Versione classicaVersione mobile

L’Europe dans la construction politique et identitaire russe

 | 
Stéphanie Burgaud
, 
Deplhine Placidi-Frot

Troisième partie. Échanges

Europe in russian « university discourse »

Unlocking plurality of interpretations

Andrey Makarychev

Testo integrale

résumé

1L’analyse des discours universitaires russes présente un double intérêt. Ces discours émanent en premier lieu de l’une des principales sources de critique de la politique extérieure du pays, à savoir la communauté universitaire. Cette dernière produit en second lieu des concepts scientifiques abondamment repris, et détournés, par la classe politique russe (par exemple les notions d’équilibre des puissances, de sphère d’influence ou de multipolarité). Les notions centrales d’identité, de démocratie ou de sécurité sont ainsi revisitées à l’aune de leur conceptualisation par les universitaires russes. Cette production normative se déroule à la fois dans un dialogue mené avec les collègues européens et dans une interaction singulière avec les élites politiques nationales, interaction dans laquelle l’Europe occupe une place prépondérante. Si la Russie contribue à définir l’identité européenne, c’est surtout l’Europe qui exerce une influence majeure sur la réflexion identitaire russe à travers le dilemme entre une tendance souverainiste et nationaliste, exaltant l’exceptionnalité russe, et une alternative internationaliste, vantant son intégration dans les échanges internationaux. Par sa démarche constructiviste, cet article souligne ainsi la co-construction intersubjective de la relation entre la Russie et l’Europe, ou plutôt des interactions entre deux sujets « ontologiquement disloqués ».

2Any meaningful political characterization of Russia is possible only through its semantic association – in one way or another – with Europe. The political positioning of Russia as a European country has never been seriously challenged in Russian political discourse which asserts Russia as a European country in terms of its history, culture and civilizational identity. Russian leaders on a number of occasions referred to European experience in order to justify Russia’s « normalcy », its belongingness to European milieu and alleged compatibility with European political logic. Vladimir Putin, who resumed presidential powers in 2012, has repeated in one of his most recent foreign policy articles an old thesis of compatibility between Russia-sponsored post-Soviet association and institutional mechanisms of European integrative project – an argument which is meant to substantiate the Kremlin’s slogan of « moving together toward Europe », addressed to countries with strong pro-European feelings like Ukraine and Moldova.

3However, in spite of this massive pro-European rhetoric, political reality looks much less optimistic. Political relations between Russia and European countries during the last decade were marked by a series of crises. Russia has refused to partake in the EU-sponsored European Neighbourhood Policy and reacted with suspicion to the Eastern Partnership program; the Russian – Estonian tug-of-war over the Second World War monument in 2007 has revealed a deep gap between the two parties as far as collective historical memories are concerned, etc. Due to these developments, one may argue that neither of the frameworks of bilateral relations seems to work smoothly: economics, along with identity and normative matters, are widely perceived as contaminated by political controversies, while security agenda appears to disjoint the two parties rather than unify them.

  • 1 M. Muller, « Situated Identities: Enacting and Studying Europe at a Russian Elite University », p.  (...)

4Yet apart from diplomatic and political narratives, there is one more rather important, though often under-investigated, subject of analysis: academic discourses that keep certain autonomy in constructing Russia’s imagery of Europe and do not necessarily follow the political controversies of the official state-to-state relations. This paper shall discuss the structure of Russian academic discourses, basically in international relations and political science, and their influence on political institutions and practices. As any discourses, they are to a large extent results of intellectual encounters and exchanges with other discourses, including European ones. These interactions result from direct scholarly communication within collaborative research projects, working groups, joint conferences, panel discussions, seminars, summer schools, and other professional interfaces, and represent perpetual references to Europe as Russia’s constitutive Other for substantiating a set of arguments inherent in Russia’s identity-making1.

  • 2 A. Konovalov, « Mir ne dolzhen byt’ mnogopoliarnym », Nezavisimaya gazeta, september 16, 2008.
  • 3 A.L. Andreev, « Russkiy mir kak faktor rossiiskoi politiki », Mir i politika, no 1 (52), january 20 (...)

5The importance of studying Russian academic discourses boils down to two major reasons. First, in the absence of political pluralism in Russia, academic community is one of major sources of criticism of Russian foreign policy. Thus, voices from academic milieu questioned the idealization of multipolarity by the Kremlin and started unveiling conflictual dispositions in this most cherished concept of Russian diplomacy2. A variety of civilization-based schools, being supportive of the Kremlin’s policies of « raising from the knees », are however rather skeptical about the overall capabilities of the Russian state, arguing that civilizational resource is relatively independent from political elites3.

6Secondly, professional vocabulary of Russian policy makers contains a number of concepts borrowed from Western academic lexicon. This migration of academic concepts to political domain is not immune to semantic distortions. Some of them (like balance of power or spheres of influence) are put in a negative context and rebuffed as presumably obsolete, while others (like multipolarity) are re-signified in a much more positive way, consonant with the Kremlin strategy. Thus, the political trajectories of academic concepts become important factors shaping the Russian – European communicative domain.

  • 4 The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the much appreciated financial and organizational suppo (...)

7This paper4 consists of two sections. The first presents the author’s methodological vocabulary for studying academic content of Russia’s identity discourse as related to Europe as its key reference point. The second explains the ways in which Europe can play signifying roles within this discourse. The empirical material for this study is made up by publications by Russian authors from major Universities and research institutions on issues of identity, democracy and security. Most of them were published in Russian and are therefore unavailable for non-Russian speaking Western academic audience. The author’s personal experience of participation in multiple research projects within INTAS framework, joint EU-Russia working group on Human Security, and academic projects sponsored by European (mostly German) foundations in Russia is also included in the analysis.

8The key argument is that the intricacies of the Russian – European relations can be better grasped through the prism of ideational and thus identity-related factors. It shall also be demonstrated that politicization of University discourse is due to the wide spectrum of divergent interpretations of its key concepts, and broad areas of interaction with political elites which tend to adjust academic concepts shaping subjects’ identities for politically motivated projects.

How to Study Russia’s Academic Discourses?

  • 5 I.V. Sledzevskiy, « Obraz Rossii kak smyslovoi konstrukt », p. 100.

9Historically, Russian political debate on Europe was shaped by the famous schism between Westernizers and Slavophiles. This debate tends to reproduce itself, but in the meantime becomes increasingly irrelevant due to its either ignorance of or insensitivity to structural changes outside Russia. Such categories as the West, Europe, the East, Eurasia etc. are evolving, « floating concepts »5, which are constantly re-signified in the process of public political debates.

  • 6 A. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence. Aspirations, Identity, and Security Inte (...)
  • 7 A. Klots and C. Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations.
  • 8 Ibid., p. 221.

10This explains the relevance of constructivist and discourse theory approaches to studying Russian academic discourses on Europe. Constructivism treats identity as a social construct resting « on another-image rather than self-image »6. Therefore, national identity is based on how a state is identified and perceived by another state. Logical consistency does not necessarily need to be a prerequisite for dominating discourses7 and their combinations, since identities of political subjects are intrinsically split, which explains why states often espouse contradictory and inconsistent premises in their policies. Thus, Russian imagery of international relations is « constructed in relation to the great powers and the West »8 with whom Russia competes yet simultaneously seeks its recognition and approval.

  • 9 R. Aitken, « Embedded Liberalism in Counterpoint: Reading Woody Guthrie’s Reciprocal Economy », Mil (...)
  • 10 J. Short, « Outside of Power? Or The Power of the Outside.
  • 11 M. Braun, « Talking Europe – the Dilemma of Sovereignty and Modernization », p. 400.

11The concept of discourse is of primordial importance for this study since « our own formation as subjects is inextricably woven into the relational webs that constitute the social context in which we live »9, and this context is made up of discourses. Placing discourses at the heart of the analysis makes the mapping of social and political spaces more flexible and constantly changing: in some instances, discourses may gravitate to and reinforce each other; in other occurrences, they are in conflict that fuels what could be called « the battle of the story ». Therefore, a number of different stories may co-exist and intermingle with each other. Within each of them, statements ( « order-words »10) are given their discursive status and expanse for circulation. Discourses form their semantic fields and may serve certain political purposes. Each discourse produces a certain type of identity embedded in the dominant narratives and speech acts. In the meantime, « no discursive formation constitutes a completely closed system, but, on the other hand, it is never totally exterior to other discursive formations »11.

12Russia’s academic discourses on Europe can be approached through the prism of a chain of interrelated concepts: University discourse, inter-subjectivity, dislocations, re-signification and empty signifiers. All these notions are methodologically positioned at the intersection of constructivist school of thought and critical discourse analysis.

University Discourse

  • 12 S. Zizek, Iraq: the borrowed kettle, p. 131.

13The concept of « University discourse », coined by Jacques Lacan and further developed by Slavoj Zizek, was introduced as one of potentially hegemonic discourses in contemporary societies, sustained and legitimized by scientific – and thus presumably ideologically neutral and rational – knowledge12. Yet University discourse matters in influencing power relations, from elucidating the changing roles of states to kindling debates between alternative political platforms. Therefore, the idea of University discourse should not be understood too narrowly and literally, as encompassing only institutions of academic research and higher education. It points to the roles of expert knowledge in a wider sense, and embraces, apart from Universities, a number of other institutions, such as analytical units, research centers, professional networks, think tanks and individual (free-lance) knowledge producers.

14Russian University discourse in the field of international relations is split into three segments:

  1. politicized nativist pseudo-academic narratives, meant basically as a rhetorical tool to substantiate the dubious idea of Russian exceptionality and, concomitantly, the futility of attempts to explain its identity through European concepts13;
  2. largely de-politicized descriptive projections of Western theories that without proper adaptation may be erroneously taken as having universal applicability14, and
  3. conceptually oriented reflective discourse that stays aloof from the first two streams. This discourse plays the role of interface in inter-subjective construction of Russian collective Self vis-à-vis Europe15.
  • 16 A. Bogaturov, « Desiat’ let paradigmy osvoenia » [Ten Years of the Paradigm of Absorption].

15In the past two decades, major professional debates within the Russian community of IR scholars were focused on the question of whether learning from the West is enough to account for the specificity of Russia vis-à-vis the West. In Alexei Bogaturov’s view, Russian scholars had limited their ambitions to « assimilating the experience of others, which has become an end in itself for political studies. In both metropolitan and peripheral academic and educational centers, reproducing Western books and making students learn them by heart turns out to be more prestigious, easier and financially more beneficial than struggling to comprehend the living empirical reality16 ». This « paradigm of absorption » has diverted the efforts of Russian political scientists from their true mission of « studying reality in all its contradictions and creating our own theory that would stop viewing the specificity of the local situation, which does not fit into the Western schemes, as deviations and pathology ».

  • 17 B.I. Makarenko, « Post-kommunisticheskie strany: nekotorie itogi transformatsii », p. 105-124.
  • 18 V. S. Martianov, « Politicheskiy modern za predelami Evropy: tsennostnoe edinstvo i institutsional’ (...)

16Yet other scholars preferred to work within the transitological paradigm, considering Russia as a particular case of transition to democracy17. Their views are grounded in the acceptance of the universality of modernist paradigm, which defies the claims for specificity of national and other local experiences as, at best, expressing the anxieties of those social groups that are marginalized and disfranchised by modernity18. It is in this sense that the transitological approach might be characterized as both post-political and apolitical, since it legitimizes itself through references to policy solutions presented as neutral, technical knowledge that emerges as a generalized summary of previous transitions.

  • 19 V. Radaev, « Est’ li shans sozdat’ rossiiskuyu natsional’nuyu teoriu v sotsial’nykh naukakh? », p.  (...)
  • 20 S.I. Kaspe, « Politicheskaya natsia i tsennostniy vybor: obschie polozhenia, rossiiskiy sluchai », (...)

17For instance, according to Vadim Radaev, the best way of building professional communication within the Russian analytical community is through adapting Western concepts which are, in his view, the only viable theoretical instruments available for researchers in social and political sciences19. These theories, he claims, are equally applicable in the West and in the East, though the results of this application are evidently dissimilar. Therefore, Russian scholars are supposed not to « complete » Western theories by adding to them some « local stuff », but to choose between a wide gamut of available theories. The quality of research thus depends not on contriving « local » conceptualization, but on the ability to understand and properly use the whole richness of Western theoretical tradition. Along the same lines, Sviatoslav Kaspe regrets that attempts to inscribe the Russian case into wider theoretical frameworks are often rebutted as ideologically biased and aimed to corroborate pre-existing arguments20. These accusations may be polemically advantageous, but they lead to blocking any contextual analysis of Russia, which compares it with other countries by means of using for this purpose internationally established academic lexicon.

Inter-subjectivity

18Since University discourse changes ways of thinking and speaking positions of international subjects, it possesses a distinctive identity-making potential, which can be unveiled through the concept of inter-subjectivity. It elucidates not only a function of discourse to alter policies of other actors, but also to constitute their identities in the process of communicative exchanges. In light of this approach, the formation of Russian identity in wide historical perspective is impossible without references to European experiences and practices, and vice versa. Identities always relate to their « constitutive others », which is the case of Russia – EU inter-subjective relations. Intersubjectivity makes any subject position dependent on the outside and thus immanently fluid, mobile and changeable.

  • 21 K. Engelbrekt, B. Nygren, « A reassertive Russia and an expanded European Union », p. 3.
  • 22 S. Zizek, « The Antinomies of Tolerant Reason: A Blood-Dimmed Tide is Loosed », available at http:/ (...)
  • 23 O. Kessler, « From agents and structures to minds and bodies: of supervenience, quantum, and the li (...)
  • 24 M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire, London and Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 125, 127.

19This is why inter-subjective relations are full of distortions, disconnections, asymmetries, ruptures and imbalances. The concept of « the friction of ideas » (or « ideational friction »), borrowed from Swedish colleagues, makes the case for « deep-seated cultural differences between Europe and Russia »21. To quote Slavoj Zizek, « language... is the first and greatest divider », and this is the reason why we and our neighbors (can) “live in different worlds” even when we live on the same street »22. To put it differently, language « provides the boundaries of inter-subjective process »23, and « alterity is thus not given but produced »24. This is very much the case of Russian – European relations. While frequently using the same normative vocabulary, European and Russian discourse-makers deliberately infuse different meanings in them. Europe, thus, faces not an opposition to its concepts of democracy, identity and security, but different interpretations of them. Indeed, Russia questions neither of the basic European norms or ideas; instead it seeks to offers alternative visions for most of them.

  • 25 F. Lukianov, « Putin, Russia, and the West: Beyond Stereotype ».

20Inter-subjectivity in Russian – EU relationship is hard to deny, but its interpretations may be different. For example, Fiodor Lukianov explains the predominantly negative portrayal of Putin’s Russia in Europe by « the internal insecurity of the West, and the growing sense that everything is not proceeding quite as it should... Vladimir Putin [...] indicates to western partners their mistakes and failures. He criticizes their hypocrisy and double-standards, appearing in the role of an idiosyncratic Savonarola whose utterances are especially annoying because they are often true... He plays by the same rules as everyone else but simply doesn’t see the need to dress this up in respectable ideological garb. And the fact that – whether by force of luck or by force of a more realistic calculation – he furthermore periodically outperforms his partners, compelling them to take the opinion of that same declining Russia into account, adds a mystical halo »25.

  • 26 Y. Citton, « Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible », in G. Rockhill and Ph. Watts. (...)
  • 27 T. May, The Political Thought of Jacques Ranciere. Creating Equality, Edinburgh, Edinburgh Universi (...)
  • 28 V. Morozov, art. cité.

21Yet instead of (mis) presenting the Kremlin as a bearer of a hidden truth for Europe (and implicitly denying a similar role for Europe in its relations with Russia), the author shares a more nuanced approach to inter-subjectivity as an active « power to affect and a passive power to be affected »26. In other words, even in its role as an object of EU influence, Russia still can – perhaps indirectly – influence debates within the EU and its choice (s) for future actions. For Russia this is especially important, since its ability to influence the EU is limited, which apparently makes the EU – Russia inter-subjectivity asymmetrical. The EU policy philosophy can be expressed as follows: « If I act toward the other following principles I have previously to and outside of my interaction with the other, then it is not really the other I am concerned with. I am imposing my ethical framework upon the other, rather than taking up the other in his own right »27. As a reaction to the alleged universality of EU norms, rules and principles, Russia prioritizes its sovereignty and a great power status which is not supposed to be confirmed by anybody, including the EU28.

Dislocations

  • 29 A. J. Norval, « Theorising Dislocations », paper presented at New Stability, Democracy and National (...)

22Discourses of – and in – Russia and the EU are not only in the process of constant formation; both are internally dislocated. By dislocation, one shall understand indeterminacy, uncertainty, and undecidability. Russia can be portrayed as a deeply divided political subject incapable of speaking with a single voice internationally. There is also an external dimension of dislocation manifested by the dependence of Russia’s identities « upon an outside which both denies that identity and provides its conditions of possibility at the same time »29. This dislocates Russia’s academic discourse: it represents Russia as a country eager to get attuned to the dominating discourses, but reinstalls Russia’s subjectivity through the re-interpretation of the key components of dominating discourses. In this light, Europe may be perceived as a challenge to Russia, but nevertheless Russian identity is constructed through communication with – and reference to – Europe. Indeed, each of the two parties inevitably refers to its counter-part in the process of identity construction, which testifies to a non-self-sufficient nature of these identities, unavoidable inter-penetrations and overlays of different discourses.

Re-signification

  • 30 B. Schippers, « Judith Butler, Radical Democracy and Micro-politics », p. 80-91.

23In discourse theory, this term denotes transformative practice of deploying terms in previously unexplored or even « unauthorized » contexts. Re-signification is mostly used by political agents located at the margins of political structures who wish to change previous meanings by either expanding concepts or by including other meanings into them30. This appears to be applicable to Russia which painstakingly makes efforts to avoid marginalization and raise its world profile by promoting and propagating structural changes in international society to foster greater plurality of power holders and diversification of their resources. In particular, Russia borrowed the concept of multipolarity from the realist vocabulary where it denoted a rather conflictual and unstable type of international system, and re-signified it by ascribing to this concept more positive connotations and making of it the key strategic landmark for Russian diplomacy.

  • 31 C. Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory. The View from Somewhere, p. 12-13.
  • 32 Ibid. p. 49.

24Re-signification is closely related to the concept of language games that seems to be also appropriate here. Following the logic of Wittgenstein, language has neither ontological stability nor unity; consequently, there is no authoritative, determinate collective « we » which would appeal to a mental or metaphysical source of identity or authority, or unveil « literal, uninterpreted truth »31. The language games approach claims that each concept under a closer scrutiny decomposes into a series of « pictures » of reality; henceforth, « playful and fluid »32 contexts of political discourses ought to be studied. Due to language games, political queries are called to examine particular features of the world which bring into questions the issues of well established identities. Of course, not all language games translate into strong political voices that explain how to change the world, yet at least some of them provide different « road maps » to the future. This has important repercussions for the Russia – EU discursive relations: for example, both parties may formally agree on the importance of modernization agenda, but treat its meaning differently. For EU modernization inevitably presupposes drastic reforms in the Russian system of governance (including eradication of corruption, establishment of effective social institutions, etc.), while for the Kremlin, modernization connotes mainly technical projects of upgrading Russian industrial sector.

Empty signifiers

  • 33 E. Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 96.
  • 34 E. Laclau, Emancipation (s), London and New York, Verso, 2007, p. 40.
  • 35 E. Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 106.
  • 36 E. Laclau, Emancipation (s), p. 15.
  • 37 Ibid. p. 43.

25Dislocations of Russia’s role identity may be problematized through the concept of empty signifier introduced by Ernesto Laclau. Empty signifiers are concepts that evade monosemantic explanation and are open for divergent interpretations. From Laclau’s perspective, its role is « to function as the name of a fullness which is constitutively absent »33. This supposed « fullness » may come in different versions, be it nation, society or community. In other words, « there can be empty signifiers within the field of signification because any system of signification is structured around an empty place resulting from the impossibility of producing an object which, none the less, is required »34 for fulfilling ordering function. When we talk about empty signifiers, « we mean that there is a place, within a system of signification, which is constitutively irrepresentable; in that sense it remains empty, but this is an emptiness which I can signify »35. Each potentially ordering concept functions as an empty signifier36, which is the very « condition of hegemony »37, since to hegemonize something is to infuse meanings in the original lack that is constitutive for empty signifiers.

  • 38 E. Laclau, « Constructing Universality », in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary Dial (...)

26Against this background, one may argue that the meanings of academic concepts may differ from each other: « there is an essential unfixity in the meaning attached to some contested signifiers as a result of the operation of a plurality of strategies in the same discursive space »38. As shall be demonstrated in the second part, the concept of Europe may be viewed from this angle as an empty signifier, open to different academic and political interpretations and subject to the struggle for discursive hegemony.

Europe as an argument and a signifier

  • 39 V. Morozov, « Obsessed with Identity: the IR in post-Soviet Russia », Journal of International Rese (...)

27As Viacheslav Morozov claims, the development of international studies in Russia since the fall of the Soviet system has been marked by a dominating obsession with identity, which can be exemplified by the often raised political issues: is Russia a western nation or a unique and self-sufficient civilization39? Is Russia still a great power, and what needs to be done to retain/restore this status? Academically, some Russian authors – like Alexey Bogaturov quoted earlier – deem that Russia’s specific identity requires Russia’s own school in international relations studies to challenge the domination of Western theories.

  • 40 M. Entin, « Future tasks for the development of the relations between Russia and the European Union (...)
  • 41 « Europe: “Real” and “Unreal”. Report of the Institute of Europe », Russian Academy of Sciences, no(...)

28However, as will be argued here, Russia’s peculiar identity does not prevent scholars from applying for its study a variety of approaches well established in constructivist and critical theory literatures. Meanwhile, the concept of identity is of course differently tackled by Russian scholars. Some of them tend to essentialize their country’s belongingness to Europe by explaining it through the prism of either geography or history, or both. As the director of the Institute of European Law at MGIMO deems, « social and political transformation of Russia cannot be considered as a precondition for rapprochement with Europe »40. Russia’s European identity, thus, is simply reduced to the invocations of Russia’s « natural », « legitimate », « objective » grounds to be considered a fully fledged European nation41.

  • 42 D. Danilov, « Rossiya i Zapad: bol’she ne vragi... a kto? », Vestnik Evropy, no 7-8, 2002.
  • 43 B. Mezhuev, « Sotvorenie kosmopolisa ».

29Other authors consider Russia’s European identity as a matter of social construction, recognition, and painstaking adaptation of European ideas42. The problem looming large here is that almost each of the most controversial policies introduced in Russia – from economic protectionism to increasing intervention of the state in political parties’ affairs – may contain implicit references to various « European experiences ». Europe indeed is frequently used as an argument for sustaining certain political position in Russia, which turns the conception of Europe into a rather broad and elastic signifier. The basic intricacy here is that Europe has multiple roles to play and can’t be easily anchored in a single set of meanings. Historically, in modern times Europe was associated with Christianity, balance-of-power and monarchic solidarity against republican ideas, but nowadays all these meanings are either relinquished or seriously questioned. The sense of Europe as a « moving target » was insightfully grasped by Boris Mezhuev: « We were thinking of constructing a modern society, as in the West, but it turned out that the West itself is transforming in a direction hardly conceivable for both them and us. We wanted to say farewell to the empire and convert into a nation state, but it turned out that the age of nation states has already gone, and we are on the eve of a new imperial era... We strived for a multi-party system, but we are said that it is moribund in Europe. We wanted public politics, but it occurred that even in the so called civilized world it is far from sane. We were eager to be modern, but it is exactly in this sense that we have gone hopelessly obsolete »43.

  • 44 M. Borschevsky and V. Yaroshenko, « Eta zhivuchaya Evropa », Vestnik Evropy, no 28-29, 2010.
  • 45 O. Nemenskiy, « Kosovskiy precedent i buduschee Evropy », april 21, 2008, http://www.apn.ru/publica (...)
  • 46 A. Dugin, « Evraziyskiy otvet globalizatsii ».
  • 47 M. Remizov, « Demokratia plus gegemonia bol’shinstva », june 24, 2011, http://www.apn.ru/publicatio (...)
  • 48 V. Karpets, « Imperia neizbezhna », available at http://www.intelros.org/books/russia_book_karpec1. (...)
  • 49 S. Karaganov (ed.), K soyuzu Evropy.
  • 50 A. Utkin, « Padenie Evropy », Prognosis, no 2 (6), summer 2006, р. 139.

30Yet, in spite of this situation of indeterminacy, Europe does play signifying roles for constructing Russia’s multiple identities. For liberal thinkers, the EU is « a complex and sophisticated edifice, the main achievement of postwar Europe »44. Thus, a shift from « the Europe of nations » to the « Europe of regions » and networks, and, therefore, from modernity to its radical reconsideration, is viewed as a global trend towards growingly appealing networking type of structures to which Russia has to adapt45. For conservative authors, Russia has by all means to help reviving the continental Europe which hypothetically might become its political ally46. This means explicit disdain to countries of Central Europe which are, in the view of some Russian geopoliticians (such as Sergey Kurginian, Natalia Narochnitskaya, or Alexey Pushkov) overtly pro-American and inimical to Russia. The conservative recipe sounds quite paradoxical: Europe has to display its imperial qualities, and exert hegemony based on its ’cultural majority’ for reinventing the forgotten meanings of national identities47. Only this prospect may redress Europe from its current troubles and lay foundation for its stable and sound engagement with Russia48, with good prospects of joint management of energy projects instead of confrontation, restoration of Moldova’s territorial integrity, incorporation of Turkey in joint Moscow – Brussels political framework, etc.49 An opposite perspective is regretfully described by Russian authors: after the failure of its constitutional project, the EU may gradually keep losing its chance to speak with a single voice internationally, and will fall victim of intensive migrations unsettling European identity50.

Russian Euro-pessimism

  • 51 Y. Shestakov, « Why we have finally fallen out of love with Europe », december 22, 2011, Valdai Dis (...)
  • 52 B. Martynov, « Pravilo obratnoi perspektivy i dukh mirovogo poriadka », International Trends. Journ (...)
  • 53 Y. Latynina, « Evropa, ty ofigela », Novaya Gazeta, august 16, 2011, available at http://www.novaya (...)
  • 54 M. Mayatskiy, Kurort Evropa.

31Pessimistic assessments of Europe’s ability to play the role of the most important shaper of Russia’s identity abound in Russian discourses. « Russia no longer sees itself as part of modern Europe. The idea of creating a common European space from Vladivostok to Brest has failed. The ongoing rapid change of the European model prompts Moscow to take any long-term projects involving Europe with a big pinch of salt », one author concludes51. « ARussia identifying itself with the West and accepting its values won’t ever be able to play the role it deserves as a country-civilization », another author presumes52. Even among Russia’s liberal community, Europe is under the fire of sharp critique. As a reputed journalist of Novaya gazeta opines, at the peak of its strength Europe had based its policies on private property, minimal state, intra-European competition, and a feeling of cultural superiority53. In the recent times, as soon as those principles were substituted by social distribution, regulatory powers of the state, pan-European unity and multiculturalism, Europe’s role in the world is in decline. Metaphorically speaking, Europe appears to turn into a « resort »54, instead of being a powerful world pole.

  • 55 O. Prikhod’ko, « Rossiya v meniayusheisia Evrope ».
  • 56 O. Prikhod’ko, « Rossiya –Evropa: v plenu protivorechiy », Obozrevatel’ –Observer, no 9, 2005, avai (...)

32The power logic is an indispensable part of Russia’s discourse, yet sometimes it is not EU weakness, but, on the contrary, its presumed ability to play a role of its own that troubles Russian authors. Thus, it is often claimed that the EU uses conflict resolution agenda for fostering its influence in Russia’s « near abroad », and that EU enlargement has weakened Russian influence towards its western borders55. New EU member states are portrayed as hindering the effective relationship between Russia and the « old » EU states. Russian experts are also skeptical about Russia’s adaption to European educational standards (the Bologna process), and the lifting of Russian duties on European flights over Russian territory. Some Russian analysts accuse the EU of a « politically correct » explanation of terrorism as a derivative of economic and social troubles, and in concomitant disregard of cultural and religious roots of terror in the Islamic world56.

  • 57 A. Panov, « S. Sh. A. : kurs na sderzhivanie », Strategia Rossii, no 2, february 2012, p. 14, avail (...)
  • 58 O. Butorina, « Evropa bez Evrosoyuza ».
  • 59 S. Karaganov « Evropa bol’she ne rastiot », « Global Affairs’ portal, december 30, 2011, http://www (...)
  • 60 D. Evstafiev, « Glazami konservatora : perezagruzka mertva », Index Bezopasnosti, no 4, july-octobe (...)
  • 61 V. Nikonov, « Kak krizis izmenil Evropu », « Politika » Foundation web site, 2011, available at htt (...)

33Expectedly, the current crisis of eurozone made Russian discourse on the EU even more critical. A former rector of Russian Diplomatic Academy deems that nowadays it is time for Russia to say « good-bye » to Europe until it recovers from the current economic troubles57. Another Russian author claims that the EU has fallen victim not only of financial troubles, but also of its either inability or hesitation to more clearly articulate the European identity58. His colleague argues that deep financial troubles within the EU will make it a doubtful partner for Russia and seriously damage the prospects of Russia’s European orientation59. Europe’s weakness may prompt it to more robustly team up with the United States in policies concerning Syria and Iran, and thus to disregard the dangers of a possible destabilization of the larger Middle East for Europe itself60. As seen from this vantage point, the only good news for Russia is that a less ambitious and a more inward-oriented Europe may decrease its normative pressure on Moscow, which may open a new chance for Russia – EU relations61.

  • 62 N. Shmeliov, « Chto nam nuzhno ot Evropy », Soyuznoe veche, no 59 (414), december 22-28, 2011, p. 7

34In the meantime, Russia appeals to the EU as a strong proponent of international law and a preferable mediator. This explains why the director of the Moscow-based Institute for Europe Studies deems that Russia « is interested in preventing the EU from falling apart. We don’t need a patchwork Europe. It is easier to deal with it as a unique formation which already exists »62. By the same token, bilateral relations with major EU countries (especially France, Germany and Italy, but not the UK) are considered as more productive – and less politicized – than relations with Brussels.

35What this variety of opinions among experts elucidates is that Europe is a very tricky and ambiguous signifier for Russian identity discourses. On the one hand, in most countries of Eastern Europe the slogan « return to Europe » contained implicit anti-Russian tones, which only distanced Russia from Europe. On the other hand, within Russia itself Europe is a divisive concept: it may be synonymous to both attraction and aversion, sympathy and jealousy.

« True » vs. « False » Europe

  • 63 I. Neumann, « Russia and Europe », in J. Godzimirski (ed), Russia and Europe. Conference Proceeding (...)

36Norwegian scholar Iver Neumann63, as well as his Russian colleague Viatcheslav Morozov, distinguished two different versions of Europe – « false » and « true » – as a key feature of Russia’s thinking about Europe. « False Europe », in their interpretation of Russian foreign policy philosophy, includes countries with strong anti-Russian sentiments and those having lost « genuine European values ». « True Europe », on the contrary, is arguably made up by nations friendly to Russia and which adhere to what Russia considers as « the original spirit of Europe ». « True Europe », most likely, contains, besides what US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dubbed « old Europe » (France and Germany), countries with some degree of cultural affinity to Russia. Politically, the fact that Russia leans toward French – German « couple » could be an indication of its search for a European subjectivity which is ultimately a pre-condition for Russia’s own self-assertion vis-à-vis Europe. Re-creation of what could be called « a great continental family » became a substantial part of Russia’s rediscovering of « old Europe » as its interlocutor.

  • 64 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 277.
  • 65 Ibid.
  • 66 Ibid., p. 329.

37Russia’s construction of its own identity and subjectivity through such type of identity-driven dichotomy may be explained with a reference to Alexander Wendt’s « projective identification thesis »64. It might be instrumental in understanding the role of the Other – i. e. Europe in reference to Russia – « for displacing unwanted feelings about the Self... Individuals who, because of personal pathologies, cannot control potentially destructive unconscious fantasies, like feelings of rage, aggression, or self-hatred, will sometimes attribute or “project” them on to an Other, and then through their behavior pressure that Other to “identify” with or “act out” those feelings so that the Self can then control or destroy them by controlling or destroying the Other... A requirement for this process is therefore “splitting” the Self into “good” and “bad” elements, with the latter being projected on to the Other... This can in turn be a basis for the cultural constitution of enmity, since the split Self needs the Other to identify with its ejected elements »65. The Self is « casting » the Other « in a corresponding counter-role that makes » Self’s identity meaningful66. This might shed some light on Russia’s mental – and very artificial – division of Europe into « weak » and « strong », « false » and « true », « old » and « new », ascribing judgmental significance to each of these dichotomies. By discursively molding a « true Europe », Russia strives to overcome and displace its own fears of being isolated from the European scene. According to Wendt’s « projective identification » concept, deep split ( « dislocation ») within the Russian Self provokes and necessitates corresponding binaries in Russia’s imagination about other countries. Almost all accusations Moscow addresses « false » European countries – maltreatment of the Second World War veterans, pluralization of historical narratives filled by alternative assessments of the previously glorified past, pro-American sentiments – can be easily found within Russia itself as a testimony for the dislocated nature of Russian identity.

38The « false – true Europe » dichotomy determines, to some degree, other adjacent conceptualizations. One of them seems to be a contradistinction between « traditional Europe » and « post-Europe ». The « false » features of Europe are associated with the evaporation of national spirit and growing self-denial of national interests and identities. This Russian discourse, then, seems to deny what Europe itself is proud of – both the refusal of national egos and the valorization of supranational integration.

39The « false – true » dichotomy may be approached as a discursive frame allowing Russia to assess other European nations according to its own standards, thus stressing Russian subjectivity toward European affairs. Russia needs a « false Europe » in order to reinstall its European credentials and feel at home with what it considers a « true Europe ». The idea of alleged « Russian Europe », historically exemplified by Novgorod’s and Pskov’s inclusion into the Hansa medieval trade network and these cities’ commitment to a set of democratic procedures, has to be understood in the light of « true Europe » concept.

40Russia’s « false – true Europe » dichotomy has important historical connotations. Russia’s relations with Baltic countries, being fundamentally damaged by different interpretations of the events of World War II, are an emblematic case of history-driven identity clash. The « battle of words » includes a number of dichotomies: « voluntary membership » in the Soviet Union or « annexation », « liberation » from the Nazi Germany or « occupation » by USSR, etc.

41Identity and history debate largely intersects with political discourse which actualized the discursive division of Europe in the aftermath of the Georgia war of August 2008. In the Kremlin’s eyes, France and Germany have strengthened their status and reputation of « good Europeans » (those loyal to Russia), while Poland (who signed the final agreement on accommodating the American anti-missile system right in the middle of the Russian-Georgian war) and Ukraine (who was accused of selling arms to Georgia and threatening to prevent the Russian Black Sea Fleet from returning to its naval base in Sebastopol) are put in a different category of unfriendly states. Again, this way of interpreting Europe contains a great deal of Russia’s eagerness to present itself as an unalienable part of « true Europe » which is threatened by « false Europeans ». It is not incidentally that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov dubbed the treatment by Georgian authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia « un-European », which reveals Russian sensitivity to the concept of European-ness. In a rather indicative way, Russia did not hide its irritation to the display of the EU flag during Mikhail Saakashvili’s public pronouncements – a reaction that was arguably grounded in Moscow’s resolve to disavow any European connotations as far as Georgia is concerned.

  • 67 V. Pernatskiy, « Rossiya v mirovom politico-pravovom prostranstve », Svobodnaya Mysl’, no 10 (1605) (...)
  • 68 A. Maler, « Pochemu ot Dmitryia Medvedeva ne iskhodit netvarniy svet? Part 2 », Russkii zhurnal, ap (...)

42The othering of Europe frames and conditions the discursive construction of Russia itself, which, in the view of some authors, sometimes thinks of itself as a « real » Europe, a heritor of century-long European culture. The uncovering of a lack of authenticity in today’s Europe leads some Russian scholars to presume that Russia is destined to inherit and incarnate the legacy of the « genuine », ancient Greece-based European civilization, while the EU has deviated from these « traditional values »67. Many Russian political thinkers are convinced by Russia’s ability to confess and defend « genuinely Christian and, therefore, genuinely European values, among which the key one is the value of free human being whose freedom is derived from its creation on the basis of the image of the Lord »68. This type of discourse not only makes today’s Europe a poorly self-articulated entity, but concomitantly questions the strategy of Russia’s integration with it.

  • 69 I. Neumann, op. cit.

43Yet, of course, the fact that the Kremlin assumes the right to pass judgments on Russia’s neighbors from the position of a « true Europe », does not necessarily imply that Russian foreign policy discourse becomes structured in European terms. Russia does appeal to the norms of Europe, but stops short of applying them to its own policy. That is why this Russian discourse was never recognized as legitimate anywhere beyond Russia itself and thus did not leave any institutional traces in Moscow’s relations with other countries. Russia’s imagined « special relations » with either of « real » European powers were never institutionalized; moreover, under a closer scrutiny they may turn into a myth. Russia’s policy of ostracizing Estonia for its decision to remove the Bronze Soldier monument from Tallinn downtown to a military cemetery in 2007 resonated neither in Europe, nor even in Russia’s « near abroad ». Russia’s attempts to condition its relations with post-Soviet and post-socialist countries by their adherence to the Soviet/Russian glorious narrative of World War II largely failed. Ultimately, Russia had to recognize the politically meaningful role of Poland – otherwise associated with « false Europe » – in finding visa facilitation solution for Kaliningrad’s residents. As Iver Neumann puts it, « this is a situation where pluralism and some kind of generalized liberalism become increasingly central to European identity, with Russia opting for what looks to Europeans like old-fashioned state building. As a result, Russia is out of synch with the development of European identity »69.

Identity and Democracy

44The encounters of Russian and European democracy discourses represent another interesting example of the « frictions of ideas ». Russia does understand its vulnerability in issues of democracy, which leads to two discursive moves.

  • 70 T. Bordachov, Predely evropiezatsii, p. 162-163.
  • 71 http://www.indemco.org/

45First, even liberal analysts speak of a « democratic deficit » within the EU70. This argument is completely borrowed from European academic discourses and very often merges with political logic of a group of scholars associated with the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation71, a misnomer for the Kremlin-sponsored propagandistic institution settled in Paris and New York as presumably the Russian version of – and alternative to –Western foundations working in Russia.

46Secondly, some Russian scholars try to project the concept of democracy to the whole international area. It is within this context that the concept of « democratic multipolarity » was introduced, which claims that the idea of democracy, being transferred from the domestic to the international domain, is denotative of a plurality of interests whatever the nature of these interests might be. Democracy here may be understood as a redistribution of power between the leading nations and the developing ones, or those representing the « middle layer » of international system. Yet this predominantly realist vision of multi-polar international society does not resonate in Europe. The underestimation of institutional and normative mechanisms turns the concept of « democratic multi-polarity » into an image of international scene consisting of loosely tied groups of countries whose members share with each other nothing more than power ambitions.

47The process of re-signifying democracy as key normative concept explains why Russian academic discourse is torn apart between politicization and de-politicization, as well as between norms and exceptions. On the one hand, Russia is certainly eager to be recognized as a « normal country » that fits European standards of democracy and sovereignty; yet on the other hand, it repeatedly relies on the rhetoric of exceptionalism, recalling its alleged specificity and hoping to get preferential treatment from Europe. Nevertheless, Russia’s intention to be recognized in Europe as an equal partner in norm-setting is not to be understood as an indication of Russia’s possession of its « own » norms that Europe, arguably, either rejects or disregards. Russia seems to be ready to offer an alternative reading of a set of norms constitutive to European identity, but definitely not to substitute them with some kind of Russia-only norms or values.

Identity and Security

  • 72 D. Trenin, Integratsiya i identichnost: Rossiya kak noviy Zapad, p. 206.

48Russian academic discourses are eager to find their niche in the European intellectual milieu but, in doing so, they reinterpret key terms and fill them with the content suitable to its own discursive needs. This is why Russian foreign policy discourse became increasingly normative. Thus, Russia accepted – though reluctantly – the legitimacy of human security discourse because of the awareness that it is precisely the normative matter that is being used by European countries to define « civilized humankind ». In fact, Russia’s normative zeal is a crucial tool in its attempts to be accepted as an indispensable member of an international society which, by and large, is grounded in European norms72. In fact, what is at stake at this juncture is the drawing of the borders of international society, and human security notion seems to be quite fit for this purpose. Seen from this angle, the normative turn in Russian foreign policy can be discussed as one of its political instruments aimed at reinstalling Russia as a key international subject and an organic part of international society.

49Yet Russia’s intention to join European security discourse – as a sovereign power fully capable of making its own moves – only reveals deep gaps in understanding the nature of security and in striking a balance between its « hard » and « soft » dimensions. The paradox is that nowadays it is Russia that buttresses the split between hard and soft security as supposedly two separate spheres, while both NATO and EU experts are in favor of a more complex vision of security with no strict borderlines between its hard and soft aspects.

  • 73 Helsinki Plus. Toward a New Security Architecture in Europe, Barcelona and London, CIDOB and LSE, 2 (...)

50Prevailing attitudes in Europe are indeed remarkably different from Russian security discourse. Thus, by arguing that « human security is European security », CIDOB – a Barcelona-based think tank – sent a message to the Kremlin making it clear that the EU support of Russia’s attempts to restructure the Euro-Atlantic security is conditioned by Moscow’s embracement of a more human-oriented perspective on security and a stronger cosmopolitan worldview73. A number of recent documents – such as « Helsinki Plus. Towards a New Security Architecture in Europe » report of the joint EU –Russia expert group – explicitly advocate Russia to inscribe human security into its global political discourses. The operationalization of this concept in the report was done in a way that cannot be dismissed by Russia in its capacity of Soviet Union’s successor: human security was explicitly presented as encompassing the « three baskets » of 1975 Helsinki Accords signed by USSR. The explicit linkage to Helsinki accords constitutes a good platform for promoting a human security agenda in Russian – EU relations on the basis of European understanding of this concept’s ability to blur difference between « internal » and « external », as well as « hard » and « soft » dimensions of security. Yet the author’s first-hand experience of being part of the EU-Russian working group on human security shows that even INSOR, the think tank patronized by former President Medvedev, displayed little interest in engaging in serious discussion with its European colleagues on the nature and importance of a wider East – West security outlook to include human dimension.

51The « Helsinki Plus » report, as many others, place human security as comprising both (and transcending) hard and soft dimensions, and see no much avail in drawing separation lines between them. Yet this thinking, dominant in Europe, remains in sharp contrast with Russia’s intentional re-actualization of this hard – soft separation in both academic literature and political speeches. Their authors deem that in hard security (i. e. military-related) terrain it holds critical material resources and is a powerful player, while in soft security it is rather a source of troubles (in environment, migration, human trafficking, etc.). Presumably, Europe does have arguments to reverse this logic: it is exactly because of a convincing experience of tackling soft security issues that the West may share it with Russia, thus testing the Kremlin’s intentions to comprehensively change the obsolete practices of governance. Consequently, the acceptance of soft security agenda, in contrast to hard security, necessitates deep domestic debate within Russia, in which academic community should have its loud voice.

In lieu of conclusion

52As this analysis has shown, the academic concept of identity is strongly and intentionally politicized (i. e. used for political judgments that often spur conflicts of interpretations, involving the issues of collective memories), but remains largely outside existing institutional frameworks of EU–Russian relations. In case of democracy one could see some kind of conceptual transfer: the democracy discourse shifted from domestic to international level of analysis. This shift reduced all semantic contexts of democracy to the legalist (and politically irrelevant) principle of sovereign equality, as engrained in Russia’s interpretation of the idea of multipolarity. As for security, Russian academic discourse since the beginning of 1990s found itself under a strong influence of the « hard vs. soft » conceptualization widely popular among European experts. In both Russian academic and political discourse this dichotomy was legitimized, which is not the case of human security concept that was mostly reduced to technical matters of survival in conditions of disasters, post-crisis management, state regulation of medical and pharmaceutical standards, etc.

  • 74 N. Shmeliov, « Rossiya i Evropa: vmeste ili porozn’? », Vestnik Evropy, no 19-20, 2007.
  • 75 S. Zizek, « Da Capo senza Fine », in J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Univ (...)
  • 76 J. Huysmans, « International Politics of Exception », paper prepared for presentation at SGIR Fifth (...)

53The notion of inter-subjectivity is instrumental in understanding the intricacies of the Russian – EU relations as interaction of two « ontologically dislocated », or unstable, divided, split and unfixed subjects. A menu of Russia’s identity choices may include such roles as a « different Europe »74, a « non-Western Europe » (along with Turkey), and a constitutive part of wider Europe, or of « Euro-Atlantic civilization ». European and Russian identities are mutually dependent, but the EU role in moulding the Russian identity is stronger than Russia’s role for the EU. The latter seems to be embedded in « the Eurocentric procedure of imposing its own hegemony by means of the exclusionary discursive strategy of devaluing the Other »75. This policy can be explained by European Union’s adherence to the « thick » (solidarist) version of international society, with clear emphasis on normativity understood as « a way of thinking that emphasizes the central importance of an autonomous legal order for constraining the arbitrary and personal exercise of political power »76.

54In communicating with EU, Russia certainly tries to reject and even challenge its otherness. Academic discourses, therefore, are instrumental in the attempts to avoid alienation from Europe. By the same token, Russian international discourse is torn apart between « sovereignist », « exceptionalist » or « nationalist » reading of Russia as a country surrounded by fundamentally hostile environment with no reliable friends, on the one hand, and « internationalist discourse » arguing that Russia stays in line with the international community in managing the most deadly security challenges, on the other. One may see here the double function of Russia’s European discourse: forming an image of Europe easy to deal and communicate with, as well as constructing Russia itself through emphasizing the roles it is supposed to play and the qualities it is expected to display internationally.

Bibliografia

Bibliographie

Bogaturov, Aleksei, « Desiat’ let paradigmy osvoenia », Pro et contra 5 (1): 20, 2000.

Bordachov, Timofei, Predely evropiezatsii, Moscow, Higher School of Economics Publishers, 2007.

Braun, Mats, « Talking Europe – the Dilemma of Sovereignty and Modernization », Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, vol. 43 (4), 2008.

Butorina, Olga, « Evropa bez Evrosoyuza », Global Affairs portal, december 15, 2011, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Evropa-bez-Evrosoyuza-15407

Clunan, Anne, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence. Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

Danilov, Dmitry, « Rossiya i Zapad: bol’she ne vragi... a kto? », Vestnik Evropy, no 7-8, 2002.

Dugin, Alexander, « Evraziyskiy otvet globalizatsii », Politicheskiy zhurnal, no 4 (139), november 15, 2009.

Engelbrekt, Kjel and Nygren, Bertil, « A reassertive Russia and an expanded European Union », in K. Engelbrekt and B. Nygren (eds), Russia and Europe. Building Bridges, Digging Trenches, Routledge, 2010.

Entin, Mark, « Future tasks for the development of the relations between Russia and the European Union », in H.-G. Heinrich and L. Lobova (eds), EU-Russia: New Departures and Old Habits, Vienna, ICEUR Working Papers, no 3, 2010.

Karaganov, Sergey (ed.), K soyuzu Evropy, St. Petersburg-Valaam-Kizhi-Moscow, The Valday Club Report, 2010.

Kaspe, S.I., « Politicheskaya natsia i tsennostniy vybor: obschie polozhenia, rossiiskiy sluchai », Politia, no 4 (55), 2009.

Klots, Audie and Lynch, Cecelia, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, Armonk, New York and London, England, M.E. Sharpe, 2007.

Laclau, Ernesto, On Populist Reason, London and New York, Verso, 2005.

Lukianov, Fiodor, « Putin, Russia, and the West: Beyond Stereotype », Valdai Club web portal, february 15, 2012, available at http://valdaiclub.com/usa/38620.html

Makarenko, B.I., « Post-kommunisticheskie strany: nekotorie itogi transformatsii », Politia, no 3 (50), 2008.

Martianov, V.S., « Politicheskiy modern za predelami Evropy: tsennostnoe edinstvo i institutsional’noe raznoobrazie », Politia, no 3-4 (58-59), 2010.

Mayatskiy, Mikhail, Kurort Evropa, Moscow, Ad Marginem Publisher, 2009.

Mezhuev, Boris, « Sotvorenie kosmopolisa », Kosmopolis, no 1, autumn 2002.

Morozov, Viatcheslav, « Evropa: orientatsiya vo vremeni i prostranstve », Rossiya v Global’noi Politike, no 3, may-june 2008.

Muller, Martin, « Situated Identities: Enacting and Studying Europe at a Russian Elite University », Millenium: Journal of International Studies, no 37: 3, 2008.

Neumann, Iver, « European Identity and Its Changing Others », NUPIWorking Paper, no 710, 2006.

Prikhod’ko, O., « Rossiya v meniayusheisia Evrope », Obozrevatel’ – Observer, no 9-10, 2004, available at http://www.rau.su/observer/N9-10_2004/9-10_04.HTM

Radaev, Vadim, « Est’ li shans sozdat’ rossiiskuyu natsional’nuyu teoriu v sotsial’nykh naukakh? », Pro et Contra, no 3, vol. 5, summer 2000.

Robinson, Christopher, Wittgenstein and Political Theory. The View from Somewhere, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Schippers, Birgit, « Judith Butler, Radical Democracy and Micro-politics », in A. Little and M. Lloyd (eds.), The Politics of Radical Democracy, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Short, Jon, « Outside of Power? Or The Power of the Outside », Journal of Social and Political Thought, vol. 1, no 2, june 2000, http://www.yorku.ca/jspot/2/jshort.htm

Sledzevskiy, I.V., « Obraz Rossii kak smyslovoi konstrukt », Obschestvennie nauki i sovremennost’, no 4, 2007.

Trenin, Dmitrii, Integratsiya i identichnost: Rossiya kak noviy Zapad, Moscow, Evropa Publishers, 2006.

Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Zizek, Slavoj, Iraq: the borrowed kettle, London and New York, Verso, 2004.

Note

1 M. Muller, « Situated Identities: Enacting and Studying Europe at a Russian Elite University », p. 3-25.

2 A. Konovalov, « Mir ne dolzhen byt’ mnogopoliarnym », Nezavisimaya gazeta, september 16, 2008.

3 A.L. Andreev, « Russkiy mir kak faktor rossiiskoi politiki », Mir i politika, no 1 (52), january 2011, p. 98.

4 The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the much appreciated financial and organizational support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation which made possible this research.

5 I.V. Sledzevskiy, « Obraz Rossii kak smyslovoi konstrukt », p. 100.

6 A. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence. Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests, p. 6.

7 A. Klots and C. Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations.

8 Ibid., p. 221.

9 R. Aitken, « Embedded Liberalism in Counterpoint: Reading Woody Guthrie’s Reciprocal Economy », Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 37, no 2, p. 460.

10 J. Short, « Outside of Power? Or The Power of the Outside.

11 M. Braun, « Talking Europe – the Dilemma of Sovereignty and Modernization », p. 400.

12 S. Zizek, Iraq: the borrowed kettle, p. 131.

13 See for example S. Baburin, « Russkiy mir kak on est », Natsional’nie Interesy, no 3, 2011; V. Yakunin, « Globalizatsiya I dialog tsivilizatsiy », Svobodnaya Mysl’, no 3 (1610), 2010.

14 See for example S. A. Lantsov, « Institutsional’nie faktory v mirovoi politike », Politex, vol. 7, 2011.

15 See for example A. Magun, Yedinstvo i odinochestvo. Kurs politicheskoi filosofii Novogo Vremeni, Moscow, NLO Publishers, 2011; V. Morozov, « Evropa: orientatsiya vo vremeni i prostranstve ».

16 A. Bogaturov, « Desiat’ let paradigmy osvoenia » [Ten Years of the Paradigm of Absorption].

17 B.I. Makarenko, « Post-kommunisticheskie strany: nekotorie itogi transformatsii », p. 105-124.

18 V. S. Martianov, « Politicheskiy modern za predelami Evropy: tsennostnoe edinstvo i institutsional’noe raznoobrazie », p. 60.

19 V. Radaev, « Est’ li shans sozdat’ rossiiskuyu natsional’nuyu teoriu v sotsial’nykh naukakh? », p. 202-214.

20 S.I. Kaspe, « Politicheskaya natsia i tsennostniy vybor: obschie polozhenia, rossiiskiy sluchai », p. 6.

21 K. Engelbrekt, B. Nygren, « A reassertive Russia and an expanded European Union », p. 3.

22 S. Zizek, « The Antinomies of Tolerant Reason: A Blood-Dimmed Tide is Loosed », available at http://www.lacan.com/zizantinomies.htm

23 O. Kessler, « From agents and structures to minds and bodies: of supervenience, quantum, and the linguistic turn », Journal of International Relations and Development, volume 10, number 3, 2007.

24 M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire, London and Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 125, 127.

25 F. Lukianov, « Putin, Russia, and the West: Beyond Stereotype ».

26 Y. Citton, « Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible », in G. Rockhill and Ph. Watts. Jacques Ranciere: History, Politics, Aesthetics, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2009, p. 122.

27 T. May, The Political Thought of Jacques Ranciere. Creating Equality, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2008. p. 149.

28 V. Morozov, art. cité.

29 A. J. Norval, « Theorising Dislocations », paper presented at New Stability, Democracy and Nationalism in Contemporary Russia, workshop, Basel, 26-27th september 2008, p. 3.

30 B. Schippers, « Judith Butler, Radical Democracy and Micro-politics », p. 80-91.

31 C. Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory. The View from Somewhere, p. 12-13.

32 Ibid. p. 49.

33 E. Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 96.

34 E. Laclau, Emancipation (s), London and New York, Verso, 2007, p. 40.

35 E. Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 106.

36 E. Laclau, Emancipation (s), p. 15.

37 Ibid. p. 43.

38 E. Laclau, « Constructing Universality », in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, London and New York, Verso, 2000, p. 305.

39 V. Morozov, « Obsessed with Identity: the IR in post-Soviet Russia », Journal of International Research and Development, no 12, 2009, p. 200.

40 M. Entin, « Future tasks for the development of the relations between Russia and the European Union ».

41 « Europe: “Real” and “Unreal”. Report of the Institute of Europe », Russian Academy of Sciences, no 204, 2007, p. 7-10.

42 D. Danilov, « Rossiya i Zapad: bol’she ne vragi... a kto? », Vestnik Evropy, no 7-8, 2002.

43 B. Mezhuev, « Sotvorenie kosmopolisa ».

44 M. Borschevsky and V. Yaroshenko, « Eta zhivuchaya Evropa », Vestnik Evropy, no 28-29, 2010.

45 O. Nemenskiy, « Kosovskiy precedent i buduschee Evropy », april 21, 2008, http://www.apn.ru/publications/article19807.htm

46 A. Dugin, « Evraziyskiy otvet globalizatsii ».

47 M. Remizov, « Demokratia plus gegemonia bol’shinstva », june 24, 2011, http://www.apn.ru/publications/article24379.htm

48 V. Karpets, « Imperia neizbezhna », available at http://www.intelros.org/books/russia_book_karpec1.htm

49 S. Karaganov (ed.), K soyuzu Evropy.

50 A. Utkin, « Padenie Evropy », Prognosis, no 2 (6), summer 2006, р. 139.

51 Y. Shestakov, « Why we have finally fallen out of love with Europe », december 22, 2011, Valdai Discussion Club web site, available at http://valdaiclub.com/europe/36480.html

52 B. Martynov, « Pravilo obratnoi perspektivy i dukh mirovogo poriadka », International Trends. Journal of International Relations Theory and World Politics, vol. 9, no 3 (27), september-december 2011, available at http://www.intertrends.ru/twenty-seventh/06.htm

53 Y. Latynina, « Evropa, ty ofigela », Novaya Gazeta, august 16, 2011, available at http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/48064.html

54 M. Mayatskiy, Kurort Evropa.

55 O. Prikhod’ko, « Rossiya v meniayusheisia Evrope ».

56 O. Prikhod’ko, « Rossiya –Evropa: v plenu protivorechiy », Obozrevatel’ –Observer, no 9, 2005, available at http://www.rau.su/observer/N9_2005/9_07.HTM

57 A. Panov, « S. Sh. A. : kurs na sderzhivanie », Strategia Rossii, no 2, february 2012, p. 14, available at http://sr.fondedin.ru/Publik.pdf

58 O. Butorina, « Evropa bez Evrosoyuza ».

59 S. Karaganov « Evropa bol’she ne rastiot », « Global Affairs’ portal, december 30, 2011, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Evropa-bolshe-ne-rastet-15437

60 D. Evstafiev, « Glazami konservatora : perezagruzka mertva », Index Bezopasnosti, no 4, july-october 2011, p. 150, available at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/sirus4-11/Review%20Evstafiev.pdf

61 V. Nikonov, « Kak krizis izmenil Evropu », « Politika » Foundation web site, 2011, available at http://www.polity.ru/articles/08042010.htm

62 N. Shmeliov, « Chto nam nuzhno ot Evropy », Soyuznoe veche, no 59 (414), december 22-28, 2011, p. 7.

63 I. Neumann, « Russia and Europe », in J. Godzimirski (ed), Russia and Europe. Conference Proceedings, Oslo, Centre for Russian Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI Report, no 210, november 1996.

64 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 277.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., p. 329.

67 V. Pernatskiy, « Rossiya v mirovom politico-pravovom prostranstve », Svobodnaya Mysl’, no 10 (1605), 2009, p. 56.

68 A. Maler, « Pochemu ot Dmitryia Medvedeva ne iskhodit netvarniy svet? Part 2 », Russkii zhurnal, april 29, 2008, available at www.russ.ru

69 I. Neumann, op. cit.

70 T. Bordachov, Predely evropiezatsii, p. 162-163.

71 http://www.indemco.org/

72 D. Trenin, Integratsiya i identichnost: Rossiya kak noviy Zapad, p. 206.

73 Helsinki Plus. Toward a New Security Architecture in Europe, Barcelona and London, CIDOB and LSE, 2010.

74 N. Shmeliov, « Rossiya i Evropa: vmeste ili porozn’? », Vestnik Evropy, no 19-20, 2007.

75 S. Zizek, « Da Capo senza Fine », in J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary Dialogue on the Left, London and New York, Verso, 2000, p. 231.

76 J. Huysmans, « International Politics of Exception », paper prepared for presentation at SGIR Fifth Pan-European Conference, The Hague, Netherlands, 9-22 september, 2004, p. 7.

Autore

Professeur invité à l’Osteuropa-Institut de la Freie Universität de Berlin, où il poursuit des recherches sur les relations germano-russes et leurs effets sur la relation de voisinage entre l’Union européenne et la Russie. Il a publié des articles sur la politique extérieure et la politique de sécurité de la Russie, sur les théories des relations internationales ainsi que sur le régionalisme et le fédéralisme en Russie.

Il testo e gli altri elementi (illustrazioni, file importati) possono essere utilizzati con OpenEdition Books License, se non diversamente specificato.

Acquista

Versione a stampa

lcdpu.frdecitre.fr
Cerca su OpenEdition Search

Sarai reindirizzato su OpenEdition Search