1 Hugo [1862] 2013, p. 83. I would like to thank Kathleen Cruz, William Dingee, Teddy Fassberg, and the anonymous reviewers of Mètis for their numerous helpful suggestions.
2 As Kisch 1965 details, little changed about the technique of scales throughout the ages and by Hugo’s time it was still substantially similar. Yet as the instrument recedes from view, the concept of balance will no longer automatically recall the instrument, and if – as Hugo shows – it will retain its ability do so, it is more as an illustration of a larger idea.
3 The bibliography on ancient weights and balances is vast, and only a small selection can be given here; more will be offered in the course of this article. For the former, see, e.g., the classical treatments of Flinders Petrie 1934; Glanville 1935-1936; Werner 1954; Kisch 1965; for newer studies: e.g., Petruso 1981; 1992; Hitzl 1996; Michailidou 2005; 2010; Alberti 2016; Rahmstorf 2010; 2016; Heymans 2021, especially chapters four and five; for studies of the metaphor of the scales: e.g., Moeller 1907a; 1907b; Ibel 1908; Frommhold 1925; Skutsch 1939; Wüst 1939; Daube 1951; Kretzenbacher 1958; Brandon 1969; Setaioli 1972; Kissel 1984; Robert 1993; Jacob 1994, p. 219-242; da Cunha 1995; Miller 2006; Biagioli 2019. To be added are the excellent entries in many an encyclopaedia, some of which will appear in this article, e.g. in Dar.-Sag., LIMC, DNP, RE, Reallexikon der Assyriologie (s.v. scales, Waage, libra, Psychostasie etc.).
4 The thematic focus on tool, concept, and commensurability means that some features connected to the (metaphor of the) scales will receive fewer attention than they might deserve. Little time is spent, for example, on the various parts that comprise the scales (the beam, the pans, the strings, and the support which is sometime held aloft by a hand; cf., e.g., Kisch 1965, p. 26-55) nor will we discuss ancient theories of metaphor in any detail (cf. note 107).
5 Kittler [2002] 2010, p. 34-35.
6 Searle 1984, p. 44.
7 Kapp [1877] 2018.
8 Michailidou 2010, p. 71; image with Lauer 1976, p. 77 and plate 68; cf. Kisch 1965, p. 26.
9 Thus Ibel 1908, p. 2, and Cassin 1957, p. 5, Grimaudo 1998, p. 133-134. Ducros 1908, p. 53 (plate 47) gives an image of a pair of scales balancing on the shoulder of an upright human.
10 See, for more examples, Ducros 1910. See Boehmer 1965, nos 392-404 for seals that may depict Shamash, the Mesopotamian solar god, in the manner of a balance, although the identification must remain doubtful; no 458 depicts one of Shamash’s viziers holding up the scales.
11 The relation to the human body is still more conspicuous in the case of anthropometric units of measurement, such as the foot, the ell, or the span, in which the relevant body part operates as the measuring tool; see Grimaudo 1998, p. 126-129; Kula 2014, p. 14, 24-29.
12 Cassirer [1923] 2021, vol. 2, p. 256.
13 Piaget [1965] 1995, p. 282; see also Graeber 2001, p. 60-62 (“Piaget insists that the basis of any system of knowledge is always a set of practices: Mathematics, for example, is not derived from the “idea of number” but from the practice of counting”, p. 62). For another example, recall Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s famous argument connecting the advent of money to the advent of abstract thought (see Paul 2004; Freytag 2020), a variant of which was more recently defended by Seaford 2004.
14 Simpl. in Phys. 24.13-25; cf. Arist. Ph. 204b24-9. Where Anaximander’s sentence begins and ends is controversial. Translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.
15 Already suggested by, inter alia, Gigon 1952, p. 136-140 (with discussion of another potential model, the alternation of the seasons; the closely related models appear together in Soph. Aj. 670-676, and note also the close parallel in Theophr. On Weather Signs 3.48). Still incisive are Vlastos 1947, especially at p. 173; Burkert 1969, especially at p. 10-11; Lloyd 1966, p. 212-216; Kahn 1994, p. 178-193. Recent overviews with Mansfeld 2011; Gregory 2016, p. 85-102. References for the Presocratic fragments are to the edition of Diels, Kranz 1952.
16 Plato discerns the same principle of imbalance in the human error of greed (amartēma tēn pleonexian), in the disease (nosēma) of bodies, in the pestilence (loimon) of seasons and years, and in the injustice (adikian) of polities (Pl. Leg. 10.906c); cf. Pl. Tim. 81e-82b.
17 Philolaus of Croton applied the thought to living beings. Being warm, they breathe in cold air and then breathe it out, “like a debt (kathaperei chreos)” (A27).
18 Pind. Ol. 2.61-2. Note the equinox’ role in ancient thinking about diet: Hippoc. Reg. 3.58, 68, suggests eating cooling foodstuff before the equinox, and heating foods after. On equinoxes, see Corre 2015; on Anaximander’s close connection to the invention of the sundial, with which one measures the equinox, see Gehrke 1998, p. 168-174 and most recently Thibodeau 2017.
19 Eur. Phoen. 543-544, with weights mentioned in the previous line; cf. Orph. Hymn. 34.21. Discussion about the role of weight in this passage with Grimaudo 1998, p. 37-40, 46-50.
20 Heracl. B94; in B100, Helios is the overseer of the cosmic periods and seasons (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.139; Cic. Rep. 6.17; Plin. HN 11.6.12).
21 Hippoc. Reg. 3; cf. Diogenes of Apollonia B3. On the moon’s maximum, cf. Derveni Papyrus, ed. Kotwick 2017, paras. 85-91 (= p. 98-101).
22 Cervantes [1613] 2005, p. 33.
23 Thgn. 361-362; cf. 337-340.
24 Par excellence Empedocles’ Love and Strife, who are “interchanging”, amoibaios (B30.3); see for further examples: Kahn 1994, p. 159-165. Cameron Shelley, in a treatment of the Anaximander fragment, argued that he relied on a folk meteorology in which the key concept was, indeed, balance (Shelley 2000, especially at p. 8-15).
25 Balanced battle: Hdt. 5.91.1; Thuc. 1.105.5; Eur. Supp. 706; all taking their cue from the balance simile in Homer, Hom. Il. 12.433-436. Isorrhopos in a weights and measures decree: IG II² 1013, l. 34.
26 On weights and weighing in Greek medical texts, see Grimaudo 1998, p. 58-87.
27 Simpl. in Phys. 24.24.
28 For an excellent treatment of his diction, see Kahn 1994, p. 168-178; see also Lloyd 1966, p. 223-224.
29 Lloyd 1966, p. 221-299 has astutely analyzed how pervasive the role of anthropocentrism is in both pre-philosophical and (early) Greek cosmological theories, and how the human sphere is part of the larger, cosmic order; thus also already Ehrenberg [1921] 1966, p. 89-95 and Latte 1946, p. 69-70. For Egypt, see Assmann 1990, p. 24-34 on the “homology of cosmos and society”. The question is too large to be treated in all its details, but cf., e.g., Hom. Il. 16.384-392, Od. 19.109-14, Hes. Op. 238-247; Hdt. 2.52; Soph. Aj. 668-677; Lysias 25.27; Isoc. 7.5, 8.108; Dem. 26.25-7; Pl. Tim. 83e, Resp. 444c-d; Cic. Rep. 1.44; Livy 5.34.2; Amm. Marc. 28.5.14; cf. Isaiah 55:12.
30 Lloyd 1966, p. 272-294.
31 Sen. QNat. 3.10.3; cf. Arist. [Mund.] 400b.29-31.
32 Heracl. B126; cf. Heracl. B90. See Brosnan, de Waal 2003; “homeostatic” responses appear in many societal practices, cf. Burkert 1994, p. 12-18; 1996, p. 154-155.
33 The idea is not unlike that expressed in the Anaximander fragment, and the invention of the device with which one calculates the equinox, the gnōmōn, is firmly ascribed to Anaximander (cf. above fn. 18). It must be noted, as does West 1971, p. 78, that even if historically inexact, it is nonetheless significant that the sundial derives from Babylonian science and is firmly connected to Anaximander. Ancient Near Eastern festivals paired up with equinoxes as well as the perceived contention between the moon and the sun for supremacy of the skies are attested already for 3rd millennium Ur; cf. Cohen 1993, p. 140-144, 150-153; 1996; Fischer 2002, p. 129.
34 For the formulation, Hirzel 1907, p. 191 and cf. Burkert 1994, p. 15-28. Cf. also the Latin damnum, “damage”, literally a “gift”; there exists a host of similar expressions in Latin and Greek: poenas dare, dikēn didonai kai lambanein but note also the Akkadian nadānum, “to give” as well as “to pay” and “to sell”.
35 For recent attempts to cover the appearance of weights and balances in antiquity, and their spread across the Mediterranean: Rahmstorf 2006; 2010; 2016; Heymans 2021; further literature in note 2. In this article, we are exclusively concerned with the equal-arm balance which was in use in all the societies discussed here. For the steelyard scale in antiquity, see Kisch 1965, p. 56-66; Rohmann 2017; as Bruno Kisch noted, it is almost never shown as a symbol presumably because “the equal arms of the balance represent more clearly the idea of equal treatment” (Kisch 1965, p. 77; cf. Biagoli 2019, p. 301).
36 As also in Akkadian, cf. Cassin 1957, p. 5; in Greek, the same word can frequently refer to both the balance and the weight, e.g. stathmos, talanton, and statēr, which can also mean ‘debtor’: Etym. Magn. s.v. statēr (polloi statēres apodotēres oud’ an eis); Herod. 1.48).
37 Cf. Plin. HN 33.13.42-3; Gai. Inst. 1.122; Varro, Ling. 5.169, 172, 174, 182-183, Rust. 1.10.2; Fest. s.v. pendere; Livy 1.43.9. The terminology for coinage similarly derives from weighing, with the notable exception of pecunia.
38 E.g., Gai. Inst. 1.113, 1.119, 2.104, 2.107, 2.108, 3.174. For the archaeological evidence, see: Nijboer 1998, p. 210-223.
39 Fresco from the House of the Vettii (VI, 15, 1; ca. 62 CE).
40 Hom. Il. 19.238, 247; 22.350, 24.232.
41 Ar. Nub. 1155; Arist. Pol. 1258b2; Pl. [Ax.] 367b; Hsch. s.v. histanein, histasthai, obolostatēs; Poll. Onom. 3.112.
42 E.g., IEphesos 238 (A. l. 1, l. 4 (twice), l. 5; B, l. 2 and 8); later evidence for weighing: IG XII.8 51, col. I, l. 17-32. The abundant evidence of hoards points to the same dominance of weighing, cf. Kroll 2008, p. 22-33.
43 Cf. for the Gortyn laws: e.g., col. 1.51, 1.54, 3.3, 3.11, 3.24 (ed. Willets 1967); it is frequent in Cretan inscriptions more generally, e.g., IC IV 41, col. II, l. 2, col. III, l. 13-14, col. V, l. 3; IC IV 43, col. A.b, l. 7. Archaeologically, balances are scantily attested; all Greek evidence collected in Michailidou 2005, p. 42-58, 131-177. On their depiction in Greek art: Nilsson 1951; Bresson 2000, p. 85-94.
44 Hitzl 1996, p. 133; cf. Kisch 1965, p. 5-6. One could call it “real money” as opposed to “fiduciary money”, though a minimum of fides is inevitably always required – illustrated by the fact that there can be substantial differences in weight between individual coins that are supposed to weigh the same (cf. for example Bingen 1973, p. 56-58).
45 E.g., IG XI.2 154, A l. 57-68. (296 BCE), and still in 169 BCE: IDelos 461 b1, l. 8-9 (same inventory). For a detailed treatment, see Bresson 2000, p. 211-242.
46 Arist. Pol. 1.1257a and Gai. Inst. 1.112.
47 Hymn to Shamash, l. 107-111, transl. Foster 2005, p. 627-635, ed. Lambert 1996, p. 121-138; the manuscripts are all Late Assyrian. For the concern with weights in the ancient Near East, cf. Robson 2008, p. 119-120.
48 Walker, Dick 2001, p. 73 (l. 32 with transl.). Hymn to Shamash, l. 22. For Anaximander, cf. fr. B2; see Parmenides A44 (the earth stays in place on account of “its balance (tēs isorrhopias)”, and does not “incline (rhepsein)” more in one direction than in another); Pl. Phd. 109a; Arist. Cael. 295b10-15, and, recently, Kočandrle 2017. The rhopē is the terminus technicus for a weight in the scale; rhepō the verb for turning the scale.
49 Cf. Arnaud et al. 1979, p. 18 and 56.
50 The phrase appears in all three prayers: CTH 372, para. 15; CTH 373, para. 9; CTH 374, para. 16 (transl. and ed.: Schwemer 2015); the influence of Mesopotamia is evident, and discussed by Steitler 2017, p. 371-376.
51 Book of the Dead, ch. 125, p. 26-27 (ed. Naville 1886, III, plate CXXXIII, col. 14 and 16-17; transl. Lichteim 1976, II, p. 125).
52 E.g., Levit. 19:35-6; Proverbs 11:1-3; 16:11; 20:10; 20:23; Micah 6:11; Ezekiel 45:10-2; Deut. 25:13-5; Hosea 12:7.
53 Arist. [Ath. Pol.] 51.2-3; cf. also Ar. Ran. 1387-1380; Dem. 20.9, 32; Hyp. 4.14; Arist. [Mech.] 849a35-9. For the measuring vessels and weights (as early as 6th c. BCE) found on the Athenian agora, cf. Lang 1964; recent discussion with Johnstone 2011, p. 53-55 in a chapter on measuring and weighing (p. 35-61).
54 E.g., IG XI.2 287 b l. 142; IDelos 509, l. 39; IG V,1 1390, l. 101-103.
55 See Cic. De Off. 3.80; Plin. HN 33.46.132; inscriptions: ILS 5602-5616. Generally on false weights and measures: Wallace-Hadrill 1981, particularly p. 24-25; Piazza 1992, p. 71-77 and 91.
56 The evidence is abundant; some examples: PSI 5 459 (1st c. CE); P. Col 8.229, l.8 (3rd c. CE); P. Alex 40, l. 2 (5th c. CE); P. Lond 4 1485 (7th c. CE). Recently on zugostasis, zugostasion, zugostasia: Bresson 2000, p. 251-282.
57 Much here turns on the problem of trust and, in later centuries, debasement of coinage; see, for these issues in ancient Greece, Grimaudo 1998, p. 98-119, 161-172; Johnstone 2011; more generally, Graeber 2011, especially chapter 2.
58 Edition: Vogelsang 1913; translation (followed here): Lichtheim 1976, vol. 1, p. 169-184.
59 Eloquent Peasant, B1 l. 95-97. The imagery appears first, in the same speech, at B1 l. 90-93.
60 Eloquent Peasant, B1 l. 161; instead, as we read on the Middle Kingdom Stele of Intef, col. 24, one has to be “exact (ꜥqꜣ) like the balance, truly straight (mty mꜣꜥ) like Thoth” (text: Wallis Budge 1912, vol. 2, plate 23; transl.: Lichtheim 1976, vol. 1, p. 121-123). Modern parallels: Biagioli 2019, p. 290.
61 Eloquent Peasant, B1 l. 165-167. Similar imagery at B1 l. 148-151 and B1 l. 311-313.
62 Eloquent Peasant, B1 l. 322-326. Whence the emphasis, in the texts about the psychostasia, on the straightness of the plummet; cf. Clère 1931, p. 435 for examples.
63 Eloquent Peasant, B2 l. 94; the term appears also at B1 l. 4, as well as in mathematical texts in the course of a subtraction, where it expresses the “remainder, excess, difference”: parallels with Vogelsang 1913, p. 220; Clère 1931, p. 436.
64 See, generally, Eyre 2016.
65 B1 l. 13-16. Cf. Wente 1965, p. 105-109.
66 “Nothing in excess” (mēden agan), warns the Delphic oracle, and cf. Thgn. 219, 335, 401, 657. Dio Chrys. 17.11 closely connects the invention of weights to the prevention of pleonexia; more sources with Grimaudo 1998, p. 40-41. The antithesis of kerdos, “gain”, and zēmia, “loss” as well as “punishment”, may also be adduced: Arist. Eth. Nic. 1132a10-16 (with the verb isazein, ‘to balance’); cf. Democritus frs. B220-221; Lys. 7.12, Pl. Hipp. 226e, Arist. Eth. Nic. 5.1130a25-6, Rh. 1.12.1372a8; 37.
67 Clère 1931, p. 425-447.
68 And since the weight of Ma’at was that of a feather the deceased had to be free of sin. So also in the late Inscription of Petosiris (no 81, l. 19-20; text: Lichteim 1976, vol. 3, p. 45-49), and Clère 1931, p. 431-432 offers additional examples. Other conceptions appear too; in the later Demotic tale of Setne Khamwas, as in the Christian tradition, good deeds are weighed against bad deeds (II. 2-5; Lichteim 2006, p. 140).
69 The expression appears on the stele of the general Intef, and is discussed by Clère 1931, p. 437-447 (with text, translation and further parallels) and Grieshammer 1970, p. 48-51, 106-107 adduces further examples in which same terminology is used (e.g., CT III 314a; CT III 325g; CT IV 300a; ed.: Buck 1935-2006).
70 See Grieshammer 1970, p. 49, for an interesting variant involving “robbers”, adducing: CT III 314a, CT IV 300a, 335, CT VI 324g, 691.
71 Pl. Leg. 9.870d-e; for a collection of material see still Glotz 1904, p. 576-597. Until the 1st or 2nd c. CE Testament of Abraham (itself not very Greek), scales seem absent from a judgement of the dead, but note Merkelbach 1951, fo. II v. l. 9 and IG I3 1179, l. III.12 (psuchas d’antirrhopa thentes); 432 BCE.
72 Pl. Resp. 331e and cf. the Roman conception of iustitia as suum cuique tribuere (Rhet. Her. 3.2).
73 Arist. Eth. Nic. 5.1131a25-1134b19 (1132a18 has epanorthikon); the verb frequently used by Aristotle is isazō, “to balance”, “make equal”: Arist. Eth. Nic. 5.1132a7, 9-10, 11333a14, 1154b24 etc.
74 See generally Wüst 1939 and Dietrich 1964. For a collection of the vases depicting weighing scenes – nine in total –, cf. LIMC I.1, s.v. Achilleus, p. 172-175 and VI.1, s.v. Memnon, p. 453-454.
75 Ch. 16; so also in the later inscription of Petosiris in his family tomb (l. 22; text and transl. with Lichteim 1992, p. 96-97). Ample visual evidence of a baboon sitting on Egyptian scales with Ducros 1908, p. 49-53.
76 Job 31:6 (transl. New International Vision). Famous is the tekel in Daniel 5:27; Prov. 16:2, 21:2, 24:12. A Mesopotamian judgement in the underworld is doubtful, however; see recently M. Stol, in Reallexikon der Assyriologie, xiv, p. 602-606, s.v. Waage. On the judgement of the scales across cultures, see the excellent overview in RE, 23.2, p. 1439-1458, s.v. Psychostasie; amongst the Hittites, note Haas 2003, p. 188-191; Haase 2006.
77 Soph. El. 571. Cf., again on Iphigeneia, Eur. IA 1169 (misthon apoteisai) and note the use of antirrhopos, “counterpoise”, in Soph. El. 120.
78 In Greek literature, see the collection in Setaioli 1972 and the discussion in Grimaudo 1998, p. 87-98; for the later appearance of Nemesis and the scales, see Skutsch 1939. For the visual appearance of dikaiosunē with scales see Wallace-Hadrill 1981, p. 28-31, as well as for the “parallel lives” of the legal dictum aequum et bonum and the libra of commerce at Rome. On the afterlife of the scales, see Frommhold 1925.
79 Grimaudo 1998, p. 90, and, for an overview of variants of the Pythagorean proverb, p. 97-98.
80 Lloyd 1966, p. 336, 380, 438.
81 We may recall at this point the Hegelian idea according to which “the evolution of legal consciousness was, at least in large measure, about the development of the idea of value-equivalence, of the idea that it is possible to put a price on things”, Whitman 1995-1996, p. 59 with further literature. In that article, Whitman demonstrated the errors of a Hegelian evolutionary perspective on ancient law; and yet, as he himself recognizes (82), the problem of value-equivalence remains a, if not the, fundamental one in legal history.
82 Still outstanding is Dihle 1962, p. 12-40. Recent and comprehensive: Rothkamm 2011.
83 Recently, with further references, Loney 2019, p. 13-48; the first attestation, perhaps, is SEG 47, 1476 A.1 (late 8th, early 7th century), but the reading hisa menē tin(n)unai is disputed (cf. Cassio 1993 and Löschhorn 2007, p. 300-302).
84 E.g., Festus s.v. talio (par, “equal”); Gell. 20.1.14, 20.1.33 (par), 20.1.34 (parissimus, “most equal”); Gai. Inst. 3.223; Isid. Orig. 5.24 (similitudo, “likeness”).
85 Gell. NA 20.1.34 (“equilibrium” and “placed in the scales” (in librili perpenderent))
86 Miller 2006, especially chapter 3. See further, Graeber 2011, p. 36-37, 61-63, 103-108 (with a focus on money, not weight) and Biagioli 2019, p. 293-297 (with a powerful discussion of commensurability, talion, and the scales).
87 The link between weight and money, as became apparent particularly in section IV, is intimate and it would seem that weight is able to fulfil the basic function of money as “the autonomous expression of a mutual relationship of exchangeability” (Simmel [1900] 2004, p. 127), i.e. of commensurability. Large and controversial as the topic of money is, we cannot treat the connection between the concept of equivalence, the instrument of the scales, and the idea of money here in all its intricacies. I hope to do so separately elsewhere.
88 Diog. Laert. 6.42.
89 Already recognised in antiquity: Soph. Trach. 935, 1134; Gell. NA 20.1.15.
90 Arist. Eth. Nic. 5.1133a20; see also Johnstone 2011, p. 107-109, with a discussion of using money to convey incomparability. Coinage turns on counting, another means of establishing commensurability; alongside counting and weighing, ancient sources frequently single out measuring as well (e.g. Pl. Euthphr. 7c-d; Xen. Cyr. 8.2.21; Plut. Mor. 99b; cf. in general terms Kisch 1965, p. 1-3), yet the idea of equilibrium, of weighing, dominates conceptions of justice to an extent that is absent for counting and measuring.
91 Aesch. Ag. 1527; note also Soph. El. 298.
92 Hom. Il. 23.885; cf. Hom. Il. 9.401 (antaxion); Chantraine 1968, s.v. agein and axios. From agein, “to draw down in the scale”, e.g., Dem. 22.76, 24.129; Arist. [Pr.] 931b15; Plut. Mor. 96b.
93 Pl. Leg. 8.845a.
94 E.g., Aesch. Cho. 312-314, Supp. 435-436, Sept. 638; Soph. Phil. 316, 795, 1114, OC 870, Aj. 840-842, 1177, Trach. 1040; Hdt. 1.2; Eur. El. 125, 279, 983, Or. 655; SEG 47, 1476 A1 (cf. fn. 83), could be a very ancient case in point, if we accept the reading hisa menē tin(n)unai.
95 So also Biagioli 2019, p. 288; cf. Whitmann 1995-1996, p. 82: “the most difficult mystery of the early codes is: Why do humans ever regard weighed metal as the equivalent of anything?”
96 The material, to which a few details are added here, was first collected by Cassin 1957, p. 7-9.
97 Harper 1892, no 292.
98 Hom. Il. 22.351, eruein, “draw”, seems to mean “weigh” here, as in Thgn. 77-78 (anteruomai); the same thought, perhaps, in Hom. Il. 23.885.
99 Scholia ad Hom. Il. 22.351; cf. Hsch. s.v. aroton and perhaps Verg. Aen. 1.484.
100 For a discussion, see Graham 1958.
101 Plaut. Mil. 658. The evidence is conveniently collected in Grimm 1899, vol. 2, p. 145-147.
102 As in the infamous caste system of Plato: Pl. Resp. 3.415a.
103 Thgn. 77-78. A more literal idea of substitution is perhaps discernible in Plut. Sol. 25.2, and cf. Arist. [Ath. Pol.] 55.5, as well as in the joking exchange in Pl. Phdr. 235d-e.
104 We should add that already in these cases, a regime of value (or money) is in place that exceeds a standard based purely on weight: restitution is in gold or silver, not in bronze or iron.
105 For Greece, see recently Heymans 2021, p. 196-205; for the ancient Near East, e.g., the Laws of Ur-Namma, para. 18-37; the Laws of Eshnunna, para. 42-60 in Roth 1997.
106 See, for early examples, the ancient Near Eastern Laws of X, or the Laws of Eshnunna in Roth 1997; for ancient Greece, Link 1994; generally, Whitman 1995-1996, p. 51-53, 80-82.
107 On such “metaphors we live by” in general, see Lakoff, Johnson 1980, Blumenberg [1960] 2010, Martinengo 2016. For ancient theories of metaphor, see, par excellence, Arist. Poet. 1457b6-9, Rhet. 1412b34-1413a2, and generally Novokhatko 2014.
108 Biagioli 2019, p. 289; cf. p. 287-288, p. 300-303; a similar argument with Graeber 2011, p. 158.
109 Blumenberg 2009, p. 78. It is not impossible that “balance” constitutes what Blumenberg, elsewhere, called an “absolute metaphor” – an idea that cannot be grasped directly but only metaphorically. Germane, as Blumenberg himself recognized (Blumenberg [1960] 2010, p. 4-5), is Immanuel Kant’s suggestion, in §59 of his Kritik der Urteilskraft, that all concepts require Anschauungen (“intuitions”, “contemplations”) to verify their reality and that some ideas – such as liberty, nature, and, perhaps, justice and balance – cannot be apprehended sensorially (via a sinnliche Anschauung; as one could, for example, grasp the concept of a pen by looking at a concrete instantiation) but only symbolically, that is, by means of an analogy that itself does invoke such a sinnliche Anschauung. The concept of balance, on this reading, can only be apprehended via the scales, in a process that Kant would call Versinnlichung; cf. Kant [1790] 2007, p. 178-182; Recki 2008, p. 195-208. I owe the reference to Kant to one of the anonymous reviewers of Mètis.
110 Horkheimer, Adorno [1944] 2002, p. 4. For a pressing contemporary account of such dynamics, see Brown 2015.
111 Sahlins 2000, p. 278; as is perhaps the case at p. 202-203 in the otherwise superb Garapon 2001; the analysis of Miller 2006 is in a similar tenor.
112 Hugo [1862] 2013, p. 1184.