Reconsidering Governance from Below
Practices and Models of Autonomous Governance, Social Inclusiveness and Decentralisation in Wartime Syria
p. 265-296
Texte intégral
1Syria has been the theatre of an almost unique revolutionary experience among the countries of the so-called Arab Spring: the rise of autonomous administration structures. A number of actors have contributed to the local structures that have emerged since 2012. These include domestic actors—such as local civilian councils and activist groups, Sharia courts, influential tribes, extremist groups and militias, the “political opposition”—and also the National Council or Iʾtilāf and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), as well as foreign powers, NGOs and INGOs and private implementers.1 In this chapter, I shall focus on the governance experience of local councils and the SIG while giving only some brief attention to other administrative structures in Syria.2
2My research findings question the view that the bottom-up, autonomous, post-2011 local government structures in opposition areas (let alone in jihadist and foreign “managed” areas) are an expression of democracy, which has been constrained solely by war and external intervention.3
3My first point is the need to shift the attention of analysis away from “the conflict” as the default explanation for the uneven trajectory of local governance experiments. There is no question that the war has both enabled and constrained the birth of local autonomous governance. Yet I suggest a departure from “conflict” as the main methodological approach (as in war studies or post-conflict studies) in favour of two broader aspects: a political economy perspective and an analysis of authoritarian governance.4 Specifically, we need to place the ongoing local events within the context of the political strategy of authoritarian rule. This is necessary not only to understand the reasons for the conflict in the first place—this has been the main concern of political economy studies of the Syrian war—but also to grasp the significance of what is going on in the post-2011 period. The authoritarian context—the power practices which the Syrian regime has pursued for decades—continues, in significant ways, to frame the nature and praxis of the new governance structures which have emerged since 2011. Their priorities and strategies, their ultimate ability to devise effective institutions, and to bring about qualitative change, must be seen in this historical context. I am not referring here to institutional path dependency but rather to discursive frameworks and practices, or the political modus operandi, which have been and continue to be so essential to the regime’s repertoire and its governmental practice, and which have influenced the autonomous government experience in important ways.
4Such an analysis—a political economy of authoritarian rule—will highlight disquieting elements of continuity between some pre-conflict authoritarian practices and post-2011 developments. This is still true despite the profound changes that, unquestionably, have taken place, with an unprecedented resurgence of civil and political actors. Moreover, this analysis will introduce a more sober discussion of “post-conflict scenarios”: it will show that the conflict will not end in the foreseeable future, not only because its root causes have not been addressed, but also because, within the context of authoritarian power, the organisation of local order is part of a highly conflictual political economy. In such circumstances, practices which have transformed Syria in the last few decades are likely to condition its future long after the end of open military confrontation.
5The general question guiding this research is whether local structures can have a transformative role in any future governance or political process. As a preliminary step in assessing opportunities and conditions for re-creating a supra-local system of governance out of the now highly fragmented territorial order, we need to examine existing practices and new frameworks and models of local governance, if they exist. A fruitful discussion about micro-level governance starts with considering the current reality, a scenario in which the regime has regained control after having lived through over years of erosion of State institutions.
6The first element that stands out is the extreme territorial fragmentation of governance practices in 2023. Geopolitical fragmentation is the most obvious outcome of several years of war: the Kurdish north-east, the rebel-held north-west, the northern area under Turkish tutelage, central and southern Syria under Syrian government control—including the “reconciliation” areas recaptured militarily and again under central authority—and finally the areas in central and eastern Syria which were under the domination of the Islamic State until the summer of 2019.5 This is a huge challenge to any national regime.
7Within this geopolitical fragmentation, local councils have provided Syrian communities with a modicum of social order. They have provided limited services, social organisation, and security—in the absence of functioning State structures. Nevertheless, local councils had already formed the micro level of Syrian administration well before 2011, and some never ceased to operate as part of the Syrian Baʿathist socio-political organisation of the country. Therefore, it is necessary to understand these continuities within an assessment of what is new.
8The study of micro-level structures of local administration escapes the neatness of mainstream conceptualisations of democracy and the linear nature of transitional paradigms (Dorronsoro et al. 2013, Hajjar et al. 2017, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2014, Bedir Mulla 2018, LDSPS 2020). Rather, such local structures appear to be deeply entangled within a network of dynamics and interactions both vertically and horizontally. “External” actors such as foreign donors and exiled political institutions have an impact from above; competing or parallel local groups and actors, who have indirect leverage on local dynamics within the context of adaptable or flexible authoritarian practices of governance, affect the situation on the ground. An analysis of local structures in rebel-held areas, and a cursory look at other experiments in governance, bring to the fore unexpectedly hybrid governing strategies, alliances and practice. These reveal a certain amount of continuity between opposition practices and authoritarian frameworks, all of which help to explain why autonomous forms of local governance in rebel-held areas have not evolved into autonomous, bottom-up, State-building processes.6
Local government in Assad’s Syria
9In order to understand developments and appreciate governance strategies and the resilience of social forces, we must briefly look into the past. In so doing, it is especially important to recognise that legal reforms are linked with each other, in spite of the considerable span of time between them. Therefore, any attempt to analyse the current situation needs to take into consideration those events and practices which are the still-present foundation for contemporary Syrian local governance structures and approaches.
Authoritarian deconcentration under the Baʿath and Hafez al-Assad
10Immediately after the 1963 coup, the Baʿath Party initiated a vast reorganisation of social relations at the national and the local level. The Baʿath developed a rigid, vertical administrative hierarchy which worked in combination with a flexible horizontal patronage network.7 Thus, the Syrian territory was restructured by the creation of new muḥāfaẓāt or provinces (Rīf Dimashq, Ṭarṭūs and Idlib) and a proliferation of smaller bodies at the local level minṭaqa (a district with a population of a minimum of 60,000 registered citizens); nāḥiya (a subdistrict of 20,000 people), and baladiyya (or municipality) (Maurel 1984, Balanche 2008). From 1963 to 1983, local councils were under the Interior Ministry. A muḥāfiẓ (province governor) and a raʾīs minṭaqa (chief of district) presided over city councils and nominated their members, while in the countryside mayors and municipal councils were also appointed by a muḥāfiẓ (Balanche 2008).
11Parallel to a land reform and a wave of nationalisation measures, the administrative reform was a multi-layered geographic re-organisation at the micro-level. All of these measures were designed to pave the way for the social revolution which would bring to the fore small and medium peasants and the urban petite bourgeoisie. After 1963, the interests of these social groups were tied to the Baʿathist regime by a “social contract” which secured social mobility in exchange for consent and loyalty (Hinnebusch 1990, Heydemann 1999). The establishment of municipalities was an effective way to create intermediaries between the population and the regime: a layer of bureaucrats and notables charged with managing social crises and popular mobilisation (Balanche 2008).
12The combination of centralised bureaucratic control with the development of instruments of local engagement—including the capillary expansion of Baʿath Party branches and the creation of popular organisations such as the Peasant Federation, the General Federation of Trade unions, the Syrian Students Union as well as loyal professional syndicates8—were deemed necessary to prevent the formation of any competing locus of power on the periphery of the highly centralised Baʿathist State. The main aim of the Baʿathist “revolution from above” was to prevent a “revolution from below” by integrating the population into local bureaucracies and linking their interests to that of the Baʿathist State (Hinnebusch 2001). Administrators became the new “notables” in Baʿathist Syria. Throughout history, the more powerful the regime, the more trust the individual places in elaborate local and family networks. From within these networks, notables arise which every state apparatus aggravates at its peril (Schatkowski-Schilcher 1985). During the early years of Baʿathist rule, dense networks of local élites continued to exist, but the new strong man, Hafez al-Assad eventually co-opted them as useful tools of local governance. Thus, these elite social formations can be considered a pillar of Baʿathist rule in Syria.
13The “corrective movement” introduced in late 1970 by Hafez al-Assad deepened—rather than “correcting”—the Baʿathist practices of population and territorial control. Legislative decree No.15, issued in 1971, reorganised the Syrian territory according to demographic criteria with a strict hierarchy. The proliferation of local administration bodies increased the presence of the Baʿath Party in the country’s peripheries in order to favour regime clients, create new jobs for administrative cadres and weaken the cities of Aleppo and Damascus within their own region. The number of manāṭiq grew to 61 (from 42), the nawāḥī (plural of nāḥiya) reached 249 (from 96 in 1960), and municipalities increased from around 50 to two thousand (Balanche 2008). The law created city councils with several offices in charge of managing the implementation of services to the local communities. The composition of the councils was to reflect society as envisaged by the Baʿathists, i.e., with fixed quotas of key categories. Representatives of peasants, workers, craftsmen and limited-income workers were to make up at least 60%. Council members were elected from closed lists proposed by the National Progressive Front—the ruling coalition of parties dominated by the Baʿath Party—and the Executive (six to ten officers) was appointed by the central government from among the council’s elected members. The council selected its president and the members of the Executive Office (Carnegie 2008).9 Beyond this procedure, the Baʿath Party has continued to play a significant role in selecting city council members and their presidents through formal and informal mechanisms, including screening by the security apparatus.10
14It is important to note that the focus which Hafez al-Assad placed on the reorganisation of administrative bodies was not meant to change those mechanisms of power, which had already proved effective in regimenting Syrian society under the Baʿath. Centralisation of power remained extreme: crucial responsibilities, including the management of big infrastructural projects, the exploitation of natural and mineral resources, and the financial management of governorate cities may have been nominally concentrated in the hands of provincial councils, elected in 1972 and 1976 (Kienle 1991, Picard 1980). Yet in reality, these councils had a merely consultative role. The most powerful components of the local administrative system were the Damascus-appointed governors, endowed with strong discretionary power, which they exercised together with the chiefs of the local Baʿath Party and security agencies (Picard 1980: 165). A series of legal procedures—for example, all decisions needed the signature of the muḥāfiẓ and the minister concerned—and the financial constraints on local entities within a centralised command economy, made local bodies heavily dependent on Damascus. Smaller units were reduced to consultative bodies under the supervision of appointed senior officials. They did, however, retain important roles as policing agents and in the electoral process, and they also provided opportunities to build local patronage networks.11
15In fact, all local bodies operated as structures of social control in conjunction with existing elites (such as notable families and tribal chiefs) which had been shattered but not obliterated by the Baʿathist “revolution”. The political outcome of such an arrangement was that networks of urban bureaucrats, local Baʿath Party and security heads, and traditional local elites offset each other and ensured that no local power could be aggregated in opposition to the central authorities (Hallaj 2017).
16Finally, the proliferation of new small administrative units (nawāḥī and manāṭiq) was expedient in providing administrative relevance to communities in minority areas— such as the predominantly ʿAlawi mountain and coastal region in northwest Syria—despite their non-compliance with the demographic minimums required by the law. Thus, the calibration of administrative boundaries revealed the ability of the “secular” Baʿath to play sectarian politics through local administration.12
17In sum, the 1971 regulation appeared to introduce a deconcentration of the State architecture, but it actually disguised a centralisation of power—following an Eastern European model (Dbyat 1995). At the same time, the regime’s indirect method of maintaining order resulted in the entrenching social cleavages and the strengthening of the role of influential families in their own localities.
18A further reshuffle of local administration bodies in 1983—one year after a Muslim Brotherhood-led revolt which culminated in a civilian massacre in the city of Ḥamā—gave governors full control of provincial government, local ministerial offices and state-owned enterprises. As focal points of State power reporting directly to the president and key decision-making bodies for local economic projects, governors became an even more effective tool of central authority and a pillar of the locally based patronage machine.13
Bashar al-Assad and local power
19Under the senior Assad, the local administration system proved to be an effective instrument of social control just as the centralisation of authority ensured that peripheral institutions would be unable to produce any autonomous power. This explains why the reform package introduced by his son and heir Bashar barely touched local administration structures and left political structures intact. In a bid to assert his personal power after inheriting the presidency in 2000, Bashar al-Assad launched a massive turnover in party leadership and elite cadres, including province governors. Ten governors out of fourteen were replaced in 2000; eight new governors were nominated in 2002, while government officials had to retire at the age of sixty, contrary to established practice.
20The rejuvenation of state officials was hardly an indication of a “growing influence of the institution at the expense of the individual” or a “widening participation in the decision-making process”, as Bashar al-Assad announced (Hamidi 2002). The political structures and patrimonial practices supporting the regime did not change: at best, the new mobility in government institutions helped to reduce the entrenched influence of an “old guard” allegedly opposing the reforms launched by this President who, ironically, had himself inherited power.14
21With the belated introduction of the ninth Five Year Plan (2001–2005) announced in 2004—shortly after the Kurdish revolt15—there was yet another administrative reform, which included the first Municipal Administration Modernisation program and free elections for all local councils. Reflecting demographic changes, several new locations gained the legal status of municipalities. Yet the competencies of local bodies were still limited, and centralised bureaucratic procedures remained untouched. Crucially, provinces and cities were classified as before, irrespective of the size of their population, while local government continued to receive all operating funds from the central government and had to return revenue collected to the national treasury (Carnegie 2008). Moreover, the office of governor remained one of the most powerful offices in the Syrian polity.16
22The turn towards liberalisation did not bring the results that the Syrian public expected. In the framework of unchallenged bureaucratic centralisation and neopatrimonial relations, the reforms exacerbated existing discrepancies—between centre and periphery, rich and poor, the well-connected and the majority.17 It also created new cleavages because, crucially, the “social” aspects of the “social market economy”, which was announced with grand fanfare in 2005, remained a mere slogan. The Baʿathist welfare state shrank while the population grew, all in the face of the brazen monopolisation of wealth by regime cronies. Large parts of Syria became increasingly dependent on informal economic networks: black markets, smuggling networks and informal jobs, while huge slums mushroomed around the main urban centres (Hallaj 2017).
The 2011 “decentralisation law”
23The revolt that spread across the country beginning in March 2011 sparked a renewed interest in local administration on the part of a regime concerned with its own survival. Ministry of Local Administration decree 107 of August 2011 was presented as a decentralisation legislation within a set of attempted reforms made in response to the growing protest movement. Thus, the law conveyed a clear reformist message aimed at appeasing popular protest as well as improving the international reputation of the Assad regime (Gharibah 2018, Favier & Kostrz 2019). Yet despite its ambitious title, the so-called “decentralisation law” was no exception to the established method of responding to economic crises and popular discontent: it launched a sweeping reform package while preserving existing power structures.
24In theory, Law 107 provided a potential framework for a devolution of political authority, which was expected to transform provincial governorates from hierarchical oversight bodies into coordinating structures and empowering elected councils. Nevertheless, a number of issues raise questions as to the true intention of the regime. First, the law placed responsibility for identifying suitable areas of decentralisation on ministries and governors—who had the least interest in devolving their considerable power.18 Second, the main economic sectors —agriculture, industry and trade—continued to be administered by ministry directorates.19 Third, despite granting municipalities greater decision making in the fields of health, education, social services and private investments, cities continued to have no role in actually implementing these measures. Moreover, central decision-making bodies continued to determine policies with regard to urban planning, revenue management and budgetary allocations.20
25Fourth, the representatives of governors at the lower administrative levels were not elected members of local councils, but the district or sub-district managers appointed by the Minister of Interior on recommendation of the governor.21 Thus, the appointed governors continued to have ultimate powers over the lower administrative units while they enjoyed a high level of immunity from public accountability and legal prosecution.22
26Finally, the centralised power of the Minister of Local Administration (MOLA) remained unchallenged. Considering that this position has been occupied since 2016 by Hussein Makhlouf—former Governor of Damascus and a relative of the notorious businessman Rami Makhlouf, cousin of President Bashar al-Assad—it is clear that the regime continues to hold direct control over the administration of large parts of Syrian territory.23
27The legislation which followed showed once again the instrumentality of local administration as a means of co-opting and controlling local communities. Thus in 2011, ordinance 1378 changed the administrative boundaries of the new municipalities, allowing authorities to merge potential rebellious rural settlements into loyalist towns while creating numerous rural townships where regime support was strong.24 For example, the loyalist province of al-Lādhiqiyya included 64 townships with budgets of their own, thus allowing the regime to spread its patronage deeper into its rural communities. By contrast, the turbulent province of Aleppo, with a population five times that of al-Lādhiqiyya, had only twenty townships. Decree 19 of 2015 and Law 10 of 2018, which addressed the role of local administration in the management of local development projects, reinforced this trend by giving the final word to those at the apex of power—the president, his ministers, and governors.25
28In sum, despite creating new administrative units and setting up local elections in 2011, Law 107 has barely scratched the hierarchical structure of power which it was meant to replace. This legislation is ambiguous, fails to designate procedures, makes no attempt to regulate overlapping jurisdictions, has poorly defined sectoral strategies and does not sort out administrative and human resource redundancies. In essence, local structures have continued to operate according to the old Law 15 of 1971 (Gharibah 2018). Within this configuration, local councils are likely to form another layer of inefficient bureaucracy unaccountable to their constituents (Favier & Kostrz 2019). Even if fully applied, the reform would move toward a deconcentrated rather than a truly decentralised system. Decentralisation requires a thorough reform of administrative and legal practices to shatter the hierarchical structure and the patronage networks which ensure the reproduction of the Syrian power system.
29It is fully understandable that the regime itself is unwilling to make a genuine reform of the political structures of public service and territorial administration. More surprisingly, opponents of the regime showed themselves to be blind to certain systemic realities of the country’s political economy. Their newly created structures—local councils, the National Coalition, and its executive arm, the Syrian Interim Government (SIG)—appeared neither able nor prepared to face these national challenges. With the exception of the Kurdish northeast, the autonomous structures which emerged in rebel-held locations were spontaneous and fragmented, reflecting the opportunities and challenges specific to their location—and often subject to the priorities of external actors. The attempt of the SIG to corral local structures fell well short of its goal to structure local bodies under its “government”—as I argue below.
Local government under Syria’s opposition
30The organisation of autonomous civil administration in areas held by the opponents of the regime developed in parallel with the spread of the conflict and the retreat of forces loyal to the central government. The new structures may have emerged in an administrative vacuum but they did not operate in a power vacuum because persistent, resurgent or newly emerging actors and practices contributed to their formation and influenced their trajectory. First, direct confrontation with the regime—and later with IS, Kurdish and foreign forces as well as intra-rebel fighting for territorial control—heavily influenced the ability of rebel-held councils to retain their autonomy. Second, the different agendas and direct intervention of external donors ignited a local competition which contributed further to the fragmentation of local structures as they became entwined in foreign strategies (Hajjar et al. 2017). Third, the conflict itself also generated a fragmented patchwork of localised economies associated with the emergence of “war entrepreneurs”.
31Nevertheless, some of the practices which constituted the old order have persisted in the wartime environment, replicated by old and new actors in both regime- and opposition-held areas. This last dynamic adds a disturbing, and often ignored, dimension of continuity with previous practices of governance and power. The persistence of pre-2011 authoritarian practices throughout the Syrian conflict is well illustrated by the role that notable families and clans have played in the formation and management of local structures, and by the rise of new actors in local economic orders.
Local councils and social networks: the rule of tribes, families and new traders of the crisis
32Starting with Zabadānī in March 2012, hundreds of councils were formed in towns and villages in rebel-held areas in order to address the daily challenges of providing basic services and humanitarian relief to local communities. On many occasions, the leading activists behind the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), which were first drawn together in the early stages of the uprising in order to organise and document peaceful demonstrations, became the main nuclei of the new local councils.26 Despite diverse local circumstances and political affiliation, their common focus was a new-found autonomy from regime control and the lack of an overarching political framework: as a result, local councils varied widely in both their capabilities and autonomy.
33The majority of local councils were subsequently created by mechanisms of elite consensus or community nomination, in which influential local figures—including activists, rebel fighters, and powerful families and tribes—agreed to share council seats via a closed self-selection process through ad hoc electoral bodies.27 Selection processes varied and evolved over time, leading some observers to note that the role of notables in local administration became increasingly confined to the shūrā (consultative) council—also called aʿyān (notables) or wujahāʾ (dignitaries) councils—leaving the membership of the local council to more technically qualified people. Nevertheless, family dynamics remained the most important factor in local governance not only in conservative rural communities—such as Mariʿ and Aʿzaz (both in Aleppo’s muḥāfaẓāt)—but also in larger cities such as Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman and Ḥamā. Often the shariʿa courts, shūrā councils or tribal networks, rather than the local councils, were the real locus of power.28
34The towns of Darʿa in southern Syria and al-Rafid in the south-west illustrate the power of tribal structures. In both locations, local governance bodies were formed on the basis of consensus between tribal leaders and local notables.29 In Darʿa, local armed opposition groups were typically formed along tribal and family lines. In the new political and military landscape following the Darʿa “reconciliation” agreement, the role of tribal elites became even more prominent: the Darʿa Central Committee—a semi-formal grouping of influential clan members—served as mediator in high-level negotiations with the State and with Russia about violations of the reconciliation agreement (Urban Syria 2019).
35Tribal networks also played a pivotal role in al-Rafid, a small town in the al-Jawlān Heights which became the SIG local governorate in July 2013. Over time, al-Rafid changed military controls several times. Most members of the short-lived SIG-affiliated council were from tribal clans. Since early 2014, attempts to set up an Islamist administration by Ahrār al-Shām and Jabhat al-Nusra, or a Free Syrian army administration, have failed. No change in military control, including the August 2018 takeover by the regime, was ever able to shatter the authority of these tribal clans. The strongest communal body in al-Rafid is the “council of tribes” formed by prominent individuals from the most influential clans of the Naʿīm tribe. This council played a key role in mediating between the al-Rafid community and opposition forces and later during reconciliation negotiations. Moreover, the Naʿīm confederation manages its own finances (ṣundūq) and has set up an informal tax system based on tribal ʿaṣabiyya rather than territorial criteria.30 Finally, while overseeing the local “reconciliation” committees—as well as those dealing with local security and service—these influential tribal chiefs also continued to hold seats in the Syrian parliament and in central State institutions such as provincial councils and service directorates.
36In al-Rafid as well as in Darʿa, tribal structures acted as key interlocutors on behalf of nearly every group involved in the conflict: the local community, the Russian authorities, the opposition and the regime (Jabassini & Ezzi 2021). Thus, the range of their activities has spanned local structures, central institutions, communities, informal networks, and even foreign authorities.
37The fact that the Syrian regime has continued to work towards winning the support of tribes in their areas of influence speaks well of the importance of tribes and clans in upholding local order. This is demonstrated by the visits of Bashar al-Assad with tribal chiefs in Raqqa in 2011 as well as the high-profile tribal conference held in the Ithriya region (south-west of Raqqa) in 2019.31 Moreover, the tribal justice system in Darʿa and Suwaydāʾ has once more re-emerged.32
38The erosion of State control as a result of the uprising shattered the links between Damascus and local family networks, and opened up new opportunities for protection and influence. The town of Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, in southern Idlib province, well illustrates the enduring power of influential family networks over the administrative structures. Prior to 2011, the Maʿarra Council was elected according to the 1971 decree, dividing membership into quotas among peasants, craftsmen, teachers, students, women, professionals and other key categories of society as the Baʿathists saw it. Nevertheless, it was dominated by prominent families (including the Nahhās, Yusufi, Haraki, Bilāni, Jundi and Tannāri) which had a strong influence in the Council’s decision-making process and proves that traditional patrimonial networks have taken over the “legal-rational” as well as the “revolutionary” Baʿathist ones.33
39Shortly after taking control of Maʿarra on 10 October 2012, opposition factions established their first local council, initially focused on relief work. After 2013, the council became a crucial institution in the provision of services and territorial administration. From 2014 the council was under the authority of the Idlib Governorate Council, which in turn was affiliated with the SG (see below).
40From 2015, council membership was expanded to include members of other families appointed by an ad hoc committee while elections were cancelled following the expansion of Hayʾat Taḥrīr al-Shām (HTS) in the district (Khaddour & Mazur 2019). The ensuing confrontation between armed factions enabled the independent Maʿarra Council to continue to operate. The 35-member Maʿarra Council, which took office on 20 October 2017, was selected by a seven-member preparatory committee, allegedly to ensure that all Maʿarra stakeholders had equitable representation in the Council (ACU 2018).
41The Salvation Government (SG), which took over in mid-2019 after the town came under the control of HTS, gradually imposed its own people on the council, despite the latter’s strong resistance and the resilience of the Maʿarra community.34 Elections for the new council were scheduled at the beginning of 2019, but have not been held, due to the insecure environment. Nevertheless, all the heads of the council offices—except the council president—have been replaced to allow new members to enter the council: they have been chosen by consensus and approved by the local shūrā council.
42The shūrā council of Maʿarra, appointed in October 2016 as the chief vehicle for the traditional notables of the city,35 has often been described as the “real authority” behind the city council—together with the armed factions. It comprises small businessmen, neighbourhood representatives (makhaṭīr), newly emerged war profiteers, leaders of armed groups, and highly qualified individuals such as doctors and engineers—most of whom are wujahāʾ belonging to prominent Maʿarra families. The personal connection between Bilal Zakra, the Maʿarra Council President, and the head of the shūrā council explains why he was the only figure to keep his position from 2017 until early 2020, when regime forces recaptured the town. 36
43Local resistance to the attempted seizure by the HTS of Maʿarra, as well as of Kafr Ruma and al-Atārib, in the north-west of Syria, speaks well of the close alliance between both the shūrā and the local councils with moderate local brigades, who are typically drawn from the same extended families.37 Here, kinship ties and privilege networks override “class identity and solidarity” (Bareesh 2020). Similarly, the relative autonomy of the al-Atarib local council from the SG and popular opposition to the HTS stems from the legitimacy of the council head (Muafak ʿUbayd, from a prominent local family) as well as their realisation that the presence of the HTS justified, rather than deterred, regime attacks.38
44The dynamic was the same across liberated Syria: representatives of large and influential families tended to be the majority bloc in Aleppo’s neighbourhood councils while a minority were chosen for their experience or revolutionary credentials (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2014). The system of family apportionment was more visible in smaller towns, such as in the shūrā council of Kafr Ruma, which was monopolised by six main clans.39 In bigger cities such as Ḥamā, powerful extended families are often split between pro-regime and pro-opposition factions, and different armed brigades draw their membership from the same families.40
45The case of Ḥamā is a textbook example of the traditional role of notables in the neopatrimonial Syrian system. Historically, a dozen large, mercantile families —such as the Barazi and Bashuri, which included both religious figures and educated professionals—were the key trusted local contact points for the regime. Yet the fact that the Ḥamā city council has been dismissed by presidential decree three times—in 2010, 2015 and 2017—on the usual charges of “corruption”, reveals the lack of autonomy of local institutions vis-a-vis the regime.41 The difficult relationship between “traditional” local holders of social capital and the central authorities has been further exacerbated by the development of localised war economies which have changed the local power system.
46While the city of Ḥamā remained under regime control, the patronage relationship between the central authorities and its own local intermediaries did not really change. The involvement of prominent families with charities and their provision of important services has made of them an even more crucial element of community support in wartime (Khaddour 2017, Hallaj 2017). Yet the local power system is changing in parallel with the transformation of Ḥamā into a crossroads of licit and illicit trade routes, due to its central location and its proximity to the rebel Idlib region. In the unfolding war economy, a significant number of “traders of the crisis”—i.e., war profiteers who exploit the opportunities for enrichment arising from the conflict and the sanctions—have become the latest players of significance.
47The predictable regime response to changes in the landscape of local power has been to expand its pool of intermediaries. In Ḥamā, the 2011 “elections” saw shabbiḥa and warlords running as independent candidates, while the August 2018 elections marked the formal entry of war profiteers into local institutions (Youssef, Turkmani & Gharibah 2019, Favier & Kostrz 2019). The Council President himself, ʿAdnan Yahya al-Tiyar, allegedly represented this emerging “elite” of gas smugglers and middlemen.42 Thus, the group which controls the local Ḥamā Council is an uneasy mix of new—or would-be—elites connected to loyalist militias and Damascus-based circles of power, and old elites, such as the Barazi family, themselves involved in profitable activities connected with the tremendous urban expansion of the city.43 In this context, either the role of the council is reduced to giving a façade of legality to illicit activities serving private interests while acting as an interface with the local community—or it is blatantly bypassed altogether.44
48The siege economy of eastern Ghūṭa, on the outskirts of Damascus, well illustrates this central aspect of the Syrian war economy: The fortunes of the new war entrepreneurs and middlemen depend on their relationship with the regime. From the end of 2013 until the spring of 2018, when the area was retaken by the rulers from Damascus, the siege of the Ghūṭa placed the survival of its population in the hands of networks driven by local traders who smuggled goods though crossings and tunnels. Business elites, combatants, and civilians—all depended on the war economy. The “Manfoush phenomenon”, i.e., the rise of a dairy trader from the town of Misraba into a prominent contractor for imports/smuggling through the Wafidin crossing, is a well-known example. The sudden fortune of Moheddin Manfoush was only made possible by a tacit “engagement with the palace”, i.e., the recommendation of high-ranking Republican Guard officers, who were responsible for managing the crossing, and, allegedly, the protection of the business insider Mohammed Hamsho (Lund 2016, Dassouki 2019). Thus, local traders and businessmen, generals, and commanders in charge of crossings and check points on all sides of the conflict benefited from a process which brought inflated prices, illegal levies on goods in transit, bribery and extortion, protection rackets, and the illicit exploitation of natural resources (Dassouki 2019).
49Eventually, these illicit networks which connected the central and the local levels also blurred the divide between formal and informal, private and institutional (Heydemann 2018). The Damascus authorities, who made local war traders economically reliant upon them and calibrated their own connections with these business networks, might eventually sanction the entry of a selected few into the local power elite—as has occurred in the local Ḥamā Council.
50The relative ease with which localised yet well-connected illegal economic networks have formed in wartime Syria comes as no surprise.45 Well before 2011, smuggling and other illegal practices were ubiquitous in Syria, where the shadow economy accounted for anything between 30 and 40% of the Syrian economy.46 The point to make here is the continuity of governance practices: in both past and present, activities carried out in order to acquire wealth and influence required direct engagement with agents of the regime.
51The political economy of food provides further examples of the persistence of pre-2011 authoritarian practices. In both regime and rebel-held areas such practices continue to influence the local economy, and because of this, the trajectory of the conflict. That wheat—the staple of the Syrian diet being wheat bread—has been an essential element in politics is hardly new, especially in a wartime environment.47 Control of food supply lines and production inputs, such as energy, fertilisers and seeds, have long been key elements of the domestic power strategies followed by the Syrian regime. Since 2011, the provision of subsidised bread—long perceived as a State obligation—has played into each warring party’s claim to sovereignty and legitimacy while they targeted the food security of their adversaries (Eng & Martinez 2014).
52The scaling down of government wheat-collection centres was a direct consequence of the loss of central control of much of the rural northern and eastern areas. Yet bread provision remained an explicit “red line” for the Syrian regime.48 Thus bakeries, which had been military targets everywhere in opposition-held areas since 2012, were subsequently rebuilt by the central authorities in the areas it recaptured, and “bread traffickers” were now criminalised.49 Moreover, Damascus competes with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control the north-eastern breadbasket region of al-Ḥasaka, to grab that province’s harvest after crop fields were ravaged by fires deliberately set in what has been called a “scorched earth” policy.50 All opposition groups, including the Islamic State (IS) and the rebel “governments” in the north-west of the country (the SIG and the SG) have sought to gain civilian support by mimicking the regime’s welfare programs, and come under sharp criticism if they do not do so.51 Similarly the Kurdish autonomous administration—which otherwise relied heavily on the Syrian government to provide an array of public services in areas it ostensibly controlled—set up its own bread distribution apparatus (Eng & Martinez 2014, Abu Zeid & Eng 2015).
53Thus, it is clear that pre-conflict practices and expectations have shaped the behaviour of both the government and rebel groups struggling to provide welfare and thus to perform as a State (Eng & Martinez 2014). As discussed before, bottlenecks and shortages resulting from a highly centralised control of production inputs (such as energy, fertilisers and seeds) and food supply lines have long been key elements of the clientelist power strategies followed by the Assad regime. Unsurprisingly, since the outbreak of strife in 2011, war-induced shortages of such inputs, food scarcity, and barriers to supply chains created by the nature of the fighting, have multiplied profiteering opportunities. The shortage of subsidised bread led to the development of a thriving black market: Local intermediaries associated with the regime—among them Manfoush, who began to provide bread to the Eastern Ghūṭa in 2014, when the government tightened its siege—have profiteered through their access to cheap, subsidised wheat for re-sale (Lund 2016). Local military personnel have profiteered by their control of transport routes to smuggle food to rebel areas and communities under siege (SCPR 2019). Political and business insiders, such as the Qaterji brothers, have reportedly acted as middlemen trading wheat (and oil) from IS-controlled localities to the regime (Georgy & El Dahan 2017).
54For Syrian farmers, wartime circumstances made it impossible to operate without the patronage of de facto power brokers. This meant that “everything pertaining to the subsidy system (fuel for irrigation systems, fodder for livestock, improved seeds and more) would have to pass through a bottleneck of personal connections, favouritism and bribery” (Daher 2018). District governors (raʾīs minṭaqa) play a pivotal role in this profiteering network at the regional level, as policing the bread market is the responsibility of provincial governments (Ahmad & Leigh 2014).
55The collaboration and collusion between old and new actors—local authorities, both loyalists and insurgent groups, and the intermediaries who profiteer across these political divides—shows that they all have familiarity with existing black-market practices and clientelist networks. They are all able and willing to exploit the full range of local processes and interactions created within the current wartime economy.
56In sum, the local economies of rebel areas and recaptured districts alike are dominated by the pre-war patterns of politics, which were characterised by a matrix of informal connections among central authorities, provincial security officers and private businessmen. Although these actors may have new faces, the authoritarian “old order” has survived to adapt and reproduce itself as a central component of a wartime strategy. This ensures regime survival in wartime and will eventually deepen the institutional fragility, antagonism and social injustice which have always been a hallmark of the heavy-handed domestic grip of the regime (Said 2019).
57In this wartime economic system, the role of local structures is more pronounced today than before. Yet local actors—including notables, businessmen, and opposition structures—often appear hardly able (or even willing) to disentangle themselves from existing authoritarian practices: a degree of continuity with authoritarian practices can also be observed in the attempts of the Syrian expatriate opposition to reconstruct a centralised order out of the constellation of contemporary newly-created and spontaneous local structures.
The Syrian Interim Government reconstruction of local order: institution-building and governance
58The Syrian Interim Government (SIG) was created by the expatriate political opposition as an executive arm whose central task was to supervise administrative structures in liberated areas. Beginning with its formation, the SIG appeared to be locked in fierce internal power struggles, detached from the Syrian revolution on the ground, and unable to attract firm international support and funding. With these weaknesses, the SIG strove to aggregate local grassroots structures into a three-tier local governmental system—local councils, city councils and provincial councils—subordinated to its own ministries and directorates.
59By May 2015, the SIG claimed to have supervised the formation of nine provincial councils out of fourteen Syrian provinces, in spite of the presence of myriad armed and clashing groups in such areas.52 By 2015, about 44% of local councils had become affiliated with the SIG and adopted its legislation on local administration (Omran Centre for Strategic Studies 2015).
60The core concepts guiding the SIG-led restructuring of local administration were decentralisation and the preservation of State institutions.53 Decentralisation was promoted as a fundamental step away from the authoritarian Syrian State. Nevertheless, the hierarchical administrative structure envisaged by the SIG limited the power of local and city councils in advancing proposals to the relevant Ministry and in implementing projects.54 This was evident in the SIG’s Regulatory Frameworks for Local Administration, which showed little understanding of subsidiarity and local empowerment as democratic mechanisms, and aimed instead at promoting “decentralisation” on the basis of a slightly modified version of Law 107.55 Thus, despite a few significant steps towards empowering elected councils—such as decentralised security arrangements, which allowed local councils to play a leading role in the protection of their own population, and the abolition of the position of governor56—the SIG reconstruction of local order ultimately failed to make local government more accountable and closer to the people. As a result, this “decentralisation” strategy of the SIG was in fact merely an administrative deconcentration policy: the integration of local councils into a hierarchical structure under its own control.
61Similarly, with regard to the legal sphere and the judiciary, the SIG sought to adapt the previous regime’s provisos with some amendments.57 The decision to preserve State institutions stemmed from its rejection of any moves which threatened to partition the country—a prospect that Syria’s experience of colonial rule made abhorrent. Moreover, opposition jurists were concerned that a wholesale change in laws and institutions would bring legal chaos. According to former MOLA minister al-Bakri—himself a former public servant—“Syria needed to topple the regime, not the State”. For such bureaucrats, only the security sector—the infamous Mukhābarāt—needed complete reform, while administrative institutions and the Syrian corpus of laws, modelled on French codes, should be preserved.58
62Other policies promoted by the SIG exhibited an indicative similarity to those of the Assad regime: the decision to retain civil servants en masse in order to preserve human capital and, arguably, to build bureaucratic constituencies at the expense of economic rationale;59 the plan to support civil society as a “strategic arm” aligned with the government (Williams 2015, Le Saux 2006); and the lack of concern about accountability mechanisms despite recurrent accusations of corruption (Zaman al-Wasl 2015).
63The viewpoint of the SIG contrasted with the aims of the Syrian revolutionary activists and thinkers such as Omar Aziz, who have continually maintained that State and regime are intertwined to the extent that no structure, public or civil sphere is independent of regime control.60 Therefore, the move to a democratic State would need a clear break with existing practices and institutions which have “only served authoritarian power centers” (Mir 2013). Thus, Omar Aziz thought that the creation of new grassroots institutions would be essential for the success of the new Syria.
64The SIG considered its chronic insolvency to be the major obstacle to its achieving legitimacy, an attitude that one can summarise with the phrase “if a government does not provide services, it is not a government” by Omar Aziz (Shami 2013). Moreover, SIG officials, pointed to the divisive politics of foreign and multi-national donors who operated with high costs at the expense of coordination and efficiency; and a myopic international strategy—or lack of one—which hindered efforts to substitute civil organisation for armed chaos. Yet the credibility and effectiveness of successive SIG governments were themselves impaired by their own failures which included nepotism, peculation, incompetence, overly bureaucratic organisation and a top-down approach—all of which made the SIG ill-equipped for the institution-building exercise required by its mission.61
65Crucially, the legitimacy of the SIG was further diminished by its own debilitating logic. First, the SIG criticised the divisive practices of donors while ignoring the political costs of its own dependence on aid and politically-inspired funding. These policies made SIG governments less responsive to pressures from below which would empower local structures and democratise the decision-making process—both of which are crucial dimensions of government.62 Instead, the SIG praised its own role in providing training and capacity building.63 Second, the exiled opposition—consumed by political manoeuvring which mirrored the rivalries among key Arab States—lacked an autonomous political vision. On the whole, the “technocratic” mission of the SIG discouraged open discussion and diminished its incentive to invest in effective and accountable public institutions.64
66Ultimately, the attempt by the SIG to supervise local bodies deepened the divide between the external opposition and activists on the ground. Because they saw their endeavours reduced to a mere partnership with the SIG in implementing projects, many local councils maintained a wait-and-see attitude towards SIG initiatives.65 For its part, the SIG perceived local councils to be “insubordinate or competing bodies” while recognising them nonetheless as useful sources of much-needed grassroots legitimacy which they accrued as providers of essential services.66
67It will come as no surprise that, even after the SIG moved its offices into Syria, activists and local councils have continued to find it difficult to reconcile themselves to its centralising approach and its questionable “reformist” agenda.
68Jawad Abū Hatab set up the SIG offices in the Idlib governorate as the elected prime minister in May 2016. This was soon to become the last territory in rebel hands after regime and allied forces re-conquered lost territories. Thus, Idlib became a battleground of jihadi forces who were relocated there under so-called “reconciliation” agreements. From July 2017, Hayʾat Taḥrīr al-Shām (HTS)—the latest incarnation of former Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra—has militarily controlled the rebel northwest. It has imposed the authority of its “Salvation Government” (SG) which has openly challenged the SIG and nullified Abū Hatab’s modest successes, e.g., the streamlining of ministries and the replacement of exiled SIG officers with individuals based inside Syria; the formation of a unified military structure under the SIG; and projects in education and health care.
69The shaky legitimacy of the SIG has recently been further diminished by the exclusion of Kurdish members and its vocal support for the Turkish intervention against Kurdish forces as well as their control of “safe zones” in north and north-west Syria. These acts have further undermined its claim to represent a “revolutionary government… working to build national institutions” (Darwish 2016).
Conclusion
70I sought here to present a political economy of authoritarian rule in Syria in order to demonstrate the continuities between the present and the past. I have focused on the many links in government practice between the Syrian revolutionaries and their opponents in Damascus, through examining local government in its myriad permutations. By looking at different and competing actors and how they interact with each other within their own arenas, this chapter provides a clearer picture of Syrian reality on the ground. From father to son, the Assad family has held control over local governance as a key mechanism for regime entrenchment. The timing of the various administrative reforms they launched is telling. Major reforms which brought the restructuring of the architecture of local governance were introduced as a response to political turmoil after the 1970 “correction” of the Baʿathist revolution. More were introduced after episodes of insurrection which challenged the stability of the regime—such as in 1983, after the Muslim Brotherhood-led insurgency in Ḥamā, and in 2004, after the Kurdish revolt.
71However, the most recent administrative reform—the “decentralisation” initiative launched at the onset of the Syrian Spring—has, for a variety of reasons, become the new consensus among all parties in the conflict, including the Syrian government, the opposition, and even external actors such as Russia and the USA.67 For the regime, it is a conveniently flexible smokescreen to maintain, with certain adjustments, the hierarchical system of power based on patrimonial networks that have long guaranteed Syrian stability, i.e., regime security. As for the Syrian opposition, after the rapid eclipse of the initial democratic moment, the next stage of the conflict witnessed opposition structures often reproducing the authoritarian practices that they were founded to repudiate, and the failure of attempts by the SIG to reorganise local structures under its authority. There were a number of reasons for this, including the SIG’s bureaucratic authoritarian perspective, exemplified best by its inability to question the political rationale of former administrative practices. Its rush to adopt a deconcentration rather than decentralisation program—ironically the only real application of Law 107—illustrates this.
72It is especially telling that none of the parties involved has ever discussed the issue of subsidiarity—including decision-making sharing and local financial autonomy—at any length. Even foreign and multi-national actors seem to be content with the mistaken assumption that increased decentralisation would overcome the serious lack of trust between parties in the conflict.68
73Thus, while the wartime strategy of the regime has swung from unlimited and indiscriminate State violence to engagement with various local actors—across different communities of interest, identity and political preferences—local structures on the ground have clung to their grassroots legitimacy, in which the “rule of notables” (even if they are new notables) provides a modicum of order in an otherwise extremely fragmented landscape of power.
74The fragmentation of wartime Syria goes well beyond the geopolitical division of control among the principal belligerents. It involves different actors with various degrees of power—such as governors, businessmen, militias, officials, conciliation committees, tribes, civil society and foreign agents—all of which interact across State, society and market spheres.
75Indeed, the fuzzy nature of the multiplicity of local initiatives in wartime Syria is striking. The variety of local orders which have flourished on the ground —everything from autonomous governance initiatives to illicit economic networks—is a peculiar mix of old and new. As my analysis of local-level administration has shown, this conglomeration of local, central, regional and international interests is not simply a matter of cooperation versus confrontation among discrete entities. Neither it is a mere reflection of immutable pre-existing socio-economic or identity cleavages—with the possible exception of the Kurdish administration—nor it is the result of the destruction wrought by war.
76Pre-2011 Syria was already a hybrid order with ambiguous distinctions between legal and illegal, formal and informal, public and private. The cultivation of social cleavages, cronyism, patrimonialism, and a culture of impunity were coeval with the formation of the Assad regime. A four-decades old experience of Syrian authoritarianism is the starting point for comprehending the processes at work among diverse structures of authority, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power which co-exist, overlap, interact and intertwine in wartime Syria. This authoritarian context—the repertoire of governmental mechanisms of social control and co-option which have developed together with the entrenchment of the Assad regime—has framed and influenced in significant ways the priorities and strategies of autonomous governance structures, and, ultimately, their ability to devise effective institutions and qualitative change. The centralising logic of the SIG, the role played by influential intermediaries turned administrators in the new local structures, along with the persistence of corrupt and predatory practices within the framework of a rampant war economy, all these point to the enduring relevance of pre-rebellion authoritarian practices.
77The above analysis helps to explain why autonomous forms of local governance in rebel-held areas have not evolved into a successful state-building process. There are currently no fully independent local councils in Syria as they are all operating in areas subject to de facto authorities—the regime, HTS, and the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as Turkey, the Russian military and pro-Iranian militias. Yet, with all their limitations, local councils remain the building blocks of local order, and retain a grassroots legitimacy that—with no better model— will be difficult to supersede.
78For a local government to have a transformative role in its community, we need to consider a few lessons learned during this decade of war. On the one hand, the centralising governance strategies followed by both the regime and the SIG have failed. On the other hand, “local” does not necessarily mean inclusive or democratic, and the resilience of such elites does not necessarily mean social cohesion.69 By mirroring the practices of the regime, Syria’s mainstream opposition has so far failed to articulate an inclusive alternative vision for the polity it sought to create.
79Hybridity is not necessarily a marker of dysfunction in a political order, but authoritarianism is. Short of a political agreement on decision-making and power sharing—which is unthinkable for the regime—decentralisation is meaningless: If the regime succeeds in re-establishing authority over intermediaries within opposition-held localities, decentralisation will simply add another layer of unaccountable authorities while empowering a new cadre of regime-affiliated, kleptocratic elites.70 A meaningful peace, however, will almost certainly require new arrangements negotiated between central government and the local administrative units—each of which has its own specific history and strong ties to its constituent members. Such compacts will be necessary to lay the foundation for a democratic Syria in these globally challenging times.
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Syria Direct, “Activist: Civilians ‘Prefer’ Nusra to US-backed SRF ‘Stealing, Looting’,” 6 November, <https://syriadirect.org/activist-civilians-prefer-nusra-to-us-backed-srf-stealing-looting/>.
Syrian Arab Republic Prime Ministry website 2015
Syrian Arab Republic Prime Ministry website, “Decree 19 of 2015 (in Arabic),” last modified on 30 April 2015, <https://bit.ly/2LqoW0b>.
Taqi 2013
Taqi Omar, “The Fate of the Syrian Crisis,” Orient Research Centre.
Urban Syria 2019
Urban Syria, “Dar’a City profile,” <https://urban-syria.org/#city-profiles>, consulted in December 2021.
Williams 2015
Williams Lauren, “An Interim Government in Waiting,” Middle East Eye, 13 February, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/features/syria-interim-government-waiting>.
Youssef, Turkmani & Gharibah 2019
Youssef Myriam, Turkmani Rim and Gharibah Mazen, “Progress in the Wrong Direction: The 2018 Local Council Elections in Syria,”, Conflict Research Program, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, <https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/progress-in-the-wrong-direction-the-2018-local-council-elections-in-syria>.
Zaazaa 2017
Zaazaa Ahmad, “From Brothers to Enemies: How Syria’s War Has Divided Families,” Syria Deeply, 11 January, <https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/syria/articles/2017/01/11/from-brothers-to-enemies-how-syrias-war-has-divided-families>.
Zaidan 2020
Zaidan Taim, “Sweida: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society,” Conflict Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science, <https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/sweida-conflict-dynamics-and-the-role-of-civil-society>.
Zaman al-Wasl 2015
Zaman al-Wasl, “Interim Govt. Faces Bankruptcy Amid Mass Corruption,” Zaman al-Wasl, 6 February.
Notes de bas de page
1Non-State agencies, local and international, which contributed to the working of local structures (by providing training, goods, funding, strategy, experts, management, M&E etc.).
2This paper draws on my personal experience of Syrian politics under Hafez al-Assad’s rule and thereafter. My work began studying in Damascus in the late 1980s, continuing into the 1990s as a doctoral candidate and the 2010s as a postdoctoral researcher and research fellow at European institutions. During this time, I was able to carry out research in Syria in 1998 and again in 2010. I have also carried out research among Syrians living outside the country in Beirut in 2012, Gaziantep (Turkey) in 2014–2015, and again in Beirut in 2019. I have also participated in European workshops with Syrian activists, intellectuals and NGOs while doing research on various aspects of the Syrian conflict between 2016 and 2018. The material specific to this chapter is drawn from interviews held during 2019 by local researchers/informants who were based in various Syrian locations and had access to council officers, and also to professionals, community figures, local activists and NGOs. For their safety, these sources cannot be identified here.
3On grassroots democracy, see for example Stein & Beek 2020, and the literature on Omar Aziz (see footnote 60).
4A political economy approach sheds light on the political origins and implications of economic policies and internal dynamics of transformation, which involve the interplay of internal forces. It reflects the basic notion that the economic, the social and the political are mutually interdependent. The literature on post-conflict and peacebuilding practices associated to civil wars includes a number of strands—transformative approaches, stabilisation practices and political settlements, economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and transitional justice. Most of these works assume that the conflict itself created a novel, wholly pristine space for new, effective and sustainable institutions, norms and practices to be created. An example of this “ground zero” approach is the project of the National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS), built on “a vision of a comprehensive transition towards an inclusive, democratic Syria” (NAFS website), regardless of the fact that any incoming or transitional government will also have to confront the profound legacy of a 40-year dictatorship (Heydemann 2018).
5In October 2017, the SDF announced the capture of Raqqa from the IS. The last area under ISIS control—the village of Baghuz along Syria’s south-eastern border—was cleared by SDF-led forces in March 2019.
6Already in 2013, a lack of resources and the fragmentation of territorial control were singled out as the main obstacles to the establishment of coherent and autonomous local institutions (Dorronsoro et al. 2013). Pressure by military groups, Islamist and foreign forces further eroded the independence of local councils (Favier 2016).
7Author interview with a Syrian expert, Beirut, September 2019.
8There were traditionally six organisations: The Revolutionary Youths Union, Syria’s Students Union, the Women’s Organisation, the Peasant Federation, the General Federation of Trade Unions and the People’s Army (Hinnebusch 1995).
9According to the Local Administration Law (1971), candidates from intellectual professions (professors, liberal professions, civil servants) must not represent more than 40% of elected officials (Balanche 2008).
10Author interviews with Syrian expert and Maʿarra informants, Beirut, 2019.
11Author interview with a Syrian expert, Leiden, 2018.
12On competition for municipality position in rural Idlib, see Saidawi 2019.
13For example, controlling where to direct investments. Author interview with a Syrian expert, Beirut, 2019.
14Reforms mainly concerned financial and educational institutions (Gambill 2004).
15On 12 March 2004, a football match in Qāmishlī between a local Kurdish team and an Arab team from Dayr al-Zūr sparked violent clashes.
16Under Bashar al-Assad, three out of five prime ministers were former governors: Mustafa Miro, Naji al-Utri and Riyad Hijab. See also Perthes 2004.
17Neopatrimonialism refers to a form of ruling in which two Weberian types of domination —patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic—coexist. See Erdmann & Engel 2006.
18Author interview with Syrian expert, June 2018 and September 2019. The principle of subsidiarity seems not to play a role in Syria’s governance structure, see European Committee of the Regions 2011.
19European Committee of the Regions 2011.
20Urban Syria 2019, and author interviews, Beirut, 2019.
21These appointed managers have a security mandate to oversee public security and to establish public order. Gharibah 2018.
22Only the Supreme Judicial Council, acting by presidential decree, has the authority to prosecute a Governor. Gharibah 2018.
23For example, the MOLA will recommend urban areas for expropriation and redevelopment under Law 10.
24Author interview with a Syrian expert, June 2018.
25Ibid.
26Shami and Yassin-Kassab 2016. With the militarisation and sectarianisation of the conflict on the one side, and the formation of opposition structures based in exile and weakened by internal conflicts on the other, the LCC and revolutionary grassroots forces committed to peaceful revolutionary action were side-lined. See among others Khouri 2013 and Taqi 2013.
27For examples of council formation mechanisms, see LDSPS 2020.
28Interviews with Rafid informants, Beirut, 2019.
29Between 2011 and 2018, Darʿa al-Balad was under opposition control.
30Interviews with al-Rafid informants and council figures, Beirut, 2019.
31Author interview, see also Musarea 2019. Bashar al-Assad visited Raqqa in June 2011 and held meetings with sheikhs and tribal figures in the area.
32In Darʿa, tribal diwans settle intra- and inter-tribal disputes. On Suwaydāʾ, see Zaidan 2020.
33Interviews with Maʿarra activists, Beirut, 2019. On the al-Jundi family, see Schatkowski-Schicher 1985, pp. 168–169. On the Hiraki family, see Schatkowski-Schilcher 1985, p. 136.
34HTS occupied southern Idlib in early 2019 and imposed its own administration (the SG) which took control of the main sources of council revenue (court, civil and land registry and awqāf). The local council continued to operate with a degree of independence in its day-to-day affairs, but it was unable to implement decisions autonomously. Interviews with Maʿarra informants, Beirut, 2019.
35It includes key elite families such as the Nahhas, Khalluf, Sayyid, and Kassar, according to the influence of each family. Against the backdrop of the struggle between HTS and the National Liberation Front (NLF) the council’s one-year mandate was extended in late 2017.
36Interviews with Maʿarra informants, Beirut, 2019.
37For example, in September 2019 demonstrations flared in Sarāqib, Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, Atārib, and Sarmadā. Local brigades operated under the umbrella of the National Liberation Front (NLF).
38Interviews with Maʿarra informants, and Bareesh 2020.
39Six members from the Hajj Musa family (including the family sub-branches); four each from the Bahlaq and al-Aqdeh families, three each from the al-Ziadeh and al-Tah families, and one member from the Bayour family. Author interviews, Beirut, 2019.
40Interviews with Ḥamā informants, Beirut, 2019. On shattered families, see also Zaazaa 2017.
41Interviews with Ḥamā informant, Beirut, 2019.
42Interviews with Ḥamā informant, Beirut, 2019.
43The Barazi Company for Real Estate Development (recently licensed as a reconstruction company) has building projects in Wādī al-Jawz, similar to the Basātīn Rāzī project in Damascus.
44Author interview with a Syrian expert, Beirut, 2019.
45Author interview with a Syrian expert, Beirut, 2019.
46Estimates in the 10th five-year plan show that the sector would contribute about 30% to employment and about 30–40% to GDP (ILO 2010).
47Both during the famine of World War One, and then as the Allies controlled the entire Middle East during World War Two, wheat was the political commodity par excellence. See Schatkowski-Schilcher 1992.
48Syrian Prime Minister Wael Halqi quoted in “Loaf of Bread is a Red Line”, Damas Post, 3 January 2014.
49Mauvais 2020. In an attempt to attribute the crisis to individual criminals, rather than regime strategies or policy failures, Minister of Local Trade Talal Barazi announced a series of harsh penalties targeting “bread traffickers”. See COAR 2020.
50“In Syria’s breadbasket, Kurds and regime battle for wheat”, Arab News, 11 June 2019. Roughly 70% of the total wheat production comes from northeast Syria (COAR 2020). In their weekly al-Nabaa, the IS claimed responsibility for burning crops in Kurdish-administered eastern Syria. Residents of rural areas in Dayr al-Zūr, Ḥasaka, Raqqa, Aleppo and Idlib accused the Syrian regime. SOHR 2020.
51FSA affiliated groups were accused of capturing wheat silos and selling grains on black markets rather than distributing it among the citizenry. Syria Direct 2014 ; Martinez & Eng 2017.
52The SIG-linked provincial councils were Aleppo, Ḥamā, Ḥoms, al-Lādhiqiyya, Damascus, Damascus Countryside, Darʿa, Quneitra, Idlib. Author interview with Majd Dalala, MOLA, Gaziantep, 2 May 2015.
53Author interview with Hussein al-Bakri, MOLA minister, Gaziantep, 27 April 2015.
54al-Bakri interview, MOLA minister, Gaziantep, 27 April 2015. Provincial council’s decision about local projects do not need approval from MOLA.
55The text still reports a reference to the Five-Year-Plan of the Assad regime. See also Gharibah 2018.
56Abolishing the position of Governor and delegating all his powers and responsibilities to the elected head of the provincial council (except Governor’s security mandate which was delegated to the Prime Minister of SIG). Gharibah 2018.
57al-Bakri interview, MOLA minister, Gaziantep, 27 April 2015 and author interview with Hazem Loutfi, deputy minister, MOLA, 4 May 2015.
58al-Bakri interview MOLA minister, Gaziantep, 27 April 2015.
59The SIG paid the salary of some 4,000 employees, of which about a thousand were civil defense members, and tried to build the capacity and competence of “those who are in charge on the ground” (mostly civil servants dismissed by the Syrian government on claims of “corruption” or “support for terrorism”). Interview with Majd Dalala, MOLA, Gaziantep, 2 May 2015.
60The Syrian activist Omar Aziz authored what is considered the Syrian revolution manifesto, in which he called for a social and political revolution at the local as well as national level. In his view, the local council was a forum for the autonomous development of community solidarity, cooperation and revolutionary struggle. Aziz was arrested in November 2012 and died in custody in February 2013 (Shami 2013).
61Author interview with former SIG minister for energy, Paris, 16 June 2017. See also Zaman al-Wasl 2015.
62Being in exile, the SIG was unable to collect taxes and enforce any of its legislative decrees without the cooperation of local councils. See Hajjar et al. 2017.
63SIG officials stressed the role of the SIG in providing training and “capacity building” to local council members. Author interviews, Gaziantep, 2015.
64Often SIG officials decline to answer questions that they consider “political”.
65Author interview with Sultan Bakar (Aleppo Provincial Council), Gaziantep, 25 April 2015.
66Author interview with a Syrian expert, Leiden, 2018.
67The Russian proposal for a Syrian constitution, presented at the ceasefire Astana talks, contained provisions outlining precisely the type of decentralised system enshrined in Decree 107.
68Kodmani 2019.
69But see Midmar 2019.
70Khaddour 2017.
Auteur
-
Aurora Sottimano
Centre for Syrian Studies at St Andrews University
aurora.sottimano@gmail.com
Dr. Aurora Sottimano is a political scientist who specialises in the politics and regional relations of the Middle East, with a focus on Syria. Her research focuses on authoritarian governance, political and economic reform, civil society and mobilisation, and the politics of migration. She is a lecturer at the University of International Studies in Rome (UNINT, Italy), non-resident senior fellow of the Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St Andrews (UK), and visiting researcher in the Centre for International Studies, Lisbon University Institute (CEI, ISCTE-IUL Portugal). Her publications include “The Syrian Interim Government” in R. Hinnebusch and J. Gani (eds.), Actors and Dynamics in the Syrian Conflict’s Middle Phase (Routledge, 2022), and “Syria in the resistance axis: persistence through reconfiguration?” in L. Matar and A. Kadri (eds.), Syria: From National Independence to Proxy War (Palgrave, 2018).
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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