Introduction

1The life of the Spartan commander Dercylidas¹ may be chronologically divided into three parts, using as watershed his command in the Greek expedition in Asia because it is the period for which we have the greater part of information, mostly thanks to Xenophon’s Hellenica. Before and after this stage, various sources provide only scattered mentions that do not make it easy to reconstruct a comprehensive picture of his political and military activity².

2This paper, however, does not aim to provide an account of Dercylidas’ Asian expedition³, or a comprehensive biography of the commander; it is rather intended as a survey on his Xenophontean portrait, and therefore chronologically it will consider only the last two periods of his life. The Xenophontean portrait of Dercylidas consists not only of explicit assessments made by the historian about him, but also and importantly of the presentation provided by the historian of the conduct of the Spartan man in the episodes in which he is involved. In fact, it is well known that not only does Xenophon pay special attention to the figure of commanders⁴, but also that he is fond of providing portraits of the individuals who appear in the pages of his works⁵. The case of Dercylidas is significant in many respects, including the fact that the historian had a personal knowledge of the Spartan commander: this fact on the one hand ensures a well-founded judgment about his human characteristics and his military activity, but, on the other, could lead to a biased view because of the personal relationships between them.

3This essay is divided into four paragraphs: this introduction offers a brief summary of the information concerning Dercylidas which comes from Hellenica; the second paragraph, the core of the paper, is focused on his Xenophontean portrait, while the third supplies information about him provided by sources different from Xenophon, in order to check the trustworthiness of the historian’s picture; the last section contains final remarks about the figure of Dercylidas and his Xenophontean portrait.

4As a preliminary point, it is useful to provide a concise summary of Dercylidas’ operations in Asia, as far as they are known from Xenophon. They may be divided into two parts: the stage at which Dercylidas was the commander of Greek forces in Asia Minor, outlined in the first two chapters of Hellenica’s third book, and a few scattered pieces of information concerning the following period, contained mostly in the fourth book.

5Dercilydas was commander of the Greek troops in Asia between 399, when he replaced Thibron, and 396, when Agesilaus arrived in Ephesus.

• Season of war of 399 (Xen., HG, 3.1.8-10; 16-28). Dercylidas, having replaced Thibron at the head of the army, makes an agreement with Tissaphernes. In the Troad, he took possession of the cities of Larisa, Hamaxitus and Colonae, that voluntarily surrendered to him, and then obtained also Neandria, Ilium and Cocilium. Xenophon’s account is more detailed regarding other three cities: Cebren, notwithstanding an unfortunate sortie of Athenadas, a Sycionian official who criticised Dercylidas’ strategy, eventually voluntarily opened its own gates to the Greek army (§ 17-19); in Scepsis Dercylidas negotiated with the local ruler Midias, who then let the army enter the city (§ 20-21); lastly, Midias accompanied Dercylidas to Gergis, where the Greek commander took possession of the treasury that Midias had stolen from his mother-in-law Manias after killing her (§ 22-28).

• Winter of 399/398 (Xen., HG, 3.2.1-5). Dercylidas, having gained possession of nine cities in eight days, made a truce with Pharnabazus and planned to spend the winter in Bythinian Thrace, in order to avoid being a burden to his allies. Knights and peltasts arrived there from the Thracian Odrysians as reinforcements for the Greeks, but they suffered a heavy defeat by the Bythinians.

• Season of war of 398 (Xen., HG, 3.2.6-11). Dercylidas came back to Asia and arrived in Lampsacus, where he met three Spartan delegates who extended his assignment for another year and praised the troops for their respectful conduct towards the allies. As they returned to Sparta, the commander, having heard that they considered it a good idea to build a wall in the Chersonese, renewed the truce with Pharnabazus and returned to Europe in order to build that wall: its construction began in spring and was concluded in autumn, when Dercylidas went back to Asia.

• Approx. winter of 398/397 (Xen., HG, 3.2.11). Dercylidas sieged the city of Atarneus for eight months and conquered it.

• Season of war of 397⁶ (Xen., HG, 3.2.12-21). As a result of the complaints of the Ionian allies to the Spartans about Tissaphernes’ conduct, the ephors ordered Dercylidas to move to Caria. He met Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and their army north of the Meander, in Ionia: while Pharnabazus wanted to go into battle, Tissaphernes wished to reach an agreement with Dercylidas; they finally met and established that the king should allow the Greek cities to be autonomous and the Greeks should withdraw the army and the harmosts; they also made a truce, in order to have these proposal examined by Sparta and by the king.

6The next mention of Dercylidas is after the arrival in Asia of Agesilaus, who in 396 took command of the Greek army (Xen., HG, 3.4.5). Concerning this second part of Dercylidas’ life, Xenophon provides four pieces of information.

• • Xen., HG, 3.4.6 (396). Agesilaus, after arriving in Asia, started negotiations with Tissaphernes through three delegates: the satrap was willing to plead Agesilaus’ request to make the cities autonomous and Agesilaus was willing to grant a truce; one of the delegates was Dercylidas (with Herippidas and Megillus).

  • Xen., HG, 4.3.1-3 (394). Dercylidas reached Agesilaus at Amphipolis in order to inform him about the outcome of the battle of Nemea, a Spartan victory gained with heavy casualties among their allies. Agesilaus entrusted Dercylidas with notifying these events to the allies; his first destination was the Hellespont.

  • Xen., HG, 4.8.3-5 (394). After the Spartan defeat at Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Conon expelled the Spartan harmosts from many coastal cities and then Pharnabazus came back to his satrapy, because he heard that his old enemy Dercylidas, in contrast to many harmosts who had fled their cities, was still in Abydus. Dercylidas summoned the citizens of Abydus and successfully persuaded them not to be discouraged and to remain loyal to Sparta; then he moved to Sestus and there raised an army and in this way prevented those who were loyal to Sparta from being frightened.

  • Xen., HG, 4.8.39 (389/388). After the death of Thrasybulus, the Spartans became concerned about the situation in the area of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont because of the operations of Pharnabazus and of the Athenians. Consequently, they decided to send Anaxibius as new harmost of Abydus.

7From this point forward, Xenophon provides no more information about Dercylidas. Given this report, it is possible to carry out an analysis of the characteristics that Xenophon attributes to Dercylidas. The following paragraph (§ 2.1) collects features coming from the above mentioned passages, dividing them into three frameworks, i.e. the rational or emotional approach to events (A), the private sphere (B) and the public field (C); then, par. 2.2 compares these traits to explicit remarks given by the historian about him.

The Xenophontean portrait of Dercylidas

Traits of Dercylidas’ character

Rational behaviour and incidence of emotions

Rational behaviour

8Xenophon’s account presents a fair number of references to the use of reason on the part of Dercylidas, who in this respect is portrayed as a wise commander.

9As soon as he arrives at Ephesus in 399, Dercylidas realises (γιγνώσκω) that Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes were hostile to each other and on this animosity he sets his conduct (3.1.9). Later, when he took hold of Midias’ treasury, he spoke to some officials of his army informing them of the available amount of money, because he knew (γιγνώσκω) that the soldiers, having this piece of information, would be more disciplined and obedient (3.1.28). After his assignment was extended for the second year, Dercylidas moved to the Thracian Chersonese and there he built a wall in order to protect that region from Thracian depredations: he made this decision not only because he heard a conversation among Spartan delegates about it, but also because he noted (καταµανθάνω) that the land was thriving and prosperous (3.2.10). After completing the wall, Dercylidas observed (ἐπισκοπέω) the situation and noted that it was satisfactory with the exception of Atarneus, which was occupied by Chian exiles: he decided to seize the city, because he was informed (πυνθάνοµαι) that the occupants had plenty of food (3.2.11). When in the season of war of 397 the ephors ordered Dercylidas to move to Caria in order to wage war to Tissaphernes, he actually led the army to Ionia because he had heard (ἀκούω) that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus crossed the Meander toward Ionia (3.2.14).

10The verbs that appear in these passages (γιγνώσκω, καταµανθάνω, ἐπισκοπέω, πυνθάνοµαι, ἀκούω) indicate that Dercylidas’ decisions were the result of a rational analysis of the situation as he knew it and, for a general, acting with γνώµη was particularly important⁷.

11References to a rational approach are basically lacking in the second phase of Dercylidas’ activity, i.e. after Agesilaus took control of the Greek army in Asia: this appears as an obvious consequence of the fact that he had no more decision-making power and, therefore, this aspect becomes less apparent in the account of the source.

Incidence of emotions

12The issue of emotions in the ancient Greek world and of their incidence in historical events has been widely studied in recent years⁸: therefore, it is worth focusing also on this side of Dercylidas’ personality. In fact, Xenophon does not depict Dercylidas only as a rational man, but he also assigns to him a variety of emotions which may be distinguished between negative, like anger or hostility, and positive, like joy and pleasure.

13The first kind of emotions is more represented. On the one hand, we find anger and impatience. When in 399 the city of Cebren does not allow Dercylidas to take possession of it, he prepares to assault it, being angry (ὀργιζόµενος); but then he µάλα χαλεπῶς φέρει the fact that the sacrifices were not favourable for many days (3.1.17). Shortly afterwards (3.1.18), the Sycionian commander Athenadas, believing that Dercylidas was wasting time, tried to make a foray in order to interrupt water supply⁹ for the inhabitants of Cebren, but was killed: again Dercylidas gets irritated (ἀχθοµένου τοῦ ∆ερκυλίδου). On the other hand, also personal animosity is attested: since his arrival in Asia, Dercylidas noticed that Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes were on bad terms and thus decided to make agreements with the latter, because he was πολέµιος τῷ Φαρναβάζῳ. The reasons for this hostility, as Xenophon states, lay in the past, when, in the last years of the Peloponnesian war, Dercylidas, harmost in Abydos, having been slandered by the satrap about something that remains unknown, was sanctioned with a dishonourable punishment¹⁰. Since then, Dercylidas was hostile to Pharnabazus, as Xenophon repeats again in a passage dealing with events of five years later, at the time of the battle of Cnidus (4.8.3; see also 3.1.26).

14This being the framework, some remarks may be provided. In the first place, it is noteworthy that all references to anger are situated in the same episode, that of Cebren, when Dercylidas is disappointed for three different reasons. Apart from this occasion, Xenophon does not record any other incident in which the commander was upset and therefore we can not say that anger was a peculiar trait of Dercylidas’ character, at least according to the historian. Besides, the question arises whether this anger and the animosity against Pharnabazus adversely affected his management of the Asian affairs or not: in fact, anger is usually considered by Xenophon as a dangerous emotion for a general, because it prevents from being lucid and rational in decisions¹¹. But this does not seem the case of Dercylidas. His triple wrath is actually not groundless and, what is more, does not lead to uncontrolled reactions: in particular, notwithstanding the fact that he was angered because the sacrifices were not favourable, Dercylidas continued to immolate until the situation changed and only at that time he moved the army towards the gates of the city (3.1.19); besides, albeit being irate for Athenadas’ sortie, anger does not compromise his lucidity in reasoning since, rather than seeking an immediate revenge, he considers (νοµίζω) that, after that episode, any attack would be less spirited.

15As for the animosity against Pharnabazus similar considerations can be drawn. On the one hand, Dercylidas is angered for an old unspecified wrong endured by the satrap in the last years of the Peloponnesian war and this seems to be something emotional rather than rational. But, on the other hand, this wrath does not compromise the rationality of his political strategy: in fact, at the initial stage, he took advantage of the tense situation between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes (3.1.9); then he did not hesitate to make a truce with his πολέµιος Pharnabazus, both in the winter of 399/398 (3.2.1), and in the subsequent season of war (3.2.9), considering that this would be useful for his military tactics. Therefore, it clearly appears that Dercylidas, even though he has feelings of hatred against Pharnabazus, is not blinded by this emotion and rather preserves his lucidity¹².

16The second sphere of emotions, concerning joy and pleasure, is less represented. It appears in the spring of 398 when Dercylidas was pleased (ἥδοµαι) by the fact that the Spartan delegates who had visited him came back home crossing lands and cities that, thanks to his management, were in peace and prosperity (3.2.9)¹³. Afterwards, when he announced to Agesilaus, who had replaced him in Asia, the outcome of the battle of Nemea and the king entrusted him with bringing the announcement to the allies, who had suffered not few casualties¹⁴, he accepted this task ἄσµενος, because he was fond of travelling (4.3.2). These references are evidently few, but they belong to both the stage of Dercylidas’ command in Asia and the subsequent period; Xenophon does not seem to be concerned with providing information about this side of Dercylidas’ personality.

17In conclusion, for the aspects related to rationality and emotions, Xenophons’ portrait of Dercylidas is largely positive. He is represented as a wise commander, who makes logical decisions also in difficult situations. At the same time, he is depicted also in his human side, as a man who experiences joy, but also anger and impatience and does not forget an old wrong. These emotions, however, do not negatively affect his decision-making ability¹⁵.

Private sphere

Ideal of hospitality

18In the episode of Gergis, during the first year of Dercylidas’ campaign, the Spartan was accompanied by Midias, who opened the gates of the city for him. After they entered the city and Dercylidas made sacrifices in the acropolis, Midias was about to prepare rites of hospitality for the Spartan commander, who insisted in turn on preparing hospitality for Midias: therefore they sat down and talked while the banquet was arranged (3.1.24). Nominally Midias was the local ruler and therefore he was expected to do the honours, but Dercylidas stopped him, likely because, according to Greek custom, the person who made sacrifices had to share meat with the others¹⁶. Dercylidas’ act could also be explained with the fact that he wanted to show himself publicly as the new real ruler of the city: thus it could be a political gesture, and not only a private one. But in any case formally the Spartan commander, fulfilling his duties of hospitality, reveals himself as a person who also in the private sphere cares deeply for hospitality, which is a typical Greek feature.

Generosity

19On the same occasion, during the conversation between the two men, Midias tried to deceive Dercylidas, stating that he owned less than he actually did. When the inhabitants of Scepsis warned the Spartan commander that Midias was trying to mislead him, Dercylidas answered that they should not shabbily care about details (3.1.26: µὴ λίαν µικρολογεῖσθε). This episode shows Dercylidas’ magnanimity¹⁷, since he grants to Midias to maintain all the belongings of his family. But this is not foolish magnanimity: on the contrary, he seems to have taken it for granted that Midias could be lying, but he wanted to ensure his loyalty by being generous with him. In fact, later on, when he reviews Pharnabazus’ fortune confiscated at Gergis, he is completely aware of its importance, since it can be used to pay the troops. In other words, he is not careless or disinterested in money, but he rather consciously chose to be magnanimous in order to secure Midias’ loyalty.

Fondness for being abroad

20Xenophon preserves a further trait of Dercylidas’ character: as reported below¹⁸, the historian remarks that in 394 Dercylidas accepted ἄσµενος the task of informing the allies about the outcome of the battle of Nemea because he was ἀεὶ φιλαπόδηµος, which means that he was fond of travelling, as in LSJ’s translation, or, better, of being abroad (4.3.2)¹⁹. In effect, what we know about Dercylidas’ life confirms this aspect, because he was often abroad for military and political assignments, and not only in the years of his Asian campaign, but also: before it, since Thuc. 8.61-62 records operations led by him in the area of the Hellespont in the last years of the Peloponnesian war; and after it, given that four passages of Xenophon’s Hellenica testify to his activity in Sardis, Amfipolis and Abydus once Agesilaus replaced him as commander of the Asian expedition²⁰. In this case, Xenophon does not provide, not even implicitly, any comment, either positive, or negative, about the fact that Dercylidas was fond of being abroad, but in any case it is a remark worth of consideration.

21About Dercylidas’ “private” sphere, which partially emerges also through what Xenophon reports about his emotions, a couple of final remarks can be provided.

22In the first place, two of the three features, hospitality and generosity, have in common the fact that they are attested only by a single episode, which is not sufficient to consider them as proper characterisations of the overall figure of Dercylidas; in any case, it seems relevant that Xenophon considers them worthy of mention in his portrait of him. On the contrary, his characterisation as φιλαπόδηµος can be confirmed by what we know about his life: in fact, its main episodes take place abroad (which allowed Xenophon to get acquainted with him) and this is quite remarkable for a Spartan man, given that, with few exceptions, the Spartans preferred not to be away from their homeland for long²¹.

23In the second place, it is worth noting that all three aspects concern the private side of Dercylidas, yet they have evident public implications: about hospitality, because he may have used it for publicly displaying that he was the new ruler of the city; about generosity, because it was a stratagem to ensure Midias’ loyalty; and about his fondness for being abroad, because this is the actual scenario of his military and political experience. Therefore, all of these “private” characterisations have also a public dimension. One might wonder whether Xenophon chose to highlight them also for this reason, as well as in order to portray comprehensively the figure of Dercylidas, given that he is always very concerned in offering portraits of the main individuals who appear in his historical work.

Public sphere

Pious performer of sacrifices

24Given that there is no need to draw attention on the fact that sacrifices concern the public life of a Greek man, rather than the private, many references to sacrifices made by Dercylidas are provided in the first and second chapter of Hellenica’s third book. Actually for each of the three seasons of war in which he was the commander of the Greek campaign in Asia, Xenophon recalls that before any operation Dercylidas performed the sacred rites: in 399, outside the gates of Cebren (3.1.17; 19), in the cities of Scepsis (3.1.21) and of Gergis (3.1.22-24); in 398, before building the wall in the Chersonese (3.2.10); and in 397, on the eve of the clash with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, then averted thanks to an agreement with them (3.2.16). We have no more references to sacrifices for the period after his replacement by Agesilaus, obviously because he was no more entrusted with important operations. While it is usually not specified for which deity the Spartan commander makes sacrifices, on two occasions (in Scepsis and Gergis) it is stated that Dercylidas ἔθυε τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ.

25Since Xenophon was a very religious man, he scrupulously records the sacred rites made before any crucial moment, and naturally not only for Dercylidas but for most of the Greek commanders, including his friend Agesilaus²². In any case, a pious commander who fulfils all his religious duties is undoubtedly much appreciated by Xenophon: this is a clear hint at the fact that the historian had a favourable opinion of Dercylidas.

26It has been already pointed out above that in Cebren Dercylidas patiently waited for favourable sacrifices for several days, unlike the Sycionian Athenadas who believed τὸν ∆ερκυλίδαν φλυαρεῖν διατρίβοντα: as reported above, Athenadas’ sortie ended badly, while Dercylidas, having moved the army only when the presages were favourable, entered the city with no bloodshed. Xenophon does not provide any explicit remark about the different outcomes of the two generals, while elsewhere he notes that the gods do not neglect to punish impious men (e.g. 5.4.1); however, it is manifest that the pious Dercylidas succeeds in his task, while the impious Athenadas, who had considered religious practices as a mere waste of time, not only fails, but also dies. This is typical of Xenophon’s religious views, according to which the sphere of the sacred has a crucial importance²³.

Champion of autonomy and liberty

27On several occasions Dercylidas appeals to the ideals of liberty and autonomy. Evidence of this can be found in the campaigns of 399 and of 397. About the former, he resorts to these political slogans from the very first days of his arrival in Asia: after the cities of Larisa, Hamaxitus and Colonai came over to him in just one day voluntarily²⁴, he sent envoys to other cities of the Aeolis urging them to free themselves (ἐλευθεροῦσθαι) and to admit him into their walls and become allies (3.1.16). Soon afterwards, in Scepsis, when he met Midias for the first time, he negotiated with him imposing as condition the fact that he would leave the citizens ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ αὐτονόµους; as Midias let Dercylidas enter the city, the Spartan commander gave over the city to the citizens (παραδοὺς δὲ τοῖς πολίταις τὴν πόλιν) and exhorted them to πολιτεύειν as Ἕλληνες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι (3.1.20-21)²⁵. Again, in his last campaign in Asia, he asked Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to leave the Greek cities autonomous, while they requested him to move the Greek army (3.2.20). No claims for liberty and autonomy made by Dercylidas occur either in the campaign of 398, in which he was engaged in Europe with the building of the wall in the Chersonese, or after Agesilaus’ arrival, when he was no more in charge of the expedition. In conclusion, about this issue Dercylidas is entirely the mouthpiece of Spartan ideology, or, more precisely, of a specific line of Spartan ideology, the one that aimed at hegemony through the appeal to panhellenic ideals, rather than by imposing decharchies or similar regimes. It appears particularly interesting that in Scepsis not only is he committed to seizing the city, but he is also particularly interested in the ways in which it would be ruled, since he states that the form of government of the city had to be consistent with the fact that the citizens were Greek and free: the Scepsians enjoyed what he had done in their city so much that they accompanied him to Gergis τιµῶντές τε καὶ ἡδόµενοι τοῖς πεπραγµένοις (3.1.21)²⁶.

Dercylidas’ strategy: a smart diplomat more than a man of war

28It can be particularly interesting to explore Dercylidas’ strategy during the three years in which he was in charge of the Greek expedition in Asia, because it can show his style of leadership.

29It is curious that, in three years of war, Dercylidas engaged an actual military action only once, at least according to Xenophon’s detailed account: the siege of Atarneus, which lasted eight months apparently in winter 398/397. This city was occupied by exiles from Chius²⁷, who frequently plundered the Ionian cities; finally he took over Atarneus and set Dracon of Pellene as supervisor of the city, in which he left a large amount of supplies that he could grab whenever necessary (3.2.11). Also this episode shows that Dercylidas is very careful about the issues of supplies and of the government of the cities he seized; but the main feature of this episode lies in the fact that this is the only military operation directly carried out by Dercylidas. In three other episodes he was about to fight but eventually did not: in 399 in Cebren, where he is prevented from fighting by the unfavourable sacrifices and in the end the inhabitants of Cebren open the gates of the city voluntarily (3.1.17); in winter 399/398 in Bythinian Thrace, when he brought assistance to the Odrysians who had been attacked by the Bythinians, but he did not fight because he arrived late and he found only corpses of the dead soldiers (3.2.5); and in 397 in Ionia, where he led his army against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, but eventually made an agreement with them (3.2.18 sq.). In sum, according to Xenophon, during his command of Greek troops in Asia, Dercylidas had only one actual opportunity to use the army, on occasion of the seizing of Atarneus.

30It is plain that Dercylidas’ activity in Asia concerned mainly the diplomatic field. He negotiated with Tissaphernes, with his personal enemy Pharnabazus, with the inhabitants of Cebren and with Midias. All these negotiations were successful, which shows that Dercylidas was not only a soldier, but also (and perhaps above all) a wise politician²⁸. Clearly, in the three years he spent in Asia as commander of the Greek army he took advantage of his diplomatic skills more than of the military ones. Hence, Xenophon is portraying a complete man, experienced both in military and diplomatic fields: a truly important resource for Spartan policy. His expertise in negotiations is closely linked with his rational side (par. 2.1.A, Rational behaviour), but also with his oratorical ability (par. 2.1.C, Skills in speeches and persuasion) also in using propaganda slogans like freedom and autonomy (par. 2.1.C, Champion of autonomy and liberty).

31It has been suggested that on some occasions Dercylidas’ decision not to embark upon a military clash could suggest that he doubted whether his army could grant him success²⁹. This is quite possible, even more so because when Agesilaus was sent to replace Dercylidas, he was accompanied by more than eight thousand soldiers (3.4.2), a clue suggesting that the previous number of troops was considered inadequate for an effective military activity. Would this be the case, Dercylidas’ resort to diplomacy would be even more clever.

32There are, in my opinion, at least three more aspects worth mentioning about Dercylidas’ strategy during his command in Asia. First, his policy of incentives to work: in the building of the wall in the Chersonese in the season of war of 398, Dercylidas, κατὰ µέρη διελὼν τοῖς στρατιώταις τὸ χωρίον, promised he would give prizes (ἆθλα) not only to the first men who would finish their part, but also to the others who deserved an award proportionate to the efforts: in this way, he completed the wall, begun in spring, before the time of harvest (3.2.10). This closely recalls the ninth chapter of Xenophon’s Hiero, in which Simonides suggests the tyrant should reward those who operate indefatigably, in order to stimulate a speedy outcome of the works³⁰. It is apparent that Xenophon expressly endorses this policy and this is a clear indication that he considers Dercylidas’ initiative correct and approves of it.

33Secondly, it could be noted that Xenophon often points out what Dercylidas carries out after he takes hold of a city. Sometimes the author records that he left a garrison (e.g. 3.1.19; 3.2.14), but on a couple of occasions he provides remarkable pieces of information: in Scepsis he exhorted the inhabitants to πολιτεύειν, i.e. to have a governing regime, fit for men who are Greek and free (3.1.21); and in Atarneus he appointed Dracon of Pellene as ἐπιµελητής of the city (3.2.11). This is another side of Dercylidas’ political skills: he does not limit himself to take control over the cities, but also takes care of their political organisation after the liberation. Pieces of information are actually scarce and it is not completely clear why we find solutions that are seemingly different: in Scepsis he encourages the inhabitants to organise their πολιτεία autonomously, while in Atarneus he places an ἐπιµελητής, i.e. an administrator, a supervisor, that is a role which, according to P. Krentz, was supposed to have no military command³¹. This suggests that Dercylidas chose different options for different situations: we cannot see exact reasons for these choices, but apparently they are made according to the specific scenario of the city. In other words, Xenophon, although implicitly, is depicting Dercylidas as a sharp politician, able to adjust to different situations.

34We can suggest a final remark about Dercylidas’ management of the army with regard to supplies and salaries³². Xenophon shows the Spartan commander as greatly concerned about supplies: in the winters both of 399/398 and 398/397 Dercylidas faces the problem of getting supplies without being a burden for the allies, which instead was the case of Thibron, as Xenophon remarks in the very first paragraphs devoted to Dercylidas’ command (3.1.10): in 399/398 he wintered in Bythinian Thrace pillaging the region in order to secure supplies without burdening the allies (3.2.2 sq.); and in the following winter, at the end of the eight-month long siege of Atarneus, he took hold of the abundant supplies of the city, so that he could use Atarneus as a source of supplies whenever he would need them (3.2.11). Besides, Xenophon portraits Dercylidas as careful and prudent also with regard to the management of money, a field in which, as well known, the historian shows particular interest³³. In Gergis, when he takes hold of Manias’ treasury, the Spartan commander remarks that it would be enough to pay an army of eight thousand men for one year (3.1.28): it is an accurate calculation that shows Dercylidas’ care for the management of funds³⁴.

35The aforementioned episodes show that Dercylidas was skilful at managing the army, because he was careful about the livelihood of his army as for supplies and salary and that he paid attention not to cause troubles either to the allies, or indirectly to the Spartans.

Dercylidas’ relationship with Spartan authorities

36As noted above, Dercylidas is careful about not causing damage to the allies: he had in mind what had occurred when Thibron was the commander of the army, i.e. that he had been recalled to Sparta, tried and convicted, because the allies had accused him of pillaging their country (3.1.8)³⁵. In this regard, Dercylidas is attentive not only towards himself, but also towards Sparta’s good reputation in Greece. This aspect suggests his relationship with Spartan authorities should be further examined.

37It has been noted that, when Dercylidas lands in Ephesus in 399, he does not head south to Caria, as the Spartans had previously ordered Thibron to do (3.1.7), but north to Troad, into the territory of Pharnabazus (3.1.9): this could seem like contravening to Spartans’ orders, due only to personal reasons, i.e. his enmity towards Pharnabazus. However, admittedly, Dercylidas might have received new orders before his departure from Sparta³⁶ and, therefore, this episode cannot be interpreted as evidence of an individual initiative in violation of Spartan orders. On the contrary, Dercylidas likely decided autonomously to winter in Bythinian Thrace (3.2.2), without consulting with Spartan authorities³⁷; but this way of acting was perfectly normal and, moreover, in accordance with Spartan interests.

38In the following spring, Dercylidas moved to Lampsacus where he met three Spartan delegates (Aracus, Naubates and Antisthenes), who complimented with the soldiers because they acted respectfully towards the allies (3.2.6)³⁸. Soon after the visit of this delegation, Dercylidas moved to Europe and built the Chersonese wall across the peninsula from sea to sea (3.2.10): also in this case, he received no specific order about this, but his decision was completely appropriate and consistent with Spartan interest. Besides, on this occasion Dercylidas had heard the Spartan delegates talking about the fact that it would be useful to build such a wall and that it would not be surprising if some Spartan were sent in order to accomplish that task (3.2.8): therefore, he even anticipated what would be likely decided in any case by the Spartan authorities. Anticipating appropriate decisions and carrying out what has to be done quickly is undoubtedly a sign of cunning behaviour and intelligence.

39Dercylidas received again directions by the ephors after the seizing of Atarneus, probably at the beginning of the season of war of 397, but the situation seems at least partially different³⁹. The Ionian cities had sent an embassy to Sparta in order to complain that it was in Tissaphernes’ power to permit or not that they lived autonomously; therefore the ephors ordered Dercylidas to move to Caria (3.2.12). On the one hand, Dercylidas actually undertook his task, but, later on, he made a provisional agreement with the satrap, which assured autonomy for the Greek cities. On this occasion, he proved to be respectful of Spartan authority, at least at the beginning, since he actually undertook the campaign against the satraps; and when afterwards he made a provisional agreement with them that ensured the autonomy of the Greek cities, he submitted it to Sparta to be approved (3.2.20)⁴⁰. Actually, he achieved the objective of the peace for the Greek cities in ways that differed from what Sparta had suggested, given that he did not wage war against Tissaphernes, likely because of his good relationship with him: but this does not seem to be a sign of insubordination, but on the contrary of smartness in choosing the best way to achieve the assigned task⁴¹. On the other hand, the Ionian embassy to Sparta, about which Xenophon is clearly annoyed⁴², is a clue of the fact that not all the Ionians appreciated Dercylidas’ conduct and his approach to defend Greek interests in Asia mainly through diplomatic means⁴³. And perhaps some of the Spartans shared this opinion (or some of the Spartans belonged to a political faction different from Dercylidas’), given that, in addition to the instructions given to Dercylidas, they ordered the navarch Pharax to sail alongside the coast and support the army⁴⁴. Anyhow, Xenophon completely justifies Dercylidas, at first when he states that both the commanders of the army and of the navy obeyed the orders (οἱ µὲν δὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἐποίουν, 3.2.12), and then when he reports that, after he arranged an agreement with the two satraps, he sent it respectfully to Sparta to be approved (3.2.20): Xenophon’s bias in favour of Dercylidas does not remove the fact that there was some discontent by some of the Ionians, and likely also of the Spartans, about Dercylidas’ management of the expedition.

40Concerning the period after the arrival of Agesilaus in Asia, Xenophon presents Dercylidas as a Spartan delegate on some occasions; moreover, Agesilaus in Amphipolis shows great trust in him since he states that Dercylidas would perfectly (κάλλιστα) accomplish the delicate mission of announcing to the allies the outcome of the Nemea battle⁴⁵. This seems relevant because it means that he was granted trust by the Spartans (or at least by Agesilaus) even after his replacement by the king.

41In sum, leaving aside the campaign of 399, when however Decylidas could have received orders different from those that were given to Thibron, Xenophon clearly portrays Dercylidas as a commander loyal to Sparta and respectful of the orders received. On one occasion he achieved the goals set by Sparta in ways different from those that had been indicated, and on another he even anticipated Spartan intentions, but Xenophon, far from considering either of these episodes as actual insubordination, seems conversely to approve of Dercylidas’ conduct⁴⁶. It should be remembered that in a well-known Xenophontean passage (HG, 5.2.32), Agesilaus, commenting on Phoebidas’ occupation of the Cadmea, states that if what Phoebidas had done damaged the Spartans, he deserved to be punished, while if he had done something advantageous, “it was an ancient custom” (ἀρχαῖον εἶναι νόµιµον) that a commander, in such cases, had the right to act on his own initiative⁴⁷. This is precisely Dercylidas’ case: and the fact that this is the view of Agesilaus corroborates the assumption that the Spartan king had a positive opinion about Dercylidas. In fact, after his replacement in Asia by Agesilaus, Dercylidas was entrusted with further tasks in the same area. It remains to be assessed whether Agesilaus’ opinion about Dercylidas was shared by the rest of the Spartans or not, but at least the king showed he personally trusted the commander.

Skills in speeches and persuasion

42Xenophon assigns Dercylidas dialogues and speeches that enrich his portrait. Their trustworthiness seems high, also because the historian had direct knowledge of events in which he personally took part⁴⁸. Four examples are worthy of mention: two dialogues, respectively with Midias in Gergis (3.1.24-26; 28) and with Agesilaus in Amphipolis (4.3.2), one direct speech in Abydos (4.8.4) and a speech, reported partially in direct form and partially in indirect form, to the Sestians (4.8.5). The two dialogues are interesting because through the first one Xenophon depicts Dercylidas as careful and smart, since the general collected information about the economic and political situation of the area, while through the second dialogue Xenophon shows Agesilaus’ trust in him⁴⁹.

43But the speech to the inhabitants of Abydos is more important, also because it is the only complete direct speech preserved by Xenophon for Dercylidas⁵⁰. It is placed after the Spartan naval defeat at Cnidos (and therefore after Dercylidas’ replacement by Agesilaus), when several cities abandoned Sparta and Dercylidas had the delicate and difficult task of preserving the loyalty of Abydos to Sparta. He resorted to various arguments for supporting his claim: he stated that the citizens of Abydos had been φίλοι of Sparta καὶ πρόσθεν, thus stressing the long-term relationship; he added that ἐν ταῖς εὐπραξίαις πιστοὺς φαίνεσθαι οὐδὲν θαυµαστόν, and, besides, the higher the number of the cities that defected from Sparta, the more manifest would be their fidelity; he stated as well that a naval defeat did not imply that Spartan power was over; and he concluded that the Abydenians should not be feared (φοβέω), also because an actual Greek fleet did not exist and, whenever the Persians tried to impose their naval supremacy, the Greeks would not allow this (οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι εἰ ἐπιχειρήσουσι τῆς θαλάττης ἄρχειν, οὐκ ἀνέξεται ταῦτα ἡ Ἑλλάς). The speech is well-devised and founded on a variety of arguments, like the long-lasting relationship, loyalty, the power of Sparta, groundless fear and so on. Moreover, it is a speech based on an opposition between rationality and irrationality: on the one hand, the latter, i.e. the natural fear of the Abydenians, who are worried because they think that Sparta is destined to be defeated in the war; on the other, the former, i.e. the rational arguments used by Dercylidas to persuade the Abydenians to maintain loyalty to Sparta and not to be afraid.

44As considered above (par. A), rationality is an important aspect of Dercylidas’ behaviour, but in this case it is a biased rationality, since Dercylidas provides an interpretation of the situation which is quite favourable to Sparta: for example, he states that Ἑλληνικὸν µὲν οὔπω ναυτικόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, which, strictly speaking, is right but neglects that the Persian fleet was at the anti-Spartan Greek coalition’s disposal; moreover, he claimed that, if the barbarians had tried to rule the sea, the Greeks would not permit them to do so, which is a fine (and effective) panhellenic argument, but at the same time it is pure speculation, since internal enmities had already been stronger than the Greek-Persian hostilities for decades.

45Dercylidas resorts to similar rational arguments also when, immediately afterwards, he crossed over to Sestus (4.8.5): here he gathered all those who had obtained land in the Chersonese thanks to the Spartans and also the harmosts that had been expelled from their cities. Xenophon reports Dercylidas’ speech to the Sestians, partly in indirect form and then in direct form, which is based on three arguments: they should not ἀθυµεῖν; they should consider that even across the sea, in Asia, where the Persian king ruled, there were cities like Temnus and Aegae οὐχ ὑπήκοοι ὄντες βασιλέως; and Sestus was not easy to take, since the city had to be sieged by land and sea.

46In both cases, Dercylidas succeeded in persuading the citizens: for Sestus this is apparent from the fact that immediately afterwards the citizens rejected the request of expelling the Spartans; for Abydus, it is explicitly stated by Xenophon, who writes that the citizens προθύµως ἐπείσθησαν.

47In sum, Xenophon depicts Dercylidas as skilled in persuading through speeches, which are based both on argumentations, albeit biased, and on a propagandistic slogan such as panhellenism, but also freedom and autonomy as considered above. Through these speeches, which are likely to have been accurately reported by the eyewitness Xenophon, Dercylidas successfully tried to restrain emotions like fear, which appear insistently after the battle of Cnidus, as evident from verbs like φοβέω, ἀθυµέω and ἐκπλήσσω.

Remarks provided by Xenophon

48Xenophon inserts a few remarks about Dercylidas, that deserve consideration. The first one occurs in the very first passage in which he is mentioned. Οn his arrival in Asia, the author states that he was an ἀνὴρ δοκῶν εἶναι µάλα µηχανητικός· καὶ ἐπεκαλεῖτο δὲ Σίσυφος (3.1.8). First, it should be specified that being called Sisyphus is not a bad remark, since in Greek mythology Sisyphus is not a negative figure⁵¹. Moreover, according to Xenophon, the Spartans were used to µηχανᾶσθαι since childhood (Lac. Pol., 2.7); besides, to be tricky is considered by him an important characteristic for a general⁵² and, more broadly, Xenophon states explicitly that µηχανήµατα are very relevant in an historical account⁵³: this confirms that Xenophon’s remark about Dercylidas is largely positive. Most importantly, this preliminary judgment provided by the historian seems completely confirmed by the events in which Dercylidas is involved: in fact, as noted above, he appears more as a smart diplomat or politician than as a man of war⁵⁴. This is evident from many elements, as for example, on the one hand, the large amount of verbs concerning rational thinking attributed to him⁵⁵, and, on the other, specific episodes drawn from his Asian campaign. I limit myself to only one example, i.e. the episode in which, having heard from some delegates that Sparta was likely to send someone to build a wall in the Chersonese, Dercylidas accomplished this task before receiving any order about it (3.2.9); yet, more generally, one may recall also his respectful conduct towards Spartan allies in Asia and his ability to take advantage of the dualism between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; moreover, also his skill in speeches and in persuasion⁵⁶ is a hint of the fact that he was smart and tricky. Therefore, Xenophon’s preliminary remark in 3.1.8 is perfectly consistent with the role actually played by Dercylidas, according to the same historian, in subsequent events.

49A second aspect worth noting is that Xenophon remarks on a couple of occasions that Dercylidas was different from his predecessor, Thibron. The first time it occurs at the beginning of his Asian campaign, when the historian underlines the different approach of the two commanders concerning the Greek allies in Asia (3.1.10). The second time is particularly interesting, because it occurs in a direct speech attributed to Xenophon himself, named ὁ τῶν Κυρείων προεστηκώς (3.2.7)⁵⁷. Moreover, after his replacement by Agesilaus, the historian points out that in Abydos Dercylidas behaved οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἁρµοσταί: in fact, after the defeat at Cnidus, Dercylidas did not leave the Mysian city, but preserved it as an ally to Sparta (4.8.3); in this case, Xenophon does not name the Spartans who are compared to Dercylidas, but he clearly aims at emphasising Dercylidas’ heroism and, ultimately, at praising him. Thus, Xenophon remarks the singularity of Dercylidas compared to other commanders, both in terms of sensitivity and cleverness, concerning his relations with the Greek allies in Asia, and of heroism and loyalty, regarding his conduct in an extremely serious moment like that of the Spartans loss of naval hegemony.

50Another statement should be considered: it does not contain an explicit judgment by Xenophon, but it seems important because it comes from the last passage of the Hellenica in which Dercylidas is mentioned. In 4.8.32, when Anaxibius replaces Dercylidas as harmost of Abydus, Xenophon observes that τῷ µὲν οὖν ∆ερκυλίδᾳ οὐδὲν ἐµέµφοντο: the subject is the Spartans and the historian clearly aims at removing the suspicion that this replacement occurred because of any failure attributable to Dercylidas⁵⁸. Moreover Xenophon cautiously suggests that the real cause for this substitution was that those who were ephors in that year were friends of Anaxibius (φίλων αὐτῷ γενοµένων τῶν ἐφόρων) and therefore that the latter obtained this appointment only thanks to his personal ties with them, rather than because of his own particular merits or demerits of Dercylidas. This suggests that at Sparta there might have been a clash of power between the supporters of the two men and it cannot be excluded that those who were ephors in that year took advantage of the possible absence of Agesilaus (clearly a supporter of Dercylidas; Xen., HG, 3.4.6; 4.3.1-3⁵⁹), who between 389 and 388 was engaged in two campaigns in Acarnania (HG, 4.6; 4.7.1), in order to obtain the substitution of the harmost of Abydus. This passage does not preserve an explicit judgment by Xenophon about Dercylidas, but clearly the historian tries to justify the commander both stating that “the Spartans” did not blame Dercylidas for anything, and that the replacement occurred only because of private reasons.

51These remarks clearly show Xenophon’s appreciation of Dercylidas and, moreover, are perfectly consistent with the survey conducted through the episodes in which he was involved. Besides, the last comment about the replacement by Anaxibius seems to pair with the first one about Dercylidas’ being “tricky”: Xenophons’ Hellenica frames the whole political experience of this commander in Asia between two observations that positively characterise him and his conduct. At this point one may wonder whether this presentation be biased, depending on the fact that Xenophon knew him personally and was probably a friend of him, or it may find confirmation in sources different from Xenophon⁶⁰.

Other sources about Dercylidas

52The only source that clearly deals with the period before 399 is Thucydides. Since this paper aims at reconstructing not Dercylidas’ biography, but rather his portrait as supplied by Xenophon, these events are less interesting, because in this case we cannot make a comparison with Xenophon’s account; nevertheless a few remarks could be made. According to Thucydides (8.61.1; 62.1), in 411/410 Dercylidas was sent to Abydus in order to stir a revolt of the city; not only did he succeeded in the task, but also obtained for Sparta and Tissaphernes the city of Lampsacus⁶¹. These events show that, even before replacing Thibron, Dercylidas was quite familiar with the Asian area and, moreover, that he was able to conduct successful campaigns, just as appears from Xenophon. Besides, Thucydides reports that Dercylidas had Lampsacus revolted against the Athenians in just two days: also this detail is consistent with Xenophon’s portrait, since the author of the Hellenica often remarks that Dercylidas achieved important and brilliant results in a short span of time⁶². Furthermore, Thucydides does not state that Dercylidas fought any battle and instead remarks that he was sent with a little army; it is not unlikely that he managed to obtain the favour of the two cities through means other than an armed conflict. Therefore, it seems relevant that the information coming from Thucydides, although it is scanty and it does not provide any overlap with the events narrated by Xenophon, is consistent with the portrait of the latter: an expert on Asia Minor, able to obtain for Sparta Asian cities quickly and perhaps without an actual armed conflict.

53Almost all the other sources deal with the period of Dercylidas’ expedition in Asia as a successor to Thibron. I begin this survey with passages providing brief references, leaving for last the only continuous account we have apart from Xenophon’s, i.e. that by Diodorus; Ephorus will be treated at the very end of this paragraph, in order to compare his fragment both with the account provided by the Bibliotheca historica and with Xenophon’s portrait of the commander.

54Isocrates and the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia provide brief references to Dercylidas’ expedition of 399-397. The former recalls that Dercylidas, with a thousand hoplites, extended his power over Aeolis, Thibron plundered Lydia and Agesilaus conquered almost all the area west of the Halys river⁶³; in this passage, Isocrates seems to aim at emphasising the weakness of Persia rather than Spartan courage or military skills⁶⁴. The author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, dealing with Agesilaus’ expedition in Asia, states that in an ambush the Spartan king used many of the so-called Dercylidean mercenaries (πολλοὺς τῶν µισθοφόρων τῶν ∆ερκυλιδείων καλουµένων)⁶⁵: the fact that an almost contemporary source terms these soldiers “Dercylideans” and not “Thibroneans” (or even “Cyreans”) seems very interesting, because it suggests that this commander left a particular mark on these soldiers and in this expedition⁶⁶. In any case, these fourth century sources point out the military side of Dercylidas’ biography in particular.

55Concerning the sources that belong to the second century A.D., Polyaenus deals with the episode of Scepsis of 399 (Polyaen. 2.6)⁶⁷, known also from Xen., HG, 3.1.20-21. The two sources are not actually completely contrasting, but they have a different tone. According to Xenophon, Midias asked for a conference with Dercylidas, while Polyaenus reports the opposite, stating that Dercylidas promised Midias that, if he had came to a conference, he would be free to go back to his city afterwards. Xenophon informs us about this meeting, in which the Spartan leader asked for freedom and autonomy for the inhabitants of Scepsis, while Polyaenus just says that Dercylidas threatened Midias’ life if he would not open the gates of the city. The two sources agree that Dercylidas entered the city and that he allowed Midias to remain in Scepsis⁶⁸. Yet, while Polyaenus seems to suggest that Dercylidas kept his word only formally, but actually deceived Midias, preventing him to rule, as before, the city, conversely Xenophon provides a completely different picture: the agreement did not involve Midias’ retaining of power, but rather freedom and autonomy of the citizens, who formerly were hostile towards their ruler and afterwards grateful to their Spartan “saviour”. In conclusion, in this episode Xenophon portraits Dercylidas as the liberator of the city and the champion of Greek ideals as πολιτεύειν, αὐτονοµία, ἐλευθερία, while Polyaenus emphasises his cunning and deceiving duplicity. Polyaenus’ version is very interesting, because on the one hand, generally speaking, it agrees with some aspects of the Xenophontean portrait, but, on the other, specifically on the episode of Scepsis, it provides a different interpretation of Dercylidas’ conduct.

56Plutarch preserves two pieces of information about Dercylidas⁶⁹. Both in the Life of Lycurgus and in the Moralia, he reports the same anecdote according to which a young Spartan did not offer his seat to Dercylidas, καίπερ εὐδόκιµον ὄντα στρατηγόν, because the general had not begotten any son who, in the future, would give his seat to him (Plu., Lyc., 15.3; Mor. [Apopht. Lac.] 227f). This information is doubly interesting: on the one hand, the fact that Dercylidas had no sons is consistent with the fact that he often lived abroad, involved in military expeditions in the Asian area; on the other, it confirms that he was somehow an “anomalous” Spartan, not only because φιλαπόδηµος, but also because, as it is well known, it was imperative for the Spartiates to generate legitimate sons⁷⁰.

57Dercylidas is mentioned also in the Life of Artaxerxes in a brief reference to the Spartan expedition in Asia: Plutarch states that the war was waged at first by Thibron and then by Dercylidas, but, since they accomplished nothing worthy of note (οὐδὲν δὲ πράττοντες ἀξιόλογον), the Spartans entrusted the leadership to the king Agesilaus (Plu., Art., 20.3). This information concerns the issue of Dercylidas’ replacement by Agesilaus, for which Xenophon does not provide any reason: it is obviously a delicate stage in Dercylidas’ career. Sources provide two different explanations for this substitution: according to some of them, it was Lysander who persuaded Agesilaus to sail towards Asia, while one source states that the initiative was Agesilaus⁷¹. It is curious that Xenophon himself provides both the explanations in two different works, the first one in the Hellenica and the second in the Agesilaus: actually, both reasons could be partially true, but what it is relevant here is that Xenophon avoids dealing with this issue with regard to Dercylidas. Anyhow, it seems to me that two different reasons could explain his replacement. On the one hand, we have a version that blames (Thibron and) Dercylidas as ineffective, as it appears from Plutarch. On the other, a different tradition suggests that the war was too serious and important to be continued by a common general and rather needed someone of the rank of a king: this is Xenophon’s version (with the two variants about the initiative of Lysander or of Agesilaus himself), which is obviously a “justificatory” explanation that avoids putting Dercylidas under a bad light. It is unclear which of the two versions is more reliable, but actually both could actually be partially true. However, what is relevant here is that Xenophon in his works avoids providing the version that is hostile towards Dercylidas⁷².

58To these sources we should add a passage from Justin’s Epitome of the Historiae Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus (6.1.2-3), where a certain Hercylides is mentioned, a name which is clearly a mistake for Dercylidas⁷³. The passage, which is inaccurate under many aspects⁷⁴, states that the Spartan commander decided to sign a truce with Tissaphernes, because, compared to Pharnabazus, he was et industria potior et militibus⁷⁵: this version is quite different from Xenophon’s, who attributes the decision of coming to terms with this satrap to the fact that Dercylidas had an old grudge with Pharnabazus. H. D. Westlake prefers Justin’s version⁷⁶, but actually the two reasons are not mutually exclusive: Xenophon provides an explanation which is more “private”, since he personally knew Dercylidas, and his account should not be superficially dismissed; but at the same time, it cannot be excluded that his decision was motivated not only by personal reasons, but also by military tactics. This would corroborate Xenophon’s portrait of Dercylidas as a commander who makes wise decisions and who acts not in anger but through reasoning⁷⁷.

59After considering these sources, which just supply single pieces of information about Dercylidas’ biography and usually dwell mainly on its military side⁷⁸, it is time to deal with the only continuous preserved account (apart from Xenophon’s), which is provided by a couple of chapters of Diodorus’ fourteenth book (Diod. 14.38-39). The historian mentions Dercylidas only with regard to his Asian expedition, and the first aspect that stands out is that Diodorus concentrates all the events of Dercylidas’ expedition in a single year, 399/398. Diodorus’ account is much shorter than Xenophon’s, but it preserves almost all the most important events of the three years between 399 and 397, except for the siege of Atarneus in the winter of 398/397.

60The source of Diodorus is surely not (only) Xenophon⁷⁹, not only because of the dissimilar chronological arrangement, but also for some details, in terms of additions or differences. For example, among the cities conquered in 399 the two authors present many similarities in the names and in the structure of the list, but Diodorus mentions Arisbe where Xenophon Larisa (Diod. 14.38.3; Xen., HG, 3.1.16)⁸⁰. For the truce with Pharnabazus of the winter of 399/398, Diodorus adds that it had an eight-month duration, while Xenophon provides no information in this regard (Diod. 14.38.3; Xen., HG, 3.2.1-2). Different is also the framework of the construction of the wall in the Chersonese: according to Xenophon, it was an initiative of Dercylidas’, who had heard some Spartan delegates speaking about this intention, while Diodorus presents it as a request from the inhabitants of the Chersonese, who later honoured Dercylidas with great gifts. Lastly, dealing with Dercylidas’ last operation before his replacement by Agesilaus, Diodorus states that his army consisted of not more than seven thousand soldiers, while Xenophon provides no figures⁸¹. Despite these differences, the reported events are very similar and also the general tone of the account is not very different.

61Diodorus’ account, as it is much shorter, does not provide explicit judgments about Dercylidas; yet, it contains a few interesting hints: I shall consider three examples in this respect. First, Diodorus states that the general conquered Hamaxitus, Colonae and Arisbe ἐξ ἐφόδου (at the first assault) and Xenophon claims that the three cities (having Larisa instead of Arisbe) capitulated ἐν µιᾷ ἡµέρᾳ (Diod. 14.38.2; Xen., HG, 3.1.16): both sources emphasise Dercylidas’ rapidity. Besides, dealing with “Ilios, Cebren and all the rest of the cities of the Troad”, Diodorus asserts that the Spartan commander occupied some of them δόλῳ and others ἐκ βίας. Xenophon adds four more cities to this list (Neandria, Cocilium, Scepsis and Gergis) and, for Cebren, Scepsis and Gergis, clearly attests that Dercylidas made no use of the army; and, with all probability, this also applies to Ilios, Neandria and Cocilium (Diod. 14.38.3; Xen., HG, 3.1.16-28). Therefore, Xenophon seems to emphasise the side of the δόλος (in the meaning of cunning), instead of that of the βία; but, considering the overall experience of the three Asiatic years of Dercylidas, Diodorus’ remarks are totally convincing and consistent with Xenophon’s account. Finally, the fact that the inhabitants of the Chersonese, as noted above, honoured Dercylidas with great gifts, a detail reported by Diodorus but not by Xenophon, contributes to create a positive picture of the Spartan leader.

62The overall impression provided by Diodorus is that of a capable general, skilled both with the army and the use of cunning, able to conclude profitable agreements with the Persians and appreciated by the populations he defended against the barbarians. Therefore, the framework seems positive on the whole and, consequently, it seems to be not so far from Xenophon’s, which is quite encomiastic. The only problem with this interpretation could be the exact meaning of the term δόλος in Diodorus, because it can be translated not only as cunning, but also as deception. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the latter translation may seem at odds with a globally positive picture and, on the other, deception may obviously be interpreted also in a good way if it leads to the desired outcomes. Therefore, it does not seem to me that the term δόλος could seriously question the global interpretation of Dercylidas’ picture provided by Diodorus. At worst, we would have a man who does not hesitate to resort to deception and, thanks to it, is able to achieve the expected goals. In sum, the Diodorean presentation of Dercylidas seems very interesting, because an author who depends (also) from sources that are clearly different from Xenophon somehow mostly confirms Dercylidas’ portrait provided by Xenophon himself.

63It remains to be taken into account the fragment of Ephorus, preserved by Athenaeus (FGH/BNJ, 70 F 71 = Ath. 11.101.500c)⁸²: Ephorus’ text, at first sight, seems to be reliable, both because Athenaeus mentions the number of the book from which it is taken (book 18⁸³) and because it is a textual quotation⁸⁴. Ephorus’ text requires a careful reading:

“The Lacedaemonians sent Dercylidas to Asia to replace Thibron, since they had heard that the barbarians living in Asia were accustomed to do everything with deception and cunning (µετὰ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου). For this reason (διόπερ) they sent Dercylidas thinking that he was least likely to be deceived (ἥκιστα νοµίζοντες ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι): in fact, he was not at all “Laconic” or straightforward, but altogether cunning and savage (ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδ᾽ ἁπλοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες). Therefore the Lacedaemonians nicknamed him “Skyphos” (διὸ καὶ Σκύφον αὐτὸν οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι προσηγόρευον)”.

64While Diodorus preserves a summary of the actions in which Dercylidas was involved with no judgments about him, the only extant Ephorean fragment concerning the Spartan commander presents an opposite situation. This is quite frustrating, because it does not allow us to directly compare the two sources. Having said that, the fragment deserves consideration under two aspects: the portrait of Dercylidas provided by Ephorus and the nickname the historian attributes to him.

65While Diodorus is not concerned with Dercylidas’ personality and while Xenophon often presents it also in comparison with that of the other Spartans (and of Thibron), Ephorus instead makes a comparison mainly between Dercylidas and the Persians: the Persians are characterised by ἀπάτη καὶ δόλος, and Dercylidas as able to avoid being deceived (ἐξαπατάω), lacking in ἁπλότης, πάνουργος, θηριώδης and not ἁπλοῦς; Ephorus argues that he was chosen to replace Thibron in Asia precisely for these features, as, thanks to his nature, he would be able to oppose the Persians. But Dercylidas’ characteristics deserve further attention. To begin with, actually Ephorus does not state that Dercylidas was a deceiver (the Persians were rather deceivers), but that he was able to avoid being deceived; more precisely, this means that, according to Ephorus, Dercylidas was more cunning than deceiver (and this is consistent with Xenophons’ account⁸⁵). Dercylidas’ lack of ἁπλότης can be interpreted both as a generic reference to his behaviour and also, more specifically, in connection with his way of speaking, to mean lack of frankness, since ἁπλότης is a specific term to designate straight talk⁸⁶. This feature (in both interpretations) seems to be connected by Ephorus with Dercylidas’ being “not at all Laconic” and, besides, it is consistent with a man not easily deceived; yet, it is more difficult to evaluate with certainty whether his being different from the typical Spartan is considered as something positive or negative by the historian⁸⁷. Instead, the qualification of θηριώδης concerns a completely different area, since it relates to his “wildness” (properly, the feral nature), and seems quite negative⁸⁸: since we do not have Ephorus’ account, it is hard to assess why the historian considers him θηριώδης, but we cannot exclude that through this characterisation Ephorus refers to Dercylidas’ conduct towards non-Greeks, for example on the occasion of plunders; this is, however a mere assumption drawn from Xenophon’s account. Finally, the adjective πάνουργος is actually a uox media, because it means wicked, knavish, but also clever, smart: the former meaning could be more consistent with Dercylidas’ savagery, the latter with his cunning. Lacking Ephorus’ account, it is hard to evaluate the proper meaning of this adjective in the framework of his account⁸⁹. In sum, the portrait supplied by Ephorus remains ambiguous, because, on the one hand, we lack his historical account of Dercylidas’ expedition, and, on the other, some terms used by the historian may have a double meaning. It is a picture which mixes features that partly could be positive (he is not easily deceivable), in part are borderline (he is cunning / a deceiver and he lacks of ἁπλότης), and in part are strongly negative (he is a savage)⁹⁰.

66The other issue worthy of consideration is the nickname attributed to Dercylidas: Ephorus reports Σκύφος (or perhaps Σκύθος, according to another variant of the codices⁹¹), while Xenophon Σίσυφος. This issue has been largely discussed⁹². Since in Greek myth Sisyphus is a notorious trickster, while, according to Athenaeus, σκύφος (and its dialectal variant σκύθος) is a name of a vessel for liquids, obviously Xenophon’s text makes more sense: this is why some editors, including F. Jacoby, corrected the text reported by codices and adopted Xenophon’s version⁹³. But Athenaeus quotes this nickname in a section of his Deipnosophistae in which he is dealing with cups and vessels, hence it is clear that the text of Ephorus read by Athenaeus had Σκύφος or Σκύθος and not Σίσυφος. G. Parmeggiani, who studied this issue in depth, concludes that Σκύφος/Σκύθος cannot be excluded to properly outline Dercylidas’ personality from the point of view of his political opponents, possibly even as an intentional distortion of the “original” nickname Σίσυφος⁹⁴. In my opinion too, it is not unlikely that more than one nickname, even similar ones, of the Spartan commander circulated⁹⁵, one being the derisory version of the other⁹⁶; these appellations, however, must necessarily make sense with his personality. This is the case of Xenophon’s Σίσυφος, which is consistent with the fact that Dercylidas is portrayed by the historian as µάλα µηχανητικός. It has been pointed out, however, that it may also be the case of Σκύθος because this term, being not only a dialectal variant of the name of a vessel, but also a distortion of Σκύθης, may allude to the brutality which is typical of the Scythians and, according to Ephorus, also of Dercylidas (θηριώδης)⁹⁷. It is harder to find an explanation for the nickname Σκύφος, which may allude to his drinking habits, although nothing in Ephorus’ fragment (and in the other ancient authors) refers to this aspect of his personality⁹⁸: in any case, not even this nickname can be ruled out, since we may be unaware of some aspects of Dercylidas’ character. Anyway, both the Ephorean variants do not seem to be particularly favourable to him, in contrast to the nickname quoted by Xenophon⁹⁹: in fact, the fragment praises the Spartans, rather than their commander¹⁰⁰, because they chose the right man for the right task. Since the Persians acted with deception and cunning, the Spartans sent against them a man who could stand up to them: the portrait of the Persians is ambiguous, if not negative, and so is Dercylidas’. Therefore, in conclusion, although the nickname that Ephorus attributed to the Spartan commander is not entirely clear, both the variants seem to be consistent with what we noted from Ephorus’ portrait, which is not completely positive and, therefore, in this respect, is quite different from Xenophon’s. This difference is very interesting, but obviously we would need a larger portion of Ephorus’ account to make an appropriate comparison between the portrait provided by the two historians.

67Since it is commonly believed that Ephorus is the main source for Diodorus’ account about the events of Greece, it is hard to reconnect the two sources, given that the portrait provided by the latter seems more favourable, while that of the former ambiguous¹⁰¹. It cannot be excluded that Diodorus took his information both from Xenophon and Ephorus¹⁰²; in any case for a proper comparison between Diodorus and Ephorus we would need the complete Ephorean account of Dercylidas’ activity in Asia. Besides, Diodorus may have possibly neglected this aspect of his source because the brief account provided by him focuses mainly on the military events. In addition, it should be remarked that, while Ephorus uses the name ∆ερκυλλίδας, Diodorus spells the name with only one λ: this is not a conclusive hint, but anyway it seems noticeable. The only aspect that the accounts of the two historians have in common is the term δόλος, which however in Diodorus is attributed to Dercylidas, while in Ephorus primarily to the Persians and, indirectly, to the Spartan commander: this term seems to be the hint that enables the link between the two accounts, but, admittedly, the scanty evidence about Ephorus’ picture of Dercylidas does not allow us to speculate further on the portrait of the Spartan general provided by the two historians¹⁰³.

68In conclusion, the framework supplied by the sources other than Xenophon is complex. If we exclude sources whose references are too short for inferring anything (Isocrates and the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, which is however interesting for its definition of “Dercylidaeans” with respect to Agesilaus’ soldiers), we may distinguish two typologies of account.

69On the one hand, accounts providing an overall favourable picture of Dercylidas. Thucydides suggests that he was a skilled general and also Diodorus seem to agree, although he uses the term δόλος, which seems an interesting fact.

70On the other hand, accounts that are more ambiguous and cryptic or even negative. The initiator of this trend seems to be Ephorus, who mixes in his fragment different aspects, some of which could be positive, while others (included his nickname) are ambiguous or (as for the case of his savageness) absolutely negative. Polyaenus, whose account is very interesting because it can be compared with the same episode as narrated by Xenophon, presents Dercylidas as cunning and as a deceiver, a man who does not hesitate to break his word in order to achieve a goal. And, in my opinion, it is likely that Polyaenus’ source could be Ephorus himself: in this case, we would have a specimen to compare Xenophon and Ephorus, which would demonstrate that the two historians narrated the same events in a different tone. Lastly, in this group of ambiguous presentations of Dercylidas I list also the two passages by Plutarch, although they most likely depend on two different sources: the first one, concerned with Dercylidas, presents him as an εὐδόκιµος στρατηγός, but also as “atypical”, since he had no sons; the second one, clearly not specifically interested in Dercylidas, states that in the Asian expedition Dercylidas and Thibron were replaced because they accomplished οὐδὲν ἀξιόλογον.

Conclusions

71The portrait of Dercylidas provided by Xenophon is very interesting, because the author knew the Spartan commander personally and was an eyewitness of the events narrated. Obviously, given this situation, his portrait cannot be completely unbiased: Xenophon held Dercylidas in great esteem for various aspects related to his Asian campaign, as I tried to prove in par. 2. The author praises his rational behaviour and also his emotional side; he appreciates also aspects that are halfway between the private and the public spheres, such as his ideal of hospitality, his generosity and his fondness for being abroad; and he commends as well features properly concerning the public sphere, such as his religiosity, his apparent adherence to panhellenic ideals, his strategy, relying both on war and above all on diplomacy, his loyalty towards Spartan authorities, his skills in speeches and in persuasion. Besides, according to Xenophon, Dercylidas is “tricky” in a surely positive sense, since he is able to use cunning and diplomacy in order to achieve his goals, perhaps also as required by the military superiority of his Persian enemies.

72In addition to these features considered above, also the rapidity of his actions should be noticed. Xenophon emphasises this aspect on several occasions: e.g. in 3.1.16 he states that Dercylidas took possession of three cities in just one day; in 3.2.1, nine cities in eight days; and in 3.2.10, regarding the wall in the Chersonese, he remarks that, its construction began in the spring and was concluded before the following autumn. This trait seems to be indeed characteristic of Dercylidas, since also Thucydides (8.62.1) refers that Dercylidas had Lampsacus revolted against the Athenians in just two days. But Xenophon must have particularly appreciated it: for example, in the speech of Polidamas of Pharsalus, rapidity is an important feature of Jason of Pherae (HG, 6.1.15), who is regarded as a good leader by Xenophon. Actually, other aspects as well are common to Dercylidas and Jason. According to Xenophon, the Thessalian tyrant is able to λανθάνειν, φθάνειν and βιάζεσθαι (HG, 6.1.15): the second verb alludes exactly to the rapidity of the leader, the third one to his use of the army and the first one to his ability to go unnoticed, to act without being observed. Dercylidas did not have many occasions for βιάζεσθαι, but in the case of Atarneus he proved to be skilled in sieges; as for λανθάνειν, the episode should be recalled when he found out that the Spartan delegates were speculating about a wall in the Chersonese and then, without saying a word and without informing the Spartan authorities, he actually built that wall. But also other features of Jason’s life closely resemble Dercylidas’: in his army Jason had a large number of mercenaries (HG, 6.1.5); he granted prizes to particularly hard-working soldiers (6.1.6), just like Dercylidas during the building of the wall; he knew how to satisfy the needs of his soldiers (6.1.15), just like Dercylidas who continuously cares about supplies and pay for his army; and, finally, he is a φρόνιµος στρατηγός (6.1.5), i.e. a commander that acts not only with βία, but also with reason. In sum, the Xenophontean portrait of Dercylidas, not so different from that of Jason, is that of a good and also unscrupulous commander, caring for his troop as well¹⁰⁴, a kind of commander appreciated by Xenophon.

73Consequently, in my opinion, the overall portrait of Dercylidas provided by the historian is very positive, as appears also from Xenophon’s own words in HG, 3.2.7¹⁰⁵. This view is shared by many scholars¹⁰⁶, but not by all of them: C. Tuplin states that, according to Xenophon, Dercylidas is better than Thibron, but does not deserve a totally positive judgment; M. Tamiolaki even includes Dercylidas in a group in which she lists, amongst others, also Thibron, Teleutias and Xenophon himself, stating that the attitude of the author towards these leaders is mixed, since, on the one hand, he attributes to them a certain degree of skills, but, on the other, also presents their shortcomings¹⁰⁷. Clearly Xenophon is well aware of some limits of Dercylidas’ actions in Asia, but in most of the cases he tries to justify him in an explicit or implicit way. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, Xenophon’s judgment on Dercylidas is undoubtedly biased (because of their personal acquaintance), but this does not mean that it is not a positive judgment. A few example may better illustrate the biased feature of the portrait.

74It has been remarked that Dercylidas’ soldiers lack discipline: when Dercylidas is about to clash with the joint troops of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, Xenophon admits that, during the march, the army was not in battle formation, supposing that the enemy was not nearby (3.2.14), and, subsequently, while they were preparing for the battle, some of the soldiers coming from the allied troops ran away and defected from the army (3.2.17). Tuplin remarks that Xenophon cannot have considered these events as examples of good generalship¹⁰⁸ and this seems uncontroversial. But the historian reports that Dercylidas had by then been aware of the problem for a couple of years: in Gergis, after taking possession of Midias’ treasury, the commander claims that, thanks to a sum granting the payment of the troops for almost an year, the soldiers would be more orderly and obedient (3.1.28)¹⁰⁹. Thus, Dercylidas is aware of the discipline issue and does anything he can to resolve it; he was not completely successful, as we noted, but at least he tackled the problem. In his presentation of this aspect, Xenophon is implicitly justificatory towards Dercylidas: at the same time, he, as a military leader, cannot be completely satisfied with Dercylidas’ management of the troops, but he does not consider the general as actually responsible of the soldiers’ conduct, also because he managed to grant them all what they needed in terms of pay and supplies.

75One could also recall the fact that on a couple of occasions the Spartans intervened in Dercylidas’ management of the Asian campaign, which may be interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction: it occurred when they sent three delegates to Lampsacus (3.2.6 sq.) and when the ephors ordered him to move to Caria (3.2.12). But, again, Xenophon justifies Dercylidas. Concerning the former occasion, he states that the delegates were sent not to remove him, but to tell him to continue in command for the ensuing year (3.2.6); moreover, when they came back to Sparta they could see that the Greek cities of the area of Ephesus were enjoying a state of peace and prosperity (3.2.9). In sum, even if the Spartans sent the delegation due to some reservations about Dercylidas’ management (perhaps because of complaints coming from the Ionian cities), Xenophon does not provide this piece of information and, on the contrary, he limits himself to reporting their appreciation for Dercylidas’ command¹¹⁰. With regard to the second occasion, Xenophon clearly shows that the Spartan intervention was somehow counterproductive: he states indeed that up to that time the Greeks and the barbarians of the region “lived in peace” and instead (δέ), after the complaints of the Ionians, Dercylidas was ordered to move to Caria and fight against Tissaphernes (3.2.12). Thus, Xenophon depicts Spartan intervention as breaking a delicate balance that Dercylidas had been able to strike: also in this case, even if there could have been grounds for criticizing Dercylidas’ operate, since the Ionians were unhappy with his conduct, Xenophon chooses to justify him and to present his management under a positive light.

76A final example may come from his double replacement in his Asian assignments, the first time by Agesilaus (as commander of the Greek army) and later by Anaxibius (as responsible of a specific mission)¹¹¹. In the former case, Xenophon gives no explicit explanation, although it seems that the presence of a Spartan king (as well as of fresh new troops) had become necessary in the Asian area, since the Persians were reportedly preparing a fleet of more than three hundred ships (3.4.1-2). In the latter case, instead, the historian expressly states that the Spartans did not blame Dercylidas for anything and that the replacement occurred because Anaxibius, φίλων αὐτῷ γενοµένων τῶν ἐφόρων, διεπράξατο ὥστε αὐτὸς ἐκπλεῦσαι ἁρµοστὴς εἰς Ἄβυδον (4.8.32): thus, Xenophon insinuates that this replacement occurred only because of personal ties between the ephors and the new harmost¹¹², and not due to Dercylidas’ faults. In sum, according to Xenophon’s version, neither replacements implied any blame for Dercylidas: in fact, after the first one, he operated again in Asia as Agesilaus’ delegate. Again, the historian seems justificatory towards Dercylidas, because his account may be partial and may overlook the fact that not all the Spartans (and, of course, of the Ionians as well) were satisfied with Dercylidas’ activity¹¹³. This biased version depends on the fact that Xenophon wants to portrait the Spartan commander as a good leader¹¹⁴.

77This opinion seems to be shared, as noted above, also by an intimate friend of Xenophon’s, i.e. Agesilaus, with whom Dercylidas had personal ties¹¹⁵. Not only the two Spartans have some features in common, like a deep religious piety, as appears from their high consideration for sacrifices (and this obviously makes them both very appreciated by Xenophon), but there are also a couple of hints of Agesilaus’ appreciation of Dercylidas: it is known that in 396 Dercylidas was (with Herippidas and Megillus¹¹⁶) one of the three Spartan delegates who swore an oath with Tissaphernes on behalf of Agesilaus (HG, 3.4.6) and that in 394, in Europe, Dercylidas, commissioned by the king himself, announced the outcome of the battle of Nemea to the allies (4.3.1-2). In my opinion, an hypothesis can be made about 395: since his arrival in Asia, Agesilaus was accompanied by a special commission of thirty men who apparently acted both as advisors and inspectors of his activity; in the first year this commission was led by Lysander, while in the second one, after Lysander and the other twenty-nine came back to Sparta, by Herippidas¹¹⁷. Well, since in 396 Herippidas worked together with Dercylidas and in 395 Herippidas was not only the leader of the thirty-man commission, but was also appointed commander of the squadron of the Cyreans, which had been guided by Dercylidas for three years, it is possible that also Dercylidas became member of the commission of the thirty Spartiates for that year. This assumption is based on no actual evidence, but it is however possible: in fact, Xenophon does not state that these new thirty men arrived from Sparta and, after getting rid of the awkward presence of Lysander, Agesilaus could have managed to arrange a commission, at least in part, more favourable to him.

78As a final point, given these peculiar traits of Dercylidas’ portrait provided by Xenophon, it seems remarkable that the sources taken as a whole, despite mutual differences, also show a couple of constant features.

79In the first place, almost all the sources agree on the fact that Dercylidas was cunning: Xenophon (and perhaps at least partially also Diodorus) interprets this trait in a positive way and introduces it from the very first moment in which he mentions him, emphasising also his nickname Sysiphus, while in other sources, starting with Ephorus, who however remains more ambiguous on this point, his craftiness becomes a tendency to deceive (as particularly apparent in Polyaenus). Although Dercylidas is often portrayed as an unscrupulous man with a good amount of personal initiative, no source suggests that he used his talents in order to take advantage for himself, creating abroad a sort of personal power in order to establish a tyrannical potentate in the area where he operated¹¹⁸. Yet, not all the sources consider that his cunning and his military skills were enough for his assignment and in fact sometimes his Asian campaign is depicted as ineffective, while Xenophon praises the results that Dercylidas was able to achieve mainly through his craftiness and diplomacy.

80The portrait of the “typical” Spartan man depends on the periods and on the authors. Sometimes sources emphasise the “Lycurgan Spartan”, serious, loyal, obedient, honest and upright, while other times the astute, duplicitous and deceiver Spartan. Ephorus seems to present both models, contrasting the “ideal” Sparta of the origins with the degenerated Sparta of the fourth century¹¹⁹ (and in this dualism, his Dercylidas seems to be an example of the latter type, given the qualification of “savageness”). The commonplace of Spartan duplicity, the model of the Spartan man who thinks one thing but says another, is widely represented in ancient literature since the fifth century, so much that there were several proverbs with slight variations in which the Spartans were compared to foxes¹²⁰. Perhaps the most effective of them is the one preserved in Plutarch’s Comparison of Lysander and Sulla: “lions at home, foxes abroad” (οἴκοι λέοντες, ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ δὲ ἀλώπεκες)¹²¹. But a scholion to Aristophanes’ Pax is particularly remarkable, which comments the words οἴκοι λέοντες and states: “there is a saying against the Spartans who have bad luck in Asia: lions at home, at Ephesus Spartans” (Schol. in Ar., Pac., 1198: παροιµία παρὰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ᾽Ασίᾳ Λάκονας ἀτυχήσαντας, οἴκοι λέοντες, ἐν ᾽Εφέσῳ δὲ Λάκονες). It seems highly interesting that, according to the scholion, a particular version of the proverb was used in connection with the Spartan expedition in Asia and its alleged “failures”¹²². This version may have been generated also by the events of Dercylidas’ three years in Asia, obviously with a negative interpretation of them, not far from the interpretation that we find in a passage of Plutarch quoted above, according to which Thibron and Dercylidas accomplished nothing worthy of note in Asia (Plu., Art., 20.3: οὐδὲν δὲ πράττοντες ἀξιόλογον)¹²³. Besides, it is interesting that the saying reported by the scholion replaces ἀλώπεκες with Λάκονες, almost considering the two terms as equivalent: if this version of the proverb was generated also in connection with Dercylidas’ campaign, then we would have a further confirmation of the fact that he was considered cunning (in this case, in a negative sense, given the unfavourable tone of the saying).

81In sum, cunning seems to have been a distinctive feature of Dercylidas’ portrait in the source, notably with a twofold interpretation, depending on the bias of the author: besides the positive interpretation provided by Xenophon, also a negative one is attested, probably connected also with the saying “οἴκοι λέοντες, ἐν ᾽Εφέσῳ δὲ Λάκονες”. After all, nicknames and sayings might have been not irrelevant in Dercylidas’ life.

82A second feature, that, under different aspects, occurs in several sources is the fact that he shows traits that are not traditionally Spartan¹²⁴. For example, Dercylidas’ unscrupulousness, which is shown by various sources, is a trait of his personality that is surely not typically Spartan. Three authors in particular show this “atypicality”.

83First, Xenophon: according to him, Dercylidas was φιλαπόδηµος (HG, 4.3.2), which is confirmed from what we know about his life: as it is well-known, the Spartans, generally speaking, disliked spending a long time abroad, also because they feared for the stability of the situation in their homeland. An exception thereof is, for example, that of Archidamus III, Agesilaus’ son, who, according to Theopompus, ἐσπούδαζεν ἔξω διατρίβειν (and it could be remarkable that this negative judgment comes from an historian who, in his moralistic temper, is not so different from Ephorus)¹²⁵. Besides, Xenophon himself (Lac. Pol., 14.4) attests that the Spartans were forbidden to live abroad (ἀποδηµεῖν οὐκ ἐξόν); he also adds that for the Spartans the contact with foreigners was dangerous and that the degeneration of their morality is manifest in the fact that the leaders constantly managed to be harmosts abroad¹²⁶. It is not easy to understand how this characterisation provided by Xenophon could be consistent with his positive judgment of Dercylidas, but in effect his opinion about a single man of whom he had personal and direct knowledge may be quite different from a general evaluation. Besides, the whole chapter 14 of his Spartan Constitution is not easy to interpret in the context of the whole treatise¹²⁷. But it is not our task here to resolve this issue; what here is important here is that, according to the common view, the “Lycurgan” Spartan disliked staying abroad and, therefore, in this respect, Dercylidas is an “anomalous” Spartan¹²⁸. This “atypicality” may have been less curious in the period of Spartan imperialism¹²⁹, but nevertheless it is a deviation from the image of the traditional Spartan man.

84In connection with the fact that Dercylidas was fond of living abroad, it should be remembered that, according to Plutarch (Lyc., 15.3; Mor. [Apopht. Lac.], 227f), he had no family: this is consistent with Xenophon’s information, but inconsistent with Spartan tradition, since the most serious danger for Sparta was the ὀλιγανθρωπία: having no sons meant not contributing to the prosperity of the homeland and, therefore, it is quite anomalous¹³⁰.

85Besides, it is important to recall that, according the fourth-century historian Ephorus¹³¹, in Dercylidas’ manners there was nothing that could be considered as “Laconic” or straightforward (ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδ᾽ ἁπλοῦν ἔχων). Whether this consideration concerns his way of speaking, i.e. the fact that (as in proverbs dealing with the Spartans) Dercylidas thought one thing and said another, or has to be intended more broadly as referred to his conduct, the passage is relevant not only because it is connected with Dercylidas’ well known cunning, but also because it explicitly states that in his manners there was οὐδὲν Λακωνικόν: this remark further confirms that Dercylidas presented traits of an “anomalous Spartan”.

86In any case, the “atypical” traits that emerged in this survey are in part connected with the sphere of Dercylidas’ private life (the fact that he had no sons), while in part are strongly related to the period of Spartan hegemony: features like unscrupulousness, living abroad, personal initiative and so on are inevitably connected with the historical and political circumstances of the moment and, particularly, with the new challenges that Sparta had to face. Not all the Spartans of this period did present these untraditional characteristics, as for example Agesipolis¹³². But Dercylidas, thanks also to his experience abroad during the Ionian phase of the Peloponnesian war, seems to be perfectly comfortable with the new characteristics of the historical period and, according to Xenophon’s favourable version, seems to be able to achieve effective results acting in the interests of Sparta.

87In conclusion, Xenophon’s portrait of Dercylidas is quite interesting because the historian depicts him both in his private sphere (since they knew each other in person), and in the public one. Besides, it has to be analysed with particular attention: in fact, if, on the one hand, it is basically reliable, because in several aspects it is confirmed by the other sources (not only concerning Dercylidas’ cunning, but e.g. also the events of his Asian expedition, as they are reported by Diodorus and, in part, also by sources having a different tendency like Polyaenus), on the other hand, it is undoubtedly also biased (not only because Dercylidas’ astuteness is rather presented as deception by other sources, but also because Xenophon is often justificatory towards the Spartan commander). Furthermore, Xenophon’s portrait of Dercylidas is interesting in many other respects: for example, because it concerns the issue of the good leader, with which the historian was particularly concerned, because it allows us to perceive contrasts in the Spartan management of the Asian expedition and also because it shows that the traditional figure of the Spartan commander had to some extent changed in the period of Spartan hegemony. In any case, this paper further confirms Xenophon’s inclination to investigate human nature and to provide vivid portraits for the individuals who appear in the pages of his works.