borrowed to finance the construction of Hilton Hotels ($300 million), Sheraton Hotels ($250 million), and some Paper Mills ($1 billion) alone. According to the BPE, the rate of return on these investments was only 0.5%, while their contribution to budgetary deficit represented 5% of GDP in 1998. As a matter of fact, with the exception of the Nigerian Insurance Corporation (NICON) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), none of the state companies or corporations had been profitable. This is notwithstanding the fact that they collectively received statutory transfers to the tune $3 billion in 1998, $800 million in 1999, $1.4 billion in 2000, and $4 billion in 2001 (ThisDay, 28 April 2005).
6Despite this disappointing record, along with the collapse of course of some of the most costly state firms—such as Nigeria Airways, Nigerian National Shipping Line, and Nigerian Railways Corporation—and the critical state of others—for example, the refineries, Nigeria Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), and the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA)—the privatisation of inefficient state enterprises was never faithfully implemented by Obasanjo’s predecessors. The policy was abandoned midway by the Babangida regime, which had initially embraced it, and then by its successor the Abacha government, which showed even less interest in the policy. These regimes were pressurised to drop the policy both by the Nigerian political class, used to seeing appointments to public office (including onto the boards of public enterprises) as a principal source of political patronage, and by an increasingly impoverished civil society, who saw the invisible hands of some foreign actors bent on violating the sovereignty of their nation and fostering inequality and mass poverty in Nigeria (Biersteker & Lewis 1997). During his brief period in power, General Abdusalami Abubakar, who rose to power in June 1998 following the sudden demise of General Sani Abacha, promised to resuscitate the policy before the re-establishment of civil democratic rule planned for May 1999. This promise, however, which was applauded by Nigeria’s creditors in the West and international financial institutions (Obadina, went unfulfilled. Even if the regime had overcome domestic political pressure against the policy, time and the presence of other pressing priorities (such as the transition to a civilian-rule programme) would not have allowed for the implementation of any meaningful privatisation programme.
7The arrival of President Obasanjo in May 1999 marked the revival of the privatisation programme. Obasanjo’s vision was influenced by three factors: the works of influential scholars, successful privatisations elsewhere, and of course the pressures of international financial institutions. Despite some pessimism as to the efficacy of privatisation as an anti-corruption tool (Watt et al. 2000; Whitehead 2000), many scholars and anti-corruption experts had continued to emphasise its benefits. Rose-Ackerman (1996: 3), for instance, argued that “if a parastatal that is the locus of corrupt payoffs is moved into the private sector, those payoffs will end … Policies that lower the controls on foreign trade, remove entry barriers for private industry, and privatise state firms in a way that assures competition, all contribute to the fight against corruption”. Some of the proponents of privatisation, however, have suggested that privatisation policy is likely to succeed only if accompanied by other specific changes, such as adoption of a new management order and new regulations and principles of production. These in turn will be facilitated by the putting in place of external controls—that is, the transfer of ownership rights to foreign investors (Bafoil 1999). Empirical data have also been supplied by some Africanists to show the long-term benefits of privatisation. According to one such study, despite some deficits at the level of job creation, privatisation has largely ameliorated the condition of privatised firms in several countries in Africa, including Nigeria, Benin, Mozambique, and Uganda. In the particular case of Nigeria, “changes in management and labour practices led to improved enterprise performance and increase in shares prices” (Makalou 1999: 15).
8Successful privatisations in other emerging economies also had salutary effects on President Obasanjo. Since the 1980s, a considerable number of countries, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and recently Africa, have embraced the policy of privatisation of state enterprises on the conviction not only that it will raise the overall efficiency of the privatised firms, but also that it will lead to a reduction in the level of corruption (Schleifer & Vishny 1993; Olson 1996; Ades & Di Tella 1997; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1999). The fact that the successes of these nations did not escape President Obasanjo’s attention was evident in the following comments:
State enterprises suffer from fundamental problems of defective capital structure, excessive bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, gross incompetence and mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling complacency which monopoly engenders. Inevitably, these shortcomings take a heavy toll on the national economy. The problems associated with state-owned enterprises and monopolies are not peculiar to Nigeria. It is true, however, that many developing countries have overcome the problems through a well-designed and single-minded pursuit of privatization programme. (Obasanjo 1999: 4)
9While President Obasanjo, like other leaders before him, continued to deny that privatisation was embarked upon to satisfy powerful foreign interests, it remains true that attempts to sell off wasteful and inefficient state companies is not just about a rational economic decision born out of enlightened self-interest. Nigeria, like other highly indebted poor countries, was more or less compelled to embrace privatisation, one of the preconditions fixed by her creditors for the much-sought-after debt relief (Obadina 1998). Pressures from these actors did not cease until Obasanjo began to implement the policy (cf. Osaghae 1995). But how far did Obasanjo go in his quest to sell Nigeria’s moribund public enterprises, and what challenges confronted him? How did the administration overcome pressures from the political class and civil society—particularly from labour, who are historically against privatisation?
10During the inauguration of the National Council on Privatisation on 20 July 1999, President Obasanjo identified three steps or phases to be followed by his privatisation programme. The first phase, running from June to December 1999, was the privatisation of banks and cement factories already quoted on the stock exchange. The second phase was the sale of hotels, vehicle assembly plants, etc.
11Then the third and final phase was to see the privatisation of the largest state companies and corporations, such as the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), Nigeria Airways, fertiliser plants, and the petroleum refineries (Obasanjo 1999: 6). The administration approached the exercise with such speed that by the end of 2006, very few companies were unsold as against a total of 95 marked for either full or partial privatisation in 2000-01. The sales helped save the government some $4 billion in 2004 alone, representing the amount that was given to these institutions in the form of state support the previous year (ThisDay, 28 April 2005). This progress, however, did not outweigh the negative aspects of the policy. Progress was not as rapid as one may be tempted to assume, nor was it uniform across the three tiers of government. Some of the biggest enterprises were never privatised by the time Obasanjo left office in May 2007. More importantly, the whole process was not as transparent as the proponents of privatisation often presented it.
12First, Nigeria, a federation with 36 state governments and 774 local governments, is such a huge and complex country that a single policy is hardly applicable across the whole country. While the federal government was quick in privatizing its own companies, the situation in the states and local councils remained unclear. While some state governments pursued their own privatisation plans, others were busy creating new business. To cite one example: In the north-central state of Nasarawa, an eight-man panel was inaugurated by Governor Abdullahi Adamu on 10 November 2003 to privatise the state’s enterprises. Seven of these enterprises were slated to be sold by the end of 2005 (ThisDay, 1 March 2005). But in the south-south state of Delta, which retained approximately N17.7 billion in investments in various private business concerns at 13 December 2004, including N9.5 billion in one of Nigeria’s mobile phone operators (V Mobile Nigeria Limited), politicians were taking a completely different direction. In its 2005 budget, this state announced it was setting aside a further N5 billion (out of a budget of N106 billion) for the creation of commercial enterprises with the aim of creating employment for the youth in the state. Conscious of the folly of its decision, the state government was quick to emphasise that “within a given period, once the businesses stabilize, then we remove our participation before political interferences begin to impact on the business” (ThisDay, 12 March 2005).
13At a second level, in spite of its often-restated commitment, the Obasanjo government did not succeed in privatizing the largest enterprises, which were coincidently the most inefficient firms. The electricity company (NEPA, now known as Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN)) and the refineries1 are the most relevant here. Part of the reason, as we have said, was the politics of patronage.
14The Nigerian political class (especially from the southeast and north of the country) opposed or tried to halt the privatisation train, owing to the fear that privatisation would most certainly exacerbate the concentration of economic wealth in the hands of elites from rival ethnic groups (such as the Yoruba of the southwest) considered to be more economically advanced (Osaghae 1995). They also collectively feared losing a vital source of political patronage provided by these institutions, which offered some 5,000 political appointments in their commissions and boards of directors (Anya 2003). One example occurred in April 2001, when a planned privatisation of the debt-ridden Nigeria Airways was halted following the strong opposition of some members of the House of Representatives, the second chamber of the National Assembly (BBC News, April 2001). This decision prompted a World Bank team, advising the government on the privatisation policy, to depart in protest, citing “slow progress, refusal of the government to heed its advice and resistance to the sale of Nigerian Airways”. The government was able to liquidate the airline only in 2004, when all its aircraft became grounded.
15A third factor concerns the limited interest shown in the enterprises slated for privatisation by the foreign investors often preferred by the government. Outside the upstream sector of the petroleum industry, foreign investors showed limited interest in Nigeria, despite its immense potential. As a rule, foreign investments in Africa and Nigeria in particular largely favour the extractive sector, notably the oil and mining sectors (The Economist, 24 June 2006; UNCTAD 2006). Indeed, frequent appearance in opinion polls of the world’s most corrupt countries, poor regulatory environment, decayed public infrastructures, and frequent violent ethno-religious conflicts appear to have conspired to rob the country of investors’ interest. The administration’s failed attempt to privatise the four refineries, symbols of Nigeria’s endemic corruption, is emblematic of this situation. One newspaper editorial dutifully summarised the problem of the refineries:
The government’s efforts have met little success. The government is finding it difficult to sell the four refineries, which are being portrayed as worthless in their current state … Investigations revealed that the government made an unsuccessful bid to get the oil majors (Shell, Chevron-Texaco and Mobil) to take up the offer of acquiring 51 percent stake and partner the government in managing the refineries … The oil majors are demanding wide-ranging liberalisation (removal of fuel subsidy) and full control of the refineries’ management before considering buying them. Government’s attempt to implement these demands has sparked off unrest. (AfroNews, 5 August 2004)
16The privatisation of state assets was also dented by allegations of massive corruption and favouritism. The process was heavily criticised for the lack of transparency which characterised the selection of buyers and consultants, the undervaluing of assets on sale, and even conflicts of interest where officials bought up assets using fronts (Anyi-Ude 2005). These allegations were repeated by different sources during the sale of companies such as the Aluminium Smelter Company (ALSCON) located in Ikot Abasi, Akwa Ibom State (ThisDay, 29 April 2005), and especially NITEL (ThisDay, 26 April 2005).
17By and large, these obstacles and challenges did not detract from other gains recorded in the privatisation project, especially at the federal level. In the final analysis, the success of the privatisation programme will depend on its contribution to the reduction in the level of waste and corruption in the public sector, which was the original intention of its initiators. This in itself will depend to some extent on the successful implementation of other aspects of the reforms proposed for the public sector, such as a reform of the management of public finance and the adoption of a new policy on employment and compensation.
Reform of the management of public finance: The Budgetary and Fiscal Transparency Initiative (BFTI)
18Before the advent of civilian rule in 1999, the concept of budgetary or fiscal transparency in the management of public finances was almost non-existent (Alli 2005; Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999b). This permitted assorted fraud and abuses, including massive diversion of state resources, illegal award of contracts, and tax fraud, to flourish unchecked. Contract awards, particularly, gave public officials unlimited opportunities to enrich themselves through the construction of white-elephant projects2 and price inflation and kick-backs.3 The relative absence of taxpayers and a culture of secrecy, induced by decades of military rule, undermined the capacity of the population to demand financial accountability from leaders. Determined to eliminate such waste and abuses, the Obasanjo administration embraced a number of policy measures, including the adoption and application of financial regulations relating to public procurement, the publication of all revenues and transfers accruing to the three levels of government (federal, state and local), and the monetisation of the benefits of public officials.
Transparent and strict application of financial regulations relating to public procurement: The due process regime
19In January 2000, a document titled Preface to Financial Regulations was released by the federal government. The document painted a sorry picture of the state of public finances in Nigeria, while highlighting the need for urgent reform. To correct some of the observed deficiencies, a study by the World Bank and a group of local experts was commissioned by the administration. Accordingly,
the comprehensive review of the country’s public procurement system covered the existing legal framework; organisational responsibilities and capabilities within government; present procedures and practices; the reliability of government accounting systems and the effectiveness of budgeting systems in directing resources for intended purposes. Comparisons were made in each of these areas on how practices in Nigeria differ from established international best practices. A participatory approach was used for the review, which involved all key stakeholders, including Federal, State and Local Governments together with representatives of the private sector. (Ekpenkhio 2003: 1)
After a painstaking review, the study concluded:
Nigeria lacks a modern law … to provide guidance and monitor purchasing entities; the Finance (Control and Management) Act (1958), and … regulations which set basic rules for managing public expenditures have gaps, deficiencies and faulty implementations … which create opportunities for bribery and corruption; due to inflation and lack of regular adjustments on the thresholds of the approving limits of the Tender Boards, their authorizations were constantly being eroded resulting in abuses; there was proliferation of tender boards which were perceived by the private sector as sources of delays and non-transparency … Customs systems and procedures were cumbersome and major causes of delay in clearing goods, and hence a source of corruption; and procurement is often carried out by staff who substantially lack relevant training. (World Bank 2003: 2)
20The report also proposed some remedies, including
the need for a procurement law based on the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model; the need to establish a Public Procurement Commission (PPC) to serve as the regulatory and oversight body on Public Sector Procurements; the revision of key areas of the Financial Regulations to make them more transparent; the streamlining of Tender Boards and strengthening their functional authority, including powers to award contracts; a critical need to rebuild procurement and financial management capacity in the public sector; and a comprehensive review of the businesses related to export, import and transit regulations, procedures and practices. (ibid.)
21In furtherance of these recommendations, the federal government published a document, dated 27 June 2000, Circular on New Policy Guidelines for Procurement and Award of Contracts in Government Ministries/Parastatals, outlining what later became known as the due process policy. Under the policy, all projects or purchases below N1 million must now be approved by the Director General/Permanent Secretary, through “selective tendering.” Projects and purchases of between N1 and N50 million are to be approved by a minister heading a Ministerial Tenders Board, while those above N50 million must now be approved by the Federal Executive Council, presided over by the President (Federal Government of Nigeria 2000c).
22After this policy was adopted, other measures followed in quick succession. For instance, a bill for the establishment of a Federal Public Procurement Regulatory Agency was submitted to the National Assembly. And in a move towards institutionalising reform, an institution named the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU) was established. All projects financed from the public treasury at the federal level and above N50 million are now to be vetted by the BMPIU, which was given powers to issue “due process certificates” or cancel all contracts that failed to meet international standards for transparency and competition or ‘value-for-money’.
23Despite mounting criticisms that the BMPIU was slowing down government work,4 the evasive attitude of some government institutions, and the unwillingness of the federal legislature to pass into law some bills that were supposed to institutionalise this policy—including the Fiscal Responsibility Bill and the Federal Procurement Bill—the BMPIU made rapid progress. It managed to increase conformity with financial regulations,5 at the same time saving billions of dollars in inflated contracts that would have ended up in private bank accounts. The institution became particularly well-known during the period 2004-5, when it was led by one of the most reform-minded members of the Obasanjo administration, Mrs Obiageli Ezekwesili.6
Publication of revenue allocations to all tiers of government
24At the beginning of its second term of office, in April 2003, Obasanjo’s administration introduced a new financial policy: The monthly publication of revenues accruing to all levels of governments (federal, state, and local). This was expected to promote greater financial accountability and reduce corruption. The brainchild of the former Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the monthly publications of official revenue on the Federal Ministry of Finance’s official website and in the local dailies soon emerged as one of the most important steps taken by the administration to advance its war against corruption.
25However, much as it encouraged interest and popular demand for political leaders to provide more information on their financial activities, which was traditionally considered an official secret, monthly publication of government revenue inflow was deeply controversial. It was also difficult to see how exactly this measure could contribute to reducing official corruption and how to measure its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the virulent opposition the policy generated, especially among state governors and their local government chairmen, who immediately dismissed it as “harmful” to good governance, appears to confirm its potency as a tool in fighting corruption. The real challenge, therefore, was how to ensure its consistent application, especially after Obasanjo’s expected departure in May 2007. Fears about the principled application of the policy were initially raised by the refusal of the President to fulfil his June 2004 promise to ensure that, in line with this policy, payments to all federal ministries and parastatals are published regularly (ThisDay, 15 June 2004). This immediately opened the door to accusations of hypocrisy by the state governors, who now see the policy as targeted at them. One other factor, apart from political opposition, that threatened its survival was funding. The publication of such information on a regular basis entailed huge financial costs. In fact, within a few months of launching it, the policy was almost abandoned owing to shortage of funds. The policy was rescued only by the generosity of The Soros Foundation, which intervened to ensure that publications continued (The Independent, 16 May 2006).
Monetisation of the benefits of public officials
26The third aspect of reforms in public-sector finance was the introduction of a new policy, which calls for the monetisation of fringe benefits enjoyed by federal officials.7 This policy came into existence in 2002. Monetisation, as it was popularly called, aimed to eliminate waste and abuse committed by public officials in general, and the top brass in particular, who were provided with assorted official benefits outside their monthly take-home pay. These included accommodation, domestic servants, furniture, and chauffeur-driven vehicles (Ekaette 2003; The Anti-Corruption Crusader 2003). As Head of Service Alhaji Yayale Ahmed himself pointed out, the management of these provisions in the past had generally “tended to create leakages weighing heavily on the cost of government” (7%g Guardian, 18 June 2004). Typically, the officials concerned converted public property in their possession, especially official vehicles, and their houses, including the facilities inside them (telephones, electricity, gas, water), to illegal private or commercial use. Alternatively, they allowed them to decay into the most terrible conditions, or simply left with them when they disengaged from the service. In place of such official privileges, public servants (with very few exceptions such as soldiers, police officers, and judges) would now be paid cash, proportionate to their position. This was to be included in their monthly salaries, in lieu of such benefits. In other words, these public officials would henceforth now rent or purchase their own homes, buy their own vehicles, and pay their telephone, water, and electricity/gas bills8 (Daily Independent, 16 May 2006).
27There are obviously some important benefits associated with such a policy. Unlike what obtained in the past, this policy is not only prudent because it will save the government substantial resources in the long run; it is also more just and egalitarian. As the government itself was quick to point out: “There was inequality (in the previous system) as majority of the officers did not enjoy those benefits. Monetization on the other hand, is anchored on equity as every officer gets his or her due” (ibid.).
28Like all the other reform policies highlighted, monetisation has also had its own costs and setbacks. Beyond the noble intentions, monetisation involved considerable financial resources and some macro-economic trade-offs in terms of inflationary pressure and distortion of national budget. These considerations subsequently forced the government to slow down its implementation. Instead of applying the policy to all categories of federal officials in one sweep, a revised plan issued in June 2004 stated that the policy would first apply to the ministries (core civil service) and then progressively apply to the other services in a step-by-step fashion or as funds permitted.
29Soon after its implementation commenced, other problems began to appear, which tended to undermine the very objective of the policy. Some institutions of the same government were not committed to this policy and took steps that went contrary to the requirements of monetisation. The federal legislature will serve as an example. In April 2006, the Senate ordered and took delivery of 117 Peugeot 407 cars, one each for its members. Apart from a statement condemning this action, which was issued by the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC)—the federal institution charged with supervising revenue allocation to the three tiers of government and fixing salaries and benefits of public servants—nothing else was heard from the administration, fuelling speculation that the purchase might have been made with the approval of the Presidency as a way of buying off the lawmakers, who were planning to vote on a controversial constitutional amendment bill which sought to extend the tenure of President Olusegun Obasanjo beyond 2007 (ThisDay, 25 April 2006).
Reinforcing administrative capacity: New policy on employment, remuneration and retrenchment
To be able to push sufficient changes in the direction of public service capacity building requires that we review and strengthen our management development institutions. Accordingly, I have mandated the Head of Service to immediately embark on a policy of catch them young to bring into the service young graduates from tertiary institutions with first-class performance in their colleges. With their ambition, motivation, creativity and capacity to learn, they will be the high flyers that will move the civil service into the contemporary age of precision-driven efficiency and effectiveness. —President Olusegun Obasanjo. (The Guardian, 25 June 2005)
30With the above statement, President Olusegun Obasanjo signalled the arrival of yet another aspect of his multiple public-sector reforms: A new policy on recruitment, reinforcement of capacity, and retrenchment9 of public servants. This policy, like the other policies discussed above, was pursued with relative vigour and consistency until Obasanjo left office in May 2007. What was the actual goal and content of this policy? The policy on recruitment, reinforcement of capacity, and retrenchment focussed on three broad areas: Meritocracy in recruitments—that is, professional competences with respect to actual institutional needs; appropriate compensation or remuneration for public officers, including regular salary increases, reform of the pension system, and the gradual adoption of a National Health Insurance Scheme; and retrenchment or prompt removal of officials for inefficiency or corruption. These reforms received wide support from Nigerians and the international community, especially among the international financial institutions,10 creating the impression that they were irreversible.
Appropriate compensation and remuneration
31The new policy of reinforcing the capacity of public officers was tied principally to the idea of adequate compensation and remuneration of workers. It rests on the hypothesis according to which only a well-remunerated service can resist corrupt temptations or inducements (van Rijckeghem & Weder 1997). Pursuant to this, the monthly minimum wage of federal workers rose from N3,500 to N7,500 in 1999, representing a more than 100% increase. In 2003, an increase of between 12% and 4% was implemented in ascending order.11 Salary increases were also introduced in all the 36 states of the federation, as dictated by available resources. In the same measure, the government also pushed through a new Contributory Pension Scheme. The debt-ridden National Pension Fund (NPF) was replaced by several licensed, private financial institutions specializing in the management of pension funds. Similarly, a new National Healthcare Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was launched by the federal government to ensure decent living conditions for workers.12 On a more negative note, the proposed National Housing Fund failed to materialise despite all the publicity, in part owing to the complex negotiations involving the federal government and workers’ union on the one hand, and federal government and state governments on the other.
Professionalisation of the public service: Return to merit-based recruitment
32The professional competence of a public service is a factor that cannot be ignored or underestimated in the search for a credible and honest public service (Evans & Rauch 1995). To this end, a new policy emphasizing a more meritocratic recruitment—that is, the attraction of quality personnel into the public service—was encouraged. In theory this should involve a reformulation of Nigeria’s constitutionally rooted quota system or ‘federal character system’, which prescribes that public sector employment at all levels of government must be shared between the geo-political zones, states, or local governments as the case may be. This system, which is as old as Nigeria itself, was adopted to avoid the domination of the public services by a few states or ethnic groups or regions, but has now become emblematic of its neo-patrimonial politics, often becoming a source of conflict and disintegration rather than stability and integration, the latter being the reasons for which it was adopted in the first place (Suberu 2001). Even if this system had permitted a better management of ethno-religious tensions, it had unfortunately institutionalised a culture of mediocrity, clientelism, and corruption, which have plagued the Nigerian public service for decades (Ademolekun 1997). The Nigerian public service is largely composed of individuals lacking the necessary skills and know-how to do the job required of them. This is because most owe their job to the quota system or to the benevolence of a certain ‘big man’ with the right ‘connections.’
33This fact has been adequately reflected in most official statistics published since 1999 on the subject. According to the report of a committee set up by the Federal Ministry of Finance (Committee on Restructuring and Reprofessionalisation of the Federal Ministry of Finance) to conduct a staff audit on behalf of the ministry in 2003, only 8% of the ministry’s employees possessed degrees or professional qualifications relevant to the work of the ministry. In all, a total of only 13% had university degrees, while 70% were not qualified to work in the ministry in the first place (ThisDay, 28 July 2004). The same scenario has been reported in other public institutions, such as the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), an institution that emerged in 2005 following the merger of the former Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) and the National Data Bank (NDB). According to its director general, Dr Vincent Akinyosoye, of a total staff strength of 4,100, only 15% possessed any of the professional qualifications necessary for the work of the institution. The other 85% had irrelevant qualifications or none at all. In order to correct this anomaly, 1,153 employees of the NBS were relieved of their positions in February 2006. The fund required for this exercise, estimated at some N1 billion, was supplied by the World Bank (ThisDay, 6 February 2006).
34Summarizing the decay which has characterised the public service in Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo had this to say:
I have received reports of a number of pilot ministries, which reinforced the self-review studies undertaken by the Office of the Head of the Civil Service. The results show that the civil service has decayed very badly. It did not retool. Its technology and methods became outdated. Its philosophy became denigrated and its integrity badly compromised and corrupted. The net result was inefficiency, waste, corruption and, in some cases, arrogance. (The Guard’an, 25 June 2004)
35In furtherance of its mission of professionalising the Nigerian public service, the Obasanjo government soon ordered the employment of 1,000 young Nigerian graduates with at least first-class or second-class-upper honours’ degrees in various fields to beef up the organisation. Beyond that, it also sought to bring about a change of value among those who are already employed. This largely involved the holding of seminars, conferences, and retreats, during which public officers were reminded of the necessity of observing and internalising the rules of the game, that is, the Civil Service Rules and Financial Regulations.
Dismissal of inefficient and corrupt officers
36The strategy for reinforcing the capacity of the public service finally came down to dismissal or making redundant of corrupt and inefficient public officers, or ‘deadwoods’ as they are called in Nigeria. The thinking of the government was that its policies which focused on attracting young and talented Nigerians into the public service could not succeed unless there was first a reliable process of identifying and dismissing unwanted hands. The identifying and removing of unwanted civil servants was not, however, a very simple task in Nigeria.
37The first issue was that outside the 180,000 individuals working in the federal ministries or ‘core civil service’, the exact number of public servants at the federal level was unknown. The compilation of any such list would certainly contain thousands of ‘ghost workers’. To cite just a single example: After a 2004 audit, the federal government confirmed that it had identified 42,000 ghost workers in the entire federal public service, of whom 3,000 came from the defunct Ministry of Federal Capital alone (Th’sDay, 5 May 2004). These figures were far from exhaustive. Indeed, following another round of reform in 2005, this time initiated by Minister of the Federal Capital Territory Nasir El-Rufai specifically for the ministry, it was found that the staff strength had tumbled from 26,000 to 18,000. Among the 8,000 that had left, 5,000 were said to be ghost workers. The other 3,000 were those who had no qualification required for the job (Vanguard, 5 June 2005).
38The phenomenon of ghost workers is a problem common to all the tiers of government in Nigeria. Zamfara, Ondo, and Ekiti states are among the few states that identified and flushed out hundreds of ghost workers during the period covered by this study. In a single incident in 2004, Zamfara State was able to identify as many as 800 ghost workers in its 14 local councils, through the work of a
39Special Verification Committee (The Guardian, 21 June 2004). In April 2004, following a probe of the payroll of one of its parastatals, Ondo State Scholarship Board, the Ondo State government was able to save a staggering N44 million. Note that the budget of this institution for the same year was just N71.4 million (The Guardian, 18 May 2004). In a related development, Ekiti State government also announced it was saving about N33 million monthly, after identifying an undisclosed number of ghost workers on its payroll during an audit (ThisDay, 22 June 2004).
40The ghost-worker syndrome was unfortunately not the only pathological condition of the Nigerian public service. The service was also characterised by an aging workforce, if official reports are anything to go by.13 At least 60% of the workforce was said to be above 40 years of age in 2004. These statistics, of course, hide some very important information, one piece of which is the rampant falsification of age among all categories of public officials. As the Head of Civil Service of the Federation pointed out, “it should not be a surprise that a large proportion of staff … are over the age limit for serving officers, but continue to amend their records to stay … We have discovered that except we utilise the modern techniques on scrutinising, we would never be able to clean up our records and determine our actual staff strength” (The Guardian, 18 June 2004).
41Whatever may be the case, the Obasanjo government tried to implement measures to tackle these problems. With the concept of ‘rightsizing’, it sought to return the service to its past glory through the removal of unwanted public servants, judged in terms of their inefficiency or involvement in corrupt practices.
Disengagement for corruption
42The notion of rightsizing hinged, first and foremost, on the dismissal or retirement of public officers believed or alleged to be guilty of corruption. Despite controversies that often trail allegations of corruption, this policy surprisingly proved much easier to carry out, at least when compared with the policy of axing people on the basis of inefficiency or redundancy. There is a general feeling in Nigeria that given the level of unemployment in the country, people should not be dismissed from their positions just because their services are deemed unnecessary. On the other hand, most people accept that corrupt officials should be dismissed. Thus, when in August 2001 the Federal Executive Council approved a resolution giving the President carte blanche to sack corrupt public officers (Vanguard, 20 September 2001), the resolution passed almost without notice.
43Before then, several public institutions had independently announced a purge of ‘bad eggs’ from their organisations. The Nigeria Police Force, for example, dismissed over 1,000 officers between 1999 and 2004 for various offences, ranging from bribery and extortion to falsification of certificates and records in the quest to enter into the force14 (Balogun 2004; Daily Times, 26 April 2004; The Guardian, 2 July 2004; The Guardian, 4 August 2004). The Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) also dismissed some of its personnel, including 13 who were sacked in February 2004 for various corrupt practices (The Guardian, 4 February 2004). Other agencies which took similar steps included the Nigeria Immigration Service, which sacked 200 officers (out of 235 employed in its passport office) in January 2006 for fraud in the issuance of passports or ‘official touting’ (ThisDay, 25 January 2006), and the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), which in January 2005 dismissed 6 people judged by its Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit to be guilty of “involvement in unethical conduct, poor attitude to work and rude to customers” (The Guardian, 19 January 2005). NEPA, now known as the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), also sacked over 500 personnel (including 15 managers) between 2001 and June 2006 for corrupt practices, through its own Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit (The Guardian, 29 July 2006). The Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), a parastatal under the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, was probably one of the worst hit. According to the minister in charge, as many as 300 officials of the FCDA had been dismissed as at 6 June 2005 for fraudulently selling lands belonging to the ministry (ThisDay, 6 June 2005).
44Retrenchment for corruption is not limited to junior- or middle-level staff, notwithstanding the impression of a highly politicised public service. In April 2004, seven senior managers of the Pipelines Products and Marketing Company (PPMC), a subsidiary of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), received their dismissal letters (ThisDay, 19 April 2004). In June of the same year, a further three received the same treatment (The Guardian, 3 June 2004). These officials, in active collaboration with some fraudulent foreign businessmen, had allegedly engineered a fraud in the importation of petroleum products which cost the nation some $108 million. Similarly, in 2001, 109 senior officials of the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), indicted by NITEL’s Anti-Corruption and Other Related Offences Monitoring Committee, were sacked for various corrupt practices, including extortion, over-charging of clients, and manipulation of phone lines (Otisi 2001). Similar reforms were also carried out by the National Judicial Council (NJC) in the justice sector, where a number of judges were queried, suspended, retired, or dismissed from service for corruption.
45According to the federal government, up to 160,000 public servants were to be disengaged as part of the ongoing reform. This number includes 90,000 in the lower grades, 62,000 from the intermediate grades, and 8,000 from the superior grades (The Guardian, 9 January 2006; ThisDay, 8 February 2006). It must be emphasised, however, that not all these officers were to be disengaged because of corruption. According to a policy paper approved by the Senate on 7 February 2006, the criteria for retrenchment included the following: Being guilty of gross misconduct, lacking basic entry qualifications, being unfit medically, failing to earn promotion, failing to acquire mandatory skills, and age (ibid.).
46In the states of the federation, where similar public service reforms were implemented—under the title of State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS)—dismissals for corruption also took place. For instance, in Imo State, 700 public officers employed in the Secondary Education Management Board were sacked in January 2004, after being indicted by a commission of inquiry established in September 2003, for fraud leading to the loss of N126.5 million. Out of this number, 613 were employed illegally, 27 had fabricated a list of ‘ghost pensioners’ to defraud the state, 9 were due for retirement but had falsified their records to remain in service, 46 were actually in retirement but continued to receive their salaries, and 33 had earlier retired but were illegally reemployed (Daily Times, 28 January 2004). Other states, such as Kwara (The Guardian, 3 March 2004) and Cross River (The Guardian, 25 November 2004) also dismissed some of their staff, especially school heads who engaged in examination malpractices. Some states, like Gombe State, had to take even more radical measures, such as the sacking in some cases of the entire management parastatals. This, for example, was the case on 23 December 2004, when the entire management of Gombe Floods Relief Management Committee, who were accused of diverting relief materials meant for three local government areas (ThisDay, 24 December 2004), were sacked. Ondo State also took the same action, when it sacked six managers in November 2004 at its Ondo State Afforestation Project (OSAP), accused of stealing equipment valued at N20 million (The Guardian, 17 November 2004).
47The complexities of malpractices witnessed in the various public services of the federal and state governments as presented above show that not only was comprehensive reform urgently needed to reposition the Nigerian public bureaucracies, but also that such reforms required considerable political commitment and time to implement.
Retrenchment for inefficiency and redundancy
48While corruption among public servants has been the major focus of public sector reform and has attracted much attention from Nigeria’s leaders, other areas such as inefficiency have not been completely forgotten. During the tenure of President Olusegun Obasanjo, thousands of public officers were sent packing for no other reason than inefficiency or redundancy. While officials often cited multiple reasons for downsizing, many of the reasons were actually linked with the ongoing policy of professionalisation and rightsizing of the public service. For example, when in November 2003 NNPC, which employed 14,000 workers, announced the departure of 1,388 workers and the promotion of 34 to management positions, it claimed that the decision “reflected management’s decision to reward hardworking staff and weed out the bad eggs” (ThisDay, 19 April 2004). But the reorganization was widely interpreted within the framework of the federal government’s adjustment policy. Most organisations, however, did not see any reason to be evasive about their intentions or objectives. Thus, Nigerian Custom Services, with over 17,418 employees, justified its downsizing policy by saying, “many officers were found to be redundant, while there are serious overlapping responsibilities in the existing schedules of duty … The committee had thoroughly reviewed the service and found that the service … is over-bloated at the top and medium levels especially in the comptroller cadre” (ThisDay, 22 March 2004). Similarly, in February 2004, over 153 employees of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) were relieved of their duties. According to an official statement from NCAA, “the staffs affected were those with disciplinary cases or are redundant, those considered untrainable, cases of ill health as well as length of service put in” (ThisDay, 10 February 2004). This exercise, according to the NCAA, would lead to the departure of 500 more workers (ibid.).
The judicial reforms
49As was the case with institutions of the executive arm of government, reform of the institutions of the judicial arm of the Nigerian state also received unprecedented attention, even if to a lesser extent, after the launch of the anti-corruption campaign in 1999. The importance of a credible and effective judiciary in the struggle against criminality in general, and corruption more particularly, is no longer in doubt (Langseth & Stolpe 2001; Shihata 1997; Ades & Di Tella 1996; Gurgur & Shah 1999). For obvious reasons, it should be expected that where the judiciary is corrupt or inefficient, the first priority of a war against corruption should seek to reform this institution and ensure that a close collaboration exist between it and the various law enforcement agencies. As the experiences of developed countries show, this partnership holds the key to the rule of law and good governance. Unfortunately, in Nigeria such co-operation was more the exception than the rule. The relations between the judges and law enforcement agencies were frequently characterised by mutual accusations. Nigerian security agencies, especially the Police and the anti-corruption agencies, regularly blame the judiciary for the high level of criminality and corruption, owing to the judiciary’s tendency to grant bail to individuals accused of corruption and other crimes. According to the then EFCC chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, “the judiciary has encouraged financial crime because the … law enforcement agencies and the judiciary often times turned a blind eye to the criminal activities of these 419 perpetrators … Instead of fighting them, they provided the fraudsters with adequate protection via heavily armed police or army escorts and in some cases the courts grant trivial injunctions in favour of the criminals” (ThisDay, 29 June 2004). The judges, on the other hand, blamed these agencies for poor investigations.
50More troubling is the fact that the Nigerian judiciary itself was not free from corruption. Allegations of corruption and inefficiency against judges are not new phenomena in Nigeria (Osipitan 2005). Indeed, the persistence of these accusations led to the establishment of a commission by the Abacha regime in 1993. During the inauguration of the commission, which was to examine the issue of corruption in the judiciary and suggest necessary reform, General Abacha correctly summarised the state of this institution:
This administration is aware of some of the public perceptions of the present state of our nation’s judiciary, namely: Polarisation of the Judicial System along ethnic, tribal and political lines; corruption and high-profile lifestyle of some of the judges; ineptitude, laziness and incompetence; long period of time in the disposition of cases; ridiculously high cost of obtaining justice; mode of employment of judges which does not facilitate the required calibre of judges into the Service; the terms and conditions of service of judges. (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004: 6)
51Many of these lapses highlighted by Abacha were later confirmed by the report of the Kayode Eso Panel. According to the report of the panel, which was submitted to the Abacha government in 1994, the Nigerian judiciary was chronically inefficient and deficient in credibility. The inefficiency of the judiciary, which manifests itself notably in the area of slow speed of trials and poor quality of judgements, was largely caused by inadequate funding, use of obsolete equipment, insufficient judges, inefficiency of the security agencies, reliance on outdated legislation, and widespread corruption among judges, especially at the lower levels of the judicial pyramid (ibid. 20). On the issue of corruption, the commission noted:
There is a concurrent affirmation that the judiciary has declined by alarming proportions. What is more, and the saddest aspect, is that the pernicious cankerworms of official corruption by gratification, undue influence, ineptitude, laziness have made appreciable inroads into the nation’s judicial system all over the country. The lower you descend in the hierarchy of courts, the denser is the cloud of corruption. (ibid. 117)
52According to the panel, these problems came about largely owing to the institution’s lack of independence vis-à-vis other organs of government (notably the Executive), poor remuneration, and absence of a regulatory body. As a remedy, the report called for the immediate retirement of 47 judges across the different levels of the courts’ system, including 8 Chief Judges, 21 High Court Judges, and 18 Magistrates, and the establishment of 2 regulatory bodies. These were the National Judicial Service Commission (NJSC), to be concerned with appointments, promotion, and general well-being of judicial workers, especially judges, and the National Judicial Council (NJC), to be charged with the finance, discipline, and independence of the judiciary.
53While corruption and abuse of power has been part of the history of the judiciary in Nigeria for decades, under the Obasanjo administration the institution became enmeshed in major scandals, which further undermined its credibility and culminated in the sacking of several judges15 (Newswatch, 9 February 2004). The widening degree of corruption among judges, including judges of superior courts—until recently relatively immune from graft—also became a major source of worry for many senior citizens. A retired judge of the Supreme Court, Honourable Justice Samson Odenwingie Uwaifo, captured this perception when he made the following observation:
Corruption was once thought to be only in the magistracy because of the disturbing way some of the personnel tended to abuse their office … It gradually crawled to the High Courts and would appear to have had a foothold among a noticeable number of judicial officers there … Now, there is real apprehension that the appellate court may soon be infested if not already contaminated with some of these vices. (ThisDay, 25 January 2005)
54The multiple challenges facing the Nigerian judiciary were highlighted by another report published in December 2003. The report, Judicial Integrity and Capacity in Nigeria, noted:
The overriding problem was identified as ‘the precarious situation of the rule of law in Nigeria caused by insufficient integrity and capacity of the justice system in general and the judiciary in particular’. At the time of the Project’s development, the main challenges faced by the Nigeria judiciary were seen as an absence of thorough knowledge and data regarding the extent and nature of and the reasons for the malfunctioning of the judiciary. Finally, there was a lack of a systematic, realistic, time-bound and broad-based anti-corruption action plans, both at the Federal and State levels. (UNODC 2003c: 13)
55But despite the depth of the rot in the judiciary and the implications of a corrupt and inefficient judiciary for the declared war against corruption, the Obasanjo administration made little or no attempt to instigate reform in the judiciary. Talks of reforming the judiciary and indeed the entire criminal justice system only began to appear in the second half of the regime’s tenure in office. What explains this seeming indifference to matters related to the judicial sector? In our view, there are at least three possible explanations to account for this. Firstly, the reform of the judiciary failed to receive much attention largely because it was theoretically an independent institution, constitutionally separate from the executive arm of government led by President Obasanjo. The second explanation is that such reforms required some constitutional amendments, a very cumbersome process in Nigeria, where such a process entails the support of absolute majorities in not only the federal legislature (Senate and House of Representatives) but also in at least two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly. The third explanation is the poor appreciation of the role of the judiciary; that is to say, there was general ignorance about the implications of judicial corruption for society. This fact only became obvious during the adjudication of the 2003 election petitions,16 when the government and the population suddenly discovered that the judiciary is an indispensable instrument in any democracy.
56The first known attempt by the government to introduce reform of the justice system occurred in July 2004, when the government inaugurated a panel, officially named the National Working Group on the judiciary. The terms of reference of this panel included the following:
Develop a first draft of an administration of criminal justice (ACJ) bill aimed at reducing delay in the criminal trial and generally modernising the criminal justice system in the country … To organize stakeholders’ consultation on the draft bill … on the issue of corruption in the investigation and prosecution of cases, lack of effective coordination amongst the agencies of criminal justice administration, especially the police, the prisons, the prosecutors and the courts. The group is also expected to look at such areas as absence of clear sentencing guidelines, prison congestion, growing number of awaiting trial cases, lack of witnesses, lack of sureties and the issue of missing case files. (Daily Independent, 6 July 2004)
57The proposed reforms, however, did not represent any serious or comprehensive reform of the judiciary. Indeed, as was clearly obvious in the panel’s terms of reference, the government of Obasanjo was very much aware of its limited power over the judiciary. Worse still, the panel, which began its work five years after the arrival of the Obasanjo administration, submitted its report only on 9 August 2005 (Efeizomor 2005), leaving the government with very little time to reflect on its findings and implement recommended reforms. Several other reform measures conceived by the Obasanjo government for the judiciary suffered the same fate. One of them was the proposed Administration of Criminal Justice (ACJ) Bill, which was supposed to be drafted by a panel of eight law specialists (Panel on Criminal Justice Reform), appointed by the government in July 2004. The bill was intended to reduce the delay which often characterises court trials and to modernise the criminal justice system (Daily Independent, 6 July 2004). This law did not pass before the end of the Obasanjo administration in May 2007 and remains unpassed to date.
58However, the inability of the Obasanjo administration to extend its reforms to the judiciary did not stop other actors, including international institutions and the leadership of the judiciary itself, from stepping in to rescue the institution. What are the nature and goals of these reforms? In general, two types of reforms were implemented in the Nigerian judiciary between 1999 and 2007: Reforms that sought to enhance the capacity of the judiciary, and reforms that were directed at improving judicial integrity. The reforms seeking to boost capacity were spearheaded by international organizations, while reforms aimed at promoting integrity were championed by the leadership of the judiciary itself.
Reforms aimed at improving judicial capacity
59The first set of reforms—that is, reforms seeking to reinforce capacity within the Nigerian justice system—was led by several international institutions and unveiled during a meeting organized in April 2000 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in close collaboration with Transparency International. This meeting examined the necessary measures required to reform the various institutions of the judiciary and the areas where the integrity of the judiciary was deficient. After establishing the basic principle of such reform, its precise objectives, and scope, three member states of the UN—Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Uganda—offered to test the programmes in their respective countries (UNODC 2003a: 3). This point marked the commencement of a series of judicial reform measures in Nigeria.
60Following this international meeting, another project, christened ‘Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity’, was launched specifically for Nigeria. This project, coordinated by the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) in close collaboration with the UNODC, was formally announced in October 2001 during a meeting in Abuja between the CJN and the Chief Judges of the 36 states of the federation (First Integrity Meeting for Chief Judges) (ibid.: 4). The first stage of this project involved the collection of a wide range of relevant data concerning the problem of Nigerian judicial integrity and capacity. Three principal sources of data were identified. The first source was the investigation conducted by the International Judicial Group, which had participated at the April 2000 meeting. The second was the report of the April 2001 meeting between the CJN and head of judiciary or Chief Judges of the 36 states of the federation. This meeting had identified four aspects of the judicial system that required urgent reforms, namely, the quality and speed of court trials, access to courts, public confidence in the judiciary, and efficient management of cases brought before the courts. The third source was the conclusions of the research carried out by the Nigerian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS), which itself was financed by UNODC.
61The second stage of the project had to do with deciding the specific objectives to be achieved by the project in the context of the problems identified. To this end, the UNODC project sought to facilitate the struggle against corruption in the judiciary with, on the one hand, the production of a “federal action plan for a war against corruption in the judiciary”, and, on the other hand, the definition of effective measures to correct the identified deficiencies touching on judicial capacity. The measures aimed to increase access to justice, the quality of services, the level of public confidence in the judicial process, the effectiveness of responses to public complaints, and coordination within the criminal justice system.
62A third phase involved the concrete application of all the identified measures in a progressive manner, aiming first at three pilot states (Borno, Delta and Lagos) which were selected between October 2001 and November 2003. The outcome of this exercise was carefully studied and analysed by several experts, in a way that would enable the authors of the project to gradually extend the programme to all the other parts of the country, while perfecting it with respect to lessons learnt from the experience of the pilot states.17
63Despite the well-conceived nature of these projects, their implementation was undermined by a number of difficulties. According to the report received at the end of the exercise, these difficulties ranged from problems of finance and administration to the limited cooperation (e.g. from the ICPC), if not indifference (from the Police), of key public institutions18 (UNODC 2003c: 25). There were also problems posed by tensions existing between the institutions concerned (the ICPC, the Police, and the judiciary) on the one hand, and between a secular and an Islamic legal system (Shari’ah) on the other hand (ibid.: 29). Similarly, the report observed that “the continuing relative poverty and ‘non-maintenance’ culture which exists in the country will be threats to sustainability” (ibid.: 30).
64What then was the essence or benefit of the whole exercise? Or, how substantial were the reforms? According to our interviews with people familiar with the system, this phase of the project did produce some remarkable results and can be considered as a relative success. The project is said to be largely responsible for the noticeable improvements seen in the judicial systems of some states of the federation (notably Lagos and, to a lesser extent, Bornu),19 in addition to attracting popular support. The technical report prepared for the UNODC also stressed this point. According to the report:
Notwithstanding the absence of empirical evidence, this evaluation finds that there is substantial and compelling anecdotal evidence that the project has been successful in increasing judicial capacity and integrity. Such evidence includes the response to the installation of complaints boxes and attendant complaints process, and rights awareness posters; high levels of interest and enthusiasm for the project has been generated, resulting in high numbers of other Nigerian states lobbying for inclusion in the project; and procedural reform (e.g. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Multi-door courts, Civil Law Reform, ‘holding charge’ reform) which has reduced court delays and improved access to injustice. (UNODC 2003b: 6)
Reforms designed to restore the integrity of the judiciary
65Several years after the launching of the campaign against corruption, the level of judicial integrity remained low. The assistance of the international community had facilitated the improvement of judicial capacity in Nigeria in many ways. Unfortunately, the programme did not do much in the area of restoring the integrity of judges. Similarly, the efforts launched by the Obasanjo administration in July 2004 to improve access to justice, increase the speed and quality of trials, enhance the confidence of the public in the courts, increase the effectiveness and credibility of criminal investigations, and produce a greater coordination between the major institutions of the criminal justice system did not bring much succour. Nevertheless, there have been unprecedented improvements in the level of integrity of judges in Nigeria since 1999. Ironically, much of the progress noticed by way of enhanced integrity of judges was made possible by some of the efforts of the judiciary itself, which took unprecedented steps to bring some of its erring members, especially judges, to book. Three factors encouraged the leadership of the judiciary to move in this direction.
66The first factor relates to some unique provisions of the 1999 Constitution. The 1999 Constitution, unlike previous constitutions, made provision for the establishment of two independent regulatory institutions, known as the National Judicial Council (NJC) and the Federal Judicial Service Commission (FJSC), with the sole responsibility of recommending judges for appointment and promotion, enforcing laid-down procedures (as codified in the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria), and overseeing the general welfare of members of the judiciary. Under the Constitution, judges are to be appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, but on the basis of the recommendation of the NJC, which itself receives advice or nominations from the FJSC. In order to guarantee their independence, the composition of both bodies was made largely independent of the executive and legislative arms of government. Thus, both institutions are headed by the CJN and comprise some of the most senior members of the Nigerian bench and bar, in addition to some representation from outside the legal profession. Despite criticisms that these bodies represent an assault on Nigeria’s federal system, they functioned relatively well to promote judicial independence and integrity (Suberu 2008).
67The second factor was the personal commitment of successive CJNs, notably Justice Mohammed Uwais, who was Nigeria’s Chief Justice from December 1995 until June 2006 (ibid.: 457). During his tenure in office, Justice Uwais became extraordinarily committed to the idea of judicial integrity and independence. Under his leadership, the Nigerian judiciary managed not only to adhere substantially to a national, prescribed Code of Conduct, but also enthusiastically submitted to an international judicial code, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct of 2002. Indeed, the Nigerian judiciary, under Chief Justice Uwais, was one of the major initiators of the code and participated actively in all the stages leading to its adoption in April 2000 in Vienna, Austria.
68The third factor was the vigilance of the public, especially court users, lawyers and their clients, civil society groups, human rights advocates and democracy activists, and politicians, especially from opposition parties. These groups had increasingly monitored the activities of judges and in some instances raised the alarm when traces of corrupt practices or abuse of powers were found. Consequently, their petitions led to the launching of several investigations, many of which culminated in the retirement or outright dismissal of scores of judges.
69Most of the retirements and dismissals witnessed were in connection with the handling of election petitions. The outcome of successive elections, especially the hotly contested 1999 and 2003 elections, left many political aspirants aggrieved, particularly in the opposition parties. This resulted in the filing of hundreds of appeals before the various election petition tribunals, set up specifically to deal with election-related cases. As should be expected, many politicians desperate to preserve their victory or to secure one resorted to bribing judges to procure favourable judgements. In the past, such acts would have gone largely unpunished. But under the Fourth Republic, the prompt intervention of the National Judicial Council (NJC)20 resulted in the fall of several judges.21
70A few examples will suffice. On 6 and 7 October 2003, the NJC met to examine accusations and petitions against several judges, most of whom were accused of having abused their powers during election-related litigations across the states of the federation. One of the judges under investigation was Justice Wilson Egbo-Egbo, who had given a very controversial judgement in a case involving some parties in Anambra State. After initially suspending him, the NJC sent a recommendation to President Obasanjo that he be dismissed from service. This recommendation was commuted to compulsory retirement (Newswatch, 9 February 2004). The next case was that of Justice Stanley Nnaji, from neighbouring Enugu State, who was later found guilty of abuse of power. Specifically, he was said to have delivered a judgement considered illegal in another electoral dispute linked to the political crisis in Anambra State. Justice Nnaji was suspended, pending the conclusion of investigations launched by the NJC (ThisDay, 23 March 2004).
71The most notable allegation of judicial corruption in Nigeria was the accusation made against the Akwa Ibom Election Petition Tribunal. The judges of this tribunal were accused of favouritism in the legal dispute over the election of the state governor, Victor Attah, after receiving bribes from some of the governor’s emissaries. On the basis of this allegation, an investigation was opened by the NJC. It should be noted that before this incident, four judges had been indicted by the NJC for “trying to influence the same tribunal to give judgement in favour of one of the parties in the petition over the governorship election in the state”. Following this, Justice Chris P.N. Selong became the first casualty, when he was dismissed on 25 February 2004 by the President (ThisDay, 26 February 2004), acting on the recommendation of the NJC.22 Next came Justice M.M. Adamu, former President of the Akwa Ibom Election Petition Tribunal, who was sacked on 26 February 2004 (ThisDay, 16 March 2004), and Justice A.N. Elelegwu, dismissed on 20 April 2004 (Vanguard, 21 April 2004), by the governors of Plateau and Delta States, respectively. All the decisions were taken in deference to the recommendations of the NJC. The fourth victim was Chief Magistrate James O. Isede, who lost his job on 1 March 2004, following the recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission of Edo State (ThisDay, 16 March 2004).
72These anti-corruption stands taken by the NJC, even though a federal institution, also had substantial indirect impacts on the judicial systems of the other levels of government, particularly the states. For instance, on 18 April 2004, the Chief Judge of Plateau State was suspended by the state government, following allegations of inefficiency, corruption, and abuse of power made by the local branch of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) (The Guardian, 19 April 2004). This crisis reached its peak on 4 May 2004, when Justice James Samba was retired, following the recommendations of the Plateau State House of Assembly. Investigations conducted by the state legislature had confirmed the accusations made against the Chief Judge by the Bar Association (ThisDay, 5 March 2004).
73But many allegations of corruption made against judges also went unpunished, just as pressures from the NJC for change did not always lead to the removal of errant judges in all cases. One reason for this, according to Justice Samson Odemwingie Uwaifo, former Supreme Court judge, is the difficulty encountered by the accusers in assembling proofs (ThisDay, 25 January 2005). A good example is the investigation launched in Abia State in December 2003 into the activities of the State Chief Judge, Kalu O. Amah, over some allegations of corrupt practices (The Guardian, 17 December 2003). The allegations were not the first to be made against the Chief Judge. Earlier, in 2002, he was investigated by the NJC over some financial dealings. The 2003 investigation, however, found him guilty. Indeed, a special committee of the State House of Assembly which probed him even called for his dismissal. Several other groups, including lawyers, civil servants, and labour unions, also came out openly to accuse him of financial abuse and abuse of power. However, the Chief Judge managed to remain in office (Newswatch, 9 February 2004). Such cases, nevertheless, could not hide the fact that in Nigeria the fear of the NJC had become the beginning of wisdom for most judges.
Conclusion
74From all indications, the strategies employed to fight corruption in Nigeria since 1999 have also included attempts to reform key public institutions, such as the civil service and the judiciary. This indicates that corruption is systemic and that no major public institution is free from its consequences. The scope of reforms proposed for the judiciary has targeted the improvement of capacity, effectiveness, and integrity of judges and their courts, confirming on the one hand that capacity and effectiveness are directly linked to the integrity of these institutions, and on the other hand that diverse measures are necessary if any significant progress is be made. As for reforms implemented in the public service, the government of President Obasanjo, under domestic and international pressure, pursued a broad range of policies, including privatisation of public enterprises and reform of the management of public revenue and expenditure, as well as the design and implementation of new rules on recruitment, compensation, and disengagement in the public service, under the concepts of re-professionalisation and rightsizing of the workforce. All these measures were taken in the hope that they would help alter the rent-seeking behaviour of Nigerian public institutions.
75However, given the slow speed of execution of the reforms, the uncertain political environment, and the virulent opposition which some of the measures elicited within civil society, the question arose whether these policies could indeed achieve their goals. The commitment and political dexterity of the Obasanjo government was certainly required, but so also was the support and involvement of the international community, especially the West. Nigerians were aware of the fact that much of the funds looted in Nigeria were comfortably sitting in the vaults of Western banks. The availability of these safe havens, many believe, made corruption a very attractive activity in Nigeria. Indeed, it was the realisation of this fact that prompted the Obasanjo government to include in the anticorruption campaign measures a policy to persuade Western financial institutions to stop accepting deposits from corrupt Nigerian officials and return whatever had been deposited in their vaults. This constituted the third prong of Obasanjo’s anti-corruption fight, the first and second prongs being the creation of new anticorruption commissions and a general reform of the public services, respectively.
Notes de bas de page
1 Nigeria operates a total of four oil refineries (Kaduna, Warri, Port Harcourt I, and Port Harcourt II).
2 On 21 June 1999, a Panel on Non-Performing or Failed Contracts was instituted to study all federal projects launched between 1 January 1976 and 31 December 1998. The report of the study, which was submitted in November 2002, found that 1,651 projects had been abandoned by firms which had been paid varying sums to execute these projects. Most of these firms were linked to ‘big men’, who disappeared after receiving the payments (see Annex I).
3 In June 2006, the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit, a national institution set up to check contract inflation, reported that it had saved about N40 billion ($330,000) after closely scrutinizing bids submitted for public purchases and contracts.
4 Senator Abubakar Sodangi, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Internal Affairs, announced this during a meeting on the ministry’s budget with the Minister of Internal Affairs.
5 A report by the Ibadan-based Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), Nigeria’s foremost think-tank, also confirmed the effectiveness of the BMPIU, although the report also suggested the BMPIU should be relocated to the Budget Office in order to further enhance its effectiveness.
6 Mrs Ezekwesili, a founding member of Transparency International, subsequently became Minister for Solid Minerals, and then Education, in Obasanjo’s cabinet.
7 A piece of legislation known as “Certain Political and Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances etc.) Act 2002” was adopted to manage this policy.
8 By May 2006, over 25,000 government houses had been sold under the monetisation policy.
9 Retrenchment in Nigerian parlance refers to the termination of employment, owing to redundancy, the poor financial health of an organization, or any other reason.
10 In 2006, the World Bank voted a sum of $140 million to support these reforms.
11 In January 2007, a new minimum wage brought the salary of the lowest-paid federal worker to N12,000.
12 The Pension Reform Act 2004, which aimed to reform the pension system, came into effect on 1 July 2004, when the National Pension Commission was established. On the other hand, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was set up on 6 June 2005, 43 years after it was first proposed. It was made possible by the passage of the National Health Insurance Scheme Act 1999.
13 According to statistics released in February 2005 by the Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR), the Nigerian public service is also characterised by an aging workforce. This was largely attributed to a 12-year ban on employment. According to the BPSR, a considerable number of these employees were above the optimal age in relation to their qualification and position (Graduate of Optimal Age, GOA). The data showed that the percentages of employees above the optimal age were as follows: Ministry of Works (94%), Labour (95%), Petroleum (95%), Intergovernmental Affairs (95%), Commerce (94%), Industries (94%), Solid Minerals (92%), Women Affairs (92%), Tourism (92%), Housing (91%), Transport (91%), Water Resources (90%), Defence (90%), Aviation (90%), Finance (90%), Energy (89%), Communication (88%), Cooperation in Africa (88%), and Police Affairs (87%) (The Guardian, 24 February 2005).
14 Falsification of certificates and bribery were the most common reasons for the dismissals. In one incident alone, 1,220 were dismissed for these offences.
15 Between 1999 and 2004, at least five senior judges were dismissed for corruption and abuse of power, following investigations by the NJC.
16 The 2003 elections were heavily tainted with violence, fraud, and other forms of electoral malpractices, leading to the filing of approximately 1500 law suits before the various courts constituted to resolve such disputes. The handling of these cases brought the role of the judiciary into the limelight (Enweremadu 2011).
17 This system is known as the Action Learning Model.
18 The Police were the worst offenders, as the UNODC report observed: “Chiefs/Commissioners of Police do not routinely attend implementation and sub-committee meetings, if at all. The Police generally do not grant bail in accordance with Project aims, nor will they routinely accept women as sureties. At the other extreme, individual police/entire police stations have removed and/or vandalised Project posters which educate citizens of their rights” (UNODC 2003b: 25).
19 Our information came from a personal interview with a retired Supreme Court judge, Justice Kayode Esho, who also headed the Judicial Panel on the Reform/Reorganization of the Judiciary, established by General Abacha in 1993. The interview took place at his residence on 15 August 2005.
20 The 1999 Constitution, in the Third Schedule, Chapters 20(a) and 21(a), empowers the NJC to investigate judges accused of wrongdoing and recommend appropriate sanctions to the President. According to Section 158(1), “in exercise of its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over such persons, the National Judicial Council shall not be subject to the discretion or control of any other authority or person” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999a).
21 According to one law professor, Taiwo Adebayo Osipitan, the reason why there were so many casualties is that “some people got to bench through some errors, either because they knew one person or the other, and in this dynamic system some of them are found wanting. Hitherto, at the state level, appointments, promotions and dismissals terminated at the state level, such that if you act in favour of a governor, he would assure of securing your position. If you act against him, they can remove you and displace you from office. Now it’s no longer possible. A neutral body at the central level consisting of each geographical unit will now decide the fate of judges. So a judge who, either out of corruption or ignorance, gives a questionable decision cannot run back to his employer or godfather and seek protection, because the body that will decide his faith is independent of the Federal Government and also independent of the state government. Most of the time, these Executives do sometimes cajole these judges to give questionable decisions and are unable to protect them. In other words, judges are now on their own”. (ThisDay, 13 April 2004).
22 Justice Selong has since gone to court to challenge his dismissal.

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Creative Commons - Attribution - Partage dans les Mêmes Conditions 4.0 International - CC BY-SA 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
Anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria (1999-2007)
The politics of a failed reform
David U. Enweremadu
2012
Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (dir.)
2014
Violence in Nigeria
A qualitative and quantitative analysis
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (dir.)
2016
Transnational Islam
Circulation of religious Ideas, Actors and Practices between Niger and Nigeria
Élodie Apard (dir.)
2020