The Debate over the Altar of Victory in 384
A Test Case for Bertram Raven’s Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence?
La controverse sur l’autel de la Victoire en 384. Un cas d’école pour le modèle de Bertrand Raven sur le pouvoir comme interaction d’influences interpersonnelles ?
p. 313-331
Résumés
In 384, Senator Symmachus attempted to convince Emperor Valentinian to restore the pagan altar, a move which Bishop Ambrose of Milan sought to prevent. I hope to show that by examining the two conflicting petitions to the ruler through Bertram Raven’s ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence,’ we will better understand this case of influencing rulers: first of all, there are surprising similarities; they both make use of the entire range of power bases including manipulation and threat. Thus, it is not only Ambrose who should be described as a power-broker, but Symmachus too. At the same time, the power bases are defined and weighted differently due to their personal background and situation. Raven’s model, when slightly modified and paired with historical criticism, has great potential: it can be a viable framework to guide our analysis. In principle, this heuristic method can be applied to different situations, epochs and cultures.
En 384, le sénateur Symmaque tenta de persuader l’empereur Valentinien de restaurer l’autel païen, ce à quoi l’évêque Ambroise de Milan s’opposa. J’espère montrer qu’en lisant les deux pétitions contradictoires au travers du Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence de Bertram Raven, nous affinons la compréhension de ce cas d’influence sur les dirigeants. Tout d’abord, les deux textes présentent des similitudes étonnantes, en mobilisant toute la gamme des outils de pouvoir, y compris la manipulation et la menace. Ambroise n’est donc pas le seul qui doive être décrit comme un personnage de pouvoir, Symmaque aussi. En même temps, les bases du pouvoir sont définies et pondérées différemment en fonction de leurs contexte et situation personnelle différents. Le modèle de Raven, légèrement modifié et combiné à la critique historique, offre un grand potentiel en tant que cadre opératoire pour l’analyse. Plus généralement, ce modèle heuristique peut être appliqué à différentes situations, époques et cultures.
Entrées d’index
Mots-clés : influence intersubjective, Antiquité tardive, Ambroise, Symmaque, Bertram Raven
Keywords : interpersonal influence, Late Antiquity, Ambrose, Symmachus, Bertram Raven
Texte intégral
1Under autocratic systems, those who successfully influence a ruler’s attitude and decisions acquire a degree of power. This connection can be studied especially well in Late Antiquity, a time when political, social and intellectual upheaval altered the basic conditions for the exercise of influence. The period from Diocletian to Theodosius corresponds to the formation of the late imperial administrative apparatus and Christianization which established the essential discursive and institutional conditions for the exertion of influence in Late Antiquity. Many attempted to have the emperor’s ear: from court eunuchs who were particularly close to the emperor, to bishops who had risen to power through Christianization. The competition was fierce and often led to conflict and polemic. But, in the end, it is usually the victor’s perspective that comes to be remembered in history books.
2By focusing on a case study, this paper will investigate which methodology could help us pinpoint different conceptions and practices of the exertion of influence. I will not limit myself to established historiographical methods, but also draw on social-psychological approaches.
3Medieval scholars have long focused on ‘institutions’ like the imperial diets, assemblies at court and ‘offices,’ e.g. town councillors. This area of study has gained new impetus thanks to the work of Gerd Althoff: his model of symbolic communication has brought individual actors and their deliberations to the fore.1 Inspired by Althoff, other important studies on advice, mediation and friendship have appeared that also touch on what amounts to ‘informal influence.’2 Byzantinists and Islamists have also recently contributed to this research topic.3 Research in Ancient History has followed a similar path to Medieval Studies. Scholars’ attention has shifted from formal deliberative bodies to examine individual councillors in their various contexts. Hence, Aloys Winterling proposes to define councillors under the Roman Empire in terms of ‘proximity to the emperor’ and the ‘court.’4
4This approach is also plausible in Late Antiquity. There were people at court who could influence the emperor independently of deliberative bodies.5 Scholars have identified empresses, eunuchs and soothsayers, who had previously been overlooked, because of vestigial ancient prejudices.6 The vast majority of contemporaries viewed the influence of empresses and eunuchs with suspicion, and scholars had also long associated it with weak emperors and decline.7 When, for example, Roland Delmaire’s standard work on palace offices distinguishes the cubiculum (i.e., the imperial apartments) from the consistorium (the imperial council) insofar as the former bears witness to intrigue and occult influences, he is merely reiterating the prejudice of the sources.8
5But, as specialized studies have shown, the ‘court’ and ‘proximity to the emperor’ paradigms have limited use for Late Antiquity. For example, philosophers, ascetics, monks and bishops–who cannot simply be categorized as ‘court bishops’–could also be advisers.9 There are no studies that generally focus on advice itself. In addition to the protagonists and the context of their influence, the ‘mode’ of influence must also be determined and differentiated. After all, the sources mention appeals, emotional outbursts, arts of seduction, and gestures more frequently than advice and credit these modes with a high degree of efficiency.
6Since these groups of people and their methods do not fall under the paradigms ‘institution,’ ‘proximity to the emperor,’ ‘the court’ or even ‘advising,’ I propose to adopt the terms ‘influence agents’ and ‘(the exertion of) influence,’ which have seldom been used.10 Classical historians and philologists indeed often discuss influence–namely, the artistic, cultural, intellectual or institutional influence between authors, works, building styles and peoples. But influence in this context is a concept that lacks hermeneutic precision, as Édouard Will has pointed out.11 Interpersonal influence is discussed less often, at most as a side topic of older books about ‘great men’ or in the aforementioned studies of specific groups of people. The ‘exertion of influence’ has not yet been studied in depth, which may have something to do with the fact that the term has no exact equivalent in the Latin and Greek sources.12
7While historical studies have developed a wide range of tools to study group-decisions, methodological approaches investigating the role of interpersonal relations in reaching individual decisions are sorely lacking. Methodological variety is also limited in most of the social sciences, as they place greater emphasis on the relationship of an individual to a group, society or media.13 Social psychology, however, has developed models of interpersonal influence that can be of interest to historians. Already in his famous essay on the history of mentalities, Georges Duby noted and stressed the exciting potential of social psychology: ‘The frameworks, the models they construct allow us to isolate particular behaviours... and better observe them.’14 But despite Duby’s appeal, historians have neglected the best-known model of interpersonal influence: Bertram Raven’s ‘power/interaction model of interpersonal influence.’15 This paper will apply it for the first time to analyse past influence.
Bertram Raven’s ‘Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence’
8Raven defines influence as a change in the attitude or behaviour of a person (the target). His power/interaction model, which specifies phases (boxes) and suggests a process (arrows), adopts two perspectives corresponding to the communications distinction between transmitter and receiver. On the one hand, there are various motivations for the influence agent (e.g., extrinsic/intrinsic goals), power bases (e.g., reward resources, legitimacy, expertise) and considerations (e.g., cost/benefit; see fig. 1). The box “Choice of Power Bases, Influence Attempt: Choice of Mode” which does not contain any elements in Raven, has been supplemented with actions corresponding to the power bases (additions in italics). Furthermore, three modes characterizing these actions have been added. For example, one may threaten someone in person or in writing, shouting or raising one’s fists, coolly or with an evil grin.
Fig. 1: Model of power action from the perspective of the influence agent; additions italicized.

Graphic: Fabian Schulz
9On the other hand, the target also has motivations that may determine his or her reaction to a form of influence because of role requirements or their regard for third parties (fig. 2) for instance. The positive or negative result then affects the exertion of influence in the future, insofar as it alters the preconditions of doing so.
Fig. 2: Model of power action from the perspective of the influence target.

Graphic: Fabian Schulz
10Raven developed this model as a way to analyse political behaviour and ‘tested’ it on historical case studies linked to World War II,16 albeit without considering source-critical issues. In order to identify motivations and power bases, however, we need a precise knowledge of the historical context. In Late Antiquity, not only could civil and military officials claim to possess expertise, but bishops, philosophers and soothsayers often did too. Moreover, thorough source criticism is also necessary to expose unwarranted claims.
11The source analysis will therefore proceed in two steps: first, on the textual level, we will analyse and interpret the exertion of influence as per the model depicted above; then, this representation from the perspective of the observer will be supplemented and potentially corrected.
Late Antique Case Study
12Let us take a well-documented example from the conflict between pagans and Christians, the dispute over the Altar of Victory, which has been extensively discussed in the context of the ‘last pagans’ and the ‘triumph of Christianity’.17 Of its many phases, we will focus on the year 384, which is the best documented, although central questions like the precise object (altar, statue, subsidies) referred to in the sources remain controversial.18 In the year 382, Emperor Gratian had the Altar of Victory removed from the Roman senate. This step alarmed the pagan senators. One of them, Symmachus, attempted to persuade the emperor to revoke his decree, which in turn alarmed the Christians. Damasus, Bishop of Rome, protested on their behalf; Ambrose of Milan forwarded their letter to court. Gratian stood by his decision. These events are only attested indirectly. After the thirteen-years-old Valentinian II had succeeded Gratian a year later, Symmachus–now prefect of Rome and therefore president of the senate–once again attempted to have the altar restored (384). Symmachus sent the emperor a petition (Symmachus, Relatio 3; transmitted and edited among Ambrose’s letters as Epistula 72a according to Michaela Zelzer’s numbering). Having been informed of this petition, Ambrose wrote to the emperor immediately even though he did not know yet his opponent’s specific arguments (Ambrosius, Epistula 72). Both documents, which survive in the corpus of Ambrose’s writings, seem to have been presented in this form. Later on, Ambrose felt obliged to write a second letter, in which he refutes Symmachus point by point (Ambrosius, Epistula 73). Since the second letter was probably conceived exclusively for publication,19 we will concentrate here on the first letter and on the petition.
13Both documents can be analysed in a variety of ways. Their structure and style, for instance, can be assessed according to the rules of ancient rhetoric.20 Pedro Barceló, in turn, contrasts the authors’ modes: “Unlike Symmachus, who argues, pleads, and attempts to persuade, Ambrose expresses himself apodictically, making requests and demands.”21 This assessment is based on scholarly opinions both old and new that celebrate Symmachus’ relatio as an appeal for tolerance and depict Ambrose as a calculating power broker;22 this view can be refined with the help of Raven’s model. It can help us analyse and compare how the authors framed their own and their opponent’s influence.
The Perspective of the Agents of Influence (cf. fig. 1)
Motivation
14Symmachus and Ambrose had conflicting motivations: the senator wanted to persuade the emperor to restore the altar (Relatio 3, 3); the bishop, however, tried to prevent that from happening (Epistula 72, 10). For Ambrose, the altar is a symbol of a false belief that has been defeated; for Symmachus, it is a symbol of Roman tradition that must be preserved. So, in Raven’s terms both individuals pursue extrinsic goals (motivation 1). By intervening, Symmachus (as he himself professes) would like to fulfil his duty to convey the will of the people and senate to the emperor (Rel., 1-2); these are the requirements of his role and authority (motivation 3). That this position coincides with his personal views is self-evident (Rel., 2). This contrasts with the altruistic motive that he claims: concern for the good of the Empire and the emperor’s legacy (Aeternitatem curamus famae et nominis vestri, Rel., 3-4). Emperors, naturally, cared for their realm and their reputation and were indeed expected to do so (fig. 2, motivations 3 and 5). Ambrose, for his part, alleges that Symmachus is exploiting the emperor’s young age (iunior aetas) and is embroiling him in a false religion (Ep., 6).23 Ambrose further attacks the Christians who approved of Symmachus’ proposal: they are supposedly seeking to outwit the emperor and mislead him with empty words (Ep., 8). He cites his concern for the emperor’s soul as his sole motivation (Ep., 17). But Ambrose, who had only played a supporting part in 382, now potentially hoped to distinguish himself as a defender of Christian interests by defeating the new attempt to restore the altar (motivations 2 and 5).
Power Bases
15Reward: Symmachus promises the emperor at the outset that his fame will increase if he follows his advice (Rel. 2). In conclusion, he argues that restoring the altar or money would be valuable for the emperor: “They (sc. the traditional gods) should protect you; let us honour them!”.24 In characterizing the relationship between gods and humans as Do ut des Symmachus draws on a common way of thinking.25 Similarly, Ambrose concludes by asking the emperor “to act as you believe, so that it may someday benefit you in the eyes of God”.26 In the former case, the emperor’s will be gratified in his lifetime; in the latter, he will receive his reward in the afterlife. At the same time Ambrose seems to want to co-opt Symmachus’ arguments in declaring that eternal victory (aeterna victoria) is based on Christ (Ep., 15) and that it was not a foreign religion, but the Christian faith that sustained the reign of Valentinian’s father (Ep., 16).
16Coercion: Symmachus threatens: without the altar, more false oaths would be sworn that might jeopardize the safety of the ruler (Rel., 5). Given the current political situation this danger must have appeared particularly serious, because at that time the usurper Magnus Maximus was challenging Valentinian’s rule.27 Ambrose threatens in turn: “But when something to the contrary is decreed, we bishops cannot accept it with indifference and keep silent. You may still enter the church, but you will not find a priest there or you will find one who will resist you”.28 He then imagines the priest’s harsh rebukes (Ep., 14). This was a serious threat to Valentinian’s public image, which depended on the child emperor’s display of piety when attending mass.29 What is more, the break with Ambrose would have given Magnus Maximus–who at the time displayed himself as a strict Catholic and who would shortly afterwards accuse the Milanese court of Arianism–an advantage, while it would have weakened the support of Emperor Theodosius, which was the only true guarantee of Valentinian power, as the bishop well knew.30 Ambrose accuses his opponents of using coercion: Symmachus should not attempt to impose his faith on the emperor no more than the emperor does on him (Ep., 7). If Christian senators were forced to take an oath and perform sacrifice, it would amount to persecution and ridicule (Ep., 9 and 16). The emperor’s freedom of choice would be reduced (Ep., 11). Both authors also make threats that are disguised as information (see below).
17Legitimacy: Symmachus and Ambrose stress the legitimacy of their wishes by referring to the role requirements of the ruler (fig. 2, motivation 3). Symmachus argues that Valentinian cannot break with ancestral custom (instituta maiorum, Rel., 2). He should fill the treasury with the spoils of war (hostium spolia) like a good ruler, not with the confiscated property of priests (sacerdotum damna) or inheritances (Rel., 12-13). “Greed is incompatible with your nature”.31 If good rulers (boni principes) respect private property, then Valentinian is one of them, since “you esteem righteousness to be above despotic power”.32
18Ambrose begins by asserting that the ruler serves God (Ep., 1). The emperor should fight for the true faith; God must always take precedence (Ep., 6). “Nothing is more important than religion; nothing ranks higher than faith”33–here the emperor’s freedom of decision is restricted by ethical principles (fig. 2, evaluation 1). In framing the controversy in terms of a Pagan-Christian opposition, Ambrose glosses over inner-Christian divisions, which ran deep. While the bishop of Milan was a Nicene Christian, Valentinian adhered to the Homoean faith, which to Ambrose was a heresy. The letter mentions a little further that every age, even Valentinian’s youth, is ripe for Christ (perfecta Christo, Ep., 15). As mentioned above, Ambrose is elaborating the image of an ideal Christian ruler against which he measures Valentinian.34 Ambrose accuses his opponents of ignoring these principles: “Since you, Christian emperor, should believe in the true God … and show piety, I am amazed that several people expect you to...”.35
19Some scholars think that in between his appeals to the emperor’s piety, Ambrose included a small hint, which might have had far more impact on the emperor’s final decision: “Remembering the embassy that was recently entrusted to me, I once more appeal to your faith.”36 According to Neil McLynn, Ambrose refers to his embassy to the usurper Magnus Maximus in 383, which had bought Valentinian precious time.37 If this is correct, Ambrose would be appealing to the Do ut des principle.
20Expertise: As urban prefect, Symmachus stood at the summit of the judicial system. He relies on his legal expertise especially in the second part of his petition, which calls for the restoration of the financial privileges of the Vestal Virgins (Rel., 11-19): “Good rulers should not believe that what certain people received from public property should be available to the public treasury. A state consists of many individuals; therefore, that which leaves the state becomes once again the property of individuals.”38 Over time, custom transforms concessions into obligations (Rel., 18). These legalistic interpretations, however, were by no means binding.39
21Ambrose begins by instructing the emperor as to how the true and almighty God should be worshipped: zealously (veraciter, intima mente, intimo affect, Ep., 1-2). Citing a psalm, he dismisses the gods of the pagans as demons (daemonia, Ep., 1; Ps. 95,5). Symmachus adheres to a false religion (superstitio) and fights for illusions of truth (veri vana, Ep., 6). With this allusion to Plato’s allegory of the cave, the pagans’ weapons are turned against them. Furthermore, Ambrose poses as an expert in matters of faith, which were at issue here: in military questions, one should listen to a man with combat experience–in matters of faith, one must rely on God (Ep., 7), and his servant (Christi sacerdos, Ep., 10). If, however, the emperor follows Symmachus’petition, he would become a pagan and commit blasphemy (sacrificium, Ep., 8 and 10). This claim dramatically raises the stakes of the decision (fig. 2, evaluation 4). Drawing on the gospel of Matthew, Ambrose instructs the emperor: “You cannot serve two masters”.40 This either-or dilemma reduces the ruler’s freedom of action.
22Identification: Symmachus repeatedly urges the emperor to follow the example of religious tolerance set by his predecessors (Rel., 3 and 7), which in reality was not actually so manifest. Ambrose in turn cites Valentinian’s brother and father as models whose memory the emperor is about to betray (pessime iudicasti, iniuria, Ep., 16-17). Non-compliance would be costly (fig. 2, evaluation 4). He also uses a negative example: the false zeal of the pagans should inspire good zeal in the emperor (Ep., 6).
23Information: If Symmachus connects the welfare of the empire and the ruler’s success to the maintenance of the old cults (Rel., 2-3 and 8-9), rejecting them poses a threat. Symmachus shows that this threat is real with the following claim: “The year’s produce was dried up by sacrilege. It was inevitable that all mankind should lose what was denied our religion”.41 “Did the provinces ever suffer to such an extent, when the state nourished the administers of its cults with an honourable salary?”;42 a threat that takes the form of information. Christians took this accusation very seriously.43 Moreover, Ambrose claims that the treasury did not make any profits after withdrawing its support (Ep., 11). Symmachus warns him: “You may not abandon the patronage of the goddess who grants you triumphs over the enemy”.44 Naturally, military success was a central concern of rulers (fig. 2, motivation 3). By reinforcing oaths and decrees, the altar preserved general unity (concordiam tenet omnium, Rel., 5). Symmachus concludes: Valentinian should rescind the decree; it went against Gratian’s true feelings, who was unaware of its unpopularity (Rel., 20). The fear that the emperor would appear to take sides is therefore unjustified (Rel., 19). This claim could be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the costs of the decision (fig. 2, evaluation 4). When Symmachus describes Gratian’s ignorance, it is not merely information, but potentially a manipulative construction of the past that should make it easier for Valentinian to break with it.
24When Ambrose recalls the concerted action that allegedly caused the first petition to fail (Ep., 10), this should also be interpreted as manipulation rather than information, because we do not know the actual reasons why Gratian stood by his decision. Given his determination to separate Roman state and Roman religion,45 he might have never considered reversing it.
25Manipulation: While both appear to distort the past to further their cause, each of them accuses the other side of manipulation. Symmachus systematically imputes base character flaws and methods to the opponents of his first intervention (“dishonest”; “withholding information”).46 He is probably alluding to the magister officiorum at the time, Macedonius.47 He is hitting a sore spot: we know of cases in which unpleasant information was hidden from emperors for a long time.48 Valentinian, who like other rulers also depended on a degree of insulation and filtering in order to be able to work and make decisions, was probably aware of this danger. Similarly, Ambrose claims that Symmachus and his sympathisers hoped to manipulate the emperor: “exploit... entrap... outwit... lead astray”.49
26Third parties: Symmachus claims to have the unanimous support of the other senators and the general public (Rel., 1-2); doing so, his own persona fades away to reveal the will of the people. He is probably exaggerating in both instances, although pagans still had considerable sway in the senate, even if they were not in fact the majority.50 Ambrose, in contrast, asserts that the supporters of the restoration consisted, not of the entire senate, but rather of individual pagan senators (pauci gentiles, Ep., 9-11). Ambrose, for his part, claims the support of his episcopal colleagues: if there had been more time (fig. 1, inhibition 5), all bishops would have expressed their assent (Ep., 10). Later, he protests on their behalf: “We bishops cannot accept this with indifference”.51 Both Symmachus and Ambrose make use of ethopoeia so that they may present additional supporters: Symmachus has the goddess Roma come to call the emperor to account (Rel., 9-10). Ambrose introduces Valentinian I and Gratian, who take their son and brother to task (Ep., 15-16). For Edward Watts this argument is naive,52 but the memory of his father probably mattered to a child emperor like Valentinian II. In both cases, this virtual expansion of one’s own camp of supporters is a manipulative strategy. In the eyes of all parties involved, the divine powers that Ambrose and Symmachus invoke can also be considered to be third parties. Ambrose declares with biblical undertones: “No one deceives God, who sees all things, even the secrets of the human heart”53 (Rom 2.17; 1 Cor. 14.15). The purpose of this general statement is to scare the ruler, to remind him of God’s vigilance (fig. 2, evaluation 5). Instead of disputing the existence of the pagan gods, Ambrose dismisses them as demons (Ep., 1; see above).
Preparation and Mode
27Although the emperor resided in Milan and Ambrose was no stranger to court procedures, he still composed a letter. Why? He probably did not expect to be granted an audience at such short notice. Alternatively, he may have considered that indirect influence would be more promising. The letter, although formally addressed to the emperor, also appear to include members of the imperial council (consistorium) as recipients, insofar as the letter convey interpretations and expectations that fence in the emperor’s freedom of decision (fig. 2, evaluations 3). Ambrose thus uses the setting to his advantage (fig. 1, preparation 1). This strategy made sense, because the child emperor depended on his advisors. In order to compensate for the lack of immediacy of the spoken word Ambrose puts a lot of emotion into his letter. There are some imperatives: a warning “Let no one creep up on your youthful age”;54 his indignation: “So you yourself, emperor, must be allowed the same freedom!”.55 Likewise, Symmachus describes the situation as deplorable (miser, Rel., 12) and evokes the tears of the priests (lacrimae sacerdotum, Rel., 20), probably to gain sympathy or even compassion. Both appeal to the emperor’s feelings (Ep., 12; Rel., 18).
28After the failure to meet the emperor in 382, Symmachus wanted to make sure that this time his message was received with the maximum impact.
The Emperor’s Perspective (cf. fig. 2)
29Valentinian only ruled for a year; the Altar of Victory controversy thus put the cohesion of the newly formed government to the test. As Valentinian was only thirteen years old, the real power rested with his advisers, who we can identify in part. First, there were the generals, Bauto and Rumoridus who, according to Ambrose, discussed the affair in the consistory.56 Their opinion certainly carried weight, because the court depended on their military skills to crush the usurper Magnus Maximus. Another possible candidate is Valentinian’s mother Justina, who later exerted considerable influence over her child. When it came to religion, these advisors presumably had different views, because the generals were pagans,57 whilst the emperor’s mother was a (Homoean) Christian. What Valentinian’s position was, is hard to determine, because there is little ancient testimony. This is where Raven’s model can help us make some educated guesses. The motivation to maintain the status quo (no altar in the senate) was probably greater than to change it (motivation 1). At the same time, it was expected for a ruler to be open to hearing his subjects’ wishes, particularly when they represented a group whose loyalty was important, as Symmachus did, even though the senate had declined in significance since the 3rd century. It is highly likely that Valentinian had a strong sense of duty, regardless of his young age, but there is no way of knowing whether he felt more inclined to match the role requirements sketched out by Ambrose or those by Symmachus (motivation 3). Like Gratian in 382, Valentinian could have chosen to ignore the senatorial embassy (anticipation 2 preparatory resistance), but this was probably not an option, because support for the motion was so widespread.
The Influence Attempts and their Effects
30Long after the facts, Ambrose relates how both documents were received at court: once in the funeral oration for Valentinian II (392) and later in a letter to the usurper Eugenius (394). The truthfulness of these accounts is doubtful since they obviously serve as exempla, but careful examination may uncover an element of truth. In the funeral speech, Ambrose gives a vivid description (with direct speech) of how the young emperor prevailed over his councillors in the consistorium, who unanimously supported the senatorial motion to restore the altar.58 It is probably no coincidence that the words Ambrose puts in the emperor’s mouth (he allegedly wanted to live up to the piety of his brother) and his alleged behaviour (he supposedly exposed the godlessness of the Christian members) recall the admonitions and recommendations that Ambrose had made to the emperor in the past.59 Ambrose depicts an emperor who acts by his standards, without mentioning his own intervention, because it would have undermined the independence of the emperor and the purpose of the eulogy. In the letter to Eugenius, who had potentially permitted the altar to be restored,60 he gives a detailed account of the failure of earlier attempts and his part in them, including Symmachus’attempt as prefect of Rome:61 after Ambrose’s counter petition was read in the consistorium, Valentinian supposedly agreed with his position and his councillors followed, although the magistri militum, Bauto and Rumoridus, who is singled out as pagan, were probably reluctant. Each text thus has a different emphasis when it comes to Ambrose’s role and presents the dynamics in the consistory differently, but both agree on the fact that the motions were equally discussed in the consistorium and that some of its members (among them Christians) favoured Symmachus’ position.62 Even if, in both cases, such support serves to highlight the emperor as a resolute and independent decision-maker, this support is not improbable. Already in his first letter, Ambrose takes aim at military experts and Christian supporters. Therefore, it is likely that some members of the consistorium indeed supported Symmachus’ appeal.
31While Symmachus was not received in 382, this time he was granted an audience.63 Does the fact that Valentinian–despite the partial support for the pagan motion in the senate and in the consistory–did not rescind his brother’s decree mean that Symmachus lost and Ambrose won his case, as John Liebeschuetz thinks?64 The former is more likely than the latter. If we keep Raven’s second model in mind, more complex chains of causality appear. Perhaps the emperor felt that Ambrose’s intervention was a form of unacceptable meddling and upheld his brother’s decree for other reasons. In fact, Neil McLynn attributes Ambrose’s success neither to the force of his reasoning nor to his threats, but rather to his ability to anticipate the government’s intentions and the fact that he was owed a favour.65 At any rate, cracks appeared in the relationship between the court and Ambrose’s episcopal see shortly thereafter: the years 385 and 386 were overshadowed by a serious conflict in which the court wanted to force Ambrose to surrender a basilica to the Homoeans.
New Perspectives?
32First of all, comparing how Ambrose and Symmachus exerted influence through Raven’s lens reveals surprising similarities. Both use every available power base to further their cause, even manipulation and threat, which scholars have traditionally attributed to Ambrose, and both use negative campaigning. On a closer look, we see that the power bases are defined and weighted differently. Each of them claims personal expertise, but in one case it is judicial and in the other pastoral. While Symmachus can cite the mandate of the senate, Ambrose claims to speak in the name of God. Both attempt to trap the emperor with role requirements, but while one talks about traditional leadership, the other talks about Christian rulership. Overall, Symmachus argues more cautiously and avoids invective. In contrast, Ambrose’s threats are more open and negative campaigning is more prominent. Ultimately, Ambrose appeals to the emperor’s conscience, appealing to Christianity’s guilt culture; Symmachus invokes public opinion, which had marked the classical world’s shame-culture.66 If we wish to supplement and correct these depictions with greater distance, Raven’s model helps to develop alternative interpretations: naturally, we can say nothing definite about the protagonists’ true motivations. Hence whether Ambrose was really concerned for the emperor’s soul or rather deliberately used it to apply pressure remains an open question. It is safe to assume, however, that both men pursued the strategies which they considered would be the most effective. Furthermore, it is unclear if Valentinian rejected the pagan motion because he took Ambrose’s Christian advice or simply because he owed him a favour.
33Having restored the missing modes of influence (fig. 1, my italics), Bertram Raven’s “power/interaction model of interpersonal influence” can help historians to grapple with the complexity of historical cases of influence by facilitating the analysis of the source material and developing further hypotheses. Naturally, a precise knowledge of the mental and social frameworks is indispensable. Building on Raven’s model, we can ask what power bases were available, which were used and why; furthermore we can compare several cases of influence, so that differing, converging and competing methods may come to light.67
Bibliographie
Primary Sources
Ambrosius, De obitu Valentiniani, ed. O. Faller, Explanatio symboli, De sacramentis, De mysteriis, De paentientia, De excessu fratris, De obitu Valentiniani, De obitu Theodosii (CSEL 73), Vienna, 1955.
Ambrosius, Epistulae, ed. M. Zelzer, Sancti Ambrosii Opera, Ps. X, Epistulae et acta; vol. 3: Epistularum liber decimus, Epistulae extra collectionem, Gesta concili Aquileiensis (CSEL 82/3), Vienna, 1982.
Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae, ed. W. Seyfarth, L. Jacob-Karau, I. Ulmann, Ammiani Marcellini rerum gestarum libri qui supersunt, Leipzig, 1978.
Symmachus, Relatio, ed. M. Zelzer, Sancti Ambrosii Opera, Ps. X, Epistulae et acta; vol. 3: Epistularum liber decimus, Epistulae extra collectionem, Gesta Concilii Aquileiensis (CSEL 82/3), Vienna, 1982, p. 21-33.
Secondary Literature
Althoff 1989: Gerd Althoff, “Königsherrschaft und Konfliktbewältigung im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert”, in Wolfram Drews, Christel Meier-Staubach (ed.), Frühmittelalterliche Studien. Jahrbuch des Instituts für Frühmittelalterforschung der Universität Münster, Berlin, p. 265-298.
— 1990: Gerd Althoff, “Colloquium familiare - Colloquium secretum - Colloquium publicum: Beratung im politischen Leben des früheren Mittelalter”, in Wolfram Drews, Christel Meier-Staubach (ed.), Frühmittelalterliche Studien. Jahrbuch des Instituts für Frühmittelalterforschung der Universität Münster, Berlin, p. 145-167.
— 2016: Gerd Althoff, Kontrolle der Macht. Formen und Regeln politischer Beratung im Mittelalter, Darmstadt.
Barceló 2013: Pedro Barceló, Das Römische Reich im religiösen Wandel der Spätantike. Kaiser und Bischöfe im Widerstreit, Regensburg.
Brown 1971: Peter R. L. Brown, “The rise and function of the holy man in late antiquity”, JRS 61, p. 80–101.
— 1992: Peter R. L. Brown, Power and persuasion in late antiquity. Towards a Christian empire, Madison.
— 2012: Peter R. L. Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West, 350-550 AD, Oxford-New York.
Burrus 2008: Virginia Burrus, Saving Shame. Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects, Philadelphia.
Cameron 2011: Alan Cameron, The Last Pagans of Rome, Oxford.
Chenault 2016: Robert R. Chenault, “Beyond Pagans and Christians: Politics and Intra-Christian Conflict in the Controversy over the Altar of Victory”, in Michele Renée Salzman, Marianne Sághy, Rita Lizzi Testa (ed.), Pagans and Christians in Late Antique Rome, Cambridge, p. 46-63.
Choda et al. 2019: Kamil Cyprian Choda, Maurits Sterk de Leeuw, Fabian Schulz (ed.), Gaining and Losing Imperial Favour in Late Antiquity: Representation and Reality, Leiden.
Delmaire 1995: Roland Delmaire, Les institutions du Bas-Empire romain, de Constantin à Justinien : les institutions civiles palatines, Paris.
Demandt [1989] 2007: Alexander Demandt, Die Spätantike. Römische Geschichte von Diocletian bis Justinian (284 - 565 n. Chr.), Munich.
Duby 1961: Georges Duby, “Histoire des mentalités“, in Charles Samaran (éd.), L’histoire et ses méthodes, Paris, p. 937-967.
Errington 2006: R. M. Errington, Roman imperial policy from Julian to Theodosius, Chapel Hill.
Fögen 199: Marie Theres Fögen, Die Enteignung der Wahrsager. Studien zum kaiserlichen Wissensmonopol in der Spätantike, Frankfurt am Main.
Garnier 2000: Claudia Garnier, Amicus amicis, inimicus inimicis. Politische Freundschaft und fürstliche Netzwerke im 13. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart.
Gold, Raven 1992: Gregg J. Gold, Bertram Raven, “Interpersonal Influence Strategies in the Churchill-Roosevelt Bases-for-destroyers Exchange”, Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 2, p. 245-272.
Hasse-Ungeheuer 2016: Alexandra Hasse-Ungeheuer, Das Mönchtum in der Religionspolitik Kaiser Justinians I. Die Engel des Himmels und der Stellvertreter Gottes auf Erden, Berlin.
Hoffmann-Rehnitz 2013 : Philip Hoffmann-Rehnitz, Decisions and Decision-making as a Possible Object of the Theory of History. The Future of the Theory and Philosophy of History, Gent.
Holum 1982: Kenneth Holum, Theodosian Empresses, Women and Imperial Dominion in Late Antiquity, Berkeley.
Hopkins 1963: M. Keith Hopkins, “Eunuchs in Politics in the later Roman Empire”, PCPhS 9, p. 62-80.
Jones 1964: Arnold Hugh Martin Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A Social and Economic Survey, Oxford.
Just 2003: Patricia Just, Imperator et episcopus. Zum Verhältnis von Staatsgewalt und christlicher Kirche zwischen dem 1. Konzil von Nicaea (325) und dem 1. Konzil von Konstantinopel (381), Stuttgart.
Kamp 2001: Hermann Kamp, Friedensstifter und Vermittler im Mittelalter, Darmstadt.
Klein 1972: Richard Klein, Der Streit um den Victoriaaltar. Die dritte Relatio des Symmachus und die Briefe 17, 18 und 57 des Mailänder Bischofs Ambrosius, Darmstadt.
Kolb 2010: Anne Kolb (ed.), Augustae, Berlin.
Leppin 2009: Hartmut Leppin, “Power from Humility”, in Andrew Cain, Noel Emmanuel Lenski (ed.), The Power of Religion in Late Antiquity, Farnham, p. 155-164.
Liebeschuetz 2005: John H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Ambrosius. Political Letters and Speeches, Liverpool.
Lizzi Testa 2007: Rita Lizzi Testa, “Christian Emperor, Vestal Virgins, and Priestly Colleges: Reconsidering the End of Roman Paganism”, AntTard 15, p. 251-262.
— 2015: Rita Lizzi Testa, “The Famous ‘Altar of Victory Controversy’ in Rome”, in Johannes Wienand (ed.), Contested Monarchy, Oxford, p. 405-419.
Lotz 2005: Almuth Lotz, Der Magiekonflikt in der Spätantike, Bonn.
McEvoy 2013: Meaghan A. McEvoy, Child Emperor Rule in the Late Roman West, AD 367-455, Oxford.
McLynn 1994: Neil B. McLynn, Ambrose of Milan. Church and Court in a Christian Capital, Berkeley.
Millar 2007: Fergus Millar, A Greek Roman Empire. Power and Belief under Theodosius II (408-450), Berkeley-London.
Postel 2004: Verena Postel, “Communiter inito consilio: Herrschaft als Beratung”, in Martin Kaufhold (ed.), Politische Reflexion in der Welt des späten Mittelalters / Political Thought in the Age of Scholasticism, Leiden.
Potter 1994: David S. Potter, Prophets and Emperors. Human and Divine Authority from Augustus to Theodosius, Cambridge (Mass.).
Rapp 2005: Claudia Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity. The Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition, Berkeley.
Raven 1990: Bertram Raven, “Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power”, Political Psychology 11, p. 493-520.
— 2001: Bertram Raven, “Power/Interaction and Interpersonal Influence”, in John A. Bargh, Annette Y. Lee-Chai (ed.), The Use and Abuse of Power, Hove, p. 217-240.
— 2008: Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence”, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 1, p. 1-22.
Rawson 1989: Elizabeth Rawson, « Roman Rulers and the Philosophic Advisor », in Barnes Jonathan Griffin Miriam (ed.), Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, p. 233-257.
Salzman 2002: Michele Renee Salzman, The Making of a Christian Aristocracy, Social and Religious Change in the Western Roman Empire, Cambridge (Mass.).
Schimank 2005: Uwe Schimank, Die Entscheidungsgesellschaft. Komplexität und Rationalität der Moderne, Wiesbaden.
Scholten 1995: Helga Scholten, Der Eunuch in Kaisernähe. Zur politischen und sozialen Bedeutung des “praepositus sacri cubiculi” im 4. und 5. Jahrhundert n. Chr, Frankfurt am Main-New York.
Schulz 2014: Fabian Schulz, “Ambrosius, die Kaiser und das Ideal des christlichen Ratgebers”, Historia 63, p. 214-242.
Smith 2005: Andrew Smith (ed.), The Philosopher and Society inLate Antiquity, Oakville.
Steenbergen 2008: Jo van Steenbergen, “Editor’s introduction”, Al-Masaq 20-1, p. 1-3.
Szidat 1979: Joachim Szidat, “Die Usurpation des Eugenius”, Historia 28, p. 487-508.
Tougher 2008: Shaun Tougher, The Eunuch in Byzantine History and Society, London-New York.
Vera 1981 : Domenico Vera, Commento storico alle Relationes di Quinto Aurelio Simmaco, Pisa.
von Haehling 1978: Raban von Haehling, Die Religionszugehörigkeit der hohen Amtsträger des Römischen Reiches seit Constantins I. Alleinherrschaft bis zum Ende der Theodosianischen Dynastie (324-450 bzw. 455 n. Chr.), Bonn.
Watts 2015: Edward J. Watts, The Final Pagan Generation, Berkeley.
Will 1986: Édouard Will, « Influence. Note sur un pseudoconcept », in Hellenica et Judaica. Hommage à Valentin Nikiprowetzky, pp. 499-505.
Winterling 1997: Aloys Winterling (ed.), Zwischen “Haus” und “Staat”, Munich.
— 1998: Aloys Winterling (ed.), Comitatus, Berlin.
— 1999: Aloys Winterling, Aula Caesaris, Studien zur Institutionalisierung des römischen Kaiserhofes in der Zeit von Augustus bis Commodus (31 v. Chr.-192 n. Chr.), Munich.
Notes de bas de page
1 Althoff 1989, 1990 and 2016.
2 Cf. Garnier 2000; Kamp 2001; Postel 2004.
3 The International Medieval Congress at Leeds in 2006, included a session dedicated to “Rulership in the Latin West, the Byzantine Commonwealth, and the Islamic World: Counsel and Advice.” Part of the Byzantine and Islamic Studies contributions have been collected in Steenberg 2008, there is also an Editor’s Introduction.
4 Winterling 1997, 1998 and 1999.
5 Cf. the early treatment of “Powers behind the Throne” in Jones 1964, vol. 1, p. 341-347.
6 Eunuchs: Scholten 1995; Tougher 2008. Imperial women: Holum 1982; 2015. Soothsayers: Lotz 2005; Fögen 1993; Potter 1994.
7 As already emphasized by Hopkins 1963, p. 69-71.
8 Delmaire 1995, p. 45.
9 Philosophers: Rawson 1989; Smith 2005. Ascetics: Brown 1971 and 1992. Monks: Leppin 2009; Hasse-Ungeheuer 2016. Bishops: Just 2003; Rapp 2005.
10 For steps in this direction cf., e.g., Millar 2007, Chapter “Persons, Power, and Influence.”
11 Will 1986.
12 Influo/influentia date from the medieval period. Earlier terms include: auctoritas, potestas; valere, posse; in Greek: δύναμαι/δύναμις, ῥοπή; ἰσχύω, ἐπάγω.
13 E.g., rational choice or most recently Schimank 2005. For justified concerns about its usefulness in historiography, cf. Hoffmann-Rehnitz 2013, p. 2 sq.
14 Duby 1961, p. 942 and p. 944 (my translation).
15 This model was developed in the 1990s and is widespread today in the social sciences (Raven 1990, 2001 and 2008; Gold, Raven 1992). The model is based on Raven’s earlier work.
16 Hitler - von Schuschnigg (1938, Annexation of Austria); Churchill-Roosevelt Interaction (1941, World War II; bases for destroyers); Truman-MacArthur Confrontation (1950, Korean War).
17 The bibliography is extensive; recent publications include Cameron 2011, p. 33-46, Lizzi Testa 2007 and 2015. Chenault 2016 however argues that inner-Christian rivalries were more important. For preliminary work on Ambrose, see also Schulz 2014.
18 Cameron 2011, p. 41-43 and Lizzi Testa 2007 and 2015 p. 407-413.
19 Liebeschuetz 2005, p. 40.
20 Klein 1972. Ambrose and Symmachus’ rhetorical training was likely similar.
21 Barceló 2013 (my translation).
22 E.g. Errington 2006, p. 127; Brown 2012, p. 101-108; Watts 2015, p. 185-188. Brown 2012, p. 104: “Seldom have the implications of a bureaucratic half measure been distorted in so melodramatic a manner and with such lasting consequences, as in the confrontation between Symmachus and Ambrose in the year 384.”
23 McEvoy 2013, p. 128: “Ambrose was also entirely capable of using Valentinian II’s youth to excuse him.”
24 Symmachus, Relatio 3, 19: Vos defendant, a nobis colantur. Translations are adapted from Liebeschuetz 2005.
25 Vera 1981, p. 51.
26 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 17: peto ut id facias quod saluti tuae apud deum intellegis profuturum.
27 Vera 1981, p. 34.
28 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 13: Certe si aliud statuitur, episcopi hoc aequo animo pati et dissimulare non possumus; licebit tibi ad ecclesiam convenire, sed illic non invenies sacerdotem aut invenies resistentem.
29 McLynn 1994, p. 160, n. 9; McEvoy 2013, p. 124 sq.
30 Vera 1981, p. 21.
31 Symmachus, Relatio 3, 12: Atqui avaritia in mores vestros non cadit.
32 Ibid. 3, 18: plusque apud vos iustitia quam licentia valet.
33 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 12: Nihil maius est religione, nihil sublimius fide.
34 Gross-Albenhausen 1999.
35 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 3: Ergo cum a te, imperator Christianissime, fides deo vero sit exhibenda, cum ipsius fidei studium, cautio atque devotio, miror, quomodo aliquibus in spem venerit, quod…
36 Ibid. 72, 12: Et ideo, memor legationis proxime mandatae mihi convenio iterum fidem tuam.
37 McLynn 1994, p. 167, n. 36. Many scholars including Liebeschuetz 2005, p. 67, n. 2 and Watts 2015, p. 187, accept McLynn’s idea. Previously, the statement was thought to refer to 382, when Christian senators petitioned Emperor Gratian, but Ambrose only forwarded their petition.
38 Symmachus, Relatio 3, 18: Absit a bonis principibus ista sententia, ut quod olim de communi quibusdam tributum est, in iure fisci esse videatur. Nam cum res publica de singulis constet, quod ab ea proficiscitur fit rursus proprium singulorum.
39 According to Klein 1972, ad locum this is not the case with loca sacra.
40 Ambrosius, Epistula 73, 14: Non potestis duobus dominis servire (Mt. 6.24).
41 Symmachus, Relatio 3, 16: sacrilegio annus exaruit. Necesse enim fuit perire omnibus quod religionibus negabatur.
42 Ibid. 3, 17: Quid tale provinciae pertulerunt, cum religionum ministros honor publicus pasceret?
43 In his second letter, Ambrose curiously counters the argument of the wrath of God with a scientific explanation (Ambrosius, Epistula 73, 17-21).
44 Symmachus, Relatio 3, 3: vos amicum triumphis patrocinium nolite deserere.
45 Vera 1981, p. 13 and 47.
46 Symmachus, Relatio 3, 1: a principibus piis vidit purgari famam temporum proximorum; denegata est ab improbis audientia
47 Lizzi Testa 2015, p. 411 with n. 31.
48 Demandt [1989] 2007, p. 291 and Lizzi Testa 2015, p. 410 with n. 28 cite the same case: Ammianus Marcellinus XXVIII 6.
49 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 6: obrepat, innectere; 8: mentem…capiant, fallant.
50 According to Salzman 2002 the shift of balance from pagans to Christians occurred in the 380s and 390s.
51 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 13: episcopi hoc aequo animo pati et dissimulare non possumus.
52 Watts 2015, p. 187.
53 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 2: Nemo enim deum fallit, cui omnia etiam cordis occulta manifesta sunt.
54 Ibid. 72, 6: Nullus obrepat iuniori aetati tuae.
55 Ibid. 72, 7: Hoc idem vobis liceat, imperator.
56 Ambrosius, Epistula 10 ex, 3; McEvoy 2013, p. 67 sq. and 129.
57 Von Haehling 1978, p. 463 sq. and 466.
58 Ambrosius, De obitu Valentiniani 16 and 19. Liebeschuetz 2005, p. 373 about the dating.
59 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 5 and 15. Brunella Moroni suggests that De obitu Valentiniani 19-20 rests on Valentinian’s official reply to the petitions. The fictional character seems more likely to me.
60 This is disputed among scholars. Cf. Szidat 1979, p. 487-508, here 500.
61 Ambrosius, Epistula 10 ex, 2-3.
62 Ambrosius, Epistula 72, 8 and 10; in hindsight, Ambrosius, De obitu Valentiniani 19.
63 Ambrosius, De obitu Valentiniani 19.
64 Liebeschuetz 2005, p. 62.
65 See note 37 above.
66 However, Burrus 2008 has argued that Christians did not replace shame with guilt, but rather combined the two.
67 Other less studied cases are examined in Choda et al. 2019.
Auteur
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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