Version classiqueVersion mobile
OpenEdition Books

Modernism: The Creation of Nation-States

 | 
Ahmet Ersoy
, 
Maciej Górny
, 
Vangelis Kechriotis

Chapter IV. Federalism and the decline of the empires

The future of the Monarchy

Oszkár Jászi
Traduction de Dávid Oláh

Texte intégral

1Title: A monarchia jövője. A dualizmus bukása és a dunai Egyesült Allamok (The future of the Monarchy. The fall of dualism and the Danubian United States)

2Originally published: Budapest, Új Magyarország, 1918. German edition: Der Zusammenbruch des Dualismus und die Zukunft des Donaustaaten (Wien, 1918)

3Language: Hungarian
The excerpts used are from chapter 9 ‘Magyarország és a demokratikus föderalizmus,’ (Budapest: Maecenas, 1988), pp. 59–71.

About the author

4Oszkár Jászi [1875, Nagykároly (Rom. Carei, present-day Romania) – 1957, Oberlin, Ohio]: politician and political scientist. He came from a secularized Jewish middle-class family which converted to Calvinism during his childhood. He studied in Hungary, France and England. Inspired by positivist sociology (especially Herbert Spencer) and a non-dogmatic understanding of socialism, Jászi emerged as the most prominent figure of the Hungarian civic radical movement. He was editor-in-chief of the journal Huszadik Század (Twentieth century), which was the most important ‘left-liberal’ social sciences periodical of the time. Jaszi was also secretary of the radical Társadalomtudományi Társaság (Social Sciences Association) and leader of the Civic Radical Party (founded in 1914). He played a prominent role during the Hungarian Revolution of 1918, and was a minister in the government of Mihály Karolyi, with the special task of negotiating with the representatives of the nationalities. In his talks with the Transylvanian Romanian leadership in Arad, he offered wide concessions, but being obviously too late this could not prevent their declaration of union with Romania (December 1918). After the collapse of the Károlyi government and the declaration of the Soviet Republic (21 March 1919), Jászi refused to cooperate with the Communists and emigrated to Vienna, becoming the editor of the Bécsi Magyar Ujság (Viennese Hungarian journal). In the early-twenties, he attacked the ‘counter-revolutionary’ Horthy-regime, and tried to establish some kind of relationship with the liberal political elites of East Central Europe (mainly with Czech intellectuals). In doing that he lobbied for certain political concessions to Hungary provided that a democratic government was formed. From 1925, he lived in the United States, where he taught sociology at Oberlin College and published a series of important political-sociological analyses. In the 1930s and 1940s, he adopted an anti-totalitarian stance and increasingly distanced himself from Karolyi, who was willing to cooperate with the communists on an anti-fascist political platform. Although Jászi visited Hungary in 1947, he did not settle permanently and spent the remaining years of his life in the United States. He is considered the most important Hungarian radical democratic political thinker of the twentieth century and ranked among the most prominent Central European scholars of nationalism.

5Main works: Művészet és erkölcs [Art and morality] (1904); A történelmi materi-alizmus állambölcselete [The political philosophy of historical materialism] (1908); A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzeti kérdés [The formation of national states and the nationality issue] (1912); Mi a radikalizmus? [What is radicalism?] (1918); Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary (1924); The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (1929); Against the tyrant: the tradition and theory of tyrannicide (with John D. Lewis, 1957).

Context

6From the beginning of his political activities, Jászi was the proponent of concessions to the nationalities in Hungary, albeit within the framework of the overall democratization of the country. Nevertheless, in his works before the First World War, he considered the economic pressure of the processes of modernization to be the catalyst of greater integration. Consequently, he hoped to convince his mainly urban and Hungarian-speaking audience that the introduction of radical political reforms would not threaten the existence of the Hungarian state. A democratic Hungary—the ‘Switzerland of the East’—might become a strong focus of identification for its citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity. Jászi and his circle of social scientists in the journal Huszadik Század (like the sociologist Robert Braun) formed the intellectual group in Hungary most prone to cooperation with the political leadership of the nationalities in the fight for universal suffrage and national emancipation. In the first years of the World War, he advocated the Mitteleuropa-project of Friedrich Naumann which envisioned a supra-national reorganization of the region dominated politically and economically by the Germans; while, in 1917–1918, he turned towards the program of national self-determination articulated by Woodrow Wilson, and became an ardent proponent of the ideas of pacifism and European integration based on universal democratization.

7By 1918, it became obvious that the traditional focus of Hungarian politics, the dualist framework, was utterly untenable and the Czech, Romanian, Italian and South-Slav secessionist movements were threatening the Monarchy with dissolution. It was in this context that Jászi formulated his federalist project. It was an attempt to find a common ground between several, rather divergent, positions. These included the political aims professed by the Entente (the satisfaction of the claims of the ‘oppressed peoples’ in Eastern and Central Europe), the program of the national movements in the region, the Austro-Marxist discussions on solving the nationality question in the Habsburg Monarchy (see Karl Renner, State and nation and Otto Bauer, The Austrian revolution), the idea of a Central European integration against Germany and Russia, the Hungarian discursive tradition of Danubian federalism (having its roots in the liberal nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century (see Lajos Kossuth, Proposal Concerning the future political establishment of Hungary), and, last but not least, the claim of the ‘historical integrity’ of the Hungarian state. By the summer of 1918, however, the Western powers had already agreed that the Monarchy was to be dissolved, and the green light was given to the formation of nation-states in the region. ‘The Future of the Monarchy’ appeared in October 1918, when its program was in many ways obsolete (the nationalities were openly claiming national sovereignty), but it expressed the way of thinking and intellectual horizons of the Hungarian radical-liberal public opinion.

8Chapter 9 of the book contains the most important arguments which were meant to convince the Hungarian audience that connecting democratization and federalism was the only way out from the political and institutional crisis of the Monarchy. Jászi developed his argument in the form of an answer to the claims of Mihály Réz (1878–1921), a conservative legal scholar and theoretician of the nationality question close to the official establishment. Responding to these concerns, Jászi played down the possibility of the secession of the nationalities in the event of radical democratization, at the same time he did not envision the territorial federalization of Hungary proper. Instead, he advocated a ‘pentarchy,’ consisting of Austria, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and Illyria, which he considered to be the only viable political framework guaranteeing the stability of the region. In his opinion, the greatest opposition to this transformation in Hungary comes from the class-based chauvinist alliance of feudalism (the landed aristocracy and the ‘post-feudal’ gentry) and financial capitalism. Contrary to this ‘oligarchy,’ Jászi claimed, the broader Hungarian masses did not have an interest in the maintenance of the dualist system and would profit immensely from a federal and democratic transformation of the Monarchy. While developing his argument, he distanced himself from the Hungarian ethno-nationalist discourse which prophesized the death of the nation if the nationalities were given a free hand in choosing their political allegiance. He also emphatically rejected the Vienna-centered and socially conservative projects of federalization, such as the Grossösterreich-plan promoted by Aurel Popovici and other political thinkers around Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent murdered in 1914. In his opinion, there was a chance that the democratic transformation of the country would create such a strong political bond among the different nationalities of the Monarchy that they would opt for cooperation rather than secession.

9The concrete political program of the book was to a large extent illusory. What Jászi considered a highly improbable outcome, namely that national identification would supersede any other type of social and economic bond or interest, became the basis of the reorganization of East Central Europe after the Great War. The afterlife of his ideas is to be found in the history of political thought rather than in political history per se. Some of the key arguments of the book were developed in Jász’s later works, in which he analyzed the process of the dissolution of the Monarchy. He hoped to contribute, in the long run, to the formation of a democratic political culture in the region, abandoning the illusions of keeping to the ‘historical’ vision of Hungarian statehood. Therefore, his political and intellectual commitments were incompatible with the nationalist fervor of mainstream Hungarian political culture in the interwar period. This made him the constant target of attacks, on the grounds that he was personally responsible for the collapse of ‘historical Hungary.’ His ideas, however, found their ways to the populist movement of the 1930s, which envisioned a Danubian federation of agrarian democracies. As for the period after 1945, due to his staunch criticism of Bolshevism, Jászi’s intellectual heritage was almost completely marginalized. There was a certain revival of the ideas of civic radicalism, however, in the 1970s and 1980s (reflected in the works of Peter Hanák and György Litván), when it became a common point of reference for some of the reform communists searching for intellectual precursors and some of the intellectuals of the ‘democratic opposition’ who considered Jászi the key figure of the anti-totalitarian left-wing tradition and a principal inspiration for solving the thorny national conflicts of the region in a rational manner.

10BT

The future of the Monarchy. The fall of dualism and the Danubian United States

Hungary and democratic federalism

  • 1 Kuruc: anti-Habsburg military movement in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries in H (...)

11Is it true that it is in Hungary’s best interest to fight to her last breath against the system of democratic federalism? The advocates of this doctrine are largely recruited from those who today still wish to preserve the dualistic system. From their perspective, the doctrine is perfectly justified. Indeed, this constitutional system provides abundant benefits for Hungarian feudalism and its ally, banking capitalism which could not be guaranteed by any other power relation of public law: the opportunity of a parity sharing of all the bureaucratic, military and diplomatic advantages granted by the glorious position of a great power (and this sharing will be all the more favorable for the Hungarian oligarchy as the anarchic internal strife and the inability to cooperate increases in the other half of the Monarchy); the uninterrupted enjoyment of tax and duty privileges of the latifundia; the occupation of all influential positions in the county and state administration and the hermetic exclusion of the growing middle-class of the nationalities from them by means of the hypothesis of “saving the homeland”; the so-called “self-government” serving submissively the interests of the ruling classes and keeping the proletariat and the masses of the nationalities firmly in check; the Hungarian and the Austro-German banking capitalism portioning out the fat bits between them, the ample state support of capitalism; the simplicity of channeling any kind of social unrest into the ancient emotional currents of the rebellious anti-Viennese kuruc1 ideology which is always easily raked up. Undoubtedly, these are advantages that no other state structure could grant to feudalism and finance-capitalism. [...]

12Thus the conservative state philosophy wishes to base the future of Hungary on a situation in which ten million Hungarians and ten million Austro-Germans try to keep up a dictatorial supremacy over about 9 million Czechs and Slovaks, 10 million Southern Slavs, 25 million Poles and 12 million Romanians. This supremacy would obviously be based on 50 million Germans in the German Empire, but they fail to consider that there are 80 million Russians confronting such a solution. This degree of chauvinistic megalomania can only be explained by the influence of the often mentioned class rule psychosis!

13This kind of logical class reasoning, however, cannot sway the emotions of the larger masses, so the advocates of dualism mobilize more instigating and more general arguments to discredit every initiative aimed at the overthrow of the dualistic system. There are basically six such arguments. Let us look at them one by one:

14a) By a clever generalization, they make the concept of democratic federalism appear to be identical with the Germanizing Grossösterreich theory, or make it seem like Popovici’s simplistic plans which would, on the basis of the ethnographic principle, dismantle ancient historical formations that make up organic economic as well as spiritual units. We have seen and we shall see in even more detail that our concept is logically the very antithesis of both.

15b) The plan of a Danubian United States would sever Croatia from Hungary and thus would deprive her of her free sea passage.

  • 2 . It is interesting to note that the Hungarian views with regard to the Croatian issue had been muc (...)

16However, the new confederation would not sever the ancient historical ties between them but place them upon a foundation more solid, because they would be more satisfactory for both parties. It is the advocates of dualism who often complain that Croatia costs us too much and that we keep losing money on the Croatian connection, while the Croatian parties all agree that one of the main grievances of the Croatian nation is financial: Hungary is growing wealthy at their expense. Such a mutual judgment of the situation is bound to embitter Hungarian-Croatian relations and sooner or later will result in embarrassing conflicts.2

  • 3 Slov. Trst, in present-day Italy.
  • 4 Cro. Rijeka, in present-day Croatia.
  • 5 Cro. Dubrovnik, in present-day Croatia.

17In contrast, the planned new federation would sustain everything that is important and productive for the two states in this orientation (the unity of the market, joint defense, solidarity in foreign policy) but eliminate everything that may lead to discord or mistrust. And as for the passage to the sea, it goes without saying that the new alliance will manage all of its ports and its more important river systems upon joint principles. The major ports should be granted a certain international character and a far-reaching free autonomy, and the confederation would be in command of so many harbors that it would be easy to work out some kind of distribution of labor which would bring, for instance, Trieste3 mainly with the German, Fiume4 with the Hungarian, and Ragusa5 principally with the Slavic economic centers into close contact via the most effective routes. But to cut off any part of the alliance from the sea would be an endeavor just as futile and harmful as if Hamburg would suddenly decide to favor one state of the German Empire against all the others or to debar another one by force.

18c) The system of democratic federalism would sever the Slovak counties and the Serbian areas from Hungary. This argument apparently finds a formal justification in the excessive demands of the Czechs and the desperate measures of the Serbs. However, we have already shown that even a quite extensive application of the ethnographic principle would produce precious little effect for the unity of the Czech nationality and even less for the interests of the Yugoslav state. Both of these claims seem to bear the marks of a revolutionary slogan and political character instead of a serious calculation based on Realpolitik.

19If the Czechs and the Southern Slavs pursued such an irrational policy they would incite the resistance of the whole Hungarian nation against their aspirations for independence in return for some dubious and insignificant readjustments of the frontier. For it is quite evident that the Austrian forces maintaining the system of dualism would not be able in themselves to hold up the federal reform of the constitution, and the dualistic system can only be maintained as long as the whole of Hungary lines up beside it uniformly.

20d) That may well be, but the danger to Hungary comes not only from the Czech and Yugoslav states to be established; the Slovaks and Serbs in Hungary would themselves be less and less willing to remain in the Hungarian state as the Czech and Yugoslav state will be gaining strength. We do indeed believe that both the Czechs and the Southern Slavs as well as their kinsfolk in Hungary would, for the time being, welcome enthusiastically the pentarchic state system outlined in the present study as well as the internal system of autonomous nationalities that would accompany a democratic federalism. But one must have an overwhelming ideological bias to fail to realize that the people of both the reborn Czech state and Illyria as well as their kinsfolk in Hungary would only regard this achievement as a first payment whose finaliza-tion would be followed by an even more vehement outburst of the Czech and Southern Slavic irredentist movements even without their being fomented by the Czech and Yugoslav states. Such a movement would emerge simply because no kind of democratic concession could make the situation of the Slovaks and Serbs so favorable that they would not feel an accession to the Czech state or Illyria preferable. Compared to the glamour of a Czech and Yugoslav state life, the autonomy granted loyally by Hungary would still be a rather confined and dissatisfactory framework for our Slovaks and Serbs. This assumption is even more likely as Czech and Southern Slavic democracy is already more developed than the Hungarian one, and it would progress even more rapidly within an adequate national statehood. [...]

  • 6 Franz Oppenheimer (1864–1943): German sociologist and political economist.

21This objection is the weight that can be brought up against our plan, because it is not based on a feudal motivation but, to the contrary, on the psychology of democracy, the Gesetz der Strömung in the sense formulated by Oppenheimer,6 who claimed that people migrate from the site of a greater social pressure towards the site of less social pressure. Well, no matter what kind of democratic transformation took place in Hungary, for her Slovaks, Serbs and Romanians she would always remain the site of a greater social pressure compared with the Czech state, Illyria and Romania, since it would always be better, more pleasant and more illustrious to be a Slovak in the Czech state, a Serb in Illyria or a Romanian in Romania than in Hungary.

22Without doubt, one’s first impression is that this objection is psychologically well-founded and its practical inferences are correct. Nevertheless, I believe that a more profound analysis of the situation may lead to the rectification of both the starting point and the deductions. The main aspects would be the following:

23The whole argument is too strongly based on today’s venomous relations which hinder our nationalities’cultural and political freedoms. Their desperation and resistance to this social pressure may easily give the impression to a superficial observer that our Slovaks and Serbs want to have nothing to do with us, and that what they primarily want is not cultural and political freedom but a common statehood with their kinsfolk. Those who think along these lines indeed underestimate centuries-old bonds of a community of fate in the same state, existing economic and emotional values, which tie our nationalities to Hungary and which are becoming more and more manifest every day with the decrease of cultural and political pressure. That this view is not some piece of labored sophistry is shown by the examples of Switzerland and Belgium, which can keep their nationalities together in the vicinity of the most illustrious national states of the world. And yet in actual fact how meager are the opportunities of Switzerland, weak, tiny and scantily provided for by nature, or Belgium, condemned to the role of a buffer state, compared to the ones that a democratized Hungary with its liberated cultural forces could give to her nationalities. Once the cultural and administrative autonomy of the Slovaks and the Serbs is adequately ensured, once they can take their fair share of every sphere of Hungarian state life, once they can have free contact with their Czech and Southern Slavic kinsfolk in the areas of economy and culture, then their belonging to the Hungarian state will not be a burden for them, and it may even have further value, because in the great concert of confederates they would be able to make use of the bountiful economic, cultural and organizational advantages provided for them by the historical Hungary. They would be the truly competent mediators and developers of Hungarian-Czech and Hungarian-Southern Slavic economic and cultural connections!

24It is true that to reach this stage, a quicker democratic and cultural progress is required, and it is also beyond doubt that the existing democracy of the Czechs and the Southern Slavs is more developed than the Hungarian one. But as we have seen, the sine qua non of the planned alliance would be the full-scale democratization of Hungary, which would make it possible for Hungary not just to reach, but even to surpass the Czech and Southern Slavic democracy, because the potential energies of democracy are greater and more wide-ranging here due to the more opulent economic, ethnographic and geographic resources.

25But even if these statements were considered too optimistic, and even if Hungary did remain an area of relatively greater pressure for our Slovaks and Serbs, it does not necessarily follow that the irredentist endeavors would gain strength due to the changes outlined above. This depends only on whether the pressure would increase or decrease compared to the earlier situation. And who would dare to doubt that the international and internal changes we have recommended would alleviate the pressure immensely. If this pressure today cuts wounds into the bodies of the millions living under it, in the new order it would merely instill in a narrow layer of intellectuals a feeling of discomfort.

  • 7 Originally, Venio nunc ad fortissimum virum – “I am coming to the strongest man.” (Cornelius Nepos (...)

26And in any case—et nunc venio ad fortissimum7—the influx from the sites of the greater social pressure to the sites of a lesser one can only take place under two conditions: the first is that this migration is actually possible; the second is that it does not require sacrifices disproportionate to the advantages to be attained.

27Well, in our case the situation is further complicated by the fact that it would concern the migration of the population of whole regions and not isolated individuals, and this would only be possible through an annexation or cession. Yet we have seen that a Czech–Slovak unification would not be feasible without the creation of large blocks of Hungarian minorities, which would replace Slovak irredentism with an even more desperate Hungarian one. Moreover, such a situation could only be achieved by force, because the majority of the Hungarian nation would consider the violent dismemberment of a thousand-year-old state detrimental. Well, great and overwhelming pressure differentials can create a senselessly warmongering public calling out for goals that are in fact unattainable; but that a liberated Czech state and Illyria with their unimpeded growth or the nationalities in Hungary just released from the worst social pressure could be rushed into a war which would only serve the state-founding ambitions of a fragment of the Slovak and Serbian bourgeoisie would indeed be a preposterous idea that cannot be adopted even by those who, under the impact of the present war, tend to see human nature in the most pessimistic light.

28e) In the present system of dualism Hungary enjoys half of the power; it would be foolish of her to content herself with one-third or even one-fifth of it. This argument evidently stems from the feudal theory that sees power as nothing else but dividing up all the influential offices and leading posts. This theory, however, is only valid from the point of view of the privileged classes. From that aspect the wider social strata power means an economic, spiritual and moral prosperity. And this can be much more fully guaranteed within a large and peaceful federation than in any other system based on blocking the development of certain peoples.

29f) The system of democratic federalism would overthrow the rule of Hungarians in Hungary and would lead to the nationalities gaining ground. This argument is only true in the sense that the federal transformation of the whole Monarchy can only be achieved through the absolute democratization of all of its members and particularly Hungary. And in fact this democracy would by necessity ruin the present form of Hungarian supremacy, which pursues an arbitrary policy of assimilation: no democratic Hungary is conceivable without having an all-embracing regard for the rights of the national minorities. However, this trend of development would not mean the increase of centrifugal tendencies; quite the contrary, it would produce their definitive elimination, a real, intensive and spontaneous co-operation between Hungarians and the nationalities instead of the present system of dumb hostility, which revives, as it were, the silent trade of the primitive peoples between Hungarians and the nationalities.

30The cultural hegemony of the Hungarians in Hungary is not based on force and the deprivation of rights but on their advantage in numbers, their economic strength, cultural prevalence and their favorable geographical position. All these advantages would be enhanced instead of being diminished by the new constitutional order. Hungary is the natural geographical center of the new confederation: she would be the organic and indispensable link among all member states. It is hardly possible to conceive an economic and cultural integration among individual states without her. This is why we can see during the whole course of our historical development how the neighboring countries have gradually established a more and more organic contact with Hungary. This has been true for Poland just as for Bohemia, for Croatia just as for Dalmatia, for Serbia just as for Wallachia. Albeit this contact was a loose feudal one, it is impossible to fail to notice the more realistic and deeper solidarity of interests beyond merely military and dynastic connections. Hungary has always played the role of mediator of Western—and above all German—culture to the East and the South. This role would, as a matter of course, remain and even increase in significance in the future. The more the cultural and economic life of the Danube Basin and the Balkans flourishes, the more significant will become Hungary’s role as a mediator.

31Indeed, even its greatest problem and frictional disorder, the question of nationalities, would become a source of strength and cohesion in the minute she took on the attitude of friendly co-operation instead of a hostile isolation towards the neighboring states and her nationalities. After all, in this case Hungary would enjoy a certain cultural hegemony not only due to her central position, her most ancient and most compact historical frameworks, her centuries-long routine in the art of politics, her favorable geographical conditions or the advantageous nature of her land, but also because containing the kinsfolk of all the member states of the confederation in her own area, she would have at her disposal a population with the function of a natural ethnographic mediator for the transmittal of all economic and cultural stimuli, initiatives and organizations.

32Unfortunately, so many emotionally overwrought Romantic passages have been written about Hungarian hegemony and supremacy that an almost unequalled national megalomania has developed. The average Hungarian newspaper reader will believe without the least hesitation that it would be enough to declare Hungarian independence, and this independent Hungary would be able to live in a proud isolation from its neighboring countries and in a haughty supremacy over her nationalities. Few people realize how impossible and Utopian such a state would be or that the countries around Hungary are all strong and viable nations amongst which Hungary could only be a primus inter pares at most. And the more intensively she fulfilled her above mentioned historical mission of cultural mediation, the more adept she becomes at playing this role. But in no way could she behave as some lord dictating laws for vassal peoples. The replacement of this national megalomania with a real, modest but self-assured assessment of the nation’s powers and advantages would be a major moral prerequisite of the new confederate relations. This could only be attained through the downfall of Hungarian feudalism, which had been principally responsible for the development of this morale.

33Hungarian independence would thus not mean a haughty isolation but a sober self-determination; it would mean that Hungary could for once become a maker of her own fortune, and that she would have to sacrifice nothing of the opportunities of the future for the sake of a constrained constitutional system.

Notes

1 Kuruc: anti-Habsburg military movement in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries in Hungary, reaching its climax in the uprising of Ferenc Rákó-czi II. In a metaphoric sense the term was used for the anti-Habsburg political and cultural trends of later periods as well.

2 . It is interesting to note that the Hungarian views with regard to the Croatian issue had been much more tolerant and considerate before the Compromise of 1867. In 1862 Lajos Kossuth wrote that as early as 1843 or 44 he had proposed at the assembly of Pest county (“and my proposal was accepted”) that “if our Croatian brothers have grown weary of our 700-year-old contact, let the Parliament communicate to them that the Hungarian nation does not oppose their secession. Let them part in peace and may God help them in their separate ways.” In both the minority problem and the issue of Croatia, the Compromise clearly brought a radical change: the spirit of consideration and fair-mindedness was replaced by the spirit of domination. And in any case, to the same degree as the dualistic system strengthens the Hungarian ruling classes and diminishes the weigh of Austria, we may observe the declining standards and increasingly coarse tone of journalism and the literature of political science. The leading Hungarian circles apparently feel strong enough to evade all serious theoretical discussions. Now it is political power that makes up for the weight of arguments. [Author’s footnote]

3 Slov. Trst, in present-day Italy.

4 Cro. Rijeka, in present-day Croatia.

5 Cro. Dubrovnik, in present-day Croatia.

6 Franz Oppenheimer (1864–1943): German sociologist and political economist.

7 Originally, Venio nunc ad fortissimum virum – “I am coming to the strongest man.” (Cornelius Nepos).

Auteur

Dávid Oláh (Traducteur)

© Central European University Press, 2010

Conditions d’utilisation : http://www.openedition.org/6540