Imaginations, Constructions and Constraints: Some Concluding Remarks on Heritage, Community and Participation

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Electronic reference
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When UNESCO adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003, a new heritage concept was transformed into a mighty global policy. According to many authors (see Bortolotto in this volume), new notions of heritage and new criteria concerning the definition of the heritage within this new policy were established, globally spread and finally translated into national heritage policies (cf. Bendix, Peselmann and Eggert 2012). In the realm of the intangible heritage convention, heritage is no longer material or monumental, nor is it of outstanding universal value. Rather, intangible heritage means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.¹

In this perspective, communities and groups themselves will identify their own valuable heritage. Heritage here is no longer of outstanding universal value – it has to be representative for a certain group of actors. Conceptualized as “bearers” of traditions, social actors who, for example, perform a certain tradition, will guarantee the vitality of their intangible cultural heritage, which then is understood as an important cultural resource. Cultural anthropologists and ethnologists, especially, criticized UNESCO’s perspectives on communities and the consequences intangible heritage interventions have for the production and organization of popular culture. Ellen Hertz (in this volume), for example, points to a great number of conundrums and even contradictions in UNESCO’s concepts of community and participation (see also Kuutma 2012: 27). As Dorothy Noyes has already pointed out in a working paper on traditional culture, most of UNESCO’s definitions and concepts do not take into account the complex nature of traditions, performative culture or folklore. She criticizes essentialist notions of community: “Too simple: Folklore is created and owned by a community (a group). It is thus different in kind from authorcreation or networked scientific and technological innovation. A community is a natural group, bounded and homogeneous. Once the tradition is created it is generally stable unless there is outside interference.”

In contrast to this simplistic view of cultural production and its rootedness in specific groups, Noyes shows that communities are heterogeneous for different reasons and that this heterogeneity is even a very central aspect of traditional culture and its dynamics (cf. Noyes 2003). The consequences of UNESCO’s concepts of community, as well of UNESCO’s efforts of community participation are well documented in many ethnographic case studies (cf. Eggert 2010; Hauser-Schäublin 2011; Bortolotto 2012; Tornatore 2012; Kuutma 2007). These are, for example, transformations in social relations when single actors proclaim to speak for an entire group, the “re-racialization of culture”3, different forms of instrumentalization, and new relations of different social actors and collectivities to a nation state (cf. Noyes 2006). From a cultural anthropological point of view, the critique of essentialist notions of community is based on broad empirical research as well as on theoretical reflections (cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004; Bendix 2009; Smith 2006; Noyes 2012).

Various contributions in this volume show that the link between heritage, community and participation is more than complex. First, an important differentiation points to the tension between conceptual or programmatic definitions and approaches to community in UNESCO’s documents, conventions, guidelines, etc., on the one hand, and communities performing a certain ritual, for example, on the other. In a structuralist perspective, one could even argue that this

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differentiation is based on the relationship between “signifiant” and “signifié”. Certainly, both dimensions are inseparably intertwined: UNESCO’s normative and political perspectives on communities and participation influence understandings, and the performative and discursive construction of community on the ground versa.

Given this background, this article argues that, from the perspective of science and technology studies, community, in the context of UNESCO’s heritage policy, can be interpreted as a form of assemblage composed by, for example, practices, norms, moral concepts, normative policies, performances and a set of very different actors (see also Macdonald 2013: 5–7; Harrison 2013: 31–32). These actors are arguing and acting within very different frames and cultural or institutional logics, as, for instance, Christoph Brumann argues (in this volume). From the perspective of a symmetrical anthropology discussed by Bruno Latour, all actors within UNESCO’s heritage policy – Brumann talks of experts as well as diplomats, etc. – build a temporally delimited community during sessions or expert meetings. However, within this performative construction process of a heterogeneous community, legal texts, guidelines, application forms – as discussed by Nicolas Adell in this volume – and so on, can also be conceptualized as powerful actants (see Akrich and Latour 1992: 259; Harrison 2013: 32–33) which have their own agency and which, for example, influence the definition, interpretation or valorization of cultural heritage.

The following three examples discuss some crucial aspects of cultural heritage and community as a form of assemblage. My main argument here is that, borrowing the idea of translation from science and technology studies discussed by Michel Callon (1986), heritage policy and practices are the result of the successful construction of a social network composed of different human and non-human actors. This perspective, which eventually deconstructs UNESCO’s heritage interventions, can lead to a deeper understanding of cultural heritage in late modernity as Callon’s translation theory asks how actors define and take specific roles within a functioning network, how alliances are built and how actors follow an identical goal even if they may have different personal motivations. All these processes can also be observed when UNESCO, national or subordinate organizations and institutions identify, proclaim, manage and – from an analytical point of view – invent cultural heritage.

1 Past communities, present communities and the challenge of national borders

Societies negotiate and, at the same time, discursively produce their pasts through cultural heritage interventions and policies – Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett describes this well. Within this construction process, heritage “produces something new in the present that has recourse to the past” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995: 370).
Present representations of history, for example, the valuation and preservation of historic monuments, the negotiation of history within museum displays, always have very concrete functions in the present (cf. Macdonald 2013). The broad literature on collective memory and on the production of national coherence in the 19th century, for example, documents these functions. From this perspective, the history of heritage (as concept and as cultural practice) can even be understood as a history of the construction of social coherence and of collective identity. In its history, generally argued, heritage and related concepts served as a strategic tool in order to produce “imagined communities” (cf. Anderson 1983).

An almost paradigmatic example, therefore, is UNESCO’s nomination of historic belfries in the border region between France and Belgium. UNESCO’s explanation of the inscription points to the strong symbolic dimension of the buildings:

Twenty-three belfries in the north of France and the belfry of Gembloux in Belgium were inscribed as a group, an extension to the 32 Belgian belfries inscribed in 1999 as Belfries of Flanders and Wallonia. Built between the 11th and 17th centuries, they showcase the Roman, Gothic, Renaissance and Baroque styles of architecture. They are highly significant tokens of the winning of civil liberties. While Italian, German and English towns mainly opted to build town halls, in part of north-western Europe, greater emphasis was placed on building belfries. Compared with the keep (symbol of the seigneurs) and the bell-tower (symbol of the Church), the belfry, the third tower in the urban landscape, symbolizes the power of the aldermen. Over the centuries, they came to represent the influence and wealth of the towns.4

Belfry of Brugge (Belgium); Author: L. Ellis; Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/lellis_sjca/182773877/ <accessed January 15, 2015>.
The extension of the listing realized in 2005 reacted to a new contextualization of the buildings. The first nomination in 1999 had already been the result of an interesting negotiation process. The International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) claimed a new and different interpretation of the belfries in its evaluation of the first application dossier dating from July 1998. The first application by Belgium only proposed belfries in Flanders, the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium, as future cultural heritage of outstanding universal value. This national, or better federal focus on a specific heritage was based on the federal organization of the Belgian state that is composed of three linguistic communities (the so-called French-speaking, the Flemish-speaking and the German-speaking community).

However, ICOMOS pointed to a quite different reading. The evaluation underlined the importance of a historical space that is quite different from the current borders of nation states. ICOMOS argued:

There is no doubt of the distinctive nature of the Flemish belfries. Their location in the ancient County of Flanders is unique to this region. The borders of the ancient county spill over into parts of what are now the Netherlands, France, and the Walloon Province of Belgium. Belfries are to be found in each of these different regions, testifying that these are indeed a tradition specific to Flanders. […] Whilst ICOMOS has no reservations about the value of the Flemish belfries, it is conscious that they represent a phenomenon that was characteristic of the ancient County of Flanders and not merely the modern Belgian Provinces of Oost- and West-Vlaanderen. As pointed out above, fine examples are to be found in the Walloon Province of Belgium.  

Consequently, ICOMOS referred the nomination to Belgium, who obviously reacted with a new and modified application that also contained belfries in the French-speaking part of the country, so that the differently composed serial heritage site was listed in 1999. Another modification was realized in 2005 with the extension mentioned already when the title of the item was also changed: The heritage site was transformed from “The Belfries of Flanders and Wallonia” into “The Belfries of Belgium and France”.

From an analytic point of view, the title of the inscription points to a crucial friction: Whereas, in the nomination process, scientific experts argued with a certain historical landscape (the ancient county of Flanders), the naming of the world heritage site refers to recent national (or until 2005, federal) borders. The first application dossier reproduced present differences within a nation state – the difference between two linguistic groups and two federal spaces; however, the last extension in 2005 created a new “heritage-scape” (di Giovine 2009) across different national borders and, therefore, offered new meanings that eventually fulfilled new functions.

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Tensions between the Flemish-speaking and the French-speaking part of Belgium today are as serious as never before due primarily to economic reasons, but the evaluation of ICOMOS underlined the homogeneity of a historical community: “All these belfries, on either side of the border, are part of a series of cultural properties belonging to the same cultural area [...] and the same socio-cultural group.”

This interpretation reproduces a problematic container model of spaces and landscapes linked to specific groups of actors. It reflects exactly an essentialist notion of heritage and of community discussed by Dorothy Noyes at the beginning of this paper. This interpretation further shows the functions heritage fulfills today. One could argue that transnational nominations, in general, produce new scapes, and claim, as Bernhard Tschofen put it, “a community of heirs without borders” (Tschofen 2007: 24). Certainly, the evaluation of ICOMOS can also be interpreted as a sort of moral project underlining democratic ideals, the quest for liberty and independence – heritage, here, is a powerful “moral code” (Hafstein 2012: 504). Finally, one has to ask whether these interpretations and the representation and construction of a historical scape through cultural heritage also influences recent perceptions of heterogeneous actors who live at a present space that is quite different from the historical space represented.

Discussing this first example by dint of Michel Callon’s translation theory, one can see how heritage is the result of a social process leading to a specific actor network. The first nomination dossier which reflected the federal structure of Belgium generated a process Callon calls “problematization” (Callon 1999: 68f.): the first interpretations of the belfries clashed with ICOMOS’ perspective on the historic monuments. What followed, in Callon’s wording, was a phase of “interessement” (Callon 1999: 71f.) when all actors within a forming network begin to follow the same goal. Here, the expert status of ICOMOS and the hegemonic position of UNESCO can certainly be seen as the central reason why the first nomination dossier was fundamentally reworked, which led to a new symbolic order of the non-human actors – the belfries.

2 Heritage and the (re)production of difference

The conceptual, programmatic and, finally, normative task of UNESCO’s heritage policy, which also became manifest in the proclamation of the belfries in the French-Belgian border region, however, may collide with national and/or subordinate heritage policies (cf. Bendix, Eggert and Peselmann 2012). Here, heritage nominations may even be used to reproduce or discursively strengthen differences (as was also the case in the first application of Belfries in Flanders). Again, my

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example here focuses on heritage policy in Belgium, where the ratification of UNESCO’s Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage caused federal frictions.

Due to enormous political and diplomatic efforts, in 2003, the Carnival of Binche, a small town in the French-speaking part of Belgium near the border with France, was proclaimed a Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO. This nomination was not only interpreted in national political contexts, but also as a symbolic valuation of the French-speaking community in Belgium, even if the Carnival had also served as a kind of national icon since the 19th century.

Consequently, political actors discussed the future proceedings concerning the nomination of future intangible heritage. The Minister of Culture of the French-speaking community in Belgium proposed, for example, that the three federal communities should work alternately on proposals for UNESCO’s Masterpieces program in order to reflect the federal structure of the nation state in a suitable way. Due to this proposal and following the nomination of a cultural practice in the French-speaking part of Belgium in 2003, the Flemish-speaking community represented by the “Flemish Centre for Folk Culture” (“Vlaams Centrum voor Volkscultuur”) worked out a nomination file entitled “Popinjay shooting as a paradigm of safeguarding ludodiversity in context. Traditional games in Flanders today: methods and challenges.”

Despite the decision to reflect the federal organization of the state in future nomination processes and due to political pressure, the French-speaking community also elaborated a candidature file in the context of a transnational dossier entitled “Processional Giants and Dragons in Belgium and France”. With this dossier, the French-speaking community not only undercut the rule that a state should only propose one candidature file per proclamation, it also increased the chances of getting the title due to UNESCO’s policy of supporting transnational candidatures. The consequence was that Belgium, through its federal bodies, was involved in two different candidatures in 2005 (cf. Jacobs 2005).

Whereas the Flemish application in the context of the proclamation of Masterpieces in 2005 was not successful, the transnational candidacy that was elaborated by the French-speaking community won the game. This incident caused a short but intensive debate, not only among cultural brokers in Belgium. This episode may serve as evidence that the federal heritage policy in Belgium was organized along the cultural and social logics of competition. The competing logics that can be found here interpreted the status of authorized heritage by UNESCO as a powerful resource in the context of national cultural policy.

This dimension also became manifest when the French-speaking community proclaimed the first federal Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage (see also Demotte 2004). During the ceremonial act of this first proclamation, which was a specific form of federal translation of UNESCO’s heritage policy, the federal Minister of Culture described intangible heritage as an important evidence for a
strong communitarian identity: “Culture is also the feeling of being part of a region, of a community. This sense of belonging forms to an important part of our identity.” In this perspective, cultural heritage as a marker of identity is conceptualized in an essentialist way: Culture, here, is directly linked to space and identity. Intangible culture seems to serve as materialized evidence for a collective identity.

This second example demonstrates the effects when a new transnational heritage policy is translated into a concrete national context, with its own history and own concepts of cultural heritage (cf. Tauschek 2010, 2012). In Belgium, the ratification of the intangible heritage convention, which itself was even used as a powerful political resource that should demonstrate Belgium’s role as a nation state within UNESCO, intensified conflicts on a national level between the French-speaking and the Flemish-speaking communities. Again, arguing with Michel Callon, the conflicts here point to questions of representation (e.g. who speaks for Belgium?), as well as to the various reasons why the establishment of a actor network can be problematic or even fail.

Federal negotiations about national and federal programs to document and safeguard intangible cultural heritage eventually constructed the negotiating groups of actors discursively. Here, one has to state that the federal programs, in order to document and safeguard intangible heritage, even constructed a new – yet also historically preshaped – category: federal intangible heritage. This new category even served again to produce an imagined federal community, as one can see in the quote of the French-speaking community’s Minister of Culture. Hence, the first proclamations of intangible cultural heritage in Belgium, with their emphasis on federal contexts, discursively (re)produced differences of two linguistic communities within a nation state.

3 Local Intangible Heritage and the Idealization of Community

Discussing normative aspects of the creation of intangible cultural heritage through UNESCO’s heritage policy, my last example focuses on the discursive construction of a local community that performs a certain tradition. Whereas my first two examples were located on a higher, national or federal level, my last example looks at a concrete nomination process on a local level. In the case of the Carnival of Binche mentioned already, proclaimed as a “Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity” by UNESCO in 2003, different actors were involved in the preparation of an application dossier. That is why this nomination could also serve

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as a paradigmatic example of Callon’s translation theory, as all the actors involved had to find their roles within an establishing network; they had to define goals and to convince other actors of these goals in order to build functioning allies.

First of all, there was a young art historian who, on behalf of the federal ministry of culture, should coordinate all actions concerning the nomination process. Then, there was the director of the local carnival museum, who should elaborate the written dossier. And finally, the required film was made by the president of a local film club. These actors were directly involved in the production of the application. However, there were many actors who framed this production: representatives of the local carnival association, local and federal politicians, the media and – in the perspective of a symmetrical anthropology – bureaucratic infrastructures (such as forms and guidelines) and legal texts. These non-human actors are extremely important in the emergence and global distribution of heritage regimes, as they guarantee common interpretations of concepts, definitions or legal parameters and strictly define processes.

In the case of Binche’s carnival, all these actors had the task of describing a local tradition that was worthy of receiving a global title from UNESCO. This meant that local understandings and interpretations of the tradition had to fit into globally accepted characteristics and normative definitions. This process became particularly problematic when the chief of UNESCO’s intangible heritage section at that time – Noriko Aikawa – visited Binche in 2003. Aikawa perceived a carnival where only men were allowed to wear the traditional costumes and, even in an interview, she officially pointed to a quite romantic conception of folk culture: “…really a very nice (...) friendship among [the] whole population dependent on the social status or age. It’s a real (...) full participation of a whole community.”

Despite this authorized and idealized interpretation of the local tradition which ignores things such as intracommunity differences and tensions, in the professional perspective of Noriko Aikawa, the marginalization of women in the official representations of the carnival produced in the context of the UNESCO proclamation was a very problematic aspect. She warned that this could even become a strong argument against a possible proclamation. In an interview, the art historian who coordinated the application remembered the consequences of Aikawa’s visit to Binche. Aikawa had claimed that the role of women should be especially highlighted in the dossier: “Well, it was really a central condition. It was impossible that a state within the European Union proposed a dossier where the role of women was denied. […] If we solved this basic scientific problem, she would give her ok to the dossier.”

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9 Interview with M.D., 13.10.2005.
The perspective of UNESCO’s representative points directly to what Nicolas Adell called the “polyphony-monograph-dilemma” (Adell in this volume). Local descriptions of the carnival had to be modified or formatted in order to fit into global concepts of cultural heritage, or, as Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett put it: “World heritage lists arise from operations that convert selected aspects of localized descent heritage into a translocal consent heritage – the heritage of humanity” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006: 170). Within this process of conversion, not only the dossier had to be reworked, but also some of the content of the film made by a local amateur filmmaker had to be changed. In a first version, one carnivalist underlined that women did not play any important role during the carnival. His personal interpretation also had to be eliminated after responsible actors of UNESCO’s intangible heritage section had commented on this first version.

This example shows how a global heritage regime effects local interpretations of intangible cultural heritage (cf. Tauschek 2009). However, this example also demonstrates a specific concept of community popularized by UNESCO. This concept, which is, first of all, based on human rights, can be circumscribed as normative and idealizing. Heritage communities here, have to act and be composed in harmony with human rights, and these communities are supposed to speak with one voice. Paradoxically, the chief of UNESCO’s intangible heritage section only demanded changes in the textual and visual representations of the carnival and not in the performance itself, which may again point to central contradictions in many concepts linked to the intangible heritage policy of UNESCO.

Critically, one could also state that this example of a local heritagization process unmasks the programmatic claims of community participation mentioned in article 15 of the intangible heritage convention:

Article 15 – Participation of communities, groups and individuals

Within the framework of its safeguarding activities of the intangible cultural heritage, each State Party shall endeavour to ensure the widest possible participation of communities, groups and, where appropriate, individuals that create, maintain and transmit such heritage, and to involve them actively in its management.10

The changes UNESCO’s chief of the intangible heritage section demanded finally point to hegemonic interpretations of intangible heritage and to heritage making as a “transformative process” (Hafstein 2012: 507), which also changes the relationship of social actors to their culture. However, the changes demanded also point to UNESCO’s heritage policy as a tool of governance (see also Di Giovine, in this volume): “Heritage emerges from the nexus of politics and power; it is a project of symbolic domination” (Kuutma 2012: 23). Within this project, differences are domesticated in many cases (cf. Noyes 2007), and one could even argue that “the

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involvement of communities [...] is predestined to being weakened by the national validation process that is necessary for heritage authorization in the UNESCO system” (Kuutma 2012: 29). The result are monolithic representations of popular culture.

4 Conclusion

The three examples discussed in this article can be understood as an empirically founded way to deconstruct UNESCO’s concepts of community and heritage and the cultural practices linked to these. However, as Kristin Kuutma pointed out, deconstruction is only one task of cultural anthropological heritage studies:

The deconstruction of an international ‘authorized heritage’ regime seems an obvious, though perhaps also the easiest undertaking. It is not too difficult to point out the arbitrariness and contingencies in heritage production, while it has recently become rather widespread to partake in the deconstructive academic analysis of UNESCO programs as an infamous example of cultural engineering. But what kind of agency will be gained or lost as a result of such academic exercise? What is the moral agenda of this investigation and critique? (Kuutma 2012: 32)

Kuutma’s questions claim reflexive research which should critically discuss academic concepts and perspectives. Different possible ways of such reflexive approaches are presented in this volume. A first way is a wider contextualization of heritage regimes, concepts of community and participation within broader social, political or economic transformations (see, for example, the contribution of Stefan Groth in this volume): Regina Bendix compares heritage regimes with systems of patronage and Ellen Hertz focuses on political ideologies of participation in different contexts in order to problematize imaginations of a “bottom” that – in UNESCO’s perspective – produces intangible heritage and is the object of a “participatory paradigm”.

A second way is a consequent questioning of the researcher’s role within heritage regimes, as discussed by Nicolas Adell, Jean-Louis Tornatore, Noël Barbe, Marina Chauliac or Chiara Bortolotto – which also means that we have to reflect on our moral agendas: Why is the empowerment of local actors a positive aspect? Why do we interpret national or international management of intangible cultural heritage as negative? What is our own moral basis to talk about negative or positive effects of heritage nominations (cf. Tauschek 2013: 187f)? And how do we link this moral basis to analytical definitions of (popular) culture?

A third way to get over deconstructivist approaches is to intensify the interdisciplinary dialogue. This is particularly challenging, as interdisciplinary frictions are also one way to explain the contradictions and contingencies in UNESCO’s heritage policies. Whereas legal scholars, for example, (see Urbinati and
Ubertazzi in this volume) work on common and generally applicable concepts and definitions which have a strong influence on UNESCO’s heritage conventions, cultural anthropologists highlight the problematic aspects of these concepts and the various constraints, for example, of essentialist positions. Here, one could argue that cultural anthropological research should not only deconstruct legally shaped positions, but that we should also try to understand the cultural logics of these positions and their various circulations. Within such a perspective, we should also be aware that our perspectives on cultural heritage only offer “partial truths” (Clifford 1986). Valdimar Hafstein rightly emphasized that heritage is “a particular régime of truth: the patrimonial régime, all at once material and ethical, economic and emotional, scientific and sensory” (Hafstein 2012: 502). One sometimes has the impression that even cultural heritage studies share unarticulated and even unreflected normative positions which may also form a certain regime of truth.\(^\text{11}\)

To conclude, the perspective of assemblage discussed at the beginning of this paper may be a fruitful approach: Cultural heritage is an assemblage of actors, ideas, concepts, practices and discourses, and – from the perspective of discourse analysis – cultural heritage is also an assemblage of scientific approaches (legal, anthropological, sociological, etc.) which are all shaped by their own disciplinary traditions of thinking about certain concepts – tradition, community, past, participation, etc. This assemblage, which is – through processes of translation – the basis for specific actor networks, has an important historical dimension and, today, this assemblage is, to a high degree, multi-layered: Different institutional, disciplinary or bureaucratic logics are intertwined in a very complex way on transnational, national, federal or local levels (cf. Tauschek 2012). A central consequence of this assemblage character of cultural heritage is that multi-sited approaches are needed (see Kuutma 2012: 33), as well as more comparative research. The contributions of this volume are one step in this direction.

\(^{11}\) This hypothesis could be discussed with a critical look on the so-called “Critical Heritage Studies” (http://www.criticalheritagestudies.gu.se/, <accessed October 8, 2014>).
References


