Japan: a high-cultured country in the margin of the global art market
p. 655-658
Texte intégral
April 2015
1While the major developed countries have at one time or another dominated the art world—the art market restructures itself depending on where the poles of wealth are—Japan somehow “missed its chance,” even though it remained the largest economy from 1972 to 2010. With the exception of a handful of stars, such as Murakami Takashi, Nara Yoshitomo, or Kusama Yayoi, the country’s global reach remained limited. Today, it still plays a peripheral role in the international market of contemporary art. This fact is even more surprising that it simultaneously offers numerous advantages in the field of art and culture.
A domestic art market with a very strong basis
2Japan’s first asset is definitely rooted in a strong and old network of galleries. Since the Edo period, art dealers organized themselves through a dense and efficient network. Their action started from the sale of tea ceremony ustensils to embrace gradually all artistic and pictorial productions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, their networks became increasingly interlinked, with elements of competition but also solidarity, especially through sales “reserved only for professionals” (kôkankai), which were organized by art dealers associations. In the 1920s–1930s, a new generation of gallerists was born. Capable of flexibility, it has tested new sale methods and accompanied the birth of a wide variety of artistic movements. In fact, the tumultuous encounter with the West, generating a deep reflection on self-identity and a (re) definition of artistic standards, had the effect of promoting a broad spectrum of art goods, from Japanese crafts, to modern Japanese paintings using Western techniques (nihonga, yôga), or imported artworks. The avant-garde movements, in line with the necessity of “perpetual innovation,” added themselves during the 1920s.
3As in other industrialized countries, the artistic supply in Japan grew faster than demand. Nevertheless, the country has benefited from an active base of collectors, able to gather artworks, while dedicating themselves to the community. From the late nineteenth century, a new generation of buyers took over from aristocrats and wealthy merchants of the Edo period, feeling invested with a social mission of spreading the culture and protecting Japan’s cultural heritage. At the head of large companies, some art lovers have even capitalized to open foundations, with the consent of their own enterprises, launching an original Japanese way of patronage. This approach is still alive today through the action of the Association for Corporate Support of the Arts. Alongside big companies, a handful of passionate individuals (the salarîmen korektâ)—most of whom have benefited from the stable period of employment during the period of high growth—still fight for the recognition of their favorite artists. Concerned with the need to the increase the demand for arts, many of them share their enthusiasm with the younger generation, through donations to museums, organized tours in galleries, lectures, various animations and events inside collectors associations. Proud of their acquisitions, they especially enjoy showing them in galleries or museums. Whether they do it in groups or as individuals, they usually wish to remain anonymous, in order not to arouse the attention of the tax authorities.
4In addition to these central segments of the art market—galleries and collectors—Japan also experienced very dynamic and original ways of supporting the arts though the involvement of two other major actors, who left their Western counterparts far behind: newspapers and department stores. Indeed, from the beginning of the twentieth century, both of them have played a key role in expanding the arts and culture among the middle class. Whereas the first specialized in the field of art exhibitions and art criticism, the latter, without neglecting the necessity to show the paintings, focused more on the sale and the distribution of artworks throughout the country. Being in direct contact with their readership or their customers, they have replaced public institutions, at a time when few museums existed in Japan, in order to assume a “cultural service mission.” Although their motivations were also deeply linked with the will to foster brand promotion or marketing strategies, they greatly contributed to broadening the base of the demand for artworks. Moreover, even though they nowadays face a setback, due to the massive building of museums by local and regional authorities since the 1970s, they remain essential in terms of commercial networks and territorial meshing.
5In brief, the development of the art market in Japan has largely relied on private investment. However, the role of public authorities, which has greatly varied over time, shall not be underestimated. Indeed, as soon as the late nineteenth century, the state was very committed in structuring the art world. Despite a withdrawal after the Second World War, it still pursues the mission to fund artist training programs abroad, through the Agency for Cultural Affairs or the Japan Foundation. It also encourages art creation through the distribution of prizes. Even though there is no equivalent in Japan for the French contemporary art funds (FNAC and FRAC), it continues to acquire works indirectly, through the action of public museums.
A position at the margins of the global stage
6Early and strongly rooted, the Japanese art market shows obvious advantages at the national scale. However, it developed against the current evolution of the international art scene. While the researchers in the sociology of the arts usually distinguish two segments, traditional and innovative, which require a separate organization of the market and a different legitimation network, choices greatly diverged in Japan and in other countries. In fact, contrary to Europe, the US, India or China, Japan developed a highly structured organization for the traditional market, at the expense of contemporary art. The segment of figurative painting (yôga and nihonga) could take advantage of a dedicated curriculum in art schools, count on the efficient support of art galleries and department stores, and match an extensive network of buyers. In other words, it was able to control quality certification mechanisms, to participate in shaping tastes, and to ensure strong distribution networks. This kind of organization cannot be observed at that level nor at this scale in Western countries. In France, for example, traditional art is upstaged in the “marché des chromos” by a dense network of legitimation for innovative art, and is mainly promoted by art galleries which are weakly—if at all—institutionalized.
7We can see a good illustration of this general trend in the way Japan experienced the speculative bubble of the 1980s. For the first time, at the height of its economic strength and its buying power, Japan took off to conquer the international market. For five years, it monopolized the attention of Western art dealers and dominated all international auction sales, to the point of arousing incessant complaints in the foreign press: “it will steal all our treasures!” However, due to the predispositions of its art lovers, Japan finally did very few to promote its own living artists outside, preferring to focus on imports of impressionist and modern artworks from Europe. In other words, highly recognized artists took precedence over up-and-coming ones. This has been coupled with destabilizing elements of intense speculation: new buyers, primary motivated by short-term performance, aligned themselves with the lowest common denominator in terms of expertise, promoting herd behavior, which has finally failed to support the most original artistic trends. As a result, the burst of the bubble ended in a lasting trauma: in the name of openness and transparency of the market, the buying frenzy of the late 1980s finally played against art (speculation on artworks) and against the market (withdrawal of the major auction houses, galleriy bankruptcy, collapse of the demand). More than any other country, Japan has paid the price of this frenzy.
8This experience, very painful, led the Japanese galleries to keep their distance with the current outburst of the Chinese art market. It definitely made them more risk averse. However, huge risks are inherent to the world of contemporary art: galleries have to select artists within oversupply, facing almost total uncertainty about their chances of success. Furthermore, the issue consists less in unearthing new “talent”, than to build careers through supportive exhibitions, and the mobilization of a network of alliances (result of multiple interactions between curators, collectors and galleries). Success takes a pyramidal shape: promising artists are seized from their original galleries by senior art dealers. In front of these structural challenges, Japanese galleries—in addition to the traumatic experience of the speculative bubble—present weaknesses. Low staffing firms, they first depend too much on the choices made at the top of the direction, and therefore does not show much risk diversification in decision making. Furthermore, their compensation strategies in case of loss now tend to crumble. Indeed, until the early 2000s, a small gallery could compensate one of its most popular artists leaving it by still receiving support from former protégés in the long term (for example, it would occasionally receive interesting artworks). Similarly, in the field of figurative art, they could operate capital transfers from the segment of highly recognized artists (the masters of nihonga or yôga) to the beginners’, or even from “museum art” (especially impressionism) to contemporary art. In the latter case, the transfers were made from the secondary market to the primary market. However, such practices recently stumble over the weakening of solidarity between master and disciple in the world of traditional art (decline of associations of artists, salons d’art, academic career paths) and the hegemony of contemporary art on the international stage. Finally, a fourth actor, who appeared at the edge of the first market, introduced for the first time an element of fierce external competition: the new Japanese auction houses. While advocating more transparency on prices, they also participate in strengthening the market structure of an oligopoly with competitive fringe, prompting the majors to abuse their market power.
9Aware of the limitations of the domestic market, a few young and dynamic galleries prompted themselves to conquer the global stage, where only the most innovative art gain institutional recognition. Some of them do not hesitate to settle abroad, unable to bear “the inertia of the Japanese art market” and fundamentally hostile to closed sales between professionals (kôkankai), which remain in line with the academic system of career management. For instance, the successful art dealer Koyama Tomio was able impose in ten years a handful of very mediatized artists. With delay, public institutions, such as the Agency for Cultural Affairs, also seem to now be more aware of the potential for export: thus arose more attention to the growing sector of manga. As a consequence, a new form of the Japanese star system (under the leadership of Takashi Murakami) is now emerging, placing the predominant model on the verge of implosion: in place of a seniority-based advancement within the frame of a rigid hierarchy—admittedly not very conducive to the renewal of themes and internationalization of careers—appears a speed-up carrier model, with considerably increased risks. In fact, opening the system to the world bears a cost: the chances of success are minimal in light of the failure rate: only a tiny minority of artists win almost all of the sector’s incomes. Furthermore, the success of small innovative galleries expose them to the predation of their most profitable artists by more powerful galleries. In that case, they often are at a loss as to what to do with enforcing their rights, since almost no one is bound to artists by written contracts (let alone exclusive contracts). Artists also gain uncertain benefits from this predatory behavior. They expect that the commitment of more financially powerful galleries would be sustainable, but they also learn that the market power of a gallery is also built on a more selective arbitrage between short and long term.
Auteur
Associate professor at Department of Japanese Studies, Université Lyon III
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