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Nature and Realism in Schelling’s Philosophy

Emilio Carlo Corriero
Andrea Dezi

The Existence (Dasein) of Light

The Principle of Light as Unprethinkable Being

Andrea Dezi

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The System of Philosophy in General and of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular (1804) offers the opportunity to study – at various levels and degrees, in the real and in the ideal, from the finite to the infinite – what for Schelling is the internal articulation of the Absolute, that is the general law according to which the infinite springs from the infinite.

In Schelling’s view, an infinite and indivisible affirmation posits itself as affirmed, as affirming, and as their indifference, where being-affirmed is the real aspect of the position, while the affirmation itself, or the affirming, corresponds to its ideal aspect. This structure is not an expression of mere decomposition; in fact, the infinity of the affirmation translates itself into each of its moments so that the affirmed, the affirming and their indifference, each for itself, can posit itself in turn as the All, i.e. infinitely as a bond of the three moments. The Absolute, in the excess of its affirmation, there...


Adjunct Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Teramo in Italy and teaches Theoretical Philosophy at the F. M. Dostoevskij State University of Omsk (Russia). He discusses some physical and metaphysical aspects of Schelling’s ontology in Potenza e Realtà (Mimesis, 2013). His translations include the Italian version of Schelling’s System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere (1804).