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The Asian side of the world - II

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Jean-François Sabouret

Part One. Regional dynamics and globalization

Will the Asia-Pacific region become Chinese?

Fabrice Argounès

Testo integrale

1February 2012

2Is East Asia part of Asia-Pacific? This question about the limits of an area that encompasses parts of East Asia and the Western Pacific contains two unnatural terms and reveals the power relations that frame the regional approach. East Asia – a Japanese concept – emerged in the 1930s and 1940s and was revived in the 1990s, with increasing trade in the area, the spread of Japanese capital and then Chinese capital and the construction of an Asian regionalism, partly driven by ASEAN. Asia-Pacific – an American concept – emerged after the Second World War and during the Cold War, through the US alliance system (hub and spoke) in the region and the increase in trans-Pacific trade with Japan and Australia. Now, Asia-Pacific appears to have been claimed by Barack Obama, born in Hawaii, leading to affirmation of a “manifest destiny” in the region, with island relays from Guam to the Australia, Japanese and Taiwanese allies, in which the US is strongly anchored. Geographical competition between two symbols of power in the region re-emerged in the late 2000s, with two projects: the Asia Pacific Community (APC), led by the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, and the East Asia Community (EAC), suggested by the Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.

3Although this competition did not survive regional tensions and the departure of the two instigators, it remains a symbol of the power relations that help to homogenize the regional geography, such as reproduction and strengthening of economic, political and cultural competition in the region. Yet behind the symbols, East Asia is already Asia-Pacific, which has been definitely recentred in East Asia and the Western Pacific, even though the term could cover the Pacific basin of APEC in the early years.

4During the past decade, the face of the Pacific has been transformed by rapid integration into the political, economic and strategic East-Asian “regional world”. A new regional consciousness has emerged alongside Pacific identities dominated by the colonial experience and the connection to Australia or New Zealand. Even the Australian identity, traditionally “de-regionalized” from its Asian geography and built-in Britishness, is now a growing part of the Asian region, while maintaining its US alliance.

  • 1 Hu Jintao, “Address to the Federal Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia”, 27 December 2003.

5In 2003, during a speech to the Australian Parliament, Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed the long-standing ties between his country and Australia, starting with the example of the eunuch navigator, Zheng He, a 15th century hero and a symbol of the opening of his country to the Pacific and the Indian Ocean: “In the 1420s, the Chinese expeditionary fleets of the Ming dynasty reached Australian shores. For centuries, the Chinese sailed across vast seas and settled down in what was called ‘the southern land’, or today’s Australia. They brought Chinese culture here and lived harmoniously with the local people, contributing their proud share to Australia’s economy, society and thriving pluralistic society1.” Hu Jintao created a distinctively Chinese counter-narrative of Australia’s early history, which includes the South Pacific in an area of influence before the European presence and close to the Asian system of which the centre was China.

  • 2 “Chinese Military Sea”, The New York Times, 24 April 2010.

6Therefore, the Chinese Navy followed in the wake of Zheng He. Since the mid-2000s, the strategic interests of China in the Pacific extend beyond the borders of the South China Sea and its key issues: South China Sea islands, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. The new strategic doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) takes into account a presence in the South-East Asian Straits and revolves around a desire to make the South China Sea a “Chinese” sea and expand the zone of maritime interests: “Now, Chinese admirals say they want warships to escort commercial vessels that are crucial to the country’s economy […] Another element of the Chinese Navy’s new strategy is to extend its operational reach beyond the South China Sea and the Philippines to what is known as the ‘second island chain’, rocks and atolls in the Pacific”, the official said. “That zone significantly overlaps the United States Navy’s area of supremacy2.”

7Although the principle of a Chinese military threat to the US Seventh Fleet in the Pacific has been mooted by some US and Australian think-tanks, it remains hypothetical, at least in the long term. The Western Pacific is not a priority for China, as it is too far from major trade routes that run along the Asian continent, and the major tensions are closer to the coast.

  • 3 Malik, M., “Australia and the United States 2004-2005: All the way with the USA?”, Special Assessm (...)

8The emergence of a “China-centric” Asia-Pacific is based primarily on construction of a political and economic space. Australia, the country closest to Washington in the region, is paradoxically the most important link between China and the Pacific, particularly for the economy. China is the main client for Australian assets, accounting for 26% of Australian exports. The Chinese appetite for raw materials to ensure economic growth is the main explanation of the excellent health of trade between the two states. Between 2006 and 2011, many “giga-contracts” were signed with China, one of the latest in 2010 exceeding US$ 60 billion. Iron, coal and aluminium maintain the economic health of Australia, and “China is today as critical for Australia’s economic security and prosperity as the US is for its military security3”. China is also the second largest trading partner of New Zealand after Australia.

9The implication of the increasing importance of China in Oceania is the extension of its economic interests in order to ensure special access to raw materials in the region, such as oil and gas from Papua New Guinea, a country that benefited from large investments in 2009 and 2010. The Solomon Islands are also an essential source of raw materials, and China was the leading export destination in the archipelago in 2011, with 60% of the total, far ahead of Thailand (3.5%) and South Korea (3.5%). In the quest for energy, minerals and other natural resources around the world, China has also become one of the largest sources of aid in the Pacific, as in Africa. Beijing is expanding its influence in the Pacific by restructuring its development aid and increasing loans to island states to build infrastructure. Some such loans are particularly important to the annual budget; for example, a loan to Tonga was equivalent to 32% of the annual GDP.

  • 4 Wesley-Smith, T, Porter, E., China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 201 (...)
  • 5 Windybank, S., “The China Syndrome”, On-line Opinion, 27 June 2005.

10Political issues also influence Chinese choices in the region. The fight against the influence of Taiwan in the region, through “checkbook diplomacy”, remains one of the first issues in Chinese aid. Beijing is competing with other Asian players in the region, some of which have been present for longer, such as Japan, a special partner of Micronesia and a competitor for imports of raw materials. ASEAN members are also present and competing with China, such as Indonesia, an observer in the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Thailand, for example, is the main destination for exports from Vanuatu (57% of the total in 2011), Singapore for several countries and India in Fiji. Island countries are now considering the many possibilities offered by the development of Chinese power and its willingness to influence the wider region. Beijing and other Asian countries are now integrated into a regional system that was mainly oriented towards the Western powers but has now adopted a different discourse: “If we deal with the governments of the United States or western Europe, they try to impose a list of thirty-three things to do for democracy and issues of human rights. China comes in and says ‘we accept you as you are’. And it’s a refreshing change4”. All the more so since China pays special attention to the leaders of the region: “Over the past few years, the red carpet has been rolled out in Beijing for the leaders of Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Kiribati and East Timor.” “It is now accepted routine”, claimed an article in The National Interest last year, “that the first official overseas visit by a new head of government from the region is made to Beijing, not to Canberra, Washington or Wellington5”.

11As stated by Hu Jintao in the extract above, the diaspora obviously plays a role for China as a symbol and a soft power. In New Zealand, the Asian population, primarily Chinese, could become the most prevalent minority in the country by 2040, before the Maoris, and participate into the construction of a new national identity. In Australia, East Asian people accounted for almost half of all emigrants in 2009, with a quarter from Europe, the home of historical Australian immigration. Island states are also home to large Chinese populations, especially Fiji and Papua New Guinea, which play an important role in relations between China and the island states. The diaspora also participates in constructing the official Chinese narrative about the Pacific, as it did in South-East Asia, although the anti-Chinese riots in Tonga and the Solomon Islands in 2006 and in Papua New Guinea in 2009 showed the limits of the diplomacy-diaspora relationship for Beijing and Taipei.

12The Pacific is changing quickly, and, in a few years, the Chinese presence has become the decisive factor in this development. In less than two decades, the Great Ocean became the immediate neighbour of the world’s most dynamic economies, Australia depending more than ever on Asian partners. Nevertheless, the idea of a Western Pacific becoming a “Chinese lake” remains largely hypothetical, and Washington remains the strategic player in the region, especially as Japan and Australia also have navies that are undergoing rapid modernization. Chinese diplomacy is, however, already present in the Pacific, with visits, assistance, loans and contracts. This is the new face of the Asia-Pacific.

Bibliografia

Bibliographical indications

Hu, Jintao, “Address to the Federal Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 27 december 2003”.
“Chinese Military Sea”, The New York Times, 24 avril 2010.

Malik, Mohan, “Australia and the United States 2004-2005: All the way with the USA?”, Special Assessment Series, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, février 2005, p. 5.

Wesley-Smith, Terence, Porter, Edgar, China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2010, p. 2.

Windybank, Susan, “The China Syndrome”, On-line Opinion, 27 juin 2005.

Argounès, Fabrice, Géopolitique de l’Australie, Bruxelles, éd. Complexe, 2006.

Argounès, Fabrice, Mohamed-Gaillard, Sarah, Vacher, Luc, Atlas de l’Océanie : Continent d’îles, laboratoire du futur, Paris, Autrement, 2011.

Note

1 Hu Jintao, “Address to the Federal Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia”, 27 December 2003.

2 “Chinese Military Sea”, The New York Times, 24 April 2010.

3 Malik, M., “Australia and the United States 2004-2005: All the way with the USA?”, Special Assessment Series, Asia – Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, February 2005, p. 5.

4 Wesley-Smith, T, Porter, E., China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2010, p. 2.

5 Windybank, S., “The China Syndrome”, On-line Opinion, 27 June 2005.

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