European integration and the Cold War
L’intégration européenne et la Guerre froide
p. 39-52
Texte intégral
1The interplay between European integration and the Cold War deeply affected the history of Europe after World War II. Although the conceptual idea of uniting the separate states of Europe into a political and economic entity dates back to the breakup of the Cold War1, both these processes shaped the boundaries of Western and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the second World War, interweaving, influencing and entangling with one another, without ever really overlapping.
2Only for a short period, from the end of the 1940’s to 1955, did European integration and the Cold War partially overlap, mainly for the central role played by the German question in the international system, and went on interacting and influencing, albeit less intensively, throughout the following decades until 1990, flanked by other important processes of the international system, such as decolonization, North-South dialogue, transformations of the international economic and financial system, and globalisation.
3It was not a coincidence that the first steps of the integration process and the establishment of an Atlantic community took place almost simultaneously, with the signature of the Atlantic Pact in April 1949 followed by the setting up of the Council of Europe a few months later and by the Schuman Plan Declaration in May 1950.
4This article argues that, while not exclusive, interaction between the evolution of the Cold War and the development of European integration has been very close and intimate. It will examine a series of case studies which testify to the continuous interplay between these two processes, questioning its reflections on the historiographical debate and stressing the need to break down existing barriers between scholars belonging to the two distinct fields or research2.
An analysis of interaction between the Cold War and European integration
5The first and very important link between the Cold War and European Integration relates to transatlantic relations and to the role played by the United States in supporting the European unification process.
6The integration of Western Europe would have been inconceivable without US support, with its aid aimed at self-help for West Germany and its financial and economic support for the recovery of the European countries.
7The cases to be mentioned are numerous and well-known, starting with the Marshall Plan and its importance in East-West confrontation and in promoting an early form of coordination among the European economies, through the establishment of the OEEC.
8American policy-makers were deeply involved in the Schuman Plan, as Jean Monnet knew how to take advantage of the extensive net-works of contacts he had developed in the United States during World War II, as shown by the fact that the secretary of State Dean Acheson was immediately informed of the Plan, and John McCloy, the U.S. high commissioner in Germany, played a key role in pressuring Bonn to cede over the central issue of industrial concentration in the coal and steel industries3.
9Another example is US lobbying in favour of the European Defence Community (EDC), which failed to be ratified in August 1954 due to resistance from France, whose close entanglement with the Korean war and the question of the FRG’s rearmament have been intensely debated by historiography4. The well-known threat from John F. Dulles to promote “an agonizing reappraisal” of the American commitment to European security, should the EDC not be ratified, was probably the most famous and debated example of US support for European integration.
10In the following years, the US continued to be involved, although less obviously, in the integration process. However, a unified, politically independent and strong Europe did not really correspond to the interests of the United States. While the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations had a relatively unambiguous position of support with respect to the EEC, which was supposed to serve US geo-strategic interests and act as a bulwark against communism, from the end of the 1960’s the Nixon administration showed ambivalence and increasing uneasiness towards certain aspects of the European Community5. In spite of the traditional political support for European integration, shared by the State Department, the economic sphere of the Nixon administration viewed the European Community more as a rival than a partner, an inward-looking block that was trying to erode US market shares.
11In a speech made in Bonn on February 12, 1970, before the German Foreign Policy Association, the US representative to the European Community in Brussels, Robert Schaetzel, described the development of an increasingly critical attitude towards European integration, shared by the economic departments inside the Nixon administration.
12Unfortunately conventional wisdom – affirmed Schaetzel – in America has judged the Community protectionist and inward-looking. There is an exact correlation between perception of the Community and awareness of a European agriculture policy that had reduced American exports to the Community and has led to massive subsidies of surpluses to compete in our traditional markets elsewhere in the world.
13And concluded :
In sum the wide enthusiasm for the Community in America of the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods, the rosy expectations of rapid and brilliant progress towards unity has largely evaporated and been replaced by irritation, frustration and a brooding sense of apprehension as to what the future will hold6.
14The new US “coolness” towards the EC negatively affected European integration during the 1970’s. The examples to be mentioned are well-known : the Nixon administration’s decision to suspend the dollar’s convertibility into gold in 1971, without consulting European allies, would initiate a period of uncontrollable currency fluctuations, which coincided with the decline of the economy in Western Europe and an increase in inflation, thus threatening EC cohesion and con-founding the first European efforts to develop a plan for monetary integration with the Werner Plan.
15Also, Henry Kissinger’s critical attitude towards European efforts to play an international role independent from the United States, identified by the famous remark : “Whom do I call if I want to speak to Europe ?7” played a relevant role in the failure of Euro-Arab dialogue, which represented the European effort to negotiate with the Arab countries, in the framework of European Political Cooperation, in order to offset the negative consequences of the oil shock8.
16Other links between European integration and the Cold War emerge also in the analysis of national policies of the European countries.
17The first case to investigate is of course that of West Germany. The German question in the context of the Cold War was decisive for the setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the core of supranational community building in Europe in 1950-519. The Federal Republic of Germany favoured European integration primarily for political reasons, seeing it as an instrument to link its future to the Western bloc. Beginning with the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, Bonn understood that integration would represent the necessary path for its rehabilitation and would help in stabilising its international position10.
18Even during Willy Brandt’s chancellorship, when his Ostpolitik unleashed a new German diplomatic activism towards Eastern Europe, the FRG reassured its partners that its strategy towards the East did not imply any weakening of Bonn’s support for the European Community. The same tactic was used by Helmut Kohl, when he reassured his European partners, alarmed by the haste of the reunification process, with Germany’s strong commitment to European integration11.
19The interplay existing between East-West dynamics and European integration is also demonstrated by other examples. In the French case the clearest example of the link between European integration and the Cold War can be found in the policy towards Germany developed by France at the end of the 1940’s, alter the first Berlin crisis of June 1948, when Paris understood that the Cold War’s dynamics reduced its freedom of manoeuvre and influence in the international system, and was forced to accept the birth of the Federal Republic. Although economic evaluations played an important role in the negotiations that took place between Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer for the setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), showing the French goal to control the Ruhr’s resources, the first lines of the Schuman Declaration also stress the political objectives that lay behind the initiative :
“World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts to proportionate the dangers which threaten it.
The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself [...] the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.
Europe will not be made at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries12”.
20The interplay between the Cold War and French European policy continued also after the return to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958. Here too the examples to be cited are numerous : probably the most well-known is General de Gaulle’s first veto of the British entry into the EC on January 1963, a consequence of his mistrust of the Kennedy administration’s interference in the EC and of the fear that Washington would use the British “Trojan horse” to control the EC’s machinery, and a reaction to the Nassau deal on the Polaris missiles, between Kennedy and Macmillan, in December 196213.
21In the United Kingdom’s case, as argued by Piers Ludlow, “Cold War considerations played a significant role in both Harold Macmillan’s and Harold Wilson’s applications to the EEC” in 1961 and 196714.
22For example, central in Macmillan’s calculations of 1961, was the belief that Britain could not remain excluded from a Community that was negotiating the setting up of foreign policy coordination with the Fouchet Plan. If the UK remained outside the EC, it could not prevent de Gaulle’s aim to estrange/alienate the Europeans from the United States.
23When Harold Wilson decided to apply to the EC for the second time in 1966, economic reasons were certainly dominant, as a result of the increase in import and export trade from continental Europe and the declining role of the Commonwealth, especially after the col-lapse of Labour’s economic policy following the sterling crisis of 1966. However political considerations seemed to have played a role too, in particular de Gaulle’s decision of March 1966 to withdraw from Nato’s integrated military command, which represented a serious threat to Nato solidarity and to the Atlantic community. Britain’s Cold War role, and its special relationship with the United States, required the United Kingdom’s participation in the European Community.
24The European policy of Italy represents another interesting case of the interplay between the Cold War and European integration dynamics. Italy, with its strategic position in the Mediterranean and the presence of a strong Communist Party – the most powerful in Western Europe – played a key role in the US containment strategy towards the Soviet Union, especially at the end of the 1940’s.
25The Atlantic and the European choice represented the fondamental pillars of Italian foreign policy and can be considered as two Bides of the same coin. On one side, participation in the Atlantic Pact and in Nato represented a guarantee of security against the Communist threat, that soon was interpreted more as a domestic danger, because of the strength of the Italian Communist Party, than as a guarantee against a possible Soviet aggression. On the other, the European choice – the express support of the Italian government for the process of European integration, since the launching of the Schuman Plan and the establishment of the ECSC – corresponded to political and economic goals. It guaranteed Italian rehabilitation in Western Europe, linking it politically and economically to the rest of Europe ; at the same time, it also offered the opportunity to modernize the Italian economy and to ‘Europeanize’ some domestic problems, as for example the complex question of unemployment in the South15.
26In the following years, despite the stereotype of Italian participation in the European institutions as a reluctant partner, the interplay between European integration and Cold War dynamics had important consequences, mainly for Italian domestic political debate. In particular, the issue of the Italian Communist Party’s refusal of European integration, seen as a ‘tool’ of American imperialism in Western Europe, represented the best example of the link between Cold War issues and European integration, as shown by the fact that during the 1960’s no Communist representative sat in the European Assembly or in other European institutions.
European integration’s effects on the Cold War
27While European integration was affected by Cold War dynamics, it also had an impact on the evolution of East-West relations.
28European integration, in fact, contributed to building the image of Western European success, stability and prosperity, and it played an important role both in promoting democracy in countries nearby-as demonstrated in the cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal – and in destabilizing Communist rule in Eastern Europe, thus contributing to the end of the Cold War.
29In the case of southern Europe, scholarly debate on membership negotiations with Greece, Spain and Portugal has clearly demonstrated how important was the promise of doser links with the European Community for the democratization of those countries16. The revolution in Portugal in 1974, the crisis in Greece and the death of Franco in 1975 were shaking the southern flank of Nato, as their path towards democracy was fraught with dangers.
30In particular in the case of Portugal, the possibility that the Portuguese communist party would come to power seriously frightened the Nixon administration17. The European Community proved an irresistible magnet and its opening to Southern Europe played a key role in stabilizing the whole region and in strengthening democracy in these countries.
31This ‘magnet’ effect in promoting democracy continued during the 1980’s and was extended to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. How this happened still needs to be investigated, as we are only at the beginning of understanding the significance of European integration for East-West relations during the 1980’s, its influence on the Eastern European regimes and finally its potential contribution to the end of the Cold War18.
32A large-scale research project aimed at investigating interaction between the European Community and both governments and dissidents in the 1970s and 1980’s19 has just begun at the European University Institute.
33The case of the Single European Act, which entered into force in July 1987, is an interesting but still largely uninvestigated example of the influence of the European integration process on Cold War dynamics.
34While rather technical in its content and dealing mostly with the economic reforms which had to be achieved, the Single European Act triggered the EC’s resurgence and spurred a revival of the European integration process after years of stagnation and decline.
35By eliminating all non-tariff barriers and establishing the free movement of goods, labour, capital and services in 1992, the Community established a European single market of over 325 million people, thus rescuing the European countries’ economies from the doldrums of the 1970’s.
36What is interesting in the Cold War context was that member countries not only pressed forward with creating a large, competitive economic market that the Soviet bloc could not emulate, but they also developed a policy on social justice that gave fair treatment to individuals and workers. It guaranteed basic rights such as those contained in the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 1989.
37The relaunching of the European project and the successful combi-nation of the goals of free enterprise and social justice, contained in the Single European Act, proved significant in the light of East-West relations, as well as in later events in Eastern Europe.
38On the other side of the Cold War curtain, instead of being an integrated community, Eastern European countries were heavily in debt, inefficient in their use of resources, unable to compete in world markets and a burden on the Soviet Union, which supplied them with oil and raw materials.
39The people who started to demonstrate against their regimes in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia probably didn’t know much about the technical details of the process of European integration or of the decision-making process inside the European institutions. But they were conscious of the difference between their quality of life and that of the members of the European Community20.
40These factors seemed likely to have played a role in both the surge of popular protest in the Eastern European countries and in the reaction of the ruling regimes that would soon collapse, dramatically changing the political landscape of Europe between 1989 and 1990.
European integration and Cold War historiographies : two parallel and independent paths ?
41In spite of their continuous interplay, quite surprisingly, the historiography of European integration and that of the Cold War have developed along independent and parallel paths, with few points of interaction, and have been studied, explained and discussed in different conferences, different journals and different volumes.
42This was in part a consequence of the release of primary sources : while studies on the origins of the Cold War and on the United States’ policy towards Western Europe have dominated the scene since the early 1970’s, European integration history developed later, becoming an independent field of research only in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, thanks also to the European Commission’s efforts to develop a European policy of education with the Jean Monnet Action, which started in 1989.
43One of the reasons for this separation is the fact that European integration is primarily concerned with economic issues, rather than with security or military matters.
44Anyone who has worked on the documents of the European Commission or of other European institutions, especially in the early phase of European integration, has probably seen that the main concern of European officials was not the future of East-West relations, or the struggle against the Soviet Union, but the implementation of the system of tariffs and trade established by the Treaties of Rome and the mechanism of the complex agricultural policy.
45Moreover, the historiography of European integration has been deeply affected by the studies of one of its most prominent historians, Alan Milward, who has stressed mainly the importance of the economic and social causes of the integration process, questioning if political and security issues really played a role21.
46On the other hand, European integration hardly appears in narratives of the Cold War, and only marginally in accounts of the collapse of the Soviet system, or in the interaction between the Cold War and the Third World. Consequently, we can question the extent to which EC institutions, policies and culture really mattered in the larger scheme of the Cold War22.
47Cold War scholarship has explained the phases and dynamics of the bipolar confrontation, devoting limited, if not scant, attention to the role played by European integration and by European institutions23.
48Yet this separation has had significant impact on the way in which Cold War history and European integration history are taught. Too often, for example, the history of European integration is explained and taught to students as a parallel history, separated from the international system, and identified mainly by the technical and economic details of the negotiations, or by the bureaucratic institutions in Brussels, or by the ideals of a small and enlightened political elite.
49However, current research on European integration history seems now on the way to overcoming its somewhat inward looking approach and is devoting more attention to the external dimension of the process and to the international role of the EC, linking European integration dynamics to broader international history24.
50The publication in 2007 of the volume edited by Piers Ludlow, European integration and the Cold War : Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, represented a fruitful starting point for the debate, as it cast light on the way in which the East-West conflict and European integration became entangled with one another in the member states’ foreign policy, and debated the issue of the Community insulated from Cold War dynamics25.
51In a workshop hosted at the European University Institute in 2010, these questions were discussed by a group of European integration historians, who examined how European integration and its historiography can promote mutually enriching dialogue with other disciplines working on the same time-period and conceptual territory, such as for example the historiography of the Cold War. One potential new field of research, which was singled out as an example for a broader contextualization of European integration history, was the external dimension of the integration process, the many aspects of EC/EU international relations, transnational associations, global correlations26. Debate stressed the emergence of new fields of research to investigate. In particular, it pointed out the growing amount of literature on the external dimension of the European Community, literature which hitherto focused primarily on the study of transatlantic relations, on the role of the EC within European Cold War diplomacy, but that now is moving to investigate other interesting research fields such as relations between the EC and the so-called ‘Global South27’, development cooperation policy28, the complex issue of how the EC faced globalization29, and the influence of civil society, or of cross-cultural exchange. Certainly, the historiographical debate on the 1970’s has played an important role in promoting a dialogue among scholars of the Cold War and of European integration. On one hand, studies on the Cold War have demolished the stereotype of this decade merely as a period of crisis and uncertainty, an era of transition between the post-war order and the great political changes of the 1980’s. Indeed, they have proposed different interpretations of détente and stressed the difference between the superpowers détente, focused on a triangular diplomacy between the United States, the USSR and China, and a more dynamic European détente, which involved the East with financial, commercial and cultural links and played a crucial role in determining the end of the Cold War30. On the other hand, scholars of European integration have completely changed their interpretation of the 1970’s, which are no longer seen as an era of eurosclerosis, or the ‘dark age’ of the Community. Instead, the “long 1970’s” are perceived as a period of remarkable dynamics.
52The European relaunch initiated by the Hague Conference of December 1969 is now considered the starting point of a ‘second generation of Europe’, of a second phase of European integration, in which the Community started a series of initiatives that enabled it to face the challenges of the evolution of the international system, and move towards so-called globalisation31, not to mention the enlargement of the EC, implementation of European Political Cooperation, stronger ties in the form of a common monetary, regional or social policy, and institutional reforms such as the European Council and direct election of the European Parliament. Last but not least, the scholarship debate on the 1970’s has stressed that, even though the Community was an international actor from its inception, with its foreign trade policy and role as an observer or participant in international organisations, it actually entered the international arena in the 1970s when, at the Hague summit of 1969, the EC explicitly expressed its aspirations to play a more assertive role on the international stage and decided to establish European Political Cooperation32.
53It’s certainly true that European integration cannot be explained through the lens’ of the Cold War alone, and that an explanation of European integration’s achievements and setbacks as a consequence of, or dependent exclusively on, Cold War dynamics appears very limited33.
54If we accept this paradigm, Europe appears to be squeezed by the bipolar scheme, and seeking to create its own role independent of the United States. A well-known example of this representation is identified by Charles de Gaulle’s attempt to build a community of States strong enough to be politically independent of the United States, in the French vision of a new and strong European role in international affairs.
55Such a rigid interpretation, however, neglects the complexity and autonomous character of the integration process, as well as the variety of its projects and the various attempts to establish a European economic and social model.
56The Cold War and European integration have been autonomous processes ; one did not cause the other and they did not end together. At the same time, they have been influenced and have interacted with other processes and dynamics of the international system such as decolonisation, the North-South dialogue, globalisation.
57However, as this article argues, in the four decades of their evolution, they have also deeply interplayed and influenced each other. The numerous examples quoted in this article have shown such continuous interplay between Cold War dynamics and European integration, so that every detailed analysis of this period has to take into account the links between these two paths.
58In spite of their continuous interplay, the two historiographies were long divergent and separate. Only recently has European integration historiography devoted more attention to the international dimension of the integration process and to the international role of the EC, linking its integration dynamics to the broader field of international history. The results of this new path in the history of European integration are a series of interesting and stimulating topics that open potential new directions for research, from relations with the so-called ‘Global South’ to the implementation of European development cooperation policy, from the role played by ideas and cross-cultural exchanges to non-governmental actors such as civil society, mass movements and public opinion.
Notes de bas de page
1 Michael GEHLER, 2016, “Europe, Europeanization and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography”, In Journal of European Integration History, vol. 22, n° 1, 2016, p. 141-174.
2 Piers LUDLOW (ed.), 2007, European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik-Westpolitik 1965-1973, London, Routledge, p. 1-11.
3 Piers LUDLOW, 2010, “European Integration and the Cold War”, In M. LEFFLER and O. A. WESTAD (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 179-198.
4 Michael GEHLER, 2016, “Common and Different Interests since World War II and after the End of the Cold War. Europe’s Integrated Member States and their Relations to the United States (1945-2005)”, In J. de MAYER & V. VIAENE (eds), World Views and Wordly Wisdom, Leuven, Leuven University Press, p. 311-336.
5 Geir LUNDESTAD, 1998, Empire by Integration. The United States and European Integration 1945-1997 Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, p. 58-82; Massimiliano GUDERZO, 2002, Interesse nazionale e responsabilità globale. Gli Stati l’alleanza adantica e l’integrazione europea negli anni di Johnson, Firenze, Aida; Pascaline WINAND, 1993, Eisenhower Kennedy and the United States of Europe, Palgrave, Macmillan, p. 203-264.
6 National Archives, Kew Garden, London, Prime Minister Records 13/3542, Remarks by Robert SCHAETZEL, US representative to the European Communities, before the German Foreign Policy Association, February 12, 1970.
7 Kissinger probably never made this famous remark. The saying seems to be apocryphal, and in fact Kissinger’s concert’ was the precise opposite – he was fed up with having to deal with a Dane, who was trying to represent the whole of the EU as President of the Council, during negotiations on the Year of Europe.
8 Aurélie GFELLER, 2012, Building a European Identity. France, the United States and the Oil Shock 1973-1974, New York-Oxford, Berghan Books; Maria Eleanora GUASCONI, 2016, “The End of Bretton Woods and the Setting up of the Snake”, In Daniela PREDA (ed.), The History of European Economic and Monetary Union. Comparing Strategies amidst Prospects for Integration and National Resistance, Nomos-Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2016, p. 87-100; Idem, 2012, “Prove tecniche di politica estera: la Comunità Economica Europea e lo sviluppo del dialogo euro-arabo negli anni Settanta”, In Mondo Contemporaneo, vol. 2, p. 35-50; Silvio LABBATE, 2016, Illusioni mediterranee: il dialogo euro-arabo, Firenze, Le Monnier; Daniel MÖCKLI, 2009, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, London, Tauris, p. 140-183; Matthias SCHULZ and Thomas SCHWARZ (eds), 2010, US-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
9 Wilfried LOTH, 2008, “Explaining European Integration. The Contribution from Historians”, In Journal of European Integration History, vol. 14, n° 1, p. 9-26.
10 Michael GEHLER, 2011, Three Germanies: West Germany, East Germany and the Berlin Republic, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, p. 63-75.
11 Helga HAFTENDORN, 2008, “German Unification and European Integration are but two sides of one coin: the FRG, Europe and the Diplomacy of German Unification”, In Frédéric BOZOZ, Marie-Pierre REY, Piers LUDLOW and Leopoldo NUTI (eds), Europe and the End of the Cold War. A Reassessment, London, Routledge, p. 136.
12 https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_en.
13 Olivier BANGE, 2000, The Crisis of 1963. Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict, Palgrave, Macmillan.
14 Piers LUDLOW, European Integration and the Cold War, p. 179.
15 See Piero CRAVERI and Antonio VARSORI (eds), 2007, L’Italia nella costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007), Milano, Franco Angeli; Antonio VARSORI, 2009, La Cenerentola d’Europa. L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1946 a oggi, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino.
16 Mario del PERO, Fernando GUIRAO and Antonio VARSORI, 2010, Democrazie. L’Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Firenze, Le Monnier.
17 Mario del PERO, 2011, “Which Chile Allende? Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese Revolution”, In Cold War History, vol. 11, p. 629-632.
18 See Angela ROMANO, 2011, “Looking Eastward”, In Journal of European Integration History, vol. 2, n° 34, p. 353-360.
19 This research project is titled Looking West the European Socialist Regimes Facing Pan-European Cooperation and the European Community (Pan1970s), Principal investigator: Federico ROMERO, Project Manager, Angela ROMANO.
20 See Maria Eleonora GUASCONI, 2018, “The Single European Act, European Political Cooperation and the End of the Cold War”, In Juha HANHIMÄKI a and Barbara ZANCHETTA (eds.), The Great Transformation? Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War, London, Routledge, forthcoming; Angela ROMANO, 2014, “Untying Cold War Knots: the EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s”, In Cold War History, vol. 14, n° 2, p. 153-173.
21 Alan MILWARD, 1984, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951, London, Methuen; and Idem, 1992, The European rescue of the Nation State, London, Routledge.
22 For these evaluations see Francisco ROMERO, 2011, “The International History of European Integration in the Long 1970’s. A Round-table discussion on research issues, methodologies and directions”, In Journal of European Integration History, vol. 34, n° 2, p. 333-335.
23 See for example the monumental The Cambridge History of the Cold War, in three volumes, where only two essays deal specifically with European integration, Piers LUDLOW, European Integration and the Cold War, and John YOUNG, 2010, Western Europe and the End of the Cold War. Melvyn LEFFLER and Odd Arne WESTAD (eds.), 2010, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
24 Carl HEIPEL, 2014, Europe in a Globalised World. Global Challenges and European Responses in the “long” 1970s, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, p. 13.
25 Piers LUDLOW (ed.), 2007, European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik-Westpolitik 1965-1973.
26 Federico ROMERO, 2011, “The International History of European Integration in the Long 1970’s. A Round-table discussion on research issues, methodologies and directions”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 17, n° 2, p. 335.
27 Giuliano GARAVINI, 2012, After the Empires. European integration, Decolonization and the Challenge from Global South, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
28 Elena CALANDRI (ed.), 2009, Il primato sfuggente. L’Europa e l’intervento per lo sviluppo 1957-2007, Milano Franco Angeli, Idem, 2015, Prima della globalizzazione. L’Italia, la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la guerra fredda, 1955-1995, Padova, Cedam.
29 Gérard BOSSUAT, 2006, L’Europe et la mondialisation, Paris, Soleb; Carl HEIPEL (ed.), Europe in a Globalised World.
30 Melvyn LEFFLER and Odd Arne WESTAD (eds.), 2010, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (see in particular the chapter by Jan HANHIMÄKI, Détente in Europe 1969-1975, Piers LUDLOW, European Integration and the Cold War and J. YOUNG, Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979-1989); Niall FERGUSON, Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970’s and the Shock of the Global, In Niall FERGUSON, Charles MAIER, Erez MANELA and Daniel SARGENT (eds), 2011, The Shock of the Global and the 1970’s in Perspective, Harvard, Harvard University Press, p. 1-21.
31 Marie Eleonora GUASCONI, 2004, L’Europa tra continuità e cambiamento. II vertice dell’Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea, Firenze, Polistampa.
32 Lorenzo FERRARI, 2016, Sometimes Speaking with a Single Voice. The European Community as an International Actor 1969-1979, Bruxelles, Peter Lang; Antonio VARSORI and Guia MIGANI (eds.), 2011, Europe in the International Arena during the 1970’s. Entering a Different World, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, p 15-23.
33 Guiliana LASCHI, 2015, L’Europa e gli altri. Le relazioni esterne della Comunità dalle origini al dialogo Nord-Sud, Bologna, il Mulino, p. 11-13.

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Creative Commons - Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International - CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
De la discorde à l’entente
Camille Barrère et l’Italie (1897-1924)
Enrico Serra Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Anthony Crézégut et Maurizio E. Serra (trad.)
2023
Deux grandes figures de l'amitié franco-américaine : Gabriel Hanotaux et Jules Jusserand
Isabelle Dasque, Emmanuelle Haim Masson et Stanislas Jeannesson (dir.)
2023
Histoire de la construction européenne (1957-2015)
Sources et itinéraires de recherches croisés
Jean-Marie Palayret, Isabelle Richefort et Dieter Schlenker (dir.)
2019
Aux sources de la paix. Les archives du service français de la SDN
Isabelle Richefort (dir.) Monique Constant et François Cousin (éd.)
2020
Correspondance politique et commerciale
Guerre 1939-1945, tome II. Vichy 1939-juin 1944. Répertoire numérique détaillé
Isabelle Richefort (dir.) Pascal Even, Sylvie Prudon, Monique Nomazy (de) et al. (éd.)
2021
1529 La paix des Dames
Faire la paix à la Renaissance
Guillaume Frantzwa et Sylvie Le Clech (dir.)
2024
Les diplomaties euro-africaines au tournant des indépendances
Histoire et archives françaises
Céline Pauthier, Guia Migani, Michel Catala et al. (dir.)
2025