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Elites e Poder

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Manuel Baiôa

III – A crise da Restauração e da I República

The slow death of the First Republic1

Stewart Lloyd-Jones

Texte intégral

  • 1 Originally published in the Portuguese Studies Review, 10 (2) (2002): 81-100. Reprinted with permis (...)
  • 1 Rui Ramos, “O fim da República”, Análise Social, 34 (153) (2000): 1059-82.

1At its most superficial level, the coup of May 28, 1926 was little more than “a confused coincidence of several coups”,1 all of which were united under the military by the sole desire to bring about the end of the hegemony (or dictatorship) of the Democratic Party. However, it is important to recognize that there were several competing motives behind the wish to bring an end to the liberal republic, ranging from the minimal (and unifying) desire to be rid of the Democratic Party and to install a more genuinely liberal republic to replace that founded in 1910 to the wish to create a nationalist conservative regime that would secure the State from the “liberals” and which may lead to a restoration of the monarchy. Within this spectrum, almost every shade of political opinion was included.

  • 2 Francisco Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, Vol. III: arrastado pela furia do tufão. De 28 de Maio de (...)

2The initial success of the military led movement can, therefore, be measured by its ability to maintain the balance of opinion between the disparate factions that coalesced behind it, and – crucially – in the coups leaders’ ability to retain a substantial degree of corporate discipline within a politically heterogeneous military’s ranks. Furthermore, the decision of the Democratic Party leadership not to oppose the uprising – despite the opportunity presented to them by General Peres’ and General Sousa Dias’ refusal to support Gomes da Costas proclamation – led them instead to “defend the Republic” by transferring power to Commander Mendes Cabeçadas2.

3The only reasonable explanation for the rapid capitulation of the government before all means of active resistance had been exhausted, is that the Democratic Party leadership knew that more attempts would follow in quick succession – and that even the few forces that remained loyal to the government would begin to make demands for change. It is feasible that the government believed that by allowing the revolution its space in the north, it would soon burn itself out. This, not unreasonably, presupposed that the façade of unity presented by the revolutionary forces in order to obtain victory would very rapidly disintegrate once that victory had been achieved. By conceding a tactical defeat while the main revolutionary forces were in the north, and handing power to Mendes Cabeçadas – a military hero of 5 October and confirmed republican and member of Cunha Leal’s União Liberal Republicana – the governing Democrats may have believed that the coup attempt would abort itself, and that the Democratic Party apparatus would be able to assure its restoration as it had done before – notably in 1915 and 1919. In the meantime, Cabeçadas would be able to defend the Republic by forming a government of “republican unity,” the very existence of which would reinforce the notion that the coup was led by those who sought the restoration of the monarchy.

  • 3 Jacques Georgel, O Salazarismo (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1985), 26-7.
  • 4 See Manuel Braga da Cruz, O partido e o estado no Salazarismo (Lisbon: Presença, 1988), 39.

4In the governments defence, it is inconceivable that the conditional alliance of “monarchists, nationalists, hardened fascists, integralists, resentful republicans, rebellious Catholics, traditional anti-clericals, liberals and dirigistes” who had coalesced (or, to use Ramos’ terminology, “coincided”) within the revolutionary movement could remain united for long.3 Nevertheless, the fact that so many different groups were willing to temporarily forget their differences tends to suggest that a substantial proportion of Portuguese society had had enough and that it desperately desired change without being overly concerned over what would fill the resulting vacuum – that was a battle that could wait for another day. For the time being, the regime question had become a moral one rather than a political one. It was simply a matter of the “re-establishment of order”, and that could only be achieved once the Democratic Party had been removed from the equation. The fact that there was no unifying motivation beyond the moral goal of “ending the current State of things” was considered to be of secondary importance, subordinated to the objective of sustaining at least a façade of “coincidental” unity.4

  • 5 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias..., 21.

5The revolutionary military leadership behind the Braga pronunciamento went to great lengths to keep its ulterior motives hidden. General Gomes da Costa, this leadership’s public, face was chosen to lead the uprising as much for his republican credentials as for his military reputation – he was a member of the Radical Party, and had commanded the Portuguese Expeditionary Force during the First World War. According to Cunha Leal, Gomes da Costas financial problems had made him an attractive stooge for the real promoters of the coup – Raul Esteves, Sinel de Cordes and Filomeno da Câmara – known monarchists who had been implicated in the attempted coup of April 18 the previous year, and who were anxious to keep their involvement hidden lest they alienate potential republican support for the uprising.5 Once the Democratic Party had been ousted, Gomes da Costa could quickly be replaced in favour of a more sympathetic and malleable figure. Obviously the success of this plan, which was relayed via intermediaries, was dependent on their being able to convince Gomes da Costa to accept it. It also presupposed that there was sufficient republican support for the overthrow of the Democrats, and that these republican factions that did adhere to the revolt would be sufficiently divided amongst themselves that they would be unable to oppose the monarchists.

6This hidden leadership could only develop a minimalist program that justified their actions in moral terms – the single and deliberately vague idea of national regeneration. It was only by presenting their case in as little detail as possible that the revolutionaries could hope to garner republican support and offer themselves as the definitive response to those questions that had been raised from virtually all points of the Portuguese political spectrum.

  • 6 Ramos, “O fim da República,” 1060-9.
  • 7 Alan Wolfe, The limits of legitimacy: political contradictions of contemporary capitalism (New York (...)

7The very heterogeneity of the forces that carne together to effect the uprising serves to emphasize the extent of discontent within Portuguese society, allowing us to conclude that there was indeed a large degree of popular support for the coup (or coups). For several years, many groups within Portuguese political society had railed against the Democratic Party’s hegemonic grip on the State, and its insistence in viewing any criticism of the Party as an attack on both the Republic and the very concept of democracy itself. Following the establishment of the “New Old Republic” in 1919, the Democratic Party’s ideological presupposition was that it, and it alone, was capable of defending the Republic, a task that could only be achieved through the “republicanization” of society. That this was not a new idea within Democratic Party circles has been demonstrated at some length by Ramos, and serves to explain many of the events prior to the Sidonista interregnum of 1918 – particularly the creation of two new republican parties soon after the 1910 revolution, and the limitation of the franchise in 1913.6 However, the failure of the Democratic Republic to legitimize itself prior to 1919, and the changed international economic, social and political climate after the end of the First World War, resulted in a new and largely unforeseen set of parameters coming into play that were to limit the Democratic Party’s ability to suffocate the opposition before it became a genuine threat to its hegemony. In effect, the Democratic Party had to learn the lesson that the war “had brought the last days of the liberal world even closer,” and that “the casualty of this war was not truth but liberalism”.7

  • 8 Sigmund Neumann, Permanent revolution: totalitarianism in the age of international civil war (Londo (...)
  • 9 For more on these terms, see David Apter, The politics of modernization (Chicago: University of Chi (...)

8The epochal nature of the rupture in attitudes during the post-war era created a generalized, pan-European, social and political phenomenon in which “unpredictable perpetual motion took possession of a young generation”.8 This instability affected almost every aspect of Portuguese society, infiltrated the military and the governmental institutions, and made itself acutely felt within political society as a whole. Yet this “perpetual motion” must have had at its root some origins within existing society: the changes that took place simply exacerbated pre-existing divisions – whether perceived or real. It would be wrong to assume that the disorder that was typical of the “New Old Republic” was merely a result of the upheavals of war and the failure of the Democratic Party to appreciate the changed parameters under which it would have to impose its solution to the “regime question.” There must have been a ready audience, waiting for an opportunity to effect its own Solutions in the absence of any real opportunities to defeat the Democrats’ by peaceful democratic means (i.e. rotation of political power by means of elections). Instead, the changes that were taking place gave courage to those who opposed the Democrats’ hegemonic control of the State, and acted as a catalyst for the expression of a new and more strident opposition that was now willing to exacerbate the societal ruptures that had always existed, but which had been brought into full view after the war. It was as if a veil had been tom away, revealing the naked ambition and blind arrogance of a Democratic Party that was determined, at all costs, to retain its self-appointed position as guardian of the republican way of life regardless of public attitudes. Having failed to convince the people of the benefits to be accrued through accepting their materialist message, the Democratic Party politicians became ever more remote from those they governed. Their continued dominance of the State was increasingly regarded as an abuse of the “social contract,” designed specifically to exclude those who did not subscribe to their “secular-liberal” model of society.9

9The distinction between the idea of Neumanns “perpetual motion” as a culprit and as a catalyst becomes much clearer when one examines the actual nature of the post-war conflicts: these were less concerned with the actual operation and mechanics of government than they were with advancement of proposed alternatives to the Democratic Party and ideological Solutions to what had become known as the “regime question.” In seeking to show what was wrong with Portuguese society, the increasingly frustrated opposition highlighted the Democratic Party’s failures: the poor State of the economy; capital flight; the collapse in the value of the escudo; the absence of workers’ rights; political inefficiency and incompetence that verged on the corrupt; intolerance of opposition; the promotion of policies that neglected rural areas; the refusal to deal with corporate grievances within the armed forces, and so on.

10However, not one of these reasons was considered sufficient justification for the oppositions attack on the Democrats, rather, they were employed as weapons in a propaganda war, the goal of which was not so much to effect any radical programmatic policy alternatives as they were intended to increase public resentment against the Democrats. That is to say, they were descriptive and negative, as opposed to prescriptive and positive. There was no real need or desire on the part of the various opposition factions to solve the problems that were affecting the nation. All the problems could be reduced to just one: the “regime question”. Within a system that had deliberately been manipulated to minimize any meaningful popular involvement in the political process, the opposition factions preferred – whether they were republican or monarchist – to pursue populist measures that would involve those elements of society that had been shut out by the Democrats. In effect, Portuguese politics had become a struggle for the ideological control of the State, and those groups that were prevented from exerting any direct authority, and excluded from exercising any political power, became a focus for dissent against the political system as it functioned – once this control was achieved, that is, when the “regime question” had been dealt with, then the other problems would be child’s play. Given the absence of any real possibility of obtaining control via the electoral mechanism, it was in the oppositions interest to promote social disorder, as the blame for the lack of social peace would rest with the government, and this could only further aid the oppositions cause. The longer the disorder continued, and the more entrenched the Democratic Party became, the more likely it was that their downfall would be by violent and unconstitutional means.

11The armed forces, and the army in particular, were increasingly perceived to be a suitable vehicle for carrying the oppositions plans forward. After all, if a regime that had been created by the sword was going to have to die by it, then who better than men with swords to do it. A ready audience could be found within a military institution that was suffering its own corporate crises.

  • 10 José Medeiros Ferreira, O comportamento político dos militares: forças armadas e regimes políticos (...)

12Of greatest concern to the officer corps was the introduction of the Militia Law on November 23, 1921, which increased the number of conscript officers in the regular armed forces and led to the creation of Military Juntas throughout the country as the professional officer corps sought to protect their career paths.10

  • 11 José Pacheco Pereira, A preparação ideológica da intervenção militar de 28 de Maio de 1926 (Oporto: (...)

13However, a much more general concern was the low pay that forced officers to seek alternative means of subsistence that was “imposing upon [them]... the need to intervene to end the purgatory that consumes [them]”:11

  • 12 Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, História de Portugal, Vol. XI: a Primeira República (19101926), história (...)

...the conditions in which the armed forces had lived since the end of the First World War were hard and humiliating, without having sufficient money at their disposal to dignify their military career... with their salaries having failed to keep pace with the cost of living... their only alternative was to seek secondary employment.12

  • 13 See José Norton, Norton de Matos: biografia (Lisbon: Bertrand, 2002).
  • 14 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 21.
  • 15 It is worthwhile inserting a comment here on the political affiliadons of the main characters invol (...)

14The extent of this problem can be illustrated by the case of General Norton de Matos who, despite being a leading member of the Democratic Party, continually experienced financial difficulties when forced to live solely off of his army salary alone.13 It is perhaps unsurprising that Gomes da Costa is believed to also have been in debt.14 The blame for this situation was laid at the door of the Democratic Party – as much by discontented officers as by opposition politicians. Rather than seeking solace in their own company, however, officers sought avenues through which they could directly influence the business of the Republic. One consequence of this reaction can be seen in the political arena, where many officers became actively involved in political affairs. Many of those who carne to prominence during the Dictatorship cut their political teeth as members or supporters of one or other First Republican party faction.15

  • 16 Ramos, “O fim da República”.
  • 17 It had been long argued that what Portugal needed to obtain some semblance of social and political (...)

15While there is little doubt that the corporate crises within the armed forces was an important factor in the continued disarticulation of the Portuguese political system during the post-war Republic, we have shown that this was both a cause and a symptom of the much more generalized crisis – that is, it was not a sufficient condition for the success of the coup. What was clearly happening was the final rupture between the Democratic Party and its representational and mediatory function as the hegemonic State power. Quite consciously, as Ramos has shown,16 the Democratic Party detached itself from civil society and ceased any pretence at defending clearly delineated mobilizational policies that could lead to the creation of a relatively strong republican alternative with which it could peacefully share power.17

  • 18 See Wolfe, The limits of legitimacy, 305-9.

16The implicit promise of the early Republic – its “pact with the nation” – was to broaden the political base by incorporating new elements into the political system. Within this novel milieu, the republicans and – more importantly – the majority Democrats, were invested with the expectations of these new popular forces that the 1910 revolution had unleashed. Once in power, however, the newly installed politicians moved quickly to quell those forces that had raised them. This new political elite had two over-riding goals that, whilst not necessarily contradictory in themselves, were nevertheless fraught with inconsistencies. The initial impetus was to consolidate the Republic, a task that could only be achieved by rewarding its supporters and punishing its opponents, whilst simultaneously minimizing the opposition of a nation whose republicanism ranged from “sullenly acquiescent” to “outright hostile.” Running parallel with this was the Democrats’ need to ensure its own long-term ascendancy and eventual hegemony, giving it time and space to “republicanize” Portugal. The former required that they tackle matters such as the distribution of sovereign powers, while the latter demanded that questions of administrative implementation be addressed. However, as Wolfe has noted, the distributive question involves continuing politicization and popular integration through, for example, the inclusion of previously excluded sections of society by the promotion of ideologically oriented goals (such as anti-clericalism, etc.), while the implementation of a successful administrative solution requires the pursuit of exclusionary goals that facilitate the continued support of important elite elements.18

  • 19 Ramos, “O fim da República,” 1061.
  • 20 Claus Offe, “Political authority and class structures,” in P. Cameron (ed.), Critical sociology (Lo (...)

17The inability – or unwillingness – of the Democrats to implement the former in order to pursue the latter led, inevitably, to the internal disarticulation of the Democratic Party itself and its fragmentation into a number of personalist factions that were united by their desire to exclude others outwith the party from sharing power. This goal was pursued with gusto, driven by the Party’s belief that only it had “the ability to execute the program that would produce a nation of intelligent and well intentioned people”19 and expel from the consciousness of its members as voters those opposing social interests that it had been its original purpose to articulate and present to the public at large.20

18In the end, almost all political forces felt themselves either betrayed (in the case of the republican opposition) or vindicated (in the case of the monarchists) by the manner in which the system functioned, and did not, therefore, feel constrained by any residual loyalties or by any remaining doubts to make any attempts to maintain it, if by so doing they would be surrendering the State to the Democrats.

  • 21 Raul Proença, Obra política, Vol.4, (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1975), 25.

19All forces opposed to the Democratic Party had their “magic formula, their doctrine of salvation”: government by technocrats, corporatism, presidentialism, and rotativismo. “They were always outspoken against dictatorship, against the revolutions – but only against the others dictatorship and the others revolutions. There was almost no one who did not have their dictatorship – painfully deep in their heart: waiting for the opportune moment”.21 However, cometh the moment, cometh the heroic remedy:

  • 22 Proença, Obra política, 31-2.

The most obvious solution, that which had the merit of rousing the greatest number of adherents and sympathizers, the abolition – pure and simple – of parliament... the majority had decided that it was no longer worth the effort to preserve it... By the end of 1925, everyone was prepared to swallow the need for a dictatorship. Everyone was resigned to it because there were no democrats left.22

20Despite the best efforts of Proença and his small group of followers to present the “regime problem” in political terms, the Democratic Partys arrogance and intransigence had transformed it into a moral problem of “good versus evil.” It had transcended mere politics – the combined actions of the Democrats and the opposition had effectively seen to that – to become a matter for millenarian and sebastianist Solutions. The country was looking for a “saviour” who would rid it of the “evil” politicians and lead it to a new “golden age”.

  • 23 For example, see Richard Robinson, Contemporary Portugal: a history (London: George Allen & Unwin, (...)

21This was the context in which the Military Dictatorship was conceived and executed. The lines were drawn, and all “good Portuguese” knew whose side they needed to be on – the side of “order” and “social peace.” Gomes da Costa, like the heroic leading man in a Hollywood western, was at the head of the Seventh Cavalry, leading them into battle against the heathen natives. This was the necessary portrayal, for in the battle of good versus evil, good will only prevail in the presence of good men – and Gomes da Costa, unlike the real leaders of the coup, was a good man, the epic war hero who represented “the will of the nation [from whence] national salvation would come” and who could “re-establish public order” thus “save the Republic” and “regenerate the nation.” The fact that the forces behind the coup “lacked any preconceived program” was irrelevant, for such “programs” are political matters – they are shades of gray that have no place in a moral crusade in which the battle lines are drawn in black and white.23

22As Cunha Leal was to point out in language remarkably similar to that used by Proença:

  • 24 Francisco Cunha Leal, A aspiração de um Portugal maior: para onde vamos? (Lisbon: Formoso, 1926), 4 (...)

The victory of the revolution was achieved without combat, because the Democratic Party... had no one to defend it. It had created a vacuum around itself, and the hour of its defeat became the hour of its atonement, with neither glory nor greatness.24

  • 25 See letter dated June 2, 1926 in Bourne and Watt, British documents, Document 146.
  • 26 The Times (June 19, 1926).
  • 27 Proença, Obra política, 89-91.

23Whilst many people saw behind this urban legend, not least the real leaders of the coup, there can be little doubt that Gomes da Costa himself believed it, as can be seen through his use of millenarian language in his public pronouncements: “The movement[‘s]... objectives are to purify the administration... [and] take care that it is not used by politicians to advance their own particular interests”;25 in his determination to march on Lisbon – leading his host of good Portuguese men into the heart of evil; and in his brusque treatment of Cabeçadas whom he accused of countenancing “influences hostile to the revolutionary movement”.26 Cabeçadas’ crime: “an unforgivable lack of vision, lack of a plan for government, an inconceivable inability to prepare the resistance... Leader in name only, he was never more than a subaltern... The story of his government was, from the very first day, the story of its fall”.27 Cabeçadas had realised too late that he would not be permitted to form a government that included politicians – to make a pact with the Devil. This should have sounded a warning to both the deposed politicians and the republicans within the revolutionary movement alike – there could be no immediate return to constitutional order. Not only was the Democratic Party to be ousted from office, but, in a continuation of the moral battle against them, every aspect of their republic had to be expiated from the national psyche and a new ideology of the State had to be created in its place. The victory of the revolutionary “coalition” in ousting the Democrats and their chosen “liberal” successor was only the first step in this greater conflict which was to divide not only the revolutionaries, but also their “democratic” opponents.

  • 28 ‘Leader of the monarchist and plutocratic military... and secret progenitor of the dictatorial phen (...)
  • 29 See Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 22, 34; A. M. Caldeira, “O partido de Salazar: antecedentes, or (...)
  • 30 Bourne and Watt, British documents, Document 177, (July 12, 1926).

24Gomes da Costa had not been chosen by providence to lead this struggle – he had not obtained his position because of some inherent ability to unite the people against the demagogues. Rather, he had been selected and manipulated by a faction within the movement – Sinel de Cordes,28 Raúl Esteves, Filomeno da Câmara, Martinho Nobre de Melo, Trinidade Coelho and Rolão Preto.29 Gomes da Costas undoing was caused as much by his incompetence in office, as it was by his belief in himself as the “saviour” and his attempt to create a Sidonista-type presidentialist republic. The British Legation stated that he “showed himself to be lacking in the ordinary gifts of government, interfered constantly with the work of his colleagues, accepted the advice of inferior persons and caused general confusion”.30 Raul Proença was less diplomatic:

  • 31 Proença, Obra política, 91-2.

What do we have now?... A movement of national salvation led by a man without any political common-sense, and who is easily led, possessed of the most distressing mental instability and with very unclear attitudes. It is with this that they seek to create the true democracy with which to guide our political life... Our national stupidity knows no limits.31

  • 32 Bourne and Watt, British documents, Document 177, (July 12, 1926).

25Having served his usefulness to those behind the scenes, who were now forced to come into the open and show their colours – forcing other factions to also break cover – Gomes da Costa was removed. However, in one final demonstration of his misunderstanding of the revolutionary movement he had nominally led, Gomes da Costa would not go quietly, refusing to accept the proposal that he remain as executive Prime Minister “without portfolio and without power of appointment” – and thereby jeopardizing the success of the “national revolution”.32

  • 33 Douglas L. Wheeler, A Ditadura Militar portuguesa, 1926-1933, (Mem-Martins: Europa-América, 1986), (...)

26The events that succeeded this initial turmoil are well known – Gomes da Costa was deposed by a military junta that included both Sinel de Cordes and Raúl Esteves, and sent into internal exile on the Azores. He was replaced as Prime Minister by General Óscar Carmona while Sinel de Cordes finally carne out of the shadows to assume control of the nations finances. Carmonas selection was founded on the principal that he was a respected military man with no overt affiliation to any particular faction: “Carmona was the Dictatorship’s safety net – a symbol of authority, political mediator and arbitrator between the military factions... [He] did not arouse any conspicuous populism or a personality cult around his person”.33 In short, he was just the man to secure the “national revolution” from any accusations of “politicking”.

27However, even Carmonas appointment could not end the continuing uncertainty within the regime as the façade of the “national revolution” began to show signs of fragmentation – and nor could it placate the politicians that had been deposed. Divisions, both within the army and civil society, were now evident between those who wanted to see some movement towards the creation of a strong military government with a view to the possible creation of an integralist constitutional monarchy, and those who sought rapid progress towards the creation of a nationalist republic. Both of these forces were strongly represented within Carmonas cabinet, and broke to the surface on a number of occasions.

  • 34 Francisco Cunha Leal, A obra financeira e económica da Ditadura portuguesa (La Coruña: Moret, 1932) (...)

28During the autumn and winter of 1926-27, Sinel de Cordes attempted to perform the first act of “salvation” by resolving the country’s dire financial and economic situation. Sinels policy was simple: “to stimulate the economic activity of the country, in the certainty that the increase in production will result in a corresponding increase in taxable profits”34 – in other words, he intended to spend his way out of the crisis, and would use existing credit facilities and new borrowing to enable him to do so. Looking after those who had backed the coup, Sinel increased military pay and began a program of rearmament that saw total military expenditure increase by anywhere between 114 and 138 million escudos, depending upon whose figures you choose to believe (see Table 1).

Table I. Comparison of 1925-26 and 1926-27 budgets: estimates by Salazar and Cunha Leal (contos)

Table I. Comparison of 1925-26 and 1926-27 budgets: estimates by Salazar and Cunha Leal (contos)

Sources: Francisco Cunha Leal, A obra intangível do Dr Oliveira Salazar (Lisbon: 0 Auctor, 1930), 23, 28, 36-7; António de Oliveira
Salazar,
Novidadas (November 30-December 24, 1927).
(a) Salazar’s figures show only money received during the financial year.
(b) Cunha Leal claims that the military costs of the February uprisings in Oporto and Lisbon were paid from the Ministry of Finance’s budget (1926-27), while those incurred in putting down the 18 April 1925 uprising were included in the Ministry of War’s budget (1925-26).

  • 35 See Cunha Leal, A obra financeira, 41-50; Rosas, A história de Portugal, 170; Wheeler, A Ditadura M (...)

29A financial policy was introduced that “favoured the plutocratic elite” through which the Caixa Geral de Depósitos was instructed to lend money to private individuals and companies without receiving any guarantees in return.35 The result of this was that money was often given to insolvent enterprises, and used solely to pay off creditors prior to bankruptcy, with the State having to repay the outstanding debt to the bank. Sinel, however, did not seem too perturbed, and announced his intention to seek a £12 million overseas loan, which would then be used for:

  • 36 Sinel de Cordes, Novidades (December 20, 1927). See also António José Telo, “Salazar e a ditadura f (...)

...definite and taxable ends: currency stabilization; discharging the external floating debt; payment of budget deficits and the attainment of a balanced budget within two to three years; and the economic development of the country.36

  • 37 The Times, (February 4-28, 1927), especially “The revolt in Portugal,” (February 12, 1927). See als (...)
  • 38 The Times, (June 4, 22 and 23, 1927).

30In the meantime, the opposition to the Dictatorship decided to act against it, with several military units staging an uprising in Oporto on February 3, 1927 and in Lisbon six days later.37 The Dictatorship was caught in two minds how to proceed after the successful suppression of these uprisings by the Minister of War, Colonel Abílio Passos e Sousa. On the one hand, a special tribunal, the Serviço de Investigação para o Apuramento das Responsibilidades, was established under Colonel Schiappa de Azevedo, which was charged with bringing the rebels to justice. All rebel units were disbanded, as were the Ninth Hussars; however, only 81 rebels were brought to trial, with a further 176 being deported to the Azores and Africa.38 On the other hand, after personally leading government forces against the rebels, Passos e Sousa – who had maintained links with Cunha Leal – issued a call for a rapid return to constitutional normality – albeit one that had been “morally corrected.” Within a relatively short space of time, many leading “respectable” politicians accepted this “Political Pact” – viewing it as a way to end the Dictatorship sooner rather than later through the creation of a directed democracy with two political parties licensed by the military. However, many of the Dictatorship’s supporters viewed this as a betrayal of just about everything the national revolution stood for, and feared the immanent return of the politicians to power – leading to increasingly strident condemnations of all republicans, and setting the scene for a conflict within the Dictatorship between Sinel de Cordes and Passos e Sousa.

  • 39 The founding members of this organisation were Afonso Costa, Filemon de Almeida, Prestes Salgueiro, (...)
  • 40 Clímaco, “A emigração,” 22.
  • 41 Clímaco, “A emigração,” 23.

31Moreover, the Republican Defence League (Liga de Paris) – an organisation of exiled politicians who had broken with the Democratic Party in 1923 and intellectuals led by Afonso Costa39 – opposed any compromise with the Dictatorship – and particularly one that would result in the Democratic Party being restored to a dominant position and thereby end any hopes of “introducing reforms that would enhance social harmony” in a restored democracy.40 Consequently, they refused to join with their “fellow liberais” of Cunha Leais União Liberal Republicana, Júlio Dantas’ Partido Nacional, the majority of the Democratic Party, and a substantial part of the conservative republicans within the army, arguing that any “pact” with the Dictatorship would represent little more than the surrender of liberal principles and a return to the Democratic Party dictatorship. One important consequence of this difference of opinion within the opposition was the Democratic Party’s subsequent refusal to adhere to the Paris League, undermining this latter’s desire to be “a united opposition movement, above parties and political groups, with the aim of uniting all opposition republicans and independent exiles in a single movement”.41 Moreover, the split within the opposition movement provided a propaganda boost for supporters of the national revolution – just a leopard cannot change its spots, the politicians would always place their own interests above those of the nation.

  • 42 Caldeira, “O partido de Salazar,” 950-1.
  • 43 See Madureira, Antecedentes imediatos, 65-7; Braga da Cruz, O partido e o estado, 3941; The Times, (...)

32By mid-summer 1927, there were rumours that Sinel de Cordes, his monarchist supporters, led by Filomeno da Câmara, and tenentista allies, led by Vicente de Freitas, were planning a coup against the supporters of the by now moribund Political Pact. With the Pact effectively dead in the water, Passos e Sousa – with Carmonas tacit support – set about the creation of a “grand conservative party that would include members of [Júlio Dantas’] Nationalist Party, and attract those who presently find themselves within one of the monarchist groups”.42 On August 11, Passos e Sousa was appointed deputy Prime Minister in an apparent attempt to secure the ascendancy of the mainly pro-Pact conservative republicans. However, the following day an attempt was made to publish a proclamation dismissing the existing government and naming Filomeno da Câmara as sole dictator. At almost the same time, three junior officers interrupted a meeting of the cabinet to present Sinel de Cordes with a let ter accusing him of incompetence and corruption. While the Dictatorship was apparently self-destructing, the democratic opposition did nothing.43

33Sousa’s ascendancy was brought to an abrupt halt with these events, and the political pact with the Democrats was abandoned in favour of the creation of a commission charged with securing an independent political settlement. In the meantime, however, the financial situation, under Sinel de Cordes’ stewardship was lurching from bad to worse. The only viable solution, at least in the Minister of Finances mind, was to secure the £12 million loan, and now that any negotiated settlement with the politicians seemed to have been ruled out, securing this money would enhance his reputation and go some way towards consolidating the Dictatorship on his terms.

  • 44 António de Oliveira Salazar, Novidades, (January 3, 1928).

34While Britain did not refuse to lend Portugal the money, it did, however, advise the Dictatorship to approach the League of Nations’ Finance Committee instead. Opinions concerning the nature of Portugal’s application were divided both within the Dictatorship and the opposition. The conservative republican faction, now with Vicente de Freitas and Ivens Ferraz at its head, remained to be convinced – fearing that it would result in the end of all hope of even a “guided” democracy. Support for their position was to come from an unlikely source in the shape of António Salazar who had, during December 1927, published a series of articles in the Catholic newspaper, Novidades, that were highly critical of Sinel de Cordes’ management of the nation’s finances. During January 1928, Salazar attacked Sinel de Cordes’ attempts to secure a loan: a balanced budget, he argued, is a necessary condition for any loan to guarantee currency stability and economic resurgence, whilst redemption of the floating debt would cost £2 million and the payment of subsidies to the colonies and balancing the budget would cost a further £10 million over two years – this would leave no money for economic development:44

  • 45 António de Oliveira Salazar, Novidades, (January 14, 1928).

We must never forget that neither private individuals nor States can live off credit indefinitely... With a budget that is permanently in deficit..., whether or not there is an economic crisis, it seems that no stabilization process will survive longer than the time it takes to spend the money.45

  • 46 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 137-8.
  • 47 Novidades, (January 24, 1928).

35For Salazar and all of the other opponents of the loan, Sinel’s policy was motivated by a political desire to secure his position as the “saviour of the national revolution,” and not by any more “moral” motive. The League of Paris had denounced the loan in a letter dated June 9, 1927 to all countries with diplomatic representation in Portugal in which they stated their opinion that only Parliament had the constitutional authority to borrow money in the name of the Portuguese State, warning that they would not feel obliged to honour any such illegal agreements upon their return to power.46 This position was restated in a letter published in the press in late January 1928.47 However, even when the democratic opposition was able to agree on a point of general principal, in this case over their opposition to the loan, they remained bitterly divided over tactics. The League of Paris’s actions were condemned by Cunha Leal in an open letter to Carmona dated December 14, 1927:

  • 48 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 139-41. See also Clímaco, “A emigração,” 23-8.

[The União Liberal Republicana] does not wish to be associated with the protest that some of our fellow citizens have made against this government’s actions at the League of Nations. We believe that for Portuguese to prolong the echoes of their differences overseas is damaging, contemptible... humiliating and dangerous.48

  • 49 Clímaco, “A emigração,” 27.

36The Paris League was hoping to force the League of Nations into refuseing the loan on the grounds that the Dictatorship was an illegal government. However, this position was rejected and the League’s Financial Committee, after a brief visit to Portugal, agreed to lend the money – but only once it had received guarantees that the money would be repaid, even if the Dictatorship was overthrown. In order to do this, it required that a League appointed commission be sent to Lisbon to “manage the loan’s guarantees,” which were secured on the profits of the National Tobacco Company.49 These terms were considered unacceptable by the conservative republicans within the Dictatorship, who presented them as an “insult to the nations honour,” whilst privately using them as a means to remove Sinel, thereby seriously undermining the monarchist cause.

37Sinel was not given an opportunity to pursue his policy in Geneva as, apparently, he had fallen ill and was unable to travel. His place was taken by the conservative republican, Ivens Ferraz, who rejected the terms of the loan, and therefore the loan itself, before returning to a hero’s welcome in Lisbon. Sinel never recovered – explicit in his removal from office was condemnation for having allowed the nations finances to be scrutinized and judged by foreign powers – and the Dictatorship embarked on a new path with the conservative republicans within the armed forces and their civilian allies apparently in the ascendancy, now with an elected leader in the form of Carmona.

38The main beneficiary of Carmonas election was Vicente de Freitas, who was appointed Prime Minister on April 16, 1928. De Freitas followed the example set earlier by Cabeçadas, and appointed Salazar to the Ministry of Finance, from where he could put his proposals (outlined in the Novidades articles) into practice. Both Carmona and de Freitas hoped that a more technocratic government would better serve their aim of pursuing the national revolution without the need for politicking, and resolve the crippling financial situation that was exacerbating political activity. Effectively, the appointment of Salazar was an attempt by the Dictatorship to draw a line under the political tumult of its first two years. However, Salazar set conditions upon his acceptance-conditions that were intended to prevent a divided military from interfering with his plans. The military, perhaps anxious to expatiate its guilt, felt that there was no other alternative open to them – Salazar had the expertise and he had the support of the conservative republicans. However, they mistook Salazars intentions when during his acceptance speech he declared:

  • 50 António de Oliveira Salazar, Diário de Notícias, (April 27, 1928).

I know very well what I want and where I am going, but don’t expect me to achieve these objectives in a few short months. Meanwhile, let the country study, let it make observations, let it object and discuss, but also let it obey when the time comes for me to command.50

  • 51 Cristina Faria, As lutas estudantis contra a Ditadura Militar (1926-1932) (Lisbon: Colibri, 1998), (...)
  • 52 Telo, “Salazar e a ditadura financeira,” 52.

39It was easy to mistake this statement as an indication of Salazars determination to prosecute his technical programme, however, as his future actions were to prove, these words represent a clear declaration of his intent to assume complete control of the national revolution, and to impose his political solution on the situation. Within a “few short months” Salazar had made himself indispensable, and gained the confidence of the President through his apparently miraculous success in achieving a balanced budget – without recourse to increased borrowing – by the end of July 1928. The unsuccessful Revolta do Castelo of July 20, served both to highlight the continuing divisions within the opposition – this time between the Paris League and sections of the military loyal to Generals Sousa Dias and Norton de Matos – and strengthen Salazars position as the “guarantor of the nation’s resurgence”.51 Given that this revolt was primarily a military affair, it also served to weaken the position of many of the conservative republicans within the Dictatorship, seriously damaging their position. Vicente de Freitas held on to his position as Prime Minister for another year, but it was becoming increasingly clear that he did not command. By July 1929 he had outlived his usefulness to Salazar, who then engineered a crisis over the rights of Catholics to hold processions without prior authorization from the lay authorities. The cabinet refused to pass the so-called Portaria dos Sinos, and Salazar resigned, forcing the entire cabinet to follow suit. With Salazar refusing to serve under de Freitas in any new government, Carmona appointed Ivens Ferraz to the post. Ferraz’s time in government with Salazar was no happier, and he too fell victim to one of the Minister of Finance’s manoeuvers – this time over Salazars refusal to provide subsidies to Angola, on the pretext that it would “jeopardise the success he had achieved in Portugal”.52 Salazars threat to resign brought a new government, and placed the Minister of Finance in an even stronger position – and pushed his erstwhile supporter and Governor of the Bank of Angola, Cunha Leal, into the Paris League.

40With the gradual removal of the conservative republicans from positions of influence, the democratic opposition was becoming ever more desperate and ever less numerous. The divisions that had hampered their effectiveness in the period 1926-28 had now become insurmountable, with the Paris League believing that only a revolution could end the Dictatorship, and the pro-Pact and republican elements within the military contending that “loyal” opposition was the only way forward:

  • 53 José Mendes R. Norton de Matos, “Mensagem à Grande Dieta do Grão-Mestre da Maçonaria Portuguesa,” m (...)

Before all of the perils that oppose our principles and our ideals, before the tremendous disaster that the victory of the reaction that is now being prepared would represent for the nation, it is our duty – one from which we cannot flee – to employ all peaceful and dignified means to protect the country from all the calamities that now threaten it.53

41Norton de Matos’ use of the phrase “all the calamities” is important, as it is used to include the threat emanating from the Paris League as much as from the Dictatorship. The final blow against any hopes of reaching an accommodation with the regime was struck with the outbreak of the Madeira Revolt in April 1931. Salazar, whose interest in allowing men such as Norton de Matos to organize a movement that would be a threat to his position was probably minimal, was given an opportunity to act against those within the Dictatorship who favoured such an accommodation and consolidate his position by removing all “disloyal” elements.

Conclusion

42The Portuguese First Republic suffered a slow and lingering death, one that began almost with its inception. The new republican elite, in its drive to “republicanize” Portuguese society, simply alienated a large proportion of society from them. The extent of the Democratic Party’s anti-clericalism and its mistrust of the rural population and the urban working classes – which resulted in the maintenance of property and literacy barriers to the franchise – may have seemed to them to be necessary evils to prevent the return of the monarchists, but they did little to engender a sense of unity. The stark truth was that the republic had simply replaced one small and self-interested elite with another no less self-interested elite.

43The surprising thing is not so much that the “liberal” regime collapsed then, but rather how it managed to survive for so long. The “winds of change” that blew through Europe after the end of the First World War may help explain the more tempestuous nature of the “New Old Republic” that succeeded the Sidonista interlude. However, it is important not to overplay this, for although there can be little doubt that the Bolshevik threat did play on the minds of Portugal’s social and political elites, there is very little evidence that could lead us to conclude that “increasing Bolshevism” was as significant a factor in the nations instability as the words of the politicians and industrialists would have us believe. In any event, neither the Democratic Party nor their opponents were averse to seeking the support of the masses whenever it suited them, only to blame them for the disorder in the next breath. The stark truth was that the majority of Portugals population played only a bit part in the opera that was Portuguese politics: the real battle, that between the Democrats and their opponents, was one that involved only the social elites – it was their squabble over who should lead the government that dominated the republic – the people were of only passing concern.

44It is in this context, then, that we must evaluate the causes and consequences of the collapse of the “liberal” republic and the advent of the Military Dictatorship. On the one hand, the Democrats claimed that they had a duty to pursue their dictatorial methods in order to educate the Portuguese people into being “good republicans” – following which they could, perhaps, be trusted with having some limited say in choosing their leaders. On the other hand, the Democrats’ opponents argued that it was Democratic demagoguery that was responsible for all of the ills that had befallen Portuguese society, and who then made appeals to this society for its support in a moral crusade to “renew” the nation. Both sides appealled to the people, without actually caring what the people thought.

45There can be little doubt that there was some popular support for the overthrow of the Democrats, yet only a few years earlier there was popular support for those who sought the overthrow of the Sidonista regime – a regime that in its own turn had emerged victorious in 1917 as a result of the support of “popular elements.” It is fairer to say, however, that the vast majority of the Portuguese people didn’t really care, and remained absolutely uninvolved in any political manoeuvres by any faction. The idea that the conflict was one of “good versus evil” was purely for the consumption of the small and politically important social elites-propaganda more than programme.

46The early promise of the “national unity” that was promoted by the revolutionaries was soon seen for what it really was – a propaganda weapon that was designed to give them the appearance of popular legitimacy. Soon after the victory of the “national revolutionaries,” the old factions reared their heads once more – proof, if ever it was needed, that the competing elite factions were simply seeking to impose their rule in order to advance their own self-interests. Once they had achieved their victory the old game was on again over who could take control of the ashes, and once again, the opinion of the people mattered little – they were never asked what they wanted, quite simply because the military chiefs and their various factions never trusted them to give the answer that they were required to give in order to justify their claims to govern.

47As with the supporters of the Military Dictatorship, so too with their opponents: many recent studies have highlighted the inability of the various factions to form a durable alliance – whether in the name of the people or in the name of the Republic. Petty political factionalism ruled the day and ultimately proved fatal to their cause.

48The elitism and factionalism of the “liberal” politicians, of the army, of the monarchists, of the industrialists and of the landowners – the only people whose attitudes really mattered on the political battlefield – and their complete disdain for the people (who were, in any event, disinterested) created a situation whereby one such as Salazar could appear. Salazar, as well as being a competent Minister of Finance, was the consummate politician, capable of beating the republicans, monarchists and military at their own game, and appearing to be the “chosen one” of each of these elite groups in turn. His ultimate success was in making everyone believe that he was on their side, that he was their champion, gaining their confidence and stripping their power from them.

49The “slow death” of the First Republic? The Republic was practically stillborn, yet everyone was convinced that they could breath some life into it – the ultimate question was: who would the “saviour” be that could perform this miracle? Many tried, and all failed. The Military Dictatorship, born of confused motives, and killed by its own internal contradictions and ultimate failure was a transition. It was a moment in time when the political elites were forced to accept the fact that the baby was dead, and that a new solution was required. As for the Portuguese people: Salazar made appeals to them, but never consulted them in any meaningful way. Democratic complaints that he did not have the peoples support were easily dismissed – for they never had the peoples support either. Yet Salazar’s greatest advantage over his detractors was that he did not pretend to seek support from the people, and nor did he seek to “educate” them. He simply wanted to command.

Notes

1 Rui Ramos, “O fim da República”, Análise Social, 34 (153) (2000): 1059-82.

2 Francisco Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, Vol. III: arrastado pela furia do tufão. De 28 de Maio de 1926a 4 de Dezembro de 1930 (Lisbon: Edição do Autor, 1968), 25.

3 Jacques Georgel, O Salazarismo (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1985), 26-7.

4 See Manuel Braga da Cruz, O partido e o estado no Salazarismo (Lisbon: Presença, 1988), 39.

5 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias..., 21.

6 Ramos, “O fim da República,” 1060-9.

7 Alan Wolfe, The limits of legitimacy: political contradictions of contemporary capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 109.

8 Sigmund Neumann, Permanent revolution: totalitarianism in the age of international civil war (London: Pall Mall, 1942), 8.

9 For more on these terms, see David Apter, The politics of modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 33-37.

10 José Medeiros Ferreira, O comportamento político dos militares: forças armadas e regimes políticos em Portugal no século XX, Lisbon: Estampa, 1992), 102-3

11 José Pacheco Pereira, A preparação ideológica da intervenção militar de 28 de Maio de 1926 (Oporto: Afrontamento, 1978), 37.

12 Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, História de Portugal, Vol. XI: a Primeira República (19101926), história política, religiosa, militar e ultramarina (Lisbon: Verbo, 1989), 320-24.

13 See José Norton, Norton de Matos: biografia (Lisbon: Bertrand, 2002).

14 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 21.

15 It is worthwhile inserting a comment here on the political affiliadons of the main characters involved in the events of 28 May 1926. Gomes da Costa had been a member of Lopes de Oliveiras Partido Republicana Liberal, Mendes Cabeçadas had been involved with Cunha Leal s União Liberal Republicana and Óscar Carmona had been a minister in Ginestal Machados short-lived Partido Republicana Nacionalista government of November-December 1923. As an interesting aside, in a confidential report to Austen Chamberlain-the British Foreign Minister – Sir Lancelot Carnegie, then head of the British Legation in Portugal, stated with regard to these three military officers that ‘none of them has been connected in any way with politics’. See the letter from Sir Lancelot Carnegie to Austen Chamberlain, dated June 17, 1926, in K. Bourne and D.C. Watt, British documents on foreign affairsreports and papers from the Foreign Office confidential print. Part LI: from the First to the Second World War, Series F, Europe, 1919-1939 – Portugal, (Washington DC: University Publications of America, 1993), Document 156.

16 Ramos, “O fim da República”.

17 It had been long argued that what Portugal needed to obtain some semblance of social and political stability was a strong conservative republican party. See letter from Sir Lancelot Carnegie to Earl Curzon, dated 16 April 1919, in which Carnegie States that “the need [for a strong conservative party] has long been recognised by those desirous of seeing the government of the country established on sound principles instead of being, as heretofore, at the mercies and rivalries of individual politicians belonging more or less to one political faction.” In Bourne and Watt, British documents, Document 42.

18 See Wolfe, The limits of legitimacy, 305-9.

19 Ramos, “O fim da República,” 1061.

20 Claus Offe, “Political authority and class structures,” in P. Cameron (ed.), Critical sociology (London: n.p., 1976), 397-408.

21 Raul Proença, Obra política, Vol.4, (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1975), 25.

22 Proença, Obra política, 31-2.

23 For example, see Richard Robinson, Contemporary Portugal: a history (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 41; Jorge Campinos, A Ditadura Militar, 1926-1933 (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1975), 39; Arnaldo Madureira, Antecedentes imediatos do Salazarismo (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1997), 11; Ferreira, O comportamento político, 154-5; Yves Léonard, Salazarismo e fascismo (Mem-Martins: Inquérito, 1998), 38; Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and development: the Portuguese experience (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979), 92-3; Braga da Cruz, O partido e o estado, 39.

24 Francisco Cunha Leal, A aspiração de um Portugal maior: para onde vamos? (Lisbon: Formoso, 1926), 41.

25 See letter dated June 2, 1926 in Bourne and Watt, British documents, Document 146.

26 The Times (June 19, 1926).

27 Proença, Obra política, 89-91.

28 ‘Leader of the monarchist and plutocratic military... and secret progenitor of the dictatorial phenomenon.’ See Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 80.

29 See Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 22, 34; A. M. Caldeira, “O partido de Salazar: antecedentes, organização e funções da União Nacional (1926-34),” Análise Social 22 (94) (1985): 944; Yves Léonard, Salazarismo, 35-9; António Costa Pinto, Os Camisas Azuis: ideologia, elites e movimentos fascistas em Portugal, 1914-1945 (Lisbon: Estampa, 1994), 78; Fernando Rosas (ed.), A história de Portugal, Vol.7: o Estado Novo (Lisbon: Estampa, 1994), 152-64.

30 Bourne and Watt, British documents, Document 177, (July 12, 1926).

31 Proença, Obra política, 91-2.

32 Bourne and Watt, British documents, Document 177, (July 12, 1926).

33 Douglas L. Wheeler, A Ditadura Militar portuguesa, 1926-1933, (Mem-Martins: Europa-América, 1986), 17.

34 Francisco Cunha Leal, A obra financeira e económica da Ditadura portuguesa (La Coruña: Moret, 1932), 25-6.

35 See Cunha Leal, A obra financeira, 41-50; Rosas, A história de Portugal, 170; Wheeler, A Ditadura Militar, 22.

36 Sinel de Cordes, Novidades (December 20, 1927). See also António José Telo, “Salazar e a ditadura financeira,” História, Abril (1998): 47.

37 The Times, (February 4-28, 1927), especially “The revolt in Portugal,” (February 12, 1927). See also Madureira, Antecedentes imediatos, 39-46.

38 The Times, (June 4, 22 and 23, 1927).

39 The founding members of this organisation were Afonso Costa, Filemon de Almeida, Prestes Salgueiro, José Domingues dos Santos, Álvaro de Castro, António Sérgio, Aquilino Ribeiro, Américo Buisel, Filipe Mendes, Aires Torres, Oliveiro Pio, Álvaro Poppe, Faria Leal, Oliveira Guerreiro and Renato Boaventura. See Cristina Clímaco “A emigração política portuguesa em França: a fase de Paris, 1927-1931,” História, January-February (1997): 23.

40 Clímaco, “A emigração,” 22.

41 Clímaco, “A emigração,” 23.

42 Caldeira, “O partido de Salazar,” 950-1.

43 See Madureira, Antecedentes imediatos, 65-7; Braga da Cruz, O partido e o estado, 3941; The Times, (August 13 and 15, 1927); Diário de Noticias, (August 13-15, 1927).

44 António de Oliveira Salazar, Novidades, (January 3, 1928).

45 António de Oliveira Salazar, Novidades, (January 14, 1928).

46 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 137-8.

47 Novidades, (January 24, 1928).

48 Cunha Leal, As minhas memórias, 139-41. See also Clímaco, “A emigração,” 23-8.

49 Clímaco, “A emigração,” 27.

50 António de Oliveira Salazar, Diário de Notícias, (April 27, 1928).

51 Cristina Faria, As lutas estudantis contra a Ditadura Militar (1926-1932) (Lisbon: Colibri, 1998), 102-4.

52 Telo, “Salazar e a ditadura financeira,” 52.

53 José Mendes R. Norton de Matos, “Mensagem à Grande Dieta do Grão-Mestre da Maçonaria Portuguesa,” mimeo. (March 1931).

Notes de fin

1 Originally published in the Portuguese Studies Review, 10 (2) (2002): 81-100. Reprinted with permission.

Table des illustrations

Titre Table I. Comparison of 1925-26 and 1926-27 budgets: estimates by Salazar and Cunha Leal (contos)
Légende Sources: Francisco Cunha Leal, A obra intangível do Dr Oliveira Salazar (Lisbon: 0 Auctor, 1930), 23, 28, 36-7; António de OliveiraSalazar, Novidadas (November 30-December 24, 1927).(a) Salazar’s figures show only money received during the financial year.(b) Cunha Leal claims that the military costs of the February uprisings in Oporto and Lisbon were paid from the Ministry of Finance’s budget (1926-27), while those incurred in putting down the 18 April 1925 uprising were included in the Ministry of War’s budget (1925-26).
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Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa (ISCTE)—Lisbon

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