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Struggle over Identity

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Nelly Bekus

Part V. Struggle over Identity

Chapter 21. National Ideology of the Belarusian State as a Political Articulation of Official Belarusianness

Texte intégral

  • 1 Sergei Nikoliuk, “Vozvrashchenie bludnoi docheri. Poisk natsionalnoi identichnosti ovladevaet umam (...)
  • 2 “Demokratia i natsionalizm kak alfa i omega politichesoko processa,” Adktytaie gramadstva no. 2 (1 (...)

1In alternative discourses, the Republic of Belarus governed by A. G. Lukashenka is presented as an anti-Belarusian and anti-national formation. Nevertheless, many authors who observe the developments in the country from the outside note that the process of intense institutionalization and reification of Belarusian nationhood has taken place during the country’s independence period. There is a national idea behind this process: “in no area Belarus has moved so far during its years of independence as in the mobilization on the ground of the national idea,” writes the Belarusian political scientist Sergei Nikoliuk.1 On the one hand, one can speak about the development of national self-awareness due to the establishment of a sovereign national state. “Formation of the Belarusian nation is taking place now, before our eyes, on the territory we have acquired after the disintegration of the USSR. It takes place, first of all, because the people who now live within the boundaries of modern Belarusian state begin to form mutual interests whose realization can be beneficial to all of them, irrespective of their ethnic identity or language they speak. The very fact of the independent Belarusian state existence makes us more and more Belarusians from year to year.”2

2On the other hand, many authors admit that this is also the result of the policy conducted by the authorities. The particular role of the Belarusian president in “nationalization” of Belarusians, has been commented on, as he “has probably done more for the consciousness of the independent Belarusian nation than any Popular Front or the most convinced nationalists could do.”3 In this sense, when the Belarusian president is seen as “a dictator without an ideology, only with a business plan”4 this is not quite true. The ideology of the Belarusian state is in its “national project,” based on its interpretation of Belarusianness.

3Certainly the format of the Belarusian national idea, propagated via official discourse, essentially differs from the Belarusianness conceptualized in alternative discourses. It is based “not on the idea of national revival by which the leaders of the national democratic movements of the 1980s–90s were guided, but on the idea of the national exclusiveness of Belarus as a model of a state-society, its unique character devoid of any outside influence.”5

  • 6 Zaprudnik, “Belarus: in Search of National Identity,” 122.
  • 7 Ivan Antonovich, “Mnie sniatstsa sny ab Belarusi,” Nasha Niva, March 16, 2007.
  • 8 Anastasia Mitrofanova, “Khrustalnyi sosud ideologii, ili belorusskii proekt,” Nepri kosnovennyi za (...)
  • 9 Zaprudnik, “Belarus: in Search of National Identity,” 118.

4Some authors recognize the existence of the official national project of the Belarusian government, but with the understanding that behind it there is little more than a simple aspiration to preserve its own status and power. The nationalization of Belarusian political life by the authorities is related to the desire “to resort to the national awareness of the population as a sort of barrier against absorption of national sovereignty by Russia, which would unavoidably reduce the status and the role of Belarusian bureaucrats, including Lukashenka.”6 In the context of the confrontation of the Belarusian President with the Kremlin, Lukashenka is portrayed as a fighter for Belarusian independence. According to Antonovich, a former party nomenclature member, “our president Lukashenka acquired a proper place in history, because he did not ‘give in’ and did not allow to incorporate Belarus into Russia when he was urged to do so by Moscow ‘liberals’ and when Belarus was actually faced with the ultimatum—gas or sovereignty— sovereignty for the Belarusian people became a mature political value, which it obtained after centuries of demand.”7 Russian political scientist Anastasia Mitrofanova also believes that Belarusian official nationalism has a forced character and, in fact, appears as a result of lost political game. “Relations with the West are deteriorated, and the integration with Russia is held back. It contributes to the creation of the besieged fortress consciousness. But the Belarusian nation, as well as the Soviet people, is built on an ideological basis.”8 However, the result is the same, even if the true purpose for strengthening the national feeling of Belarusians by official methods is to make the position of the current regime more secure. Be la rusians become stronger as carriers of the Belarusian national idea, and the phrase “our country” (nasha kraina in Belarusian, nasha strana in Russian), which prior to 1991 meant the Soviet Union, now means Belarus.9

5Those Belarusians who support the government also display a high status of identification by means of their belonging to the country, and a high “pride index” for being citizens of Belarus. As a matter of fact, these data mean that a significant part of Belarusians accept the idea of Belarusian ness offered by the official political discourse.

6The speeches and statements of the president of Belarus, in which he sets forth the basic provisions of state ideology, as well as monographs and textbooks on ideology, provide a concise image of “official Belarusianness.” In all these texts there is a reference to the Belarusian way of development, Belarusian tradition, and characteristics of the Belarusian mentality. All these are part of the foundation of the official concept of the Belarusian nation.

  • 10 M. A. Ermolitcki et al., Model ustoichi vogo razvitia Respubliki Belarus’: ideologia, sistema uptr (...)

7The ideology of the state started to be developed in the 1990s, stimulating academic and scientific exploration of the subject.10 Three basic values of this ideology were formulated: strong presidential power, a socially oriented economy, and Christian (or, to be precise, Orthodox) values. In public space, the ideology of the Belarusian state emerged in 2003, when it became not only a theoretical, but also a practical issue. On March 27, 2003, the President of Belarus spoke at the seminar “On Measures to Improve the Ideological Work” for senior ideological management, where he stated his vision of a new state ideology. The ideology preserved the main theoretical theses, apart from several relatively new ideas (such as Belarus’ messianic role as spiritual leader within the East Slavic civilization). An additional stress was made only on the applied character of the ideology. It should work to educate citizens. The necessity of teaching ideology to students, popularizing its values by means of the state-run mass media, was also discussed.

  • 11 V. Bobrovich, “Gosudarstvennaia ideologiia pro et contra,” Filamaty 3, no. 6 (2003): 58–59.
  • 12 “Mirovozzrencheskaia sostavliaiushchaia,” Sovestkaia Belorussia, September 25, 2003.
  • 13 “My—kto eto?” Sovestkaia Belorussia, May 12, 2004.
  • 14 S. N Kniazev, et al., Osnovy ideologii belorusskogo gosudarstva, Uchebnoie posobie dlia vuzov (Min (...)

8Characterizing the format of the Belarusian state ideology V. Bobrovich writes that “in the traditional sense it is not a political ideology. According to its content, it is much closer to such concepts as an ‘ideology of statehood’ or a ‘state idea’.”11 Indeed, constant appeals to the Belarusian people, their traditions and national developments blur the conceptual boundaries between national ideology and the ideology of the state. For example, Sovetskaia Belorussia, a mouthpiece for the state, uses such concepts as “ideology of statehood” and “national ideology” as synonyms.12 According to the newspaper, state ideology is the way out of the crisis of national identity, in which Belarusians have found themselves since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.13 The ideology of the Belarusian state is “called to strengthen the sociopolitical consolidation of society, to become a national force able to unite the country’s citizens into an integrated Belarusian people.”14

9The concept “national” is widely used in the official Belarusian discourse, in contradictory ways. The word “national” is constantly present in the media and is part of names of different public institutions and services: the National Library, the National Academy of Sciences, First National (the name of the Belarusian TV channel), the National television and radio broadcasting company, national security, and cultural national legacy. All these are meant to confirm and emphasize the national status and sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus.

10At the same time, the President speaks about the “open nationalism of the Belarusian opposition” as something alien to the Belarusian people.15 “Nationalism is absolutely unacceptable to our people. That is because internally we are the most internationally minded people.”16 These statements, however, are combined in the official rhetoric with claims of the national idea as an essential aspect of the state life, because its internalization is a guarantee for a successful development of the country. The same text declares: “The national idea should be based on people’s awareness of statehood and the primacy of national interests. And such awareness is developed throughout the whole life of the individual. Since birth, through kindergarten, school, university everyone should understand such concepts as the Motherland, patriotism, the people, history, culture not just logically, and to absorb them in the soul. Without it it’s impossible to preserve the state and to build a good life.”17

11A passage of this type would look equally at home in texts by oppositional Belarusian nationalists, as would the appeal “Let the flame of freedom and independence of the Fatherland never go out of our hearts”18 found on the official Web page of the Belarusian president. However, the official context sets its own parameters in the understanding of the national idea. There is “good” and “bad” nationalism traced in the official rhetoric of Belarusian authorities. Without the “good” nationalism it is impossible to build and preserve the state. (Valery Mikheiev names patriotism [the Soviet version of nationalism] “a spiritual core of the Belarusian people.”)19 Behind the “bad” nationalism there is political opposition, which is influenced and supported by the West (the fact that makes it possible to declare it an external, and therefore alien, notion to the Belarusian nation). When the Belarusian president declares: “This opposition is a pro-Western nationalism opposition,” it sounds like a verdict: it is not Belarusian, as it is created and financed by the West.20

12The official Belarusian national idea is based on a few fundamental guide lines. It stresses its own tradition and history; it has a positive philosophy of the Soviet experience on the whole, and a recognition of the necessity to reproduce its components in an independent Belarus; it carries an appeal for Slavic unity, with reliance on Russian culture as a counterbalance to Western values; and it refers to the peculiar mentality and special qualities of Belarusian people (such as collectivism), which form the basis of a Belarus–Europe relationship. The idea of social equality, which according to the official ideology is a truly Belarusian idea, and is the backbone of socialism, plays an important role in the counterbalance to the Western civilization and capitalism. This idea is rooted in the symbolic matrix of Belarusianness, which had been articulated as early as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during the first stage of Belarusian nationaldevelopment. The official discourse makes use of the fact that the Belarusians had never existed as a formal nation within capitalist formation.

  • 21 Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation,” 90.

13Thus, if the lack of a capitalist social structure in the post-Soviet period was seen by Miroslav Hroch as a cause and aspiration for Eastern European nationalists to transform society into a capitalist system with a capitalist class,21 for the official Belarusian ideology it becomes the motivation to oppose such transformations.

  • 22 Kurczewska, “Kanon kultury narodowej,” 30.
  • 23 A. G. Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologiche skoi rabote,” Mar (...)

14As Kurczewska writes, “The significance of the national community is determined above all by its presence in primary socialization, and also by the fact that it is predisposed to cultivating nativeness, blaming alienness, and preserving a monolithic vision of the past, which is conducive to the stability and compulsory character of a canon.”22 Stating its Belarusianness, the official ideology widely uses the metaphor of “kinship:” “The ideology of the state should be built on its own foundation. Being in his senses a Frenchman will not want to adopt the American way of life, a German the Russian way, and so on. Each nation grows and develops on its native ideological ground. We will do the same.”23

  • 24 A. G. Lukashenka, “Istoricheskii vybor Respubliki Belarus. Lektsia v BGU,” March 14, 2003, http:// (...)
  • 25 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

15“The native-ours” is aggressively opposed to the “foreign-western.” It is in this rigid opposition that the independence of the Belarusian state is maintained in the official discourse. “We have built a democratic social state, relying not on a foreign single-type project, but on historical traditions and our people’s desire, because we trust in creativity of the people, their wisdom, diligence and courage.”24 A moral reasoning with regard to their own country is also introduced. It is an appeal to “the country as a family,” which makes it possible to differentiate its native and foreign values in the most understandable and emotional way. In his report on ideology President Lukashenka states: “It is senseless to copy someone’s values and aims on the basis of the fact, that this or that country is strong and rich at the present time. In fact, we do not abandon our parents, though they are not millionaires.”25

  • 26 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

16The thesis about one’s own experience, culture, and the foundations of statehood requires a more solid support and reasoning—and such reasoning is provided by a “tradition.” “One should be careful with such borrowings as ideals, values and aims. Our own traditions, ideas and values, aims and purposes, make the ‘backbone’ of our people. They are not made up, but gained through the suffering of our people; they are the result of the natural adaptation of society to the natural and social environment.”26

17An appeal to “the natural way” of our own values’ formation in the discourse of official Belarusianness is necessary for strengthening the effect of alienation from any alternative ways of its definition. Thus, according to the president, the ideology of liberalism is deeply alien to the Belarusian people’s mentality. As a counterbalance to Western individualism, he says, we should be guided by collectivism and mutual aid, social trust, and respectful relations between the state and the people.

  • 27 E. M. Babosov, Osnovy ideologii sovremennogo gosudarstva (Minsk: Amalfeia, 2004), 213–19.
  • 28 Babosov, Osnovy ideologii sovremennogo gosudarstva, 220–21.
  • 29 Babosov, Osnovy ideologii sovremennogo gosudarstva, 220–21.
  • 30 A. V. Kazlovich, “Unutrypalitychnae zyc’ce i miznarodnyia adnosiny,” in Belarus na miazhy tysiacha (...)
  • 31 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

18The source of these ideological principles, in the view of Evgeni Babosov, the author of Osnovy ideologii sovremennogo gosudarstva (The Bases of the Ideology of the Contemporary State), is the mental basis of the Belarusian people, such as patriotism, collectivism, kindness, as well as self-esteem and personal independence.27 Babosov also pays attention to the combination of patience and forbearance, on the one hand, and intolerance to any oppression, on the other hand.28 In the official ideology “peoplehood” and collectivism appear as integral features of Belarusianness. “Collectivism is, so to say, something national, something that is in Belarusians’ blood, and it is something that should be kept and strengthened.”29 It is the collectivist mentality that is viewed as one of the main reasons for the failure of liberal reforms in Belarus. Western strategies of liberal reforms “did not correspond to the collectivist mentality in the post-Soviet space, moral principles and traditions, constant search for the good and justice.”30 Western values are alien to “Belarusians, people of community, who do not accept absolutization of private property.”31

  • 32 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”
  • 33 “Vechno zhivi i rascvetai, Belarus’!” July 3, 2005, http://www.president.gov.by/press13718.html#do (...)
  • 34 V. A. Melnik, Gosudarstvennaia ideologia Respubliki Belarus’: kontseptualnyie osnovy (Minsk: Tesei (...)

19The idea of Slav unity also makes a reliable foundation for Belarusian ideology, and in its description the official discourse frequently uses organic metaphors. Although nationalists aim at “cutting off the Belarusian branch from the common spiritual Slav tree,”32 the Belarusian authorities see their mission in preservation of this tree. All integration efforts of the president are focused on it. “Ideas of the Belarusian statehood are closely connected with the ideas of Slav unity, brotherhood and cooperation of the peoples.”33 In this context, when Belarusianness is placed on the territory of Slav civilization, ideas of the union with other states “inside” this civilization do not contradict, but develop an idea of Belarusian independence: “the political strategy of the President of Belarus A. G. Lukashenka is expressed in his policy, which deals with the creation of the union state of Belarus and Russia. One should qualify this strategy as historically justified and utterly corresponding to the Belarusian national idea.”34

  • 35 The leader of the 1863–64 rebellion against the czarist rule. Also recognized as a Polish and Lith (...)
  • 36 During the Polish–Lithuanian January Uprising of 1863, Murav’iov was appointed Go ver nor General (...)
  • 37 A. Feduta, “Kollektivnyi politinformator i agitator. Izbrannye mesta iz uchebnikov po go su darstv (...)

20The geopolitically predetermined idea of Belarusian tradition is represented in the assessment of the Belarusian past. Those periods of history, when Belarusians together with the Poles or Lithuanians were members of the same states, are declared to be alien to the Belarusian tradition, which is more linked to the periods of history related to czarist or Soviet Russia. Considering such ideological directives, as Belarusian author Aleksander Feduta notices, it is not surprising that in the official history textbooks “all fighters against the czarist oppression, including the national hero of Belarus, Kastus Kalinouski,35 are presented as ‘Poles,’ and their activities are looked upon as a result of the influence of Catholicism, but the notorious count Mikhail Murav’iov36 who lives in the people’s memory as the ‘hangman,’ was posthumously characterized as a talented administrator.”37 Also, the decision made by the president to withdraw the award named after Kastus Kalinouski from the list of Belarusian state awards, follows the roadmap of the ideological shaping of official Belarusianness, which relieson commonness with Russia and separateness from Europe in the past.

  • 38 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

21All Belarusian history is the subject of a certain politically determined interpretation within the official historical narration, though the basic source of the Belarusian tradition is considered to be the Soviet era. “[W]e were a part of the great, large state, and all ideology was within that state […] That ideology was in fact our Belarusian ideology too.”38

  • 39 Viktor Chernov, “Nishcheta ideologii ili ideologiia nishchety,” Filamaty 3, no. 6 (2003): 47.
  • 40 A. Rubinau, “Eshche raz ob ideologii,” Sovetskaia Belorussia, July 28, 2006.

22This formulation, in spite of the obvious conflict of meaning between the notions of “Soviet” and “Belarusian,” is in its own way a sensible one. As the Belarusian political scientist Victor Chernov writes, “Sovietness” was for Belarusians an organic form of expression of their “ethnomarginality,” moreover, it was a way of their identification with the “the Great Country of Soviets.” One can say that due to such identification an original, Soviet–Belarusian “nationalism” was stimulated—a truly Soviet Belarusian felt, that he or she was the “most Soviet of the Soviet.”39 The Belarusian nation is viewed as a product of Sovietness: “today’s Belarus has grown up not out of the ideas of nationalists-in-exile, but out of the truly brotherly family of the Soviet Republics, due to the common efforts of all the peoples, and, first of all, of the Russian one.”40

23Ideologists of the official Belarusianness constantly emphasize the relevance and the positive nature of the Soviet experience, “succession” (implying the preservation of Soviet traditions through various practices of the state and public life) is proclaimed to be one of the principles of the state policy. “The state policy is to adhere to the established mechanisms and traditions, to improve some aspects of the policy that had taken place before, in order to improve its efficiency and progression.”41

  • 42 Laptenok, “Belarus’— voiennyi i nravstvennyi forpost.”

24In the official interpretation, all Belarusian tradition is focused on Soviet time, and Belarusian history is focused on World War II. Laptenok, the author of the texts on the president’s Web page, writes that “in those difficult years Belarusians struggled not only for the common victory, but also for the sovereignty of their country.”42

25It is not clear which country—Belarus or the Soviet Union—stands behind this concept of “their country;” however, this ambiguity does not contradict the construction of an identity that merges Belarusianness with Sovietness. The people’s memory focused on the Great Patriotic War undergoes a similar reduction. “The state policy is based on its commitment to the historical memory of the people—the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The introduction of the course ‘the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people’ in the curricula of the educational institutions has been a reflection of this commitment.”43

26There is a discrepancy in the basic guidelines of the Belarusian ideology. Victor Chernov describes it as “an eclectic set of separate elements of Marxism and Keynesianism, the market and feudal socialism, liberalism and conservatism, pan-Slavism and nationalism, atheism and Ortho doxy.”44 However, as another Belarusian author Ianov Poleskii remarked, the Belarusian ideology is “a project that has failed in its theoretical part, but which has been a success in its practice.”45

  • 46 Clelia Rontoyanni, “Belarus and the East,” 134.

27The practice of state ideology like the Belarusian one means its successful internalization by people. When studies of patterns of Belarusians’ self-perception show that the prevailing majority of Belarusians support integration with Russia on the grounds that Russians and Belarusians are historically one people, that they are spiritually close, and have similar languages, cultures, and traditions,46 it indicates that the way most Belarusians perceive their Belarusianness reflects certain guidelines of the official discourse.

Notes

1 Sergei Nikoliuk, “Vozvrashchenie bludnoi docheri. Poisk natsionalnoi identichnosti ovladevaet umami sootechestvennikov,” Belorusy i rynok, May 24–31, 2004, http://www.belmarket.by/index.php?article=22032&year=2004.

2 “Demokratia i natsionalizm kak alfa i omega politichesoko processa,” Adktytaie gramadstva no. 2 (11), 2001, http://data.minsk.by/opensociety/2.01/5.html.

3 Fedor Lukianov, “Belorussia kotoruiu my ne ponimaem,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas no. 47, 2006, http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2006/47/lu12.html.

4 Tom Stoppard, “Accidental Tyranny,” Guardian, October 1, 2005, http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,12084,1581238,00.html.

5 Lukianov, “Belorussia kotoruiu my ne ponimaem,” http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2006/47/lu12.html.

6 Zaprudnik, “Belarus: in Search of National Identity,” 122.

7 Ivan Antonovich, “Mnie sniatstsa sny ab Belarusi,” Nasha Niva, March 16, 2007.

8 Anastasia Mitrofanova, “Khrustalnyi sosud ideologii, ili belorusskii proekt,” Nepri kosnovennyi zapas, no. 3 (47) (2006), http://www.nz-online.ru/index.phtml?aid=80011760.

9 Zaprudnik, “Belarus: in Search of National Identity,” 118.

10 M. A. Ermolitcki et al., Model ustoichi vogo razvitia Respubliki Belarus’: ideologia, sistema uptravlenia, mechanism realizacii v soiuze s Rossiei. (Minsk: Tekhnoprint, 1999); “Ideologiia belorusskoi gosudarstvennosti: problemy teorii i praktiti,” Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii, November 1998, Minsk.

11 V. Bobrovich, “Gosudarstvennaia ideologiia pro et contra,” Filamaty 3, no. 6 (2003): 58–59.

12 “Mirovozzrencheskaia sostavliaiushchaia,” Sovestkaia Belorussia, September 25, 2003.

13 “My—kto eto?” Sovestkaia Belorussia, May 12, 2004.

14 S. N Kniazev, et al., Osnovy ideologii belorusskogo gosudarstva, Uchebnoie posobie dlia vuzov (Minsk: Akademia Upravleniia pri Prezidente Be larusi, 2004), 225.

15 Stenogramma press-konferentsii Prezidenta A. G. Lukashenka dla predstavitelei rosiiskikh regionalnykh SMI, November 24, 2005, http://www.president.gov.by/press18888.html#doc.

16 S. D. Laptenok, “Belarus’—voiennyi i nravstvennyi forpost,” http://www.president.gov.by/press14033.html#doc.

17 S. D. Laptenok, “Belarus’—voiennyi i nravstvennyi forpost,” http://www.president.gov.by/press14033.html#doc.

18 S. D. Laptenok, “Belarus’— voiennyi i nravstvennyi forpost,” http://www.president.gov.by/press14033.html#doc.

19 V. M Mikheiev, Ideologiia: razmyshleniia i vyvody (Minsk: Tonpik, 2004), 219.

20 Stenogramma press-konferentsii Prezidenta A. G. Lukashenka, http://www.president.gov.by/press18888.html#doc.

21 Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation,” 90.

22 Kurczewska, “Kanon kultury narodowej,” 30.

23 A. G. Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologiche skoi rabote,” March 27, 2003, http://www.president.gov.by/press29213.html#doc.

24 A. G. Lukashenka, “Istoricheskii vybor Respubliki Belarus. Lektsia v BGU,” March 14, 2003, http://www.president.gov.by/press29279.html#doc.

25 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

26 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

27 E. M. Babosov, Osnovy ideologii sovremennogo gosudarstva (Minsk: Amalfeia, 2004), 213–19.

28 Babosov, Osnovy ideologii sovremennogo gosudarstva, 220–21.

29 Babosov, Osnovy ideologii sovremennogo gosudarstva, 220–21.

30 A. V. Kazlovich, “Unutrypalitychnae zyc’ce i miznarodnyia adnosiny,” in Belarus na miazhy tysiachagoddziau, ed. A. P. Vaitovich et al. (Minsk: Belaruskaia entsyklapedia, 2000), 276.

31 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

32 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

33 “Vechno zhivi i rascvetai, Belarus’!” July 3, 2005, http://www.president.gov.by/press13718.html#doc.

34 V. A. Melnik, Gosudarstvennaia ideologia Respubliki Belarus’: kontseptualnyie osnovy (Minsk: Tesei, 2004), 147.

35 The leader of the 1863–64 rebellion against the czarist rule. Also recognized as a Polish and Lithuanian national hero.

36 During the Polish–Lithuanian January Uprising of 1863, Murav’iov was appointed Go ver nor General of the Northwestern Krai (now Belarus, Lithuania). He promptly subdued the rebellion, burning or resettling all Belarusian, Polish and Lithuanian villages to Siberia. About 9,000 people were resettled, 127 hung. Konstanty (a.k.a. Kastus) Kalinouski was executed on his order.

37 A. Feduta, “Kollektivnyi politinformator i agitator. Izbrannye mesta iz uchebnikov po go su darstvennoi ideologii Respubliki Belarus’,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas 3, no. 47, (2006), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2006/47/fe14.html.

38 Lukashenka, “Doklad na seminare rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov po ideologicheskoi rabote.”

39 Viktor Chernov, “Nishcheta ideologii ili ideologiia nishchety,” Filamaty 3, no. 6 (2003): 47.

40 A. Rubinau, “Eshche raz ob ideologii,” Sovetskaia Belorussia, July 28, 2006.

41 “Glavnye printsipy gosudarstvennoi politiki Respubliki Belarus’,” http://www.president.gov.by/press10897.html#doc.

42 Laptenok, “Belarus’— voiennyi i nravstvennyi forpost.”

43 “Istoriko-kulturnyi potentsial Belarusi,” http://www.president.gov.by/press10640.html#doc.

44 Chernov, “Nishcheta ideologii ili ideologiia nishchety,” 30.

45 Ianov Poleskii, “17 Thesis,” Nashe Mnienie, March 14, 2005, http://www.nmnby.org/pub/140305/seven.html.

46 Clelia Rontoyanni, “Belarus and the East,” 134.

© Central European University Press, 2010

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