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The Anti-American Century

 | 
Ivan Krastev
, 
Alan McPherson

Rethinking young Anti-Americanism in South Korea

Youngshik Bong et Katharine H. S. Moon

Texte intégral

1In December, 2002, a U.S. court martial of two servicemen who had been charged with driving an armored vehicle over two Korean school girls and causing their death found the defendants not guilty. This decision triggered the outbreak of a widespread and intense anti-American protest movement in the republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). more than two hundred thousand citizens participated in a series of daily candlelight vigils in front of the U.S. embassy building near the city hall of Seoul, mourning the death of the students and protesting the U.S. government’s failure to acknowledge its moral responsibility for the accident and to sincerely appreciate the sensitive feelings of the Korean people, while hiding under the shield of the legal technicality of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

  • 1 “Interview with President-Elect Roh Moo-hyun.” Sisa-Journal, 13 February 2003; Donga-Ilbo, 19 Febr (...)

2The movement also addressed South Koreans’ displeasure with what they perceived as increasingly arrogant militaristic behavior on the part of the United States and reflected the fear that the U.S. might choose to render South Korea’s national security and efforts at reconciliation with the north expendable. The anti-American movement erupted only two weeks before the 2002 presidential election and made a huge political impact. The widespread criticism toward the United States clearly favored Roh Moo-hyun, the progressive-minded Democratic Party candidate who had advocated that South Korea prepare herself to take an independent stance from the United States in engaging north Korea. With the electoral victory of Roh, who had suggested during his election campaign that anti-Americanism was not necessarily a bad thing, many in and outside South Korea came to view the conventional foundations of the Korea–U.S. relationship as unstable and possibly broken.1

3Although anti-Americanism has become a handy buzzword for many, there are still a number of issues that remain unexplained or underspecified. Perhaps it is an opportune time for everyone who has engaged in the “anti-Americanism cottage industry” to ponder whether we have accumulated enough knowledge and gained a strong enough analytical grip from which to handle the delicate and complex nature of Korean anti-Americanism.

  • 2 Kim, Seung-hwan. “Yankee Go home? A historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United St (...)

4Despite the fact that the international media regularly covers Korea–U.S. relations, and that commentators of various political backgrounds and leanings have eagerly come out of the woodwork to offer their views on the status of the alliance and the causes of tension, there seem to be only two areas of agreement: 1) the alliance has outgrown the memory of the Korean War; 2) Korean youth are endangering the alliance with their sense of nationalism and anti-Americanism. This is a surprisingly meager yield, given all the political energy, policy interest, and academic inquiry that have been invested in this new cottage industry during the last few years. And yet, to what extent do Korean youth serve as what one analyst calls the “wildcard” in the future of the alliance relationship?2 Are they such a distinct political group that new policies need to be developed to reflect their interests? To win them back to the old ways? To what extent does the youth factor (or generational gap) explain the causes, characteristics, and consequences of the recent popular expressions of anti-American sentiments? This paper is intended as an exercise to rethink what we know and do not know about anti-Americanism.

5There is a need to carefully examine the assumption that new nationalism among Korean youth generates anti-Americanism, which in turn endangers the bilateral alliance and the national security of Korea. We argue that numerical correlations between age and so-called anti-American sentiments are both limited and inconsistent. rather, contextual analysis—the effect of democratization within Korea, the transnationalization of political movements, and the evolving regionalization of pop culture and identities— complicates the assumed nationalism and undermines the simplistic explanation of generational change. We emphasize that political sentiment and popular expression do not necessarily translate into political interest and policy choices. To that end, we illustrate the rather stable and practical responses to the new disruptions and changes in the bilateral relationship in the recent period, irrespective of generation and of sentiment towards the United States.

  • 3 Richard V. Allen, “Seoul’s choice: The U.S. or the north,” New York Times, 16 January 2003, A 29.

6The complex inter-generational dynamics in South Korea today has definitely eroded the traditional raison d’être of the bilateral security relationship that had long been comfortably nested in the common experience of the Korean War and cold War. The upsurge in a critical attitude among post-Korean War generations toward the United States indicates that, after half a century, the bonus of an unconditionally pro-American attitude since the Korean War no longer exists. Yet, it is erroneous to characterize the new dynamics in South Korea as a prelude to the termination of the security alliance with the United States.3

ANTI-AMERICANISM: YOUNG AND RECKLESS?

  • 4 Moon, Chung-in. “Between Banmi (Anti-Americanism) and Sungmi (Worship of the U.S.): Dynamics of ch (...)
  • 5 Eberstadt, Nicholas. “Our Other Korea Problem.” National Interest 69 (Fall 2002): 113.

7During 2003 and 2004, two years after the outbreak of the anti-American movement in South Korea, apocalyptic outcries and laments over the end of the bilateral security alliance—South Korea choosing north Korea over the united States and the united States abandoning “ungrateful South Korea”—prevailed.4 What particularly troubled Korean observers on both sides of the Pacific was the seemingly emotional and irrational basis of the drifting alliance. In particular, these observers felt that youthful ignorance, shortsightedness, and wishful thinking (that North Koreans are not so dangerous and that South Koreans can afford to alienate the united States) abounded. These factors supposedly created the notion that “such is the temper of the times that South Korea’s most popular ‘bubblegum pop’ girl band—a heretofore entirely apolitical group with a reputation for extreme wholesomeness—released a harshly anti-American MTV-style video.”5

  • 6 Ibid, 110–118.

8In addition, a 2001 survey of fifth and sixth graders in south Kyongsang Province, one of the most conservative regions in the South, found that 42 percent identified north Korea as “the friendliest nation toward South Korea,” with the united States playing second fiddle at 39 percent.6 The Kim Dae Jung administration has been primarily blamed for turning the Korean public towards foolhardiness through its overly optimistic engagement policy.

  • 7 Lee, Sook-Jong. “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the U.S.–Korea Al (...)

9A more serious Korean academic who has been following these issues similarly noted the ascendance of younger generations into the political fray: “One consequence of democratization and institutional reforms has been the economic decline of the older generation and the rise of the younger generation… The older generation is also being pushed to the political and social sidelines. This generation is perceived as supporting the status quo and resistant to reform… in addition, [the younger generation’s] easy access to information [technologies] and ability to create and mobilize political networks gives them the ability to be an effective political force.”7

  • 8 Thompson, W. Scott. “Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Government,” in Anti-Americanism: Origins and C (...)
  • 9 Shin, Gi-Wook. “South Korean Anti-Americanism: A comparative Perspective.” Asian Survey 36 (August (...)
  • 10 U.S. Department of State, Office of research, Opinion Analysis: “Trends in South Korean Opinion of (...)

10Indeed, age and support for the United States and the bilateral relationship do correlate. Even pre-democratization, in 1985, 78 percent of the youth (versus 56 percent of the general public) believed that “Korea was too closely identified with the united States.”8 major Korean surveys conducted between 1990 and 1992 also revealed that a higher proportion of those in their twenties (even more so among college students) held a negative opinion of the United States than people in their fifties and older.9 in the midst of heavy protests in the winter of 2002–2003, a U.S. State Department survey found that the younger generation viewed the united States less favorably than older respondents (favorable: 32 percent of 20s and 69 percent of 50s+). moreover, only 22 percent of the group in their twenties versus 42 percent of the over-fifty group considered the U.S. military presence in Korea as “very important.”10

11It is true that past labors for a democratic society in South Korea have produced not only new laws, but also political institutions and unexpected configurations of social mobilization. They have also produced progressive-minded, experimentation-oriented, and outspoken youth who seem to confound the worldview and political sensibilities of older Koreans and most Americans. Although no one on either side of the Pacific outwardly blames democracy for making a mess of the fifty-year-old alliance, Koreans and Americans have eagerly echoed each other’s “explanation” that younger Koreans are to blame for the tensions, misunderstandings, and divergent interpretations and priorities between the two countries.

  • 11 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002, 56.
  • 12 Hollander, Paul. Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), (...)
  • 13 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003, 95.

12But younger Koreans are not unique in their critical attitudes towards the united States. According to the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey, 44 percent of Canadians below thirty had unfavorable views of the united States, compared to 20 percent in the 50–64 age group.11 Two decades earlier, during a time of anti-nuclear/anti-U.S. protests led by the Greens and other progressives in West Germany, “the German rejection of and mistrust toward the united States” was “especially pronounced among the younger generation.”12 Moreover, France and Germany, who in recent years have become the featured anti-American nations in Europe, defy the general correlation between nationalism and anti-Americanism. According to the categories of nationalism established by Pew in 2003, France and Germany “are among the least likely, of all nations surveyed, to say their culture is superior, that their way of life needs protection, and that other lands really belong to their countries.”13 Nationalism may be a compelling argument for those seeking a neat and quick explanation for the seeming anti-Americanism around the world, but the concept is difficult to define and disaggregate, and simply put, explains too little.

13Similarly, however compelling the idea may seem, youth itself does not explain foreign policy orientation, and does not necessarily translate into historical amnesia, blind nationalism, radicalism, or anti-Americanism. For example, in Japan, the traditional “enemy” of the modern Koreans, it is the older generation that keeps its eyes, ears, and minds closed to the realities of Japan’s war atrocities. Despite the negative repercussions for Japan’s regional and international status, the younger generations are more eager to step up to the historical plate and acknowledge past wrongs, mend old wounds, and forge new friendships with their regional neighbors. Younger Japanese busily exchange views on the internet, work cooperatively with Korean non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and admire the cultural products (film, videos, music) imported from their nation’s ex-colony. in turn, Korea’s most popular internet portal, Daum, recently hosted ten thousand blogs and cafés dedicated to introducing Japanese culture to South Korea. This is compared to just fifty blogs and cafés promoting anti-Japanese views. A newspaper survey also indicated that only a quarter of Koreans in their twenties said “they did not like Japan.”14 Since the Kim Dae Jung administration’s initial elimination of legal prohibitions against Japanese cultural imports in 1998, and the lifting of bans on imported Japanese music, films, computer games, and comics in early 2004,15 Korean youth have become avid consumers and producers of a pop culture that is sweeping the east Asian region. The Financial Times called this “Korean Wave” a “phenomenon.”

  • 16 Donald Macintyre, “Flying Too high? The Korean pop music biz is Asia’s hottest,” available at http (...)

14In a sense, Asian youth are overcoming conventional nationalism through the regionalization of pop culture, making connections across national and historical boundaries and stepping away from old enmities that governments and older generations seem unable or unwilling to give up. Donald McIntyre of Time magazine’s Asia edition describes the dizzying popularity of Korean pop music, or “K-pop,” in recent years: “The $300 million domestic market is the second largest in Asia, topped only by Japan’s massive $2.9 billion in album sales last year [2003]. K-pop has broken across borders: teenagers from Tokyo to Taipei swoon over performers such as singer Park Ji Yoon and boy band Shinhwa, buying their CDs and posters and even learning Korean so they can sing along at karaoke. BoA [an iconic Korean female singer] this year became the first solo artist in more than two decades to have a debut single and a debut album reach no. 1 in Japan. ‘Korea is like the next epicenter of pop culture in Asia,’ says Jessica Kam, a vice president for MTV networks Asia.”16

  • 17 Iwabuchi, Koichi. Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism (Durham (...)

15Such developments are not without some cost to American power and influence. Japanese anthropologist Koichi Iwabuchi observes that there is a connection between the relative decline of American cultural power and the rise of “localized,” “Asianized” pop in much of East Asia in the last decade.17

  • 18 Kim, hang. “Isip dae wa osip dae uisig bigyo” (Perceptional comparisons between the Twenties and t (...)
  • 19 Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs/P (...)

16Such observations should not be mistaken for wishful thinking that hip hop and film can bridge decades of mutual suspicion and hostility and pave the way for cooperation and peace for the future generations in Asia. indeed, a survey published in the well-known monthly, Wolgan Chosun found that 60.3 percent of Koreans in their twenties held unfavorable views of Japan, as opposed to 39.7 percent with favorable views. Yet the article emphasized that there is a substantial generational gap in anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment between the young and those in their fifties. Among the latter, only 17.7 percent had favorable views of Japan, while a decisive 73 percent had unfavorable views.18 The causes of the generational shift in such sentiments are not clear, but if “soft power” through cultural attraction, imitation, and adoption is as potent a facilitator of shared values and supportive actions between national communities as Joseph nye purports, then the increasingly shared culture among east Asian youth may be more politically loaded than we currently recognize.19 it is not impossible to imagine the evolution of novel and creative regional identities among Asians during the next fifty years.

  • 20 Pew. “Views of a Changing World.” (June 2003), 93–95.

17To focus on nationalism as a main cause of anti-Americanism without placing it in the context of broader social and cultural trends in East Asia is misleading. Globalization and regionalization are powerful forces, coterminous and coexisting with nationalism. These forces challenge and transform norms, laws, and institutions within societies. For example, South Korea and the Philippines rank among the most nationalistic nations surveyed by Pew in 2003: 82 percent of Koreans and 81 percent of Filipinos believe that their way of life needs protection from foreign influence (compared to 51 percent of Germans, 63 percent of Japanese, and 64 percent of Americans). 90 percent of Koreans believe their culture is superior to others, compared to 33 percent of French, 40 percent of Germans, and 60 percent of Americans who hold such a view (Pew reminds us that majorities around the world, except in Western Europe, believe in the superiority of their own culture).20

  • 21 Ibid, 85.

18But despite such overwhelmingly protectionist tendencies regarding foreign influence in Korea and the Philippines, support for globalization among Asian nations is highest in Korea and second highest among the forty-four nations in the Pew 2003 Global Attitudes survey. A whopping 84 percent of Koreans view the impact of globalization on their country favorably.21

  • 22 Moon, Katharine H.S. “Migrant Workers’ Movements in Japan and South Korea,” in Egalitarian Politic (...)

19Again, Koreans, who are highly homogeneous in terms of language, ethnicity, and cultural practices and are often described as highly ethno-nationalistic, rank among the lowest in opposition to immigration restrictions. in 2003, only 7 percent “completely agree[d]” that more restrictions should be placed on entry into their country. This contrasts with 46 percent of Americans who “completely agree[d]” with the statement, even though Americans live in one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse societies. It is important to remember the rapid social, economic, and political changes that Korea has been undergoing since the 1990s. For example, nearly overnight in the 1990s, South Korea became a labor-receiving country, with hundreds of thousands of migrant workers, documented and undocumented, coming from poorer countries, particularly china, Southeast and South Asia. Although some Koreans have exhibited xenophobic reactions to the foreigners, “the normative aspects of globalization—emphasis on human rights, democratization, pluralism and cross-culturalism—have helped fuel the MWMs [migrant Workers’ movements]” in Korea.22

  • 23 Moon, Chung-in. “Globalization: challenges and Strategies.” Korea Focus 3, no. 3 (1995): 66.

20Even though resurgent nationalism can be a reaction to the pressures of globalization, Koreans tactically used globalization as a way to advance national power with out-ward-looking, cosmopolitan tendencies. Korean political scientist Chung-in moon was one of many who emphasized the need for Koreans to adopt the more normative aspects of globalization: “inward-looking and xenophobic biases cannot cope with the challenges of spontaneous globalization. Peace education, education for human capital formation and cross-cultural education constitute critical components of managed globalization… cross-cultural education assists individuals in transforming themselves into citizens of the world.”23

21Given the dynamism of Korean youth and their environ-mental context, therefore, it is illogical to attribute historical amnesia and resurgent nationalism to them as if those are the only political and cultural influences that surround them. In reality, it is the younger people, in their twenties and thirties and even some in their forties, who have been developing a new consciousness about peace, human rights, and multicultural orientation in Korea and around the world. Leaders of the Korean house for international Solidarity (KHIS) and their people-to-people campaign toward Vietnam serve as just one example.

  • 24 “Saram i saram ege” (From One human to Another), Korean House for International Solidarity (April/ (...)

22Since the mid and late 1990s, KHIS has investigated and publicized both the atrocities Korean soldiers committed toward Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam War and the need for reconciliation between Korea and Vietnam. In 2000, they helped organize a “goodwill mission” to Vietnam, in which Korean dentists and other medical professionals volunteered their services to Vietnamese villagers and their descendants who had suffered violence by Korean troops. They have also organized and staged an annual music/arts festival to raise funds to assist Vietnamese victims of war, and have been working with Hankyore SinmuI, a progressive Korean newspaper company, to raise funds for a “peace park” to be built in Vietnam. They conducted such efforts while simultaneously participating in the social movement to revise the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. in spring of 2002, one of the leaders of KHIS stated that their fundraising efforts for the Vietnam project drew larger sums than for any “anti-American” protest or program.24

  • 25 For instance, some highly-ranked U.S. officials and politicians expressed concerns about some Kore (...)

23The work of KHIS is noteworthy for three reasons related to U.S.–Korea relations. First, in contrast to American officials’ oft-mentioned complaint that Koreans only seek to criticize U.S. policies and actions but overlook their own government’s and nation’s faults,25 KHIS has insisted that Koreans must take responsibility for past wartime atrocities and assist those who have survived, and not merely point their fingers at Japan and the united States for military abuses. Second, contrary to the popular view that nationalism is what drives anti-Americanism, KhiS is addressing an issue that is quite “anti-nationalist” and unpopular among Koreans, especially among political elites and veterans. Third, KHIS is intent on using new democratic freedoms and the transnationalizaton of ideas and politics to address issues, interpretive frameworks, and audiences heretofore neglected or ignored by other Korean NGOs/activists as well as the general population.

  • 26 Lee, Seok-woo and Sung-ha Yoo. “An issue of conscience: conscientious Objection to military Servic (...)
  • 27 Moon, Seungsook. Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea (Durham and London: (...)

24Younger Koreans have also been at the forefront of forging peace movements and challenging the near-sacrosanct institution of the military draft. This challenge has been made on distinct legal grounds that emphasize human rights and gender equality: 1) conscientious objector status;26 2) internal military violence against conscripts; and 3) gender discrimination (due to the work points system that automatically benefits males in employment situations).27 Such moves were inconceivable, let alone impossible, during most of the cold War years under military dictators. Regarding young Koreans as politically naïve or economically complacent because they grew up in times of relative wealth and stability does not make sense unless one also emphasizes the fact that they grew up in a social and political environment of relative freedom in the 1990s. They do not long for the right to speak out against the government or for independent opinions like their predecessors had in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; they take it for granted. in addition, no form of authority—whether their own government or the U.S. government and its troops—is off limits to them. So, if political naiveté and economic complacency are consequences of political freedom, then Korean youth must not be singled out for blame or admonishment.

25Most important is the need to distinguish between youthful expression and policy choices. In contrast to common belief, evidence shows that Korean youth are pragmatic and differentiate between sentiment and interests, both personal and national. For example, although 68.5 percent of Koreans in their twenties, versus 49.1 percent in their fifties, held favorable views of north Korea in June 2002 (compared to 29.6 percent and 40.5 percent of those in their twenties and their fifties respectively, who had unfavorable views), 82.6 percent of both age cohorts had unfavorable views of Kim Jong il.28 Haeshook Chae’s analysis of a college student survey that involved 1,076 college students in 22 universities in Korea supports this claim.29

  • 30 Chae, 113, Figure 1.

26Chae finds that young Koreans know how to distinguish between their feelings toward North Korea as a people and their judgment of the North Korean leadership. She compares the mean scores of the respondents’ sentiment toward North Korea, the United States, and the Kim Jong Il regime, measured in the ten-point scale (one being the most positive and ten being the most negative). interestingly, the result suggests that young Koreans’ negative sentiment toward the Kim regime (7.3 point) surpassed that toward the united States (7.2) or toward Japan (6.7), while their sentiment toward north Korea is the most positive among countries (5.9).30 This finding implies that young Koreans are not as divergent as other generations in their collective attitude towards the issue of balancing national security and national reconciliation with the north. This is because they embrace North Korea as a part of the divided country, but loathe the regime as a source of threats and dictatorship.

27Furthermore, the young generation in South Korea does not appear predisposed to prioritizing “nationalist” agendas at the expense of material gains. Young Koreans tend to approach ideological issues such as patriotism, nationalism, unification, and sovereign independence on normative and idealist grounds. But, once these issues directly affect their personal interests, they can exhibit a remarkable turnaround.

28Such dualism results in apparently self-contradictory reactions and positions. For example, Koreans in their twenties and thirties may denounce the imperialist conduct of the United States, but many of them desire to have U.S. citizenship and support the government’s decision to join the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq in order to secure u S.–Korean cooperation over the north Korean issue.31 Again, the young know how to distinguish between perception/sensibility and choice/decision. More significantly, they have one constant: They acknowledge the importance of the alliance relationship and support it for the sake of national security and economic stability. in April 2003, after several months of intense public demonstrations against U.S. policies and decisions, Donga Ilbo, one of the leading newspaper companies in Korea, found that large majorities of Koreans in their twenties and thirties were in agreement with their older counterparts in acknowledging the importance of the U.S. military presence for security purposes on the Korean peninsula (20s: 78.1 percent; 30s: 84.3 percent; 40s: 86.4 percent; 50s: 89.3 percent).32 Therefore, the alarmist arguments for “young and reckless” anti-Americanism brewing in South Korea and its pro-North Korean inclination are exaggerated in tone and underspecified in their causal mechanisms. It would be a gross misunderstanding if young Koreans were collectively deemed pro-north Korean dissidents or antagonistic nationalists, and their activism portrayed as one of destructive hostility.

“MISSING ANTI-AMERICANISM”: NATIONALIST SENTIMENT VS. POLICY PREFERENCE

  • 33 For a survey of changes in public opinion and the crisis of the Korea–U.S. alliance, see Lee, Nae- (...)

29There are reasons to be surprised by the way that both sides of the Pacific have come to terms with the phenomenon of anti-Americanism since the eruption of massive protests in the winter of 2002–2003. Considering all the disruption and commotion, policy has been managed in a surprisingly calm, effective, and unruffled manner.33

30For example, both countries successfully concluded a sixteen-month negotiation on relocation and reduction of U.S. Forces in South Korea (USFK). The negotiations were inevitably arduous, and checkered by push-and-pull and give-and-take between the two governments over the timing and scale of the reconfiguration of the security alliance. However, it should be noted that the negotiations were neither dominated by violent emotionalism by the public nor by a perception of any significant mutual abandonment. The negotiations were focused on streamlining the USFK in the context of global restructuring, while leaving no security void in Korea and augmenting the combat readiness and deterrent capability of the ROK forces.

  • 34 Mitchell, Derek. “Does Popular Sentiment matter? What’s at Stake?” in Strategy and Sentiment: Sout (...)

31Once the united States notified the Korean authorities of its decision to pull out a brigade of the USFK in may 2004, there were sporadic attempts by the conservative mass media to portray the U.S. decision as setting South Korea up as a model to demonstrate that the united States would never station its troops in a country where they are not welcome. In short, conservatives sought to prove how reckless and shortsighted young liberals had been with respect to national security. Yet, such attempts to stir up underlying fear among the Korean public in order to attack the government’s foreign policy did not appear to be effective. The general perception of the change in the alliance system was remarkably measured and stable. It was largely in agreement with the message articulated by President Roh Moo Hyun in his Independence Day speech in 2003, wherein he emphasized that it was a necessary and somewhat overdue cost that Korea should be ready to assume. considering the widely accepted warning a few years ago that, if mismanaged, talks on the reduction of the USFK could easily become “like the worst divorces [and] the emotional results of dissolving the alliance could be worse than the situation that led to the break in the first place,”34 one might well ask what prevented the negotiations on force restructuring from producing “profound bitterness and lasting resentment between the two allies.”

32For starters, South Korea was consistent in rendering support for the U.S. war effort in Iraq. The Roh government sent 660 medics and engineers (Jema and Seohee units) one month after the presidential inauguration. in trying to cope with worsening situations in post-war Iraq, the united States subsequently requested that South Korea send additional troops, mainly composed of combat units, and on a far larger scale. After long deliberations, the national Assembly passed a bill sanctioning additional peacekeepers. The troops were officially deployed to help rebuild the Kurdish-controlled northern Iraqi town of Irbil in early August, 2004.

  • 35 Yonhap News, 8 October 2003.

33For those who acknowledge that the Roh regime was heavily indebted to anti-American sentiment for its victory in the 2002 presidential elections, these developments came as a big surprise. This is because the dispatch of the Korean troops in Iraq was one of the most divisive issues in domestic politics since the inauguration of that government. Enlarging its involvement in the Iraq war was hardly a popular political choice for the Korean political leadership. For example, according to a spring 2003 survey of 1,542 college students in Korea, 88.3 percent regarded the Iraq war as an “imperial invasion” by the United States. Only 4.7 percent of the respondents defined the war as a just war.35

  • 36 Gallup Korea, “report on the Public Opinion on the War in Iraq,” 20 march 2003. The Gallup Korea s (...)
  • 37 JoongAng Ilbo, 16 September 2003.

34Results of the Gallup Korea opinion survey conducted with all age groups in March 2003 yielded similar results: Only 9.7 percent of the respondents said they agreed with the war aims the United States officially articulated to justify its decision to attack Iraq. Three quarters were against any type of military involvement, even in case the United States would ask for more assistance. Only 16.1 percent said that Korea should send its troops to Iraq, about 13.1 percent down from the level of support during the 1991 Gulf War.36 Opposition to Korea’s involvement did not significantly diminish a few months after the actual outbreak of the war. In a poll conducted in September 2003, opinion against dispatching Korean troops far outweighed opinion in favor (56.1 vs. 35.5 percent).37

35In addition to such general aversion to the Iraq war, political events in early 2003 further complicated the decision to dispatch troops. The landslide victory of the ruling Uri party and the gains of the Korean Democratic Labor Party (KDLP) in the 17th national Assembly election in April 2003 provided huge momentum for progressive civic activist groups and liberal national Assembly members. Moreover, in June 2004, Kim Sun-il, a Korean who had been working for a trading company in Iraq, was captured and beheaded by an Islamic militant group. Even before Kim’s capture and death, coalitions of more than three hundred civic organizations launched a series of protests and candlelight vigils to force the government to reconsider its decision to send troops. About twenty members from both ruling and opposition parties, mostly elected for their first term, initiated collective action in collaboration with civic organizations to block the passage of the troop deployment bill. The Roh government had justified the decision to send troops mainly on the ground that it was indispensable to preventing the U.S. government from transferring part of the USFK to Iraq. Given the U.S. decision to go ahead with the plan prior to the Korean government’s decision, the opposition groups argued that reneging on the promise to send troops to Iraq would be a rightful quid pro quo.

  • 38 JoongAng Ilbo, 17 June 2004.

36However, collective action against the troop deployment was never strong enough to produce a political impact comparable to the massive demonstrations in December 2002. During the first half of 2004, the most controversial issue was the ratification of the free trade agreement between South Korea and Chile, not the dispatch of troops. The national Assembly passed the troop dispatch bill before that of the Korea–Chile free trade agreement (FTA); the process of voting to ratify the latter bill was postponed three times in less than a month. While the anti-Iraq war rally organized by activist groups drew only about fifteen hundred participants, a crowd about ten times larger gathered for the anti-FTA rally organized by the farmers’ coalition. Moreover, while the FTA agenda caused major defections by ruling party members against the government’s preference for immediate ratification, the troop deployment issue did not. In the general meeting held on June 17, 2004, the day after President Roh met its leaders, the ruling Uri party confirmed that it would be the party’s official position to support the government decision to proceed with the troop deployment plan as scheduled.38

37Even more surprising than the conclusion of the two sensitive issues—U.S. troop reduction and the deployment of Korean troops in Iraq—was the fact that neither of the cases was converted into a violent anti-American movement. At no point during the entire period of negotiations for relocating and reducing the USFK did the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) emerge as a critical issue.

  • 39 Lee and Jung, “Banmi yeoron”: 62.

38The absence of the SOFA discourse is a remarkable turnaround, considering that an opinion survey conducted at the peak of the anti-American movement in 2002-2003 revealed that 96.2 percent of South Koreans believed SOFA should be rewritten or revised.39 Besides, the public reaction to the events was largely measured, devoid of a wild sense of betrayal by the united States and panic over national security. There emerged a general consensus among academics, officials, and civic activists, reflecting a wide spectrum of different ideological and policy perspectives on the security alliance between South Korea and the United States, that it was best to understand the inevitability and positive benefits of restructuring the alliance system.

  • 40 Hwang, Balbina Y. “Defusing Anti-American rhetoric in South Korea.” The Heritage Foundation Backgr (...)
  • 41 Kang, C.S. Eliot. “Restructuring the U.S.–South Korean Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean nuc (...)
  • 42 Kim, Sang-il. Interview with JoongAng Ilbo, 31 may 2004.
  • 43 “Global Views 2004: South Korean Public Topline report.” The Chicago council of Foreign relations, (...)

39Phrases like “continu(ing) to reduce the American footprint on the peninsula,”40 “more distance in the alliance,”41 “practice of distancing (遠美, won-mi)”42 were not interpreted as severance of ties, abandonment, or resentment. in fact, according to the 2004 foreign policy survey by the Chicago council on Foreign relations, 60 percent of South Koreans thought that lowering U.S. troop levels in Korea would be “good for Korea” (11 percent said very, 49 percent somewhat), while 40 percent expressed concerns (6 percent very bad, 34 percent somewhat bad).43

  • 44 DongA Ilbo, 29 June 2004.

40It is also quite miraculous that the hostage incident in Iraq did not galvanize public opinion in South Korea to place blame and responsibility for the tragedy on “imperialist America.” nor did it lead to the forging of a strong consensus for immediate withdrawal from the U.S.-led campaign. Instead of accusation and blame, the South Korean public mostly approached the unfortunate incident from the perspective of human rights violations and anti-terrorism. For instance, when the progressive Joengyojo (Korean Teachers’ union, KTU) announced its plan to mourn the death of Kim, it explained that the weeklong extra-curricular activities would mainly involve anti-war education. As for the main themes, these activities were designed to provide young students with opportunities to be reminded that peace is a universal value and that violence would only breed more violence.44 in cyberspace, internet users engaged in a series of heated debates among themselves about whether their country should contribute more actively to anti-terrorist campaigns after this personal tragedy. On balance, grievance over the loss of life and a condemnation of violence, rather than blame and spiteful faultfinding, dominated the collective psychology of the Korean public.

  • 45 Kim, Ah-young. “Old Wavers or a New Surge? Anti-Americanism from a South Korean Perspective.” Paci (...)

41These are certainly positive developments in the U.S.– Korea relationship. However, if we juxtapose what happened in 2002 and in 2004, these changes are perplexing anomalies. It should be recalled that almost everyone who wrote about anti-American sentiment in Korea said that there had been a series of events leading to its actual highpoint in late 2002. There was no shortage of writing on the wall: Bush condemned north Korea as one of “the axis of evil;” Anton Ohno walked away with the gold medal at the short track final race of the winter Olympic games; Jay Leno mocked the disqualified Korean skater, joking that he was so angry that he ate his dog; and the two U.S. soldiers who had been charged with the deaths of two Korean female students were judged not-guilty by the U.S. military court.45

42The situation in 2004 was remarkably similar. South Koreans remained fearful of possible unilateral military action by the United States against nuclear North Korea, as they witnessed the Bush administration launch a war on Iraq without the endorsement of the United Nations. The war was soon followed by the scandal of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Again at the Olympics, Paul Hamm, an American gymnast, edged ahead of two Korean gymnasts and won the gold medal in the individual men’s All-Around because three judges had failed to award a Korean the correct points (based on the degree of difficulty) for his routine. Then, the President of Harvard University mistakenly said that, “over a million girls in Seoul during the 1970s were prostitutes.”46 And famous talk show host Oprah Winfrey made disparaging comments about Korean women for their “obsession with plastic surgery.”47 in real-life politics, President Bush praised and thanked Japan for its support in the Iraq war in both his acceptance speech at the republican convention and during the first presidential debate, but made no mention of South Korea’s contributions. And both presidential candidates affirmed that in dealing with North Korea, a policy of preemption would not be off the table. In short, if one compares the litany of small and large events, the general atmosphere between South Korea and the United States in 2004 was not markedly better than two years earlier. As a matter of fact, cumulative public poll data indicates that the image of the united States in South Korea, which nosedived in late 2002, returned to its pre-2002 level in 2004 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Changing Image of the United States in South Korea
(DongA Ilbo Survey 2004)

Figure 1: Changing Image of the United States in South Korea(DongA Ilbo Survey 2004)

43What accounts for this fluctuation of opinion? Why has there been no outburst of anger towards the United States?

44After all, a period of two or three years is not long enough for either generational change to take place or for a certain age group to reverse its orientation on key political issues. For anti-Americanism, the passage of time has only augmented the voice of the age groups who are more critical of the United States, since the conservative and pro-American older generations are mostly retired or deceased.

  • 48 For policy suggestions to increase diversity in bilateral dialogue, see moon, Katharine h. S. “Sou (...)

45One could suggest that both governments took measures that successfully prevented mutually sensitive issues from developing into full-fledged anti-Americanism. Although it is quite plausible that the governments might have learned a lesson or two from what they had experienced, there is no strong evidence that they actually made conscious and coordinated efforts not to repeat past mistakes, despite the advice of specialists on U.S.–Korea relations that it was essential for both leaderships to celebrate the solidarity of the alliance in a rather explicit and embellished way. According to them, this could abate the escalating tensions and antagonistic feelings fostered by aggressive media and public relations campaigns to educate both countries’ citizens to the facts and the role of the SOFA, aggressive public diplomacy towards civic organizations, and the elaborate celebration of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the mutual Security Treaty. But these suggestions were not seriously implemented.48 in short, within a period of two years, anti-American rhetoric in South Korea dissipated regardless of political interventions.

  • 49 Watts, “next Generation Leaders”: 13.

46The phenomenon of the “missing anti-Americanism” in South Korea leads us to rethink what we thought we knew but in fact did not know about Korean anti-Americanism, and to reassess what now seem to be known unknowns. For starters, anti-Americanism is a misnomer, a term that clouds rather than clarifies our understanding of what has happened in the domestic politics of Korea and its relationship with the United States. Uncritical usage of the term easily creates perceptions of an anti-American movement in South Korea as something unprecedented, unfounded, unpredictable, and dangerous. This perception has promoted frustration, a sense of hurt and anger among the Korean people on the one hand, and between Koreans and American observers on the other hand. This has allowed analysts and policymakers to divert their attention from understanding the substantive characteristics of anti-Americanism in Korea and its complex nature. As William Watts observes, what the united States has observed may be more accurately characterized as a decline in pro-Americanism, rather than as the rise of anti-Americanism.49

  • 50 Kim, Jinwung. “The nature of South Korean Anti-Americanism.” Korea Journal (Spring 1994): 41.
  • 51 Moon, Katharine h. S. “Korean Democracy, NGO Activism, and Anti-Americanism (mimeo).” IFANS Semina (...)

47Moreover, we need to remember that anti-Americanism is a multi-faceted phenomenon. One consensus among researchers on anti-Americanism in South Korea is that anti-Americanism means many things to many people, defying a clean-cut definition.50 its definitions range from “critical views of the united States held by Koreans, including perceptions of U.S. policies and the behavior of individual Americans, especially those in uniform,” to “any hostile action or expression toward the united States, its government, domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people,” to simply “an increase in criticisms of, and dissatisfaction with U.S. policies” or “South Koreans’ antipathy towards America.”51

  • 52 Moon, Chung-in. “Between Banmi (Anti-Americanism) and Sungmi (Worship of the U.S.),” 139–152; Hahm (...)

48The multiple definitions of anti-Americanism do not necessarily imply confusion among its observers. Rather, it casts doubts about regarding anti-Americanism as a monolithic concept. Anti-Americanism is a phenomenon and a trend, the analysis of which should be made in a particular historical and political context. Chung-in moon and Chai-bong Hahm caution that it is important to distinguish between the different layers of anti-Americanism.52

49For example, anti-Americanism as a collective grievance towards the political entity of the United States is not fixed, but tends to fluctuate with changes in Korean domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, South Koreans as a whole have tended to embrace the universal values embodied in the American culture and system. The sporadic, inconsistent, and ambivalent manifestations of anti-American sentiment in Korea primarily result from the dynamic shift in the balance between these different strands: historical grievances, domestic politics, U.S. foreign policy and transnational values and norms.

  • 53 Cha, Victor and David Kang. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Colu (...)
  • 54 One U.S. official commented on the American reaction to the anti-American movement in South Korea (...)

50Making sense of South Korea’s ever-changing and complex sentiments towards the united States must be especially challenging for the united States, which has become so accustomed to believing that the majority of Koreans have only one image of the united States, that of a savior and patron responsible for Seoul’s security and prosperity since the beginning of the cold War. Victor cha and David Kang highlight the irony of the long success of American military engagement with South Korea. They argue that, because the United States was so deeply accustomed to having South Korea as an obedient and dutiful ally throughout the cold War, it has failed to remember that the anti-communist, conservative and dependent South Korea that existed during the cold War may have been more of “an aberration than the rule.”53 hence the sudden arrival of a vocal, independent, and democratic South Korea that refuses to manage the alliance according to American preferences and rules came as a total shock to U.S. policymakers and the American public.54

  • 55 Shorrock, Tim. “The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americ (...)

51What is needed today is for the United States to make an effort to maintain a sound working relationship with Korea despite the absence of the old premium it has enjoyed since the Korean War and the cold War. With the rapidly growing civic participation in domestic politics since the inauguration of the first civilian government in 1992, especially in the areas of national security policymaking, and the rising national pride and confidence fed by economic development, post-cold War South Korea has increasingly refused to tolerate American heavy-handedness and the asymmetric structure of the security partnership. In the United States, the predominant response to such a different South Korea has largely been emotional bitterness and a grudge over the alleged breach of faith and ingratitude. Such emotional reactions in the United States stem from unrealistic expectations of a “feeling of genuine warmth towards the u.S.”55 The image of America as a savior continued to dominate the national psyche of Koreans more than half a century after the end of the Korean War, and the military alliance forged in the aftermath of the Korean War fifty years ago should continue to operate without major restructuring. A vibrant, young, and democratic Korea is not an easy reality, but a reality to begin with nonetheless.

CONCLUSION

52Democratization in South Korea began in 1987 when Koreans regained their political rights to freely choose their leadership through direct presidential election. The end of military authoritarianism also granted previously alienated political actors an access to debates and deliberations on the issues of national security and unification. The advent of the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2003 was a symbolic affirmation of a steady trend in which the anti-communist and alliance-first principle of the conservative elite establishment became subjected to serious questioning and reappraisal both in and outside the leadership.

53The generation gap is one of the most defining features in South Korean politics today. On the one hand, youth represents the rise of progressive or left-leaning politics, and threatens to dislodge the political establishment that has been in power. Young people who are politically active and former dissident activists who dominate the Blue house (President’s Office) are referred to pejoratively as ppalgaeng-i (“reds,” “commies”). On the other hand, progressives tend to pigeonhole conservatives as well, excoriating them for corruption, elitism, and dependence on big powers. Each fears that the other is misguided and ruining the nation. This Manichean tendency is the most regrettable consequence of the rapid democratization of South Korea. But it also reveals the ongoing transitional malaise and resentment that accompany the structural upheavals in political ideology, generation, class identity, regional and international competition, and related factors, in contemporary Korean society.

54The collective expressions of anti-American feelings reflect tumultuous new political dynamics in South Korea. Yet, the task before policymakers and academics is to look past the great confusion and contractions in the political scene and carefully consider their nature, causes, and consequences. There have been generational transitions underlying the anti-American movement, but the connection between youth and the danger of anti-Americanism is underspecified and largely under-explained. Apocalyptic forecasts so popular just a few years ago seem misplaced and misleading in the face of placid but productive interactions between the two allies today.

55In order to maintain and renew their working relationship, both sides of the Pacific first need to escape from their old inertia, and admit, beyond mere rhetorical concessions, that the context of the bilateral relationship as well as the domestic politics of both countries has truly changed. There is no doubt that civic activism in addressing and protesting against the U.S. military presence will continue. Yet these political movements will increasingly tend toward “lawfulness” in procedure and moderation with pragmatism in goals. In the long run, democratic consolidation is likely to have a stabilizing effect on feelings of anti-Americanism among the youth, and lead to its pragmatic manifestations.

Notes

1 “Interview with President-Elect Roh Moo-hyun.” Sisa-Journal, 13 February 2003; Donga-Ilbo, 19 February 2003. See also “Roh Becomes South Korean President,” The Associated Press, 24 February 2003.

2 Kim, Seung-hwan. “Yankee Go home? A historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United States, 2001–2004” in Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.–ROK Alliance, ed. Derek Mitchell (Washington, Dc: center for Strategic and international Studies, June 2004), 24–35.

3 Richard V. Allen, “Seoul’s choice: The U.S. or the north,” New York Times, 16 January 2003, A 29.

4 Moon, Chung-in. “Between Banmi (Anti-Americanism) and Sungmi (Worship of the U.S.): Dynamics of changing U.S. images in South Korea” in Korea’s Attitude toward the United States: Changing Dynamics, ed. David I. Steinberg, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 139–142; Kim, Hakjoon. “Sunshine or Thunder?: Tension between the Kim and Bush Administrations in historical Perspective.” Korea Observer no. 1 (2003): 1–40.

5 Eberstadt, Nicholas. “Our Other Korea Problem.” National Interest 69 (Fall 2002): 113.

6 Ibid, 110–118.

7 Lee, Sook-Jong. “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the U.S.–Korea Alliance,” Paper Presentation, 16 June 2004, 20. Available at the center for northeast Asia Policy Studies, (Washington, D. c.: Brookings institution.), http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/20040616.htm, last accessed 5 July 2004.

8 Thompson, W. Scott. “Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Government,” in Anti-Americanism: Origins and Context, special edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, ed. Thomas Perry Thornton, (Washington, Dc: SAIS, Johns Hopkins university, 1988), 25.

9 Shin, Gi-Wook. “South Korean Anti-Americanism: A comparative Perspective.” Asian Survey 36 (August 1996): 795–796.

10 U.S. Department of State, Office of research, Opinion Analysis: “Trends in South Korean Opinion of the U.S.,” 9 April 2003. Face-to-face interviews with 1,556 adults were conducted in Korea during 24 January – 4 February 2003.

11 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002, 56.

12 Hollander, Paul. Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), 382.

13 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003, 95.

14 Financial Times (London), 7 August 2004, available at http://0web.lexis-nexis.com.luna.wellesley.edu/universe/document?_ m=550feba8dae55f, last accessed 13 October 2004.

15 Ibid.

16 Donald Macintyre, “Flying Too high? The Korean pop music biz is Asia’s hottest,” available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/1101020729/story.html, last accessed 30 September 2004.

17 Iwabuchi, Koichi. Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism (Durham, NC: Duke university Press, 2002), Ch. 1.

18 Kim, hang. “Isip dae wa osip dae uisig bigyo” (Perceptional comparisons between the Twenties and the Fifties). Wolgan Chosun (Monthly Chosun) (July 2002): 593–602, esp. 600.

19 Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs/Perseus Books, 2004).

20 Pew. “Views of a Changing World.” (June 2003), 93–95.

21 Ibid, 85.

22 Moon, Katharine H.S. “Migrant Workers’ Movements in Japan and South Korea,” in Egalitarian Politics in the Age of Globalization, ed. Craig n. Murphy (London: Palgrave, 2002), 195.

23 Moon, Chung-in. “Globalization: challenges and Strategies.” Korea Focus 3, no. 3 (1995): 66.

24 “Saram i saram ege” (From One human to Another), Korean House for International Solidarity (April/may 2000): 16–20.

25 For instance, some highly-ranked U.S. officials and politicians expressed concerns about some Korean civic activist groups’ vilification of General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the U.N. coalition forces during the Korean War, as responsible for setting off massive casualties of Koreans. “Mi ‘MacArthur Dongsang Cheolgeoharyeomyeon charari Neomgyeodalla” (U.S. Demands the handover of the Gen. MacArthur’s Statute, if it is to Be Demolished), Donga Ilbo, 16 September 2005; Kim, Seunryun, “Mijidochung, Ijen Banhanneomeo Jorongggaji” (U.S. Leaders: now from Anti-Korean to mocking Korea, Donga Ilbo, 28 October 2005.

26 Lee, Seok-woo and Sung-ha Yoo. “An issue of conscience: conscientious Objection to military Service in Korea from a religious and international Viewpoint,” unpublished manuscript, 2005, 1–16; Jong-ju Na, “constitutional court upholds Security Law, Also rejects conscientious Objectors’ Petition,” The Korea Times, 26 August 2004; Hong Gu Han, “I Am Ashamed of myself in Front of Jehovah’s Witnesses,” The Hangyoreh 21, 3 June 2004, 87–89.

27 Moon, Seungsook. Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 123–146.

28 Available at http://srch.chosun.com/cgi-bin/www/search?did=10 10847&OP=5&word=..., last accessed April 15, 2003.

29 Chae, Haesook. “Understanding Anti-Americanism among South Korean College Students.” International Journal of Korean Studies 9, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2005): 107–126.

30 Chae, 113, Figure 1.

31 Bong, Youngshik, “Yongmi: Pragmatic Anti-Americanism in South Korea.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 10, no. 2 (Winter/ Spring 2004): 161.

32 Available at http://donga.com/fbin/news?f=print&n=200304010323, last accessed April 14, 2003.

33 For a survey of changes in public opinion and the crisis of the Korea–U.S. alliance, see Lee, Nae-young and Han-Wol Jung. “Banmi yeoron gwa hanmi dongmaeng” (Anti-American Sentiment and the Korea–U.S. Alliance). Gukgajeonrak 9, no. 3 (2003): 57-82.

34 Mitchell, Derek. “Does Popular Sentiment matter? What’s at Stake?” in Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.–ROK Alliance, ed. Derek Mitchell (Washington, D.C.: center for Strategic and international Studies, June 2004), 9.

35 Yonhap News, 8 October 2003.

36 Gallup Korea, “report on the Public Opinion on the War in Iraq,” 20 march 2003. The Gallup Korea survey in November– December 2001 on the future leaders of Korea showed that this general public opinion was not a deviation from the consensus among political elites. The levels of possible support South Korea might provide in what President Bush calls a war on terrorism, 76 percent give limited support, but do not include military involvement and 9 percent give no support. Watts, William. “Next Generation Leaders in the republic of Korea: Opinion Survey report and Analysis.” Potomac Associates, (May 2002): 15.

37 JoongAng Ilbo, 16 September 2003.

38 JoongAng Ilbo, 17 June 2004.

39 Lee and Jung, “Banmi yeoron”: 62.

40 Hwang, Balbina Y. “Defusing Anti-American rhetoric in South Korea.” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 1619 (January 2003): 1–5.

41 Kang, C.S. Eliot. “Restructuring the U.S.–South Korean Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean nuclear crisis.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 2 (2003): 309–324.

42 Kim, Sang-il. Interview with JoongAng Ilbo, 31 may 2004.

43 “Global Views 2004: South Korean Public Topline report.” The Chicago council of Foreign relations, (September 2004): 13.

44 DongA Ilbo, 29 June 2004.

45 Kim, Ah-young. “Old Wavers or a New Surge? Anti-Americanism from a South Korean Perspective.” Pacific Forum CSIS report, (2003): 8–14.

46 Available at http://news.kbs.co.kr/ispecial/ps00204.php?id=512, last accessed 12 October 2004.

47 “Oprah Winfrey’s negative remarks about Korean Women Spark Storm,” Chosun Ilbo (English edition), 15 October 2004.

48 For policy suggestions to increase diversity in bilateral dialogue, see moon, Katharine h. S. “South Korean civil Society and Alliance Politics,” in Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.–ROK Alliance, ed. Derek Mitchell. (Washington, D.C.: Center For Strategic and international Studies, June 2004), 56–8.

49 Watts, “next Generation Leaders”: 13.

50 Kim, Jinwung. “The nature of South Korean Anti-Americanism.” Korea Journal (Spring 1994): 41.

51 Moon, Katharine h. S. “Korean Democracy, NGO Activism, and Anti-Americanism (mimeo).” IFANS Seminar, May 17–8, 2002, 1; Kim, Jinwung. 37; Hwang, Balbina y. “The implications of Anti-Americanism in Korea for the Future of the U.S.– ROK Alliance.” Korea Observer 34, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 41.

52 Moon, Chung-in. “Between Banmi (Anti-Americanism) and Sungmi (Worship of the U.S.),” 139–152; Hahm, Chaibong. “Sadewa Banmi Saiaseseo” (Between worshiping the great and Anti-Americanism). Quarterly Sasang (Winter 2000): 52–68.

53 Cha, Victor and David Kang. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia university Press, 2003), 171.

54 One U.S. official commented on the American reaction to the anti-American movement in South Korea that generally speaking, it is hard for our senior military people to believe that we are not loved. We are doing God’s work, and if people don’t appreciate it, there is something wrong with them. Howard W. French, “Shifting Loyalties: Seoul Looks to new Alliance,” New York Times, 26 January 2003, A15.

55 Shorrock, Tim. “The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americanism.” Third World Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 1198–1199.

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