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Jean Hannoyer
Seteney Shami

Cinquième partie. Économie, société et distribution des ressources

Urban Development and the role of the Service and Banking Sector in a Rentier-State

Urbanisation, services et secteur bancaire dans une économie de rente

Reiner Biegel


La théorie de l’État rentier en sociologie a permis de renouveler les analyses des processus en cours dans les pays du Moyen-Orient. Depuis sa fondation, la Jordanie n’a pas pu survivre sans une aide financière extérieure bien que l’économie politique du royaume ait fondamentalement changé depuis le milieu des années 1970. Les rentes étaient distribuées et investies dans la capitale, principalement dans les secteurs commerciaux et de la construction. Cela a provoqué une rapide croissance démographique, accompagnée d’une forte ségrégation spatiale à Amman ces vingt dernières années. En conséquence, le secteur bancaire a connu une très grande importance dans l’économie et la société jordanienne. L’État rentier et l’économie de rente produisent une centralité extrême dans la capitale. C’est là que les conflits de coalition pour la distribution de la rente se produisent et cela explique la poursuite du processus de ségrégation spatiale et sociale à Amman.

Texte intégral


1The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is located in the political epicentre of the Near East wedged in between Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Despite many internal and external crises, Jordan was considered for a long time as a stable state. Budget aid coming from the oil states and remittances from Jordanians working abroad allowed many Jordanians to live in circumstances of prosperity, which is especially visible in the capital Amman. The Jordanian capital may be said to have profited from the conflicts in the region in some ways, and has developed into a service centre. The second Gulf war (1991), however, has shown clearly the state dependence on external revenues, a dependence which also has a great impact on the role of Amman.

2The Jordanian population is estimated at 3,880,000 at the end of 1991. Just over 1.3 million people, thirty-four percent of the population, live in Greater Amman, while 309,000 live in Zarqa and 115,000 in Ruseifa. This means that almost fifty percent of the Jordanian population live in the agglomeration of Amman-Zarqa-Ruseifa. Nearly seventy percent of employment in industry and a much higher percentage in the service sector is concentrated in Greater Amman. Some economic functions, for example the airport, main branches of banks, insurance companies and industry we find only in Amman. Therefore, the characteristic primacy character of a developing economy is clearly visible. This dominance of the capital city is less the result of the allocation of the country’s resources than of the steering mechanisms produced by the external dependency of the country. The function of these mechanisms of a “rentier-state” will be the major focus of this paper.


3The sociological theory of the “rentier-state” is an innovative approach to explaining and analysing spatial and structural processes in the Near and Middle East region. We call those states of the Third World “rentier-states” which receive gratuitous, periodically extensive, external financial aid (see Beblawi and Luciani 1987). The concept of the “rentier-state” has not yet been developed widely in relation to questions concerning urban geography (Abu Lughod 1984, Findlay 1986).

4In spite of the variety of Near and Middle Eastern “rentier-states” we find some common characteristics:

  • States which are based substantially on external rents are in principle different from those states whose internal revenues come from national taxes.

  • The conservation of the political system is the guarantee for receiving continuous foreign aid.

  • The “rentier-state” decides exclusively concerning the distribution of external financial resources and guarantees consequently its internal stability.

  • The participation of the state influences allocation-cycles and produces a specific social behaviour which we call “rent-seeking” (Chatelus 1987). Consequently, the aim of subjective action mechanisms is to find access to the rent-cycles.

5In the Middle East region we find two types of “rentier-states” (Pawelka 1991):

  • The oil countries, we call direct “rentier-states” (first rank rentiers). These dispose of extremely high incomes as a result of differential rent (low production costs) and stocks rents (interests and dividends of invested money = petrodollar recycling).

  • The indirect “rentier-states” (semi-rentiers) owe their existence to capital rents (budget aid, credits, etc.) which they receive for political and strategic reasons from oil countries and highly industrialized countries as well as remittances from expatriates working in the Gulf states. In contrast to the rents mentioned above, this income (and it is a controversial discussion if this income constitutes rents) belongs not to the state but to its citizens. For the state, this has advantages and disadvantages: remittances help to stabilize the economic base, and at the same time they destabilize the autonomy of the state, because it is now not the only distributor of rents.

6Is Jordan a “rentier-state”? Jordan possesses all the structural attributes of an indirect “rentier-state” mentioned above:

  • Between 1974 and 1991 the rent portion (budget aid, credits, remittances) amounted to thirty eight percent in average of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

  • The employment structure and the role of the different economic sectors are absolutely untypical for a Third World country, but typical for “rentier-states”: employment in the service sector in 1990 totalled 71.3 percent, of which 49.5 percent fell to the public sector. The tertiary and quartery sector has had a share of 62.8 percent in the GDP. This one-sided sectoral alignment is an indicator that the service sector attracts more attention, because it plays a much more crucial role for rent-allocation and rent-consumption. The concentration of the service sector in the capital of Amman is, in the end, a result of the advantages of contact with the political power centre.

7The question now is if urbanization processes in “rentier-states” follows principles other than those of other Third World countries. A socio-geographic type of the “rentier-state” has been described by Janet Abu-Lughod (1984). States like Lebanon, Palestine (including Israel and the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza strip) and Jordan (as well as the special case of Egypt) are so-called “charity case countries”. Abu-Lughod concludes that “Urbanization in the Arab World today neither fits the dependency model so robust for other parts of the Third World, nor does it any longer fit the decolonizing model” (1984: 94).

8For the “charity case countries” Abu-Lughod gives the following analysis:

9“The key characteristic of the welfare mode of production is that decision making is disengaged from economic rationality. The key consequence for urbanization of the welfare state of production is that settlement patterns need not have any relationship to internal economic developments. This mode of production operates in the same way that any ‘third party payment’ does in an economy. It raises prices and allows administrative (or political) discretion to outweigh economically measurable costs and benefits” (1984:101).

10We have to ask if this thesis that production is disengaged from economic rationality is valid. There is not yet an answer to the question of which rationality the settlement patterns in Jordan are following. In this paper, an analysis of the development and socio-spatial structure of Amman will show that external factors have had far-reaching influences on the capital city and the Jordanian system of settlement. In addition, internal factors, notably the administrative structure and the power of familial and other networks, also play an important role in influencing the economy and urban development. The centralization of decision-making, the allocation of authority and responsibility, patrimonialism and clientelism all interact with external factors. These aspects, however, lie beyond the scope of this paper which will seek to clarify the relevant external factors.


The Forced Migration of Palestinians

11As a result of the Israeli-Arab wars, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled into Jordan. The result was a fundamental change in the distribution of citizens, for example between the West Bank and East Jordan. In 1949 thirty-eight percent of the Jordanian population lived on the East Bank, in 1952 forty-four percent and in 1961 fifty-three percent. After the loss of the West Bank as a result of the six-day war in 1967, Jordan had to accommodate more than 300,000 people, who were at first located in refugee camps. Four of the now existing thirteen camps were erected between 1949 and 1955; the other nine camps were installed in the years 1967/68. The displacement was oriented to Amman. The Palestinians living in Jordan today are estimated at sixty percent, and in Amman probably around seventy percent.

12The high percentage of Palestinians in Jordan was latently always a risk factor (for example, the events of “Black September” in 1970). This was one reason why the Kingdom received politically motivated rents (development aid, credits and budget aid) from the industrialized states as well from the oil states.

Foreign Financial Aid

13Since its foundation, Jordan was not able to survive without external financial aid. Although we can call the British financial support “rent” in some sense, yet the conclusion that Jordan was a “rentier-state” par excellence must be denied. Rent-theory posits that a “rentier-state” should aim at finding as many different sources of rent-income as possible in order to ensure its political survival and to minimize by diversification the risks caused by the drying up of different sources. But this does not apply to the Emirate of Transjordan between the two World Wars, because Emir Abdallah was under severe British control from outside as well as from inside his country and could not deliberately acquire other rents.

14After the Second World War, Great Britain was replaced by the U.S as the main financial donor to Jordan. With the massive rise of oil prices beginning in 1973, the oil states were able to replace the Western industrial states as main rent payers. The importance of these rents directly paid to the Jordanian state can be seen through their share of the Jordanian GDP (figure 1): between 1974 and 1981 rents amounted to eighteen percent on average; with the decline of the oil prices after 1981 the share of the GDP fell to seven percent. Including credits, the share of direct rents totalled sixteen percent in 1990, or half of their total in 1977.

Labour Migration

15With the oil boom in the seventies, the countries at the “periphery” of the Arabian pensinsula became labour exporting countries, comprising mainly Jordanians and Palestinians, Egyptians and Yemenis. It is difficult to distinguish between native Jordanians and Palestinians due to the fact that the Jordanian government granted the Palestinians Jordanian passports (Czichowski 1990), so they become statistically Jordanians. The number of Jordanian expatriates was estimated in 1987 at approximately 277,000.

16Massive labour migration led to a labour force shortage in Jordan, especially in the service and construction sector. They were mainly replaced by Egyptians, Syrians and South-East Asians. Until 1984 we can see a rise of remittances into Jordan. The world-wide economic recession beginning in 1984 reduced the remittances, which rose again since 1990 (figure 2). One result of these indirect rents was an import boom (mainly of consumer goods) which led to a steadily rising negative trade balance. In spite of fluctuating rent income, the GDP rose yearly, because the state levied indirect fees (for example on import goods) and so could collect a part of these private rents.

The Lebanese Conflict

17The outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 had far-reaching consequences on Amman: around 200,000 Lebanese left Lebanon, to Jordan, Cyprus, the Gulf states and other countries. By the end of the seventies, approximately 30,000 Lebanese lived in Amman with some wealthy Palestinian families coming from Beirut as well. This Lebanese influx as well as remittances caused a construction boom for housing and commercial activities (Figure 3). Around 100 foreign representative offices and headquarters of international institutions (for example: the UN) shifted from Beirut to Amman (Biegel 1990, 1992, 1993). But, on the whole, the results remained moderate: too few apartments, offices and luxury hotels, too high rents for housing, a lack of qualified staff, the too small capacity of the old airport and last but not least, a restrictive policy towards foreign banks and firms led to an exodus of the Lebanese. The housing sector ran into a severe crisis.

The First Gulf War

18With the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war, Jordan became a transit country par excellence. The port of Aqaba was promoted to the most important transit port: the number of vessels doubled between 1980 and 1987. Transfer of loads registered as transit goods rose from 88,000 tons in 1978 to 60 million tons in 1987, mainly for Iraq. This was visible in the rising Iraqi trade balance deficit with Jordan. For better transport, Iraq financed a road between Aqaba and Baghdad. State-owned (partially bilateral like the Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Company) and many private transport companies were founded. But after two years of war, Iraq had spent its foreign currency and its economy measures led to a shift to the cheaper supply route of Turkey. The result was a complete slump of the Jordanian transport services and a decline of transport prices on the Aqaba-Baghdad road from 26 JD per ton in 1980 to 11-13 JD per ton in 1987. The port of Aqaba lost more and more of its transit importance. Jordanian deliverers of construction material and other firms which had expanded their production also had to accept severe losses.

The Second Gulf War

19While Jordan derived partial benefits from the Iraq-Iran war, it was one of the main losers in the second Gulf war. The expulsion of more than 300,000 Jordanian expatriates from the Gulf caused heavy problems concerning their integration into the national economy. On the other hand, remittances deposited in Jordanian banks reached a peak of over 800 million JD. Budget aid reached in 1989 the mark of around 262 million JD and fell in 1990 to 164 million JD and then went up again in 1991 to 236 million JD to stabilize the political base of Jordan. At the same time, construction permits reached record heights all over the country as the returnees tried to guarantee their future in Jordan through investment in housing and property.


20Influenced by the factors mentioned above, since 1970 the outlook of Amman has changed fundamentally, leading to far-reaching structural and spatial changes in the capital.

The Development of Residential Areas

21The mass exodus of Palestinian refugees especially led to a rapid growth of population in Amman. In 1949, the total population of Amman was around 87,000, in 1972 already 550,000, in 1985 it reached 900,000 and in 1992 nearly 1.3 million. In 1948 the city of Amman covered an area of 20 sqkm, in 1981 it covered already 160 sqkm and in 1986, affected by incorporation of surrounding municipalities, it covered an area of 380 sqkm. More than one third of all houses in Greater Amman were constructed after 1975 (Map 1).

22The construction boom since 1970 as a result of rent flows was produced by Jordanian expatriates, national and international merchants, immigrant Lebanese, land owners, contractors and land speculators. The responsible authorities prepared zoning plans with which the building land was parceled into strict use categories. Depending on the quality of planned construction, land was parcelled out into the categories A – E of which 90 per cent belonged to the higher categories A and B. Poorer income groups were, therefore, mostly excluded, because it was the aim of the city quarter municipalities to collect as much land and property fees as possible.

23The precipitous development of building land had many negative consequences. Reinforced by family and administrative connections (wâsta), land speculators bought cheap land without developing it. One result was that much developed land was only sparsely built up. Land was blocked by speculators due to the tremendous rise of land prices. Very often the newly developed areas were poorly equipped in infrastructure (water, electricity, removal of refuse). At least a lot of agricultural area got lost.

24The construction boom, which is still going on, and the policy of panellation exercised by the municipalities resulted in visible spatial and economic segregation. In West and North Amman, housing areas of the categories A and B were developed along the main traffic axes in the West and along the university road in the North. This densely or scattered developed area is characterized by villas and multi-floor apartment houses, unused and agricultural land and speculative property. The more densely settled areas belong mostly to the categories C and D, with small slums and two Palestinian refugee camps in the South and East of Amman. The demarcation line between the housing areas of high standing and the more modest housing areas are the mountains around the old city centre, where the houses erected between 1940 and the sixties are located (Map 2).

The Commercial Sector

25All essential commercial functions were located, until the beginning of the seventies, in downtown Amman near the Hussein mosque: the main branches of banks, the moneychangers, the gold suq and retail business and wholesale trade (Map 3).

26The economic sectors which include the tertiary and quartery sector are playing a crucial role in creating an indirect “rentier-state”. In 1986 about 70 percent of the Jordanian labour force were engaged in these two sectors, 13.5 percent in construction, 16 percent in industry and only 0.5 percent in agriculture. The quartery or information sector includes all economic institutions or activities in which neither production nor the distribution or generation of primary matter or person-related services are in the foreground but rather the treatment and preparation of information (Ellger 1988: 39). This is the sector to which banking belongs.


27The influx of direct and indirect rents and the steadily rising funds since 1970 led, at the end of the seventies, to the foundation of several new banks which played an increasingly crucial role in the Jordanian economy. The importance of the banks is visible physionomically in the creation of a new banking quarter in Shmeisani (Map 4).

The Development of the Jordanian Banking Sector

28Until the fifties, there were no Jordanian banks besides the Arab Bank which is originally a Palestinian bank. The earliest banks established in Jordan were: the Ottoman Bank in 1925, the Arab Bank in 1934 and the British Bank of the Middle East in 1949. In the mid-fifties, the first national banks were founded: in 1955 the Jordan National Bank, in 1960 the Bank of Jordan and the Cairo-Amman Bank. Three further foreign banks settled in Amman: in 1957 the Iraqi Rafidain Bank and in 1958 the Lebanese Intra Bank which, after its bankruptcy in 1966, reopened in 1971 under the name of Bank al-Mashrek. Since 1950 the Arab Land Bank founded by the members of the Arab League established a branch in Amman.

29The reason for the small number of banks operating in Jordan in the fifties and sixties is that the national and international financial market made it unnecessary to operate more banks. The characteristics of the shareholders of the existing Jordanian banks at that time show clearly that the financial policy was restricted to the national market and Arab neighbours: 75 percent of the shareholders of the Arab Bank are Jordanians, 20 percent are held by the Shoman family; 90 percent of the shares of the Jordan National Bank belong to Jordanians and in the Cairo-Amman Bank, 88 percent. The shares of foreign citizens or governments amount to about 10 percent (exception, Arab Bank: 25 percent). All main branches were located in Feisal Street downtown.

30In 1964 the newly founded Central Bank of Jordan replaced the Currency Board and settled in King Hussein Street next to the courthouse. With the foundation of new banks in the middle of the sixties, the first banks began to settle outside the old town: in 1965 the Industrial Development Bank settled in Jebel Webdeh and moved one year later to the third circle in Jebel Amman and in 1968 to a location between the first and second circle. Only the Cairo-Amman Bank moved within the old centre to a new building opposite the gold suq.

31With the seventies, the situation changed fundamentally. Two factors were responsible:

  1. The most important financial centre of the Near and Middle East, Beirut, lost with the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war its role as the leading banking and commercial centre. Foreign banks and firms looked for alternatives and some decided to shift their branches or representative offices to Amman: in 1977 the Osterreichische Länderbank, the French banks, Société Générale in 1977 and Banque Nationale de Paris in 1980 and the American Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company in 1981. Athens, Cyprus, Cairo and Bahrain also gained by this development. Other foreign banks, Bank al-Mashrek, Citibank, Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Chase Manhattan Bank, used Amman as their base for international financial transactions. The outbreak of the first Gulf war brought Amman more advantages. Because of the ban on foreign banks operating in Iraq and Syria, Amman became the ideal place to serve these two countries. No bank settled in the downtown area: some banks decided to settle in the third circle area, in the embassy and ministry quarter, while other banks settled in Shmeisani.

  2. The massive oil price rises in 1973/74 and 1979 gave the oil producing countries in the Gulf the opportunity to develop their countries. This led to three consequences:

    • The high flow of petrodollars led to capital surpluses which could not be absorbed in the oil countries with their low population numbers (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia) in spite of rapid national economic growth. In other words, these were countries with a low capital absorption capacity. As a result many new Arab banks were founded, sometimes with Western shareholders (for example: BCCI which opened a branch in Amman in Feisal Street in 1975).

    • With aid (direct rents) from the oil countries, the Jordanian state was able to hold and distribute external revenues.

    • The oil states imported more Jordanian workers who were among the most highly skilled in the region. The remittances (indirect rents) contributed to a steadily rising capital flow into Jordan.

32The founding of new Jordanian banks during the seventies is a result of the factors mentioned above. The Arab oil states obtained access to deposit and invest financial capital from oil revenues in the newly founded banks in the neighbouring Arab countries. To promote these investment possibilities, they become shareholders in these banks.

33The names of the new banks show partially these capital shareholdings from the Gulf states: Jordan Kuwait Bank (founded in 1977, Gulf-share: 40 percent), Jordan Gulf Bank (founded in 1978, Gulf-share: 30 percent), Petra Bank (founded in 1978, Gulf-share: 30 percent), Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment (founded in 1979, Gulf-share: 50 percent). Arab Jordan Investment Bank (founded in 1978, Gulf-share: ?, Libya: 10 percent). Additionally, special banks were founded like the Co-operative Bank in 1971 within the Jordan Co-operative Organization to promote a co-operative trading system with credits. The Housing Bank founded in 1973 by the Jordanian government to subsidize construction activities has 50 percent shareholders from the Gulf and Iran. Supplementary to these banks were the Cities and Villages Development Bank and the Syrian-Jordanian Bank (with a 50 percent share by each state) and several Jordanian financial institutions and savings banks which met the steadily rising demand for special banks.

34The decline of the importance of Central Amman as a financial centre was accelerated by the new banks: most banks shifted their headquarters from the downtown towards Jebel Amman between the first and third circle: The Jordan National Bank in 1972 to the second circle and in 1976 to the third circle: the Arab Land Bank is located at the third circle since 1967 as well as Citibank since 1974. Chase Manhattan Bank opened its foreign branch at the first circle in 1976. Jebel Amman had become the embassy and ministry quarter and included a royal palace and was consequently a good address for banks to open their headquarters. In 1983 the Petra Bank settled in the Seil street between Jebel Amman and Jebel Webdeh.

35With the beginning of the eighties, Shmeisani advanced to the most important banking centre of Amman: in 1980, the Cities and Villages Development Bank and the Arab Bank opened its main branches in Shmeisani, in 1981 it was followed by the Grindlays Bank which merged with the Ottoman Bank. The year 1986 marked the definitive loss of importance for Central Amman: the Jordan Islamic Bank, the Jordan Gulf Bank, the Bank al-Mashrek and, one year later, the Arab Jordan Investment Bank moved to Shmeisani. In 1987 the British Bank of the Middle East shifted its main branch to Jebel Hussein (Figure 4).

36In spite of spectacular successes of the new banks, the eighties are also characterized by sensational bankruptcies of moneychangers (for example, Abdullah Saleh Rajhi in 1981 in Dammam/Saudi Arabia, in 1982 the Suq al-Manakh in Kuwait and in 1986 the Rizk-house in Amman) and some banks (Bank of Credit and Commerce International closed in Amman in 1991, Petra Bank in 1990 and the Syrian-Jordanian Bank ended its activities in 1991). Other banks were troubled such as the Jordan Gulf Bank and the Bank al Mashrek. In 1989 all moneychangers had to close because of the sharp decline of the JD. Foreign banks left the country: the Chase Manhattan Bank in 1986 and the Austria Bank in 1991.

37The Central Bank of Jordan started a complete reconstruction of the Jordanian banking system. Financial institutions were allowed to merge into investment banks: Business Bank, Amman Investment Bank in 1990 and Union Bank for Savings and Investment in 1991. The Bahrain-based Arab Banking Corporation opened its first branch outside Bahrain in 1989 in Amman. All banks started their activities with main branches in Shmeisani. In 1992, the Central Bank of Jordan allowed 34 moneychangers to reopen, which constitutes half of those operating in 1989.

38What conclusions can we draw from the development and the role of the banking sector within the last twenty years?

  1. Jordan as a “rentier-state” is, more than other countries in the region, susceptible to political and economical crises. The past political events and the scattered Jordanian economy have shown this clearly.

  2. In spite of some bankrupcies and the worldwide recession, the Jordanian private banking sector was, in the last twenty years, partially very successful as indicated by the expansion of financial activities, visible in the opening of many branches in Jordan. Especially in Amman, the quarter of Shmeisani underlines the important position of banking in the Jordanian economy. The banking sector is playing a crucial role in the Jordanian and Amman economy as the financier of trade, construction and industrial activities.

  3. The Jordanian commercial banks have succeeded in attracting a large share of indirect rents (remittances) and have contributed by this means to canalize the external cash-flow into formal channels. This enables the Jordanian government to control more effectively the financial market.


39Within Jordan direct and indirect rents have had far-reaching consequences. In Amman especially, rents were concentrated and invested into the national monetary cycle by a newly developed class of merchants, speculators and bankers. The money was mainly invested in commerce and into the housing sector. These investments were increased because of the Lebanese civil war and the two Gulf wars.

40Internal factors (the structures of administration, tax legislation, the fee market for land, the change of social structures and the emergence of new classes) as well as the external factors described above, have added decisively to the actual structure of the city and to the development of the present primacy of Amman. The “rentier-state” with its centralized distribution of rents favours the concentration of administration. Consequently, private investors try to find access to the rent-cycles and thereby strengthen the centrality of the capital-city. The money which was invested into Amman’s housing sector caused spatial and social segregation. The old central business district in downtown Amman lost its role as the leading commercial and financial centre in favour of the Western and Northern parts of Amman (Shmeisani, Jebel Amman and Jebel Hussein).

41While Abu-Lughod (1984) does not find rational reasons underlying settlement structures in a “rentier-state” like Jordan, we can state that there are rational reasons:

42Only in the capital city does the “rentier-state” or “rentier-economy” cause extreme centrality. The struggle for coalitions for the distribution of rents mainly takes place in the capital city. The growth of the city and the actual city structure are the result of the economic basis of the state: the economic basis is not industrial, rather production is to be understood as the distribution of rents and access to rent-circles. This is why production is related to an economic rationality which Abu-Lughod denies.

43The connection of political and economical interests is so strong, and social groups so influential, that Amman will guard its dominating role in Jordan even in future. In spite of all formulated and partially realized plans for a decentralized spatial policy in Jordan, these plans are condemned to fail. It is unlikely that Amman as a primate city (demographic as well as functional) could lose its essential functions through measures of decentralization because of its unsual and specific situation.

Fig 1: Share of Rents at the Jordanian Gross Domestic Product (1974-1991).

Fig 1: Share of Rents at the Jordanian Gross Domestic Product (1974-1991).

Fig 2: Jordanian Remittances and their Shares in Jordanian Banks (1974-1991).

Fig 2: Jordanian Remittances and their Shares in Jordanian Banks (1974-1991).

Fig 3: Construction Permits and Developed Land in Amman and all Other Jordanian Communities (1970-1991).

Fig 3: Construction Permits and Developed Land in Amman and all Other Jordanian Communities (1970-1991).

Source: Central Bank of Jordan: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, diff. vol.

Figure 4:
Establishment and Shifts of Bank Main Branches, Bank Branches and Representative Offices in Amman Between 1925 and 1993.

Figure 4:Establishment and Shifts of Bank Main Branches, Bank Branches and Representative Offices in Amman Between 1925 and 1993.

Figure 5: The Jordan Banking System

Figure 5: The Jordan Banking System

Source: Own survey, Central Bank of Jordan: Twenty eighth Annual Report 1991, Banking Reports, diff. vols.



ABU-LUGHOD, J., “Culture, Modes of Production and the Changing Nature of Cities in the Arab World”, In: Agnew, al. (Eds.): The City in Cultural Context, London 1984, p. 94-119.

BEBLAWI, H. and LUCIANI, G. (Eds.): The Rentier State, London 1987.

BIEGEL, R., “Politische und Wirtschaftliche Steuerungsfaktoren der Stadtentwicklung von Amman/Jordanien. Die Rolle der Metropole in einem Rentenstaat”. (Ph.D), Tübingen 1990.

—, “Amman: Die Entwicklung einer Metropole im “Rentenstaat” Jordanien unter dem Einfluß externer und interner Steuerungsfaktoren”. In: Mitteilungen der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft, vol. 38 for 1991. Erlangen 1992, p. 91-189.

—, “Amman: Zur Dominanz einer Metropole in ‘Rentenstaat’”. In: Geographische Rundschau, 1/1993, p. 40/48.

CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, diff. vols. Amman.

CHATELUS, M., “Policies for Development: Attitudes Toward Industry and Services”. In: Beblawi, H. and Luciani, G. (Eds.): The Rentier-State, London 1987. p. 108/137.

CZICHOWSKI, F., “Ich und meine Verttern gegen die Welt.... Migration, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und soziale Stabilität in Jordanien”. In Orient, 29/1988, p. 561-578.

, Jordanien: Internationale Migration, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und soziale Stabilität. Hamburg 1990 (Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts).

ELLGER, C, “Informationssektor und räumliche Entwicklung-dargestellt am Beispiel Baden Württemberg” Tübingen 1988. (Tübinger Geographische Studien, vol. 99).

FINDLAY, A., “Amman: Urbanization in a Charity State”, In Bulletin de la société languedocienne de géographie, 20/1986, 2-3, p. 211-221.

LUCIANI. G., “Allocation vs. Production States: A theoretical framework”. In: Beblawi, and Luciani, G. (Eds.): The Rentier State. London 1987, p. 63-82.

PAWELKA, P., “Der Irak als ‘rentierstaat’. Zur politischen Ekonomie des Vorderen Orients”. In Der Bürger im Staat, 41/1991. 1, p. 39-50.

Table des illustrations

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Titre Fig 1: Share of Rents at the Jordanian Gross Domestic Product (1974-1991).
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Titre Fig 2: Jordanian Remittances and their Shares in Jordanian Banks (1974-1991).
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Titre Fig 3: Construction Permits and Developed Land in Amman and all Other Jordanian Communities (1970-1991).
Légende Source: Central Bank of Jordan: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, diff. vol.
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Titre Figure 4:Establishment and Shifts of Bank Main Branches, Bank Branches and Representative Offices in Amman Between 1925 and 1993.
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Titre Figure 5: The Jordan Banking System
Légende Source: Own survey, Central Bank of Jordan: Twenty eighth Annual Report 1991, Banking Reports, diff. vols.
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