Vagueness and ambiguity in communication
p. 633-636
Texte intégral
May 2014
1It is generally assumed that Chinese people are predisposed to using vague and ambiguous communication and prefer a “roundabout,” suggestive way of expressing their thoughts. This is not only the case in interpersonal communication and social interaction (renji guanxi) but also applies to the domain of official speech. The roots of this communication style can be found in ancient moral philosophy and in the structure of society (its origin is also based on ancient philosophical thought), and ultimately comes down to the ideal of maintaining harmony (hexie). In this respect, this mode of communication still serves as a powerful tool today for “the harmonious society,” having been the former president Hu Jintao’s signature’s ideology in contemporary society. But where are the limits of such speech after decades of rapid social change and modernization?
Origin and aim
2The way things are communicated in China tends—especially in comparison with the Western style of clear and unambiguous messaging—more often than not to be vague, suggestive, and ambiguous. Several reasons explain why communication in China displays these characteristics.
3On a sociological level, following a long history of political ups and downs and constant risk of falling into disgrace with the authorities, Chinese people are conditioned to be particularly aware of the ebb and flow of power and how it can flow in unpredictable directions. That is to say, yesterday’s opponent may be tomorrow’s superior, and thus it is best to bite a fiery tongue. This is an especially threatening factor in societies such as China that lack a robust legal system that protects the individual and where there is a strong focus on maintaining face (mianzi or lian) and with a lack of legal protection, such as Chinese society. The Confucian saying that “a word uttered by a gentleman cannot be taken back, even by a team of four horses” continues to be viewed as a practical wisdom that is never far removed from the Chinese psyche. In other words, what is once said cannot be undone, hence vague or no communication is generally perceived as the safest way of self-preservation.
4From the viewpoint of social morality, indirect and ambiguous communication is strongly related to social harmony, the ultimate aim of the Confucian moral code. Confucian society is dominated by strict hierarchical roles and well-defined rules of behavior that govern how people of different status should address and interact with one another within their relationships. Given the interdependency of specific contexts that a person might be engaged in and the variable roles a person is expected to take, in such a society, people seldom directly express their thoughts or feelings. Although it seems that on the surface there is an apparent contradiction between well-defined roles and vague communication, Chang Hui-Ching, an authority in Chinese communication, observed that it is “precisely because Chinese relations are well-defined, there is little need to be verbally explicit, since utterances can be interpreted against definitions of the relationship.” That is to say, improper utterances would be detrimental for the harmonious development of the conversation by causing loss of face, for example, and thus negatively impacting the relationship. A young Shanghainees employee confirmed this by explaining that in social interaction, Chinese people tend to be “implicit,” and would even feel awkward (gangga) if they had to explicitly take a clear position in issues that imply face and social status. If this involves pretending not to know clearly, then that is the preferred social conduct.
5A fine example of this is the frequent use of the expression bu fangbian, “It is not convenient.” For example, when a Chinese person wants to express the fact that something cannot be done because he or she is not able or in the position to do so, or simply does not feel like doing so, whatever the real reason might be, the phrase “It is not convenient” will often be used. This reply is less negative and more likely to avoid conflict than simply saying no, since it leaves room for interpretation and for negotiating the boundaries of the role one finds oneself in, without disturbing the relational harmony.
6This also implies that Chinese people are not always eager to hear a truthful representation or explanation of the facts, whether true or not. Often enough, the “true” reason or explanation is less important than maintaining face or not embarrassing others, especially in the case of upsetting, conflict-arousing facts or information.
7Strongly related to the search for interpersonal and public harmony which conditions all forms of communication, the Confucian virtues of modesty and self-effacement also explain such a vague or ambiguous communication. The absence of the need for well-articulated self-expression simply means that there is, to use the words of social psychologist Michael Harris Bond, “no [individual] desire to transcend the larger scheme of things.” Indeed, compared to Western cultures, where communication is rather seen as an expression of the self, in Chinese cultures, communication is primarily considered a means of reaffirming the communicator’s position in society and maintaining social harmony. As a result, pretending to be ignorant, unclear or just uninformed, and expressing oneself in vague, moderate terms, functions as a social virtue rather than as a social impediment.
Official discourse: growing resistance
8What is true for interpersonal communication, also applies to official discourse, that is, all public communication conducted and controlled by official channels and oriented to the wider society. Constantly vigilant to the need to maintain social stability, Chinese political leaders are very selective about spreading news. This is reflected in the far-reaching systems of censorships and self-censorship by all those who communicate in public media. Not surprisingly, the word “censorship” is often referred to by Chinese netizens as “river crab” (he xie), which sounds similar to “harmonious” in Chinese (hexie).
9Not only does the central government sometimes chooses to adopt a news black-out or restrict access to news sources, in other cases, Chinese leaders prefer to distribute vague and general news information rather than report the full story if this could cause upset. Keeping citizens ignorant or vaguely informed about disturbing issues is justified as being for the sake—or at least under the pretext—of the “harmonious society,” as too much negative information may lead to social discontent and instability. A few examples are the inaccurate and scandalously late official news coverage of the SARS outbreak (2003), the poisoned milk powder scandal (2008), and the Tibet protests in Lhasa (2008), the last two examples undoubtedly influenced by the Olympic Games in Beijing.
How Beijing streets looked like during the SARS epidemics in 2003.

© 2003 / Lynn Robbroeckx.
10Conditioned by thousands of years of censorship and very limited access to accurate information sources, and by the constant threat of falling into disgrace, the man in the street is seldom eager to be accurately informed, nor does he feel the need to be so. A striking example is the comment of a clerical assistant on the lack of information on Tiananmen incident: “In my opinion, normal Chinese people are not interested in politics very much. History has almost nothing to do with their real life.” And another young (27) person admits that: “For my generation, it’s not a big issue at all. I didn’t understand what was really going on [at the time].” To most Chinese people, receiving clear and truthful information is unlikely to change, let alone improve, anything about their current situation and daily life. Receiving unreliable, vague or no information at all, indeed has become a habit to which Chinese people seem to have become accustomed to and which has in the past rarely been questioned. What matters is the acceptance of one’s position and the knowledge and information to which one according to this social position has or does not have access, and further remain focused on the necessities of the day.
11However, despite this deeply imbedded, culturally conditioned resigning attitude, there is a growing and increasingly explicit resistance against such vague, unreliable and ambiguous communication in official media. Individuals and groups of citizens started questioning and resisting the censorship of the state, articulating a growing anger with being kept in the dark. Especially in the domain of officialdom, anger takes over from resignation and pretended ignorance. From ancient times, officials traditionally bear the strong social and moral responsibility of serving the people and being a role model in society. In the fight against ubiquitous corruption among officials who pretend not to know and give ambiguous information about corrupt practices they initiated for the sake of self-enrichment, both central government and the man in the street no longer tolerate this. An example is the school corruption scandal during the Sichuan Earthquake in 2008, when Chinese civil engineers, bloggers, and activists joined forces to bring attention to the alleged corruption of officials involved in the construction of schools that collapsed.
12So one the one hand, as far as interpersonal communication is concerned, vagueness and ambiguity in communication are still highly valued social virtues, which in turn contribute to the harmony in society. On the other hand, keeping the people ignorant is losing a lot of its legitimacy as a “harmony-oriented” official strategy, and discontent grows especially when it concerns corruption. Obviously, the task of moderating the flow of information through media will become harder over time. Political leaders, both at central and local level, will sooner or later have to recognize the limits of such social stability-oriented communication and adopt a more transparent middle way of communicating with the people.
Auteur
-
Mieke Matthyssen
Researcher at Sinology Department at Ghent University (Belgium)

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Creative Commons - Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International - CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
The Asian side of the world
Editorials on Asia and the Pacific 2002-2011
Jean-François Sabouret (dir.)
2012
L'Asie-Monde - II
Chroniques sur l'Asie et le Pacifique 2011-2013
Jean-François Sabouret (dir.)
2015
The Asian side of the world - II
Chronicles of Asia and the Pacific 2011-2013
Jean-François Sabouret (dir.)
2015
Le Président de la Ve République et les libertés
Xavier Bioy, Alain Laquièze, Thierry Rambaud et al. (dir.)
2017
De la volatilité comme paradigme
La politique étrangère des États-Unis vis-à-vis de l'Inde et du Pakistan dans les années 1970
Thomas Cavanna
2017
L'impossible Présidence impériale
Le contrôle législatif aux États-Unis
François Vergniolle de Chantal
2016
Sous les images, la politique…
Presse, cinéma, télévision, nouveaux médias (xxe-xxie siècle)
Isabelle Veyrat-Masson, Sébastien Denis et Claire Secail (dir.)
2014
Pratiquer les frontières
Jeunes migrants et descendants de migrants dans l’espace franco-maghrébin
Françoise Lorcerie (dir.)
2010