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Whence They Came

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Barbara Roberts

4. Developing the System, 1890s-1920

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1Deportation practices of Immigration officials between the early 1890s and the early 1920s can be readily seen to fall into three fairly distinct periods: 1890s-1906; 1906-1914; 1914-1920. During the first period, the Department was deporting so informally and unofficially (and extra-legally) that little can be known beyond the bare outlines of the practices of the time. Some trends are nonetheless clear. Deportations were made on an ad hoc basis when individual immigrants came to the notice of the Department, usually because of a real or perceived incapacity to support themselves. Most of these instances of inability to earn a living were due to some kind of physical incapacity, because of illness or injury or some kind of defect or condition. Often these people were casualties of industrial accidents. Sometimes the inability was related to moral rather than physical “disability”; this was a real and serious liability for women domestic servants at this time, as they were judged fit to work in their employers’ homes not only on the basis of their physical but also their moral condition. These early deports were judged and deemed unfit on an individual basis and treated as individual cases.

  • 1 Public Archives of Canada (PAC) Record Group (RG) 76, File 837, titled “Pauper, insane and otherwi (...)

2Although the Department did not have the legal power to deport immigrants before 1906, statistics show deportations did take place from 1902 onwards. As early as the 1890s the federal government had a firmly established policy of sending back unwanted immigrants, that amounted to deportation. A system for shipping the deports had been developed so that helpless, ill, feebleminded, or insane immigrants were taken care of by immigration agents, railroad conductors, and other official and semiofficial persons during their journeys of deportation.1 After the 1902 Immigration Act gave government the power to set up a system (in effect after 1903) to exclude or send back “undesirables”, the same informal methods of deportation continued for the following few years.

  • 2 Ibid., Department to Canadian Pacific Railway Agent McNicholl, 9 March 1895; see correspondence Au (...)

3Correspondence of the Department of the Interior (at that time responsible for immigration matters) for 1895 shows that there was a “long standing rule” that immigrants who had become “unable to earn a living because of illness or bodily infirmity,” accident, or other reason, would be deported. The Department reported, “it is the practice to send them back, as the simplest and cheapest mode of dealing with them.” Sometimes this procedure was referred to as the return of “failed” immigrants. Often these people had been in Canada for less than a year, but departmental files describe deportations of immigrants who had been here four years or as many as ten years. The government often asked transportation companies to reduce fares or issue passes; the government sometimes paid all or part of the cost, depending on the financial resources of the immigrant. The government accepted some measure of responsibility for new arrivals in their first year, in accord with a policy established in 1878,2 although this sense of responsibility seemed most pronounced when the government was considering deporting the immigrant.

  • 3 Ibid., See correspondence from Montreal Immigration Agent Hoolahan, concerning the Lea family. Mr. (...)

4The government did not automatically ship out people who had fallen upon hard times. Immigration buildings were sometimes used to shelter immigrants who were temporarily penniless, and Immigration agents tried to help them find employment. On rare occasions they acted contrary to policy by advancing fluids to a particularly deserving family.3

  • 4 Ibid., See correspondence passim, Summer 1895.

5Often immigrants fell on hard times through no fault of their own. Immigrants who were disabled at work received no compensation from their employers, and were sent home by the government at public expense. For example, Johan Altmeir came out from Austro-Hungary in 1893 and worked near Winnipeg for the Canadian Pacific Railway. He was wounded through the heart by a piece of metal and although he recovered and wanted to work, he was thereafter unable to do heavy work. The Department decided that he should be sent home to Europe to his wife and child. The CPR sent him free from Winnipeg to Quebec, the Intercolonial from Quebec to Halifax. As he was unable to pay the reduced Atlantic passage so kindly granted by the Allan Line, the Department tried to arrange for him to work his passage home.4 This could not be done and the government paid.

6In a somewhat similar instance, a young Dane could no longer work after he lost a hand in an accident at a planing mill near Limbank, Ontario. He had been working there for six months to learn English and save some money to go out farming in the Northwest. Because his wages were low he had not been able to save much in such a short period, and could not pay the costs of his own deportation after his release from hospital. The Department paid the costs of his maintenance and deportation, the Intercolonial gave him a pass between Saint John and Halifax. The CPR did not want to become involved in such cases and feared that “its acts of charity” in giving such passes would set a precedent. The CPR agent explained:

  • 5 Ibid., CPR Agent McNicholl to Department, 9 March 1895. The unfortunate Dane was eventually sent h (...)

Many towns in Canada have their poor that they want to send to many places, and we have in the past been repeatedly asked to assist, but we have declined, feeling that municipalities should take care of their own poor. There is no reason that I can see why private corporations should participate in a matter of this kind anymore than any other tax payer.5

  • 6 Ibid., Montreal Agent to Ottawa, 10 August 1903, and see correspondence, Hoolahan to Ottawa, passi (...)

7Some immigrants were deported on “mental” grounds because they offended contemporary sensibilities and mores. A twenty-five-year old British immigrant was deported from Winnipeg via Montreal because he was “addicted to masturbation” which officials believed surely “will end in insanity”. The case of a twenty-four-year old Swedish woman who had come to Canada as a domestic servant illuminates the thinking of the Department (as well as contemporary standards) in this somewhat delicate area. She had come with a party of domestics imported by Mrs. Haglin of Montreal. Mrs. Haglin complained to Montreal Immigration Agent Hoolahan that the young woman had a bad reputation and loose morals. Hoolahan was told by three young fellow domestics that the woman in question had “conducted herself like a prostitute” in her hometown in Sweden. She set a bad example for the others, Mrs. Haglin complained; she kept late hours, and got fired from her “situation”. Mrs. Haglin requested that the Department deport the woman; Hoolahan agreed. No substantive evidence was brought forth. The woman was deported on the basis of these interviews, with no further hearing, for possessing a bad reputation and setting a bad example.6

  • 7 Ibid., Hoolahan, 7 November 1903; Ottawa to Hoolahan, 22 November 1903; Hoolahan to Ottawa, 3 Dece (...)

8Some immigrants were deported because they violated class norms. Mrs. Austin and her two young children had been deserted in Canada by her husband; soon after they had emigrated from England, he returned home, leaving her penniless. She stayed at the St. George Society’s Montreal centre for British immigrants while the Department debated her case. The medical inspector in Montreal had ordered her deported. Immigration officials at Ottawa queried the order: it did not seem to be based on medical grounds, and they did not understand why she should be deported. The Montreal Charity Organization Society had requested it, so that she would not become a charity case in the city. The Department suggested that the children could be boarded and Mrs. Austin, who seemed healthy and willing, could work. The Montreal Immigration office countered that the inspector had ordered the deportation of this woman because he did not think that she was the “type” to do domestic work. Since other work for women was hard to find and would not pay enough to support herself, let alone children, Mrs. Austin would probably become a public charge. She and her children were deported.7

9Two trends were established in this early period. The most significant was the practice of shipping out those unable to work, because of mental or physical illness or condition, or an injury received at work or otherwise in Canada. In the case of a work injury, immigrants could expect no compensation from the employer. Immigrants who were rendered helpless were shipped back “home”.

  • 8 See B.A. Roberts, “A Work of Empire: Canadian Reformers and British Female Immigration” in L. Keal (...)

10The Department also shipped back those who did not fit in well in other ways, such as the British masturbator and the immoral Swedish domestic servant. Female immigrants were particularly vulnerable to the consequences of sexual or social deviance. This was in part because of economic factors such as the job market for female workers. Domestic service was the largest single paid female occupation in Canada, and an occupation for which the government and a variety of interest groups consistently and vigorously sought immigrants. The moral character of a domestic servant was a job qualification which she must demonstrate by producing a certificate of character from a previous employer or responsible person.8

  • 9 See Women at Work, Ontario, 1850-1930, Toronto, Women’s Press, 1974.

11The female immigrant, especially the domestic (and nearly all single women coming to Canada were domestics) could lose her ability to earn a living at her normal occupation because of an injury to her moral reputation, as well as because of physical disabilities which a male immigrant might also suffer. Moreover, if she had indeed engaged in sexual relations outside marriage, by choice or by force, and had become pregnant, she would be subject to deportation on these grounds. The birth of an illegitimate child was proof of immorality. As well, it often forced women to become public charges, because they could not support themselves before and after the birth, or because they could not pay the costs of confinement and thus were listed by a hospital or other institution as “public” patients. Domestics usually earned little, and their workplace was also their home. They could not save enough to pay for another home between the time they might be fired from one job for noticeable pregnancy, and the time they might hope to find another – a hope that was usually without foundation. Most jobs for women did not pay enough to support an adult.9 Understanding the relationship between morality and work for female domestics is necessary for putting into context many of the deportations of single women from Canada in the early decades of the twentieth century.

12The early period of deportations between the 1890s and 1906 had been characterized by a particular type, techniques and targets. Deportation was under-reported, informal and ad hoc. The role of government was essentially passive. Deportation was aimed at individuals who had come to the attention of the government as undesirables. The nominal reasons for deportation concerned the unfitness of the injured, incapable, and immoral.

13The second period, from 1906 to the beginning of the First World War, marked the introduction of modern deportation practices. The Department’s work became specified in law and regulation, became systematized, and rationalized. The Department adopted a more aggressive approach. It energetically constructed and operated a whole series of systems to search out, take into custody, and deport not only individuals but also members of undesirable social groups: the insane, infected, diseased, mentally defective, and the unemployed. Technically, the period was characterized by statistically accurate reporting of those deported for specific causes, cases actively sought out by the Department. Although the reporting of the work was modernized, the information beyond bare numbers was not available to the public.

  • 10 File 563236, Bryce to Medical Superintendents of Asylums, 4 October 1906; Bryce to Southworth, Dir (...)

14Deportations became more numerous and more systematic after the 1906 Act went into effect. In fact, records of the Department suggest that the increased systematization of deportation was an important factor in the absolute and proportional increase in the numbers deported. Deportations continued to be attributed to more or less the same causes as before 1906. Now, however, the Department began to seek prospective deports instead of waiting to have problem immigrants brought to its attention. In October 1906, Chief Medical Officer Peter Bryce took the first step in this campaign of searching for deports, by notifying virtually all insane asylums and like institutions in Canada to send names of alien inmates, going back five years, so that they could be considered for deportation. The original impetus for this request had come from a decision by the United States to empty its asylums of Canadian inmates. By gathering names of American citizens in Canadian asylums and other institutions, Canadian officials hoped to show the American authorities that “they will suffer more than we” in any exchange.10

  • 11 File 563236, Bryce to Southworth, 25 October 1906. It is not clear why Blanchet was appointed to s (...)

15Chief Medical Officer Bryce extended the search to prisons shortly thereafter. At the same time, the Department hired Alfred Blanchet to work in the Province of Quebec to implement the Department’s wish to “clear the country of undesirables who have come in... or who may... hereafter... succeed in gaining admission.” Blanchet, formerly of the Grand Trunk Railway, was recommended by a cabinet minister and hired by Laurier, then acting as his own Minister of the Interior. Wardens of prisons and directors of institutions were told to assist Blanchet in his search for the unfit. In other provinces the “searching out” was done by mail. In Ontario, directors of asylums were eager to expel immigrant inmates. Deportation was under the direction of the medical officers of the Department, and seen as a medical problem. The medical officers were almost obsessively concerned with insanity and other forms of mental or physical degeneracy. Eligible cases were not likely to escape notice.11

  • 12 File 563236, Scott to Southworth, 7 November 1906; Scott to Warden of Dorchester Penitentiary, 7 N (...)

16This new thoroughness in the methods of the Department was largely due to the Department’s new ability to deport legally. Anything done before the 1906 Act “really was not sanctioned by any special law,” as Superintendent Scott explained to an Ontario provincial official. The Department continued to prefer deportations (especially of insane persons) to take place quietly, even though they were now quite legal, “since experience in New York has shown that the speculative lawyer may by habeas corpus proceedings give a good deal of trouble before the case has been gotten out of the country.” With prison and insane asylum deportations, the emphasis was on increased searching out and secrecy. The Department wanted to make the arrangements “without exciting... suspicion,” in order to avoid controversy or upset. Deportation of immigrants who were inmates of penal institutions could be arranged automatically no matter how trivial or serious the crime. A third area in which the work of the Department became more systematic was the deportation of immigrants who had become public charges. Mayors or clerks of municipalities could rid themselves of these immigrants by sending a written report to Immigration authorities in Ottawa.12

  • 13 Ibid., Scott to Provincial Secretary of Quebec, 14 September 1908; Blanchet to Scott, 19 September (...)

17The Department enlisted the co-operation of a variety of public officials to help in the campaign “to weed out undesirables” and “to assist the Department as much as possible in keeping the stream of immigration coming in as pure as may be.” It became increasingly important to the Department that this assistance come from the public rather than the private sector. By 1908 the Department was insisting that referrals of public charge cases come from municipal officials, as provided in the Immigration Act, rather than from charitable organizations or private individuals. The Department explained this shift in policy by claiming that private referrals might have been acceptable earlier because there had been little doubt about the deportability of the immigrants in question. But the Department had begun to receive requests for deportation of the impoverished “from so many different sources, some of them at the moment from some of the undesirables themselves, that it is felt to be only reasonable deportation papers being at least signed by the proper municipal authorities.’’ It was because of these “innumerable” requests from other sources that the Department decided to “follow the law more closely.”13

  • 14 Ibid., Scott to R. H. Lane, 12 October 1908.

18But the timing of this decision to funnel deportation requests through municipal officials was due to criticisms of the Department, by the Home Authorities in Britain, for sending back immigrants who had never “previously shown any such obnoxious characteristics as were attributed to them” by those requesting their deportation in Canada. It was to avoid such criticisms that the Department wanted a more official sanction for deportations, and insisted that responsible municipal officials “at least endorse” the various requests for deportation “originating in their various municipalities.”14 It was not solely in order to sidestep criticism from Britain that Ottawa was anxious to have requests for deportation originate from public and official sources. The Department wanted to be sure that there could be no question about the legality of the deportations. The aim of the process was to show that the deports were unfit, and had been of bad quality originally.

19In the 1908 depression a myth appeared that was to enjoy significant publicity in the ensuing decades: the immigrant caused his/her own deportability by being lazy or unwilling to work. This convenient claim reappeared in 1913-14, and persisted like a deeply rooted weed in the 1930s. The necessity for the myth can be seen in the cost argument; that is, the Department had to argue that they were receiving flawed immigrants from the transportation companies in order to force the companies to pay deportation costs.

  • 15 Ibid., Scott to Mayor of Englehart, Ontario, Dr. R. C. Lowney, 13 October 1908.

No encouragement should be given to strong able bodied immigrants, well able to work, that they will be returned home free of expense simply because they are too lazy to apply themselves or happen to be suffering from temporary homesickness. It is intended that only the criminally inclined, mentally or physically incapable, and moral degenerates should be deported.15

  • 16 Ibid.
  • 17 Ibid., Scott to City Clerk of Toronto, 30 October 1908; Scott to Montreal Agent Hoolahan, 30 Octob (...)

20Indiscriminate deportation of people who had become public charges would encourage “idle and indolent habits.” Local municipal authorities should make “every effort... to induce strong and able bodied immigrants to work for their living if such is obtainable.”16 The Department required municipal officials to send detailed information in their deportation requests. “Reasons for inability to secure work” had to be detailed in the complaint, “as well as what if any efforts have been made either on their behalf or by the immigrants themselves” to secure work. If the reasons for unemployment were sickness or incapability, then a medical certificate to that effect should be included in the request for deportation. The Department did not want it thought that unemployment and deportation were automatically linked. “You will easily understand the necessity for discouraging the impression that deportation may be resorted to solely” because immigrants were destitute and unable to find work, Scott wrote. Testimony from responsible authorities was needed about the capacity or willingnesss of the immigrant to work, and about the availability of work. “Lack of work and liability to become a public charge are not satisfactory reasons for deportation” under the Immigration Act. An immigrant must actually have become a public charge to be deported as such.17

  • 18 Ibid., Scott to Lane, Charity Organization Society. Montreal, 6 November 1908; Scott to Town Clerk (...)

21By November 1908 Scott’s tone had become exceedingly moralistic and sometimes verged on the hysterical. “Lazy immigrants should not be encouraged in this idea” that they can give up and go home, or escape without paying any penalty for their failures in Canada, Scott urged. “If they will not work, and are physically fit for employment, they should be properly punished before resorting to deportation.” Scott reiterated this punitive policy to numerous municipal officials: “All physically capable immigrants who refuse to work when work is available should be made to understand that they will be severely punished for their neglect before being sent away.”18

22This attitude, often expressed by nineteenth and twentieth century poor relief and welfare workers, would reappear in subsequent periods of high unemployment when the Department was embarrassed by increased public charge deportations. Deportation of the unemployed was not supposed to be automatic. It was necessary to identify lazy failed immigrants and to assure that they did not get away with anything. Inmates of asylums or prisons were clearly deportable (and perhaps sufficiently punished) by their very presence in these institutions. But the public charge cases were more ambiguous, and had to be treated differently.

  • 19 Michael Piva, The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto, 1900-1921, Ottawa, University of Otta (...)

The deportation of misfits and indigents generally should be closely supervised by the local authorities and care should be exercised in order that none may be deported who are not thoroughly undesirable and incapable of reform; lazy or homesick immigrants should be made to understand distinctly that they are expected to accept whatever employment may be available, failing which they will be dealt with the same as any other citizen of Canada before any attempt is made to secure their deportation.19

23Victorian attitudes about poverty and unemployment certainly played a part in this approach. More significant was the question of who was going to pay the costs of deportation.

  • 20 File 837, Ottawa to CPR Agent McNicholl, 9 March 1895; File 563236, Scott to Winnipeg Commissioner (...)

24Under the provisions of the 1906 Act (and earlier legislation and custom dating back to at least the 1880s) transportation companies who brought in immigrants who were defective, or in some other way contravened immigration laws, were responsible for taking these immigrants back again. The companies had never been particularly eager to do this, but usually could do little but comply. They did examine each individual case for a loophole. When deportations increased because of the 1908 depression, the costs to the companies rose. So too did their scrutiny of the deportation cases for which they were expected to pay. That this was a problem for the Department can be seen in its internal documents and correspondence. In March 1908, after the impact of the depression had been felt strongly, Scott cautioned that because the transportation companies were examining each case carefully, it was necessary to make sure that all cases did “come clearly within the provisions of the Immigration Act.” In order to make sure that the companies paid the costs, it was important to distinguish between those immigrants who were “public charges more the result of some temporary hardship readily overcome in the course of time,” for which the transportation companies would probably refuse to pay, and “those of a hopeless or irreclaimable nature” for which the companies must pay. The same caution appeared in numerous warnings later that same year: the transportation companies could not be expected to accept responsibility willingly for deportations caused by the laziness, selfishness, and irresponsibility of wilfully unemployed immigrants, therefore municipalities must not automatically send forward such cases.20

  • 21 Ibid., Memo, “Minister’s ruling concerning undesirables in the different towns and cities,” 30 Dec (...)

25This immediate dilemma was resolved by the Minister of the Interior who ordered: “If the Mayor recommends deportation and it is within the law, deport.”21 The emphasis on the importance of demonstrating that proper procedure had been followed in these cases lasted as long as the serious economic problems that created large numbers of unemployed for the Department to deport.

  • 22 Ibid., Scott to Lane, Charity Organization Society, 22 January 1909; numerous memos, passim, Febru (...)

26Proper documentation of the legal case for deportation was essential. As Scott explained to the head of a relief organization in Montreal, “while pauperism may result in an immigrant becoming a public charge, “pauperism alone” is not considered a proper cause for deportation under the Act.” It was necessary to show that a person had actually become legally liable to deportation. “It is very desirable that in every case the evidence should be complete and in proper form before being finally submitted to the transportation companies concerned.” Even after the Minister ordered that deportation, if within the law, should be automatically carried out at the request of the Mayors of municipalities, Scott continued to urge caution in deportation solely due to unemployment, because the transportation companies would refuse to pay the costs if they could argue that the immigrants were not defective when they arrived.22

27The suggestion that deportation might be an easy way out for the irresponsible immigrant had been couched in moralistic terms, although the Department claimed that it was a question of law and justice. Neither of these was the real issue. The Department claimed repeatedly that it did not deport solely on the basis of unemployment. Its files show that this was not true; it routinely deported those who had become public charges solely because of unemployment. The Department was caught between the transportation companies and the municipalities. The Department wanted to make sure that the transportation companies paid the costs of these deportations, but the companies could claim that, because nothing was inherently wrong with such immigrants, there was no legal obligation to ship them back whence they had come.

28On the other hand, the Department was pressured by the municipalities (and sometimes by agencies like the Charity Organization Society of Montreal which acted as a Protestant Relief Department for the City of Montreal) to remove unemployed immigrants who had become a charge on the municipalities. The Department tried to perform a precarious balancing act. It attempted to discourage the municipalities from using deportation to ship out their immigrant poor, and insisted that the municipalities’ deportation complaints be in proper legal form. The former would cut down the flood of public charge deportations for which the transportation companies were asked to pay, and the latter would make it more difficult for the companies to evade payment. At the same time the Department tried to reassure the transportation companies that the deports with whom they were being presented were not the wicked, lazy, or unlucky, but rather the unfit. The undeserving poor were supposedly winnowed out. The Department attempted to dupe the transportation companies into paying for what amounted to a national system of immigrant poor relief through deportation.

  • 23 Ibid., Deputy Minister of Justice to Scott, 3 June 1908; Ottawa to Winnipeg, 7 May 1908. “Smoothly (...)

29There were limits to the timing and methods of deportation. Before the 1906 Act, for a one-year period the government assumed a small measure of responsibility for the immigrant, a responsibility sometimes discharged by arranging his or her deportation as a last resort. After the 1906 Act, the Department legally could deport within two years of arrival. This limit was relaxed by the Department of Justice: “there is no limit to the time in which he may be deported.” The Department advised its agents to obtain written consent to their deportation from immigrants who had arrived prior to 13 July 1906 (when the new Act was effective); both the immigrants’ consent and a “reasonable prospect” of reception in the home country were necessary to assure that deportation would go smoothly. The deportation period was extended to three years and further defined by the 1910 Amendment to the Immigration Act. Time spent as an inmate of a mental hospital, charitable, penal, or other public institution did not count as part of the three-year period. Anyone becoming a public charge within three years of landing was deportable. Earlier, there had been some question about the legality of a deportation when a long time had elapsed since the commission of the deportable offence, but the Department of Justice had ruled that the Department of Immigration was “empowered to act after the expiration of sentence or after the immediate cause for deportation had ceased to exist.” Technically, this meant too that if an immigrant became a public charge at any time within three years of landing, even for just a brief period (for instance due to illness or unemployment), that immigrant was deportable. Insane immigrants were deportable at any time, if they had been insane within the five-year period previous to entering Canada.23

  • 24 Ibid., Memo, 7 March 1913; see for instance the “Report of the Interview with Robert Rogers” (then (...)

30As a rule, the Department adhered to the statute of limitation rules on deportation. It did not always follow the rules on what were deportable offences, however. For instance, immoral immigrants, by which was usually meant a woman who lived with a man to whom she was not married, were an ambiguous group. “Immorality” was not clearly defined in the law. Deputy Minister of the Interior William Cory ruled in 1913 that a woman who had come to Canada “to live with a man in adultery” was not to be confused with a woman who had come to practice prostitution. The former was not supposed to be deported for that reason alone. The correspondence of the Department, however, suggests that these distinctions were not often made in practice. Nor did the Department always adhere to the law concerning procedures to be followed in carrying out deportations. For instance, in 1911 the Vancouver Agent J. H. MacGill expressed his concern that deportations of persons convicted of crimes were being carried out by a letter from Superintendent Scott, rather than by an Order for Deportation issued by a Board of Inquiry, as provided in the Act. Although the transportation companies might accept this procedure, a letter was not a legal substitute for a Deportation Order. Scott replied that no one had objected to this before, and that while MacGill might follow the law if he chose and obtain Deportation Orders from Boards of Inquiry, Scott thought that “the Department may safely continue the present practice.”24

  • 25 Ibid., Vancouver Agent Malcolm Reid to Scott, 9 June 1912; Scott to Reid, 22 June 1912.

31In fact it could not. In March 1912, four Armenians prosecuted for entering without proper inspection were convicted, fined, and sentenced to jail in lieu of paying fines, and ordered deported by the presiding magistrate. The four were then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus. The writ argued that deportation could be ordered only by a Board of Inquiry, and that inasmuch as there had been no Board of Inquiry, these deportations were not legal. The new Vancouver Immigration agent Malcolm Reid suggested that other such deportation cases might be stopped by the courts on the same grounds. The Department had ordered the Vancouver office to follow legal procedures by holding Boards of Inquiry only when it was felt necessary or judicious to do so. Scott still thought that the Department could follow its informal (albeit extralegal) practice as before, since no transportation company or deportee had protested. Despite court cases unfavourable to the Department, it was to be left a matter for local discretion.25

32There is much evidence that the Department did not always follow the law on deportation matters. When it began to follow certain parts of the law more closely, it was due as much to economic or political as to legal or moral factors. Although the period from 1906 to the First World War showed increased systematization and formalization of deportation procedures, the old ad hoc and sometimes illegal practices of the earlier period were still in evidence from time to time. Of course, as the provisions of the deportation laws became more comprehensive there would be less need to act outside the law. Each new law or regulation increased the powers allowed the Department.

  • 26 See for example, File 961162, Secretary Blair to Agent, 18 December 1919, concerning suspect Nicho (...)

33The war period, from 1914 to the very early 1920s, was characterized first of all by a sharp curtailment in the numbers of deportations, and secondly by a sharp increase in the intensity of deportation work. Between these years the head office in Ottawa devoted a good deal of attention to instructing the local offices in how to build a tight case for each deportation, a case that could stand up to challenges from the courts, from the transportation companies, from foreign governments, and from interest groups in Canada. The war period offered a unique opportunity for the Department to learn how to conceal illegal or unfair practices behind the legal categories through which it reported its deportation work. The war also provided unique opportunities to ship out some residents who were not otherwise deportable because they had been here long enough to have domicile. As immigrants originating from enemy countries, they could be shipped out along with the internees. In fact, since one sure way to make someone deportable was to intern them, some politically troublesome people were interned for the express purpose of deportation after the war.26 Although the major target groups remained the unfit and the unemployed, added to these were two new categories: enemy aliens, and agitators. Late in the war and just after, the deportation of agitators and radicals would become systematized, as the Department moved deliberately into the field of political deportations, based on wartime authority and experiences, but functioning to benefit interest groups such as large employers.

  • 27 File 803230, Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Scott, 18 September 1914; Scott to Winnipeg, (...)

34Shortly after the commencement of hostilities in 1914 the Minister of Immigration decided to deport to the British Isles only those immigrants who had friends there to receive and care for them. This was in part to avoid “adverse criticisms or comment in the Old Country.” The Department told the municipalities that requests for deportation would be acknowledged but not necessarily carried out until conditions changed. This policy was developed in more detail in the fall of 1914. The Department told its agents to notify those requesting deportations that the Department “cannot consider the case while war conditions exist.” The Department would continue to send away individual cases who could be cared for by friends. The local office had to send the Department a copy of the evidence because, as Scott explained, “I expect that sooner or later some objection will be raised against our sending forward some of these individual cases and I would like to be in a position to defend our action from correspondence on file before the deportation is ordered.”27

  • 28 File 563236, Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario, 5 November 1915; copi (...)

35Public charge deportations were delayed somewhat not only because of the concern that the transportation companies might refuse to pay the passage for those deported solely because of unemployment. The Department had the idea that by forcing the municipalities to support the unemployed, rather than shipping them back to the British Isles, it was helping with the war effort. The Canadian municipalities were not suffering as badly as Britain on account of the war, and keeping indigent immigrants was “one way by which we can help Great Britain and to my mind appears to be a patriotic duty,” explained Scott.28

  • 29 Ibid., Scott to Belleville Ontario City Clerk, 24 March 1915.

36The Department continued to claim that it did not consider the fact of an immigrant becoming a public charge, solely on the basis of unemployment, as grounds for deportation. Scott explained to one annoyed city official that the steamship companies would say that the “Immigration Act was not drawn up to get rid of persons out of employment, but persons who are undesirable through sickness, feeblemindedness, inmates of gaols etc.” If there were any sickness that contributed to an unemployment problem, or any contributing disease or perhaps feeblemindedness, Scott would ensure deportation.29

  • 30 Ibid., Scott to Mssrs. Smoke and Sanders, Paris, Ontario, 26 May 1915. “Foreigners” were not prote (...)

37There was often another alternative. An unemployed immigrant could be arrested and convicted for vagrancy, and then easily deported. Sometimes the length of a vagrancy sentence was directly influenced by the wishes of the Department of Immigration. The sentence had to be long enough to permit the Department to arrange for the deportation, and short enough to save the municipality maintenance costs during the jail term. This sort of covert bargaining occurred with the blessing of the Department of Justice.30 But the path from unemployment to deportation via vagrancy charges was not always smooth, and local agents turned to the Department for advice.

  • 31 File 563236, Scott to Windsor, Ontario Inspector, 13 July 1917; Windsor to Scott, 18 July 1917.

38Scott might take the agent over the ground, step by step. Speaking of a specific case, he said: “We must find some ground for her deportation connected with 1) the manner of her entry, 2) her character before the entry showing she was a prohibited immigrant 3) something she may have done in Canada since her entry,” explained Scott. It was not sufficient to be in jail on remand, she must actually have been sentenced in order to be deportable as a convicted criminal. The agent must examine her to find out if she was a prohibited immigrant under the Act. If there was something wrong with her entry, the applicable Sections were 33, and 7; if she were convicted of a crime (Section 40), she could be questioned as provided in Section 42 (which set out procedures for deportation examinations). Whether or not she could appeal depended on her being free from disease (Section 18). “Our action can be taken altogether separate and apart from that of the court, although if she is convicted then her deportation would naturally follow by the application of Sections 40 and 42.” Fortunately, from the Department’s point of view, this immigrant was convicted of vagrancy and thus easily deportable.31 Once the Department had decided to deport someone, they worked methodically through each possibility until one was found. The decision to deport did not always follow upon the commission of some specific offence. Often, someone in the Department would decide that an immigrant should be deported, and the action followed the decision. The flexibility of the law provided much room for seeking the appropriate legal cause.

  • 32 Ibid., Scott to Hoolahan, 14 October 1915; Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for (...)

39The deportation of “criminal immigrants (not enemies)” still proceeded more or less as usual except that it took much longer to carry out investigations for the first few months of the war. Despite the general difficulties of carrying out deportations, other than those to the United States, there was a bright spot. A ruling by the Americans permitted Canada to deport to the United States aliens who had resided in Canada less than three years, who had formerly long resided in the United States but who were not U.S. citizens. If Canada could show that, prior to their last entry into Canada, they had been rejected by a Canadian Immigration officer, these aliens could simply be deported to the U.S. instead of to their native countries. This would be much cheaper and much simpler. Therefore, the Department asked heads of all penal institutions, various city Relief and Department of Health Officers, and other public officials in most provinces to include questions about previous rejections by Canadian officials in their interrogations of these immigrants.32

  • 33 Ibid., Scott to heads of institutions, etc. May 1, 1915.

40Because the war affected available shipping, even the reduced numbers of deports were more difficult to transport across the Atlantic. By the winter of 1915, there were few sailings by Canadian lines, and those that sailed were full of troops. Before, in deport cases paid for by the government rather than by the transportation companies, the cost at a “charity rate” had been $15. During the war when it was necessary to ship via New York, the cost rose steeply to $50-$70. As conditions in Britain grew more “acute”, deportation became a last resort.33

  • 34 Ibid., Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario, 20 February 1918 and 5 July (...)

41The slowdown on overseas deportations endured until after the end of the war. By 1918, the Department was frequently going through the deportation procedure, ordering the deportation, then simply holding the case (although not always holding the person) until deportation could be carried out. In the summer of 1919, an interoffice memo noted that “most of our deports at the present time go to the U.S.,” the only type of deportation remaining unaffected by wartime conditions.34

  • 35 On using wartime conditions to get rid of agitators, see File 912791, Secretary Blair to Commandan (...)

42Despite the fact that the war prevented the Department from eliminating numbers of the unemployed, it still gave the Department an unprecedented opportunity to lock up agitators and activists of enemy alien background, and to rid themselves of a raft of people whom they could never otherwise have deported because such deportations were illegal under the terms of the Immigration Act. Enemy aliens did not include prisoners of war, strictly speaking, although the lines between the two groups tended to blur. The government admitted to holding 8,579 internees in prison camps in Canada during the war, of which about 3,179 were real POWs; the remainder were civilians snatched up under the War Measures Act. Locking up civilians of enemy alien origin was part of a massive campaign of surveillance of enemy aliens in general and, ultimately, of harrassment of some aliens in particular: the radicals. Internees, like deports, were prisoners in fact, although not according to peacetime law. Under the Order-in-Council of 28 October 1914 internees were declared prisoners of war, thus had “no remedy in law.” The management of internment camps during the war had its scandals and abuses, as well as its bungling and stupidities, although the camps were probably not much worse than some Department of Immigration detention facilities. By the end of 1915 there were nineteen internment sites in Canada, five of which were reception centres only. Originally the inmates were supposed to clear bush land for use by returned veterans after the war, but by the spring of 1916 some were released to do farm labour and industrial work. By the end of the war, there were still large numbers interned, and it was not until 27 February 1920 that the last batch of ninety men, nineteen women and children, left the camp at Kapuskasing to be “repatriated”, as these deportations under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice were often called. In theory, the enemy aliens deported from the camps were POWs being repatriated. In practice, it was the “policy of the Government... to deport all interned enemy aliens who are considered undesirable” whether or not they were otherwise legally deportable.35

  • 36 Ibid., Scott to Fred Wilson, New Liskeard, Ontario, 7 March 1916, and File 912971, Scott to Lt. Co (...)
  • 37 File 912971, Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 26 November 1918, Director to Scott, 26 N (...)

43During the war, the Department did not want to send healthy enemy aliens “home”, even if there were sailings, for this would help the enemy and “be a menace to our allies.” There were other ways to deal with enemy aliens, as in one case involving an Ontario family: “If the party in question or her son-in-law are manifesting a pro-German attitude, and you will advise me, I will have the case looked into with a view to having them interned,” Scott wrote to one “patriot”. The Department was not interested in legitimate prisoners of war, except to know their names should they ever try to return to Canada. Prisoner of war deportations were sometimes handled more or less as rejections: some POWs were examined as if they had applied to enter as immigrants and had been turned down; then they could be sent back.36 But this was not necessary in all cases. The Department wanted to send deportable enemy aliens back to Europe along with POWs. The original request came in 1918, after the armistice, but it took several months for shipments to be arranged. POW shipments did not begin on a large scale until February 1919, handled under the legal direction of the Minister of Justice, who had authority under the War Measures Act to remove, expel or deport enemy alien internees.37

  • 38 Ibid., Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 25 April 1919, 7 May 1919; Director to Scott, 1 (...)

44The files of the Department show that whenever possible, ordinary deports, legal or not, were sent along with these “repatriatees”. For instance, George Dowhy, Austrian, in Canada since 1909, was arrested in Winnipeg 4 March 1915, held at the internment camp at Kapuskasing, Ontario until November 1917, when he was released to do railroad work. In 1919, he was in Kingston Prison serving a five-year sentence; the Department considered him undesirable. Because he had been here since 1909 he was not legally deportable, but because he was of enemy alien origin, the Department was able to ship him out with the interned enemy aliens. An attempt to get rid of Clara Dubin, age 17 (an imbecile orphan of German origin, imprisoned in an asylum since March 1914), failed – not because she could not legally be deported, although that was true, but because there were no other insane female prisoners of war. Thus, the Internment Office refused to include her in their shipment. Tom Taschuk’s deportation was also arranged using this method: originally an Austrian reservist but in Canada long enough to acquire domicile, he was arrested in 1919 at Vegreville and interned at Vernon, British Columbia; he was “not subject to deportation under the provisions of the Immigration Act.” Taschuk was a member of the IWW, a “socialist, with Bolshevik tendencies, who has been actively engaged in endeavouring to create discontent and rebellion in the foreign element in Canada.” The Department was eager to get rid of him.38

  • 39 Ibid., Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 16 May 1919. File 563236, Deputy Minister of Ju (...)

45The Department also used the POW repatriation shipments to carry out legal deportations. In September 1919 the internment camps at Vernon and Kapuskasing were designated as immigrant stations to legalize their use as detention centres for deports. By that fall, there were dozens of enemy aliens being sent along with repatriatees, some legally deportable, others not. An attempt by the Province of Quebec to clean out its asylums failed only because the Department could not find space for the inmates on the military-controlled sailings.39

46The Department considered itself responsible for the protection of the public purse, the public health, and the public morals. In order to safeguard the country, the Department stretched, ignored, and sometimes violated its own rules. As the laws and regulations became increasingly complicated, deportation procedures were more minutely defined. In numerous cases, the Department did not follow legal niceties. Its gradual and piecemeal reforms were often due to painful, if infrequent, experiences in the courts: losing deports on habeas corpus writs, and the like. The common response of the Department was to tighten up the procedures when it had to, and to try to have the law amended to legalize what it had already been doing.

47The Department’s heightened sophistication in case building would serve it well in the ensuing years. Wartime experience with the possibility of deportation as a method of social and political control would be the basis for overt and systematic political deportations until the mid-1920s, and again in the 1930s, when they would reach another peak with the prosecution of communists by the Department of Immigration.

Notes

1 Public Archives of Canada (PAC) Record Group (RG) 76, File 837, titled “Pauper, insane and otherwise undesirable immigrants to be returned,” see 10 March 1896, Cloutier to Dominion Lands Secretary, concerning arrangements for the care of Louis Rauserot.

2 Ibid., Department to Canadian Pacific Railway Agent McNicholl, 9 March 1895; see correspondence Autumn, 1894 and Memo, no date, February 1894.

3 Ibid., See correspondence from Montreal Immigration Agent Hoolahan, concerning the Lea family. Mr. Lea finally got a job as a printer at the Montreal Gazette at a wage of $10 per week. Hoolahan had sheltered them in the Agency and advanced the family $5, before Mr. Lea became employed; passim, Autumn, 1894.

4 Ibid., See correspondence passim, Summer 1895.

5 Ibid., CPR Agent McNicholl to Department, 9 March 1895. The unfortunate Dane was eventually sent home at CPR expense, after the government brought persuasion to bear. See ibid., 12 March 1895.

6 Ibid., Montreal Agent to Ottawa, 10 August 1903, and see correspondence, Hoolahan to Ottawa, passim, October 1903.

7 Ibid., Hoolahan, 7 November 1903; Ottawa to Hoolahan, 22 November 1903; Hoolahan to Ottawa, 3 December 1903.

8 See B.A. Roberts, “A Work of Empire: Canadian Reformers and British Female Immigration” in L. Kealey, ed., A Not Unreasonable Claim: Women and Reform in Canada, 1880’s-1920’s, Toronto, Women’s Press, 1979; “Sex, Politics and Religion; Controversies in Female immigration Work in Montreal, 1880-1920,” Atlantis, A Journal of Women’s Studies, Fall 1980. This practice (as did deportation) originated in the poor law system in the British Isles in the sixteenth and later centuries. See G. Nicholls, A History of the Irish Poor Law, New York, Augustus Kelley, 1967 [London, J. Murray 1856]. As part of provisions added in 1715 to assist servants to collect wages owed to them, servants were required upon leaving a position to obtain a certificate attesting to their good character. Such a certificate was supposed to be necessary to get another job. It came to be called simply a “character”.

9 See Women at Work, Ontario, 1850-1930, Toronto, Women’s Press, 1974.

10 File 563236, Bryce to Medical Superintendents of Asylums, 4 October 1906; Bryce to Southworth, Director of Colonisation for Ontario, 4 October 1906. On the medical outlook, see Peter Bryce, “Immigration in Relation to the Public Health,” The Canadian Journal of Medicine and Surgery, April 1906; C. K. Clarke, “The Defective and Insane Immigrant,” University of Toronto University Monthly, Vol. 8, 1907-8. For doctors’ assumptions about desirability, see Leon Kamin, The Science and Politics of IQ, Potomac Maryland, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1974, especially chapter 2, “Psychology and the Immigrant.” For a glimpse of day-to-day immigration medical work, see Allan McLaughlin, “How Immigrants are Inspected,” Popular Science Monthly, February 1905. On the role and work of Canadian doctors in the Immigration Branch, see Barbara Roberts, “Doctors and Deports: The Role of the Medical Profession in Canadian Deportation Policy and Practice, 1900-1935,” Canadian Ethnic Studies, January 1987.

11 File 563236, Bryce to Southworth, 25 October 1906. It is not clear why Blanchet was appointed to scour Quebec, but perhaps patronage was partly responsible. There would seem to be no compelling necessity for personal contacts by an officer of the Department. File 567097, Scott to Blanchet, 11 October 1906; Blanchet to Scott, 15 October 1906; Memo, 16 October 1906; Scott to all Wardens etc., 16 October 1906. For Ontario, see File 563236, passim; see for example Ontario Inspector of Asylums and Prisons, Armstrong to Bryce, advocating rounding up inmates and shipping them back in a group. The problem was to assure their reception on the other side. This sort of thing was commonly done by New York State, according to Armstrong, 23 November 1906. See also Armstrong’s letters of 1 May 1907, and Dr. Clarke’s letters of 11 May 1907 and 23 March 1908. Dr. Clarke, head of the Toronto Asylum, wanted to deport British inmates who had gained Canadian citizenship by many years of residence in Canada. This was not legal in 1908, although it soon would be. See also Bryce’s lengthy discussions in his Annual Reports, in the Annual Reports of the Department. See Chuen-Yan David Lai, “A ‘Prison’ for Chinese Immigrants,” Asianadian, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1980, on the conditions for Chinese immigrants in the Victoria Detention Hospital.

12 File 563236, Scott to Southworth, 7 November 1906; Scott to Warden of Dorchester Penitentiary, 7 November 1906; Scott to Provincial Governments, 17 November 1906; Scott to Premier of Saskatchewan, 20 November 1906.

13 Ibid., Scott to Provincial Secretary of Quebec, 14 September 1908; Blanchet to Scott, 19 September 1908; Scott to Southworth, Ontario Director of Colonization, 7 October 1908; Scott to R. H. Lane, Secretary of Charity Organization Society, Montreal, 1 October 1908.

14 Ibid., Scott to R. H. Lane, 12 October 1908.

15 Ibid., Scott to Mayor of Englehart, Ontario, Dr. R. C. Lowney, 13 October 1908.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., Scott to City Clerk of Toronto, 30 October 1908; Scott to Montreal Agent Hoolahan, 30 October 1908.

18 Ibid., Scott to Lane, Charity Organization Society. Montreal, 6 November 1908; Scott to Town Clerk of Deseronto, Ontario, 16 November 1908.

19 Michael Piva, The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto, 1900-1921, Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1979. See pp. 66-7, on the 1908 and 1913 depressions. File 563236, Scott to Alfred Coyell, Relief Officer of the City of Toronto, 19 June 1913.

20 File 837, Ottawa to CPR Agent McNicholl, 9 March 1895; File 563236, Scott to Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration, 17 March 1908, and, passim, Scott to various municipalities, for example, 16 November 1908.

21 Ibid., Memo, “Minister’s ruling concerning undesirables in the different towns and cities,” 30 December 1908.

22 Ibid., Scott to Lane, Charity Organization Society, 22 January 1909; numerous memos, passim, February 1909.

23 Ibid., Deputy Minister of Justice to Scott, 3 June 1908; Ottawa to Winnipeg, 7 May 1908. “Smoothly” meant no official or public outcry would be raised, on either side of the Atlantic. Another amendment passed 4 April 1911 specified that the first two years of this residence must take place immediately following landing. See ibid., Assistant Superintendent of Immigration to Deputy Minister of Justice, 26 November 1913; Scott to Edmonton Agent Clegg, 15 April 1914; Scott to Medical Superintendent of Battleford Asylum, 27 April 1914.

24 Ibid., Memo, 7 March 1913; see for instance the “Report of the Interview with Robert Rogers” (then Minister), Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario to Scott, 8 October 1913; MacGill to Scott, 6 October 1911. MacGill shortly thereafter left the Department. Scott’s reply; 25 October 1911.

25 Ibid., Vancouver Agent Malcolm Reid to Scott, 9 June 1912; Scott to Reid, 22 June 1912.

26 See for example, File 961162, Secretary Blair to Agent, 18 December 1919, concerning suspect Nicholas Babyn. Blair noted that Babyn was registered as an Austrian. If he had been interned he would have been very easy to deport, “as a matter of course and without any further examination or difficulty.” Babyn was an OBU sympathiser. Blair suggested attempting to deport him under Section 41, but was afraid that Babyn might be “prepared to fight for his supposed principles.” The Department was not eager to be “in the position of having to put a man on the witness stand without first being able to establish that we have a case against him” under Section 41. Because he was domiciled, deportation for other causes (such as criminal conviction) was not possible. Concluded Blair, “I think, however, if it is desired to get rid of him, the best plan is to have him interned and then his deportation is very simple.” Or see ibid., memo regarding “Minister’s comments on examinations of aliens under Section 41,” 27 April 1920. Else Saborecki was a German national, who arrived here 1 June 1914. She was “associating with enemy subjects,” was a Communist Party member, a “revolutionist of a pronounced type.” Her deportation was ordered under Section 41 but not carried out since she could not be sent to Germany during the War. She was interned and “repatriated” as a “prisoner of war” on 27 February 1920. See also Donald Avery, “Continental European Immigrant Workers in Canada, 1896-1919: From ‘Stalwart Peasants’ to Radical Proletariat,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 12, 1975, pp. 60-4.

27 File 803230, Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Scott, 18 September 1914; Scott to Winnipeg, 15 September 1914. File 563236, Assistant Superintendent of Immigration Robertson to Department Officers, 11 September 1914; Scott to Winnipeg Office, 6 October 1914.

28 File 563236, Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario, 5 November 1915; copies to other municipalities and institutions.

29 Ibid., Scott to Belleville Ontario City Clerk, 24 March 1915.

30 Ibid., Scott to Mssrs. Smoke and Sanders, Paris, Ontario, 26 May 1915. “Foreigners” were not protected by any patriotic concern for their countries’ welfare during the war, and feared deportation for unemployment. See Roseline Usiskin, “Toward a Theoretical Reformulation of the Relationship Between Political Ideology, Social Class, and Ethnicity: A Case Study of the Winnipeg Jewish Radical Community, 1905-1920,” unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1978, pp. 213-220 about fear of deportation in the Jewish community, and the Social Democratic Party of Canada’s organizing around this issue. See also File 563236, Winnipeg Office to Scott, 8 January 1917. The use of vagrancy convictions for political or other forms of deportation was made easier by the passage of the 1918 Order-in-Council known as the “anti-loafing” law, requiring “every man in Canada from the age of 16 to 60... regardless of his financial position... [to be] engaged in some useful occupation.” Borden described it as “a very good law in time of war... [and] a pretty good law in time of peace.” Quoted by R. C. Brown, “Whither Are We Being Shoved? Political Leadership in Canada During World War I” in J. L. Granatstein and R. Cuff, eds., War and Society in North America, Toronto, Thomas Nelson, 1971, p. 108. Enforcement was in the hands of municipal authorities.

31 File 563236, Scott to Windsor, Ontario Inspector, 13 July 1917; Windsor to Scott, 18 July 1917.

32 Ibid., Scott to Hoolahan, 14 October 1915; Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario, 5 November 1915; Scott to Deputy Minister of Justice, 28 October 1914.

33 Ibid., Scott to heads of institutions, etc. May 1, 1915.

34 Ibid., Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario, 20 February 1918 and 5 July 1919.

35 On using wartime conditions to get rid of agitators, see File 912791, Secretary Blair to Commandant of the Vernon Internment Camp, 11 October 1919. For camps, see Desmond Morton, “Sir William Otter and Internment Operations in Canada During the First World War,” Canadian Historical Review, March 1974. See also File 563236, Deputy Minister of Justice to Scott, 21 July 1919. See also note 26 above.

36 Ibid., Scott to Fred Wilson, New Liskeard, Ontario, 7 March 1916, and File 912971, Scott to Lt. Colonel MacPherson, Internment Operations Office, Ottawa, 21 November 1916.

37 File 912971, Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 26 November 1918, Director to Scott, 26 November 1918 and 6 February 1918, and Privy Council of Canada Report, 23 January 1919. See also Desmond Morton, “Sir William Otter,” Ibid.

38 Ibid., Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 25 April 1919, 7 May 1919; Director to Scott, 16 May 1919; Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 15 May 1919 and 17 May 1919.

39 Ibid., Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 16 May 1919. File 563236, Deputy Minister of Justice to Blair, 12 October 1919. In File 912971, see for example Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 26 August 1919, and Superintendent of Verdun Asylum to Secretary of Immigration, 17 November 1919. It is unclear if these people were sent over on later sailings.

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