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The Asian side of the world - II

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Jean-François Sabouret

Part Two. National challenges and strategies

Radicalisation & resilience: should Indonesian Islam be considered as an example to be followed in the Muslim world?

Gwenaël Njoto-Feillard

Texte intégral

1December 2013

2When the “Arab spring” began in 2011, it resembled more and more like a long and harsh winter; the compatibility of Islam and democracy is finding itself once again at the centre of debates among academics and chancelleries. They were not the only ones who to have observed, been puzzled by, and undoubtedly disappointed by the political instability and the economic crisis stemming from the recent events in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia or Libya. Often glued to their television sets, the news of chaos that the Indonesians were watching was reminiscent of the events in 1997 and 1998 that led to the fall of President Suharto, under the pressure of the public and notably courageous students.

3Many Indonesians undoubtedly realised the extent of the progress made since this historic period after being under an authoritarian regime for more than 30 years. Others undoubtedly understood the importance of the national ideology, “Pancasila”, adopted in 1945, establishing the religious neutrality of the Indonesia. In this country, the largest in the world in terms of its Muslim community (88% of its inhabitants are Muslims), the Pancasila does not privilege Islam, but recognises the “belief in one God only” as one of the five founding principles of the country. As an instrument of ideological control that was used for a long time by Suharto, the Pancasila is experiencing a comeback. Moreover, despite Indonesian Islam having suffered an inferiority complex, due to its “peripheral” situation in the Muslim word, it is now proudly claiming its singularity.

4Indonesian democracy is, admittedly, far from perfect. In benefitting from the decentralisation process initiated by the post-Suharto reforms, corruption has also become endemic, and now affects all levels government. The last scandal saw Akil Mochtar, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, being arrested in October 2013 by the infamous Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi). The case was such that it could even have put the legitimacy of the political system into question. The corrupt Chief Justice was suspected of bribing the decisions of the Court on the outcomes of several contested local elections. A few months earlier, important political figures from the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) were accused of embezzling tens of millions of dollars originally intended for the building of a sports complex.

5Not long ago, the implementation of the Islamic ideal built around that of the Sharia would have been openly claimed as the solution to these problems of corruption, or to any other societal problem in countries that were at times disoriented by the frantic chase towards modernity. Today, however, these militant voices seem to be somewhat less vocal, for good reason. The country’s main Islamist political party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), was at the centre of a major corruption scandal, related to the beef import quotas overseen by the Ministry of Agriculture, which itself is headed by a member of this party. The case was all the more shocking in the view that the PKS – a distant cousin of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood – had prided itself in being the “true” party by excellence, possessing religious legitimacy. In the eyes of the public, these scandals were becoming intolerable as the social and economic inequalities were increasing with the sustained development that the country had been experiencing for several years (an average growth of 6%).

6It thus seems that political Islam is not as popular as it was a few years ago: many surveys have shown that Islamic parties are at risk of facing a historically low result from the legislative elections that will be held in 2014. However, since the fall of Suharto and the liberalisation of politics, Islamic parties (Islamist and non-Islamist) have received a significant number of votes (approximately 33% and 35% of the vote in 1999 and 2004). The decline in 2009 (25% of the vote) could thus increase in the next elections. While the PKS managed to secure 7.3% of the vote in 2004, and 7.88% in 2009, according to current surveys, the party’s popularity could decrease to a level closer than that of its results in 1999 (1,36%).

Results of the main Muslim parties in the Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2009

Results of the main Muslim parties in the Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2009

Results of the main Muslim parties in the Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2009. (© 2013 / Réseau Asie – Imasie.)
(Source: The General Election Commission (KPU), Indonesia Memilih.)

7With regard to radical and violent Islam that suffered defeat from the government’s security policy, it is much more fragmented than it was in the early 2000s and thus appears to have a lesser impact. No major terrorist attack has shaken the country since 2008, despite there being a new mode of action: it is decentralised and operated by self-taught independent militants who are targeting the police and religious minorities.

8Mainstream Muslim organisations (the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama and modernist Muhammadiyah) are still torn in between a “liberal” current and a “conservative” current, more tolerant to radicals. However, their leaders have realised that the two organisations are being threatened by the “entry” strategy of Islamists and neo-fundamentalists.

9It is clear today that the challenges faced by the role of Islam in the country’s politics are more associated with local issues. Since the early 2000s, this phenomenon was translated by the implementation of regulations in certain local communities, inspired by the Sharia (ban on alcohol selling, curfew for unaccompanied women, the wearing of the veil), favoured by the political manoeuvres of local candidates who were members of “nationalist” parties, and therefore secular, but who were nevertheless trying to gain the Muslim vote.

10The role of political elites in Jakarta is thus important. It is the cowardice of the current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (with the support of certain ministers) that is granting legitimacy to the acts of violence performed by the militias of the Islamic moral order, like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI, Front Pembela Islam). The public is becoming increasingly exasperated by abuses committed by the FPI (raid at bars, billiard halls, intellectual and interfaith gatherings). Recently, certain communities have started responding to this violence by resorting to force themselves. There is hope today that this active minority, which has been causing harm, will diminish with the arrival of a new and firmer political power.

11There is therefore a growing willingness, not only in intellectual circles, but also in the most popular areas, to defend an Islam that wishes to be specifically Indonesian and distinct from the religious exclusivity associated to the Saudi Wahhabi model. Some even speak of the need to counter Islamic extremism, with “Pancasila extremism”, whereby the religious neutrality of the country is reaffirmed; a country, which has long favoured the sectarian and ethnic cohesion of the island.

12Does this relative resilience of Indonesian society faced with the rise of radicalism deserve to be considered more throughout the Muslim world? Indonesia has certain undeniable advantages; in addition to its national ideology, it has a booming economy, a strong civil society, media enjoying total freedom of speech, reactive student organisations, moderate Islamic mass-organisations occupying the social ground, a strict anti-corruption commission, and last but not least, young rising political figures with a reputation of great integrity. The latest surveys show that the public is convinced that democracy, despite its imperfections, remains the best political system of country. The inhabitants of Greater Jakarta illustrated this political maturity during the last elections for governor and vice-governor, when they nominated both Joko Widodo, an entrepreneur with a reputation of possessing integrity and being efficacious, and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Sino-Indonesian Christian, the first in the country’s history.

13The problem thus stems less from the public than from certain elites who are ready to defend their political and economic interests through favouring an intransigent form of Islam or, at the least, by tolerating the acts of violence performed by radical militias. The results of the next legislative elections in April 2014, followed by the presidential elections in July of the same year, will partly determine whether this strategy still has a future in a country that has now almost fifteen years of democratic experience behind it. For the moment, the island is one of the few countries in the Muslim world that has succeeded in combining democracy, religious revival, and economic development together. It is therefore interesting to note that since 2011, representatives of the Egyptian government have been visiting Indonesia in order to understand the country better.

14Finally, one may wonder whether the reported failure of political Islam in the next elections could lead the forces of Islamist activism to return to their area of preference that is to say, preaching and social work, or increasingly investing in new horizons, such as the economy. Like the American televangelists, a new generation of charismatic Muslim preachers has been promoting “pious enrichment” for a few years now, associated to the provision of charitable services to the middle-class who are in need of the meaning of life. Similarly, parties and organisations have begun to create their own businesses and to use the motivational techniques of Western management to compete in a “benefits of salvation” market of 240 million souls (i.e. alms tax, endowments and the multiple forms that religious donations take today).

15It remains to be seen what the outcome is of this possible “redirection of the area against which one fights”–from political activism to lucrative-charitable areas – when the joining of religious and economic fields is instilling a new dynamic into Islam and modernity.

Bibliographie

Bibliographical indications

Bruinessen (van), Martin, Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”, Singapore, ISEAS, 2013.

Feillard, Andrée et Madinier, Rémy, La fin de l’innocence : l’islam indonésien face à la tentation radicale: de 1967 à nos jours, Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2006.

Njoto-Feillard, Gwenaël, L’islam et la réinvention du capitalisme en Indonésie. Paris, Karthala, 2012.

Picard, Michel and Madinier, Rémy, The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2011.

Table des illustrations

URL http://books.openedition.org/editionscnrs/docannexe/image/13086/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 103k
Titre Results of the main Muslim parties in the Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2009
Légende Results of the main Muslim parties in the Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2009. (© 2013 / Réseau Asie – Imasie.)(Source: The General Election Commission (KPU), Indonesia Memilih.)
URL http://books.openedition.org/editionscnrs/docannexe/image/13086/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 93k

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