The transformations of the meaning of work in Japan

September 2018

1In a global context of an increasing precariousness, faced with the major transformations of work and its role in the socialization of individuals, the flexibilization of the workforce has redefined labour, social participation and the self-definition of young adults in Japan. Thus, the economic difficulties of the past two decades have produced new subjectivities and a new sense of participation in society.

View of Akasaka, Tokyo.

2Indeed, despite some recent signs of recovery of its economy, Japan has gone through a series of political and economic difficulties that have marked society. In 2008, the Lehmann shock hit a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, weakened financial sector and the economy in general and in 2011, Fukushima, the biggest cataclysm that the country has experienced since the Second World War prolonged the pre-existing economic difficulties. However, difficult times began well before and it is important to note that the economic slowdown of the 1990s and early 2000s had a greater influence on the increase in part-time workers and on the transformations of the labor market. Indeed, for more than twenty years, the difficulties of the Japanese economy have considerably transformed the configuration of the labor market and corporate practices (Lechevalier, 2011). Not only the difficult conjuncture of the last two decades brought to light social inequalities, but it has also rendered explicit the differences in working conditions, aspirations and life choices.

3This context affects several spheres of the social including the articulation between representations of the economy, social participation, lifestyle choices and the aspirations of young adults who have more and more difficulty defining their places and meet the expectations of mainstream society.

4Several narratives emerged in the public space to highlight the effects of the last two decades slump, but also to exploit it. Neo-liberals want to reform the economy and the neo-conservatives are pushing for a return to the moral order. In both cases, the crisis serves as a springboard for a discourse that insists, for some, on the need to adapt to globalization and, for others, on the need to strengthen national spirit (Mirza, 2008). It should be reminded that large corporations have been not only the engine of economic growth, but also the essential link in a very tight institutional chain linking family, education and work. As a result, the difficulties of the companies quickly gave way to a discourse on the future of the nation and the importance of morals and ethics at work.

5The press has largely build up on this topics by talking about problems related to the world of work. Several observers have announced the end of the employment system for life, and daily reports relate the difficulties faced by employees in the work environment. Commentators have begun to denounce the new attitude of young people in relation to work who supposedly lack vigor, determination and also individualist and selfish. Of course, this discourse ignores one of the major consequences of the flexibilization of the work regime i.e. an important drop in recruitment in schools and universities. With a decline in recruitment in secondary schools and universities, companies have significantly weakened their links with the world of education and many studies have shown that this phenomenon is one of the important causes of the increase in the number of temporary or part-time employees, which is to say that in Japan we work full-time, but without benefits (Brinton, 2010).

6These moral denunciations therefore correspond rather poorly to the reality of young adults who have to adapt to a labor market that has considerably flexibilization, but still works, at least in the discourse, modeled on Japan Inc. This is also highlighted by surveys conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, which shows that the proportion of irregular employees increased from 20 % in 1990 to 37.4 % in 2014 to exceed the 40 % threshold a year later (Takahashi, 2015).

7Thus we observe that more and more young people find themselves in the job market without job security or future prospects (Mirza, 2008). These uncertainties are also about marriage, as more and more young women and men are not married. Here again, a moral discourse especially directed towards women insist on the necessity of marriage, especially to respond to the crisis.

8Here again, a moral discourse directed above all to women insist on the necessity of marriage, particularly in response to the demographic crisis (since there are very few children out of wedlock in Japan).

9However, a growing number of young women are delaying or delaying marriage (in Tokyo, more than 50 % of 30-year-old women remain single) and stay longer in the labor market. This phenomenon indicates a desire on the part of young women of the middle class to obtain more independence and to develop a career even if working conditions for women are still very difficult in Japanese companies and that women occupy majority of part-time or temporary jobs (Mirza, 2016).

10While young women refuse or reject marriage, young men must also deal with paths that are less and less regulated by transitions between the world of education and the world of work. They face many difficulties if they deviate from the typical career path, if they have made the wrong choice in their field of study, or if they can not find a regular job right out of school because of a limited job market. Moreover, contrary to expectations, many young men refuse to follow the prescribed path and many give up stable jobs in large companies. The flexibilisation of work has resulted not only in an experience of loss and increase of inequalities but also in the emergence of a discourse which insists more and more on self-realization and the possibility of making different choices.

11If precariousness and inequalities are more apparent than before, it is also the variation in the life course that becomes more convincing. Thus the well-orchestrated transition from post-war society that allowed people to go from school to business and then to found a family has given way to a greater individualisation of destinies. This diversification of choices results in a greater job insecurity, but also in the emergence of a plurality of representations. Thus, in response to moral denunciations against young people and to face the difficulty of finding a job, the last decade has also been marked by the emergence of political demands and, following the tsunami and the disaster Fukushima nuclear power on 3 March 2011, a series of demands in the public space against poverty, insecurity or nuclear power. Even a minority (for example, the SEALDs movement has already been dissolved for two years) these movements are still clues as to how young adults are trying to think about the effects of neoliberal reforms in Japan (Mirza, 2015).

12The transformations of work, by weakening the hegemonic framework of the last 60 years, opened gaps, highlighted several contradictions. The economic difficulties of the last twenty years have not only weakened the practices and representations of work, but also what had to be mastered in modernity : individualism, the diversification of choices, etc. However, it is the fragmentation of this hegemonic framework, the contradictions that are engendered by this fragmentation that allow the emergence of new practices, new values and a “new sense of work”, but also a new meaning politics and a redefinition of oneself and one’s relationship to society among young adults in Japan.

13As such, the link between work, politics and everyday life is a privileged “place” for understanding and explaining these transformations. It allows us to reflect on these new subjectivities that are shaping contemporary Japanese society and how this new flexible life reconfigures the relationship to others, to things and forces young adults to make sense of this new conjuncture.