The Future of Turkish-Iranian Relations
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1Although successive states and governments have ruled over the contemporary territories of Turkey and Iran, they have been neighbours for over five hundred years. Over time, they have not only experienced numerous wars, fierce competition and instances of intimate relations, but also developed and maintained a culture of diplomacy. That diplomatic culture, based on the preservation of the ‘fine line’ between cooperation, friendly competition and fierce rivalry, has been partly dictated by geopolitics, history and structural differences between the two countries, and partly shaped by the ruling elite.162
2Geopolitics has played a crucial role in Turkish-Iranian relations throughout history.163 Located on two edges of a key geographic area bridging Asia and Europe, political power in these respective territories emerged as barriers limiting the expansion of the other’s influence. Rising imperial powers based in these countries tempted them to advance against the other, which led to numerous confrontations throughout history. The declining power of the rival imperial states based in these two countries lessened the expansionist tension and facilitated relatively stable, and closer relations between the two countries. Geopolitics in modern times has dictated new concerns and provided new opportunities to Turkey and Iran. Modern Turkish and Iranian states have emerged as middle powers roughly equivalent to each other. Vulnerable to external interventions and internal challenges, Turkey and Iran have prioritised the preservation of the status quo on their borders and in their neighbourhood.164 In this respect, there have been two long-term and fundamental challenges to the status quo and security of the respective states; the Kurdish question and the Azerbaijan question.
3The Kurdish people have dispersed into four countries in accordance with the post-War settlements subsequent to WWI. Various Kurdish movements revolted against this status quo in each country mostly seeking autonomy, which was regarded by the regional states, that is Iran and Turkey, as a fundamental challenge to national security and territorial integrity. Additionally, the countries that have been hosting a considerable Kurdish minority population have dreaded the idea of an independent Kurdish state in the region, which emerged as a perception of a common threat that has brought regional states together. However, regional states have a practice of exploiting the Kurdish revolts in neighbouring countries either to force concessions from neighbouring hostile regimes, or for the purpose of ensuring their own national security. As a result, throughout the twentieth century and after, the Kurdish question has emerged as source of both contention and cooperation between the regional countries.165 Considering the persistence of regional geopolitics around the Kurdish people and the challenges to that status quo, we can safely argue that the Kurdish question will continue to be an influential issue in the future of Turkish-Iranian relations.
4The history of the Azerbaijan question arguably dates back to the Golestan and Turkmenchay treaties between Iran and Russia in the early nineteenth century, which culminated in the division of ancient Azerbaijan between Russia and Iran. The rise of Turkish nationalism among the Azerbaijani people in the early twentieth century, and the temporary independence of Azerbaijan that remained beyond the borders of Iran, turned the Azerbaijan question into a security issue for the Iranian establishment. Since then, successive Iranian governments have had misgivings with the potential Turkish incitement of nationalist and separatist feeling among the Azerbaijani people, who constitute the largest minority group in Iran. The independence of the Azerbaijan Republic along with some other Turkic states in Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has not only revived the Turkish interests in these countries, but also the conventional Iranian fears of Pan-Turkism. Although Turkish and Azerbaijani governments have consciously avoided stirring unrest among the Turkic people in Iran, the Azerbaijan question remains an important concern on the security agenda of Iran.
5The geopolitical location of Turkey and Iran also compels them to maintain at least a minimum level of cooperation between their respective governments. Firstly, as adjoining neighbouring states they need to coordinate their actions for the protection of their borders and for the security of the border areas. Indeed, the issue of border security and the related Turkish-Iranian dealings have been on the agenda since the turn of the twentieth century, and it will likely continue to be.
6Secondly, they need to use routes passing through the other’s territories for transportation of goods either for the purpose of exportation or importation. Trade, transportation and issues related to the safety of trade routes were on the agenda of bilateral relations even at the height of the imperial rivalry between the Ottomans and the Safavids, and continues to be an influential factor in contemporary Turkish-Iranian relations. A considerable amount of Iranian imports from the Western countries, and its exports to European markets are transported via Turkey. Likewise, a considerable amount of Turkish trade with the Central Asian countries passes through the Iranian territories. For this reason, it is not surprising that the Joint Economic Council meetings between Iran and Turkey that were institutionalised in the mid-1980s have emerged as the most persistent pattern in Ankara-Tehran relations.
7Finally, the new energy geopolitics has started to effect Turkish-Iranian relations, especially since the mid-twentieth century. The growing share of oil as an energy source in contemporary economic structures has led Turkey, an oil poor country, to be dependent on oil imports. Considering the rich reserves in Iran, successive Turkish governments have approached Tehran to match its needs for oil. Likewise, the growing share of natural gas in present-day economies since the 1990s has again led Turkey to turn towards Iran, which has the second largest gas reserves. Thus, Turkish dependency on energy imports has coincided with Iranian search for markets for its oil and gas, which has reinforced Turkish-Iranian energy dealings. Until a fundamental transformation of energy geopolitics, energy trade will be on the agenda of both Ankara and Tehran.
8Additionally, Turkish-Iranian relations are not immune to the effects of regional developments and great power politics. Following the establishment of nation-states in their respective countries in the early 1920s, either because of their preoccupation with internal challenges, or because of the dominant role of the great powers around Turkey and Iran, both countries avoided seeking influence beyond their borders. Subsequent to the rise of Cold War, both Ankara and Tehran allied with the United States against the Soviet threat, which culminated in close relations between them. However, Iran’s reversal to anti-Americanism after the revolution of 1979 adversely affected Turkish-Iranian relations. Moreover, the geopolitical changes in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the geopolitical transformation of the Middle East following the two Gulf Wars, gave Turkey and Iran an appetite to increase their influence in these areas. Thus, Ankara and Tehran entered into a fierce regional competition that continued with an inability for either to dominate over the other, or for the return of great powers, or for the rise of common threats. Considering the imperial background and cultural influences of both states which reach beyond their political borders, we could estimate that the geopolitical transformations and emerging power vacuums in the common neighbourhoods of Turkey and Iran, will likely lead to revival of regional competition in different forms in future as well.
9Against this geopolitical background, the different religious and ethnolinguistic identities of Iran and Turkey are argued to play effective roles in Turkish-Iranian relations. Although both countries have multicultural societal structures, there is a dominant Persian linguistic identity and Shiite religious identity in Iran against the predominantly ethnically Turkish and religiously Sunni identity in Turkey. However, rather than playing a defining role per se, as evidenced by the lack of continuous fighting between the two countries, identity differences are mostly regarded as part of geopolitical considerations. Thus, identity differences have played a complementary role in the regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran, and their security concerns. Therefore, sectarian and national differences between the two countries will continue to remain in the future, however, they will likely play their role in the case of a regional competition coloured with sectarianism.
10In this regard, the role of elite and political leaders has come to play relatively more effective roles through their assessments of geopolitics, and their foreign policy preferences. That is why any shift in leadership in either country may culminate in considerable changes in Turkish-Iranian relations. In this respect, successive JDP governments have opted for enhancing Turkey’s relations with Iran for different economic, strategic and political reasons. They have employed rationalisation, institutionalisation, and compartmentalisation strategies to deal with Iran, which have facilitated the steady growth of Turkish-Iranian relations. The rationalisation process has led to a downgrading of ideological considerations from the agenda of bilateral relations that facilitated the focus on potential opportunities and issues of common interest. The frequency of diplomatic exchanges has increased considerably and has culminated in the formalisation of a number of agreements, and the institutionalisation of diplomatic relations (See Tables 1 and 2). Finally, the compartmentalisation strategy has added a multi-dimensional perspective to Turkish-Iranian relations and brought relieving issues of cooperation from the adverse effects of contention in various fields. While regional context has mostly played a conducive role for the improvement of Ankara-Tehran relations, at times, it has also instigated competition between the two countries. Nevertheless, the rationalisation, institutionalisation and compartmentalisation have not meant the removal of all obstacles and the conciliation of all differences between the two countries. Indeed, as Jenkins highlighted, there is an asymmetry and a contrast between the repeated enthusiasm in the public declarations of officials to further bilateral relations and commitments to future cooperation, and a failure to translate that rhetoric into action. Moreover, there have been considerable fluctuations in Ankara-Tehran relations throughout the seventeen years of JDP power in Turkey,166 which indicates the limits of an analysis which solely relies on elite preferences.
11Actually, through the decades of neighbourhood, Turkey and Iran have developed a complicated relationship that defies simplistic explanations based exclusively on geopolitics, geo-economics, identity, and elite preferences. It is possible to detect two simultaneous but contrasting trends in Turkish-Iranian relations, one tilting towards competition and the other tilting towards cooperation.167 The compartmentalisation strategy employed by the respective governments in Ankara and Tehran to separate issues of contention and conciliation, have facilitated the maintenance of a ‘fine line’ between cooperation, friendly competition and fierce rivalry. The level of cooperation or rivalry between them is shaped by the mutual or clashing interests of the two countries which are influenced by geopolitics and elite preferences.168 This diplomatic culture is likely to continue into the foreseeable future of Turkish-Iranian relations.
Appendix
Table 1. Visits paid by High-Level Iranian officials to Turkey, 2002-2018
Official | Date | Occasion |
Mohammed Reza Aref, Vice-President | 29 Apr. 2003 | State visit |
President Ahmadinejad | Aug. 2008 | State visit |
President Ahmadinejad | Nov. 2009 | OIC – ISEDAK Summit |
Mohammad Reza Rahimi Vice-President | 5 Jan. 2010 | Meeting of Aghanistan’s Neighbors, Istanbul |
President Ahmadinejad | 7 June 2010 | CICA Conference, Istanbul |
Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Vice-President | 15 Sept. 2010 | State visit |
President Ahmadinejad | 23 Dec. 2010 | The ECO Summit |
President Ahmadinejad | 8 May 2011 | UN Conference on Least Developed Countries |
Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Vice-President | 5 Oct. 2012 | State visit |
President Rouhani | 9 June 2014 | State visit- 1st meeting of the HCC |
President Rouhani | 15-16 Apr. 2016 | OIC Summit in Istanbul, 3rd meeting of the HCC in Ankara |
Ishaq Jahangiri, Vice-President | 19-20 Oct. 2017 | State visit to Ankara and D-8 Summit in Istanbul |
President Rouhani | 13 Dec. 2017 | Extra-ordinary Summit of OIC, Istanbul |
President Rouhani | 3-4 Apr. 2018 | 2nd Iran-Russia-Turkey Summit meeting within the framework of Astana process |
President Rouhani | 19 May 2018 | Extra-ordinary OIC Summit, Istanbul |
President Rouhani | 19-20 Dec. 2018 | 5th meeting of the HCC |
Source: These events are collected from various news reports and chronologies on Iranian-Turkish relations. It excludes visits of speakers of parliament, foreign ministers, and ministers.
Table 2. Visits paid by High-Level Turkish officials to Iran, 2002-2018
Official | Date | Occasion |
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer | 12 June 2002 | State visit |
PM Abdullah Gül | 12 Jan. 2003 | Looming Iraq War |
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer | 18 Feb. 2004 | Summit meeting of D-8 Organization |
PM Erdoğan | 28-29 July 2004 | State visit |
PM Erdoğan | 2-3 Dec. 2006 | State visit |
President Abdullah Gül | 11 Mar. 2009 | 10TH Summit of ECO |
PM Erdoğan | 26 Oct. 2009 | State visit |
PM Erdoğan | 17 May 2010 | Tehran declaration |
President Abdullah Gül | 13 Feb 2011 | State visit |
PM Erdoğan | 28-29 Jan. 2014 | State visit – Joint declaration for the establishment of High-Level Cooperation Council (HCC) |
President Erdoğan | 7-8 Apr. 2015 | State visit – 2nd meeting of the HCC |
PM Davutoğlu | 4-5 Mar. 2016 | State visit |
President Erdoğan | 4 Oct. 2017 | 4th meeting of the HCC |
President Erdoğan | 7 Sept. 2018 | 3rd Iran-Russia-Turkey Summit meeting within the framework of Astana process |
Source: These events are collected from various news reports and chronologies on Iranian-Turkish relations. It excludes visits of speakers of parliament, foreign ministers, and ministers.
Table 3. Turkey-Iran Trade Relations, 2002-2018 (million $)
Years | Turkish Export | Turkish Import | Total Trade Volume |
2002 | 300 | 918 | 1.218 |
2003 | 523 | 1.857 | 2.380 |
2004 | 803 | 1.950 | 2.753 |
2005 | 905 | 3.469 | 4.375 |
2006 | 1.057 | 5.623 | 6.680 |
2007 | 1.380 | 6.600 | 7.980 |
2008 | 2.028 | 8.199 | 10.228 |
2009 | 2.024 | 3.405 | 5.403 |
2010 | 3.042 | 7.644 | 10.687 |
2011 | 3.590 | 12.461 | 16.051 |
2012 | 9.922 | 11.964 | 21.887 |
2013 | 4.193 | 10.383 | 14.577 |
2014 | 3.888 | 9.833 | 13.721 |
2015 | 3.665 | 6.096 | 9.761 |
2016 | 4.966 | 4.699 | 9.665 |
2017 | 3.259 | 7.492 | 10.751 |
2018 | 2,394 | 6,931 | 9,325 |
Source: ‘Türkiye-İran Dış Ticareti,’ T.C. Ticaret Bakanlığı, 28 March 2019, https://ticaret.gov.tr/yurtdisi-teskilati/guney-asya/iran/ulke-profili/ekonomik-gorunum/turkiye-ile-ticaret (accessed on May 30, 2019).
Table 4. Exchange of Tourists between Turkey and Iran, 2002-2018
Years | Number of Iranian tourists visiting Turkey | Number of Turkish tourists visiting Iran |
2002 | 432,281 | N.A. |
2003 | 494,977 | 180,000 |
2004 | 631,522 | 250,000 |
2005 | 957,245 | 210,000 |
2006 | 865,942 | 140,000 |
2007 | 1,058,206 | 140,000 |
2008 | 1,134,965 | 150,000 |
2009 | 1,383,261 | 200,000 |
2010 | 1,885,097 | 301,581 |
2011 | 1,879,304 | 293,683 |
2012 | 1,186,000 | 258,072 |
2013 | 1,196,801 | 203,039 |
2014 | 1,590,664 | 161,610 |
2015 | 1,700,385 | 163,500 |
2016 | 1,665,160 | 243, 559 |
2017 | 2,541,968 | N.A. |
2018 | 2,001,744 | N.A. |
Source: Data is retrieved from various sources including TÜRSAB, ‘2017 Tahran Uluslararası Turizm Fuarı Değerlendirme Raporu,’ https://www.tursab.org.tr/apps/OldFiles//dosya/15825/tahran-turizm-fuar-raporu_15825_6240747.pdf (accessed on May 30, 2019); T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Turizm İstatisikleri, http://yigm.kulturturizm.gov.tr/TR-9851/turizm-istatistikleri.html (accessed on May 30, 2019); Ceyhun Can Ozan, ‘İran ve Türkiye Turizm İlişkileri, İRAM, September 2017, https://www.iramcenter.org/d_hbanaliz/A_Ceyhun_Can_Ozcan_Yran_ve_Turkiye_Turizm_YliYkileri.pdf (accessed on May 30, 2019); ‘Türkiye-İran Ekonomik İlişkileri Bilgi Notu,’ https://kuto.org.tr/site/assets/files/1585/turkiye-iran_ekonomik_ve_ticari_iliskiler_bilgi_notu.pdf (accessed on May 30, 2019).
Notes de bas de page
162 Ayman, ‘Turkey and Iran: Between Friendly Competition and Fierce Rivalry,’ p.6.
163 Özdamar and Özcan, ‘Uneasy Neighbors…’
164 Süleyman Elik, Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualizing the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in Middle-Power States (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).
165 Sinkaya, ‘The Kurdish Question in Iran and its effects on Iran-Turkey Relations.’
166 Gareth Jenkins, Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Paper, May 2012, p.6-7.
167 Sinkaya, ‘Iran and Turkey Relations after the Nuclear Deal: A Case for Compartmentalization’.
168 Karabekir Akkoyunlu, ‘Turkey’s Iranian Conundrum: A Delicate Balancing Act’, in A.Kadıoğlu, Ö.Karlı, K.Öktem (eds.), Another Empire? Turkey’s foreign policy in a new century (Istanbul, Bilgi University Press, 2012).
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