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Introduction: Corruption in Nigeria—A historical challenge
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Texte intégral
Introduction
1On 29 May 1999, Nigeria concluded a successful transition to civil democratic rule with the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo as the country’s second popularly elected president. The election of President Obasanjo, himself a former military dictator, came after sixteen years of uninterrupted military rule, during which corruption and financial crimes1 were more or less installed as state policies (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1977, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1994 & 1999). Although corruption is a major challenge for several other developing states (Haarhuis 2005; Nadiz 2004), very few countries have been so ravaged by graft as Nigeria. This fact was duly underlined by the voting of Nigeria as the world’s most corrupt nation in 1999, just weeks before Obasanjo was elected.
2This conclusion, produced by Transparency International (TI), the global corruption watchdog (1999), could itself be corroborated not only by the findings of dozens of official inquiries set up by successive Nigerian governments before and after 1999 (see Annex I), but also by several academic studies. These research studies have been unanimous in their conclusion that in Nigeria corruption has become the norm (Odekunle 1986; Joseph 1987; Daloz 2002; Lewis 1996; Bayart 1989, 1997; Erubami & Young 2003).
3It would be difficult to estimate exactly how much Nigeria has lost to corruption since its independence from Britain in 1960. One source has estimated the loss to be in the region of $400 billion for the period 1966 to 1999 (The Economist, October 21, 2006). This would of course consist of income from Nigeria’s vast oil resources—but also international aid. The looting of billions of dollars by General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria between 1993 and 1998, is perhaps the best illustration of this corruption. Investigations launched by Abacha’s successors have so far led to the recovery of $2 billion from the Abacha family alone, while another $2 billion remains frozen in Western countries such as Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein (Daniel 2004: 102).
4Yet corruption has a much longer history in Nigeria. If Abacha’s record can be considered appalling, his criminal path had been nurtured to a large extent by the actions of his predecessors, both civilians and military dictators, who were no less culpable. As the eminent historian Stephen Ellis has argued, political corruption in Nigeria was incubated during the colonial era, especially in the crucial 1940s and 1950s, when the then emerging Nigerian political elites were thrust into positions of political power without any independent financial base with which to finance their political careers. The British colonial policy of discouraging indigenous private entrepreneurship ensured that there were very few entrepreneurs. State coffers were the only available source of funds, and so these elites had little choice but to grab them.2
5Numerous commissions of inquiry established in the late 1950s and early 1960s after Nigeria secured independence from Britain have confirmed the long history of corruption in the country. In 1962, a commission of inquiry, popularly known as the Justice Coker Commission, showed vividly how politicians in Nigeria’s Western Region used the then marketing boards to divert millions of pounds into their political party, the Action Group (AG), while deploying the same funds for their personal use (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1962). Earlier, similar official inquiries had established that such corrupt practices had become widespread in the Eastern Region, governed by the National Congress for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1956; 1957). Widespread mismanagement, rampant corruption, tribalism, and nepotism were some of the reasons cited by the leaders of a coup which overthrew this set of civilian leaders on 15 January 1966 (Dudley 1982).
6All the regimes that followed saw a much higher level of corruption and mismanagement. According to the reports of some panels of inquiry established following the overthrow of the Yakubu Gowon regime in 1976, senior members of the Gowon regime indulged in a massive diversion of state resources (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1977, 1978; Dent 1978; Apter 2005). Subsequent governments, particularly the civilian regime of President Shehu Shagari (1979-83) (Odekunle 1986; Joseph 1987) and the military governments of Generals Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) (Lewis 1996; Erubami 2003), Sani Abacha (1993-8), and Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-99), took corruption to higher levels. Immediately after the Shagari regime collapsed, following a 31 December 1983 military coup, a tribunal was set up to try some of the worst offenders and recover their ill-gotten wealth. At least 51 public office holders were convicted of embezzlement and other abuse of public office on a grand scale (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1986). Elsewhere, an audit inquiry instituted into the finances of the Nigerian Central Bank in 19943 indicted Babangida and his administration of filtering away some $12 billion of ‘excess’ oil revenue which accrued to the nation during the first Gulf War (Agbese 2005). In 2000, an official inquiry, commonly known as the Christopher Kolade Panel, set up in 1999 following return to democratic rule, also indicted the preceding military regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-99), for “massively inflating and flagrantly awarding contracts, licences, awards, etc., usually to firms in which top members of the regime had substantial interests, often at very exorbitant prices, thereby causing a sharp drop in the country’s external reserves” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999b).
7This level of corruption explains much of Nigeria’s other social and economic problems, weak economic growth, decaying public infrastructures, endemic poverty, and chronic political instability and violence. This is in spite of its abundant natural resources, including petroleum and gas reserves estimated at some 36.6 billion barrels and 1840.6 billion cubic feet respectively (Africa Confidential, 25 June 2004), and its large and talented population. The extent of its socioeconomic challenges has been documented in several official reports. In a 2004 report on socio-economic conditions, for instance, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) estimated that the country was the worst affected by capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa, with over $100 billion in private capital held overseas in 1999, representing around 70% of total private capital (The Punch, 24 July 2004). This amount excludes some $63 billion in non-monetary assets held by Nigerians abroad (ThisDay, 20 October 2003). Until recently, Nigeria was a large debtor nation and attempted to be considered one of the ‘highly indebted poor countries’ deserving of debt cancellation. In 2006, after accumulating $36 billion in external debts,4 she managed to secure a favourable treatment from the Paris Club, which wrote off $18 billion. This pardon, however, came after she paid a colossal $12.4 billion and agreed to continue a broad range of economic and anti-corruption reform policies (The Guardian, 23 March 2005).
8Endemic corruption in Nigeria has also nurtured widespread poverty and low human development indices. In 1999, when Nigeria transitioned from military to civil rule, an independent estimation of poverty—that is, the percentage of those living on less than a dollar a day—stood at 70% (Xavier & Subramanian 2008). Although the figures are now much lower, standing at 54.4% in 2004, this is still very high compared with past figures. The poverty rate was only 27.2% in 1980, 46.3% in 1985, and 42.7% in 1992 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2005). Poor governance also translated into a largely illiterate population. According to official sources, the national literacy level for men in Nigeria, as recently as 2004, was only 50.6%. The percentage is even worse for women: 37.7% (ibid. 100). Other indices of human development follow similar trends. According to the World Bank, per capita income in Nigeria stood at $390 in 2004, well below the African average ($600) in the same period and even Nigeria’s per capita income in 1980 ($1,000). Life expectancy at birth did not fare any better: Only 47 years in 2000 (World Bank 2004).
9The impact of endemic corruption on public order is another area that has attracted considerable attention. According to a 2005 World Bank report, Nigeria figures among 25 countries classified as ‘Low-Income Country Under Stress’ (LICUS). A LICUS is a state characterised by ‘weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdown in the rule of law, and lack of mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority’ (World Bank 2006b). Ethno-religious conflicts were particularly widespread, as politicians frequently exploit mass ignorance and poverty as well as ethnic and religious differences for political gains. These conflicts often left thousands dead or displaced, engendering a general atmosphere of social insecurity and disorder (HRW, April 2006). Official and reliable data on victims of violence are rarely published in Nigeria. However, a 2005 study by the Human Rights Watch suggests that Nigeria may have lost up to 10,000 citizens between 1999 and 2005. The figure for displaced persons hovers around 500,000, according to an aide to President Olusegun Obasanjo, Moremi Soyinka-Onijala, who was in charge of migrations and humanitarian affairs (ThisDay, 27 April 2006).
10It would probably be disingenuous to claim that corruption is the sole cause of all Nigeria’s development problems. However, this ailment, fostered by a mixture of surviving traditional norms and colonial legacies and subsequently lubricated by the influx of massive petroleum resources and persistent authoritarian rule, has hardly been a blessing in Nigeria (Ndih 2003).
The Fourth Republic: A new era of reform?
11As soon as President Obasanjo was sworn into office as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, a series of reform measures were rolled out in quick succession in a bid to tackle the cancer of corruption which has tarnished the image of Nigeria and undermined socio-economic and political development. During his inauguration on 29 May 1999, Obasanjo, a longstanding critic of corrupt military regimes and founding member of Transparency International (TI), the global anti-corruption watchdog, promised that “corruption, the greatest single bane of our society today, will be tackled head-on … There will be no sacred cows … Nobody, no matter who and where, will be allowed to get away with the breach or perpetration of corruption and evil” (Oko 2002). Indeed, this campaign remained Obasanjo’s number-one policy priority throughout the eight years he was in office. The campaign was pursued through different methods and directed at achieving a number of objectives, three of which are most perceptible.
12The first was to bring about a sharp drop in the incidence of corruption, through the speedy arrest and prosecution of corrupt public officials. This was to be achieved through the establishment of new anti-corruption agencies, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), inaugurated in 2000 and 2003 respectively. Previous experience has shown that such institutions, which have produced relative successes in some countries, were not easily adaptable to Africa—never mind to Nigeria specifically, where the necessary administrative capacity (adequate funds, quality manpower, strong laws, and efficient judicial systems) and strong political support are often lacking, and prevailing political logic tends to favour the abuse of office and misappropriation of public resources.
13The second objective was to reduce or remove incentives for corruption among public officials, via a comprehensive reform of the public sector (including the judiciary). Specifically, the reforms aimed at the following: eliminating monopoly, by privatisation and deregulation; reducing discretion, by the streamlining of functions and reinforcement of controls; and removing administrative opacity, by the increasing of transparency and accountability, particularly in public revenue collection and expenditure. The aggressive implementation of these policies, it was hoped, would reduce the opportunities for corruption among public officials. Some aspects of these reforms—privatisation, reform of the management of public finance, and the adoption of a new policy on employment and compensation (also known as ‘professionalisation’ and ‘rightsizing’) in the public service—were pursued with considerable vigour. But their cumulative effect on corruption has proved difficult to see.
14The third objective was to redress some of the worst consequences of past corruption on the economy and improve the financial health of the nation. This goal was to be achieved through the identification of some of the offshore bank accounts and assets—landed properties, companies, shares, and so on—owned by corrupt Nigerians and ensure they were duly confiscated and the proceeds repatriated. The corollary to this well-publicised campaign was a well-coordinated diplomatic offensive directed at persuading the (usually Western) governments whose financial institutions are key instruments of this fraud to also initiate reforms to help check the practice. Obasanjo’s effort led to the recovery of only a fraction (less that $1 billion) of Nigeria’s $300 to $400 billion of stolen assets, although it appeared to have had some effect on the behaviour of office holders in Nigeria as well as leading to the adoption of several international anti-money-laundering initiatives.
15Why was the Obasanjo government interested in pursuing such an ambitious anti-corruption war in a country where the privatisation of public resources has been the norm among the political elite and where all previous anti-corruption projects had failed so woefully? Did the strategies announced by the Obasanjo government truly help reduce corruption in Nigeria? Was President Obasanjo’s campaign against corruption a genuine anti-corruption crusade or mere political grandstanding? If indeed it was genuine, was the President able to muster the necessary political will and support to implement his war against corruption?
16In 2005, President Obasanjo provided some clear insight into the considerations that informed his administration’s anti-corruption policy. During one of his numerous speeches dwelling on transparency and accountability in government, the President revealed:
Our avowed zero-tolerance for the scourge of corruption derives from our conviction that countering corruption and promoting public integrity are critical to economic rebirth and sustained development … The globalized world in which we live today has become hostile to corrupt nations and their citizens. The first consideration in receiving support or assistance from the international community today is the level of corruption in that country. The implication is that we have no choice but to change our ways. (The Punch, 6 September 2005)
17This statement by President Obasanjo raises two key aspects of the motivation for launching a campaign against corruption. The first is that Obasanjo and those who worked with him were patriotic and rational leaders who wanted to see their country develop. These leaders correctly diagnosed the cause of their country’s underdevelopment and were determined to remove what they perceived as the major obstacle to achieving that goal: Corruption. The second issue raised by Obasanjo is the fact that the decision to embrace anti-corruption reforms was partly, if not entirely, driven by the need to escape international sanction or isolation.
Anti-corruption campaign and the logic of rational leaders
18At face value, Obasanjo’s comments would seem to confirm the validity of the ‘rational choice theory’, according to which public policy makers act on the basis of cost-benefit calculation (Downs 1958; Elster 1986). Two major inferences can be drawn from this perspective. The first holds that decision makers are rational people guided by national or public interest, who can and are willing to select the best solutions to society’s problems among several competing alternative courses of action. The second suggests that these decision makers also act to preserve their own narrow, selfish interest—that is, to become ‘boundedly rational’ (Simon 1982)—in an attempt to escape political sanctions, whether from voters (in advanced liberal democracies, for instance) or from the international community (donors to countries largely dependent on foreign aid). Thus, when decision makers act, it is because sanctions will presumably be put in place if they do not embrace reforms (Haarhuis 2005: 177). How true are these assumptions?
19The first argument has not been supported by recent events in many Africa countries, notably Nigeria. Many studies, including our reading of Nigeria’s history, show that anti-corruption campaigns have not been motivated by public interest alone (Médard 1986). In fact, very often they have been motivated by the personal political interests of political leaders, who, for instance, instrumentalise the struggle to legitimise their regime, gain access to power, eliminate their political rivals, and reconstruct a crumbling political hegemony. Indeed, despite being credited with exceptional personal political will during the early days of his government—a fact which was largely informed by his long-standing opposition to corrupt military regimes, involvement in some international anti-corruption NGOs, and adoption of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy on assumption of office—Obasanjo’s anti-corruption fight itself, as we will soon discover, became a vital instrument for targeting political rivals.
20The second argument appears even less compelling, to say the least. First, the prevailing political context in Africa in general, and in Nigeria particularly, is largely unfavourable to any serious democratic exercise of power as suggested above. Elections and voters are for now ineffective tools for controlling African political leaders. Similarly, donor pressures have little meaning for countries such as Nigeria that receive little or no foreign aid (World Bank 2005, 2006), just as the huge debt write-off the country won in April 2005 did not lead to the abandonment of the anti-corruption policy, contrary to expectations. Indeed, as K. Haarhuis has argued, there is no evidence that African leaders who receive aid will implement measures against corruption imposed from outside, particularly if their implementation has potential to undermine their strategic interests. African governments have tended to busy themselves with paper reforms, aimed principally at satisfying the demands of voters, but more especially the international community (Haarhuis 2005: 162). During the period under review (1999-2007), for example, political elites in Nigeria successfully resisted several reform measures, pushed by civil society and the international community, which they considered potentially dangerous: Strong anti-corruption agencies, public declaration of assets by public officers, and privatisation of the larger and more lucrative public corporations, such as the Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the oil refineries, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). On the other hand, reforms and measures perceived as less risky or aimed at individuals outside the political class received a more enthusiastic reception.
21It could be reasoned that the effectiveness of domestic (voter) and international (donor) pressure for a cleaner government will ultimately depend on the specificity of each country and/or region; that is to say, the adoption of reforms will depend both on whether the electorate is perceived to be prepared to move against the political regime if pressures for reforms are ignored and on the extent to which donors are prepared to go to force reforms on recipients of aid (Knack 2000; Tavares 2003; Burnside & Dollar 2000; Alesina & Weder 1999; Rodrik 1996; Dollar & Pritchett 1998). While these conditions are difficult to apply in the case of Nigeria because the country has been largely free from voter and donor pressure, other external and internal factors were as important in shaping Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign. The adoption of an anti-corruption policy in 1999 and its implementation were influenced by some recent dramatic international changes (which are still affecting the global attitude towards corruption), as well as by the history of the country, which points to the necessity of embracing some forms of campaign against corruption to stave off unpalatable consequences (such as a military coup).
Historical dynamics of anti-corruption reforms in Nigeria
22The analysis and understanding of recent anti-corruption measures in Nigeria require a study of the country’s history and internal socio-political dynamics. This will help us understand the extent to which the anti-corruption drive is path-dependent in this country (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). The crusade against corruption proposed by President Obasanjo at the hour of his election in 1999 may be the first under a civilian or democratic government in Nigeria. It can also be described as the most ambitious ever seen in the country. Nevertheless, it is far from being the first in its history. Corruption and anti-corruption fights have been at the heart of national political discourse and actions in Nigeria since independence in October 1960. Almost all the regimes that have come to power in Nigeria strongly denounced corruption, without any form of external pressure, while also proposing measures against it. It is true that most of these measures (inauguration of commissions of inquiry to probe specific allegations and suggest remedies, adoption of new anti-corruption laws (Kolajo 2002) and even the setting up of anti-corruption agencies) did not yield positive results.5 It is also true that regimes with radical anti-corruption agenda have been overthrown after only a few months in office: Murtala (1975-76) and Buhari (1983-85). Yet, it is also a well-known fact that many regimes, including the two previous civilian regimes—Balewa (1960-66) and Shagari (1979-83)—fell largely because they failed to take action to check corruption in their governments. But in what way did these past experiences really influence the decision to launch an anti-corruption war in 1999? In our view there are at least two ways in which historical antecedents influenced President Obasanjo’s decision to launch the current anti-corruption war.
23The first way obviously was through ‘imitation’ or ‘cloning’. This occurs when newly arrived regimes attempt to understudy how their predecessors profited from their anti-corruption projects, in order to do better in this regard. It is a well-known fact that despite the many catastrophic consequences of corruption on Nigeria’s development, very few regimes in Nigeria have been interested in fighting it.6 Several popular measures offered by these regimes—such as dismissal of some corrupt officials, confiscation of illicitly acquired assets, establishment of commissions of inquiry, adoption of anti-corruption laws and agencies, and even ad hoc tribunals set up to try offenders—all failed to produce tangible results, largely because they were driven by ulterior motives. These motives usually involved the legitimisation of unpopular military dictatorships and the need to deal with political rivals in a country where struggle for political power is usually intense, if not violent.
24Secondly, and more importantly, past governments in Nigeria have, through massive looting of the public treasury, promoted abject poverty among an overwhelming majority of the population, while also widening the gap between the rich and the poor. The Babangida (1985-93) and Abacha (1993-98) regimes, under which corruption became almost a state policy, are arguably the most culpable. The behaviour of these military regimes changed Nigerian political economy in two ways. The first way was somewhat direct, in the sense that appointment to public offices, especially the more lucrative ones, became transformed into a vast system of patronage guaranteeing the maximisation of political support for whatever regime was in power (Gboyega 1996). The second consequence was more indirect, to the extent that the grand corruption of political leaders and top functionaries led to the impoverishment of lower-level officials, who now embraced the same practices without any fear of sanctions. Consequently, the spread of corruption clogged almost all the machinery of public administration, making basic social services almost inaccessible to the poor. In this context, popular pressure and demand for more anti-corruption measures cannot but increase under a popularly elected government.
Anti-corruption reform and the new global good governance agenda
25Despite the huge negative impact of corruption on the socio-economic and political development of many Africa countries, notably Nigeria, anti-corruption projects in the continent had initially received little or no attention from the international community, who considered it the internal affair of relevant sovereign states. Since the second half of the 1990s, however, anti-corruption reforms have been increasingly supported by the international community, which now considers it as a major preoccupation to be promoted under the framework of the global push for ‘good governance’ and poverty reduction (Galtung & Pope 1999; Hadjadji 2002). Everyone in this context, including researchers, international financial institutions (notably the World Bank and the IMF), development agencies, donors, NGOs, and national governments, have now adopted the fight against corruption as a battle cry. What explains such a dramatic change? And what has been its impact in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular?
26The first explanation for the dramatic change in the orientation of the international community and the emergence of the ‘global coalition against corruption’ which followed it comes from the collapse of the Soviet Union, which signalled the demise of the Eastern Bloc and accelerated the processes of globalisation. The end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, brought an unimaginable amount of diplomatic pressure to bear on countries or governments perceived as corrupt and repressive (Bresson 1998). Secondly, the interest shown by the international community in corruption has also been raised by ‘global corruption eruption’, that is the growing revelation of serious cases of fraud and bribery involving senior public officials around the world. These corrupt acts have often occurred with the complicity of the largest commercial enterprises, who in the face of rising competition resorted to corruption. Thirdly, this global corruption eruption then led to an increased academic interest in the study and analysis of corruption. The outcome of these studies revealed that despite billions of dollars provided as development aid, the effects of corruption, especially on poor countries, were growing and could no longer be ignored by decision makers (Keefer & Knack 1995; Brunetti et al. 1997; Clarke & Xu 2002; Mauro 1995, 1997).
27The interaction of these three factors culminated in the proliferation of anticorruption programmes in Africa and other parts of the developing world, most of them imposed and supervised by the major international financial institutions (notably the IMF and the World Bank), the United Nations (UN) or its agencies (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)), and Western donor agencies. These programmes initially centred on neo-liberal economic reform policies such as privatisation and deregulation. Better known in Africa as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), these policies were presented as necessary solutions to the economic crises which rocked many African states in the 1980s and early 1990s, but more importantly as conditions for future international development aid. In the mid-1990s, a second type of anti-corruption policy, rooted in neo-institutional theories, appeared on the stage. These policies called for the reform of the administrative apparatus of the state and the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions, including institutions of civil society (Haarhuis 2005). The presence and proper functioning of these institutions, referred to as ‘indicators of good governance’, would also qualify a country for foreign aid, cooperation, and support from the international community (ibid. 21).
28The impact of international involvement in the war against corruption has been very noticeable in Africa, where corruption is considered endemic (Kempe 2000; Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman 1997). The first evidence of this is perhaps the continent’s prominent position in virtually all international prescriptions against corruption. The second is the actual spread of reform measures, such as anti-corruption agencies, in many African states. But what has been the effect of these changes on Africa? If these reform agencies have in some instances helped stave off growing local activism and external pressures, there is hardly any evidence that they have changed the behaviour of public officials in Africa in any significant way. With very few exceptions—notably Botswana—the inauguration of anti-corruption agencies and other forms of anti-corruption reform have clearly not been accompanied by an effective war against corruption in Africa.
29Some scholars have argued that this failure is occurring owing to the fact that anti-corruption reforms are often designed and imposed by foreign institutions on unwilling recipients (Hadjadji et al. 2002: 30; Fjeldstadt 2002); that is to say, the failure of international anti-corruption programmes in Africa is principally due to the absence, at the helm of affairs, of political leaders who favour reforms (Fjeldstadt 2002; Kpundeh 1998). Robin Theobald formulates this thesis more clearly: “reforms require reformers” (Theobald 1986: 258). In other words, successful reforms require the presence of strong and courageous leaders—what Peters & Savoie (1998: 5) called a “political champion”, in apparent allusion to Britain under the reformist Margaret Thatcher regime. It is perhaps for this reason that the arrival of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was widely portrayed as a ‘reformist leader’, raised unprecedented interest and hope.
Anti-corruption war: The role of reformers
30The return to democratic rule on 29 May 1999, and its ‘consolidation’ four years later with the national elections in April 2003, offered Nigerians a new opportunity, not only to elect a reform-minded government but also to exercise some pressure on those they elected to institute effective anti-corruption measures. The election of President Obasanjo seemed to reflect this logic, given that corruption was a dominant theme during his election campaigns. Although Obasanjo had promised an all-out war against corruption if elected, as had other candidates, many Nigerians reasoned that his anti-corruption credentials were far more solid than those of his rivals. Aside from his past record as a founding member of Transparency International, Obasanjo was a long-standing critic of corrupt military regimes. President Obasanjo himself even acknowledged the role of corruption in his election. During his first post-election speech, he noted that he considered “this election as a mandate from the people of Nigeria and a command from God Almighty that I should spare no effort in rebuilding this nation. I understand the clear message of the Nigerian people. In giving me their mandate, they have asked me to … restore our dignity … they want me to alleviate their poverty and reduce corruption” (ThisDay, 9 May 1999). In other words, his election was largely due to the public perception that he was the candidate most capable of fighting corruption.
31Once elected, Obasanjo moved to justify his reputation as a reformist by rolling out a number of anti-corruption initiatives, including the adoption of an anticorruption law and institution of a specialised anti-corruption agency, retirement of military officers who had held political appointments, review of several projects initiated by past regimes and believed to be tainted with corruption, and inauguration of dozens of inquiries into the activities of public institutions (see Annex I) (Bello-Imam 2005). Initially, during his first tenure, the President was largely isolated in this fight, having filled his cabinet with the old political guard (a move that was widely believed to be compensation for their roles in his electoral victory in the February 1999 elections). But following his re-election in 2003, several individuals regarded as ‘committed reformists’ with solid international reputations were appointed to his government to head key institutions. These individuals included Dora Akuyili (National Agency For Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)), Obi Ezekwesili (Budget and Price Monitoring Intelligence Unit (BPMIU)), Nuhu Ribadu (Economic and Financial Crimes Commissions (EFCC)), Nasir El-Rufai (Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE)), Charles Soludo (Chief Economic Adviser to the President, later Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)), and Ngozi Okonjo-Iwalla (Minister of Finance and Head of Obasanjo’s economic reform team until 2006). One common feature shared by these personalities charged with driving the reforms was that they were all technocrats with no previous political affiliation, mainly educated abroad, and/or with substantial ties to major international institutions. Although such foreign connections occasionally raised some eyebrows in Nigeria, these concerns were brushed aside by Obasanjo, who provided these technocrats with political shielding. In the years that followed, Obasanjo’s anticorruption programme benefitted from the presence and initiatives of these personalities.
32The Western background of these technocrats or reformers led to a major ideological shift in Obasanjo’s anti-corruption war. Unlike the situation that had obtained in the past, when corruption was viewed as a personal moral failure of political leaders and public officials, corruption was now considered as a systemic and structural crisis, resulting from “excessive state intervention in economic and commercial domains” and a “failure of governance”. The new thinking now was that corruption required the adoption of a multi-dimensional strategy, including the deregulation of the national economy and privatisation of public enterprises, reform of the civil service (downsizing and review of recruitment, remuneration, and procurement policies), and legal and institutional reform (including the enactment of new laws and creation of new regulatory agencies and the strengthening of existing institutions, such as public services, the judiciary, the parliament, and civil society). At the same time, it was recognised that this multi-dimensional struggle did not exclude public reorientation via public enlightenment and punitive measures such as arrest, confiscation of illegally acquired assets, and criminal proceedings.
33This strategy draws from two of the most dominant approaches or perspectives in contemporary literature on anti-corruption: The market and neo-institutionalist approaches. The former, which is rooted in neo-liberal economic theories, views corruption as largely resulting from excessive intervention of the state in economic and commercial domains (Toye 1987; Grindle 1991; Evans 1995). According to this view, this state involvement breeds unlimited opportunities for corruption by public officials. The solution to this malaise must, therefore, include structural economic reforms that eliminate state monopolies, discretion, and opacity and that increase transparency in the management of public resources (Klitgaard 1995, 1996; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum 1997; Ades & Di Tella 2000; Mbaku 2002). The latter, that is the neo-institutional theory, underlines weakness or failure of governance and state institutions as causes of corruption. This is why it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of exiting institutions and to put in place new institutions to complement existing ones.
Conclusion
34The reasons behind the adoption of an anti-corruption campaign will most likely continue to be a question of intense political debate (Holmes 2003). What is clear, however, is that the Obasanjo campaign against corruption in Nigeria was substantially influenced by domestic and external political dynamics, and to some extent by Obasanjo’s own personal vision and past anti-corruption commitments. These past commitments are indeed rarely found in Nigeria, so that not surprisingly Obasanjo’s anti-corruption policy was greeted with widespread approbation instead of suspicion as was the case in the past. Public support is usually regarded as an essential precondition for the success of public policies. So, how much success did Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign register in the end? Did the reforms address the key issues? What were the major highlights of this campaign? To what extent did the elevation of anti-corruption struggle into a major policy priority and the groundswell of local and international support translate into success in Nigeria’s anti-corruption drive? In other words, what factors have influenced the outcome of the Nigerian campaign against corruption? There are other logical questions that are bound to follow the announcement and implementation of any anti-corruption policy or strategy anywhere in the world. For instance, how prepared was the Nigerian political class, and indeed civil society, for a genuine struggle against corruption? Given the plethora of failed anticorruption programmes around the world, what factors could have led to the success of the anti-corruption battle in Nigeria? The above are some of the questions addressed in the following chapters that make up this book.
Notes de bas de page
1 Nigeria’s anti-corruption legislation provides straightforward definitions of the twin concepts of corruption and economic crimes. To begin with, the ICPC Act defines corruption to include “bribery, fraud and other related offences”. The word bribery is used interchangeably with gratification, which the Act defines, under Section 8, to mean “money, donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property being property of any description whether movable or immovable, or any other similar advantage, given or promised to any person with intent to influence such a person in the performance or non-performance of his duties”. According to Section 46 of the EFCC Act, “economic crime means the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objective of earning wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner thereby violating existing legislation governing the economic activities of government and its administration and includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods, etc.” (Federal Republic of Nigeria: Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission Act 2000a, Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act 2004). For more details on available definitions and theories of corruption, see Heidenheimer (1989) and Andvig & Fjeldstadt (2001).
2 Personal discussion with Professor Stephen Ellis took place on 9 October 2009 during a meeting at the African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands.
3 The report of this audit (Pius Okigbo Report) has never been published officially, but many aspects of it have been published by the local media (Alli 2005) and internet sources: https://dawodu.com/okigboreport1.htm [archive].
4 According to figures published by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2000, Nigeria’s external debt was only $2.2 billion in 1978, before rising to $13.1 billion in 1982 and then $33.1 billion in 1990. (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999-2007a).
5 These laws included the Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunal Act Cap. 389), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 (as amended in 1999), Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts and Financial Malpractices in Banks), Decree 1994 (as amended in 1999), Criminal Code (applicable in southern Nigeria), Penal Code (applicable in the north), and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Cap. 56 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Some of the anti-corruption agencies established in the past included the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, proposed by the Murtala Mohammed administration in 1975, and the Code of Conduct Bureau, established in 1979 by the Second Republic Constitution left behind by the Obasanjo military regime.
6 With respect to application of sanctions against corrupt officials, the Murtala Mohammed (July 1975-February 1976) and Mohammadu Buhari (December 1983-August 1985) regimes were rare exceptions, although tendencies toward the instrumentalisation of the anti-corruption war to punish rival political factions were also observed.

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