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    Plan détaillé Texte intégral The challenge to ensure energy security by Europeanisation Explaining Europeanisation in member states, candidate and neighbouring countries The limits of Europeanisation with regard to the establishment of a pan-European gas market Conclusion – The failure of Europeanisation in the field of Energy Notes de bas de page Auteurs

    Sociologie de l'énergie

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    The limits of Europeanisation in the field of Energy

    The case of a common, pan-European gas market

    Bernd Weber et François Bafoil

    p. 53-60

    Texte intégral The challenge to ensure energy security by Europeanisation Explaining Europeanisation in member states, candidate and neighbouring countries The limits of Europeanisation with regard to the establishment of a pan-European gas market Objectives and instruments of Europeanisation in the internal dimension Objectives and instruments of Europeanisation in the external dimension The limits of establishing an internal gas market in the post-enlargement EU-27–the case of Poland The limits of establishing a pan-European gas market in the neighbourhood – the case of Ukraine The limits of establishing a pan-European gas market in the neighbourhood – the case of Azerbaijan Conclusion – The failure of Europeanisation in the field of Energy Notes de bas de page Auteurs

    Texte intégral

    The challenge to ensure energy security by Europeanisation

    1The policy field of energy has always been at the heart of the European integration process since the founding of the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in the 1950s. The most far-reaching integration in the field of energy took place when a common market for coal was established. With regard to European gas markets, it was more than three decades later that a broad process towards «formal Europeanisation» gained momentum with the Single European Act in 1987, which initiated a EU-wide liberalisation process of infrastructure and network industries. Since then, the EU promotes the «Europeanisation» of energy markets and policies, focussing first and foremost on the establishment and implementation of a functioning common European market for electricity and gas. What is more, this Europeanisation approach is not limited to member states or candidate countries, but has been strategically extended to neighbouring countries. Europeanising the energy sectors and policies of neighbouring countries became a priority in the light of shortfalls of European supplies, due to repeated gas disputes between the major transit country Ukraine and the major gas supplier Russia and the «trilemma of European energy security». The latter refers to (1) a growing European demand and regional competition for finite fossil fuel resources, (2) the depletion of gas and oil reserves within Europe, and (3) the combat against climate change by reducing CO 2-emissions, while guaranteeing competitive energy prices. These structural constraints increase the importance of gas supplies from the neighbourhood1.

    2The rationale behind the EU’s strategy to strive for a «pan-European gas market» is, that it supposedly increases the EU’s and its neighbours’ energy security by creating a predictable, transparent market, stimulating investment, cross-border trade and diversification of supply routes and sources2. The corresponding Europeanisation agenda coincides with the liberalisation of energy markets, based on core provisions on unbundling, Third Party Access (TPA) and market pricing. Thereby, the EU aims at reducing market concentration in energy markets, dominated by few and often state-controlled companies.

    3However Europeanisation in the field of energy needs to be put into question. Despite the willingness and competence of the EU to ensure the functioning and interconnection of the common energy market, supply security, and sustainability, member states remain the sovereign core actors. They autonomously decide on their energy mixes and the general structure of their energy supply3. The shared ownership and the tension between the EU and member states constitute the background against which Europeanisation in the field of energy has to be analysed. While the EU has developed clear objectives and instruments to establish a common energy policy, based on a functioning (pan-) European energy market as centre of gravity, member states continuously challenge the EU approaches to europeanise energy in and around Europe. Their national strategies and responses vary to a large extend. One the one hand, this variance can be explained by structural changes that determine the capacity of the EU to influence member states, candidate and third countries. One the other hand, this variance results from the evolution of the preferences of domestic political actors under the impact of diverging (geo-) political, economic and institutional contexts, resulting from different historical paths and spatialisation.

    4In order to analyse Europeanisation in the field of energy, we will first discuss theoretical models and their explanations for achievements and failures of the process in member states, candidate, and neighbouring countries (II). Subsequently, we will explain achievements and limits of establishing a (pan-) European energy market in Poland, Ukraine and Azerbaijan (III). Finally, we draw the conclusion that the Europeanisation of energy markets and policies has largely failed (IV).

    Explaining Europeanisation in member states, candidate and neighbouring countries

    5Europeanisation provides a conceptual framework4 to understand the achievements, as well as the resistance and limits with regard to the adoption and implementation of the pan-European energy market. «[…] Europeanization, [is] a term pinpointing to processes of domestic ideational, institutional and policy change that have been allegedly triggered by the EU5.»

    6The two theoretical approaches that help to explain the different internal and external Europeanisation processes are rational and sociological institutionalism. The literature distinguishes between the array of Europeanisation mechanisms on the basis of their underlying theoretical foundations, referring to March and Olsen’s broader work on the two bases that can guide the decision-making deliberations of actors, the rational institutionalist «logic of consequences» and the constructivist «logic of appropriateness»6.

    7The «logic of consequences» assumes that actors choose strategically between available options, by evaluating the consequences of their decisions with regard to their objectives and preferences. From this perspective, Europeanisation is the result of rational actors maximising their material benefits in their relations with the EU, within the existing institutional framework, according to their fixed preferences and exogenous, a priori determined interests. The «logic of appropriateness» on the other hand, highlights the «bounded rationality» of actors and their interest in «optimising» their benefits. The latter can be of economic or political, as well as symbolic and social nature. Thus, preferences and interest are not exogenously given, but vary according to actors’ perceptions of appropriateness of behaviour in specific situations. From this perspective, decision-making is influenced by identities, perceptions and roles at specific points in time, instead of being purely instrumental.

    8The thereof derived Europeanisation framework focuses on the reformulation of the influences and constraints that limit actors. This reformulation is based on available resources and capacities, past experiences and historic trajectories, institutional environment, and the veto power of interest groups.

    9One influential model that was applied to explain the success of Europeanisation within the EU is the model of «misfit-Europeanisation»7. It highlights the institutional distance between the European rules and the specific domestic situation, on which the European level exerts pressure. In this context, the concept of «misfit» refers to the intensity of the adjustment pressure to which the specific, historically shaped domestic system is exposed. The bigger the «misfit», the bigger the adjustment pressure, i.e. the pressure to europeanise. The «misfit» thereby offers domestic interest groups the possibility to intervene, either by favouring Europeanisation, or by resisting to the adoption of European rules. Confronted with the pressure to adopt European rules, actor groups form pro-and contra-alliances, while some of them hold the institutional veto-power to resist the Europeanisation of specific institutions.

    10The bulk of the existing literature on external Europeanisation focuses on the enlargement process. Authors draw the conclusion that its success is based on the combination of the pressure to adjust to European rules, in order to benefit from material and immaterial advantages of EU membership («external incentives model»), as well as on policy learning and persuasion, based on progressive socialisation and positive experiences of East-European elites8. However, due to a widespread lack of administrative capacities and the imposed pressure to adopt the acquis communautaire, Europeanisation turned out to be quite often a purely formal, superficial adoption of rules that were not implemented and appropriately internalised9.

    11The discussed Europeanisation models apply to cases, where the asymmetries between the actors are limited. The «misfit model» was foremost applied to the EU-15, were political and economic asymmetries between member states were limited due to shared trajectories and spatialisation. With regard to the Central and Eastern European accession negotiations, the increased political and economic asymmetries between old and new member states were attenuated by shared values and a shared interest in reuniting Europe10. This congruence of preferences and ex ante adjustment of expectations, shaped by a common history, was at the base of shared values and at the heart of common collective interests and identity.

    12These conditions for a simple «collective action system» with limited asymmetries seem to be absent in the EU-27 and in the EU neighbourhood. In their absence, the evolution of actor preferences is increasingly exposed to regional and international constraints that can converge with or diverge from European ones. In the field of energy, these constraints stem from the evolution of global and regional energy markets, geopolitical rivalry and conflicts, the development of the internal energy market and legal constraints resulting from the communitarisation of EU energy policy. Under these conditions, the pan-European gas market, the EU is striving for, is facing resistance, both internally and externally, while initial agreements and compromises become less stable.

    13After analysing the EU’s strategy and objectives in the following section, we will apply the outlined theoretical framework to grasp Europeanisation dynamics, achievements and limits in the internal and external dimension, with regard to three case studies: (1) Poland as a former candidate and new member state; (2) Ukraine, considered to be a «forerunner» in terms of cooperation with the EU; (3) Azerbaijan, considered to be a «laggard» in the Eastern neigh-bourhood in this regard11.

    The limits of Europeanisation with regard to the establishment of a pan-European gas market

    Objectives and instruments of Europeanisation in the internal dimension

    14The European Commission (EC) has undertaken several gradual reform steps to liberalise and europeanise national electricity and gas markets. The first series of liberalisation directives and related regulations were adopted in the late 1990s («First Legislative Package»). Subsequent liberalisation directives and regulations were adopted in 2003 and foresaw that some key provisions, e.g. on TPA to infrastructure would enter into force by 2007 («Second Legislative Package»). In 2007 the EC introduced the last «Third Legislative Package», which was adopted in 2009. It reinforces the principle of «ownership unbundling», which stipulates the separation of companies’ generation and sales operations from their transmission networks. Unbundling aims at ending the exclusive control of major energy producers over transmission networks, which is hindering market access of competitors12.

    15Since having embarked on the project of establishing an internal energy market for gas, the EC has faced strong resistance from member states. So far, neither the Second nor the Third Legislative Packages have been fully implemented. Unbundling has not been realised throughout the Union and many member states continue to protect their markets, national energy companies and influence prices13. While the Commission was able to establish a common institutional architecture, there is no functioning European energy market so far, but a gap between articulated goals on the European level and barely compatible national energy strategies. Member states continue to define their interests egocentrically, based on their specific energy mixes, their energy market structures and their external suppliers14. All these specific elements have been shaped by path-dependency and spatialisation.

    16Under such conditions, the EC regularly produces ambitious initiatives, which are barely based on public and democratic consultation, fail to secure a necessary consensus among member states and do not prevent purely unilateral approaches. Thus, articulated joint goals of a common European energy policy often remain empty words that leave great margins of uncertainty. A functioning energy market could help to overcome this situation, since it would increase the energy interdependence of member states. This could gradually transform national preferences and render energy strategies more compatible.

    17A more detailed evaluation of the implementation of the internal market for gas reveals, that some member states have liberalised and implemented the institutional architecture to a higher extent than others. Only the energy policies and markets of a few member states are widely and effectively liberalised in accordance with EU provisions, while those of others feature gaps with regard to key provisions15.

    18In sum, Europeanisation of gas markets and energy policies remains unstable for two reasons. Firstly, the EC’s approach to liberalise and interconnect markets, based on a specific, common institutional architecture, is not accepted by all member states. Effective implementation is hampered by a lack of political consensus, which itself can be related to prevailing asymmetries between member states. Secondly, while member states are only able to agree on the sheer principle of liberalisation, they continue to defend their sovereignty in organising and governing their markets and pursue incompatible strategies. Hence, national prevail over common interests. Europeanisation in this sector remains an empty word, as long as a critical mass of member states continues to ignore and bypass already adopted European legislation. Furthermore, this raises the question of how the EU can possibly extend the internal energy market to neighbouring countries, while internal consistency is lacking and asymmetries are much higher than within the EU-27.

    Objectives and instruments of Europeanisation in the external dimension

    19The EU already obtains 79% of its gas imports from neighbouring countries and this share is expected to rise further16. The EU’s approach to europeanise energy markets and policies in the neighbourhood aims at increasing EU supply security by accessing new sources, diversifying routes and securing existing supplies, through promoting investment and a stable institutional framework17. In this context, the export of the rules and norms on unbundling, pricing and TPA have become a priority and an important component of energy cooperation between the EU and its neighbours. The overarching common approach towards producer and transit states in the neighbourhood is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is a sound bilateral policy approach that comprises a multitude of policy fields and is based on positive conditionality and joint ownership. The approach was supplemented by bilateral and regional instruments and institutions18. With the European Energy Community (EEC), the EU has established an organisation in the neighbourhood, which builds on a binding treaty that embodies the whole acquis with regard to energy. The EU thereby establishes a «reference framework», based on the main EU leverages of access to the internal market, trade and mobility agreements, engagement in regional affairs and further support and incentives in different fields.

    20Energy relations with neighbouring countries are characterised by a high degree of instability and uncertainty for several reasons. Firstly, the ENP remains ambiguous with regard to the end point of cooperation, rewards and their conditions. Secondly, core values of the EU are not necessarily shared and a common European identity is either non-existent or non-consolidated. The picture is further complicated by the divergence of energy strategies of member states that can undermine the EU’s approach towards neighbouring countries. Member states can offer bilateral alliances to withstand EU pressure and their internal non-compliance provides neighbours with a credible argument not to commit to core provisions. At the same time, regional energy players offer alternatives to a complicated and demanding rule-based cooperation with the EU.

    The limits of establishing an internal gas market in the post-enlargement EU-27–the case of Poland

    21At a first glance, the importance of natural gas in the Polish energy mix seems to be limited, since it accounts for only 12.6% of the gross inland consumption. For the time being, hard coal accounts for 83% of the gross inland consumption of the Central and Eastern European Country. However, the share of natural gas in the Polish energy mix is expected to rise significantly in the light of the EU’s 20-20-20 strategy to reduce carbon emissions. Annual gas imports of Poland were 10 bcm in 2010, representing 70% import dependence. 90% of these external supplies come from Russia under long-term agreements with Gazprom19. In the light of cut-offs during the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, diversifying supplies away from Russia has become a strategic imperative for Poland, in order to ensure its energy security. Correspondingly, the country is advocating for the strengthening of the common European energy policy in its internal and external dimension with regard to gas20.

    22When Poland became a member of the EU in 2004, 51% of its gas market was liberalised21. The essential directive 2003/55/EC of the Second Legislative Package was adopted and transposed into Polish legislation. The provisions on unbundling helped to formally abolish the monopoly of the state-controlled, vertically integrated PGNiG that dominated all sectors of the gas supply chain. Thereby, elements of competition were introduced into the gas market against the opposition of powerful trade unions. On the one hand, this formal adoption of EU rules was possible, since the EU was able to capitalise on its superior bargaining power, imposing the adoption of the directives as a non-negotiable condition of accession. Polish political actors were prepared to liberalise their gas sector according to EU standards, since EU accession promised economic gains and more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Furthermore, the formal Europeanisation of the national energy market was favoured by the fact that the country pursued a far-reaching liberalisation of many sectors in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, domestic resistances remained and complicated the process22. Nevertheless, the European accession process worked as a catalyst to overcome the «misfit» between the Eastern country in transition and the EU-15. At the same time, Poland’s «return to Europe» was based on a shared European identity and interest to be a member of the community after decades of communist rule. The integration into a European gas market and the political structures of the EU provided domestic political actors with a credible option to strengthen Poland’s energy security vis-à-vis its dominating Eastern neighbour.

    23While legal unbundling of transmission and distribution is given since the mid-2000s, PGNiG still dominates the gas supply chain. The Transmission System Operator (TSO) Gaz-System can be considered as a subsidiary of the state-owned company. This is also the case for the other six Polish distribution companies. Although legally independent from PGNiG in decision-making and accountability, Gaz-System is controlled by the Polish Ministry for Treasury that also holds 85% of PGNiG shares23. The outcome of this structure is the dominance of PGNiG and politically controlled low gas prices. The Polish Ministry for Industry has postponed the implementation of the Third Legislative Package that aims at correcting this situation. This unilateral decision is not permitted by European legislation. «The Ministry has merely asserted that Poland wants to diversify its gas supplies before addressing the issue of making its gas market more competitive24.» While the formal, structural adjustment took place during the enlargement process, the implementation of structural reforms in a post-enlargement environment was stopped, since it was perceived to compromise national sovereignty in terms of energy security. Lacking EU incentives to further promote the process and the increasing threat of over-dependence on Russia explain the reinforced Polish resistance. Further liberalisation of the gas market could leave Poland exposed to the influence of gas companies with close ties to Russia. Under these conditions, the application of the European rules is considered to be inappropriate. This is demonstrated by the case of Emfesz Polska. Gas-System denied pipeline access to the Hungarian trading company with close ties to Gazprom with vague arguments such as lacking capacity. This can be considered as breach of the TPA provisions, due to discrimination in favour of the dominating PGNiG25.

    The limits of establishing a pan-European gas market in the neighbourhood – the case of Ukraine

    24Russian gas supplies account together for more than 80% of the Ukrainian gas consumption. At the same time, 80% of the EU’s gas imports from Russia are delivered via transmission systems running through Ukraine. Based on its over-dependency and the experience of supply cut-offs in the aftermath of Gazprom’s strategy to increase prices for its gas deliveries, the country developed an interest in securing its supplies institutionally and diversifying them through interconnections with Europe and its southern neighbours. The integration of Ukraine’s gas sector into a pan-European market can help to secure much needed investment in the transmission system, thereby securing transit revenues and furthermore contribute to the diversification of Ukrainian supplies. On the other hand, the concentration of the gas transmission and distribution in the hand of Ukrainian oligarchs and opaque business structures, resulting from a failed liberalisation after the Cold War26, clearly hampers the Europeanisation of the gas sector and provokes resistance to unbundling, TPA and market pricing.

    25European investment in the gas sector holds the advantage of being much less politicised than alternative Russian investment. More importantly, the «Orange Revolution» raised Ukrainian aspirations to become a member of the EU and brought clearly pro-European elites into power. They undertook an ambitious reform programme to europeanise the country in order to be provided with a membership perspective. The EU for its part provides Ukraine with significant economic and political incentives within the framework of the ENP. The main incentives are gradual access to the internal market through a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), visa facilitations and funding in various sectors27. The political willingness to europeanise Ukraine is mirrored in the «advanced status» that was granted to the country within the framework of the ENP, as well as in the far-going convergence with the acquis communautaire in many sectors. Ukraine’s membership aspirations are grounded in shared European values of its pro-Western elites and expected economic and political rewards. Furthermore, they had a significant «spillover effect» to the energy sector. Padgett describes this as «co-variation» of functional needs to co-operate in the energy sector with the accession incentives and aspirations of the country28. Energy cooperation with the EU took place within the ENP and INOGATE and was further strengthened by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed in December 2005. Within this dense cooperation structure, the adoption of the Second Legislative Package was prioritized. However, it was not before prices of Russian supplies reached a level that was close to European ones, that Ukraine fulfilled the conditions for EEC accession. Only at that point, costs of introducing market pricing mechanisms became rather limited. It is thus fair to say, that Gazprom’s strategy to increase gas prices for Ukraine favoured the integration of the country in a pan-European energy market. With its accession to the EEC the Eastern neighbour committed itself to implement the whole Third Legislative Package. «This means that Naftohaz Ukrainy, the Ukrainian party to the supply and pricing contracts with Gazprom, will cease to exist in its current form, requiring the renegotiation of gas import contracts with Russia within the new economic and legal environment29.»

    26Nevertheless, the commitment that the country has undertaken through its accession to the EEC remains fragile. The implementation of the adopted norms and rules remain insufficient30. Opaque informal structures continue to exist and the pro-Russian political elites that came back into power in 2010 have questioned the sustainability of the commitment to integration in a pan-European energy market in the light of the offer to join Russia’s Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). Both, the implementation of the DCFTA and the EEC provisions would render a Ukrainian membership in the ECU impractible31.

    The limits of establishing a pan-European gas market in the neighbourhood – the case of Azerbaijan

    27The case of Azerbaijan is entirely different from the aforementioned two cases. The neighbouring country is a gas producer, with significant reserves that the EU tries to access via the Southern Corridor Initiative. Since the country signed the «Contract of the century», it experienced a lot of FDI in the energy sector. Since 2006 it benefits from the inflow of oil and smaller gas revenues, based on the evacuation of its resources to foremost European markets. This led to the accumulation of abundant financial reserves. While gas supplies to the EU remain insignificant so far, this is supposed to change, once the Southern Gas Corridor will be implemented. The corridor is supposed to deliver 10 bcm of Azerbaijani gas to the European market annually, thereby diversifying Europe’s gas supplies by providing vulnerable states in Eastern and South Eastern Europe an alternative to Russian supplies32. Azerbaijan continuously showed itself prepared to deliver gas from the Shah Deniz II production phase to Europe from 2018 on. Particularly, the European frontrunner project Nabucco received strong political support from the EU to open the corridor since the first gas crisis in 2006.

    28It was not before 2007, that Azerbaijan became a net gas exporter. Baku took the decision to develop its indigenous gas reserves instead of importing most of its consumed gas from Russia in the light of Gazprom’s strategy to increase energy prices in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. High import prices rendered the development of its reserves more beneficial. While Western companies benefit from a reliable and liberal regulatory environment in the upstream, the mid-and downstream sector remain under the dominance of the state-owned company SOCAR and its subsidiaries33.

    29The gas producing country holds no credible ambitions to become a member of the EU and discards any political conditionality that would undermine the authoritarian regime. A MoU with the EU was signed in 2006 and singles out the one sector of strategic cooperation that became of utmost importance to the EU in the light of insecure supplies from Russia via Ukraine. De facto, the MoU delinks energy from other fields of cooperation within the ENP. The document, although not legally binding, refers to the gradual harmonisation of the Azerbaijani with the EU’s internal energy market and more explicitly to the Second Legislative Package34.

    30Azerbaijan has a clear economic interest in increasing energy revenues by selling gas to Europe. Moreover, the geographic positioning of the country raises expectations of transit revenues from additional supplies from Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan that could be delivered to Europe via the large-scale pipeline Nabucco. The EU commitment to the implementation of Nabucco represented a strong economic and political incentive for Azerbaijan to foster the overall political and energy cooperation with the EU, in order to establish itself as an independent gas producers against Russian pressure. Furthermore, the country lacks experience in regulating the newly emerging gas sector. The EU offers the country the possibility to adopt and learn from the European model and experience, based on the intensification of a longstanding technical cooperation on the expert level within INOGATE. In 2009, the EU negotiated an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on Nabucco with all transit countries, which provided for TPA to the geostrategic pipeline35. At the same time, a EU twinning project between member state and Azerbaijani experts on the legal approximation and structural reform of the energy sector led to the drafting of laws, based on the Second Legislative Package36.

    31However, these achievements on the road to the widening of and the integration into a pan-European gas market were neither effective, nor sustainable. In the light of the inability of the EU to unite member states behind one project of the Southern Gas Corridor and to secure financing for it, Azerbaijan and Turkey conceived the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). This project fits into the strategy of Azerbaijan to use its abundant financial resources to increase its presence along the value chain and suits Turkey’s ambitions to become a regional gas hub. While this project does not necessarily run against the European interest in implementing the Southern Gas Corridor, the bilateral IGA on TANAP does not include any provisions on TPA37. Turkish opportunism with regard to the Nabucco IGA can be linked to the fact that the country refused to join the EEC in the light of a fading membership perspective38. This provided Azerbaijan with the possibility to cooperate with Turkey in order to design an IGA that suits best its ambitions to increase revenues and control over the midstream. At the same time, the aforementioned laws on the harmonization and reform of the Azerbaijani energy sector failed to win political support for adoption, although involved ministerial experts back them. The main reason for this is, that effective liberalisation would loosen the grip of governing elites on a sector that is highly important in terms of domestic politics. Thus, elites consider effective Europeanisation of the sector to be highly inappropriate for Azerbaijan. Deprived of strong incentives towards the energy producer that has only a very limited interest in integration into the European market and that benefits from a lot of FDI in the energy sector, the EU is not able to exert pressure on Azerbaijan to pursue a EU-inspired reform of its energy sector and policy39. On the contrary, the country seeks to obtain a special status as a strategic partner that would single it out further from the ENP framework.

    Conclusion – The failure of Europeanisation in the field of Energy

    32Our analysis has pointed out the limits and failures of the EU’s strategy to establish a pan-European gas market. Within both, the internal and external dimension, the EU was only able to push for formal institutional change, but failed to initiate a political, economic and ideational one. Thus, the formal adoption of EU rules in the case of Poland and Ukraine and the legal approximation towards them in the case of Azerbaijan remain empty words.

    33In the internal dimension, Europeanisation is hindered by the inconsistency and ineffectiveness of the common energy policy. This is reflected in the incapacity of the EC to push for the implementation of the internal gas market and the intertwined prioritisation of energy sovereignty by a critical mass of member states. While Poland formally adopted the core provisions of the internal energy market under EU pressure during the accession process, the case of «post-enlargement Poland» demonstrates the inappropriateness of the very same EU rules. As long as the energy security of the country is not guaranteed, effective unbundling and TPA could jeopardise national energy security, by opening the door to more politicised Russian influence on Poland’s energy sector. Under these conditions, domestic actors have strong arguments to bypass and ignore formally adopted rules in practice.

    34In the external dimension, the picture is further complicated by increased asymmetries and institutional gaps, while the ENP lacks sufficient and precise incentives to overcome them. At the same time Neighbourhood Europeanisation cannot lean on strong common values and a shared European identity. The case of Ukraine demonstrates the initial ability of the EU to capitalise on the pro-European elites, their reform programme and functional needs for energy cooperation. While the domestic resistance and the opaque structures in the gas sector hindered the implementation of the EU rules, the new government openly questions Ukraine’s EEC membership in the context of its strategy to improve relations with Russia. With regard to the supplier state Azerbaijan, the EU was only able to achieve a MoU, referring to the Second Legislative Package. Yet, substantial progress in liberalising the energy market never took place, since this touches upon domestic power structures. What is more, in the light of the incapacity of member states and the EU to agree on the implementation and financing of the Southern Gas Corridor, the neighbouring supplier formed an alliance with Turkey to partially replace European partners and EU rules enshrined in the Nabucco by the new TANAPIGA. This opportunism was favoured by the accumulated financial capacities of Azerbaijan, its cultural proximity with Turkey and the inconsistency of European external energy policy.

    35Based upon these findings, it is not only the effectiveness of Europeanisation in the field of energy that one has to question, but also the appropriateness of the concept in a post-enlargement and ENP environment. Can one speak of Europeanisation, when there are only formal institutional changes, which are continuously challenged, or even overthrown?

    Notes de bas de page

    1 Iea, World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris, IEA/OECD, 2011.

    2 European Commission, Green Paper. A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, COM (2006) final, 2006, p. 16.

    3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/01, 2008, § 194.

    4 Börzel, T./Risse, T., «Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics», dans Knud-Erik Jorgensen, Handbook of European Union Politics, London et al., Sage, 2006.

    5 Gänzle, S., «Policy-making and New Modes of Governance in the European Neighborhood Policy», Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, no8, 2008, p. 5.

    6 March, J./Olsen, J., Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York, The New Press, 1989.

    7 Börzel, T./Risse, T., op. cit.

    8 Schimmelfennig, F. /Sedelmeier, U., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Cornell, Cornell University Press, 2005.

    9 Epstein, R./Sedelmeier, U., International influence beyond conditionality: postcommunist Europe after EU enlargement, London, Routledge, 2009.

    10 Lippert, B., Bilanz und Folgeprobleme der EU-Erweiterung. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004.

    11 Franke, A./Gawrich, A./Melnykovska, I., «The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan», Post-soviet Affairs, vol. XXVI, no 2, 2010.

    12 European Parliament, EU Energy Markets in Gas and Electricity – State of Play of Implementation and Transposition, Brussels, European Parliament, 2010.

    13 Ibid.

    14 Baumann, F./Simmerl, G., «Between Conflict and Convergence The EU Member States and the Quest for a Common External Energy Policy», CAP Discussion Paper, no February, 2011.

    15 European Parliament, op. cit., p. 70.

    16 Andoura S./Oultremont, C., «The role of gas in the external dimension of EU energy transition», Notre Europe Policy Paper, no79, 2013.

    17 European Commission, On security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders, COM(2011) 539 final, 2011.

    18 E.g. Lannon, E., The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges–Les défis de la politique européenne de voisinage, Berlin et al., Peter Lang, 2012.

    19 European Commission, Energy Markets in the European Union in 2011, Brussels, European Union, 2011, p. 122-124.

    20 Polish ministry of economy, Energy Policy of Poland until 2030, 2009.

    21 Oljenik, M., «National Approaches to Implementation – Poland», dans Peter Camron, Legal aspects of EU energy regulation: implementing the new directives on electricity and gas across Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 405.

    22 Nowak, B. «Challenges of Liberalization. The Case of Polish Electricity and Gas Sector», MPRA Paper, no 23804, 2009.

    23 Slupik, S. «Barriers to Developing Competition in the Polish Electricity and Gas Market», International Business Research», vol. V, no8, 2013.

    24 Nowak, B, op. cit., p. 145.

    25 Ibid., p. 147.

    26 Pirani, S. «Ukraine: A Gas Dependent State», dans Simon Pirani, Russian and CIS Gas Markets and their Impact on Europe, New York et al., Oxford University Press, 2009.

    27 Franke, A. et al., op. cit.

    28 Padgett, S., «Energy Co-operation in the Wider Europe: Institutionalizing Interdependence», Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. IL, no5, 2011, p. 1084.

    29 Cutler, R., «Russian Gas, European Integration and the Fate of Ukraine», ISN-ETH Zürich, 2/5/2013, URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=163528(téléchargement5/6/2013).

    30 Energy Community Secretariat, Annual Report on the Implementation of the Acquis under the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, Wien, Energy Community Secretariat, 2012.

    31 Cutler, R., op. cit.

    32 Satori, N., «The European Commission’s Policy Towards the Southern Gas Corridor: Between National Interests and Economic Fundamentals», IAI Working Papers, vol. XII, no 1, 2012.

    33 Energy Charter Secretariat, Follow-UP In-Depth Review of the Investment Climate and Market Structure in the Energy Sector, Brussels, Energy Chareter Secreteriat, 2011.

    34 Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the field of Energy, 7/11/2006.

    35 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Nabucco Gas Pipeline, 13/7/2009.

    36 European Union, Final Report Twinning – Legal Approximation and Structural Reform in the Energy Sector of Azerbaijan, 15/11/2010.

    37 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Anatolian-Gas pipeline, 22/11/2012.

    38 Kardas, S. «Turkish-Azerbaijani Energy Cooperation and Nabucco: Testing the Limits of the New Turkish Foreign Policy Rhetoric», Turkish Studies, vol. XII, no 1, 2011.

    39 Franke, A. et al., op. cit.

    Auteurs

    • Bernd Weber

      Doctorant, rattaché au CERI-Sciences Po. Il est diplômé en science politique, géographie économique et ethnologie européenne de l’université de Munch. Il a été invité par la Fundação Getúlio Vargas à São Paulo en tant que chercheur associé, puis engagé à la Direction générale du Commerce de la Commission européenne. Sa recherche porte sur la politique énergétique extérieure de l’UE dans son voisinage. Il a publié plusieurs contributions scientifiques sur la Politique européenne de voisinage.

    • François Bafoil

      Sociologue, directeur de recherche au CNRS (CERI, Sciences Po) et dirige le réseau de recherche sur la cohésion territoriale et l’énergie, Coesionet. Il a publié plusieurs ouvrages sur l’Européanisation en Europe centrale et orientale. Il travaille désormais à l’étude comparée des formes d’intégration régionale et des problématiques énergétiques en Europe centrale et dans la région du Grand Mékong.

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    1 Iea, World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris, IEA/OECD, 2011.

    2 European Commission, Green Paper. A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, COM (2006) final, 2006, p. 16.

    3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/01, 2008, § 194.

    4 Börzel, T./Risse, T., «Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics», dans Knud-Erik Jorgensen, Handbook of European Union Politics, London et al., Sage, 2006.

    5 Gänzle, S., «Policy-making and New Modes of Governance in the European Neighborhood Policy», Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, no8, 2008, p. 5.

    6 March, J./Olsen, J., Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York, The New Press, 1989.

    7 Börzel, T./Risse, T., op. cit.

    8 Schimmelfennig, F. /Sedelmeier, U., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Cornell, Cornell University Press, 2005.

    9 Epstein, R./Sedelmeier, U., International influence beyond conditionality: postcommunist Europe after EU enlargement, London, Routledge, 2009.

    10 Lippert, B., Bilanz und Folgeprobleme der EU-Erweiterung. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004.

    11 Franke, A./Gawrich, A./Melnykovska, I., «The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan», Post-soviet Affairs, vol. XXVI, no 2, 2010.

    12 European Parliament, EU Energy Markets in Gas and Electricity – State of Play of Implementation and Transposition, Brussels, European Parliament, 2010.

    13 Ibid.

    14 Baumann, F./Simmerl, G., «Between Conflict and Convergence The EU Member States and the Quest for a Common External Energy Policy», CAP Discussion Paper, no February, 2011.

    15 European Parliament, op. cit., p. 70.

    16 Andoura S./Oultremont, C., «The role of gas in the external dimension of EU energy transition», Notre Europe Policy Paper, no79, 2013.

    17 European Commission, On security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders, COM(2011) 539 final, 2011.

    18 E.g. Lannon, E., The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges–Les défis de la politique européenne de voisinage, Berlin et al., Peter Lang, 2012.

    19 European Commission, Energy Markets in the European Union in 2011, Brussels, European Union, 2011, p. 122-124.

    20 Polish ministry of economy, Energy Policy of Poland until 2030, 2009.

    21 Oljenik, M., «National Approaches to Implementation – Poland», dans Peter Camron, Legal aspects of EU energy regulation: implementing the new directives on electricity and gas across Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 405.

    22 Nowak, B. «Challenges of Liberalization. The Case of Polish Electricity and Gas Sector», MPRA Paper, no 23804, 2009.

    23 Slupik, S. «Barriers to Developing Competition in the Polish Electricity and Gas Market», International Business Research», vol. V, no8, 2013.

    24 Nowak, B, op. cit., p. 145.

    25 Ibid., p. 147.

    26 Pirani, S. «Ukraine: A Gas Dependent State», dans Simon Pirani, Russian and CIS Gas Markets and their Impact on Europe, New York et al., Oxford University Press, 2009.

    27 Franke, A. et al., op. cit.

    28 Padgett, S., «Energy Co-operation in the Wider Europe: Institutionalizing Interdependence», Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. IL, no5, 2011, p. 1084.

    29 Cutler, R., «Russian Gas, European Integration and the Fate of Ukraine», ISN-ETH Zürich, 2/5/2013, URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=163528(téléchargement5/6/2013).

    30 Energy Community Secretariat, Annual Report on the Implementation of the Acquis under the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, Wien, Energy Community Secretariat, 2012.

    31 Cutler, R., op. cit.

    32 Satori, N., «The European Commission’s Policy Towards the Southern Gas Corridor: Between National Interests and Economic Fundamentals», IAI Working Papers, vol. XII, no 1, 2012.

    33 Energy Charter Secretariat, Follow-UP In-Depth Review of the Investment Climate and Market Structure in the Energy Sector, Brussels, Energy Chareter Secreteriat, 2011.

    34 Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the field of Energy, 7/11/2006.

    35 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Nabucco Gas Pipeline, 13/7/2009.

    36 European Union, Final Report Twinning – Legal Approximation and Structural Reform in the Energy Sector of Azerbaijan, 15/11/2010.

    37 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Anatolian-Gas pipeline, 22/11/2012.

    38 Kardas, S. «Turkish-Azerbaijani Energy Cooperation and Nabucco: Testing the Limits of the New Turkish Foreign Policy Rhetoric», Turkish Studies, vol. XII, no 1, 2011.

    39 Franke, A. et al., op. cit.

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    Weber, B., & Bafoil, F. (2015). The limits of Europeanisation in the field of Energy. In M.-C. Zélem & C. Beslay (éds.), Sociologie de l’énergie (1‑). CNRS Éditions. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionscnrs.25818
    Weber, Bernd, et François Bafoil. « The Limits of Europeanisation in the Field of Energy ». In Sociologie De l’énergie, édité par Marie-Christine Zélem et Christophe Beslay. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2015. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionscnrs.25818.
    Weber, Bernd, et François Bafoil. « The Limits of Europeanisation in the Field of Energy ». Sociologie De l’énergie, édité par Marie-Christine Zélem et Christophe Beslay, CNRS Éditions, 2015, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionscnrs.25818.

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    Zélem, Marie-Christine, et Christophe Beslay, éd. Sociologie de l’énergie. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2015. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionscnrs.25758.
    Zélem, Marie-Christine, et Christophe Beslay, éditeurs. Sociologie de l’énergie. CNRS Éditions, 2015, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionscnrs.25758.
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