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Estudios del Trabajo desde el Sur. Volumen I

 | 
Dasten Julián Vejar
, 
Álvaro Galliorio Jorquera

Trabajo y estructuras económicas

Organisational mechanisms and structuration of financial work

Javier Hernández

Texte intégral

  • 70 Matt Vidal & Jamie PECK, “Sociological Institutionalism and the Socially constructed Economy”, Trev (...)
  • 71 Gerald Epstein, “Introduction”, Gerald Epstein (Ed.), Financialization and the World Economy, Chelt (...)
  • 72 Alex Preda, Framing Finance: The boundaries of markets and modern capitalism, Chicago, Chicago Univ (...)

1Markets and economic activities are socially constructed70. Financial services are structured by contacts, social codes and hermeneutics of signals and expectations about the future. Furthermore, financial services are a part of contemporary societies and economies; they play an increasingly important role in the way economic activities are organised and structured and the way societies distribute their valuable resources71, but at the same time they depend on the way the public and other institutions of society look at them and trust in financial firms to accept or pursue professional careers in these areas, hire their services and purchase their products72. In this sense, financial activities are not only shaped and enabled by cultural and social dynamics; they are also integrated and connected into society in cultural, structural and institutional terms.

  • 73 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cam (...)
  • 74 Mark Granovetter, & Richard Swedberg, “Introduction”, Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg (Eds.), T (...)

2Mechanisms are social patterns which bring regularity to social interaction73. In the cases of mechanisms in financial activities, they emerge from the interplay of different elements of social experience. First, there are organisational and individual strategies performed in order to pursue different social interests. Secondly, there are formal and informal norms which emerge as institutional responses to particular struggles or challenges. There are also regularities, which emerge from internal dynamics, and particular decisions which structure future practices and decisions in terms of path dependence74; these also act as mechanisms bringing regularity to social interactions. All of these interact, of course, with the broader economic set of opportunities and power relations, that is to say, the market and the broader social structures in which take part.

Methods

  • 75 Nigel King, Christine Horrocks, Interviews in Qualitative Research, London, London: SAGE Publicatio (...)

3The present paper is based on a study performed in two very different social contexts: the United Kingdom (specifically firms located in London and Edinburgh) and Chile (specifically Santiago). For that purpose, 42 in-depth and semi-structured interviews; the interviewees were mostly people who currently work, or have worked, in financial organisations in the mentioned cities were performed on a face-to-face basis. Some interviewees were especially relevant since they have taken part in selection, recruitment and allocation processes. We performed thematic analysis methods75. Participant observation during recruitment events in both countries was also performed.

4We selected people working in certain London, Edinburgh and Santiago organisations in order to investigate how they relate to the structures, institutional arrangements and social distribution of valuable resources found in their environments. Historical and current conditions for finance-based business are very different in both countries, in terms of the social distribution of resources, in terms of culture and institutions and in terms of their roles in the world financial system. Those differences make comparison interesting and relevant. The sample aimed at achieving diversity, in terms of types of firms, types of products, types of positions, etc., in both countries. In this sense, most studies focus on a specific market or position within the high diversity of financial activities. This research aimed at analysing a wide range of firms, activities, positions and markets, in order to have a big picture of the field and understand the interaction of organisational practices, financial work and the broader social environments.

Integration of financial firms into society

  • 76 Olivier Godechot, “Getting a Job in Finance: The Strenght of collaboration ties”, European Journal (...)
  • 77 Ali Reza Montazemi, John Siam & Akbar Esfahanipour, “Effect of Network Relations on the Adoption of (...)
  • 78 Ronald Burt, Miguel Guilarte, Holly Raider & Yuki Yasuda, “Competition, contingency, and the extern (...)

5At the level of ties and networks, individuals are crucial. While there are inter-organisational ties and relationships, they are normally embodied in interpersonal ones76. In this sense, internal integration of individuals within an organisation is not only relevant because they are the ones who perform the work and keep them running (regardless of the increasing role played by machines and electronic devices in transactions, analysis and control77, but also because they are the ones who build ties and relationships with the rest of the market, with the customers and with organisations based in other fields of society. As social network analysis scholars have proposed, the role played by specific ties depends on the broader structure into which they are inserted and the particular access to resources that the structure provides to specific nodes and their connected ones78. In this sense, different social configurations and distributions of resources lead to different networking and adaptation strategies by firms.

  • 79 Neil Fligstein, “Markets as politics: a political-cultural approach to market institutions”, Americ (...)
  • 80 Mitchel Abolafia, “The institutional embeddedness of market failure: Why speculative bubbles still (...)
  • 81 Gerald Davis, “Politics and Financial Markets”, Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda (Eds.), The Oxford (...)

6Institutional mechanisms also play an important role in social coordination. Institutions not only promote and enforce the norms that bring stability to social expectations and behaviour, but also contribute to structuring interests, aligning positions and strategies and dealing with conflicts79. Institutional mechanisms play a role in the social integration and reproduction of financial services and the investment industry, through internal norms and control and external regulation80 . Thus, different institutional mechanism may emerge from decisions within particular firms, interplay of firms within particular markets and the social contexts in which firms are working81.

  • 82 Mitchel Abolafia, Making Markets: Oportunism and Restraint on Wall Street, Cambridge, Harvard Unive (...)
  • 83 Alex Preda, “The Investor as a Cultural Figure of Global Capitalism”, Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Pre (...)

7Symbolic integration is also important. Individuals learn specific discourses, expectations and status systems that bring coordination, stability, motivation and attraction to the work in firms and the industry82. Symbolic integration needs to be negotiated and recognised by markets and the broader society in order to provide legitimation for these companies among their potential customers, regulators and other related people and organisations83. Again, symbolic integration mechanisms will vary depending on the particular culture and discourses of a firm, market or broader society.

Socialisation

  • 84 Mitchel Abolafia, “Markets a Cultures: an ethnographic approach”, Michael Callon (Ed.), Laws of the (...)
  • 85 Neil Fligstein & Taekjin Shin, “Shareholder Value and the Transformation of the U.S. Economy, 1984– (...)
  • 86 Abolafia, “Markets a cultures…”, op. cit.

8As described by Abolafia84, inductees in finance learn a number of scripts that then are taken for granted once they get used to their everyday work. They learn the technical tools of their jobs while they gradually become accustomed to the specific values, discourses and ideologies of their firm and also the industry. Therefore, it is possible to propose that socialisation works at three different levels: at the level of values, ideologies and discourses related to financial practitioners’ positions in society (such as shareholder value creation85 and entrepreneurial activities86), at the level of the expectations and scripts about their job trajectories and professional selves, and at the level of the knowledge an toolkit they need to perform their tasks.

  • 87 Alexandra Michel & Stanton Wortham, Bullish on Uncertainty: How Organizational Cultures transform p (...)
  • 88 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies”, American Sociological Review, 51: 2, 1986 (...)

9New members of firms gain knowledge of criteria for evaluating their own actions and those of other people, even though these criteria may lead to malfeasance. In socialisation processes they learn about the culture of teams, firms and the industry87. They also learn, formally and informally, a set of values needed to make decisions and observe and evaluate their own performance. In this sense, this notion of values as part of symbolic reality does not presuppose that values are positive or that they frame or provide meaning or goals of action, but rather that they provide a background which “fine tune [s] the regulation of action within established ways of life”88. For example, the next quotation presents a sample of discourse that the interviewee probably learnt in his workplace in order to legitimate his job and see the role it plays in society; they learn a particular type of phrasing or narrative about their own positions in which the downsides are ignored in order to allow him to evaluate his activities positively.

“My principal goal is to create value for the investors whose money we are looking after. So we look after a huge variety of investors but large portions of them are charities, pension funds, people that cannot afford losses and need that money when they retire, so what I am interested in is creating value for them and making sure I invest that money in the correct way. That is what wakes me up in the morning.” (Interviewee working as an equity analyst in a large investment bank in London)

10Within their workplaces and teams, new employees learn not only about the job they will perform but also the culture of the firm and the industry and legitimation of the different modes of doing things which dominate in their specific fields. For example, when asked about the risk management policies of firms in the UK, soon-to-be employees of these firms (who had already been hired but had yet to start their jobs) declared themselves sceptical about the foundations and different aspects of the models and systems used, considering them naïve and simplistic; this was probably motivated by the recent crisis and a more academic approach learnt at university, as it is clear in the following quotes.

“I do not like at all the way industry deals with risk. So in the 1970s, 1980s, a number of economists at the University of Chicago. Well, it started in 60s really, but they tried to quantify economics, and in doing that... they managed to quantify a number of aspects of economics. And there are some quite big flaws in the way they quantify things. So they look at markets as following a random walk process and they look at markets as if they follow a normal distribution, which they don’t.” (Interviewee soon to start his job in a large firm based in Edinburgh after a successful internship in the same company)

11However, the more experienced workers did not seem that critical of risk management systems, even those who were actually working in the industry during the 2007 financial crisis (and probably previous ones). When asked generally about risk, they told me about the models they use and how control systems and their participation in transactions have improved, but did not say much about the downsides of risk management models and systems, in contrast to the new members. It seems that models and systems are not only a part of everyday life for analysts, traders and risk managers, but also a solid base backing their decisions, allowing them to cope with uncertainty and supporting their own expertise. To question them would, to a certain extent, be questioning their own trajectories and prospective careers.

12In terms of expectations, job trajectories and criteria of judgement, new employees learn scripts for their jobs through mentorship by specialised people or their team colleagues. Formal and informal mentorship works on a basis of direction and feedback on the part of the mentor, and imitation and adaptation on the part of the apprentice. Those processes allow new members to become familiar not only with the concepts, procedures and systems used within the team, but also with job trajectories which they can mirror. The processes of learning include not only the particular ideologies, values and discourses that exist in their teams, as indicated in the previous paragraph, but also the particular lifestyles they may acquire once they have progressed in the industry and the particular personality elements they should develop in order to fit with the profile of successful members of the team. The following two quotes narrate how interviewees remember their initial interactions with more experienced members of their teams, and how they appreciated their experiences, examples and how they learnt from them from the beginning.

“We had session with lots of senior investors about how do they invest. It was simply as having lunch or a two hours session with people about how do they invest. So we learn from lots of senior people from around the firm”. (Interviewee working as an investment manager in a large firm based in Edinburgh)
In the UK most of processes of recruiting and inclusion of new members are more formal, so socialisation often take the form of graduate programmes, which are formally designed in order to integrate new members and socialise them in the culture of the organisation and the different areas of knowledge they need in their new jobs. Accordingly, the following quote describes a typical experience as a graduate trainee.
“Yes, so basically the way a graduate scheme works is... you basically have three years and a main feature of that is that you rotate around three investment teams. At the same time you are expected to pass level 1 of the CFA. That is the main threshold; the firms expect that as long as you pass level 1, that’s a basic. And then, through the first three years you have so many training and interactive sessions with all sorts of people from around the firm. That’s the kind of programme most people go through. Normally we hire right at the bottom, we don’t have many people who joined after ten years”. (Interviewee working in a senior position in a large firm in Edinburgh).

  • 89 Michel, op. cit.

13Although is in the context of frames and approaches for dealing with uncertainty, clients and teams, Michel and Wortham’s89 work showed how individual positions are framed during socialisation processes, which may also apply to situations as the above described.

14When comparing socialisation processes in both countries, they seem similar in terms of the role played by teams, where new employees learn how to perform their regular jobs and how to project themselves in the firm and the industry. However, in the UK socialisation processes are often carefully designed and formally instituted, while in Chile they are more tacitly and informally performed, as it also discussed in Chapter 3. In a different aspect, as in the UK new employees are socialised to perform in a very demanding and competitive environment, and within teams new employees are also inserted in very competitive dynamics, some particular individuals may feel pressures to behave in a deviant way in order to perform better, which does not seem the case of Chile, although there are also cases of malfeasance. This does not mean that there is not informal socialisation in financial firms in the UK, but it is not as preeminent as it happens in firms in Chile.

Work

15Financial work is often pictured as done by isolated individuals. However, the following quote is interesting since it remarks that individual behaviour is explained in a large extent by organisational dynamics, in this case hierarchical decisions, rather than personal values.

“More than taking a lot of risks, I would say that the thing is to have a personality important enough to defend your ideas. The thing about risk is quite relative, since it depends on the boundaries set out by your boss. If there is a guy...‘hey, I like taking big risks’, but they give them... ‘you know you can lose up to one million pesos [approx £1200]’, I can be the guy who takes the most risks in the world, but I can’t do anything at all with that amount. On the other hand, I may be more conservative, but if the guy above tells me ‘hey man, you have to put everything in’, it really doesn’t matter if you don’t like taking risks, you have to put it all in. So, it’s more than whether you like taking risks or not, it depends on the situation you’re in”. (Interviewee working as a trader and financial engineer in a large bank in Santiago)

  • 90 Michel Callon, “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics”, Michel Callon (Ed (...)
  • 91 Daniel Katz & Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, New Jersey, John Wiley and Sons, (...)

16A great extent of financial work implies dealing with and interpreting expectations, in this case related to assets, products and markets. In addition, financial models used for interpretation of data also frame behaviour and decisions of practitioners, as proposed by the concept of performativity90. An important portion of what practitioners learn during their socialisation and careers is related to management and interpretation of expectations within the market. However, there are also expectations related to social interaction, about how practitioners see each other. In this sense, expectations are a crucial aspect of social coordination and play an important role on the industry, both in asset management and at an internal level in terms of individuals and their interaction91 (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Preda, 2009b). Expectations frame individual behaviour in the short, mid and long term, providing employees with a narrative where they can position themselves and others at these three temporalities. They emerge from formal and informal processes within teams and during working routines, as new and continuing employees learn about the specific tools they will use to do their job, what is expected in their roles and positions, and also about their prospective careers, by observing and interacting with their bosses and team colleagues.

  • 92 Joel Podolny, Status Signals: A Sociological Study of Market Competition, Princeton, Princeton Univ (...)

17In the UK, financial and investment positions and professions appear to be more valued than in Chile, where the interviewees who worked in managerial positions complained about difficulties in attracting the “best people” to the industry, since many people were increasingly looking for more flexible jobs where they could travel or work fewer hours. In the UK, although working times in the industry are longer and the competitive atmosphere pushes employees to work even more hours, most notably in London, this situation seems to be one reason for the high value placed on such a career, and so the industry is one of the more demanded niches among graduates, as seen in Chapter 3; independently of the current public criticism of the role played by financial firms during the crisis, people working in the industry appear to be highly esteemed. Congruently with what is proposed by Podolny92 (2005), status in the industry seems related to relationships and interaction with high status people. The following quote shows an example on how people perceive jobs in finance as dealing with high status activities and people, compared to other well respected occupations such as engineering.

18Companies build ties with specific people in the industry; individual members of the industry also get to know each other, especially those who work in particular niches, positions or products. This situation explains to a certain extent why workers refer to the industry, and especially to their own niches in the industry, as small worlds where everybody knows each other. Familiar faces are common, both at this sort of event and in activities more related to the business itself. Therefore, ties in the industry allow for exchange of views and information about markets, job opportunities for career progression and job improvement, and exchange of useful advice on practical dimensions of work, such as references about suppliers. These ties affect and structure not only individual performances in specific positions within a company, but also the way that companies coordinate with each other and, in the mid and long term, the way that specific markets and products develop and behave. The following quote shows, for example, the role played by conferences in the creation and enforcing of ties, and also in the exchange of information between people in different firms.

“Many times I see them [people in similar positions in other companies] at conferences. However, as I am not actually investing, and I am, let’s say, one step behind that, there are no problems with talking to people from this area, from institutions that compete with us. In the end, it is always useful for us to talk about the different models of risk available on the market.” (Interviewee who works as a quant analyst in a large firm in Edinburgh)

  • 93 John Levi Martin, Social Structures, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2009.

19Communication between people working in different firms, in addition to the increasing degree of specialisation at the organisational symbolic and product-related levels, generate a number of “small worlds”93 within the industry. People tend to know the rest of “the market”, as they mostly interact with people who work in the same niche, that is to say, in a similar or reciprocal position, with similar products in similar kinds of firms. This happens because they have worked together previously, done business together, normally attended the same events and gone after the same business opportunities. Even in London, where the number of people working in financial services is massive (excluding accountants and lawyers, there were around 250,000 people in 2012, and 350,000 people before the crisis), the market is described by interviewees as small, although they are also aware that they do not know what happens in other areas, sometimes even in their own firms. The increasing autonomy and specialisation of teams contributes to the creation of specific circuits of people, who rotate within particular niches. As illustrated by previous quotations, it was common for my interviewees to know a number of people involved in the particular products and markets in which they were embedded, and they interacted with them regularly. In this sense, although workers in London, and Santiago consider financial services to be a large industry, they think that their particular niche is small.

20Although financial activities are usually described as deregulated, the case is that work in the industry is often subject to specific regulations and regulatory bodies. Regulation may emerge from specific challenges in a particular market, but the specific elements of regulation will depend on the particular social arrangements within a market, the power and interests of the different agents involved and the political culture in which the markets are embedded. For example, in the case of the UK, professional certifications such as CFA are needed for various positions, which normally involves sitting exams. Although it is more an extended practice than a law-enforced regulation, this has not yet happened in Chile, and so people do not need any formal certification to enter these firms or perform a particular job. In this sense, as explained by people working in managerial positions in financial firms, financial firms in Chile tend to trust the university credentials of their prospective employees, in many cases because the managers of such firms studied in the same schools.

  • 94 Mohr, op. cit.

21Regulation is a complex situation, and regulatory systems normally involve self-regulation in the form of internal control systems and departments, which vary from firm to firm, and external regulation performed by specific bodies, which vary from country to country. However, although regulation emerges from particular social situations triggered by coordination and control challenges to the organisations involved94, it does not necessarily solve the problems it was intended to solve, is not necessarily efficient and can be seen as the result of struggles between different sectors, institutions and groups all pursuing their own interests.

  • 95 Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy, Cambridge, Polity, 2005; Vidal, op. cit.
  • 96 Abolafia, “Making markets…”, op. cit.; Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The (...)

22In the cases of both the UK and Chile, regulations need to be interpreted and adopted by every firm. Internal dynamics and struggles, observed at the level of teams or between teams and areas, configure a specific environment on in which norms are interpreted and internalised. Furthermore, as indicated above, the adoption of regulation and the creation of internal agencies to deal with them also affect internal dynamics, causing struggles or affecting internal arrangements and power relations, such as the relationship of a risk management department with other teams within a particular company. This seems to be the case with the new regulatory trends that emerged after the 2007 crisis, calling for a more active and empowered role for risk management departments, affecting the internal balances of power in different firms. Regulation, formal and informal, may also create distance between teams; for example, the adoption of Chinese Walls policy between trading rooms and corporate finance teams is due to firms considering it dangerous for people from these teams to exchange emails, since they may exchange confidential information. Financial firm’s practices are structured and constituted by their particular institutional environment95 (Bourdieu, 2005; Vidal & Peck, 2012). However, regulatory systems are always interpreted from the point of view of organisations, so it is also possible that a particular company (or teams and individuals within companies) may develop strategies to avoid, bypass or ignore regulation, which may lead to very different outputs from those intended by the creators of norms96 (Abolafia, 1997; Granovetter, 1985).

Bibliographie

References

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1998. “Markets a Cultures: an ethnographic approach”, Michael Callon (Ed.), Laws of the Market, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, pp. 69–85

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http://www.us.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Finance/Theory/?view=usa&ci=9780199556953

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Notes

70 Matt Vidal & Jamie PECK, “Sociological Institutionalism and the Socially constructed Economy”, Trevor Barnes, Jamie Peck & Eric Sheppard (Eds.), The Willey-Blackwell Companion to Economic Geography, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, pp. 594–611

71 Gerald Epstein, “Introduction”, Gerald Epstein (Ed.), Financialization and the World Economy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005, pp. 3–17

72 Alex Preda, Framing Finance: The boundaries of markets and modern capitalism, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2009, Retrieved
fromhttp://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?mode=synopsis&bookkey=398921

73 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007

74 Mark Granovetter, & Richard Swedberg, “Introduction”, Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg (Eds.), The Sociology of Economic Life, Boulder, Westview Press, 2001.

75 Nigel King, Christine Horrocks, Interviews in Qualitative Research, London, London: SAGE Publications, 2010

76 Olivier Godechot, “Getting a Job in Finance: The Strenght of collaboration ties”, European Journal of Sociology, 55, 2010, pp. 25-56; Ranjay Gulati & Martin Gargiulo, “Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From?” American Journal of Sociology, 104: 5, 1999, pp.1439– 1493.

77 Ali Reza Montazemi, John Siam & Akbar Esfahanipour, “Effect of Network Relations on the Adoption of Electronic Trading Systems”, Journal of Management Information Systems, 25: 1, 2008, pp. 233–266.

78 Ronald Burt, Miguel Guilarte, Holly Raider & Yuki Yasuda, “Competition, contingency, and the external structure of markets”, Advances in Strategic Management, 19, 2002, pp.167 - 217; Ronald Burt, Brokerage & Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.

79 Neil Fligstein, “Markets as politics: a political-cultural approach to market institutions”, American Sociological Review, 61: 4, 1996, pp. 656–673; John Mohr & Harrison White, “How to model an Institution”, Theory and Society, 37: 5, 2008, pp. 485–512.

80 Mitchel Abolafia, “The institutional embeddedness of market failure: Why speculative bubbles still occur”, Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 30: B, 2010, pp. 177–200.

81 Gerald Davis, “Politics and Financial Markets”, Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.

82 Mitchel Abolafia, Making Markets: Oportunism and Restraint on Wall Street, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1997; Karen Ho Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street, Durham, Duke University Press, 2009

83 Alex Preda, “The Investor as a Cultural Figure of Global Capitalism”, Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda (Eds.), The Sociology of Financial Markets, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005

84 Mitchel Abolafia, “Markets a Cultures: an ethnographic approach”, Michael Callon (Ed.), Laws of the Market, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, pp. 69–85

85 Neil Fligstein & Taekjin Shin, “Shareholder Value and the Transformation of the U.S. Economy, 1984–2001”, Sociological Forum, 22: 4, 2007, pp. 399–424, Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1573-7861.2007.00044.x

86 Abolafia, “Markets a cultures…”, op. cit.

87 Alexandra Michel & Stanton Wortham, Bullish on Uncertainty: How Organizational Cultures transform participants, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009

88 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies”, American Sociological Review, 51: 2, 1986, pp. 273–286, Retrieved from citeulike-article-id: 16853, p. 282.

89 Michel, op. cit.

90 Michel Callon, “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics”, Michel Callon (Ed.), The Laws of the Market, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1998; Donald Mackenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 2006

91 Daniel Katz & Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, New Jersey, John Wiley and Sons, 1978; Alex Preda, Information, Knowledge, and Economic Life, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, Retrieved from
http://www.us.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Finance/Theory/?view=usa&ci=9780199556953

92 Joel Podolny, Status Signals: A Sociological Study of Market Competition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005

93 John Levi Martin, Social Structures, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2009.

94 Mohr, op. cit.

95 Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy, Cambridge, Polity, 2005; Vidal, op. cit.

96 Abolafia, “Making markets…”, op. cit.; Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”, American Journal of Sociology, 91: 3, 1985, pp. 481– 510.

Auteur

Doctor en Sociología de la Universidad de Edimburgo, Escocia. Magíster en Sociología y Licenciado en Sociología de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Académico e investigador de la Universidad Católica de Temuco

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