1 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 272.

2 Ibid. p. 200.

3 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 12–13, 115–117. In sharp contrast to Scowcroft’s skepticism, the career CIA experts in the Office of Soviet Analysis predicted continuing Soviet defense cuts, an eagerness for conventional forces reductions, a willingness to be flexible on verification, and Gorbachev’s commitment to “political leverage instead of military strength to promote the USSR’s security.” See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Moscow’s 1989 Agenda for US-Soviet Relations,” SOV 89-10012X, February 3, 1989 (Bush Presidential Library Copy).

4 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, see for example pp. 40, 43, 71, 78, 114.

5 For extended analysis of the Bush administration’s characteristic insecurity, see Blanton, “U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989,” in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History.

6 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 40.

7 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 71.

8 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 71; see also Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 67–68.

9 See, for example, Don Mahley Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, “Next Steps on SNF,” January 30, 1989 (Bush Library 2010-2911-MR, declassified June 22, 2012); Brent Scowcroft Memorandum for the President, “Short-Range Nuclear Forces and NATO’s ‘Comprehensive Concept,’” n.d. (Bush Library 2010-2914-MR, declassified September 13, 2012).

10 Philip Zelikow Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, “Next Steps with the Germans on SNF,” March 13, 1989 (Bush Library 2010-2911-MR, declassified June 18, 2012): “Teltschik will not be coming this week” and “other political factors are at work…” Also, “Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl,” April 21, 1989 [talking points labeled “The President Has Seen”] (Bush Library 2010-2914-MR, declassified June 6, 2012): “We’ve been trying to engage you for some time on this issue….”

11 Document No. 74.

12 See the discussion of “Soviet Foreign Policy Reborn” and quote in Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 192.

13 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 73–79.

14 For the colorful details of these uncomfortable meetings, see Sebestyen, Revolution 1989, pp. 301–305.

15 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 126.

16 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 88–92.

17 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 130.

18 Ibid., p. 132 compared to pp. 156–159.

19 Bush’s actual letter to Gorbachev, July 21, 1989, see Document No. 76. This 3-page note “which I have personally written,” contains the characteristic Bush sentence: “In my view, it would be preferable to avoid the word ‘summit’ which is, at best, overworked, and at worst, a word whose connotation is one of a momentous happening.”

20 For extended analysis and documentation on these points, see Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History.

21 Document No. 79.

22 Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft, “Foreign Government Reaction to the President’s Announcement of His Upcoming Meeting with Gorbachev,” November 2, 1989 (Bush Presidential Records, White House Office of Records Management, Subject File: C.F. Bush Library FOIA 1999-0273-F). The memo was couched as a draft for Scowcroft to send on to Bush, but the national security adviser scribbled in the margins, “Unnecessary. CIA had run down of reactions (public + private) in PDB [President’s Daily Brief] this a.m. Thanks anyway.”

23 Arnold Kanter/Robert D. Blackwill, Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, “Possible Initiatives in the Context of Malta,” November 24, 1989 (Bush Library 2008-633-MR).

24 Department of State, Information Memorandum to Secretary Baker from Gen. Edward L. Rowny [Special Adviser for Arms Control], November 17, 1989, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive.

25 Document No. 85.

26 26Naval Arms Control,” n.d., Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Arnold Kanter Files, Subject Files, Summit (Malta)–November 1989 [3]. (Bush Library FOIA 1999-0273-F, declassified May 28, 2008).

27 See Brent Scowcroft, Memorandum for the President, “How to Think about Naval Arms Control,” n.d. (Bush Library 2008-0627-MR, declassified August 15, 2012).

28 National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-89, “The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years,” November 1989, in Fischer, ed., At Cold War’s End, pp. 49–81. The Helgerson dissent is on p. 75.

29 Brent Scowcroft to the President, “National Security Council Meeting, November 30, 1989,” George H.W. Bush Library, NSC Files, FOIA request F93-1217.

30 The President’s Meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev, December 2–3, 1989, Malta [Briefing Book for the President]. Excerpts (contents pages, selected released pages). Source: George H.W. Bush Library, FOIA request 99-0273-F.

31 Document No. 110, Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History.

32 Ibid.

33 Document No. 80.

34 Memorandum of Conversation of George H.W. Bush, John Sununu, Brent Scowcroft, and Helmut Kohl, December 3, 1989, Document No. 111 in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History.

35 Condoleezza Rice subsequently called Gorbachev’s position at Malta on the U.S. staying in Europe “revolutionary change” (see Sebestyen, Revolution 1989, p. 403), but Gorbachev had explicitly made such assurances—to the Trilateral Commission delegation in January 1989 in answering a question from Henry Kissinger, repeatedly in conversations with Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, among other leaders, and publicly in his famous Strasbourg speech on June 6, 1989. The Americans in the White House (in contrast to the State Department’s INR, for example) were apparently not listening, and as late as November 21, 1989, President Bush had suggested to West German Foreign Minister Genscher, much to the latter’s surprise and disagreement, that Gorbachev would propose at Malta the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany and Europe—the old American fear that the Soviets were attempting to “decouple” the U.S. from Europe. See Bush-Genscher memcon, November 21, 1989, George Bush Library, released under 2007-0051-MR.

36 The American memcons of the Malta conversations are published in this volume, while the Soviet transcript first appeared in English in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, Document No. 110, pp. 619–646.

37 Brent Scowcroft [memorandum to the President], “National Security Council Meeting, December 5, 1989 (Bush Library 2005-0965-MR).

38 For example, during the productive September 1989 ministerial between Baker and Shevardnadze in Wyoming, the secretary of state promised to address Soviet concerns about U.S. early-warning radars in Greenland and Great Britain. But the Pentagon reflexively vetoed the very idea of Soviet site visits to Thule and Fylingdales, seeing no benefit in confidence building or reciprocity, and predicting only pressure on the allies that might threaten modernization plans for the radars. See Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) [Paul Wolfowitz], Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Arms Control and Defense Policy [Arnold Kanter], November 1989, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Arnold Kanter Files, Summit (Malta)–November 1989 [5] (Bush Library FOIA 1999-0273-F and 2008-0634-MR).

39 Excerpt from Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary, January 2, 1990. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB317/chernyaev_1990.pdf.

40 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1139.

41 Information Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to President Bush, “Scope Paper—Your Visit to Poland.” June 29, 1989, George H.W. Bush Library, obtained through FOIA 1998-0194-F by the National Security Archive [original in Condoleezza Rice Files, President’s Trip to Poland/Hungary 7/89 (1c)].

42 Sentence crossed out in the original document. [Editors]

43 Information Memorandum to Secretary Baker from Gen. Edward L. Rowny, November 17, 1989, U.S. State Department, obtained through FOIA by the National Security Archive.

44 Chernyaev’s notes indicate the key missing word is probably “Marxism.” His version reads: “Now, about Nicaragua. You said that the Sandinistas are not real Marxists. Earlier I had a different opinion, but today I would tend to agree...” (Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, p. 631). [Editors]

45 Chernyaev’s version reads: “The Soviet Union has no plans with regard to spheres of influence in Latin America. This was and will continue to be the case. This continent is now in motion. You know it better than I do. I agree with you: the general trend is positive, democratic; dictatorships give way to democratic forms, although these are young, newly formed democracies...” (Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, p. 633). [Editors]

46 Chernyaev quotes Gorbachev as follows: “I would like to stress that we view positively the change that created these possibilities for normal contacts, broader cooperation and trade between the two German states,” (Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History, p. 635). [Editors]

47 Emphasis in the original. [Editors]

48 An illustrated weekly magazine and key glasnost outlet, with a progressive editor, Vitaly Korotich. [Editors]