2. French India in a Flux
p. 35-44
Texte intégral
1Since October 1946, the French Government had been following a policy of introducing administrative reforms in French Indian administration. This was done obviously with a view to placating Franco-Indian public opinion which was gradually becoming hostile to the centralized administration of French India. French India, as one politician observes, was still being governed by the ordinances of 1840. It had actually earned the sobriquet of a regime of décrets and ordinances. These ordinances had long lost their relevance and become obsolete. The Governor of French Indian settlements was the repository of all power and the Conseil Général (General Council) was no more than a consultative body. Administratively French India was divided into five dependencies or settlements.1 To these dependencies or settlements were affiliated several neighbouring “loges”. The administrative system that was in vogue in French India before 1946 was like this. The Governor of French India was entrusted with the total administrative authority of the settlements. He was assisted by a Conseil Privé, a Conseil du Contentieux (Administrative Council) and various other departments such as law, finances, education etc. A detachment of police force was placed under his command. Each settlement or dependency was headed by an Administrator who was directly responsible to the Pondicherry Governor. Among the deliberative assemblies there were the Conseil Général consisting of 28 members, a conseil local (Conseil d’arrondissement, Local Council) in each settlement and a Conseil Municipal (Municipal Council) of 17 communes. French India elected a depute (deputy) to the French National Assembly and a Senator to represent the Franco-Indian population in metropolitan France as per regulation in force in France. Theoretically, French people and French Indian people enjoyed equal rights and privileges.
2Since the termination of the war and the creation of French Union, France tried to follow a more liberal policy towards her colonies keeping in mind the changing political scenario of Asia and Africa and this is reflected in the number of décrets passed between October 1946 and August 1947 so far as French Indian settlements were concerned. The principal aims of the political and administrative reforms were to emphasize its progressive character by way of giving greater autonomy to the settlements and facilitating the effective participation of the French Indian inhabitants in the management of their own affairs. The notable beginning was made on 25 October 1946. A décret was passed which created Assemblée Représentative for the French Indian settlements and suppressed the 30 member Conseil Général. The newly elected Representative Assembly consisted of 44 members –22 from the 8 constituencies of Pondicherry, 12 from the 6 constituencies of Karaikal, 5 from Chandernagore, 3 from Mahe and 2 from Yanam. This Assembly met twice a year in ordinary sessions and twice in extraordinary sessions. It was called either by the Governor or by two-thirds of the members, if necessary. It elected a Commission Permanente (Standing Committee) of 3 to 5 members. The Assemblée Représentative could deliberate and give its opinion on matters referred to it. The Governor or head of the French Indian administration assured the implementation of the decisions or opinions of the Assembly. The budget prepared by the Governor was discussed and it was implemented by his order. In fact the Assembly and the Governor shared the initiative of incurring state expenditure. It was nothing more than an approving body as the head of French India was endowed with the power of overriding the decision or opinion of the Assembly. The Assemblée Représentative could not take up or discuss matters which were not submitted before it, and from that point of view its scope was very restrictive.
3New administrative changes were introduced by the décret of 12 April 1947 which substituted the Conseil privé du Gouverneur for a Conseil du gouvernement consisting of 7 members of whom 5 were officials and 2 were chosen from the Assemblée Représentative. Actually the President of the Assemblée Représentative and the President of the Commission Permanente de l’Assemblée Représentative were made members of the Conseil du Gouvernement in order to ensure a close co-ordination between the Conseil du Gouvernement and the Assemblée Représentative on the one hand and the affairs of Public Administration on the other. The décret of 12 August 1947, while abrogating the above arrangement, invested the Conseil du Gouvernement with enlarged powers. The Conseil du Gouvernement became the most powerful administrative organ in French India. Along with the general reforms, the French Government had also undertaken the administrative reorganization of the Villes (settlements). The décret of 30 June 1947 which created the autonomous unit of Chandernagore under the direction of the Administrator was promulgated by the arrêté of 26 July 1947. This décret was later set aside.
4In the changing context, the various administrative measures adopted from time to time for revamping the administrative structure of the French Indian settlements failed to satisfy the people. The Paris authorities failed to realize that schemes of administrative reforms were no substitute for freedom from foreign yoke, and this became evident when the extraordinary session of the Representative Assembly which met at Pondicherry, on 11 January 1947, demanded the conversion of the Representative Assembly into a sovereign assembly and unanimously adopted a resolution to that effect. Balasubramanian,2 President of the Representative Assembly, forwarded the resolution to the Minister for Overseas Empire, who in return wrote3 to Baron that the status of the Representative Assembly of the French Indian settlements created by the Parliamentary décret of 25 October 1946 could not be changed by a resolution adopted on political considerations. Moreover, the organic changes which had been made only a few months back and whose efficacy was yet to be tested could not be reversed. Le Monde4 reported that “the new concessions” which had increased the number of elected members to the Assembly of French India was unacceptable to the French Indian people and consequently failed to satisfy the aspirations of the people. It has already been mentioned that the French Foreign Minister had suggested to the French Overseas Minister, as early as March 1947, in wake of the agitation in Chandernagore, whether grant of large measure of municipal autonomy to Chandernagore would have any salutary effect in the matter of pacifying the people. This proposition was taken up. It was not a part of the general administrative reform for French India. It was taken separately for Chandernagore as a special case and later it was extended to the remaining four settlements.
5Meanwhile, the Paris authorities, realizing the grave situation in French India, decided to send there Tézenas du Montcel for an on the spot study of the situation. Tézenas toured all the French pockets in India and met a cross section of the people to ascertain their sentiments. Marius Moutet also visited the French pockets and he was preceded by Roux, Chargé d’Affaires de France in New Delhi. The political change that was in the offing in India and the consequent restlessness in the French settlements caused their headache and prompted them to undertake such visits.
6Tézenas was asked to examine the general situation in French India, to suggest measures for safeguarding French interests in India and to assess the possible impact of the creation of a cultural centre in French India. He was also entrusted with the task of examining certain subsidiary questions such as the possible consequences of the cancellation of the customs agreement (concluded on 28 May 1941) by the Government of India, of reviewing the administrative reorganization of French India and of studying as to what type of administrative reforms would be in conformity with their needs5 etc. Tézenas visited the French settlements to gather correct information about the situation prevailing there. The Chandernagore members of the Representative Assembly met Tézenas at Pondicherry and submitted to him a lengthy memorandum on 12 April 1947 detailing therein their long-standing grievances and demanding financial and administrative autonomy for Chandernagore as a prelude to complete independence. This memorandum explained6 the circumstances prompting them to demand this type of financial and administrative autonomy for Chandernagore. At the very outset the memorandum made it clear that mere administrative reforms would not satisfy the people of Chandernagore. The Fourth Republic had solemnly declared, the memorialists pointed out, the principles of liberty and equality for all people of her colonies. But they were surprised that France was acting to the contrary so far as French India was concerned and exploitation was going on much to the dislike of all. The fiscal and administrative autonomy as demanded by them, they remarked, was by no means a new demand. The former members of the Conseil Général had demanded this as far back as 1910. Chandernagore’s contribution to the central budget had always been large, but, they observed, her legitimate interests had been neglected or side-tracked by the Conseil Général in the past. Chandernagore had, in fact, been looked upon as a milch cow of the remaining French settlements. As far back as 1910 the deficit of Pondicherry, Mahe, Karaikal and Yanam were met from the surplus receipts of Chandernagore which amounted to Rs. 70,261 while Pondicherry had a deficit of Rs. 3,774, Karaikal Rs. 32,198, Mahe Rs. 21,189 and Yanam Rs. 13,103. Year after year, Chandernagore had to suffer for her sister settlements while she was “dying of hunger and deprived of her urgent necessities”.7 Millions of rupees were draining out of Chandernagore for supplementing the central budget and the memorialists argued that if the amount had been retained in its budget very important public works could have been done. This appeared to them “a terrible injustice”. To remedy this “terrible injustice”, Chandernagore had been ceaselessly protesting to the Minister of Overseas Empire, to the National Assembly, to a number of dignitaries and high functionaries of Metropolitan France. But the exploitation went on unabated. Her demands for funds for opening a maternity ward, dispensaries, schools, industry, sewerage etc. fell on deaf ears. The result was that the people of Chandernagore had become alienated. They had lost their faith in the administration and a general dissatisfaction had taken deep roots in the minds of the Chandernagoreians. The memorandum ended by pointing out that Bazin had not only recognized the justness of their grievances but also endorsed the legitimacy and urgent redressal of their demands.
7Bazin had, in fact, submitted a project for financial and administrative autonomy for Chandernagore on 28 May 1947 to the Governor of French Indian settlements.8 Bazin explained the circumstances necessitating the grant of such financial and administrative autonomy to Chandernagore and he justified this by referring to the distance which separated Chandernagore from Pondicherry resulting in the delay of the execution of works, geopolitical reasons of Chandernagore and the failure of the Representative Assembly of Pondicherry, dominated by Tamil members, to protect the financial interests of Chandernagore. The five Chandernagore members to the Representative Assembly also submitted to the Inspector of Colonies a “Project of Constitution” and a letter similar to that of 12 April 1947 to the Director of Political Affairs.9 Later in May when the Inspector of Colonies came to Chandernagore a memorandum10 was presented to him by Kamal Ghosh, Mayor of Chandernagore municipality. Incidentally it should be pointed out here that the municipality of Chandernagore, dominated by the National Democratic Front members, held radical views and differed in many respects from the views of those of the 5 members of Conseil Général referred to above. The memorandum submitted by them rejected the French autonomy plan proposed to be given to Chandernagore and demanded instead complete independence from French tutelage. The memorandum was signed by 46 prominent persons of Chandernagore.
8Situation all over India including French India was rapidly changing every day. In the meantime Vincent Auriol, President of the Fourth Republic, had made a declaration more or less similar to that of Great Britain. Great Britain’s declaration of withdrawal from India before June 1948 had already created a sense of jubilation among the people fighting to liberate themselves from the control of Great Britain. The imminence of independence in British India had its effects on the French Indian people too. So long they had been enjoying certain rights which the French democracy had given them. The prospect of India getting its independence stepped up their hopes and aspirations. They refused to lag behind and demanded complete independence for French India. This was demanded in unequivocal term by the people of Chandernagore who had been holding progressive political views from the rest of the French Indian settlements. The memorandum referred to above categorically pointed out that even if other communes of French India decided otherwise, Chandernagore would stick to its demand of complete independence and strongly demanded complete financial and political autonomy from 14 July 1947. The people of Chandernagore reserved to themselves the right of plebiscite within June 1948 by which date they would decide whether or not they would remain within the French Union. The memorandum further demanded that during the intervening period the Representative Assembly of French India be converted into a Sovereign Assembly for French India which would have the necessary power of co-ordinating the administrative activities in conformity with local autonomy. The autonomy which Chandernagore would be enjoying from 14 July 1947, the memorandum maintained, would be exercised by the Representative Assembly elected by all the people of Chandernagore and presided over by a local administrator without having any special privilege of a veto or right.
9Roux also undertook a tour of south India and visited Pondicherry and Karaikal. At Pondicherry he had a long talk with Baron, met the leading French officials as well as French Indian personalities and exchanged views with them. The impression which he had gathered from his talks with them were incorporated into a despatch sent to Bidault.11 In his opinion French India needed special attention of the French Government. According to him, time had come to introduce far-reaching reforms for changing the status of the five French settlements failing which French position in India would become vulnerable and even they might be detached from the French Union. He frankly reported that the maintenance of French prestige and influence in India had reached a dangerous point. He thought partly international situation (French policy in Madagascar, Africa and Indo-China) and partly indifference of the French authorities over the years towards the French Indian pockets were responsible for the situation. France had so long followed an erroneous policy towards her colonies in India, he added. Roux wrote that not only he, but any impartial person would be struck with astonishment on seeing the pathetic condition of Pondicherry, Karaikal and Chandernagore which had been under French occupation for nearly 200 years. Pondicherry, he stated, did not even have a port in the real sense of the term and Karaikal almost did not have any. French rule had given them “badly managed roads, insufficient number of schools, lack of electrification in the villages.” To him the general picture was gloomy and the work done was less edifying than what the French had done in quarter of a century in the Levant which was under French mandate. He observed that there was a feeling among good many number of French Indians that the metropolis had no interest towards French India other than its two seats in the Parliament. He believed that the regeneration in the life of Pondicherry would not be possible unless the authorities abandoned its hesitant and uncertain attitude which had a demoralizing effect on the leaders and the people of French India. The French officials of Pondicherry and Karaikal thought, Roux pointed out, that the absence of any definite metropolitan policy had placed them in an embarrassing position. The metropolitan authorities, in his opinion, were quite ignorant about the profound changes that were taking place all over India and hence were not in a position to prescribe the remedy needed. Roux remarked that the moods and minds of the French Indian people had also changed. The external pressures exerted on the settlements by the nationalist forces which had shaken the sub-continent and the freedom movement which was sweeping across India had their repercussions on the French Indian people. The French Indian people did not hide their nationalist sentiments. They sincerely believed that they belonged to “Mother India” and “the fever of liberty” which had inspired their brethren in British India would also have similar effect on them. Sooner or later their future would be linked with India.
10Roux was more practical and objective in his assessment of the situation in French Indian enclaves. Baron believed that the restlessness among the French Indian population was not a genuine proof of their identity with the nationalist trend in British India and they were under a tremendous pressure of the Indian nationalist forces and for fear of being branded as agents of imperialism they had to yield. Baron believed that at the time of making final choice, the people of Pondicherry, Karaikal and Yanam would prefer to remain in the French Union because of the manifold advantages being enjoyed by them.12 In his opinion the French Indian people feared that they would lose their separate identity in the mass of 400 million Indian population once they joined the Indian Union.
11However, sensing the mood of the people Roux stressed the need of urgent reforms even to the extent of granting local autonomy which would change the political status of the French Indian settlements. He suggested to start the process without any delay. Here he agreed with Baron not to waste a single minute. Like Baron Roux believed that the key to the problem rested with New Delhi. It was primarily a diplomatic problem and he was willing to surrender a little of material sovereignty in order to get back a vast intellectual sovereignty.13 He was of the view that if worked with sincerity a solution acceptable to the French Union, French India and Indian authorities could be found in less than a year.
12Situation in Mahe and Chandernagore was changing fast. Immediately after Great Britain’s declaration, Mahe and Chandernagore demanded autonomy and the right of joining the Indian Union. At time the people of these two places became violent. The people of Mahe had already harassed Professor Adicéam, a French Indian and a delegate of Alliance Française, in a meeting and called him “Quisling” and ridiculed the French culture and French imperialism of which Indo-China was a victim.14 When Tézenas visited the place, the Mahajana Party gave him a memorandum pointing out that they would have no truck with France. They demanded independence and wanted to know from him as to when the French would quit Mahe. Jayaprakash Narayan, leader of the Socialist Party of India, visited Mahe and exhorted the people to drive out the French after the withdrawal of Great Britain from India. Chandernagore did not present a rosy picture and its situation was every day going out of control. Territorial proximity between Chandernagore and Calcutta, impact and influence of Bengal politics on Chandernagore and uninterrupted exchange of ideas had transfused a revolutionary spirit among the people since the beginning of the swadeshi days. That trend continued and French position had really become precarious there. Moreover, Chandernagore had never forgotten the stepmotherly attitude of Pondicherry. Roux, however, had depicted a gloomy picture of the French position in India. He was more concerned about the fate of the French officials in case a violent agitation broke out. There were 12 French men in Chandernagore of whom more were women, a few in Mahe and Yanam and none in Karaikal.15 Sharing the feeling of Baron he was in favour of doing something before being thrown into the sea. Roux shared many of the ideas of Baron, but he did not fully agree that Baron’s cultural project in French India would have the desired effect. He thought this to be an inadequate guarantee to engender loyalty among the French Indian people and hence unable to ensure the promotion of friendly understanding with the Government of India. Nevertheless he admitted that the merit of his project had not yet been judged as the process was yet to be started.16 At the same time he cautioned Bidault to the effect that the French Government should be sure whether it would be possible for her to prolong her stay in India before undertaking a financial investment of 500 million francs for constructing a hospital. He, along with Baron, thought it better to approach the Indian Government and ascertain its attitude. Baron was in favour of meeting Nehru in New Delhi with a view to submitting to him the cultural project. This, according to Roux, would enable them to discern whether the project interested him and Indo-French rapprochement on cultural line acceptable to him. He also hoped that the talks might slide from cultural to political level. A meeting with Nehru might have positive or negative repercussions. Roux liked the idea because instead of remaining in uncertainty, such a meeting would provide an opportunity to study the mind of Nehru and help them understand their position in free India. He also observed that while this diplomatic exercise would go on, political and administrative reforms for modifying the status of French Indian settlements must be undertaken before it was too late.17 Baron had on many occasions drawn the attention of the Paris authorities to the hopeless condition of French Indian pockets. He admitted that France was still far away from the demands of the people and lagging behind than what Great Britain had already given to the people in British India. In the neighbouring states the Indians were themselves governing and the British officials executing their orders. From that point of view the Representative Assembly of French India was not associated with the day to day administration of French India. He also advocated for greater diplomatic contacts with New Delhi and for the introduction of administrative reforms leading French India towards self-government. But final organic status of French India would depend, according to him, on the shape the constitution of India would take – whether it would be a centralized Republic, federal Republic, Union of semi-independent states and above all whether India would remain or not within the British Commonwealth. Roux apprehended that Chandernagore and Mahe might slip away, but nevertheless Pondicherry, Karaikal and Yanam might be formed into a sort of autonomous Republic associated with the French Union by way of introducing there large measure of internal autonomy. At the same time he suggested, perhaps keeping in mind the dead line (30 June 1948) –the declared day of giving independence to India– the quick construction of schools, hospitals etc. in such a manner as to make Pondicherry a platform of rapprochement between France and India, a place of cultural exchange, a port of ingress of French merchandises as well as of technicians, doctors, scholars, professors –a good number of whom could certainly be placed in India and they would strengthen the tie between the two countries. “French sovereignty in French India could be maintained by cultivating Indian friendship”, Roux remarked.18
13Actually a meeting took place between Baron and Roux on the one hand, and Nehru on the other at New Delhi in the last week of May 1947. In a confidential telegram (28 May 1947) Roux apprised the French authorities in Paris of the contents of the discourse that had taken place between them.19 Baron also sent a confidential despatch to the French Overseas Ministry detailing therein the nature of the views exchanged between them.20 The French delegation expressed to Nehru the eagerness of France to establish friendly relations with the people of India and made it clear that French India would not stand in the way of the friendship –rather it would be an instrument of the desired cordiality. Both Roux and Baron emphasized the French desire to build up a cultural link with India and the French Government was ready to spend money for it. Nehru, it was pointed out, was no doubt interested in the cultural project and expressed his admiration for French culture. He would be happy to see Pondicherry becoming a window open on France and welcome any cultural programme likely to benefit the two countries. The delegation explained to Nehru that French India “whose historic mission was to play the role of a link between France and India would be a part of the French Union closely connected with Indian Union”. In fact they tried to impress upon Nehru that French India would perhaps choose to be a small independent democracy –an associated state of French Union and linked with India particularly on economic level. The proposal suggested the creation of a condominium. Nehru, in fact, did not rule out the possibility of an autonomous community of French India which would be associated to French Union but remaining at the same time a part of the Indian federation. He assured the delegation that French India would be absolutely free to make its choice, the people themselves would decide their future and that Indian Union would abstain from putting any pressure so long France would not try to impose her sovereignty by force.21
14It was in this meeting Nehru raised the question of the French “loges” on which the French Government exercised “an elusive sovereignty”. The loges had become the paradise of contraband trade and a free zone to the smugglers. The Government of India was suffering financial loss by way of evasion of customs duties by the smugglers. He said that he would be happy if France, as a token of friendship and good will, would solve the problem of the loges –tiny patches of territories serving no interest to France. It was also in this meeting the Prime Minister did not hide his strong dislike for French policy in Indo-China. He told the French delegates that Indo-China events had deeply agitated Indian public opinion and the bloody battles between France and the Asians were standing in the way of forging friendship with France. However, this meeting with Nehru convinced Roux that India was willing to attach much value to French friendship and that she was favourably inclined to develop cultural rapprochement with France. Roux reported that while Nehru disapproved French policy in Indo-China, he wished certain gestures (abandonment of the loges, grant of constitutional liberty to the French Indian pockets, settlements of property and belongings of Indians in Indo-China) to be made on the part of the French Government as convincing proof of French intention. Roux recognized the pressing necessity of responding to the views of Nehru. This would, he believed, allow the French to gain some time and perhaps enable them to reach a modus vivendi acceptable to all. Else, he feared, the Government of India was capable of rendering French position vulnerable thereby forcing them to quit India in an inglorious manner.
Notes de bas de page
1 Pondicherry, Karaikal, Yanam, Mahe and Chandernagore.
2 Pondichéry à Outre-mer (tél.), 13 mars 1947. C 370, D1 (A. O. M.).
3 Ministre de la France d’outre-mer au Gouverneur des Etablissements français, 1 avril 1947. C 370, D1 (A. O. M.).
4 16 janv. 1947. C 370, D1 (A. O. M.).
5 C 370, DI (A. O. M.).
6 C 369, D1 12 avril, 1947 (A. O. M.).
7 C 369, DI (A. O. M.).
8 Bazin au Gouverneur des Etablissements français dans l’Inde, 28 mai 1947. C 369, DI (A. O. M.).
9 6 mai 1947, C 369, D1 (A. O. M.).
10 Memorandum presente a l’Inspecteur des Colonies de la part des habitants de Chandernagor, 6 mai, 1947. As 44-55, Inde Française, Vol. 6 (Qd).
11 Henri Roux à Georges Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 16 mai 1947. As 44-55, Inde Française, Vol. 6. also Aff. Politiques C 437, (A. O. M.).
12 Le Gouverneur p. i. de l’Inde Française au Ministre de la France d’outre-mer, 6 mai 1947 (A. O. M.).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. Also Communication secrète au Conseil des Ministres, 19 mai 1947. Inde Française, Vol. 6. (Qd).
15 Henri Roux a Georges Bidault, 16 mai 1947. Inde Française Vol. 6 (Qd).
16 Ibid. As 44-55.
17 Ibid.
18 Henri Roux a Georges Bidault, 16 mai 1947. As 44-55. Inde Française, Vol. 6 (Q.d)
19 Roux au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 28 mai 1947. As. 44-55. Inde Vol. 62 (Qd).
20 Le Gouverneur p. i. au Ministre de la France d’outre-mer, 7 juin 1947. Secret (A. O. M.).
21 Roux au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 28 mai 1947. As. 44-55. Inde. Vol. 62 (Qd).
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