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Islam et société en Asie du Sud

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Marc Gaborieau

Islamic thought in relation to the Indian context

Yohanan Friedmann

Résumé

Cet article étudie les attitudes des penseurs indo-musulmans à l’égard de l’environnement indien. Nombre de penseurs musulmans cultivèrent intensément le désir de préserver l’Islam dans ce qu’ils pensaient être sa pureté originelle ; ils s’efforcèrent de le protéger de toute contamination par les coutumes et les croyances autochtones. Certains autres penseurs essayèrent de trouver un dénominateur commun entre les civilisations hindoues et musulmanes et d’établir un modus vivendi acceptable pour les adhérents des deux religions. Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn Baranī, Aḥmad Sirhindī et Aurangzēb sont étudiés ici comme les représentants de la première tendance. La seconde tendance, qui semble toujours avoir été minoritaire, est représentée par Dārā Shikōh et, dans une moindre mesure, par Amīr Khusrau et Mirzā Maẓhar Jān-i-Jānān. L’émergence du séparatisme musulman à l’époque moderne entraîna une nouvelle formulation, en termes de nationalisme, de la situation de la communauté musulmane dans le sous-continent.

Texte intégral

I

1Among the “ further ” Islamic lands, the Indian subcontinent is probably the area in which Islamic civilization attained its highest achievements. The Muslim population of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh constitutes the largest concentration of Muslims anywhere. Islamic dynasties ruled substantial parts of the subcontinent since the thirteenth century. Muslim consciousness remained alive even after the disintegration of Muslim rule and the British takeover ; it was intense enough to advance the demand for the establishment of an independent Muslim state after the termination of British rule. The establishment of Pakistan as an expression of separate Muslim nationhood is a unique event in modern Islamic history. It bears eloquent evidence to the vitality preserved by Indian Islam throughout the centuries.

2In overall terms, Muslims have always been a minority in the subcontinent. Despite the fact that certain regions became in the course of time Muslim majority areas, the minority status of the Muslims in the subcontinent as a whole has always been an essential feature of their history and exercised its influence on various aspects of their thought. There was, on the one hand, the feeling that the Indian Muslims were constantly in danger of being overwhelmed by an environment which could only be described as an anathema to their cherished ideal of monotheism. This apprehension created an intense desire to preserve Islam in its pristine purity and to protect it assiduously from any encroachment of Indian customs and beliefs.

3The development of strict orthodoxy was, however, only one result of the fact that the Indian Muslims lived in the midst of a non-Muslim, and, in their eyes, idolatrous and polytheistic population. Diametrically opposed to it was the attempt to find a common denominator for the two civilizations, to establish a mutually acceptable modus vivendi for their respective adherents, and to argue that all religions are essentially the same though their external and accidental features are diverse. This conciliatory trend was always weaker than the orthodox one. The few rulers who adopted it failed to inspire their successors, and the religious thinkers who developed it had few disciples who continued to walk on the path of inter-religious harmony and compromise.

  • 1 We include in our survey only views of Muslims who lived in India. Exposition of Indian tradition b (...)

4The distinction between these trends in Indo-Muslim religious thought should not create the impression that all the thinkers can be classified under one of these two categories. On the contrary: many of them deal with subjects common to mediaeval Islamic thought everywhere and do not make many references to the particular conditions in which the Indian Muslims have lived since the beginning of their history. Islamic thought which emerged in India but carried few specifically Indo-Islamic features appears even to have been quantitatively preponderant. The significance of this observation for the overall assessment of Indian Islam must not be underestimated, but cannot be elaborated here. It is also clear that within the limited scope of this essay it will be possible only to present the general outline of the topic under discussion; the picture here created may have to be modified by further research and more detailed exposition.1

II

5Religious law is undoubtedly one of the most important expressions of Islamic civilization. It is therefore fitting to start our discussion of Islamic thought in relation to the Indian context with a survey of shar‘ī issues which are specific to India. It is well known that Islamic law deals not only with questions which are religious according to modern Western classification, but also with matters which would be regarded in the West as part of constitutional or civil law. One of the more important questions of this kind treats the rights and obligations of non-Muslims who live in an Islamic state. These are known in Islamic law as ahl al-dhimma. In the central Islamic lands they normally were Jews or Christians. The Qur‘ān and other branches of early Islamic literature contain ample material on these two communities and define to a certain extent the relationship which the Muslims should evolve with them. With regard to India, the situation is different : the Qur’ān contains no references to India or Indians, and the references in the ḥadīth lack any legal content (Friedmann 1977 : 317-318). Muslim jurists had therefore to make their decisions without being able to base them on a religiously authoritative text. The possibility to treat the Indian population in accordance with the injunctions relative to the mushrikūn of the Arabian peninsula was out of the question due to the paucity of the early conquerors and to the precarious nature of their rule in the early period. The decision had therefore to be devised along lines similar to those adopted in the central Islamic lands: the inhabitants of India were treated as ahl al-dhimma though classical Qur’ānic exegesis did not regard them as ahl al-kitāb. This expansion of the concept entailed a compromise with idolatry which was not palatable to all schools of law. The Shāfi’is and the Ḥanbalis insisted that only Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians may be included in the category of ahl al-dhimma. The Mālikīs and the Ḥanafīs, on the other hand, agreed to include among them all non-Muslims (even idolators) who were not Arabs or apostates. This view of the Ḥanafī madhhab, which became preponderant in India, enabled the Muslim rulers of the country to find legal justification for a policy which they had to adopt in any case. It is noteworthy that the decision to expand the concept of ahl al-dhimma in this way was attributed to the eighth century Arab conqueror of Sind, Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim, who is reported to have stated that “the idol-temple is similar to the churches of the Christians, to (the synagogues) of the Jews and to the fire-temples of the Zoroastrians” (ma al-budd illā ka-kanā’is al-naṣārā wa al-yahūd wa buyūt nīrān al-majūs) (Friedmann 1972 : 180- 182).

6Being in Islamic legal terms non-Arab idolators, the Hindus were thus included in the category of ahl al-dhimma during the formative period of Islamic law. Strictly speaking, this should have settled the question of the relationship between them and the Muslims. From now on, they should have been treated according to the well-known rules concerning the non-Muslim inhabitants of a Muslim state : they should pay the jizya and abide by the discriminatory regulations specified by the sharī‘a. The state should in exchange guarantee their safety and allow them limited religious freedom. The issue was, however, too complex for such a simple and straightforward solution, and it continued to exercise Indian Muslim minds throughout the centuries of their history. The realities of India, where Muslim dynasties ruled over a predominantly Hindu population, stood between the sharī‘a and its implementation with regard to the Hindus. Practical considerations seem to have prevented the collection of the in certain periods; there is evidence to suggest that the concept lost during the Sultanate period its specific shar‘ī sense and began to be used in the sense of tax in general (Hardy 1957: 566-567). The discrepancy between the shar‘ī requirements and the actual situation provoked angry reaction from some quarters. The devout historian Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn Baranī (Hardy 1959 : 1036-1037 ; idem 1960 : 20-39) not only advised the Sultan to treat the Hindus with the utmost severity, but also recalled that not all schools of Islamic law agreed to include them in the category of ahl al-dhimma (Habib n.d.: 50). Baranī also reported that certain ‘ulamā’ unsuccessfully tried to induce the Sultan to declare that the Hindus must accept Islam or be put to the sword (Nizami 1961 : 315-316). Beyond this, there was no attempt to deviate from the Ḥanafī ruling concerning the Hindus. The extent to which the Muslim rulers implemented the discriminatory regulations against them varied (Ahmad 1964: 86-91), but their definition as ahl al-dhimma does not seem to have ever been questioned in a serious way.

III

7The virtual consensus concerning the shar‘ī standing of the Hindus did not preclude the emergence of great variations in Muslim attitudes towards them in a more general sense. These attitudes range from utmost hostility to almost total acceptance of Hindu religious beliefs.

8The first Muslim thinker who paid significant attention to Indian culture was also the most thorough and profound of all. Abū Raiḥan al-Bīrūnī (973-1050), one of the great luminaries of mediaeval Islamic science, was born in Khwārizm. When his native place was overrun by Maḥmud b. Sabuktigīn in 1017, he was brought to Ghazna and later accompanied Maḥmud on some of his military expeditions to India (Sachau 1964: I, vii ff). He studied with Indian sages and made great efforts to collect Indian books (al-Bīrūnī 1958: 17-18 ; Sachau 1964: I, 23- 24). In this way he acquired there a first hand knowledge of Indian civilization (al-Bīrūnī 1958: 18; Sachau 1964: I, 24), and subsequently wrote his outstanding account of India under the title : Taḥqīq mā li- ’l-Hind min maqūla maqbūla fī al- ‘aql aw mardhūla. While al-Bīrunī cannot be considered an Indian Muslim in the full sense of the word, he visited the country and his importance is so substantial, that his views of India and of its civilization cannot be ignored in this context. Al-Bīrūmī clearly writes as a Muslim, is in many places critical of Hindu beliefs and the information provided by him may serve those who want to engage in polemics with the Hindus. Yet his basic approach is that of a scholar and the Taḥqīq is avowedly informative, descriptive and non-polemical (al-Bīrūnī 1958 : 5 ; Sachau 1964: I, 7). His critical attitude to idolatry is tempered by the statement that this type of worship is designed for the benefit of the uneducated, common people who are impressed only by the concrete (maḥsūs), and fail to appreciate the abstract (ma‘qūl). In order to cater for the religious needs of their uneducated adherents, the Jews, the Christians and the Manicheans introduced “pictorial representations” (taṣwīr) into their houses of prayer. Islam is different in this respect and did not make such concessions to the common people’s predilection for concrete objects of worship ; yet even a Muslim who does not belong to the educated part of his community would express his adoration should he be presented with a picture of the Prophet, of Mecca or of the Ka‘ba (al-Bīrūnī 1958: 84; Sachau 1964: I, 111). Hinduism is therefore not substantially different from the other faiths: the Hindu idols were constructed only for the benefit of the common people whose understanding is limited (inna hādhihi al-asnām mansūba li- ’l- ‘awāmm alladhīna safilat marātibuhum wa qaṣurat ma‘ārifuhum) (al-Bīrūnī 1958 : 93 ; Sachau 1964: I, 122). The absurd beliefs (khurāfāt) which al-Bīrūnī relates in his work belong also to the common people only, because

those who march on the path of liberation, or those who study philosophy and theology, and those who desire abstract truth which they call sārā, are entirely free from worshipping anything but God alone, and would never dream of worshipping an image manufactured to represent him (fa-amma man amma nahj al-khalāṣ aw ṭāla‘a ṭuruq al-jadal wa al-kalām wa rāma al-taḥqīq alladhī yusammūnahu sārā fa-innahu yatanazzahu ‘an ‘ibādati aḥad dūn Allāh ta‘ālā faḍlan ‘an sūratihi al-ma‘mūla) (al-Bīrūnī 1958: 85; Sachau 1964: I, 113).

9In this way al-Bīrūnī reaches the conclusion that the elites of all communities, including the Hindus, worship Allah alone. On the other hand, all uneducated people, without regard to their religious affiliation, need concrete objects of worship and their religious leadership frequently takes their susceptibilities into account (Friedmann 1975: 215).

10The profundity and scholarly approach of al-Bīrūnī to the Hindu tradition was not matched by any Muslim scholar or thinker in mediaeval times. There were, however, numerous Muslims who paid attention to Indian culture on other levels. The first among them was Amīr Khusrau Dihlawī (1253-1325), who expressed his views of India and of Indian religion in his literary works. In his Nuh sipihr (Amīr Khusrau 1949), he pays glowing tribute to the land of India, describing it as Paradise on earth (bihishtī bi-zamīn) (Amīr Khusrau 1949: 151-158). In this work he also pays tribute to the intellectual achievements of its inhabitants. The Hindus excel in logic, astronomy and philosophy. The only science which is not to be found in India is Islamic jurisprudence, but Amīr Khusraw is not unduly worried by its absence. As for the religious views of the Hindus, Amīr Khusrau agrees that in this regard they went astray. Nevertheless, they hold some beliefs which are close to the Muslim ones: the existence and eternity of one God, His ability to create ex nihilo and His ability to sustain all life. Religiously they are therefore better than some other groups, such as the dualists (thanawiyya), the Christians who attribute to God progeny, the star-worshippers (akhtariyyān) who acknowledge seven gods, and the ‘unṣuriyyān who believe in four gods. It is true that the Brahmins worship the sun, stones, and some animals; yet they do not consider these similar to God, but only a part of His creation. They worship them only because this is a part of the tradition transmitted to them by their ancestors and they can not dissociate themselves from it (Amīr Khusrau 1949: 163-169).

11This rather sympathetic approach to Hinduism is not evident in Amīr Khusrau’s other works. The Khazā‘in al-futūḥ, for instance, is replete with hostile references to the Hindus and unreservedly condemns them as infidels. They are called “ Pharaohs of infidelity ” (farā‘inat al-kufr) and idol-worshippers (hunūd-i but-parast) ; the Sultan “ washed the earth clean with a flood of these impure people’s blood” (az ṭūfān-i khūn-i an nā-pākān khāk-i an zamīn-rā pāk bi-shust) and sent countless infidels to hell (Amīr Khusrau 1953: 10, 48, 49, 45). Amīr Khusrau’s conciliatory remarks about the Hindus, made in the context of a patriotic description of his Indian fatherland, do not therefore have as much religious significance as might have been derived from them alone. One would, consequently, agree with Hardy’s observation that Amīr Khusrau “ never looked beyond Islamic revelation for an explanation of the meaning of life ” (Hardy 1960: 93 and passim). Despite the sympathetic treatment of Hinduism in some of his works, Amīr Khusrau remains convinced that religious truth is to be found in Islam alone. In this he does not differ from the consensus prevailing among the Muslims in his time and place.

12Positive attitudes to India and favourable evaluations of its religious traditions received strong support during the reign of the Mughal emperor Akbar (1556- 1605) whose well known policies were exceedingly propitious for their development. Even if we treat Badāyūnī’s hostile descriptions with the necessary circumspection, it is clear that Akbar’s policies created an atmosphere in which the belief in the exclusive truth of Islam was substantially undermined. The willingness of Akbar to admit Hindu sages into his presence and to listen to their religious discourses implied that their views were worthy of consideration (Badāyūnī 1284 AH : 239 and passim). Abū ’l-Faḍl’s desire to discuss spiritual issues with sages who belong to religions other than Islam points in the same direction (Abu ’l-Faḍl 1948: I, XXXV). The classical conviction that Islam is the only true religion (Qur’ān 3 : 19, 85 and elsewhere) lost its axiomatic nature and the way was opened for the development of conciliatory attitudes towards Hinduism. These attitudes are clearly in Abū’l-Faḍl’s Ā’īn-i Akbarī. Like al-Bīrūnī before him, Abū’l-Faḍl asserted that the Hindus “one and all believe in the unity of God ” and that the reverence which they pay to images of stone are only “ aids to fix the mind and keep the thoughts from wandering ”, The intention of this exposition was to refute the equation between Hinduism and polytheism, hoping that the Muslim hostility towards the Hindus would thereby be reduced (Abu ’l-Faḍl 1948: III, 2, 8). This revision of attitudes towards the Hindus resulted also in the reassessment of certain historical personalities : Maḥmud of Ghazna, who was frequently considered an exemplary Muslim ruler and mujāhid, is depicted by Abū ’l-Faḍl in a totally different light. He is said to have been incited to shed innocent blood by “ fanatical bigots representing India as a country of unbelievers at war with Islam” (Abū’I-Faḍl 1948: III, 377).

13The most significant Muslim religious thinker representing the conciliatory trend towards Hinduism seems to have been the Mughal prince Dārā Shukōh (1615- 1659). In contradistinction to Amīr Khusrau, who only condescendingly admits that the Hindus maintain some correct beliefs, Dārā Shykōh considers the Hindu tradition as an essential tool for understanding the religious truth and, indeed, for the real understanding of the Qur’ān. Dārā Shukōh’s philosophy of religion is well explained in the introduction to his Persian translation of the Upanishads, entitled Sirr-i Akbar ( “The greatest secret”). His basic assumption is that religious truth is one. It is included in the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Taurāt (Bible), the Injīl (New Testament), the Zabūr (Psalms), and the Qur’ān. All these are heavenly books and contain the ultimate religious truth of monotheism (tauḥīd). Yet the degree of clarity and intelligibility with which this truth is expounded in them is not uniform. Turning first to the Qur’ān, Dārā Shukōh maintains that most of its contents is not formulated in an explicit manner. It is full of allegories (akthar marmūz ast) which are understood only by the few. The character of the Bible, of the New Testament and of the Psalms is similar: the truth is not explained in them in a sufficiently detailed and full fashion (bayān-i. tauḥīd dar ān-hā ham mujmal o marmūz būd).

14Being unable to attain his goal of full religious understanding with the help of these four books, Dārā Shukōh turned to the religious thought of India. He noted that according to the Qur’ān no nation was left without prophetic mission (Sura 35: 22) and India cannot be an exception to the universality of divine guidance. Indeed, the question of tauḥīd was extensively discussed in that country. Ancient Indian sages never rejected it and never condemned its upholders. Furthermore, the four Vedas, which are heavenly books, had been in India before all other books of the same kind. They were revealed to ancient prophets; the greatest among these was Brahma, who is, according to Dārā Shukōh, identical with Adam. The quintessence of the Vedas are the Upanishads, which are a treasure of monotheism (ganj-i tauḥīd).

15We are now ready to analyse Dārā Shukōh’s most significant statement concerning the relationship between Islam and the Indian religious tradition. Dārā Shukōh creates an intimate connection between the Qur’ān and the Upanishads by saying that they are hinted at in Sura (56: 77-80): “Verily, it is a noble Qur’ān in a protected book; none but the purified shall touch it, a revelation from the Lord of the worlds” (innahu la-qur’ān karīm fi kitāb maknūn la yamassuhu illā al-muṭahharūn tanzīl min rabb al-‘ālamīn). The crucial question with regard to this verse is the interpretation of kitāb maknūn. Classical Islamic commentators normally prefer to consider this phrase as a reference to the “preserved tablet” (allauḥ al-maḥfūẓ) in which the original text of the Qur’ān was inscribed by Allah (Rāzī 1324 AH: VIII, 71; Ṭabarī 1954: XXVII, 204-205; Ṭabarsī 1954: XVII, 132). Less frequently they take it to mean the actual copy of the book (almuṣḥaf alladhī fī aidīnā), or the Taurāt and the Injīl (Rāzī 1324 AH: VIII, 72). Dārā Shukōh does not accept any of these exegetical attempts. Without offering any substantiation of his view, he rejects the idea that kitāb maknūn refers to the Taurāt, the Injīl or the Zabūr. Subsequently he argues that the word tanzīl ( “revelation, sending down”) used in the verse precludes the possibility that the phrase refers to the “preserved tablet”. The reason implied here is that the “preserved tablet” was never “revealed” or “sent down”, Having eliminated all other possibilities, Dārā Shukōh concludes that kitāb maknūn refers to the Upanishads. In his view the Qur’ān called the Upanishads “Hidden” or “protected”, because the Indian sages did their best to conceal them from the Muslims. The Upanishads, which undoubtedly are the earliest heavenly books and provided Dārā Shukōh with answers to all his questions, are not only compatible with the Qur’ān but also serve as its commentary (muwāfiq-i qur’ān-i majīd balkih tafsīr-i ān ast). This is according to the principle that divine speech is its own exegesis: whatever is expressed concisely in one book is detailed in another. The concise formulation of one book can therefore be elucidated and understood by the detailed exposition found elsewhere (kalām-i ilāhī kih khwud tafsīr-i khwud ast wa agar dar kitābī mujmal bāshad, dar kitāb-i dīgar mufaṣṣal yāfta shawad wa az ān tafīl ān ijmāl dānista shawad) (Dārā Shukōh 1957: introduction 3-6; Göbel-Gross 1962: 13-21; Hasrat 1953: 260-269; Friedmann 1975: 217).

16In some of his other works, Dārā Shukōh also expressed high appreciation of the religious achievements of the Hindus. In the preface to the Majma‘ al-baḥrain he asserts that there is no fundamental difference between Islam and Hinduism (Hasrat 1953: 219). Elsewhere he ascribes to Hindu idolatry a positive, and even essential, role in the development of religious consciousness: the idols are necessary for those who are not yet aware of the inner (bāṭin) meaning of religion and therefore need a concrete representation of the deity; as soon as they come to know the bāṭin, they dispense with the idols (Huart-Massignon 1926: 290-291).

17Dārā Shukōh’s view of the relationship between the Hindu religious literature and the Qur’ān seems to be his most significant contribution to Islamic thought. The idea that one must use the Hindu scripture in order to attain the real meaning of the Qur’ān is hitting at the very core of the conviction that Islam is a self-sufficient system which is in no need of ideas extraneous to it. It seems to have been deviant enough to put Dārā Shukōh beyond the pale of mediaeval Indian Islam.

18The eighteenth century Naqshbandī Ṣūfī Mirzā Maẓhar Jān-i Jānān (died in 1781) also expressed relatively conciliatory views of the Hindus, but he did not go as far as Dārā Shukōh in recognizing the legitimacy and validity of the Hindu religion after the emergence of Islam. Like Dārā Shukōh, Jān-i Jānān accepted the antiquity and divine origin of the Vedas which, he thought, had been revealed at the beginning of creation. All Hindu sects agree that God is one, hold that the world is created and believe in resurrection and retribution. Their idolatry does not involve association of partners with God; it rather resembles some dhikr ceremonies of the Ṣūfīs who meditate on the person of their pīr in order to gain some spiritual benefits but refrain from carving out a concrete representation of him. The Hindus make representations of certain angels, concentrate their thought on them, create thereby a link with the entities represented by them and reap some spiritual benefits. They even prostrate themselves in front of them, but this is only a prostration of greeting (sajda-yi taḥiyyat) and not a prostration of worship (sajda-yi ‘ubūdiyyat). All this bears no resemblance to the idolatry of the pre-Islamic Arabs, who thought that the idols were powerful in themselves and not mere instruments of the divine power. Arab idolatry was, therefore, association of partners with God. Its Indian variety is different and serves only as a means which enables the worshippers to forge a spiritual link with the deity. This deity is totally different from its concrete representation.

19Like Dārā Shukōh before him, Jān-i Jānān also thought that India was favoured with the divine gift of prophecy. Krishna and Rama Chandra fulfilled in his view prophetic tasks and their title of avatār is to be understood as comparable – in Islamic terms – with messenger (rasūl), prophet (nabī) or saint (walī). This being so, the Hindu religion was in the past a true divine faith, and it was incumbent upon the Indians to follow the prophets who had been sent to their country. With the advent of Muḥammad, however, a fundamental change took place in this regard: all former religions were abrogated by Islam and since that time nobody was justified to refrain from embracing it.

  • 2 A more extensive treatment of Jān-i Jānān’s thought, with documentation and bibliography, can be fo (...)

20Thus, the crucial feature of Jān-i Jānān’s view of Hinduism is the distinction he made between the Hindus who lived prior to the mission of Muḥammad and those of the Islamic era. Those who have lived since the coming of Islam without joining its fold are infidels even if their beliefs are different from those of the jāhilī Arabs and are not polytheistic. There is no contradiction between this and Jān-i Jānān’s statement according to which all Hindu sects agree on the unity of God: even a monotheist who does not acknowledge the prophethood of Muḥammad is an infidel.2

21The thinkers whose attitudes have been discussed here are representatives of the conciliatory approach to Hinduism in Indo-Muslim thought. While there are valid reasons to characterize them in this way, we must also not loose sight of important differences between them. Al-Bīrūnī differs from the rest by being first and foremost a scholar who speaks about the various religions, including Islam, with a considerable degree of detachment. As such, he is able to discern in the religions compared features which may easily escape a person whose starting point is his own personal faith. His analysis of religious attitudes characteristic of comparable social groups in various religious communities is a case in point. As for Amīr Khusrau, he is mainly a historian and a poet, and the religious views expressed in his works seem to be of secondary importance. Thus, when he describes the land of India and expatiates on the virtues of its inhabitants, he has some positive things to say about their religious achievements; but when he deals with the military exploits of his regal patrons, he is not different from other court historians for whom Hindus were nothing but infidel enemies destined for hell.

22On the other hand, both Dārā Shukōh and Jān-i Jānān are primarily religious thinkers, but they differ substantially from each other. While the relationship between Islam and Hinduism is for Dārā Shukōh an all-pervasive concern, it is only one detail in Jān-i Jānān’s religious world-view. The nature of both thinkers’ attitudes to Hinduism is also not identical. Dārā Shukōh ascribes to the Hindu scriptures a legitimacy not lesser than that of the Qur’ān. In a certain sense the Upanishads are even superior to all other heavenly books, because the divine message is expressed in them in the most explicit fashion. They are therefore essential for understanding the less clear statements of the Qur’ān. In saying this, Dārā Shukōh abandons the cherished Islamic conviction that Islam is, in the eyes of Allāh, the only true faith (Sūra 3 : 19) and that the Qur’ān is a clear, readily understandable book. It is precisely on this point that he differs from Jān-i Jānān. While the tenor of Jān-i Jānān’s discourse about the Hindus is relatively moderate and he speaks favourably about some ancient Hindu religious figures, he strongly believes that Hinduism was valid only in the pre-Islamic past. Islam abrogated all other faiths and has been the only true religion since its emergence. All people who are now not Muslims are therefore infidels. In contradistinction to Dārā Shukōh and despite the conciliatory tone of his discourse, Jān-i Jānān assiduously maintains the exclusive validity of Islam and does not deviate from the mediaeval ijmā‘ on this matter. His inclusion among the exponents of the conciliatory trends is due only to the fact that he displays some sympathy for the Hindu religion in its pre-Islamic past and that he expresses his views on Hinduism without the acrimony frequently encountered in mediaeval Indo-Muslim writings.

IV

23We have said in our introductory section that the conciliatory trend described in the preceding pages was always weaker than its opposite counterpart. The idea that Islam is a self-sufficient system, that the religious truth is fully and exclusively contained in it and that it must therefore enjoy the position of superiority over all other faiths can be easily documented by copious quotations from the classical sources of Islam. The total incompatibility between Islam and the religious environment in which the Indian Muslims lived was favourable for the development of Islamic exclusiveness. In several Islamic traditions India was considered as the source of idolatry and as the first country in which this cult was observed (Friedmann 1975: 214). The possible analogies between Hindu India and pagan Arabia at the time of the Prophet encouraged the development of iconoclasm which could easily be described as application of early Islamic ideas to the Indian context. Maḥmud Ghaznawī’s exploits in India, and particularly the destruction of Somnath in 1025-1026 (Bosworth 1973: 78, 114), were praised as a sequel to Muḥammad’s obliteration of Arabian idolatry. The idol of Somnath was identified with the jāhilī idols Manāt or al-Lāt, which, so it seems, were brought to the safe haven of idolatrous India after the conquest of Mecca by the Muslims, but were apprehended and finally destroyed there by Maḥmud b. Sabuktigīn (‘Aṭṭār 1962: 207-208; Bosworth 1966: 90; Habib n.d. : 5). Maḥmūd can thus be described as bringing the Prophet Muḥammad’s iconoclastic endeavour to its completion.

24The historians of the Dehli Sultanate reflect the total rejection of Hinduism as an absolutely worthless and contemptible religion (Hardy 1960: 114 and passim). Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn Baranī declares that the Sultan must not be content with taking jizya from the Hindus who are “worshippers of idols and of cow-dung” (Habib n.d. 46-47). He demands of the Sultan to strive with all his courage “ to overthrow infidelity and to slaughter its leaders who in India are the Brahmans ”, (Habib n.d. : 46-47). A similar attitude is reflected in the writings of the Mughul historian ‘Abd al-Qādir Badāyūnī, who bemoans throughout his Muntakhab al-tawārīkh the consideration shown by Akbar to Hindu beliefs and practices (Badāyūnī 1284 AH: 239 and passim).

25An equally outspoken exponent of the uncompromising attitude to India and to its religious tradition was the celebrated Naqshbandī Ṣūfī Shaikhs Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564-1624). On all issues relevant to this inquiry he adopted an attitude diametrically opposed to that of Dārā Shukōh. In light of the Qur’ānic view concerning the universality of prophethood, he had to admit that prophets were sent to India as to all other countries; but he is careful to follow this admission by saying that the mission of these prophets was a dismal failure and that none of them succeeded to establish a community. The ruins scattered all over India are those of towns and villages which rejected the prophets and were consequently destroyed by divine wrath. Despite their failure, these prophets exercised some influence upon the spiritual life of India. Whatever the “leaders of Indian infidelity” (ru’asā’-i kufr-i Hind) know about the necessary existence of God, they learned it from these unsuccessful apostles. The deficient intellects of the Brahmins would never have reached this awareness without prophetic guidance. Yet despite their indebtedess to the prophets, the Brahmins misuse the knowledge communicated to them, falsify the prophetic message and induce people to bestow divine worship upon their own persons (Friedmann 1971: 71).

26It is clear that in Sirhindī’s view absolutely no religious value can be ascribed to the Hindu tradition, which is the embodiment of infidelity. Islam and infidelity are two irreconcilable opposites which can only thrive at the expense of each other. The honour of Islam requires the humiliation of infidels. The Hindus must therefore be oppressed, treated like dogs and mercilessly subjected to the jizya. The supremacy of Islam must fearlessly be demonstrated. A very effective way to do it is by cow-sacrifice which is “one of the most glorious commandments of Islam in India ” (min ajall sha‘ā’ir al-islām fī al-hind) (Sirhindi 1383 AH : 6 ; Friedmann 1971: 71). The utter disregard of Hindu sensitivities implied in this rite is taken as an indication of the extent to which Indian Islam preserved its pristine purity and refused to make any concessions to the pagan environment.

27Sirhindī’s son Muḥammad Ma‘ṣūm thought along similar lines. In an evident allusion to the thought of Akbar and Abū-’l-Faḍl, he rejected the attitude of “universal tolerance” (ṣulḥ-i hull) and argued that those who supported it treated well all kinds of non-Muslims, but adopted an unreservedly hostile attitude to the followers of the sunna (Ma’ṣūm n.d.: I, 121). Indiscriminate tolerance is opposed to the injunctions of the Qur’an which demanded the acceptance of Islam, called for jihad and declared all religions except Islam as false. Sinners and infidels are enemies of God: Muslims must therefore dissociate themselves from them and fight them. “Get close to Allah by hating the people of sin” (taqarrabū ilā Allāh bibughḍ ahl al-ma‘āṣī), says a ḥadīth approvingly quoted by Muḥammad Ma’ṣūm (Ma‘sūm n.d. : I, 113-116).

28The relationship between Islam and Hinduism was not a very important issue in the thought of Aḥmad Sirhindī or of his son. Both of them devoted the overwhelming portion of their works to Sufi theosophy, which does not relate to the Indian environment in any significant way. In the thought of the modern interpreters and admirers, however, Sirhindī’s views of Hinduism acquired central importance (Friedmann 1971: 105-115). The development of Sirhindī’s modern image is a clear reflection of the fact that the uncompromising attitude to Hinduism gained the upper hand, both politically and culturally. The execution of prince Dārā Shukōh in 1659 was not only the end of struggle for succession to the Mughul throne: it also was a decisive event in the cultural history of Indian Islam.

V

  • 3 Convenient accounts of some such groups can be found in Y. Husain (1929), L’Inde mystique au Moyen (...)

29We have said earlier that the uncompromising attitudes towards Indian culture were always stronger than the conciliatory ones. This is true, of course, only with regard to that tradition of Indian Islam, which can be studied by reference to mediaeval Indo-Muslim literature in Persian. Indian influences were discerned in the works of some Muslim Sufis who wrote in Persian, but they did not explicitly admit the existence of these influences and demanded the strict application of the sunna and the sharī‘a both in private and public life (Digby 1975). One can, therefore, say in general, that barring the significant (but not very numerous) exceptions of the kind mentioned earlier in this paper, this literature either ignored the Indian religious tradition or condemned it. This hostile neglect seems to be a faithful reflection of the attitudes adopted by Muslims who knew Persian and Arabie, could consequently draw inspiration from the mainstream of Islamic thought and were convinced that no useful purpose can be served by the awareness or study of an infidel tradition. On the other hand, this attitude is not very representative of the Muslims whose main source of inspiration was not the Perso-Arabic literary tradition and whose Islam retained a significant proportion of Indian customs and beliefs. Their religious faith and practices were not very well documented in the “high” literature of mediaeval Indian Islam, but have been extensively described by modern observers and anthropologists. Numerous groups who considered themselves Muslim, simultaneously observed customs and rituals which are part and parcel of the non-Muslim Indian environment.3 However, the existence of such groups did not make any contribution to the conciliatory trend towards Hinduism in the “great” tradition of Indian Islam. On the contrary : the revivalist movements of the nineteenth century directed a considerable part of their activity against the customs and beliefs of these groups (Ahmad 1960: 108-110; Moin-ud-Din 1963: 120-123; idem 1964: passim). It stands to reason that these movements, together with the general strengthening of “high” Islamic consciousness after the British takeover, reduced the possibility that syncretistic trends of thought appear and acquire legitimacy among the Indian Muslims in the modem period. Similar influence was exercised by the modernist movement of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. Demanding a return to “ pure ” Islam (Troll 1978: 35, 56-57), he worked in the same direction as the movements of the mujāhidīn and the Farā’iḍiyya ; but his chief importance from our vantage point lies in the fact that according to the now prevalent interpretation he was the first Indian Muslim thinker to define the differences between Muslims and Hindus in terms of nationalism and not only in terms of religion (Troll 1978: 7-13; Lelyveld 1978: 311). His opposition to Muslim participation in the Indian National Congress was a natural resuit from this definition. Beginning with Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, arguments concerning national identity and national characteristics were added to the traditional Islamic consciousness in order to build up the separate identity of Muslims in the subcontinent. The famous “two nations theory” (dō qaumī naẓariyyat) gradually came into being and its protagonists set out to undermine the idea of a unified Indian nation. They argued that différences between Hindus and Muslims are not restricted to the religious sphere, because Hinduism and Islam are not merely two religions. They also are two distinct social structures. Being based on the discriminatory caste System, Hinduism is diametrically opposed to the egalitarian ideal of Islam. Islam and Hinduism are not more similar to each other than the various national cultures of Europe and cannot be arbitrarily lumped together. The Indian Muslims are therefore a distinct nation and are entitled to live in a separate political framework (Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad 1960: I, 116-117, 160-161, 229-230).

  • 4 For a critique of this interpretation, see I. Habib (1966), “ The political role of Shaikh Ahmad Si (...)

30On the intellectual level, historiography made a significant contribution to the separatist trend. Indian Muslim history began to be seen as a process which was irresistibly drawn towards its inevitable conclusion: the establishment of Pakistan as a separate Muslim nation-state in the subcontinent. Historical personalities began to be judged by their alleged contribution to – or hindrance of – this inexorable process. Those who were seen as working for a Hindu-Muslim symbiosis, for the evolution of a cultural modus vivendi between the two communities, were calumnied and disparaged to the point of retroactive exclusion from the Muslim fold. The Mughul emperor Akbar was the most celebrated case in point. His religious policies and attitudes to the Hindu population were considered detrimental to Muslim interests as defined by the supporters of the “ two nations theory”, He was accused of destroying the solidarity of the Indian Muslims and, ultimately, of initiating processes which brought about the disintegration of the Mughul empire (Qureshi 1962: 167-169). Aurangzēb ‘Ālamgīr, on the other hand, became a historical hero, who reversed the policies of Akbar and was credited with a valiant attempt to save the Mughul empire and to prevent the assimilation of Islam into the Indian religious tradition. He failed in the first part of his endeavour because the policies initiated by Akbar had made too decisive an impact on history before Aurangzēb’s own appearance on the scene in the late seventeenth century. On the other hand, he was successful in saving Islam from disintegration. The credit for this crucial success was given to him as well as to Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, who is seen by numerous Pakistani historians as his chief source of inspiration (Qureshi 1962 : 164-175).4

31The “ two nations theory ” clearly carried the day among the Muslims of the subcontinent in the twentieth century. In its declared objective to save the Indian Muslims from “ disintegration in the Indian melting pot ”, it bears some features similar to the ideas of mediaeval ‘ulamā’ who tried to protect Indian Islam from acquiring any local characteristics. Yet the modern protagonists of this theory were not the spiritual heirs of the ‘ulamā’ and of the Sufis who fought for the preservation of “pure” and “unadulterated” Islam in the mediaeval period. On the contrary: the theory was conceived of and transformed into political reality by people who were overwhelmingly influenced by the new non-Muslim civilization of the West. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his westernized associates in the Muslim League strove to safeguard and promote the welfare of the Muslim social elite. This was the real meaning of their frequent references to Islam and to the necessity to protect Islamic culture. Their meaning of these terms had little in common with the traditional Islamic ideal as understood by the ‘ulamā’. Despite the fact that their religious heritage included the idea that Muslims should preserve their distinctiveness and resist any assimilatory trends, the ‘ulamā’ dissociated themselves from the separatist trend promoted by the Muslim League and supported political cooperation with the Indian National Congress. They developed the idea of “united nationalism” (muttaḥida qaumiyyat) and evolved an intricate theory in order to justify the notion that Muslims may be part of a nation composed mainly of non-Muslims (Friedmann 1971a). Their attitude had nothing in common with the mediaeval syncretistic trends: they envisaged that Muslims in independent India will enjoy wide ranging autonomy, will be governed by the sharī‘a and will certainly not merge into the religious traditions of the country (Hardy 1971: 32-35). Some of them admitted, nevertheless, the existence of a “mixed culture” (milī julī tahdhīb) in India (Friedmann 1976: 206-207).

32The ‘ulamā’ failed to convince the majority of Indian Muslims of the justice of their views and Pakistan came into being despite their opposition. Their failure is one of the unsuccessful attempts to propagate the idea of Hindu-Muslim unity in India. It is fascinating to observe that thinkers who raised comparable ideas in the mediaeval period were condemned by the ‘ulamā’ and sometimes even denounced as infidels. The totally new political and cultural circumstances which emerged in India in the twentieth century created a situation in which the ‘ulamā’ themselves championed this failing idea in its new form.

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Notes

1 We include in our survey only views of Muslims who lived in India. Exposition of Indian tradition by Muslims who lived in the central Islamic lands are not dealt with here. For a substantial work on the latter subject, see Bruce B. Lawrence (1976), Shahrastani on the Indian religions. The Hague.

2 A more extensive treatment of Jān-i Jānān’s thought, with documentation and bibliography, can be found in Friedmann 1975: 217-221.

3 Convenient accounts of some such groups can be found in Y. Husain (1929), L’Inde mystique au Moyen Age: Hindous et Musulmans. Paris, pp. 15-35, in M. Mujeeb (1967), The Indian Muslims. London, pp. 10-19, and in A. Ahmad (1969), An intellectual history of Islam in India. Edinburgh, pp. 47-51.

4 For a critique of this interpretation, see I. Habib (1966), “ The political role of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Waliullah ”, Enquiry 5 (New Delhi), pp. 36-55, and Friedmann 1971: pp. XIII-xiv, 77-115. See also W. C. Smith (1981), “The crystallization of religious communities in Mughul India”, in idem, On understanding Islam. The Hague, pp. 177-196.

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