Version classiqueVersion mobile

Water management in rural South India and Sri Lanka

Patrice Cohen
S. Janakarajan

Part II. Different issues of irrigation and social water management

5. Water and Food Security: Related Issues

Nicolas Druesne

Texte intégral


1The growing demand for water by various and competitive users and the unsustainability of uses have already led to a crisis in term of quantity and/or quality. This crisis affects more and more countries and is considered to be a crisis on the world scale. “The lurking global water crisis promises to make water a central issue on the international development agenda” (Peter P. Mollinga 2000).

2There is no doubt that India is concerned about the quantity crisis, that is, either scarcity due to drought, or excess during floods in many parts of the country. Examples of the alternation of droughts and cyclone floods in recent years are:

  • Flood: 2000 in West Bengal: considered by some researchers to be the worst flood of the century in that state;

  • Since 1999 in Orissa: alternation of cyclone and drought;

  • Droughts: 2000-2001: Rajasthan, Gujarat, a succession of severe droughts.

3In this paper we will discuss especially issues related to water and food security.

4We first discuss the evident link between the water crisis and the local and temporary crisis of food availability which calls for exceptional food policies and at times reveals the inadequacy of the existing system. In the second part, we will analyse the issues common to both sustainable water management and sustainable food security. This second part also raises the main issues of federalism and decentralization. In the third par t, we will underscore on the original issue of people’s participation and the concepts of citizenship relating to these two.

5Finally we will illustrate that paper with two examples, one of the Cauvery river water dispute, the other of a tank rehabilitation project.

Federalism issue in food availability crisis related to Water crisis for agriculture (lack of irrigation, crops destroyed by flood)

6These water crises lead in some geographical areas to problems of food availability, in term of physical access to food.

7The Public Distribution System (PDS) is a network all over India of procurement and distribution of food items, mostly foodgrains (rice and wheat). The procurement is made through different agencies, mostly centralised by the Food Corporation of India (FCI central government controlled) and sometimes federal (as in the case of Tamil Nadu and the TNCSC). The distribution is made through ration shops at subsidized prices.

8Originally the PDS was created to reply to geographical deficits, but a number of cases of great food scarcity stress the need of an improved system.

9These situations in some regions give rise to a strengthening of the normal Public Distribution System, the implementation of existing associated schemes (food for work, etc.) and the creation of a special relief aid. That leads to compromises and some conflicts centre and states, states and districts, as concerns the share of responsibility and, above all, the share of expenditure. This raises the key issue of federalism and decentralization which concern both food security and water.

10Recently, starvation deaths connected to drought situations have put in question the performance of food policies in India pertaining to grain distribution. Even if Tamil Nadu is not concerned by such grave problems, the question arises, especially when that state wants to declare some districts “drought hit” to benefit from central assistance.

11But the food security concept does not mean only sufficient agricultural food production and is not only related to a temporal and local crisis of food availability.

12Another issue of federalism in connection with food security concerns the sustainability of the natural resource base of crop and animal husbandry, of which water represents a main component.

Federalism and decentralization in the sustainability of irrigation water for food security

13Sustainability has to be ensured in two ways:

  • First, it can be secured by the proper regulation of permanent irrigation water and conflict management institutions that are stable and powerful (this does not seem to be the case in the Cauvery water dispute);

  • Or by measures to maintain the durability of the resources: the entire water conservation system, tank rehabilitation, recharging the ground water, maintenance, etc...

14The issue of federalism and decentralization emerged again recently at the national conference of rural water supply. The conference led to the creation of a model law concerning water management.

15Some recommendations of the model law concern the needs of some water management institutions. Thus the creation of, a “regulatory authority” is recommended in all states to regulate the various uses of water almost concentrated on the different users of ground water. In that way, this authority has to be empowered to register all the ground water users and to stipulate the depth to which a bore well can go depending on the use of water.

16The problem is that this act does not mention the existence of any actual administrative institutions and any research about informal, traditional, either previous institutions to manage the use of water and how they would interact with the recommended new authority.

17Above all, discussed at a central level, this law is only recommended to the states. Its implementation is doubtful, even if the Union Minister for Rural Development “seeks the co-operation of the States”.

18Even if these recommendations are discussed at the top and are to be implemented at the grass-roots level, once again, as in the case of the improvement of food security, the participation of the local community is expected.

19Indeed the concept of food security was also evaluated from the national-level of food availability to the individual level with the notion of the right of each and every one to have access to quantitative and qualitative alimentation (Sen A., Drèze J. 1990).

20The evolution of the Public Distribution System has followed the same course. It was first elaborated as a measure against crisis, then to enhance production by granting a minimum price to farmers during the Green Revolution Since the 1980’s, the PDS has been conceived more like a permanent poverty eradication programme progressively targeted to the most vulnerable people, than as a net to counter temporary and regional crises.

21But to ensure a proper management of the system and to be certain that the food really reaches the weakest section of the society (which, according to many studies, is not the case), it seems that, as for water, there is also a consensus that the people should be involved in their food security.

22According to statement of the Union Minister for Rural Development during the conference on Rural Drinking Water Supply (19-20 October 2001), the improvement of the water conservation and water harvesting system would be achieved by transforming a “Government-oriented, centralised and supply-driven” system into a community-oriented, participatory, decentralized and demand- driven one.

23However, the means and methodology to involve the population through representatives of the people, elected bodies or institution is rarely discussed.

24At this point, the fields of both food security and water, the complex issues of citizenship and local democracy emerge.

Participation, citizenship and democracy issues for water and food security

25The two fields are linked not only by the use of water and an input for agriculture, but also through the issue of drinking.

26Thus, the access to drinking water is now considered by many as a citizen’s right as well as the access to food. As stated by Dr. S. Arulraj, president of the IMA (Indian Medical Association) it is “recommended that the Central Government declare health a basic right of the citizen” [and that] “the Government should concede the citizen’s right to safe drinking water, nutritious food and effective sanitation”.

27This means that, while the food security paradigm concerns the sustainability of food production, in particular by sustaining the irrigation system, it also includes others essential rights of the citizen like drinking water, health and sanitation, education. This is well summarize in the definition of food security given by M. S. Swaminathan.

28Food security does not mean only sufficient agricultural food production. It implies:

29– “that every individual has physical, economic and environmental access to balanced diets, including the needed micro-nutrients and safe drinking water, and to primary health care and education so as to lead a healthy and productive life”;

30“that food originates from efficient, effective and environmentally benign technologies that conserve and enhance the natural resource base of crop and animal husbandry, forestry and inland and marine fisheries”.

31One may ask, what kind of institutions represent the voice of the local community. The proposed answer of the ruling class always is to involve the elected panchayat body in water management as well as in the Public Distribution System of food.

The panchayat institution

32The problem is that not every state has conducted the elections for the panchayat and in all states there are many irregularities regarding these local consultations. For example, during the last election in Tamil Nadu, the local newspapers revealed many incidents involving the prevention of Dalits from contesting the polls, or the acquisition “acquired” by auction of some panchayats, etc...

33Also, a decentralized resource management by an elected or administrative body does not mean in itself participative management by the people of the resource. And in particular, in the obsessive global context of reducing the fiscal deficit, the involvement of panchayats corresponds above all to the aim of the central or federal governments to abandon their responsibility and expenditures without giving any proper status or transferring any means to the local body.

34It is recognized that NGOs are useful in making links with the grass – roots level for the implementation of official schemes or to represent the people’s aspiration. But, we can question the legitimacy of non-elected bodies such as associations or NGOs. In many cases, when they do not emanate from the local community, they can just create a new class of outside intermediary the interests of which are far from those of the rural society.

Citizen’s movements, NGOs and traditional institutions

35With the paradox of amounting stock of food grains while malnutrition, undernutrition and also starvation deaths persist, the citizens are more and more claiming theirs rights, sometimes linking their food security with water security.

36We can cited some examples among others:

  • The Akaal Sangharsh Samiti movement in Rajasthan (umbrella body of 57 NGOs) who put pressure on the government to obtain drought relief work through food for work programme. Relation between water and food security;

  • Some citizens’ movements also appeal to the Supreme Court to include the right for food in the Constitution itself. In September 2001, in Kerala, after a number of starvation deaths, a prolonged movement of demonstrations and strikes by tribal representatives has taken place to claim the release of food and the allocation of agricultural land to the landless. In some states exasperated citizens break into the government warehouses food grains to distribute the food themselves.

37Now the central and federal governments seem to recognize the need of representing communities through NGOs or associations. Thus, the implementation of water schemes like tank rehabilitation is dependent on to the existence of users’ or farmers’ associations. It is a different issue, after all, to debate if this comes from a real political will to involve them, or only because outside funding agencies (World Bank, European Community) themselves make the allocation of budgets dependent on with that kind of people’s associations. In fact, these farmers’ associations for the restoration of tanks (traditional reservoirs) are usually only on the paper or they do not have any decision making power (see the box below). Also, they mostly deal only with the irrigation use of water and do not consider the other uses like drinking water. Thus, the Tamil Nadu Water Act, 2000 neglects the water rights of the entire local community to concentrate only on the landowners. It does not transfer any water rights to the landless or to women. In general, women are only associated with the drinking water issue and are excluded from irrigation water and related matters, certainly because they cannot pay any fees and are not property holders.

A tank rehabilitation project seen from the point of view of farmers2

  • 2 From our field survey. At the request of the farmers, we ensure them anonymity by not giving names (...)

38This project involves different bodies:

  • An NGO from outside the village, which is supposed to make the link between officials and the local community and is in charge of organizing the farmer association;

  • The Public Works Department, which is in charge of the tanks;

  • The Irrigation Department, which is a branch of the Agriculture Department;

  • Eri Sangam (farmers tank association);

  • One foreign funding agency.

Farmers’ participation

39The farmers do not seem to know how and why the project is taking place in their village. They remember that some officials from the PWD and the VAO (Village Agriculture Office) came to their houses a number of times to inform them that a tank rehabilitation project had been determined for their village and to summon them to a meeting.

40From what the farmers said concerning speech the creation of the association we can separate two motivations to participate in the meeting. Some attended so as to go to the nearest town and to have tea and biscuits during the meeting. Others attended in order to maintain good relations with the officials who summoned them to come because those officials are in charge of the allocation of many kinds of loans, subsidies and insurance in case of calamities, while others required official documents from official instances.

41Even with such reasons, only one faction of the village’s farmers (in general every village is divided into atleast two main political or caste – oriented factions) attended the first meeting. As usual, the farmers went first to inform the politicians whom they support (and who give them in return protection and other advantages) and consult with them as to the political necessity of participating in the project. In the prevailing local political game, one faction was told to give full co-operation, and the other one not to do so.

42Thus, from the beginning, he association represents only one small part of the landowners of the village, with or without the knowledge of the others involved in the project. The point does not seem to be very important because the association has no power of decision or any consultation role, and the project had been fully decided before its involvement. After all, the opposing faction in the village exerted pressure to obtain the seat of vice-president in the case of any empowerment, primarily for some prestigious reasons.

Farmers’ contribution

43Another crucial point is that this kind of project never fails to ask for the farmers’ participation in terms of money or labour. This is also usually the last condition for the project to be realized and funds released, because according to the funding agencies, this participation is supposed to be the effective indicator of the people’s participation. In this case participation has been fixed, again without any consultation with the farmers, at 10 % of the total project cost. Generally, because this is the only real participation expected of them, the farmers are reluctant to pay their contributions. Considering their interests, the official department and the NGO decided to pay themselves the amount (declaring at the same time to the funding agency that it was the farmers’ contribution) in order to benefit from the total allocated budget.

44The farmers must also attend classes on irrigation conducted by agricultural scientists; the main idea being that the farmers are mismanaging water resources. The instruction takes place without any proper knowledge or survey of the local conditions, or of technical practices and prevalent institutions to manage the resource.

45According to our experience in other projects, this case is not isolated and is the usual way in which the farmers’ participation is expected.

Water and food security: the Cauvery water dispute

The Cauvery and food security in Tamil Nadu

46Tamil Nadu has its own food policies, independent of the central government, and the Cauvery delta is historically the strategic geographical area for the food security. Tamil Nadu conducts its own procurement of paddy, maintains its own stocks and organizes the rice distribution through the Tamil Nadu Civil Supply Corporation. In this state, the central organ (Food Corporation of India) has no power of procurement and only supplies some complement of rice from others states.

  • 3 Procurement for the year 1997-1998 (season Kuruvai-Samba). Calculated from the data of the TNCSC.

47Indeed, the entire system depends on the Cauvery, As 99 % of the paddy procurement is realized in the eight Cauvery delta districts, and mostly (78 %) in the three main districts of Thanjavur, Nagappattinam and Thiruvarur3.

48The dispute for Cauvery Water does not question the immediate food security of Tamil Nadu or, concerning federalism, its independence from the central government because of its huge stocks, but on long-term it, questions the durability of its food security policies.

The hydraulic aspect

49The Cauvery is the longest watershed in Tamil Nadu. The river rises in the water tower of the Ghats, and follows a west-east course. The rainfall gradient is also west east and, in order to sustain the flow some interlinked systems of natural lakes and dams have been constructed upstream (dams at Harangi, Kabini, Krishna Sagar and Hemavati, controlled by the government of Karnataka and linked to the Mettur dam).

50Even so, the farmers are not free from the monsoon hazards. This highly centralized water management system involves four states (Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Pondicherry) which are permanently in conflict concerning water distribution, in terms of quantity and above all timing. The potential irrigated area for Tamil Nadu is around 250 000 ha, according to the season.

Importance of the last crisis: Loss of money in irrigated area and in production according to Tamil Nadu government

51According to the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, “the failure of Karnataka to release 66 thousand million cubic feet (tmcft) water between June and September [2001] had resulted in a loss of Rs. 300 crores to the farmers in the State as they could not cultivate 50 000 tonnes of kuruvai paddy”.

52The Tamil Nadu State Law Minister announced also the loss of 49 000 acres of paddy that has to be harvested in November [kuruvai] if a sufficient amount of water is not released, as well as problems concerning 56 000 acres samba nursery that has to be transplanted on 600 000 acres.

53That Cauvery water dispute raises all the issues of decentralization, federalism and people’s participation. Apparently, the successive institutions created and involved are unable solve the conflict. We question the sustainability of the food policies of Tamil Nadu based on the Cauvery and in general the future of that kind of big irrigation watershed project, which is technically and institutionally very difficult to manage, to ensure the food security.

Federalism and the Cauvery

Nature of conflict-management institutions

54Due to the inability to solve the conflict, a number of associated institutions has been created:

  • The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal: interim order of June 1991;

  • Conflicts are arbitrated by the CRA (Cauvery River Authority), headed by the Indian Prime Minister (Central Government);

  • The CRA is the main institution. It has a function of tribunal, and political forum. “In 1997-98, during the discussions that led to its formation, the State Governments decided that the Authority must be a political forum comprising Chief Ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister”.

55Then, the Cauvery River Water Disputes Authority Monitoring Committee was set up in August 1998, under the Cauvery River Authority is to meet before any irrigation season. It has planned “a monthly schedule of Cauvery Water to be released by Karnataka into Mettur. Any shortfalls were to be made good in subsequent weeks”.

56When states are rot satisfied with that conflict management, they can refer to the Supreme Court (as in the case of conflict between States) or to the Central Water Commission CWC.

57Examples: The committee which met on 1 June 2002, under the pressure of Tamil Nadu, decided to create a sub-group of CWC experts “to go into the uniformity of measurement of storage levels in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu reservoirs”. And on 1 October, Tamil Nadu submitted a report to the CWC on the non-respect of the water quantity released by the Karnataka.

58We have seen that the conflict involves mostly Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, but also Kerala, Pondicherry and the farmers’ community. Each of these actors seems to have a particular position concerning the federalism issue of the water dispute.

Different actors positions concerning the federalism issue

59The irrigation management of the Cauvery is a perfect example of huge centralized project where hydraulic decisions are determined at the upper level without involving the local communities. Also, it appears that this issue is extremely politicized at each level. That can be highlighted by analyzing the statements of the actors in this dispute, which is regularly covered in the press.

Position of different states

60The position of the different states is notably determined by the Indian inner political game of alliances which influences the relations between central and state Governments. This is due to the very nature of the Cauvery River Authority, a political forum chaired by the Prime Minister. Thus, the state position can be analyzed according to the membership or not in the central government coalition; as appears clearly regarding the position of the actual Tamil Nadu Government. We will see that, independently of this reason, the states have different positions according to the degree of centralization.

61We will examine an example of the demand for greater centralization in by referring to the cases of Pondicherry and Tamil Nadu.

62The actual AIADMK government greatly criticises the position of the Prime Minister who is, according to the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister and its State Law Minister, “accused of not giving any direction to Karnataka”. With this type of statement, ( “the Prime Minister has let us down”), the Tamil Nadu government gives us understand that its demands might be taken into consideration were if not opposed to the central coalition.

63The Tamil Nadu Government is opposed, as was the previous government, to the Karnataka stand views as “rigid” and responsible for the failure of the negotiations, which it criticises also the CRA commitments that do “not mention the quantum of water to be released, nor of the timing”. This opposition to the Karnataka position is shared by the entire Tamil Nadu political scene. In fact, more than the CRA’s decisions, it is the nature itself of the CRA that is questioned by the actual Tamil Nadu Government. Indeed, the AIADMK’s stand, right from the creation of the CRA, maintained that this institution is “toothless, powerless and redundant” and that they “expect nothing” from it. While it appeals for more centralization to arbitrate the conflict, this is expected in a non-politicized manner. From the beginning, the AIADMK leader has “advocated a decision-making role for the Authority, which should consist of officials”. The demand for this kind of centralization of water management has been renewed recently by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister who stressed “the need for the Authority to be empowered to oversee the regulation of reservoirs and structures and operate it with its own staff or through the Central Agency whenever a State Government refused to comply with the instructions given by the Authority”.

64The Union Territory of Pondicherry seems also to be inclined towards more centralization and requested intervention by officials to manage the water dispute. Pondicherry stated at the eighth quarterly meeting of the Cauvery River Water Authority Monitoring Committee, of June 2001, that the official should “gauge of the 6 tmcft of water it is to get at Karaikal [from Tamil Nadu]”.

65The position of the main opposition parties in Tamil Nadu is intermediary. They condemn both the action of the AIADMK, “blamed […] for not initiating steps to get water from Karnataka as per the Tribunal award”, and its critics as regards the CRA, which, on the contrary, they consider as “an essential forum to keep Karnataka under check”.

  • 4 Statement of Mr. M. Karunanidhi, the DMK president. The Hindu, 12-10-01, p. 5

66In the same way, the main political party in the opposition, the DMK, member of the central coalition, supports the CRA institution with the aim of supporting its chairman, the Prime Minister, who is described as someone taking into consideration the problems which directly affect the lives of farmers in the state4.

The opponents of further centralization

  • 5 Statement of Karnataka Chief Minister, Mr. S. M. Krishna. The Hindu, 11-10-01, p. 1.

67Karnataka, the main accused in the inter-state dispute, defends the “useful” CRA institution as it is. Moreover, the Karnataka government is strongly opposed to further centralization, in particular as wanted by Tamil Nadu, through the regulation and control of reservoirs by a central agency. The Karnataka Chief Minister, Mr S. M. Krishna, described this demand from Tamil Nadu as “revolutionary and impracticable”5.

68The smallest state holder in this dispute, Kerala, although it has not been able to use its share of the Cauvery river and requested Central intervention, disapproves any further centralization and poses as fervent defender of federalism. For this reason, the Kerala Minister for Irrigation and Water Supply, Mr. T. M. Jacob, sought in October 2001 “to make out a case against the provision that allows the Chairperson of the Cauvery River Authority to take a decision in the absence of a consensus between the States. He was of the view that this clause was contrary to the spirit of federalism and the balance of powers and responsibility between the Centre and the States”.

69Each party involved in the dispute claims to defend the interest of its farming community, but the farmers’ voice has rarely emerged. Moreover, the farmers representatives are not empowered in the CRA.

The fanners’ community of Tamil Nadu

70The first point is that the date for the opening of the Mettur dam was inflexibly fixed over the years on June 12, without taking into consideration such factors as the onset of monsoon, storage position, on the farmers’ will.

71Concerning that matter, the Cauvery delta farmers’ associations regularly express their view in the Hindu newspaper, as they did in May 2001, saying that they “hope that the [federal] Government would consult them on the release of water from the Mettur dam”. “The dam opening has to be decided after taking into consideration factors which are not political’. But the farmers themselves politicize the issue. However, regarding the opening of the dam the farmers were previously consulted by the DMK Government, they sometimes in the past resorted to support the AIADMK (the rival party now in power) to express their various objections:

  • To the way the consultation was conducted;

  • To the timing of the desilting operations and all the maintenance works (shutters, etc...) which resulted in wastage of water;

  • To the allocation of funds for desilting which they maintained were “diverted to other parts of the State”.

72In what appers to be contradictory, the farmers asked at the same time for more consultation and for more centralization through more “stringent measures” from the CRA. Their representatives from the Cauvery delta even “welcome the stand taken by the State Government that the CRA should be empowered to oversee regulation of reservoirs and structures along the Cauvery”.


73We have shown that the issues of water and food security are linked by their complexity and the existence of many actors involved in conflicting relationships as to the various uses and distribution of resources. In the same manner, both the issues are extremely politicized and dominated by the paradigm of centralization-federalism, people’s participation and citizenship and finally, by the problem of proper institutions to manage resources either in periods of plenty or of scarcity.

74We would like to introduce to this round table discussion about water management the question as to how we, as researchers, especially as social scientists and people involved in development, can contribute to the response to the challenges that India has to face concerning food and water security.

75What kind of y and representative institutions issues are concerned, we suggest that our methodology in academic research should be also systemic in a vertical approach to understand the link between the different levels of decision.

76As regards the managment-institution problem and people’s participation, we stress the need to conduct some research on the actual institutions but also using a comparative approach to analyze what has been realized in other fields and areas, combined with an historical view so as to understand their evolution. Academic researchers should be involved in development projects and conduct action-research. Also, we have to stress the importance of preliminary indepth studies to understand the complexity of any society as a condition for the success of any development project.

77Finally, because the democracy issue arises, we have assumed our responsibility and come out of our research laboratories to mix with the civil society. This should not stay at the stage of well-intentioned discourse but, for example, we have to determine how we can practically involve the citizen in our research.



Chattopadhyay, S. S., 2000. Deluge in West Bengal, Frontline, Volume 17, Issue Number 21, 27 October, pp. 34-36.

Gargi Parsai, 2001. Karnataka agrees to implement Cauvery tribunal award, The Hindu, 8th June, p. 1.

Gargi Parsai, 2001, Karnataka agrees to implement Cauvery tribunal award, The Hindu, 1 June, p 8.

Janyanth, V., 2001. “CRA credibility on test”, The Hindu, 12 October, p. 5

M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, 1998. Food Security and Nutrition, Discussion Paper, Chennai.

Peter P. Mollinga, 2000. Water for Food and Rural Development, Sage Publications, New Delhi, p. 16.

Srinivasan, G., 2001. “Consult us on water release from Mettur dam, ryots tell Govt”, The Hindu, 21 May, p. 4.

The Hindu, 2001. “Model law to sustain water sources recommended”, 21 October, p. 10.

The Hindu, 2001. “Rural Water Supply schemes to become decentralised”, 20 October, p. 8

The Hindu, 2001. “Make medical education problem-based, patient oriented”, 09 October, p. 3.

The Hindu, 2001. “Tribunal with enough powers needed CM, 16 October, p. 5

The Hindu, 2001. “Karnataka told to ensure inflows into Mettur”, Karnataka Chief Minister S. M. Krishna, 11 October, p. 1.

The Hindu, 2002. “Karnataka should abide by decision”: DMK President Karunanidhi, 12 October, p. 5.

Venkatesan, J., 2001. “TN crop loss Rs. 300 crores: Paneerselvam”, The Hindu, 11 October, p. 11.

Vydianathan, S., 2002. “T. N. yet to receive communication”, The Hindu, October 01, p. 5


2 From our field survey. At the request of the farmers, we ensure them anonymity by not giving names of the village, NGO, or funding agency.

3 Procurement for the year 1997-1998 (season Kuruvai-Samba). Calculated from the data of the TNCSC.

4 Statement of Mr. M. Karunanidhi, the DMK president. The Hindu, 12-10-01, p. 5

5 Statement of Karnataka Chief Minister, Mr. S. M. Krishna. The Hindu, 11-10-01, p. 1.


Geographer, University of Paris-X, France, formerly affiliated with the French Institute
French Institute of Pondicherry
MA Geography and Development, PhD scholar on Food Policies and their impacts on the south indian population in University of Paris-X. He has been affiliated in France to Laboratory Geotropic, University of Paris-X (from 1999), Cirad-Amis-Ecopol (2000-2002), and in India to French Institute of Pondicherry (1999-2002) on a programme about food security in South-India in the Department of Social Sciences. He is also involved in development research and action in Indo-French NGOs. He is President of the NGO in France called I. N. D. E. S. (Initiatives Nutrition Développement Education Santé), and from 2001 he is Project Coordinator for FEED Trust (Food Education Emancipation and Development) acting in an anti-child labour programme in South-India.

© Institut Français de Pondichéry, 2003

Conditions d’utilisation :


Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search