On money, properties and expulsions: Mudejars and Granadan Moriscos in Campo de Calatrava
Comparative insights
Résumés
The Moriscos from Granada suffered serious economic losses after the War of the Alpujarras, with their enforced exile to Castile dispossessing them of their real estate and leaving those who managed to settle in Castile with only a few personal assets for rebuilding their existence.
Forty years later, when Philip III decreed their final expulsion, the Moriscos were again forced to abandon their properties. Once again, their real estate was seized by the Crown, and although they were allowed to retain personal property and money, they had to register and surrender half of the value of these assets before embarking for exile. The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to analyse the strategies followed by Morisco families for integrating into the economic life of Castile and, second, to scrutinise the mechanisms they used to save their patrimony when they were forced to leave.
Después de la guerra de las Alpujarras, los moriscos granadinos sufrieron un grave quebranto económico. El destierro a Castilla les desposeyó de sus bienes raíces de tal manera que los que consiguieron instalarse en Castilla solo poseían unos pocos bienes personales con los que reconstruir su existencia.
Cuarenta años después, cuando Felipe III decretó su definitiva expulsión, los moriscos se vieron nuevamente obligados a abandonar sus bienes. De nuevo, su patrimonio raíz fue incautado por la Corona y aunque pudieron llevar bienes personales y dinero tuvieron que registrar y entregar la mitad de su valor antes de embarcar rumbo al exilio. Este trabajo analiza cuáles fueron las estrategias que las familias moriscas siguieron para integrarse en la vida económica de Castilla. También se analizan cuáles fueron los mecanismos que emplearon para salvar su patrimonio cuando fueron obligados a dejar el territorio hispano.
Entrées d’index
Keywords : Moriscos, Granada, patrimony, expulsion, Hispanic Crown
Palabras claves : Moriscos, Granada, patrimonio, expulsión, Monarquía Hispánica
Note de l’auteur
This research was conducted as part of the Research Project IMPI 2. Antes del orientalismo. Figuras de la alteridad en el Mediterráneo de la Edad Moderna: del enemigo interno a la amenaza turca (Ref.: PID2019‑105070GB‑I00), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.
Texte intégral
Moriscos, Mudejars and privileges in Campo de Calatrava
1In 1625, Philip IV of Spain ordered that the privileges granted by the Catholic kings to the ancient Mudejars (Mudéjares antiguos) from Campo de Calatrava more than a century earlier had to be respected (DOMÍNGUEZ ORTIZ, 1959, 59–60). This royal decision meant endorsement of the request made months before by Diego de Yébenes, an ancient Mudejar from Villarrubia de los Ojos. In his plea to the king, in which he relied on the special treatment that Isabel and Fernando had afforded to his ancestors because of their voluntary conversion to Christianity, Yébenes requested that the expulsion order issued by Philip III in 1610 should be revoked. The king agreed to this request; his decision overrode the expulsion of the descendants of those “privileged Moriscos” who had been regarded as Old Christians since 1502 and meant that any ancient Mudejar could freely return to his town, without fear of being detained by the justice administration. The decision by Philip IV was made in the context of a change in the Hispanic Monarchy’s attitude towards socio‑religious minorities. The scope of that change was enormous, as it represented a reversal of the policy of intolerance that had been pursued by Philip III (DOMÍNGUEZ ORTIZ et al., 1997, 258–260).
2Among the communities benefiting from the repealing of the decree were the Moriscos born in the Cinco Villas [Five Towns] of Campo de Calatrava, a small region in inland Castile, located around two hundred kilometres south of Madrid. During the Middle Ages, the area had been populated by Muslim communities spread over small farmsteads; the spread of these communities had been gradually slowing down since the twelfth century, as the Christian conquest of the Guadiana valley progressively advanced (ALMAGRO VIDAL, 2016). From then on, the Mudejars had adopted an organisational model, the aljama, that was clearly influenced by the presence of the Order of Calatrava, the owner of the land. As well as a basic form of organising those places, the aljama emerged as an institution for encouraging both the internal structure of those communities and their dialogue with Christian powers (ALMAGRO VIDAL, 2018, 12–17). The final years of the fifteenth century then saw the start of a process of demographic and cultural stagnation that favoured both the socio‑economic integration of the aljama communities and the gradual religious assimilation of some of their members. Five communities that stood out in this respect were those of Almagro, Daimiel, Villarrubia de los Ojos, Bolaños, and Aldea del Rey; these communities, known as the Cinco Villas, led the Mudejars’ conversion to Christianity in that area of Castile, with their populations becoming known as the “ancient Moriscos from Campo de Calatrava” or “ancient Mudejars”.1
3These communities were severely damaged during the third and fourth decades of the sixteenth century, when the Inquisition dismantled their ties of internal solidarity (DEDIEU, 1983). Then, after the War of the Alpujarras, Philip II ordered Moriscos from the Kingdom of Granada to be distributed throughout Castile (VINCENT, 1970). The arrival of these “new Moriscos” reactivated the importance of Islamic elements in the region, not only in the Cinco Villas, but also in localities not used to living near the Mudejars. The total of more than two thousand new residents from the south represented a huge increase in the population of Muslim origin living in those quiet Castilian villages (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2009, 33–38; 138–139). The new situation aroused fears among the Old Christians in the area and led to day‑to‑day life becoming tinged with mutual mistrust, but also coexistence and cultural and economic exchanges.
4The installation of the Granadan Moriscos not only generated mistrust among Old Christians, but was also seen as threatening the identity of the ancient Mudejars. Although some of the latter used the arrival of their coreligionists to reaffirm their old beliefs, even the most integrated Mudejars started to be identified with the newcomers in a way that ended up degrading their position vis‑à‑vis the Old Christians and resulted in all the Moriscos in the area being suspected of being bad Christians. This identification was most visibly manifested in the expulsion ordered by Philip III in the early seventeenth century, when, despite their past of collaboration and of being good Christians, and having initially been excluded from the punishment, the ancient Mudejars of Campo de Calatrava were exiled from their villages. However, the tenacity of people such as Diego de Yébenes, the Morisco submitting the request referred to above, shows that many of them did not resign themselves to abiding by the decision that was intended to force them to leave Spain.
5Studies of the extent of ancient Mudejars’ clandestine returns to their places of origin have been undertaken in recent years, with the topic gaining in relevance upon the publication of Trevor J. Dadson’s book on the Moriscos from Villarrubia de los Ojos (DADSON, 2007), one of the Cinco Villas. As this topic has been widely debated, we will not dwell on it again here. It is more interesting, though, to emphasise that those returns were one of the consequences of the legal and juridical battle launched by the ancient Mudejars of Campo de Calatrava in an attempt to avoid being forced into exile. And while their situation was not unique, it had parallels and clear links with the experiences of other coreligionists living in Hornachos (Extremadura) and in the Ricote Valley, in Murcia (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2020).
6There are multiple examples of this “legal resistance” described by Benítez, both individual and collective (BENÍTEZ SÁNCHEZ‑BLANCO, 2013), and its effects are well known: when those mechanisms opposing the expulsion succeeded, the Moriscos were allowed to remain in the territory. What is not clear, however, is whether these victories had any economic effects. This is important to establish: when the Moriscos of Campo de Calatrava took legal action against the Hispanic Monarchy, they were guided not only by love for their “natural homeland” (CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, 1615, II, ch. 54), but clearly also had interests of a chrematistic nature, given that leaving a region, a town or a neighbourhood also implied leaving behind houses, real estate, livestock; in short, leaving behind wealth.
7As a result, the confirmation of the privileges granted to the ancient Mudejars of Campo de Calatrava not only had an important social and political significance, but also implicitly had substantial legal and economic consequences because of paving the way for beneficiaries of the royal order to recover assets they had lost when they had been forced to abandon their homes. Not surprisingly, the papers presented by Yébenes to the Crown contained an extensive account of the real estate lost by him and his family more than ten years earlier. Those documents confirmed that Doña Leonor Manrique de la Cerda had acquired a large portion of the houses and lands that had once belonged to the Moriscos of Villarrubia de los Ojos. Doña Leonor was the aunt‑in‑law of Diego de Silva y Mendoza, himself son of the Princes of Éboli, a confidant of Philip III and consort of the Duchy of Salinas (DADSON, 2011). As such, Mendoza was also Lord of Villarrubia de los Ojos, where the most important Morisco aljama in the Cinco Villas of Campo de Calatrava was located. Don Diego and Doña Leonor had benefited from the generalised purchase of their old vassals’ properties. According to Dadson (2007, 515), those investments were a strategy for preventing the assets of the Mudejars from leaving the Duchy of Salinas and remaining – even if only temporarily – in the hands of the Crown. The acquisition process was completed in 1612, but had two important legal consequences for the property of the expelled Moriscos. The later of these two consequences were the lawsuits initiated by Moriscos in an attempt to recover those assets. This was ultimately achieved between 1620 and 1640, and affected not only the Moriscos of Villarrubia, but also the rest of the aljamas in Campo de Calatrava (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2009, 60).
8The other consequence was the conflict of jurisdiction that the sale of the properties and other possessions of the same Mudejars gave rise to. The protagonists in this clash were the Council of State (in charge of executing the expulsion) and the Council of the Treasury (empowered to sell Morisco properties once the expulsion had been completed). While the Treasury commissioners in charge of selling the expelled individuals’ property defended their jurisdiction over these items, members of the Council of State argued that the properties and possessions of the Mudejars should be excluded, as established in the expulsion decrees (DADSON, 2007, 515–522).
9To fully understand this situation, we have to go back to the expulsion decrees signed by Philip III. The contents of these decrees have been analysed in depth by Benítez Sánchez‑Blanco (2012), who identified similarities – but also important differences – between those decrees affecting the territories of the Crown of Aragon and those codifying the Moriscos’ departure from the rest of the Iberian Peninsula. The expulsion of the Moriscos from Castile was regulated by three edicts. The first of these was the proclamation of 28 December 1609, instructing the Moriscos from Extremadura and Castile to leave the Iberian Peninsula without interference from the authorities. The second was the decree of general expulsion, signed on 10 July 1610. In principle, this affected Moriscos from Granada and the ancient Mudejars as well, although it was relatively easy for the latter to avoid it. These breaches then led to the promulgating of the third order on 11 March 1611, in which the conditions for the Mudejars’ departure were regulated more clearly. The tougher provisions in this new order, which was ratified in May of the same year, considerably restricted the exceptions contemplated and practically pushed the entire community into taking the path of exile. Only those Mudejars who could demonstrate that they did not live in specific neighbourhoods and “were not on any list of payment of specific tributes of the Moriscos” were excluded from the expulsion (BENÍTEZ SÁNCHEZ‑BLANCO, 2012, 211–212). The provisions relating to the exiling of the Moriscos from Castile were completed with the publication of a “clarification” in May 1611 and the separate decrees for “returned and stayed” and “hidden and laggards” that were issued in September 1612 and October 1613, respectively.
10The contents of the expulsion edicts were broad‑ranging. Along with the conditions on which the exile should take place, the safeguarding clauses, and the categories of the excluded, the decrees also regulated what was to be done with the property of those expelled. Benítez Sánchez‑Blanco (2012, 221–223) has shown how the Hispanic Monarchy changed its policy, with the promulgating of norms that started from a common source but were then adapted to the legal conditions in each territory. These differences were also inspired by the differing relevance of the Morisco element in each territory and even by the interests of the lord, which led to much more restrictive norms in the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia. In the case of Castile, too, the norms included a gradation. Whereas the order of December 1609 consented to the free disposition of all property, the decree issued in the summer of 1610 authorised the seizure of the real estate and ordered that, before their departure, the expelled should declare their furniture, livestock, jewellery, and cash and deliver half of the value of these assets to the Royal Treasury (GIL HERRERA, 2010, 47 et seq.).
11These provisions remained in force until the end of the expulsion process and entrusted management of the Moriscos’ exile to the Treasury Council (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2005). They were modified only slightly in the decree of March 1611, which allowed Mudejars who were permitted to remain in the territory to sell their real estate (BENÍTEZ SÁNCHEZ‑BLANCO, 2012, 222), maybe in an attempt to facilitate a faster uprooting and propitiate their final departure.
Granadan Moriscos: between expulsions and seizures
12The Granadan Moriscos’ arrival in Castile took place in a climate of economic uncertainty. The War of the Alpujarras had been tough, with almost three years of conflict seriously depleting the Kingdom of Granada’s wealth. Furthermore, the forced exile decreed by Philip II had pushed thousands of Moriscos into emigration without a clear destination and, more relevantly, without any defined labour and economic support. Studies analysing Granadan settlement in Western Andalusia (ARANDA DONCEL, 1984; FERNÁNDEZ CHAVES et al., 2009; OTERO MONDÉJAR, 2012; PÉREZ GARCÍA et al., 2015) and those focusing on Castile (MAGÁN GARCÍA et al., 1993; GÓMEZ VOZMEDIANO, 2000; MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2009) coincide in showing how the group took years to recover economically and that its productivity did not return to normal until the 1580s and 90s, and so more than a decade after the war.
13Notary protocols represent a very useful source for gaining insight into that reality. Purchases, wills, powers of attorney, and leases are just some of the activities recorded in these sources, the study of which has shed light on daily life in societies of the Old Regime, such as the Moriscos. One of the sources that has provided more information in recent years has been marriage contracts, the study of which has provided highly relevant information about the socio‑economic strategies used by Moriscos when configuring their family assets and the interior of their homes.
Figure 1. Structure of the marriage patrimonies of Moriscos and Old Christians in Almagro (1580–1610)

Source: Archivo Histórico Provincial de Ciudad Real (AHP CR), Secc. Protocolos Notariales, Almagro, various files.
14The pre‑nuptial agreements reflect several significant aspects. First, the scant attention that Granadan Moriscos paid to real estate investments. Although the reasons for this remain to be confirmed, it may be attributable to their economic incapacity and largely motivated by social procrastination. It is true that there were Granadan Moriscos living in Castile and Andalusia who had a high standard of living and where a large part of their wealth relating to commercial activity involved investments in real estate. However, a study of the notarial documents shows that, when participating in the real estate market, the majority of the Moriscos opted for renting rather than purchasing.
15Unfortunately, we do not have any in‑depth studies of the real estate market in rural Castile in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Reliable data would enable us to conduct a proper assessment of whether this situation was due to purely economic circumstances or whether it was also influenced by political and social issues. Whatever the case, the arrival in Castile of more than 70 000 Moriscos from Granada undoubtedly distorted the housing market. And while the impact in rural areas was likely to have been less, the expulsion of 1570–1571 and the resulting higher demand for accommodation will certainly have led to a general increase in housing prices in Castile, especially in cities such as Córdoba, Seville, Ciudad Real, and Toledo, which received large contingents. The increase in the numbers of urban workers and agricultural labourers should also be noted, given the adverse effects of this in the form of lower wages and an increasing gap between real estate prices and the new settlers’ ability to pay. This situation, combined with the dramatic economic situation of those expelled from Granada, explains why the Moriscos played hardly any role in acquisitions of real estate, at least during their initial years in Castile. The course of time, improvements in their economic situation and scarcities in the market because of the economic crisis in the late sixteenth century may have facilitated their access to real estate. But while the sources suggest a greater role in purchase transactions immediately prior to the expulsions of 1609–1614, rental continued to be the preferred option and it was only in the case of the richest Morisco families that investments in real estate were above average.
16A second scenario, however, is also conceivable: a certain economic conservatism on the part of the Moriscos. In this scenario, their low predisposition to owning land related not only to economic factors but was also conditioned by psychological factors. The fear that a new exile would ruin all their accumulated efforts led many Moriscos to divert their investments into savings, either in cash or, above all, in jewellery (see Figure 1). This aspect is relevant, or at least striking, because it reflects the complaints expressed by apologists for the expulsion and by the Cortes of Castile about traditional Morisco greed.2 Of course, this should not be taken as validating the apologists’ arguments, given the exaggerated and self‑interested tone in which these arguments were expressed. On the other hand, however, it may point to an element of truth in some affirmations, reflecting the views of the Old Christian elites, but also popular sentiment, especially among urban groups. A final question then arising is whether the Castilian elites’ fears were justified? And, if so, were they interested in preventing Morisco access to real estate? To the best of our knowledge, there was no political provision preventing Moriscos from freely buying houses and land, but could the market be closed to them unofficially? Is it possible that owners used other form of discrimination and political pressure to make it difficult for Moriscos to access property? Although this is certainly a possibility, it is still a working hypothesis to be confirmed and for which we do not yet have sound answers.
17The low importance of real estate in notarial deeds also validates the structure of a real estate market observed by studying the sales of expelled persons’ properties. Although much work on this subject still has to be undertaken and only a few regions have so far been analysed – almost all of them based on case studies –, the data obtained show two aspects to be considered. First, Morisco owners of real estate were never the majority in their respective towns (MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN, 1983, 416). Second, the structure of the seized properties reflects an initial (and logical) vital aspiration: to have a home of one’s own. The fact that a third of the sales corresponded to urban goods, and that more than 90% of these goods were houses, can indicate only one thing: that, wherever possible, Morisco owners opted for direct tenure to live and for renting to survive. And although there are examples of well‑to‑do individuals and families, including Moriscos, who owned not only several farms in the countryside, but also various urban properties, the most common situation, at least in Campo de Calatrava, was that of an owner who, at the time of expulsion, owned at best a house and one or two small plots, generally for dry farming (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2009, 501–511).
18Lastly, protocols also confirm the importance of movable property in the haciendas of Granadan Moriscos, as indicated by the data in Figure 1. These data are supplemented by the reports mentioning the items that people from Granada took with them into exile (LOMAS CORTÉS, 2010). It is also important to consider the stratagems deployed to avoid the Crown’s registers and safeguard the jewels the Moriscos treasured and the cash they had saved (BERNABÉ PONS et al., 2014, 221–227). While the Castilian Moriscos used the Portuguese judeoconversos to escape, via France, and protect their money and jewels (CARRASCO GÓMEZ, 1997, 1099–1104; BERNABÉ PONS, 2008, 309–314), the Granadan Moriscos used their commercial networks in Spain and abroad to save as much of their heritage as possible. Moriscos from Granada seem to have established a nucleus of merchants in the south of France who were able to handle transfers of huge amounts of “Spanish” money to North Africa and Turkey (BERNABÉ PONS, 2008, 323–326).
19In some cases, we know that the sums of money that individuals or families managed to transfer to North Africa or Turkey were really high. In the Estienne affair, for example, in which the captain of a French ship stole money from the Moriscos that he was transporting, the latter claimed before the French consulate the sum of 100 000 ducats that they had been carrying (EPALZA FERRER, 1969; CARDAILLAC, 1973). Meanwhile, thanks to the capital he was able to take with him, the Morisco Diego/Mustafa de Cárdenas, head of the Morisco community in Tunisia, soon became a large landowner and slaveholder there, to the point of arousing the suspicions of the authorities. Another representative of the Tunisian Moriscos, Luis Zapata, was intercepted by the Spanish authorities when he was sailing from Tunisia to France to recover the heritage that he had stored there (BERNABÉ PONS, 2008, 317–318).
20These events, which must undoubtedly be considered only examples of a much broader and more complex phenomenon, raise a question concerning Andalusian and Mudejar/Morisco exile in North Africa, and specifically the fact that while wide‑ranging consensus exists on attributing the development of many techniques and knowledge in the Maghreb to this emigration, as well as the appearance of certain spiritual and social traits, very little has been written about the role that the new capital brought by immigrants could play in the host societies in the Maghreb. Indeed, while we know that various groups of Moriscos established mortmain properties (hubous) for the well‑being of their communities, and that other Moriscos contributed economically to public works in Algiers or Tunis, we still do not generally know how this monetary wealth imported from the Iberian Peninsula was inserted into the economic systems of North Africa and how it contributed to the growth of Maghreb societies, beyond benefiting their Mudejar/Morisco owners.
21The process by which the Moriscos dealt with their heritage has been studied for some towns in Castile. From notarial documentation, we know that many Moriscos from Granada made use of the little “advantage” that the authorisation published in 1609 meant for them in allowing them to freely dispose of their real estate and other property. While individual situations were very varied, we can generally see three main types of contracts. First, there were sales, which did not generally involve any problems and enabled a quick and almost immediate change in ownership in certain towns. Second, there were transfers, which were somewhat more complex. These contracts did not always relate to real estate. Indeed, the most common transaction involved rural plots yielding harvests and crops; in other words, transferring only the contents of a plot of land, and not the plot itself. Despite their apparent complexity, these contracts were quite common, mainly because, as mentioned earlier, Granadan Moriscos were generally tenants rather than owners. The existence of this kind of agreement is attested to not only in Campo de Calatrava, but also in other Castilian towns such as El Toboso or Ciudad Real, with dozens of examples (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2009, 397–401; 477–487), or in Pastrana, one of the Éboli towns (GARCÍA LÓPEZ, 2009, 350–352). These agreements only gave rise to problems if the beneficiary of the transfer was a third party and not necessarily the same person as the owner of the plot where the Morisco crop was planted. In these cases of the third type of contract mentioned above, the Morisco had to negotiate not only with the owner – with whom he had to settle payment of the corresponding lease –, but also with the assignee/buyer of his harvest. This type of three‑way contract was a form of agreement used if an expelled Morisco left behind unpaid debts; therefore, it was used not to safeguard assets, but instead to settle and extinguish previous financial commitments.
22However they proceeded, the room for manoeuvre available to the Moriscos expelled from Granada was minimised by their definitive exile, given that the expulsion decree issued in summer 1610 confiscated all their real estate and made it available to the Royal Treasury. In the face of this decision, they then had no option but to obey.
The old Mudejars and their (material) attachment to the land
23Unlike the Granadan Moriscos, the ancient Mudejars had access to certain tools for safeguarding their heritage or at least minimising the economic impact of the expulsion decrees. The first of these was the legal battle, which allowed some of them to be exempt from expulsion and the majority at least to delay their final departure. And while it may seem of minor significance, the months between the order of 1609 and the decree of 1611 provided these individuals with another key protection instrument: time. Taking advantage of this, the Old Mudejars of Campo de Calatrava made haste to sell their goods and on many occasions were able to preserve a significant share of their estates.
24By 1613, life for the inhabitants of Campo de Calatrava had become tense: Pedro de Lizana, who had been governor during the most difficult years of the expulsion, was facing a residency trial3 after his work as the highest representative of the Crown in the region was questioned owing to certain irregularities committed during his mandate. These “excesses” were related to various aspects of Lizana’s government, such as his relationship with the Moriscos and the role that he and his subordinates played in the expulsion, especially in the most difficult years of 1610 and 1611. Specifically, he was accused of having illegally collected amounts in return for registering goods seized from the Moriscos and of forcing exempt individuals to submit to these enquiries, coercing the affected, and even using force. The matter was discovered by chance, but gave rise to a long trial, the contents and vicissitudes of which are well known.4
25To clarify what happened: several testimonies were collected in various locations during the spring of 1613. Practically all those individuals questioned – many of them Old Mudejars – confirmed that Lizana’s men had charged them amounts of between six and twenty reales for registering and inventorying their assets. The fraud not only affected the Cinco Villas, but also spread to other towns in the region.
26Only a few Moriscos, who could prove they had permission not to be expelled, were exempted from having to pay these amounts, largely due to their poverty, as well as some elderly or disabled people. In the end, it proved impossible to establish that the money collected by the governor and his family had been used irregularly, or even that the governor himself had used it for his own benefit. Some of his subordinates – and also he himself at a later date – declared that the proceeds were used to cover the expenses incurred by the expulsion. Others even went as far as to affirm that the governor had risked his personal finances and that he had always acted “with great vigilance and care and desire to serve his majesty, working night and day, horseback and afoot, and many nights without going to bed, trying to do the said expulsion very calmly.”5
27Although Lizana was relatively successful in the trial – largely due to the collusion of the judge, who was his successor –, these legal proceedings provided various interesting insights for understanding the behaviour of broad sectors of Old Christian society in the face of the Moriscos’ expulsion. First, the proceedings evidenced some of the administrative irregularities generated in managing the expulsion. The governor’s first victims were the Granadans, specifically a large group from Almagro. Shortly before embarking, the Moriscos – around 70, according to the document – granted a power of attorney to Gabriel de la Caballería, a neighbour and cleric of that town. The document, signed in Murcia in June 1610, was clear: the priest was empowered to act on behalf of the Moriscos and to file a lawsuit against the governor. At stake was part of the money that the latter had collected from them illegally. The amount involved was not trivial, as it exceeded seven hundred reales. As their return seemed unlikely, the Moriscos ordered Don Gabriel, in the event of the money being recovered, to assign it to pious work he considered appropriate. Some months later the priest fulfilled these instructions; the beneficiary was the brotherhood of Nuestra Señora de las Nieves, which had a hermitage near the town. This was a curious way to allocate the money of supposed heretics.6
28The corruption went far beyond amounts charged for registering property. More serious than the amounts exacted in this way was the irregular allotting of some of the possessions of the Moriscos, especially those of the ancients. Warnings about the situation were given by Gabriel de Oviedo, alderman of Almagro, who noted that:
[…] through the warnings made both in the inventory and in the charges to Gerónimo Gaytán, Your Majesty will find that many of the goods that were sold and were claimed to be from the ancient Moriscos were bought by the ministers and bailiffs who had been in the expulsion.7
29Lastly, the proceedings against Lizana give an account of the juicy “loot” that the Moriscos’ heritage represented, especially at a time – the early seventeenth century – when signs of the Castilian economy becoming exhausted were already starting to appear. The loot in this specific case involved money and jewellery, being the funds that the people of Granada – the main people affected by the governor’s abuses – were able to take with them to the Burgos and Cartagena customs, where they had to declare the remaining “halves”. Lizana’s records also revealed other types of assets, which often get forgotten: livestock, especially cattle, but also grain. In this case, the goods came from Aldea del Rey and were inventoried in May 1612, with everything indicating that most of these goods were owned by ancient Mudejars. Although this is a partial record, in which barely a few dozen animals were counted (mainly labour cattle), it is valid for verifying three points. First, it is very likely that the Moriscos chose to undersell (or even abandon) those animals not strictly necessary for the trip. The high cost of their sustenance and then not being able to take them into exile were reason enough to justify such a decision. This high cost of sustenance also explains why the animals were a drag on the commissioners appointed to administer expelled individuals’ assets (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2015, 104), as well as why the Crown made use of them without delay and with little interest. This becomes apparent if we make a quick comparison with the prices that these animals fetched in the years prior to 1610.8
30Real estate, by contrast, posed fewer problems. The ability to use it in the medium and longer term made real estate a coveted item for Old Christians: neighbours, investors and creditors were the parties most interested, but the wide range of properties on offer, and the variety of conditions applying, meant many people ventured to buy. Little is known about the possessions left by the ancient Mudejars of Campo de Calatrava. As the bulk of the documentation remains unpublished, with only isolated references known so far, we can but guess at their importance. This lack of information can be filled with case studies such as the one presented here. This is based on two lists of properties, which, problems of interpretation notwithstanding, are revealing. The first list is dated 1614, although its information refers to Daimiel in 1611. It is a list of real estate that the ancient Mudejars of that town sold in the spring of 1611, just after the Council of State drove them, like the people from Granada, into exile. That decision led to the departure of the remaining families in the town and to the sale of their houses and plots. The speed with which both operations – exile and the sale of property – were carried out resulted in a mismatch in the accounts of the region’s tax lessors. Some of the exiled appear to have departed without paying the corresponding alcabala on the sale of their possessions. In the main, the document includes two types of information: on the one hand, a list of the individuals (about 250) who had to pay this tax, thus giving us a partial indication of the community’s size and, on the other hand, a list of the possessions sold, the names of the Mudejar sellers and the buyers (some of them also Mudejars),9 and the prices paid. Descriptions of individual farms are included only sporadically.
31The other document, issued a decade later, pertained to the transfer of the goods bought by Doña Leonor Manrique de la Cerda and that were reclaimed by the Mudejars when they were allowed to return. Although this document was written in 1627, its contents refer to the state of these properties in 1612, just when it seemed that the town’s Moriscos would be abandoning their homeland for ever.
32The two reports are different in terms of their contents. Villarrubia’s document, for example, includes many more properties: 313 compared with 99. There are also qualitative differences. For example, the Daimiel document includes the names of all the Moriscos, while that of Villarrubia does not mention any names. In the latter, the descriptions of the farms are more complete, although details of around 7% of the farms are concealed. Lastly, in relation to prices, the Daimiel list provides greater detail of the individualised properties, while that of Villarrubia states a total price for all the properties. Therefore, certain data must be interpreted with caution because they are not definitive, nor can we be completely sure that they represent the full set of properties owned by the Mudejar communities in these two towns.
33Despite the provisional character of these lists, however, we can note several important aspects. First, the greater relevance of urban property in Daimiel (52.5% of all properties, compared to 19.2% in Villarrubia), which suggests the Daimiel list was less complete. It is very likely that this document included only those properties that the Mudejars kept as a last resort; this may distort the analysis by accentuating the urban character of Daimiel. Another possible explanation could be that the Villarrubia community had greater economic potential and a more diversified heritage. Nevertheless, we should remember the provisional nature of these lists.
Figure 2. Properties of the ancient Mudejars of Villarrubia de los Ojos acquired in 1612 by Doña Leonor Manrique de la Cerda

Source: AHN, Consejos, leg. 38039.
34Be that as it may, in both cases virtually all the properties were houses, with only a few lots and fenced parcels being mentioned, and with little more detail provided. The source does not specify measurements, planimetrics or data providing information on the condition in which each home found itself.
35Leaving those details aside, which may need further explanation in the future, and focusing on the rural properties, we can see that their structure was very similar in both villages. Logically, the dry lands account for a very important part of the declared assets; however, the relevance given by the document to irrigated land deserves attention. In Daimiel, its importance was even greater than that of the dry farms. Similarly, the farms intended for vines, olive trees, or both crops simultaneously – which was common in the regions of La Mancha – were not negligible (LÓPEZ‑SALAZAR PÉREZ et al., 1986, 299).
36Despite their provisional nature, the data point to a consolidated heritage in which owners seem to show a certain preference for plots destined for intensive cultivation. In this sense, the hemp fields of Villarrubia have a special relevance. According to the source, the majority were located in a very specific place, the Dehesa de Lote, where the town’s Mudejar community had held an important part of its original patrimony since the late Middle Ages (DADSON, 2007, 706–717). On the other hand, the Mudejars from Daimiel showed a preference for orchards and quiñones,10 possibly because the town did not have so many dry lands.
Table 1. Rural real estate properties of the Mudejars of Campo de Calatrava. Partial accounts 1611–1612

Source: AHN, Consejos, leg. 38039 (Villarrubia), y AHN, OM, AHT, exp. 38538 (Daimiel).
37In any event, the data are not very different from those for the whole region regarding the people of Granada, including provisional data (MORENO DÍAZ DEL CAMPO, 2009, 216). In this sense, and despite the logical differences, there are two factors that should be considered in future research, especially in the case of Villarrubia. First, the low importance that urban assets had from a perspective of Mudejar heritage. Second, the idea of a more consolidated heritage shows the greater importance of farms with intensive cropping, although this aspect should be reviewed as soon as the available sources allow it. Other data such as extensions, numbers of owners and their socio‑economic conditions (i.e., how many farms in each owner’s possession) should also be considered. In this sense, the sample here includes individuals whom we can certainly consider wealthy, such as Diego López de Pedro López, a Mudejar from Villarrubia, in whose name no fewer than twenty‑two properties were registered: a house, two hemp fields, two quiñones, a sumac field, two vineyards, a parcel with both a vineyard and an olive tree, and thirteen more plots of dry land with a joint extension of 163.5 hectares. Unfortunately, the source does not allow us to go beyond such specific examples, as while the Villarrubia report provides more data, it is barely uniform, thus losing any usefulness it may have had for comparative purposes. However, the differences observed between the Mudejar and Granadan heritages would not seem to be attributable to sociological criteria or to ethnic or racial origins, but instead to purely economic and more deep‑rooted reasons.
38The situation regarding prices was similar. In this case, the Daimiel list provides more data, but once again, unfortunately, the information is incomplete. Nevertheless, a brief check of the available examples confirms the previously noted impression: the undervaluation of many of the Granadan goods. In this sense, paying 75 reales for a house, 66 for a garden, or 55 for a quiñón seems indicative of really low prices. Obviously, the prices paid for some farms and houses were higher, but everything indicates that sales were generally at prices below the market value, or at least at very reasonable prices, and thus benefiting Old Christian buyers. This is made clear by the example of Villarrubia and one very explicit fact: that Doña Leonor paid just four hundred ducados (just over 4400 reales) for a total of 313 properties.
By way of conclusion: transfers, changes of ownership and dispersion of money
39While much remains to be discovered about the final destinations of the assets of the Moriscos expelled from Spain between 1609 and 1614, some of the ideas suggested here, although still in an early stage, could constitute a good starting point for a deeper study of this issue. The ideas suggested are not merely opinions; the sources suggest that they seem to be correct, but we need to be cautious before confirming them with complete certainty.
40Managing, auctioning, and adjudicating the real estate of the Moriscos of Castile (regardless of whether they were Granadans or ancient Mudejars) represented a major administrative and economic process: a process that put the real estate owned by a population of more than 90 000 individuals up for sale and involved huge numbers of Hispanic Monarchy officials (DOMÍNGUEZ ORTIZ et al., 1997, 200). While it is still difficult to assess the scope of the action, it undoubtedly caused changes in the structure and uses of real estate in a kingdom that was on the verge of both an economic crisis and political decline. The use of resources was enormous, as were the efforts made. Nevertheless, we can question whether the process was executed totally reliably, whether its results were as expected, and whether the resources obtained from that great operation were beneficial. As far as we know, the operation was used to settle Moriscos’ debts and resulted in the extinguishing of many censuses. In addition, it probably helped to improve the solvency of those who obtained the assets, although this still has to be confirmed. How those properties were distributed, and whether any specific social group benefited, also remains to be analysed. Likewise, possible regional differences or nuances that may arise from comparisons between town and country, or between lordship or royal areas and so on, still need to be examined. Lastly, it is essential to establish the final amounts involved in the operation, as well as its profitability for the Crown and the destination of the earnings. In this sense, the certifications of expenses in Campo de Calatrava confirm that a huge share of the money from the Moriscos’ properties was set aside to pay for the expulsion itself and also to cover the costs of managing the sales; in other words, the costs of fees for representation and travel to court, the costs of transferring Moriscos to the ports, salary and maintenance payments for the troops in charge of pursuing Morisco fugitives, the costs of listing the expelled, and so on.
41On the other hand, we also still need to assess the economic impact that the expulsion had on the Moriscos themselves. Exile destroyed processes of enrichment and social advancement or, on a more modest level, simple personal lives and family strategies based on selfless work and prudent savings. Hence, the struggles of the Moriscos to remain where they were, or to return to their ancient towns and cities, must also be considered from an economic perspective. Acquiring in‑depth knowledge of this reality is crucial if we are to understand the Morisco exile in all its dimensions. Likewise, we have yet little knowledge of the fate of the wealth that the Moriscos managed to take with them from Spain and the role that this money could have played within the host Maghrebi societies, and both these issues demand an urgent study. After all, this was a process that showed that the struggles of the New Christians were based on more than just nostalgia.
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Notes de bas de page
1This latter term, more neutral and akin to the historical reality of the area, is proposed by Bernard Vincent in order to differentiate these Moriscos from the Granadan Moriscos, who arrived in Castile after being expelled from Granada by Philip II after the War of the Alpujarras. See Vincent, 2013.
2For further details, see Guadalajara y Xavier, 1613, 84r; Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, 1863, vol. XIII, 94 (1593).
3This last term, more neutral and akin to the historical reality of the area, is proposed by Bernard Vincent to differentiate the inhabitants of Campo de Calatrava from the Granadan Moriscos who arrived in Castile after being expelled from Granada by Philip II after the War of the Alpujarras. See Vincent, 2013.
4The whole dossier in Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección Órdenes Militares, Archivo Histórico de Toledo (AHN, OM, AHT), exp. 38787. See also Gómez Vozmediano, 2010, 86–87; Moreno Díaz del Campo, 2015, 105.
5“… con muncha vigilancia y cuidado y deseo de seruir a su magestad, trauabajando de noche y de día a cauallo y a pie y munchas noches sin acostarse tratando de hazer la dicha espulsion con mucha quietud,” AHN, OM, AHT, exp. 38787‑2, fols. 41v–43r (testimony of Diego de las Parras, a neighbour in Almagro 15 March 1613).
6AHN, OM, AHT, exp. 38787‑3, fols. 4r–7v.
7“… por aduertencias que en el ynbentario y cargo que se hiço a Gerónimo Gaytán hallará V.M. que munchos de los bienes que se vendieron que deçían ser de los moriscos antiguos, los conpraron los ministros y alguaçiles que auían sido en la espulsión,” AHN, OM, AHT, exp. 38787, fols. 52v (testimony of Diego de las Parras, a neighbour of Almagro, 15 March 1613).
8A couple of examples can confirm this, although it should be noted that the value of such merchandise could fluctuate considerably, depending on the age, robustness, and strength of each animal. In 1612, the two cows and a calf that belonged to a Morisco named Cristóbal López were sold for 132 reales, a low amount considering that, only a few years before, Gonzalo de Granada, a Morisco from Ciudad Real, had paid 200 reales for only one cow (AHP CR, Protocols, leg. 46‑1, fols. 336r–336v. 4 October 1605). The situation was similar in the case of the three mares bought by a certain Andrés Sánchez, a neighbour in Almagro. Their total price was 275 reales (about 92 each), a little lower than what was paid in the region for similar animals and on the same dates – between 110 and 150 reales per animal – (examples in AHP CR, Protocolos, leg. 55, fol. 480r, 29 June 1596 and leg. 11, fols. 123r‑v, 4 June 1601, among others).
9This was not a strange situation: both Dadson (2007) and Pascual (2014–2016) document it for Villarrubia and Pliego (Murcia), thus confirming the permanence of certain Mudejars, who occasionally acted as potential front men for those expelled while waiting for a hypothetical return and restitution of those same goods.
10The quiñones were small plots located in the vicinity of (and sometimes within) the urban area and destined for intensive cultivation of cereals, mostly barley. These plots were very common in Campo de Calatrava and highly valued by small local farmers. See López‑Salazar Pérez et al., 1986, 568–572.
Auteurs
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Francisco J. Moreno Díaz del Campo
Universidad de Castilla‑La Mancha
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Luis F. Bernabé Pons
Universidad de Alicante

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