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Gender discriminations among young children in Asia

 | 
Isabelle Attané
, 
Jacques Véron

Part II - Gender discriminations among young children in China

6. Gender Discriminations at Early Stages of Life in China: Evidence from 1990 and 2000 Population Censuses

Isabelle Attané

Résumé

Dans un pays comme la Chine où la préférence pour les fils résulte de la conception traditionnelle selon laquelle « la femme est inférieure à l’homme », les filles et les femmes sont toujours socialement marginalisées, tandis que les fils offrent de nombreux avantages. Etant donné que, dans le cadre de la politique de limitation des naissances, chaque naissance nécessite une autorisation préalable, et que des sanctions administratives, professionnelles ou financières sont infligées aux couples non respectueux de ces mesures, les filles deviennent indésirables simplement parce qu’elles privent leurs parents de la possibilité d’un fils. Cet état de fait conduit à des discriminations croissantes envers les filles, qui se manifestent notamment par l’infanticide, les avortements sélectifs, la sous-déclaration des naissances de filles, la surmortalité infantile féminine.
En utilisant les résultats des derniers recensements de population de 1990 et 2000, cette recherche décrit les tendances récentes du rapport de masculinité des naissances au niveau national mais aussi à l’échelle des provinces, et étudie la surmortalité infantile des filles comme l’une de ces pratiques discriminatoires. Ensuite, l’auteur tente d’estimer l’ampleur du déficit de filles, et en énonce les causes.

Texte intégral

1Biological norms, set up as unchanging demographic laws, determine the number of females which, compared to the number of males, must be present in a given population as long as there is no discrimination against one sex or the other. By difference with the existing (i.e. registered) females, we can estimate how many are missing. The proportion of men and women in a society at given ages, deviations from the normal gap in life expectancy at birth between sexes, levels of infant mortality by sex, are reliable indicators to measure the “demographic engineering”, that is to say, the manipulation of the laws of Nature to achieve societal and family ends.

  • 1 According to the definition used by the United Nations. See World population prospects, The 2000 Re (...)

2In countries where women are not discriminated against, the overall sex ratio, which measures the proportion of males and females in a given population, is always in favour of the latter. In France, for instance, there are 96 men per 100 women. Scandinavian societies, at the avant-garde of social progress, have a comparable ratio: 97 men per 100 women, a slight female majority. In Africa, there are 99.8 men per 100 women. In China, the overall sex ratio is of 106.3 men per 100 women, 12 per cent over the norm prevailing in more developed countries1 (94.7 men per 100 women), 6.5 per cent over the African norm (99.8 men per 100 women). This male majority is gaining ground, as 20 years ago, there were “only” 105.5 men per 100 women.

  • 2 Nevertheless, some studies suggest that Oriental sex ratios at birth (SRB), which influence the ove (...)
  • 3 Considering the increase in life expectancy, which is faster for women than for men in the early st (...)
  • 4 In spite of a fast increase from the 1960s, the overall sex ratio remains lower in 2000 than it was (...)

3China not only displays a male majority, a characteristic without biological foundation2, but from the 1960s its male part has been growing faster than the female part3. In other words, discriminations against women on a demographic basis are increasing, and more and more women are missing, at least statistically4. If China would conform to the global rule by displaying a female proportion slightly higher than the male proportion, that would bring the female deficit to 36 million (according to the African norm) or to 74 million (according to the norm prevailing in the more developed countries).

4In a country like China, where son preference is principally the product of an ingrained social prejudice that “man is superior to woman” (zhong nan qing nü), girls and women still occupy a marginal position in society, whereas a male heir offers countless advantages. Because the family planning policy imposes a prior authorization for each birth, and inflicts administrative, financial, and occupational penalties on non-compliant couples, girls become unwanted simply because they deny their parents the possibility of a son. This has led to growing daughter discrimination, materialized in different ways: infanticide, sex-selective abortions, underreporting of births, excess female infant mortality.

Traditional son preference

5Female discrimination is a product of Chinese culture. Traditionally confined to the domestic sphere, a good wife had “to serve her husband and his parents, to take care of the house and to have male heirs”. Nothing else. Supported by her family until her marriage, in some cases at the expense of great sacrifices, the daughter was then entirely devoted to her husband’s family. So, a female birth rarely cause delight, especially for the poorest. Today, “male birth is welcomed with shouts of joy and firecrackers. But when a female born, neighbours say nothing”. Because of superstition, millions of parents still name their daughters “Laidi” (literally “A boy is following”), “Pandi” (“Hoping for a son”) or “Zhaodi” (“Bring us a son”). After marriage, a girl owes nothing to her parents. She does not even have to take care of them when they become old; that is the duty of a son-and of a daughter-in-law. In the countryside, people still have to “have a son for old age” (yang’er fang lao), as they will never have any retirement pension. For hundreds of millions of peasants, a son is the only guarantee for old age, and against illness or disability.

6Some women are still ill-treated or repudiated by their husband when they are “incapable” of having a son: “At Taozhou hospital, in Zhejiang, we met a peasant woman holding a newborn girl in her arms. She explained that her husband abandoned them when he learned that the baby was a girl” explains a Chinese journalist. Mrs. Zhao tells her story:

  • 5 Renmin ribao, June 19, 2001.

My husband’s family is from the Haidian rural area. When I was nine months pregnant, someone in the village told me that my baby would surely be a son. From that time, my husband’s family called me ‘guobao’ (national treasure). But I finally delivered a girl. When I left the hospital, my motherin-law started to insult me and I was crying every day. Twenty-three days after delivery, she asked my husband to divorce and then marry another women, who would be capable of having a son. My daughter and I were forced to leave my husband’s home5.

7In spite of the recent economic development, Chinese the woman remains “inferior to man”. The patriarchal clan system, the foundation of traditional social organization, requires early marriage and numerous children, especially males, to maintain clan and family power. Today, family solidarities remain strong and patriarchal culture still dominates daily life: patrilocal marriage, patrilineal filiation, ancestor worship, keeping women backstage.

8To perpetuate the family name (chuanzong jiedai) is one of the fundamental male duties in Confucian culture, and the absence of a male heir is the worst dereliction of filial devotional rules (bu xiao you san, wu hou wei da), especially in rural areas. Peasants still consider that “the more children you have, the happier you are” (duozi duofu), and some of them even say that “to give birth to a boy or a girl, it’s the same, but to have a boy is better” (sheng nan sheng nü dou yi yang, sheng nan haishi bi sheng nü hao). To have a son is ultimately an indispensable condition for perpetuating ancestor worship.

9Rural decollectivization provided another excuse to discriminate against girls. The mirage of personal enrichment revived for peasants when they recovered land usufruct. The family recovered its function as an economic unit, of which it had been deprived during the collectivist period. Thus, the larger the family, the greater are its opportunities to become richer, as land allotment is made on the basis of family size. In the countryside, people often consider that “the early marriage of a son has three advantages: daughter-in-law, descendants and land” (erzi zaohun you san li: xifu sunzi he tudi). In cities, a child costs more than he yields. In the countryside, he has an economic value because he works in the fields, takes out livestock, etc. Rural exodus and growing disinterest for land work have not altered the necessity to have a son; if he leaves the farm, he will get a more lucrative job in the city. Even if he is not by the side of his parents, in any case, he will support them as they grow older.

10These economic constraints sustain a strong son preference, which marginalizes women.

Growing discriminations against females

  • 6 For further information on family planning policy, see Attané I. (2002), «China's family planning p (...)

11In 1971, China launched its third family planning campaign which, unlike its two forerunners (the 1956-57 and 1962-66 campaigns), was to be relentlessly pursued over the following decades. The slogan wan, xi, shao, popularized from 1973, embodied the three fundamental planks of the campaign: late marriage and childbearing (wan means ‘late’), birth spacing (xi means ‘spaced’) and fertility reduction (shao means ‘few’). But these measures were failing to deliver the official target of holding the population down to 1.2 billion by 2000, and were revised in 1979, bringing in the draconian rule of one child per family, urban or rural6. In spite of some relaxation in that policy—from 1984, rural couples were allowed a second child, subject to conditions—pernicious side effects of strict birth limitation became more acute from year to year.

12The 1980s sounded the knell of biological sex regulation at birth. From 1979, the one-child policy turned de facto into a one-son policy. Nobody wanted to give up a male heir, and girls started to go missing.

Sex ratio at birth: nationwide and provincial level

  • 7 That is to say, a total of 14,114,536 births between 1 November 1999 and 31 October 2000, and a sex (...)

13According to the 2000 population census, 7.606 million boys and 6.508 million girls were born between 1 November 1999 and 31 October 20007. With a normal sex ratio at birth of 105.5, there should have been 7.209 million female births. Thus, the female birth deficit can be estimated at 700,956, 10.8 per cent of the total number of enumerated female births. Ten years earlier, in 1989, 624,766 girls were already missing, 5.5 per cent: a worsening situation.

  • 8 Between 1 January 1989 and 31 December 1989, there were 24,624,887 births, with a sex ratio at birt (...)
  • 9 See footnote no 5.

14Discrimination against female children is rising in China year by year. Thus, the sex ratio at birth, normally between 105 and 106 boys for 100 girls, rose between the last censuses from 108.5 in 1981 to 111.38 in 1989 and then to 116.99 in 2000.

Table 1: Trends in sex ratio at birth by order, 1982-2000

Table 1: Trends in sex ratio at birth by order, 1982-2000

* See footnote no 8.
** From 1 Nov. 1999, to 31 Oct. 2000. See footnote n
o7.
Sources: 1982: Tu Ping, 1993, 1990 and 2000: population censuses, corresponding years.

  • 10 National Family Health Survey, 1998-99 (NFHS-2), India.
  • 11 Sex ratio among children aged 0 in 2002.
  • 12 Doo-Sub Kim (2003).

15China is not an exception. Many Asian countries also discriminate against girls. For example, the sex ratio at birth is 111.0 in India10, 109.3 in Taiwan11, 110.2 in the Republic of Korea12. Infringed upon by almost onethird of the world population, should the biological norm, which requires 105.5 male births for every 100 female births, be questioned? No. China itself produces overwhelming proof: the sex ratio at birth is almost normal among first births, and increases as birth rank rises. Female discriminations before or after birth almost exclusively concern high order births (Table 1).

16Sex discriminations as evidenced by the abnormal sex ratios at birth are almost universal through China, although there are provincial variations. In 1989, the sex ratio at birth ranged from 102.7 in Guizhou to 117.1 in Zhejiang, most of the provinces (25 out of 30 had over 107 males per 100 females at birth in 1989) already being largely over the norm (103-106) (Figure 1).

17In 2000, deviations from the norm largely increased, the sex ratio at birth ranging from 97.4 males per 100 females in Tibet to 138.0 in Jiangxi. At that time, 28 out of 31 provinces had over 107 males per 100 females at birth. Jiangxi, Guangdong and Hainan display the highest discrepancy, with over 135 boys per 100 girls at birth. Then, there are the eastern (Fujian, Jiangsu) and central provinces (Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi), plus Guangxi, with a sex ratio at birth comprising between 120 and 135 boys per 100 girls (Table 2).

  • 13 Could the very low sex ratio at birth in Tibet be the consequence of maternal malnutrition? (Regard (...)

18The sex ratio at birth increased in all provinces between 1989 and 2000, except in Zhejiang (where it dropped from 117.1 to 113.1) and Qinghai (where it remained steady: 104.1 and 103.5 respectively). In Tibet, it dropped from 103.5 to 97.413. The most striking increase occurred in Guangdong and Jiangxi, with an increase of 23-24 per cent in ten years (Figure 1).

Table 2: Sex ratio at birth by birth order, by province, 2000

Table 2: Sex ratio at birth by birth order, by province, 2000

Figure 1: Trends in sex ratio at birth between 1989 and 1990

Figure 1: Trends in sex ratio at birth between 1989 and 1990

Infant mortality

19Excess female mortality is one of the discriminatory practices: poor rural families, in particular, distribute more food and general care to a son than to a daughter and are more inclined to provide them with costly medical care.

  • 14 The infant mortality rate was estimated at 201.48‰ in 1945-49 and at 51.5‰ in 1970-74. See Huang Ro (...)

20In societies where women are not discriminated against, especially in health and nutrition, mortality is higher for males than for females at all stages of life. In China, that is the case among the adult population, but not among infants. The health policy implemented by Communists from the 1950s, based on hygiene and vaccination campaigns, eradicated the most fatal infant diseases and induced major progress in infant survival. Two out of ten children were dying before the age of 1 around 1945; 25 years later, most of them (around 95%) were surviving14. In the following decades, progress slowed down, especially among girls.

Table 3: Infant mortality rates - China, 1973-2000

Table 3: Infant mortality rates - China, 1973-2000

* 1990 census data, adjusted by the China Population Information and Research Center (Huang, Liu, 1995).
** Adjusted 1995 survey data (source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996).
*** Life table for China adjusted by J. Banister (2003), “Poverty, progress and mortality in China”, paper presented at the
Workshop on Population Changes in China at the Beginning of the 21st Century, Australian national University, Canberra, 10-12 December 2003.

21As child survival gradually improved, the gender differential infant mortality gap widened to the detriment of girls (Table 3). But mortality during the first year of life is routinely higher among males, in a natural offsetting of excess male births. Excess male infant mortality is a universal phenomenon in countries where there is no son preference.

22Hill and Upchurch (1995) calculated the observed normal female advantage by establishing the ratio of female-to-male infant mortality at 0.78 for a male death probability in the first 5 years of life below 0.05. In China, this advantage had already been lost by 1973-75, with a ratio of 0.875, and is increasingly waning: 0.948 in 1981, 1.156 in 1990, 1.336 in 1994-95 and 1.465 in 2000. Table 11 shows the widening gap over time compared to the norm.

Where are the missing girls?

Under-enumeration of female births

23Girls are missing partly because of under-enumeration. Many authors consider that under-enumeration was the main cause of the girl deficit in the 80s (Hull 1990, Johansson and Nygren 1991, Zeng et al. 1993a and 1993b).

24Until recently, lack of reliable data meant that the proportion of births not reported to enumerators due to neglect or parental fear of penalties for an unauthorized birth could not be precisely determined, bearing in mind that if they survived, these girls eventually filtered through into the statistics at older ages. Following the delivery of the 2000 census data, we attempted to estimate how many girls were missing at the previous census (1990) because of under-enumeration.

  • 15 The date of reference was 1 July 1990 at the 1990 census, and 1 November 2000 at the 2000 census. U (...)

25Girls aged 0-4 in 1990 were aged 10-14 years in 200015. Logically, these girls should have been fewer in 2000 than they were in 1990, because of mortality. In 2000, 59.2 million girls aged 10-14 years were enumerated. But ten years before, only 55.4 million were registered at the 1990 census: a difference of 3.8 million (Table 4).

26Using the same procedure, we compared the number of girls aged 10 on 1 July 2000 to those aged 0 on 1 July 1990. The number of female births under-enumerated in 1990 can be estimated at 1.519 million (Table 4). The total number of excess girls in cohorts aged 0-9 in 2000 compared to 1990 is over 6.6 million.

Table 4: Under-enumeration of girls under the age of 10 at the 1990 census

Table 4: Under-enumeration of girls under the age of 10 at the 1990 census

* Number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990.
** estimation of the number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990 based on enumeration at 2000 census, adjusted for mortality.

Table 5: Under-enumeration of boys under the age of 10 at the 1990 census

Table 5: Under-enumeration of boys under the age of 10 at the 1990 census

* Number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990.
** estimation of the number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990 based on enumeration at 2000 census, adjusted for mortality.

  • 16 Please refer to footnote no 6.

27In 1990, sex ratio at birth was 111.3 boys per 100 girls16. When adding the 1.519 million under-enumerated female births, the sex ratio at birth drops to the abnormal level of 98.1 boys per 100 girls. So we had no choice but to conclude that under-enumeration also concerned male births in 1990.

28The same calculation made in male cohorts reveals an underenumeration of boys aged 0 in 1990 comparable to that of the girls: 11%, versus 12% for girls. 1.32 million boys born between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990 were not enumerated at the 1990 census (Table 5).

29If we include the total number births, enumerated and underenumerated, male and female, the ‘real’ sex ratio at birth in 1990 is 110.1, one point less than among the enumerated births, but 4.4 per cent over the biological norm.

30Therefore, the female deficit is confirmed. Among the births that occurred during the year preceding the 1990 census —if we make the hypothesis that there was no under-enumeration of girls aged 10 to 20 at the 2000 census— almost 560,000 females were actually missing.

Sex-selective abortions: a female feticide

  • 17 There were 650,078 missing female births at the 1990 census. After adjustment of the sex ratio at b (...)

31Under-enumeration explains only a slight part of the female birth deficit: 10.5 per cent according to our calculation17.

32So one of the main explanations for the “missing” female births at the 1990 census may be prenatal gender selection: an ultrasound scan taken four or five months into the pregnancy that reveals a female foetus may be followed by an abortion that, with the strict birth limitation policy, offers new hope of a son. Yet the 2002 Law on Population and Birth Planning is unambiguous “Ultrasound scans or any other method to determine the sex of the foetus otherwise than for medical reasons are strictly forbidden. Abortion after sex determination otherwise than for medical reasons is strictly forbidden” (extr. from Art. 35).

33The frequency of this practice, although it can hardly be determined, is mainly due to the clear extent of son preference, and hence the more or less acute “need”-depending on how strictly the family limitation programme is enforced-to proactively influence the gender of the unborn child.

34The frequency of sex-selective abortions also depends on medical provision. Most of China’s rural districts are now equipped to carry out ultrasound scans, but their density remains low: 1.2 ultrasound B-mode scanners for 100 000 women on average in 205 districts studied in the early 1990s (Zhu Yaohua et al. 1994). And yet a 1987 survey conducted by the Beijing University of Medicine reports a sex ratio of 94.6 among legally terminated foetuses in the rural zones and 96.8 in the urban zones of the eight provinces surveyed (Zeng et al. 1993). Another survey carried out in 1993 in the south of Zhejiang province revealed a legal abortion sex ratio of 86.7 boys to 100 girls (Gu and Roy 1995). In 1989, 10.567 million abortions were recorded by the State Family Planning Commission. A sex ratio of 96 boys to 100 girls applied to these legal terminations —as far as these official data can be regarded as reliable— puts at 250,000 the number of girls who may have been victims of gender-selective abortions, i. e., 39 per cent of the girls missing at that time, and 2 per cent of female births occurring the same year. A sex ratio of 86 would bring it to 540,000, i.e., 85 per cent of the “missing girls” and 4.6 per cent of total female births. In South Korea, that proportion is assessed at approximately 5 per cent over the period 1986-1990 (Park and Cho 1995).

35If under-enumeration actually explains only around 10 per cent of the female birth deficit at the 1990 census, considering that female infanticide is residual (and can anyway be considered as a low-cost sex-selective abortion), it makes plausible that sex-selective abortions explain most of the remaining missing girls, establishing the sex ratio among foetuses aborted in 1989 at around 85 males per 100 females. This estimation is not in contradiction with the calculations of Cai and Lavely, who estimated that no more than one-third of the nominally missing girls in the 0 to 4 age range were unregistered and hidden in 1990 (Cai and Lavely 2003).

Sex-selective infanticide

36Another possible explanation of the unbalanced sex ratio at birth is infanticide. Daughter infanticide is traditionally practised in China, and may be likened to a form of low-cost sex-selective abortion. Even if indirect, as the consequence of withheld care (denial of food or medical treatment), it produces an excess female mortality and hence a deficit of girls.

37Although frequently reported, the true extent of the phenomenon is unknown and can only be guessed at. Infanticide was largely reported in the early 80s, when the one-child policy was harshly coercive. Officials as well as couples were at that time under high pressure to limit births, any infringement being severely punished. The Guangming newspaper acknowledged at the end of the 80s that “infanticide is common”.

38The calculated incidence of infanticide for the period 1851-1948, at a time when this practice was the only plausible cause of an unbalanced sex ratio at birth, was estimated at 5 per cent of the female births and 2.5 per cent of the male births (Eastman 1988). A comparable incidence today —discounting any male incidence— would make infanticide the main cause of the female birth deficit (around 90 per cent of the “missing girls” in 1990 and almost 50 per cent in 2000), which is absolutely unrealistic. An incidence of 1 per cent limits the proportion to 18 and 9 per cent respectively, but even that is obviously excessive.

Conclusion

39What demographic implications can the female birth deficit have? Obviously, under-reporting of births does not outstrip the other causes. The deficit is partly mopped-up, as these girls gradually re-emerge into the statistics with age, but not entirely. Obviously, these girls are indeed averted births, i.e. victims of infanticide or sex-selective abortion. So the situation is disturbing and could have a real impact.

40Is a lack of girls of marriageable age likely to throw the marriage market into crisis? Ostensibly not, because however large the deficit, it still represents only a small proportion of recent births. But it is still too soon to gauge the precise scope and social consequences of this imbalance.

41At the 1990 census, among a total population of 1.13 billion, there were 205 million unmarried people. Among them, three out of five were men. Among those aged 30 years or more, in 1990 as well as in 2000, nine out of ten are men, a worrying situation.

  • 18 International Herald Tribune, August 18, 1994.

42For some time, the matrimonial market will regulate itself. Spouse seekers will have to get younger potential wives, before dipping into two almost unexploited stocks: widowed and divorced women, in spite of the stigma still attached to their remarriage in China. Anyway, it is likely to bring down female age at marriage, while male candidates for marriage will have to wait longer before finding a wife, becoming older at marriage. Possibly, forced bachelorhood will be more and more frequent, with the growing trafficking of women as a deplorable consequence. Lack of girls of marriageable age is becoming acute in some remote areas. “What kind of wife do I wish?” Xu Wenyuan, 30 years old, wonders. “I don’t mind! It’s so difficult to find a wife nowadays! I want a wife, that’s all!18.

43According to Cai and Lavely (2003), a conservative estimate of the number of missing girls for cohorts between 1980 and 2000 is approximately 8.5 million, which amounts to less than 1 per cent of China’s total population. But the long-term influence on population size will be greater because the reproductive potential of these missing girls is also lost. These authors consider that the girls already missing can be expected to decrease China’s future population by 3.2 per cent in 100 years (Cai and Lavely 2003). Nevertheless, distant perspectives are uncertain. If the female deficit continues to increase at a tremendous speed, the situation may rapidly become worrying. Furthermore, fewer and fewer women mean fewer children, with logically fewer girls, and then fewer children in future generations, and finally a rapid decrease in demographic growth in the most populated country of the world.

Bibliographie

References

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Notes

1 According to the definition used by the United Nations. See World population prospects, The 2000 Revision, Vol. I: Comprehensive Tables, United Nations, pp. 40-41.

2 Nevertheless, some studies suggest that Oriental sex ratios at birth (SRB), which influence the overall sex ratio on the long term, tend to be higher than White SRBs, which are higher than those of Blacks (Clarke 2000: 44).

3 Considering the increase in life expectancy, which is faster for women than for men in the early stage of the increase, the female part of Chinese population should increase faster than the male part, leading to a decreasing overall sex ratio. But the opposite situation occurs.

4 In spite of a fast increase from the 1960s, the overall sex ratio remains lower in 2000 than it was in 1953, showing that an abnormally high sex ratio is not a new phenomenon in China. We have to stress that until the early 1950s, an unbalanced sex ratio was the result of excess female mortality associated with female infanticide. Reduction in this practice and the improved status of women in the Communist era contributed to the reduction of the overall sex ratio during the following years.

5 Renmin ribao, June 19, 2001.

6 For further information on family planning policy, see Attané I. (2002), «China's family planning policy: An overview of its past and future», Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 33, No 1, 103-113.

7 That is to say, a total of 14,114,536 births between 1 November 1999 and 31 October 2000, and a sex ratio at birth of 116.9 males per 100 females for the whole Chinese population. Birth data displayed by birth order are taken from the long-form questionnaire administered not to the whole population, but to a ten per cent sample of households. In this sample, 1,182,138 births were enumerated, with a sex ratio at birth of 119.9.

8 Between 1 January 1989 and 31 December 1989, there were 24,624,887 births, with a sex ratio at birth of 111.3 boys per 100 girls. But data displayed by birth order and mother’s age at birth total only 23,851,876 births, with a sex ratio at birth of 113.9.

9 See footnote no 5.

10 National Family Health Survey, 1998-99 (NFHS-2), India.

11 Sex ratio among children aged 0 in 2002.

12 Doo-Sub Kim (2003).

13 Could the very low sex ratio at birth in Tibet be the consequence of maternal malnutrition? (Regarding this scientific hypothesis, see Clarke 2000: 44; Andersson and Bergström, 1998).

14 The infant mortality rate was estimated at 201.48‰ in 1945-49 and at 51.5‰ in 1970-74. See Huang Rongqing and Liu Yan, 1995, Mortality data of Chinese Population, CPIRC-UNFPA, China Population Publishing House, p 4.

15 The date of reference was 1 July 1990 at the 1990 census, and 1 November 2000 at the 2000 census. Using mortality data and age structure, we reconstituted cohorts aged 10 and under at 1 July 2000.

16 Please refer to footnote no 6.

17 There were 650,078 missing female births at the 1990 census. After adjustment of the sex ratio at birth by including under-enumeration, we estimated that 595,637 were actually missing. So under-enumeration of female births at the 1990 census explains 8.37% of the female birth deficit (650,078-595,637= 54,441, and then 54,441/650,078* 100).

18 International Herald Tribune, August 18, 1994.

Table des illustrations

Titre Table 1: Trends in sex ratio at birth by order, 1982-2000
Légende * See footnote no 8.** From 1 Nov. 1999, to 31 Oct. 2000. See footnote no7.Sources: 1982: Tu Ping, 1993, 1990 and 2000: population censuses, corresponding years.
URL http://books.openedition.org/ifp/docannexe/image/4519/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 56k
Titre Table 2: Sex ratio at birth by birth order, by province, 2000
URL http://books.openedition.org/ifp/docannexe/image/4519/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 252k
Titre Figure 1: Trends in sex ratio at birth between 1989 and 1990
URL http://books.openedition.org/ifp/docannexe/image/4519/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 160k
Titre Table 3: Infant mortality rates - China, 1973-2000
Légende * 1990 census data, adjusted by the China Population Information and Research Center (Huang, Liu, 1995).** Adjusted 1995 survey data (source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996).*** Life table for China adjusted by J. Banister (2003), “Poverty, progress and mortality in China”, paper presented at the Workshop on Population Changes in China at the Beginning of the 21st Century, Australian national University, Canberra, 10-12 December 2003.
URL http://books.openedition.org/ifp/docannexe/image/4519/img-4.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 92k
Titre Table 4: Under-enumeration of girls under the age of 10 at the 1990 census
Légende * Number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990.** estimation of the number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990 based on enumeration at 2000 census, adjusted for mortality.
URL http://books.openedition.org/ifp/docannexe/image/4519/img-5.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 172k
Titre Table 5: Under-enumeration of boys under the age of 10 at the 1990 census
Légende * Number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990.** estimation of the number of births between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990 based on enumeration at 2000 census, adjusted for mortality.
URL http://books.openedition.org/ifp/docannexe/image/4519/img-6.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 166k

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