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Diplomacia & Guerra

Fernando Martins


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1The Military and Politics from the Ultimatum to the Republic

2José Miguel Sardica

3During the period from the British Ultimatum of 1890 to the founding of the Republic in 1910, the relationship between members of the military and political power was that of a complex affair involving movements in the shadows and relations of interdependence: while the armed forces regarded politics with indifference, from the standpoint of neutrality, were critical at a distance, or harboured a desire for prompt intervention, politicians regarded the military men with a mixture of fear and hope, while attempting to use each faction or ideological group for their own purposes. This paper examines with the evolution of this relationship, as well as the degree of participation of the armed forces in the events of 5th October, showing how the period from 1890 to 1910, was neither one of civilista Regeneration predominance, nor one of the “militarism” which was typical of other European nations at the end of the century, nor even singularly Portuguese in nature in the immediate post-war period.

4Foreign Policy: from the Ultimatum to the Republic

5Fernando Costa

6The evolution and objectives of Portuguese foreign policy from the British Ultimatum of 1890 to the founding of the Republic in 1910 were centred on two geographically distinct but complementary phenomena.

7The first was the scramble by the great European powers for African territories between 1850 and 1902. The colonial projects of Andrade Corvo and Barros Gomes, the Ultimatum, the Treaty of 1891 with Britain, the Anglo-German agreement of 1898, the Windsor Declaration of 1899 and the consequent involvement of Portugal in the British-Boer War (1899-1902) all have their part to play here.

8From 1902, the centre of attention of Portuguese diplomacy moves to Madeira and the Azores, mainly as a result of the naval and military rivalry between Britain and Germany and the growing importance of the Spain of Afonso XIII in the European context.

9Foreign Policy and Defence Policy: from 5th October to Sidonismo

10Alice Samara

11The aim of this paper is to examine jointly foreign policy and defence policy from the dawning of the new Republic to Portuguese intervention in the first World War and the war crisis, culminating in sidonismo (the government of Sidónio Pais). Special attention is given to the links between these two questions, and our analysis leads to a discussion surrounding the involvement of Portugal in the European theatre.

12The problem for the new regime in securing international recognition and gaining credibility in a Europe which was mainly monarchic and conservative provides the framework for an examination of the question of foreign policy. Once the first of these aims had been achieved though diplomacy, republican politicians soon realised that further obstacles were to be encountered in the conduct of international relations: the various “campaigns” conducted against Portugal.

13One of the most important aims contained in republican propaganda – a balanced budget – having been achieved, by an executive which was thoroughly democratic in nature, it was at a conference in Oporto in 1913 that Afonso Costa first spoke of the “patriotic fight” to which he was to dedicate his energies henceforth. The time had come to resolve the problem of national defence; this was to be the great achievement of the Republic, which would foster “love of the Fatherland”, newly redeemed by the regime. The strategy of Afonso Costa and groups close to him should be analysed not only with reference to domestic policy arguments, which play a decisive role in the entry of Portugal into the war, but also to foreign policy questions.

14An appreciation of foreign policy and defence policy is thus essential for an understanding of the initial period of the Republic.

15Foreign Policy and Defence Policy: from Sidonismo to the Military Dictatorship

16Luís Farinha

17The period following sidonismo (the government of Sidónio Pais) is one of the most dramatic in Portuguese contemporary history. Republican elites demonstrated themselves incapable of resolving within a democratic and parliamentary political framework the problem of economic shortages during the First World War. The fragility of the republican institutional basis led to civil unrest and made economic and financial reconstruction impossible.

18The results deriving from Portugal’s intervention in the First World War and the benefits achieved at the Peace Conference fell short of expectations which had been created. Recognition abroad of the republican regime did not provide the economic, financial and technical means either for the modernisation of the country or, by implication, for the development of the colonies, Portugal’s most important strategic trump card.

19Caught up in a web of social and political instability, the new Republic was forced to pursue a defence policy directed towards the maintenance of civil order, postponing the construction of the African Empire to an uncertain future.

20From International Recognition of the Military Dictatorship to the Estado Novo Foreign Policy Study Points from 1926 to 1933

21Susana Martins

22In contrast with the situation following the founding of the Republic in Portugal, international recognition of the military dictatorship did not pose a problem for those abroad who had filled positions of power. The government instability of the final period of the First Republic together with the international atmosphere of the time produced by a proliferation of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes led to a degree of complicity with regard to recognition of the new Portuguese government on the part of the international community. In any case, this would only have been required had the new Portuguese leaders acted in breach of the constitution, which was not the case; in the event, the recognition of Portuguese diplomats abroad was based on this very argument.

23Neither did the definition of the institutional basis of the regime cause outrage in international circles. The promulgation of the constitution of 1933 was no novelty, but rather the final stage in a long process whose aims were known and accepted.

24The Concordat Policy of Pious XI and Pious XII: The Italian, Portuguese and Spanish Concordats.

25Rita Carvalho

26This paper examines and describes the way in which the papal concordats celebrated in Europe in the inter-war period were a reaction by the papacy to the application of the principle of the separation of Church and State; by applying this instrument of diplomatic and political power to different countries, regardless of the form of regime, the Catholic Church sanctioned the rise of fascism throughout Europe, providing the new fascist regimes with a source of legitimacy and contributing to their stability and durability. While the various concordat agreements were very similarly worded, there is an attempt to gain an understanding of the considerable differences between them, especially those celebrated with the fascist regimes of Salazar and Franco.

27A Quiet Revolution? Foreign Policy from the Spanish Civil War to NATO

28Fernando Martins

29During the approximately fifteen years from the beginning of the Spanish Civil War to the setting up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, international political life underwent the most profound series of changes since the Treaty of Westphalia which brought peace in 1648. The hegemonic system of European States existing up until 1941 disappeared, with consequences for Portuguese foreign policy. Such consequences were also felt by other European powers which reacted in a similar way, by developing and pursuing non-European foreign policy, and by developing and pursuing a foreign policy which aimed at bilateralism to the detriment of multilateralism. It is the story of this “revolution” at the European level which this paper aims to tell at this conference.

30From the Marshall Plan to the Agreement with the EEC

31Francisco Castro

32Underlying the formulation of foreign policy there was always an understanding of that which constituted sovereign national interest and the most suitable strategy for safeguarding it. The dominant idea among political decision-makers of the Estado Novo (New State) held the prime aim of foreign policy to be the preservation and assertion of national independence, in the understanding that sovereign power is could not be submitted to any external power.

33In order to safeguard Portugal’s independence in Europe, the Estado Novo linked this conception to its multi-continental role. This automatically determined the stance of the regime towards movements for economic integration in Europe: any involvement would not be allowed to threaten the position of the State as the sole and indivisible power, at the same time European and African in nature. Portugal therefore sought complementarity between Europe and Africa. This strategy would be consolidated with involvement in EFTA and the attempt to set up the escudo zone, although the latter was abandoned at the beginning of the 1970s, when a free trade agreement was signed with the EEC.

34Portugal Alone’: Portuguese Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 1960s: The Case of the United States

35Luís Nuno Rodrigues

36This paper examines Portuguese foreign policy during the period from 1961 to 1968, that is, from the beginning of the Colonial War in Angola up until the end of the government of Oliveira Salazar. First, an attempt is made to gauge the position of various western countries such as Britain, France, West Germany and Spain with regard to the evolution of Portuguese domestic and overseas policy. Special attention is then given to the case of the United States, whose policy towards Portugal during the period examined provided the theme for this writer’s PhD thesis. Finally, the argument is put forward that the widely expressed view that ‘Portugal stood alone’ in carrying out its foreign policy in the 1960s seems to be mistaken; despite public criticism of its policy by its western allies, Portugal was never abandoned by them and indeed they provided it with essential support. Neither did relations with the United States, despite the trouble which developed in 1961, deteriorate to the point where the survival of the regime or its war effort in the African colonies were jeopardised.

37The Military and Politics during the Estado Novo

38Telmo Faria

39This paper seeks to provide an explanation of the history of the Estado Novo. It deals firstly with the importance of the military spectre, then goes on to describe and explain how the military question was central to the setting up of the regime led by Oliveira Salazar. Finally, Salazar’s political supremacy and long tenure of power as leader of the Estado Novo is shown to depend on an understanding of the relationship between the civil and military spheres of political power.

40The Foreign Policy of Marcelismo: The African Question

41Pedro Oliveira

42This paper presents a synthesis of foreign policy in the marcelista period (1968-74, during which Marcello Caetano was Portuguese prime minister), and concentrates on the African question. In the first part of the paper, the aim is to describe the current bibliography and historical treatment of this theme. There follows an analysis of the “production” of foreign policy during the governments of Marcello Caetano (with a profile of ministers, diplomatic personnel, and “parallel diplomacy”), after which features of continuity and discontinuity with regard to salazarismo are discussed. Finally, there is an examination of the strategies available to the regime for dealing with the impasse caused by the colonial conflict, and an attempt is made to reveal the motives behind Portuguese leaders pursuing certain strategies and disregarding others.

© Publicações do Cidehus, 2001

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