A tale of two cities
Rome and Avignon during the Schism
p. 19-48
Résumés
This article examines how the Great Western Schism affected the internal politics of both Rome and Avignon. Using a variety of evidence this chapter demonstrates that, in both cities the Schism facilitated the growth of a certain independent political awareness. Using the divided papacy, members of the Roman and Avignonese Communes leveraged, and negotiated with their respective authorities to extent their own participations into communal political life. The Schism allowed both Communes to temporarily shed the oversight of their “lords.”
Cet article examine l’impact du Grand Schisme d’Occident sur la politique intérieure de Rome et d’Avignon. À l’aide de divers éléments, ce chapitre démontre que, dans les deux villes, le schisme a facilité la croissance d’une certaine conscience politique indépendante. En s’appuyant sur la papauté divisée, les membres des communes romaines et avignonnaises ont négocié avec leurs autorités respectives afin d’étendre leur participation à la vie politique communale. Le schisme a permis aux deux communes de se défaire temporairement de la tutelle de leurs « seigneurs ».
Entrées d’index
Mots-clés : Rome, Avignon, politique communale, schisme, vie politique
Keywords : Rome, Avignon, communal policy, Schism, political life
Note de l’auteur
This essay summarizes some of the arguments I make in Rollo-Koster 2022. I want to thank the editors for their hard work and the anonymous readers for their enlightening comments.
Texte intégral
Introduction
1In February 1408, discussing the possibility of a meeting between popes Gregory XII and Benedict XIII in Tuscany, the Florentine Signoria opened the debate to collect its citizens’ feedback. By then, the Great Western Schism had languished for almost a generation, and most citizens defended Florence’s involvement, if only as an act of Christian piety. As the Florentine Gino Capponi emphasized, “considering the offers made for unity in general and in particular the commune could not hold itself back without incurring the scorn of God and of men”.1 While some feared that the presence on its grounds of the two rival popes could ignite internal rivalries, others underscored the stability of the Florentine state, or the fact that other cities had received one or the other pope and nothing drastic had happened.2 Meanwhile, the solitary voice of a certain Gionaccio Baroncelli, claimed that “enough had been done for the union of the Church, and that nothing further should proceed; and that for the good of this [Florentine] people he wished that there were twelve popes!”3
2Gino Capponi and Gionaccio Baroncelli’s words are significative on various levels, but for our purpose they show how late medieval people perceived the Schism, and how it could not be untangled from their own city’s internal politics. The presence of a pope in a city could raise animosity and internal conflicts, while some folks were getting tired of the situation and just did not seem to care. This seems a far cry from the people’s indifference that the historiography has often emphasized.
3In a recent compilation on the topic, Philip Daileader suggests that the Schism may have complicated lives, but people lived with it, adding, “As long as masses were said, confessions heard, baptisms administered, and burials conducted as they had always been – as long as the means of salvation remained unchallenged – then the Schism’s local consequences could only be minimal.”4
4While historians have insisted on the diplomatic efforts that states made to end the Schism much less has been done to investigate the ramifications of the crisis within states and cities.5 A first challenge to this passive disinterest came from Alison Williams Lewin. Using the registers of Consulte e Pratiche she meticulously rebuilt the history of the diplomatic relations between popes and Florence throughout the length of the Schism, while highlighting how navigating a variegated diplomacy brought intrigues and negotiations home. Lewin made the Schism central to her study of the city’s internal political life.6 It is the aim of this article to briefly investigate the role the Schism played in the internal lives of both Rome and Avignon, capitals of Schismatic Christianity.
5One similarity between Roman and Avignonese urban lives during the late 14th-century is civic engagement, regardless of the political imbroglio the Schism created. One can find the Schism at almost every facet of late Trecento Rome and Avignon’s communal histories, and within most internal political upheavals that both cities suffered at the time. However, counter-arguing an historiography that most often defines the crisis as limited to the “top”, with little to no echoes “below” the following pages will demonstrate that the Schism’s rivalries liberated communal governance to negotiate a certain freedom of movement vis a vis traditional powers of dominance. After briefly considering the historiography of both Rome and Avignon, this essay will survey the governing structure of both Communes, offering evidence of a certain “air of freedom” that breathed on both during the Schism. In essence, both cities demonstrate the old adage that liberties are hard to die. The Roman commune, traditionally assigned the end date of 1398, continued well into the 1410s, while in Avignon the Schism allowed a somewhat democratic resurgence quelled eventually only after the election of Eugene IV. In both Rome and Avignon, the Schism allowed the communes moments of constitutive authority and added leverage, to negotiate with authorities, like popes and kings.
A brief historiography
6Largely drawn, the historiography of Trecento Rome has emphasized either Rome before Avignon, to use Robert Brentano’s title, with an emphasis on Boniface VIII and the first jubilee in 1300;7 Rome during Avignon, the Rome of Cola di Rienzo, roughly contemporary with the second jubilee of 1350; and Rome after Avignon, especially the rule of Boniface IX and the fall of the Roman Commune in 1398.8 As James Palmer has rightfully gauged, it is the Rome of the single pope, Martin V, the Rome of the so-called Renaissance that has kindled and then inflamed interest.9 In general, historians avoid using the Great Western Schism as an analytical category to investigate the political history of the city.10 Recently, Walter Angelelli and Serena Romano’s La linea d’ombra: Roma 1378-1420 has highlighted the period, but with an artistic and cultural focus, leaving politics aside.11 While some historians hint at the period’s importance, Isa Lori Sanfilippo for example, suggests that the Schism divided Rome as it did Christianity, and Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur sees a link between the Schism and the longevity of the Banderesi government.12 A specialist like Arnold Esch refuses to address the Schism’s years in detail in his most recent book drawing a pitiable picture of the city, especially for the period 1398-1420.13
7Much smaller than Rome, Avignon is dwarfed by the history, culture and topography of its rival. More compact and concentrated, it was a city easier to rule, and the backbone of its papacy, rather than a thorn in its foot.14 The Avignon papacy has attracted scores of historians who quite often have distinguished it from the Schism. A few of the historians of the Avignon papacy have pushed its history into the years of the Schism but they have usually shied away from making the crisis integral part of their analysis of Avignon’s political life.15 The indispensable Pierre Pansier is the exception to the rule. Not that he studied the political life of Avignon during the Schism, but the ophthalmologist surgeon’s passion for history led him to research and publish several articles on Schismatic Avignon.16 For my part, I have made it the goal of some of my most recent publications.17 In sum historians have generally avoided addressing the internal lives of both Rome and Avignon during this turbulent period, almost as if embarrassed to breach a topic that left its researchers and readers uncomfortable – for somewhat unclear and nebulous reasons.
Governing Rome and Avignon
8The Roman Commune is traditionally assigned 1152 as the date of its creation. It held a Senate, whose composition, number and status varied over decades. A vicar usually supervised the spiritual while the Commune dealt with temporal matters when the pope was absent. The Roman contado (Corneto, Viterbo, Vetralla, Amelia, Sutri) paid a Grascia (food tax) that helped provisioning Rome, and sent fighting men when necessary.18 Fighting to enfranchise itself from pope, emperor and barons the Commune reached its peak in the late 1340s during the tenure of Cola di Rienzo.
9Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur delineates two phases in the history of the Commune. The first one ranged from the mid-13th century to the fall of Cola di Rienzo’s tribunate in 1347, with barons and their clientele in control. The second phase spanned from 1347 to the end of the Commune in 1398. It was characterized by a coalition of the urban nobility that managed to eliminate baronial families from the political scene.19
10One of the Commune’s essential assets was its military might. Before the initial statutes were promulgated (around 1358-1360), a citizen militia of balestrieri, armed with large shields, crossbows and swords was created. Its origin seems to find some roots in Cola di Rienzo’s 1347 constitution.20 This militia, which took the name of Felice Società dei balestrieri e dei pavesati, left its imprint on the history of Trecento Rome largely because its leadership and the Commune’s became intertwined.21 The Società had several notaries and seals, which gave it the legal qualification to execute its magistracy.
11By 1398 patricians let go of their control of the Commune, according to James Palmer, because in 1398, “Roman political elites turned their backs on a traditional ideology of communal good government and positioned themselves instead as experts in the good governance of their community, willing to serve a sovereign papacy.”22 But, Palmer’s focus on private and not public acts, from property transfers to last wills, as a gateway to the city’s baronial elites’ performance of virtue, hides the Schism. Palmer shows how the elite lost interest in defending the Commune, choosing instead to support the pope’s rule.23
12Like Rome, Avignon was originally a self-governing Commune headed by consuls named by lots with episcopal approval.24 Still, it lacked military asset. Avignon did not have a Felice Società dei balestrieri e dei pavesati. When it needed to defend itself, it hired mercenaries usually paid with funds drawn from its gabelles taxes on salt and merchandise.25 In the aftermath of the Albigensian Crusade, the papacy took the Comtat Venaissin, while Avignon remained property of the counts of Toulouse, until 1251 when dynastic alliances transferred Provence to Capetian rule. The Capetian focused their governance mainly on justice and its many revenues.26 The agent of the count of Provence, the sénéchal, appointed vicar and judges who oversaw the city’s politics, justice and administration. The vicar chose members of the city council which in turn appointed syndics who ran municipal affairs – they oversaw the levying of taxes and tolls. A sub-vicar supervised the municipal police, with ten companions serving as his personal guard. Thirty-two sergeants, headed by a captain, maintained public order. This certainly was not the government of the Roman Banderesi. The system remained more or less in place during the pope’s sojourn in Avignon, even after the pope bought the city from Jeanne Countess of Provence in 1348 for some 80,000 fl.27 The popes respected the old Capetian conventions. Urban V, for example confirmed them in 1363.28
13The city’s council, whose composition varied over the years, elected yearly two syndics (a noble and a bourgeois) and an assessor, who acted as legal support. The council did not have its own location – proof that contrary to Rome’s Senate and assembly, it carried little weight and was far from being institutionalized. Most meetings took place at the house of the vicar, which was located near the Temporal court, or in the sacristy of the Church of St. Pierre.29 Evidence supports the assertion that Avignon’s governance was essentially focused on taxes and justice, which were multiple in the city.30
14In 1376, when Gregory XI returned to Rome, he joined both positions of vicar and rector of the Comtat Venaissin into a single charge. The office of vicar/rector remained in place throughout the Schism. In 1434, the conflict between Eugene IV and the Council of Basel over whom should govern Avignon and the Comtat forced a compromise that replaced the vicar/rector with a papal legate.31 This legacy survived until the French Revolution. Papal control over the region ended in 1791, when Avignon and the Comtat became French.
Seizing the helm: Rome
15One of the first acts of Roman political independence occurred during the sede vacante that followed the death of Gregory XI in 1378. I will not return to events that I already discussed in a different venue.32 At the death of Gregory, the Banderenses, along with the twelve heads of regions and other officials, “pressured” the papal court for the election of a Roman pope.33 As Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur states, “they [the banderesi] applied continual pressure on the cardinals without challenging formally the sacrosanct rule prohibiting non-members of the Sacred College from entering the conclave – they never did enter it but they had ample opportunity to speak to the cardinals through an aperture made in one of the doors of the conclave. Nothing could have been simpler as one of the two guards required by the rules governing the conclave was one of the two banderesi, Nardo di Leonardo.”34
16Nardo di Leonardo was a friend of Pierre Gandelin, keeper of Castel Sant’Angelo. According to Gandelin, Nardo would have been paid off by Prignano before his election. Thus, banderesi ruled the city, tried to impress the court and as Maire Vigueur emphasizes, the armed militia followed the political will of the commune.35
17Rome in 1378 suffered from a political febrility exacerbated by what we could label the infiltration of “international” politics – the open animosity between the French papacy and Florence, enmeshed in their War of the Eight Saints.36 Florence influenced the Commune’s action during the conclave and helped sustain jingoism between Italian and French speakers.37 Florence, still at war with the papacy in April 1378 (the peace treaty was signed in July 1378), repeatedly asked Romans to free themselves from the “tyranny of the French”, that is, the French popes.38
18Still, using their authority during the 1378 conclave, communal officers redrew the political lines that marked their relationship with the recently returned “foreign” papacy. They negotiated directly with the court, letting go of the traditional groveling expected of uneven hierarchical rapports – expected by the French. The Banderesi set themselves as main, equal interlocutors. The most obvious evidence rests in their unfurling of the Commune’s banner – a deployment that granted them legal personhood.39 Still, it needs to be emphasized again that sharing governance between Commune and papacy was recognized in regulations of the vacant see.40
19Most information regarding the events of April 1378 is found in the Vatican Archives’ Armarium LIV, the so-called Libri de Schismate (books of the Schism) that gather in several volumes the depositions taken down for the kings of Aragon and Castile (vols. 14-39, for the Chancery’s copies of Aragon, and vols. 40-48 for copies of Castile).41 The Libri de Schismate narrate depositions taken from clergymen and laymen, present or not in the city at the time of Urban’s election. Rather than focusing on the issue of fear, which has monopolized the historiography, this short investigation aims at demonstrating that Roman officials literally positioned themselves as equal to the French curia. A fact that contemporaries did not miss.42
20Most depositions hold the same “truths” and emphasize Romans’ requests for a Roman or at least Italian pope; conclavists’ and cardinals’ fear of an over excited crowd; the breaking into the conclave once the election was concluded; and the pillaging of goods.43 Many depositions add that meetings and discussions between clergy and Roman officials belonged to customary traditions, indicating that witnesses knew there were rules, but this does not mean that Romans at large were aware of them.44
21Several testimonies draw attention to the fact that Roman officials attempted to enter the conclave after its gate was shut. They seem to emphasize the officials’ somewhat ignorance of the privacy and containment rules. Someone explains that after the closing of the gates of the conclave, ut moris est, no one could enter, but when the heads of the Roman regions asked to get in, they were told that “it was not permissible to enter once the major gate had been closed”.45 The door was closed with difficulty because the crowd was pressing on it, but the guard was able to block it with wooden beams.46
22Although slanted toward his own interest, Gregory’s camerlengo, Pierre de Cros, demonstrates that the Banderesi indeed seized the moment to communicate their authority. They gave themselves license to be the direct interlocutors of the cardinals and camerlengo; they discussed with papabili themselves. They also controlled the security of the conclave and all movements of the court. Some of this behavior may have been regulated by the rules of the conclave, but after decades of absence Romans fully embraced a role that was supposedly limited.47
23Pierre de Cros had to make the Banderesi’s involvement overbearing because it grounded his and the cardinals’ defense that the election was vitiated because of Roman violence, consequently accusing communal authorities of inaction at stopping it. He laid out his testimony in twenty-one articles.48 For example, Pierre de Cros states that Prignano interjected himself into discussions held with the Romans. While this point accuses Prignano of interference, it also empowers Romans who had direct access to him. He adds that Prignano and the abbot of Montecassino “enflamed” the Roman crowd during the conclave with “Romano lo volemo o italiano” (we want him [the pope to be] Roman or Italian). Still according to de Cros, a certain Nardo (a spicer), one of the banderesi, was closely enmeshed with Prignano. Here we see the close association between the Commune and the future elected, detrimental to the pope for sure, but again empowering for the Romans, giving them some agency in the electoral process.
24Further, Article Four describes a conspiracy to seize the camerlengo after mass to compel him, under the threat of decapitation, to surrender Castel Sant’Angelo, which held a good part of the treasury. This of course would have greatly advantaged the commune’s coffers and cut short cardinals’ efforts at fighting back. Fifth, on Gregory’s death, Romans held the city’s gates and bridges, usually in papal hands. This surveyance is scripted in the conclave rules, but it also allowed the Commune to eye the cardinals’ movements. Sixth, Roman authorities proclaimed (at the sound of trumpets) that all Roman nobles would be expelled from the city to allow the people free access to the conclave. Thus, communal authorities removed forces that could have supported the cardinals. Seventh, the Roman crowd, reinforced with “rustics” from the countryside, surrounded the conclave and vociferated day and night to such a level that those inside could not hear themselves speak. Here were the so-called violent “pressures”, which could also be interpreted from the Romans’ point-of-view that their desires were to be considered.
25Pierre de Cros leaves no doubts that the Romans were dominating the situation. They pressured the cardinals by accessing them directly, spoke with them and protected and/or terrorized them. Still the point remains that Romans performed authority according to traditional models of clientele – close personal rapports and deterrence.49 More examples show the acumen of Roman authorities. A 1386 testimony returns to the death of Francesco Tebaldeschi, the cardinal of San Pietro (at the end of August or early September 1378). It narrates the visit that Banderenses and other officials, including notaries, made to the moribund to interview him on the legitimacy of Urban’s election. The dying cardinal had been unable to utter a single word for some eight days, but supposedly did nod his head in acquiescence. This somewhat dubious testimony was then reproduced in fake “public instruments”, including a fake testament that defended the legitimacy of the election.50
26Similarly, the Roman insistence on controlling the old baronial fort of Castel Sant’Angelo is additional evidence of their leadership. After the defeat of San Marino, the French defending troops that occupied it immediately surrendered it to Urban VI on 30 April 1379. Dietrich von Nieheim notes that the castle held many wide tunnels, and that the Romans had been plundering its material for a long time, like an open quarry.51 Nevertheless, the following day, the Romans entered by force and attempted to destroy it. However, Dietrich von Nieheim notes that it was nearly indestructible.52 The Romans’ insistence underscores a reality; they were appropriating a symbol. The fortress was papal – and baronial authority.
Seizing the helm: Avignon
27The early years of the Schism were not that propitious for Avignon Commune. Avignon’s relation with its pope was before all financial. In a certain sense it could be argued that the city could feel empowered because it fed the pope’s politics. The thick Gabelles register CC 1011 initiates in 1376 details various structural and defensive works, repairs on the Durance’s banks, on the city towers, and expenses incurred by the guard of the gates. The expenses related to the great tower of the bridge (magne turris ponti Rodani) are a leitmotif, and clearly evidence a fear of an attack via the river. It also appears that Clementist cardinals in Rome used the gabelles early in the Schism.53 By September 1379 the register records payment to the cardinals of a subsidy of 300 fl.; it later shows a subsidy of 50 gold fl. sent to Pierre de Cros.54
28When Clement entered the city under his golden-embroidered canopy, he had already taxed the city council a subsidy of 3,000 fl., levied to help the war effort in Italy.55 He then required some 10,000 fl. in January 1379; 5,000 fl. in 1380; and levied an extraordinary tax in 1384 for his expenses.56 The pope also never hesitated using the gabelles direct taxes for his own enterprise, asking the council to share its revenues by a third, half, or sixth.57
29The city had little funding left to support its own infrastructure. The gabelles register for the next ten years, roughly 1379-1391, principally held by Thomas de Podio, shows that the brunt of the city’s defense rested on its tax revenues.58 The city also carried the palace’s expenses. In January 1388, the gabelles paid for cleaning the waterline that ran from the pope’s granary to the Inn of the Chapeau Rouge – a name that obviously refers to the cardinal’s galero.59 In 1391, Avignon’s gabelles paid for cleaning the waterline of the pope’s garden.60 Still, and in all fairness to Clement’s financial needs, the pope became creative in raising his revenues. He did not replace the dead bishop of the city between December 1383 and August 1392, monopolizing the revenues of Avignon’s episcopal manse.61
Rome
30Almost a generation after the election of Urban VI in Rome, another pope faced a new Banderesi rebellion. From the early 1390s on, the traditional baronial parties had resurfaced around popular leaders like Pietro Mattuzzi, an important merchant, in relations with the great Florentine companies.62 The city was again divided between Colonna and Orsini, who were taking turns on the Campidoglio. The 1394 nomination of Mattuzzi as head of the popolari led to heightened agitation. Pietro Mattuzzi followed the Orsini, while the “nobles” under Pietro Sabba Giuliani, Pietro Cenci and Natolo of Buccio Natoli followed the Colonna. For something like a year, Matuzzi ruled Rome as one of three conservatores, but by summer 1395 he was banned. He left but reappeared at the gates of Rome in June 1398, with the support of the condottiere Paolo Orsini. The noble party heading the Commune panicked, declared the city bankrupt, and handed it to the pope. With plenum dominium Boniface eliminated Nobiles on 4 July, Populares on 4 August, and gave the governance of the city to a pontifical vicar and a senator that he named. The Commune’s magistrates simply became civic administrators.
31The fall of the Commune did not rest well with all. In August, a counter coup led by the Caetani failed and the conspirators were executed. Pietro Mattuzzi did not abandon his political ambitions. In January 1400, he joined the Colonna and attempted a coup that failed amidst total disinterest. According to the Cronica volgare, the rallying cry of the revolt was “Viva il popolo e muoia il tiranno Papa.” (Long live the people and death to the tyrannical Pope).63 The major nobiles leaders were executed and Mattuzzi exiled to Rimini.64 Still, the failure did not prevent the Colonnesi from harassing anyone circulating near Rome.
32The years ranging from the death of Boniface IX in October 1404 to the entry of Martin V in Rome on 30 September 1420, were for Rome the darkest of the Schism. Succeeding Boniface in October 1404, Innocent VII did not have his temperament. He lost control of the situation rather quickly. Romans contested his dominium over the city, and they allied themselves with the king of Naples, Ladislaus who entered the city via the Porta S. Giovanni, and settled, of all places, at the Laterano.65 After a couple days, Ladislaus left the Laterano by the same Porta S. Giovanni, accompanied by a multiple of Neapolitan and Roman barons. In this second 1404 entry, Ladislaus emphasized his rapport with the pope. Escorted by the Orsini, he rode under a palio that had been ordered by the pope – we do not know if the papal gesture was natural or coerced.66 The association with the Orsini also landed the king squarely on the pope’s side. Within a few days he had managed to satisfy all parties. Ladislaus successfully arbitrated between pope and people a new treaty that gave responsibilities to a somewhat restored Commune, the pope and Ladislaus. The treaty was signed on 27 October 1404.67 The Capitol returned to the Commune and Ladislaus received the rectorship of the Campagna and Maritima.68
33After much peripeties and involvement in papal affairs, Ladislaus died suddenly on 6 August 1414. The Romans of course reacted as expected. They revived their defunct Commune, rang the bells of the Capitol, met on its square, to the cries of “Viva, viva lo Populo” (Long live the people). They retrieved the gates of the city peacefully and after having dismissed Ladislaus’ magistrates, named new representatives of the Commune.69 With this newly gained freedom, the Romans chose the old “politician” Pietro Matuzzi as their new senator, somewhat against his will. On 10 September 1414, the crowd assembled in front of his house, all pennants deployed to the cries of “viva viva lo Populo; we want one lord and not many; we want Pietro Mattuzzi because he loves the people.”70 On 16 September, the Orsini barons swore him fealty. But things did not work well for Mattuzzi. Within a month, a new movement issued from the Trastevere unseated him. Antonio di Pietro dello Schiavo’s description allows us to follow this political fluidity. The Trastevere insurrection initiated with cries of “Vìva lo Populo et la Chìesia santa” (Long live the people and the Holy Church on the order of John XXIII’s cardinal legate.71 The legate named new conservators and Rome fell again under papal dominance. A detail mentioned by Antonio demonstrates that the Commune was this time dead for good: “On Sunday, 4 November, they killed the lion of the Capitol at the palace, this was done because it had killed children.”72 The lion would have escaped the Capitol when Mattuzzi lost his seat. Once dead he was exposed (hanged) in the rione Ripa. The poor beast may have been a “murderer”. But before all, this caged lion symbolized the Commune. He died with her.
Avignon
341398 was also a fateful year for Avignon, allowing the Commune, in reverse of Rome, to voice some political initiative. The First French Subtraction of Obedience (1398-1403) was the trigger. After the death of Clement VII on 16 September 1394, his successor Benedict XIII (the Aragonese Pedro de Luna) promised conciliation and work toward union. Before his election he (and the rest of the College) swore a “capitulation” that directed the new pope to work toward union. Even he promised with an oath Benedict never once doubted that he was the legitimate pope. The French king (and his family) balked at his resistance, called three councils between 1395 and 1398 and eventually seceded, this was the French Subtraction of obedience.
35The results of the vote of subtraction were proclaimed by the king’s chancellor, Arnaud de Corbie, on 28 July 1398, in front of a large crowd attending the royal palace in Paris.73 The Clementist cardinals abandoned their pope in Avignon, crossed the bridge and found residence in Villeneuve, across the Rhône in French territory. Avignon citizens sided with them in September. In a 2003 article I discussed in detail the effects of the subtraction on Avignon’s space, population and culture.74 In a bold move, the Commune chose to participate in the isolation of the pope and his supporters and control all means of communication with them.75 The palace and its residents were bound with a chain-locked security perimeter (the same type of physical trappings that delimited cardinals’ housing clusters, the livrées), that was guarded by men of the cardinals and citizens. According to Martin de Alpartil neither the pope nor his people could obtain food or anything without permission of the guard. Alpartil emphasizes these cancellos, their keys (claves cancellorum) and guards (cancellorum custodes) that became focal point of who could communicate or not with the pope. Citizens along with cardinals had managed to reverse authority. They, the holders of these keys, controlled the pope.
36After a failed attempt at dislodging him by force, Benedict was kept prisoner in his fortress until his escape on 12 March 1403, the last ruling pope to reside in the city.76 Avignon’s Florentine residents described this evasion with a simple “he [the pope] went out”.77 Avignon and the cardinals restored their obedience by the end of March, and France in May. The first act to end the Subtraction after the approval of the 1403 treaty, was to remove barricades and chains from the streets that led to the palace, evidence of its regained centrality.78
37Avignonese officials sought to make amend with the pope by begging his forgiveness for their poor treatment of the pope’s backers, and for their involvement in the nomination process of the town’s officers. Still the sincerity of their apology is questionable. They had ulterior motives. They asked the pope to return the levy from the gabelle taxes to the city – these funds would provide for the defense, and repairs of the city’s infrastructure, especially the area around the Preachers’ convent. Benedict refused. He simply limited their requests to a single amnesty for all citizens and status quo on the rights and privileges of the city.79 That was it. Avignoneses were to consider themselves lucky to escape with their lives.
38A few years later, The Second French Subtraction of Obedience (1408-1411) gave Avignon another try at a direct involvement with the affairs of their city. This second subtraction was caused again by Benedict’s resistance at finding union, especially after the murder of Louis of Orleans, his principal supporter at the French court, on 23 November 1407. If Benedict could not find a solution, France would remain neutral between both popes.80 According to Michel Pintoin, the religieux of Saint Denis, French neutrality was officially declared on 22 May 1408, at Saint-Martin-des-Champs, by a mendicant doctor in theology named Pierre-aux-bœufs, in a voice “high and intelligible”.81
39Cardinals from both obediences agreed to meet in council, eventually designated to take place in Pisa, while Benedict eventually called his own council in Perpignan (November 1408-February 1409) that failed to accomplish anything. The pope never abdicated as promised.82 It is the Council of Pisa that deposed both popes at its 15th session on 5 June 1409. Labelled, “notorious schismatics and heretics, hardened perjurers, scandals for the Church, incorrigible, rejected by God, excluded from the Church”, they were deprived of all offices and deposed.83 Still these events did not have an immediate impact on Avignon. The city remained attached to Benedict from the time of his 1403 evasion until 1410 when the palace was again besieged, but this time empty of its pope.
40It is of note that Benedict had indeed learned something from his 1398 siege. His palace was strong and after his escape he decided to make it stronger. He reinforced its defense by first removing nearby dwellings flanking its western side and protected the cathedral and Petit Palais. Work was accomplished between December 1403 and February 1404.84 He ordered to wall and fortify the area that encompassed the Rocher des Doms, cathedral, Petit Palais, papal palace and big tower on the bridge. The highest point of the rocher, the bell tower of the Cathedral was destroyed, and replaced with a large tower that now dominated the city (tour Quiquengrogne).85 With these fortifications, a wall defined and protected the palatial complex. In a much smaller scale, it evoked Rome’s Leonine walls around the Vatican and Borgo.
41How the palace ended up besieged is a direct consequence of the Council of Pisa and the election of its pope Alexander V, in June 1409. On 10 July 1409, Alexander appointed Cardinal Pierre de Thury papal legate and vicar general of the Comtat Venaissin with the order to bring the Comtat Venaissin and Avignon under the fold of his obedience, by force if necessary. His brother Philippe de Thury, archbishop of Lyon seconded him. They were supported by various French troops headed by, to only name a few, Randon de Joyeuse, L’Hermite de la Faye, seneschal of Beaucaire and Régnier Pot, governor of Dauphiné.86
42In the absence of a pope, the palace was well defended by troops headed by Bernard de So, Viscount of Evol, and his Catalans, while Rodrigo de Luna, the pope’s nephew, was captain of Avignon and rector of the Comtat Venaissin, supported by Aragonese, Navarese, Castilians, and Catalan troops.87 To further his defense, Rodrigo finished the fortifications of the palatial compound, and he mandated the expulsion of the monks and canons of Notre-Dame des Doms. By continuing their religious services, they had been allowing people into the church, hence into the walled fortress.88 The palace was fully defended in expectation of the arrival of the troops of Philippe de Thury, who had entered the capital of the Comtat Venaissin, Carpentras, to the cries of “viva our lord Alexander”.89
43After the Comtat, Avignon folded to the Pisan obedience a few days later, on 30 April 1410, in circumstances that somewhat shocked locals. Francesco di Marco Datini’s correspondents in the city kept returning to that fateful day. Noting repeatedly that the bridge was closed to all communication, but hopeful for a quick resolution, they explain how Rodrigo, wanting to “seal a deal” with the city to hold up as long as possible against the French, invited thirty-six Avignonese notables to dine at his table. Only eleven showed up – the others did not, nervous and rightly so, of falling into a trap. Rodrigo seized his guests as his prisoners and destroyed nearby housings, including two livrées. Avignon mutinied at the act. This initiated the first salvo of the Catalan war.
44It is during that war that Avignon truly took hold of its destiny. In May 1410, perhaps having learned a lesson from the former siege, the city named “war elects” (electi de guerra), who centralized financial requests to a treasurer.90 They were supported by the traditional city council, syndics and the assessor.91 All appear at every page of the city’s registers of the period.92 The war lasted some nineteen months – it ended technically when the Catalans left the palace on 23 November 1411.
45Some of the first acts of the war in spring/summer 1410 were to fully seal the palace, barricading its access from within the city. The Catalans responded with incendiary projectiles and attempted to destroy the bridge.93 The Avignonese, by fall 1410, had gained the bridge and the exterior walls of the palace’s garden, but not the fortress.94 A long-time resident of Avignon of Florentine origin organized the bridge’s defense. Stoldus de Pazzi was a Benedictine “fighting” monk and prior of the monastery of Cathenac. He followed his sister Nona, wife of a renowned and long-time resident money-changer from Asti, Catalano della Rocca (Cathalanus de Rocha, or de la Rocha), who also participated in various functions of the government of the city.95 The Benedictine’s and Astesan’s involvement shows the heart with which the Avignonese were devoted to the cause, no doubt because some of the city’s eminent citizens were still in the hands of the Catalans.
46By winter, Avignon feared that France would abandon them. Moreover, Avignon feared for its men, still held hostage in the palace. In December 1410, the fortress’ blockade was starting to show its effects and Pedro de Luna requested help in the form of food for his prisoners. This request was a true crisis of conscience for Avignon. The city council met along with the syndics and the electi de Guerra. Notary and secretary Guillemo Mathei alias Monachi recorded the proceedings. He notes that the syndics and electi received full authority to administer the expenses of the war, and later that a vote regarding the prisoners, done with black and white fava beans, turned negative.96 Carreri’s chronicler lets us know that three of the prisoners died in January 1411. All were buried in local cemeteries, suggesting that their bodies were released to their families.97
47In December 1410, the papal legate Pierre de Thury died. John XXIII immediately appointed François de Conzié as his replacement.98 Avignon enthusiastically received the experienced administrator. And especially his plan of storming the palace, which was presented with sacred undertones. The war was now a crusade.
48In February 1411, John XXIII sent Avignon a “bull of crusade” against “those of the palace”; it was issued publicly at the church and Place Saint Didier.99 Avignon had already asserted its right of a crusade against its enemies a few weeks earlier in a letter that requested help from neighboring Carpentras. On the last day of January 1411, authorities harangued propter crusatam seu cruce signatam against “schismatics and enemies of the Church of God […] for the honor of our pope and the union of the holy Church […] for the eternal salvation of the soul […] against infidel pagans” with the concession of full remission of sins.100 There had been crusades against Muslims, heretics and pagans; now there was a crusade against the troops of a recalcitrant pope.
49The group of urban patricians who made up the “war council” made ideal interlocutors with other authorities and facilitated the logistics of war. Even the king of France, Charles VI, dealt with them directly. In May 1411, he allowed “syndics and inhabitants” to extend chains across the Rhône to stop an eventual reinforcement of the Catalans from the river – the permission included other French locations. The king further allowed them, on the same date, to levy a tithe on the French clergy, limited to 10,000 livres, to sustain the war effort against the Catalans and recover the church’s patrimony.101 These were extraordinary grants. And I would argue that the symbolism of a king directly addressing Avignon officials may have been more important than the reality of his financial aids. Because in fact, we know that the aid was slow to come, if not non-existent.102
50At every step of the war, the king “deferred” to the town – and not to John XXIII’s camerlengo François de Conzié. He asked Avignon to accept mercenary captains like Bernardon de Serres and Philippe de Poitiers, the king’s chamberlain and brother of the bishop of Valence Jean de Poitiers, rector of the Comtat.103 When in January 1412, shortly after the war ended, Avignon needed repairs, the king asked the camerlengo to dedicate to that purpose 20,000 livres from French tithes.104 The king further sent 12,000 silver francs to the camerlengo in order to repair the palace; he let the syndics know the financial steps he had taken.105
51In January 1411, the Avignonese decided on a direct assault of the fortress and the Rocher. The failing of heavy artillery emboldened them to attempt a physical charge against the enemy.106 The local carpenter Jacquet Barri built a water siege tower on the Rhône, while other carpenters put together a large ladder.107 The assault emptied the city’s coffers. Early in the siege, inhabitants had been taxed with a forced loan that would eventually be reimbursed on the gabelles taxes. It was insufficient.
52The continuation of the war effort ended up affecting everyone financially. The legate and papal camerlengo François de Conzié offered his silverware and confraternities their valuables, including tabernacles, basins, crosses and images.108 They were pawned to wealthy merchants in hope of being eventually retrieved.
53The war effort became more intimate and participatory as time went, engaging most of the city’s inhabitants in the reconquest of the palace. Archive registers log scores of individuals who lent to the city war’s effort.109 The loans were eventually reimbursed from the city’s gabelles. The lists comprise men and women, merchants and widows, of all walks of life. The spice-merchant Rostaing Veneri lent 112 gold fl. on 31 July 1411. In December 1412, the city reimbursed Philippa de Moigin, dame of Vercoiran in the diocese of Gap, the 587 fl. she had lent. In July 1413, the city reimbursed an obligation of some 790 fl. to Marguerite, wife of the wood merchant, Guillaume Nigri.110 We have to assume that financial involvement somewhat steeled resolve, as it set Avignon citizenship’s war effort closer to their pockets, hence even more painful.
54Even if only a small amount of Avignonese fought directly, they were willing to involve their fortune in the siege.111 And this made them engaged, active participants. As such, the entire city could claim a role in the reunification of the Church, via the conquest of one of the popes’ fortresses.
55The siege and political situation were taking such importance that in June 1411, the city’s council felt the need to revamp its electoral procedure. New regulations were approved by François de Conzié, the pope’s legate. Each professional specialty named representatives. Nobles and bourgeois who were not merchants named two; notaries and legal doctors, one; money-changers and silversmiths, one; apothecaries, physicians, wholesalers and barbers named two; and so on, for all thirteen occupational groups. These representatives drafted new regulations that established a council of 42 members as electoral body for three syndics instead of the previous two. New regulations aimed at preventing nepotism and organized the city’s passive defense – extending the chained barricades that protected streets and neighborhoods. These procedures extended political participation to a wider group of notables and attempted a system that was fair and equitable for its time. It also centralized the city’s defense in syndics’ hands.112
56Most importantly, Avignon officially disenfranchised supporters of Benedict’s cause. The new regulations banned anyone present and future who in any way had been supporting Benedict’s cause since 1410 to ever be eligible to seat at the council. The prohibition extended to their descendants.113 The Schism thus directly affected civic governance.
57Since its establishment in 1251, the vicar (representative initially of French authorities and then of the pope, after 1348) had decided on the council membership.114 In the early 14th century, knights, burgenses (wealthy bourgeois) and lawyers (jurisperiti) held the position of syndics, named by a council of 32 composed of the same social categories (nine knights, nine lawyers and 14 bourgeois). By 1358 syndics were limited to two, a knight and a bourgeois and the vicar added an assessor – who needed to be of the legal profession. In sum, nobles and bourgeois held the lion share of governance. The 1411 regulations upset this hundred-year-old governance. A democratic breath blew on the council, with most of the city’s occupational categories allowed to name representatives who elected the syndics.115 The new procedure also recognized immigrants, and we can note a certain Italianization of the composition of the council during this period.116 The vicar’s nominations lost their weight – he was left naming only 14 members who needed to be approved by the rest of the council. The war effort had freed the council from external interference and leveled social stratification.
58This revolutionary change however had a doomed history, mainly because the classes of nobles (knights, milites) and bourgeois melded into one, and the distinction between both became difficult to apprehend. In addition, councilors held their positions for life which ended up resting on the wealthiest. Immigration to the city changed political structures. 15th-century councils held Italians and natives in recognition of the former contributions to the political life of the city.117 Knights disappeared from social stratification and were replaced by domicelli (damoiseaux, squires) issued from the urban mercantile patriciate, of either Provençal or Ultramontane origins.118 Still, 1411 had not been for naught. In 1437, the Avignon council still counted 28 representatives from the seven parishes titled “extraordinary councilmen”; they were 56 in 1451.119
59After countless attempts, it became clear that the fortress held its reputation – it was indeed impregnable and the authorities decided that a total blockade would win them the war.120 In the end, the Catalans agreed to negotiate their surrender. They did so with the papal legate Jean de Poitiers, François de Conzié and two of Avignon’s electos de guerra. Avignon had the satisfaction of being fully involved in the pourparlers.121 With no rescuer in view, the Catalans evacuated the palace on 23 November 1411.
60For Avignon, the most significant moment of this surrender was what the inhabitants did after the Catalans left. They leveled to the ground “the new walls, the tower named Quiquengrogne and all the other walls that were on the Rocher des Doms, so much so that they flattened everything”.122 The act was of course forbidden and caused the ire of papal and French authorities. These walls in fact reinforced the palace and greatly improved its defense, something that François de Conzié wanted to preserve. The papal legate excommunicated city officials.123 Avignon sent a long letter to the pope, begging pardon, and explained that these ramparts had protected evil, caused much damage to their city, and hampered the “liberties and privileges” of the city in a section of the walls that had always been communal and separate from papal property.124
Conclusion
61To briefly conclude this discussion of Rome and Avignon during the Schism it is essential to emphasize the “spatial turn”. A papal palace, could be cherished or shunned, while political transitions favored citizens’ mainmise on certain monuments – usually involving the destruction of powerful symbols of authority (Castel Sant’Angelo and the Tour Quiquengrogne, for example).
62As with Rome and Castel Sant’Angelo, communal identity rested on its own space and architecture. Something could be taken and change hands – space on the Rocher, an ancient mausoleum like Castel Sant’Angelo, but layers of history gave these spaces civic memory.125 For a few moments the political fluidity that earmarked the years of the Schism allowed Rome and Avignon’s civic authorities and citizens, a freer range than they had previously held. In both cities communal authorities navigated fractious politics to extract some bits of communal empowerment. Granted that both held a specific space in the European urban landscape because of their unique relationship with the papacy. Popes and their courts resided and transformed both cities’ society, economy, politic, architecture and urban fabric. It is then to no surprise that in both cases communal societies were deeply intertwined with the Schism.
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validità dell’elezione di Urbano VI nei primi anni del Grande Scisma: alcune piste di ricerca, in A. Rigon, F. Veronese (eds), L’età dei processi. Inchieste e condanne tra politica e ideologia nel ‘300. Atti del convegno di studio svoltosi
in occasione della XIX edizione del premio internazionale Ascoli Piceno,
Ascoli Piceno, Palazzo dei Capitani, 30 novembre-1 dicembre 2007, Rome, 2009, p. 249-304.
Renouard 1954 = Y. Renouard, La papauté à Avignon, Paris, 1954.
Rollo-Koster 1998 = J. Rollo-Koster, Mercator Florentinensis and Others. Immigration in Papal Avignon, in K.L. Reyerson, J. Drendel (eds), Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France, Leiden, 1998, p. 73-100.
Rollo-Koster 2002 = J. Rollo-Koster, Castrum Doloris. Rites of Vacant See and the Living Dead Pope in Schismatic Avignon, in J. Rollo-Koster (ed.), Medieval and Early Modern Ritual. Formalized Behavior in Europe, China and Japan, Leiden, 2002, p. 245-277.
Rollo-Koster 2003 = J. Rollo-Koster, The Politics of Body Parts. Contested Topographies in Late Medieval Avignon, in Speculum. A Journal of Medieval Studies, 78, 2003, p. 66-98.
Rollo-Koster 2008 = J. Rollo-Koster, Raiding Saint Peter. Empty Sees, Violence and the Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378), Leiden, 2008.
Rollo-Koster 2009 = J. Rollo-Koster, The People of Curial Avignon. A Critical Edition of the Liber Divisionis and the Matriculae of Notre Dame la Majour, Lampeter, 2009.
Rollo-Koster 2015 = J. Rollo-Koster, Avignon and its Papacy (1309-1417). Popes, Institutions, and Society, Lanham, 2015.
Rollo-Koster 2022 = J. Rollo-Koster, The Great Western Schism, 1378-1417. Performing Legitimacy, Performing Unity, New York, 2022.
Sisson – Larson 2016 = K. Sisson, A. Larson (eds), A Companion to the Medieval papacy. Growth of an Ideology and Institution, Leiden, 2016.
Small 1981 = C.M. Small, The District of Rome in the Early Fourteenth Century, 1300 to 1347, in Canadian Journal of History/Annales canadiennes d’histoire, 16, 1981, p. 193-213.
Swanson 1984 = R.N. Swanson, Obedient and Disobedient in the Great Schism, in Archivum historiae pontificiae, 22, 1984, p. 377-387.
Taylor – Rinne – Kostof 2016 = R. Taylor, K. Rinne, S. Kostof (eds), Rome. An Urban History from Antiquity to the Present, Cambridge, 2016.
Trexler 1967 = R.C. Trexler, Rome on the Eve of the Great Schism, in Speculum, 42/3, 1967, p. 489-509.
Trexler 1974 = R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power. Republican Florence Under Interdict, Leiden, 1974.
Valois 1901 = N. Valois, La France et le Grand Schisme d’Occident, 3, Paris, 1901.
Valois 1902 = N. Valois, Essai de restitution d’anciennes annales avignonnaises (1397-1420), in Annuaire-bulletin de la Société de l’histoire de France, 39, 1902, p. 161-185.
Williams Lewin 1993 = A. Williams Lewin, “Cum Status Ecclesie Noster Sit”. Florence and the Council of Pisa (1409), in Church History, 62/2, 1993, p. 178-189.
Williams Lewin 2003 = A. Williams Lewin, Negotiating Survival. Florence and the Great Schism, 1378-1417, Madison, 2003.
Notes de bas de page
1Williams Lewin 1993, p. 184.
2 Ibid.
3 Williams Lewin 1993, p. 185; Landi 1985, p. 104-105, cites: pro bono huius populi vellet quod essent duodecim pape.
4 Daileader 2009, p. 121. For a minimizing view of the crisis see for example, Swanson 1984 and Favier 1980b. For the opposite argument, that is, the Schism impacted commoners’ lives see Maillard-Luypaert 2001 and Blumenfeld-Kosinski 2006. And for utter obliviousness to the crisis see Sisson and Larson 2016, that shelves the Avignon Papacy and the Schism to the “D” of papal decline and therefore ignores it.
5 I review this historiography in Rollo-Koster 2021, p. 18-69.
6 Williams Lewin 2003.
7 The most up-to-date bibliography of this pope is found in Paravicini Bagliani 2003. There is a rich bibliography concerning this first jubilee. Two primary sources of importance are available to us: Cardinal Stefaneschi’s and Giovanni Villani’s accounts. A new translation of Jacopo Stefaneschi, Cardinal Deacon of St. George’s description appears in Ilari 1997. Further discussion on Stefaneschi is found in Ragionieri 1997. As for Giovanni Villani, he was inspired to write his chronicle after having participated in this first jubilee. The most recent reprint of the edition of his chronicle is Villani 1969.
8 See Brentano 1974; Esch 1969, 1976 and 2016.
9 Palmer 2017.
10 Of the 18 articles composing the recent Bolgia – McKitterick – Osborne 2014, none address the Schism. The same can be stated of Di Santo 2016. Taylor – Rinne – Kostof 2016, is marred with errors for the period. Palmer 2019, focuses essentially on the Roman elite’s disengagement from politic. It is ironic that older publications like Gregorovius 1906 and Pastor – August 1898 remain the mainstay and reference for Rome’s history during the late Middle Ages.
11 For them Rome’s political fragmentation prevent synthesis. See Angelelli – Romano 2019.
12 Sanfilippo 2001, p. 85. Focusing on the role of the Banderesi in the 1378 election, Maire Vigueur suggests that the Schism allowed the “regime to remain powerful until the fateful date of 1398, without incurring serious dangers on the part of its opponents”, Maire Vigueur 2001, p. 140.
13 Esch 2016.
14 For the general history of the city during the 14th century see Rollo-Koster 2009 and 2015, p. 189-238. See also Delaruelle 1952.
15 For the sake of space, I can only offer the names of a few of the major authors: Guillemain 1962; Favier 1980a, 1966 and 2006; Mollat 1912; Renouard 1954.
16 Pansier 1912, 1913, 1923, 1926 and 1932. Butaud 2008 largely relied on Pansier’s work.
17 See for example, Rollo-Koster 2002, 2003 and 2015, p. 239-286; and Chapter 7, “Avignon during the Schism” in Rollo-Koster 2022, p. 293-357.
18 See Small 1981.
19 Maire Vigueur 2001.
20 Maire Vigueur 2008, p. 1-3, for its creation; Musto 2003, p. 144, for Cola’s 1347 constitution.
21 See Sanfilippo 2001, p. 71-91 and Gatto 1999, p. 472-492. The most recent historiography appears in Maire Vigueur 2008.
22 Palmer 2017, p. 7.
23 Palmer 2019.
24 See Labande 1908, for a history of the city during the 13th century.
25 See Hayez 1978, 1979 and 2002.
26 Mollat 1954.
27 Hayez 1988.
28 Urbain V, Ut per litteras apostolicas, 005447 (5.5.1363). This letter states that Urban followed into the footsteps of Innocent VI who had renewed the 1251 conventions on 28.3.1358, a few days before the oath of allegiance of the city to its pope.
29 Hayez 1997.
30 See the itemization of tribunals in Chambaud 1847, See Ut per litteras apostolicas, 005050 (1.10.1333) a letter that itemizes the duties of the marshal. On these issues of jurisdiction see Guillemain 1961 and Duval-Arnould 1980.
31 On the early legates, see Baron 1920; Labande 1920.
32 See Rollo-Koster 2008.
33 Post mortem enim Gregorii pape Bandarenses et duodecim capita regionum cum ceteris officiariis qui pro tunc Romam et Romanum populum regebant, manu armata ac cum populi multitudine copiosa congregati coegerunt, compulerunt et artaverunt cardinales tunc Rome existentes, et ad quos pro tunc romani pontificis electio pertinebat. Baluze 1914, 1: 469.
34 Maire Vigueur 2016, p. 255.
35 Maire Vigueur 2016, p. 257.
36 On this war, see Trexler 1974.
37 This relationship between Florence and the Commune is considered by Trexler 1967 and Williams Lewin 2003. It is of note that contemporaries recognized the presence of “infiltrators”. The anonymous author of Boucicaut’s biography states that, “the Roman mob was infected by malign influences”. See Taylor – Taylor 2016, p. 149.
38 Deus benignus ... erexit oppressos contra fedissam tyrannidem Gallicorum... Ob quid, fratres karissimi, cum omnes ad libertatem naturaliter incendantur, vos solum ex debito hereditario quodam jure obligamini ad studia libertatis. Coluccio Salutati cited by Trexler 1967, p. 490. Holmes 1989, p. 291, uses Florentine evidence that could be called extremely anti-curial. He cites the diary of Gino di Neri Capponi who states about the Schism, “Do not meddle with priests, who are the scum of the earth”, and continues with a discussion on the utility of the papacy to Florence’s politics.
39 See the deposition of Nicolas Clementis, who mentions the unfurling of their vexillis, at AAV, Arm. LIV, vol. XVI, fol. 40.
40 See Rollo-Koster 2008, p. 199.
41 Partially edited in Gayet 1889, Seidlmayer 1940a and 1940b. Recently Rehberg 2009, has addressed the lacunae left by these editions. I discuss this 1378 election at length in Rollo-Koster 2008, p. 167-223.
42 For a physical description of the election at the Vatican Palace, see Dykmans 1977.
43 AAV, Arm. LIV, vol. XIV, fol. 100-102, 151-164.
44 For example, Dominis Gregorius pp. XI die XXVII obisset officiales Urbis diversa consilia tennerunt aliqua secreta aliqua non secreta prout … eos moris est in expeditione magnorum negociarium. AAV, Arm. LIV, vol. XV, fol. 74. Similar language is found in fol. 124-127.
45 AAV, Arm. LIV, vol. XV, fol. 76v; vol. XVI, fol. 8-9, 51.
46 AAV, Arm. LIV, vol. XV, fol. 125.
47 On the conclave see Rollo-Koster 2008, p. 19-76, 167-224.
48 Gayet 1889, 1, p. 151-155.
49 On social hierarchy and rapports in Rome, see Carocci 1993 and 2010.
50 Seidlmayer, 1940b, p. 314-315.
51 Nieheim 1890, p. 38-39.
52 Reverendissimi patres et domini mei. Noveritis quod per gratiam Yesu Xpi Castrum sancti Angeli de Urbe restitutus fuit die xxvij mensis aprilis populo Romano, et non domino nostro; ita quod dominus noster volebat eum et ut per eum custodiretur. Populus vero Romanus noluit sibi dare; quoniam in totum volebant eum deponere. Et de hoc factum fuit consilium per eos, in quo octentum fuit, quod dominus noster non haberet, immo totaliter deponeretur. Et in hoc tractatu steterunt usque ad diem ultimum predicti mensis. Die vero ultimo dicti mensis, scilicet die sabati in mane intraverunt in dicto Castro curo vesillis eorum et inceperunt eum totaliter deponere. Alia nova ad presens non sunt rescribenda; Fumi 1886, p. 9. See also von Nieheim 1890, p. 38-39.
53 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, CC 1011, fol. 109r-120v. For the great tower see fol. 111v, 116r, 307r, with a payment to the chaplain of St. Peter who processed with cross when the new bell was put on the Great Tower of the bridge.
54 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, CC 1011, fol. 373r, 406v.
55 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, CC 1011, fol. 323-324, for September 1378.
56 Hayez 1980, p. 126, 136; Pansier 1914, p. 45, 49, 54, 60.
57 Hayez 1980, p. 128.
58 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, CC 1011, fol. 453v-776r.
59 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, CC 1011, fol. 643v.
60 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, CC 1011, fol. 776r.
61 Hayez 1980, p. 132.
62 Esch 1976, p. 240-245.
63 Cronica volgare 1915, p. 245.
64 Esch 1976, p. 270-271.
65 Gregorovius 1906, p. 509.
66 Intravit sub uno alio palio facto per dominum nostrum dominum Innocentium papam VII, qui dictus palius habuit dominus Nicolaus de Ursinis cum aliis sotiis, etcetera, ut dictum fuit. Pietro dello Schiavo 1917, p. 4.
67 Gregorovius 1906, p. 569-571.
68 Pietro dello Schiavo 1917, p. 4.
69 Pietro dello Schiavo 1917, p. 90-91.
70 Pietro dello Schiavo 1917, p. 92.
71 Pietro dello Schiavo 1917, p. 93.
72 Pietro dello Schiavo 1917, p. 95.
73 Millet 1988, p. 36.
74 Rollo-Koster 2003.
75 See Martin de Alpartil 1994, p. 69, 78, 95-102, 104-106, 110, 112, 115-116, 123, 126, 130, 132-134.
76 See Martin de Alpartil 1994, p. 130-135 for the escape and following weeks.
77 Brun 1937, p. 44-45.
78 Pansier 1923, p. 26.
79 Pansier 1923, p. 119-122, lists the Avignoneses’s demands.
80 See Valois 1901, p. 597, 605-607; RSD, 2: Livre XXIX, Tome IV, Chapitre II, p. 4-9.
81 RSD, 2: Livre XXIX, Tome IV, Chapitre IV, p. 18-27.
82 Valois 1901, p. 455-611.
83 Goudot 2010, p. 272.
84 Butaud 2008, p. 114. The Vatican archives keep the name of “Domino Didaco Navarri” as master of the works, see AAV, IE 376, fol. 257 (for 1405).
85 Bertrand Boysset: Chronique, p. 126-129. Pansier 1923, p. 26-29.
86 Butaud 2008, p. 116.
87 It is of note that Martin de Alpartil mentions signs of tension and rivalries amongst the various Spaniards. Martin de Alpartil 1994, p. 213, 221-222; Butaud 2008, p. 116.
88 Carreri 1916, p. 166.
89 Butaud 2008, p. 115.
90 The surviving treasurer’s ledgers list more than one name, see ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, EE 7, 8, 9, the ledgers of the war treasurers Martin Pamperati and Martin Martini from May 1410 to August 1411. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, EE 10, the ledgers of war treasurers: Nutinus Jacobi from August 1411 to January 1412; Poldo de Passis from December 1411 to November 1412; Guillaume de Lucquesio from May 1410 to February 1411; and Cathalanus de la Rocha from March to May 1411 and from May to November 1412. See also, for example Martin Pamperati’s evaluation of Notre-Dame’s silver tabernacles, in Pansier 1912, p. 116-117. The same document names Cathalanus de la Rocha syndic and Johannes Ralherii and Nerius Buzaffi, magistri guerre, see Pansier 1912, p. 113.
91 Pansier 1923, p. 60, 130-131.
92 Especially, ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, EE 8 for “war” payments between May 1410 and July 1411.
93 Pansier 1923, p. 40-41.
94 Pansier 1923, p. 55.
95 Pansier 1923, p. 52-53. Chatelanus Johannis de Larocha de Ast, appears as a cortisianus in the Liber Divisionis of 1371 and in the list of brothers of Notre Dame la Majour, see Rollo-Koster 2009, p. 278.
96 Pansier 1923, p. 130-131. Pansier transcribes the document, but I was not able to find the document in the archives as cited.
97 Carreri 1916, p. 168.
98 He had a remarkable career: Clement VII named him his camerlengo and vice-chancellor in 1383, archbishop of Arles in 1388, Toulouse in 1390 and Narbonne in 1391; John XXIII made him his camerlengo and legate. See Millet 2006.
99 Carreri 1916, p. 168.
100 Fornery 1909, 1, p. 476-477.
101 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39, 1293, 1294, 1295.
102 See Pansier 1923, p. 89-92, for the financial tergiversations.
103 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39, 302, 1303, 1304.
104 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39, 1319.
105 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39, 1318.
106 On the return to Aix of the large bombard, see Pansier 1923, p. 124-128.
107 Pansier 1923, p. 58-59.
108 Pansier 1923, p. 59-60; and ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, E Depot Avignon, CC/1510: On 19 and 30 January 1411, the city borrowed the silverware of the confraternity of butchers that had been deposited with the canons of the Church St. Agricol; on 27 January 1411, city officials requested from the confraternity of St. Julian silverware that was located in the Church of the Carmes; in February 1411, the city signed an obligation toward the convent of Célestins for their jewelry delivered to the town at a weight of 18 marcs and 6 ounces. On 31 July 1411, the city signed an obligation of 200 fl. toward the chapter of St. Didier. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39, 1315, the chapter of Notre-Dame des Doms lends the city 299 silver marcs.
109 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39, 1316, several of the city’s merchants lend 160 fl.
110 Philippa de Mongis, relicte nobilis et potestate viri domini Girardi Adhemari quondam dominus de Couraignano, curatrici, rectorici, et gubernatrici, curatorio et rectorio nomine nobilis Raymondi Bernardi Flamingi filii et heredis quondam domini Raymundi Bernardi. All examples are found in ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, E Depot Avignon, CC/1510. Organized by dates.
111 Most fighters were mercenaries. For their description see ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon EE 5, fol. 1-7.
112 ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 7, 33.
113 Ibid.
114 Labande 1920, p. 26.
115 Labande 1920, p. 22-23.
116 We find in the archives recurring mentions of certain Italian involved in the city’s affairs, like Cathalanus de la Rocha, Guillemus de Lucca, Giovanni de Cario and Nerius Buzaffi; see ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, E dépôt Avignon, CC/1510 for January 1411 and December 1412.
117 See Rollo-Koster 1998.
118 Labande 1920, p. 23-28.
119 Labande 1920, p. 29.
120 The use of heavy artillery is extremely well-documented for the siege, including multiple mentions of large bombards and the many repairs, and recasting they required, along with the use of various trebuchets and catapults. See Butaud 2008; Pansier 1923.
121 Valois 1902, p. 178. Pansier 1923, p. 151-161 transcribes the document. The original can be found in ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39, 1317.
122 Valois 1902, p. 178.
123 Pansier 1923, p. 105-106.
124 Presertim cum murus ipse contra libertates et privilegia civitatis supra ruppem que est et semper fuit communis, et de libertatibus eiusdem civitatis, et non contiguus, nec de pertinenciis palacii V S. fuerit factus et constructus, et eciam cum bone memorie dominus cardinalis de Thureyo, V. S. legatus. Pansier 1923, p. 178.
125 John XXIII eventually pardoned Avignon in an April 1412 bull. ADV, Archives communales d’Avignon, boîte 39 1286.
Auteur
-
Joëlle Rollo-Koster
University of Rhode Island, joellekoster@uri.edu
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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