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The Canadian Distinctiveness into the XXIst Century - La distinction canadienne au tournant du XXIe siecle

 | 
Chad Gaffield
, 
Karen L. Gould

The Place of Canada in the World of the Twenty-first Century / Le rôle du Canada sur la scène internationale au vingt et unième siècle

The Canadian Military in the Security Environment of the Twenty-first Century

Donna Winslow

Note de l’auteur

Funding for this research was received from the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine [DCIEM], Canadian Department of Defence, and US Army Research Institute Contract No. DASW01-98-M-1868, “Army Culture”. I wish to thank my research assistants Jason Dunn and Glenn Gilmour for their good humour and hard work on this project.

Texte intégral

1 At the turn of the twentieth century, people predicted an era of peace and prosperity for the coming one hundred years. Nevertheless we found ourselves engaged in vast, blood-letting conflicts that no one could have imagined at that time. It is difficult to guess what the future holds, but we can be certain that the faces of war and peace will change dramatically. New challenges will put greater demands on military personnel than ever before.

  • 1 W. von Bredow, “Global Street Workers? War and the Armed Forces in a Globalizing World,” Defence A (...)

2Certainly, we will have to place more emphasis on international military cooperation as we did during the Kosovo crisis. We can also anticipate an increase in the number of peace support operations and a broadening of the range of these missions. This carries the risk that the soldier's traditional combat role will change to one of “global street worker.”1 At the same time, military forces are subject to local (i.e. national) pressures. The budget for the military and the number of forces are likely to continue shrinking as the organization becomes more oriented to war deterrence rather than war readiness as in the past. Another local pressure will come from the demand that the military be more accountable to and representative of the Canadian population.

3In the following pages, we will examine a variety of issues. We will begin by exploring the changing nature of international conflicts. We will then examine the peace-keeping niche that Canada seems to have carved out for itself and how that relates to Canada's security interests and its role as a middle power in the international arena, in particular, the interest in “soft power.” Throughout this discussion, we will consider the impact of these policies on the Canadian Forces. The final section of the paper deals with national issues such as representativeness and how these impact upon the Canadian Forces.

The Broadening Range of Conflict

4The Cold War was a time of relative stability for the armed forces. Today, the rather straightforward, bi-polar conflict has given way to a much messier world. Conflicts are a result of internal state disintegration or civil war rather than the interstate confrontations of the past.

5One paradox of future conflict is that it will be simultaneously both extremely high tech and low tech. It will entail the management of highly sophisticated weaponry (such as smart bombs) while fighting is more likely to occur in urban and built-up areas with relatively large numbers of soldiers on foot. This is a particularly messy, dangerous, and time-consuming affair, as the recent fighting in Chechnya has shown.

  • 2 W.L. Hauser, “The Will to Fight,” in Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Volunteer Mili (...)

6The battlefield of the future will be bewildering, complex, and fluid. Although some of the technology will be ultra modern; the psychological stresses on soldiers will remain as terrible and lonely as any in the history of warfare.2 And this will all occur at a time when casualties, both civilian and military, are less politically tolerable. This is a paradox of modern conflicts: asking soldiers to kill without taking any casualties themselves. In terms of civilian casualties, the Kosovo bombing campaign has highlighted the importance of unacceptable civilian casualties. This will continue to be a leadership challenge for the Air Force in the future.

7The humanitarian approach to the prevention of harm to noncombatants represents a significant shift in the use of military force in an air campaign. Target selection during the Kosovo campaign was based upon careful consideration of the military importance of the objective, the level of proposed force, the level of anticipated collateral damage and, of course, the anticipated risk to air crews. What would happen if a plane was shot down and aircrew taken prisoner since this was not a mission sanctioned by the United Nations (UN)? In a similar vein, there was the hard choice between using high-level bombing and other risk-avoidance strategies or using lower-level bombing. The first meant greater safety for air crews and higher risk for civilian casualties compared with the second which allowed air crews to abort an attack if the potential for civilian casualties was present.

8For the first time in Canadian operations, legal counsel was extensively consulted in target selection during the Kosovo air campaign. Until this point, legalities had little impact on mission planning, but as time went on lawyers had a significant influence on operations. Lawyers often met and briefed pilots prior to missions, and pilots were encouraged to consult with legal counsel on returning from missions. We can see not only that decision-making can be influenced by a larger variety of (non) military actors, but that the influence of these actors, as it relates to ongoing operations, will likely increase.

9Another aspect to the high-tech side of war is the threat of cyber attack as economies become increasingly vulnerable to Internet terrorism. The recent spread of the ‘love virus’ (a computer virus originating in the Philippines which crippled part of the world's electronic mail traffic) illustrates just how fragile the present networked world is. Anyone with a computer and an Internet connection, no matter where, can release an electronic plague with global implications. The Internet has become a powerful tool in the information war. Now, Chechen guerillas have their own websites and are able to communicate in real time.

  • 3 US Major R. Peters, cited in Morale in the Armed Forces, G. Kummel (Strausberg: German Armed Force (...)

10In the twenty-first century, the face of the enemy is also changing. Some suggest that future militaries will no longer face another soldier but “an unconstrained warrior who has morally run wild.”3 For example, in Sierra Leone, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front, Foday Sankoh, was convicted of war crimes ranging from rape to torture and murder. The events in Sierra Leone have also highlighted the weaknesses of UN peacekeeping that pulls together troops from disparate nations who are ill-equipped and untrained to face a rapid escalation of violence. They also raise the question of whether the Canadian Forces are psychologically prepared to deal with the atrocities found in these forms of violence. Situations like those in Sierra Leone are likely to increase as will asymmetrical warfare such as guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

11In the past, Canadians have mostly depended on our southern neighbours to assure our territorial defence. We may continue to support these efforts by becoming partners in a continental missile defence system. Yet the new forms of (cyber) war make us more vulnerable and if terrorists attack the United States, some most certainly will try to come through Canada in order to do so. What role will the military play in combating these threats?

Warriors or Global Street Workers?

  • 4 Canada, Department of National Defence, A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa, 1999): 7.
  • 5 Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence Performance and Outlook 2000: Making a Difference (...)

12As the nature of warfare is changing, Canada seems unclear as to whether it wants its forces to remain interoperable warriors, which implies heavy investments in hardware in order to conduct joint operations with the Americans and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, or occupy a niche role as peacekeepers. And while the Canadian military has argued that it is still primarily a combat force, peace operations have become, over the years, its primary business. This ambiguity is reflected in official documents. “Combat capable, multipurpose forces” as described in the 1994 Defence White Paper are still being presented as a realistic future. In A Strategy for 2020, future forces are described as “high quality, combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly déployable task-tailored.”4 Yet, Defence Performance and Outlook 2000 tells us that the military is also supposed to advance Canada's human security agenda. This includes, “the ability to fight to protect the fundamental human rights and values that Canadians and the international community espouse... [and]... keep the peace once it is achieved.”5 How exactly does an armed force protect values?

  • 6 A.G. Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper.” Paper presented at the conference on Canadi (...)

13Certainly, the peacekeeping image appeals to popular Canadian self-images, to sentiments of altruism and generosity, to helping others who are suffering, and so on. In many ways, peacekeeping contributed to the formation of a Canadian identity in the international arena. Peacekeeping represented Canadian multiculturalism, tolerance, and respect for the rule of law. In the words of Sens, “Peacekeeping had become a mirror, reflecting the finest qualities Canadians ascribed to their own society and national character.”6

14There are, however, other more self-motivated reasons for participating in peace operations. During the Cold War, there were Canadian security matters to consider. As Sens points out, during the Cold War, international security and national security became intertwined:

  • 7 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 5.

Canada's paramount strategic concern during the Cold War was an escalation of superpower hostilities in Europe or elsewhere into a global confrontation which would threaten Canadian territory. As it became evident that the United States and the Soviet Union could clash in various regional conflicts, Canada acquired an interest in the prevention, control, or containment of hostilities in areas of tension around the world.7

  • 8 Canada, A Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Rel (...)
  • 9 For details, see Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper.”

15This theme appears in Canada's Defence White Papers of that period. Indeed, in 1986, a Special Joint Committee of the Canadian Senate and House of Commons stated that “the threat to Canada is one and the same with the threat to international stability and peace.”8 In the 1990s, then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney talked about the necessity of “rethinking the limits of national sovereignty” in a world of intrastate and transnational problems. This coincided with a surge in peace operations by Canadians.9

  • 10 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 14.
  • 11 H. Wiseman, “United Nations Peacekeeping and Canadian Policy: A Reassessment,” Canadian Foreign Po (...)
  • 12 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 6.

16Peacekeeping also meshes well with Canadian foreign policy conceptions of Canada as a “middle power.” Contributions to peace operations are expressions of Canada's commitment to the UN. According to Sens, the desire to be both represented and consulted on international affairs is an important driving force behind Canadian foreign policy, and peacekeeping has helped maintain Canada's profile and influence as an independent sovereign actor in the world.10 Participation in peace operations also gave Canada some leverage in international forums. According to Wiseman, peacekeeping “enhanced Canada's reputation as a middle power [and contributed] to Canada's stature and influence in the UN.”11 According to Sens: “By contributing contingents to ventures such as peacekeeping Canada hoped to gain a seat at the table, a voice, and therefore some input into decision-making forums.”12 As an example, participation in the operations in the Balkans was an expression of Canada's ongoing commitment to European security and to NATO.

  • 13 M. Shadwick, “Canadians and Defence,” Canadian Military Journal 1 (2) (Summer 2000): 109.

17However, as important as participation might be, the question remains as to whether we have the resources and capabilities to honour all our commitments. Canadians have not seen the military as an important national institution and traditionally have not supported defence spending. As Shadwick has stated, “many Canadians seem to aspire to a global security and human security role for their country and their armed forces, but are prone to terminal writer's cramp when it comes to signing the cheques for a credible defence establishment.” He indicated that-despite an overwhelming belief that “a strong military is important to Canada's international standing” (88 per cent), “peacekeeping requires combat-ready forces” (94 per cent) and “Canada needs a modern, combat-capable military” (95 per cent – when it came to a zero-sum choice, defence spending rated last of all choices, with Canadians choosing to allocate an additional tax dollar to propping up the Canadian film industry rather than improving the state of defence.13

  • 14 D. Copeland, quoted in Marcus Gee, “World's Poor Overlooked as Foreign Aid Stays Low,” The Globe a (...)
  • 15 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 21. IFOR stands for the NATO-Led Peace Implement (...)

18Dwindling force capacity will affect Canada's ability to sustain prolonged substantial commitments abroad. The ability to work with political objectives in spite of force limitations is not always easy, particularly in a resource-poor environment such as that of the Canadian Forces. In the future, we may have to accept involvement in alliances, not as an ongoing commitment but for specific purposes only. We may still be able to contribute to coalitions but only in a subordinate role with little autonomy of action. This may also have an effect on Canada's standing and ability to exert influence. According to Daryl Copeland, executive director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, “Our rhetoric will start to ring hollow unless it is backed up by resources.”14 There was already an indication of this in 1994 when Canada was excluded from the Contact Group, which became the primary mechanism for policy on the Balkans. According to Sens, “Canada's allies were dissatisfied with Canada's contribution to IFOR.”15 In short, we were marginalized for not anteing-up at the international security table.

Soft Power with No Hard Power to Back it Up

  • 16 For a review of the debate surrounding soft power in Canada, see D. Oliver, “Soft Power and Canadi (...)
  • 17 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “oreign Policy in the Information A (...)
  • 18 Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in “We're Doing Things Nobody Else Could Do,” (...)
  • 19 Lloyd Axworthy, quoted in M. Trickey, “Canada, Norway Change Their Ways,” Ottawa Citizen (28 May 1 (...)
  • 20 For an excellent critique of the soft power see D. Oliver, “Soft Power and Canadian Defence: Squar (...)
  • 21 The Canadian defence budget fell from $CDN12 billion in 1994 to $CDN 9.25 billion in 1999. This re (...)
  • 22 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping ( (...)

19Another important trend in Canadian foreign policy has been towards “soft power;”16 that is, the belief that “knowledge and information confer international influence.”17 The former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, has described soft power as “punching above your weight. In Canada's case... ideas, values, persuasion, skill, [and] technique.”18 What this essentially means “is affecting and influencing behaviour by information, by values and by forms of non-intrusive intervention.”19 Besides the fact that ‘non-intrusive intervention’ may be an oxymoron, we remain somewhat ambiguous about what role hard power plays in support of soft power – if any at all.20 Yet recent events in the Balkans indicate that peace management is only achievable through military intervention and ongoing military presence. However, in Canada, the emphasis on soft power has coincided with considerable reductions in the defence budget21 and a resulting loss of hard power capabilities. The new buzzword is “peace building” (efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict22). This has led to support for “human security,” a concept also championed by Lloyd Axworthy:

  • 23 Lloyd Axworthy, “Building Peace to Last: Establishing A Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative,” Notes (...)

The concept of human security recognizes that human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equality are as important to global peace as are arms control and disarmament. It follows from this that, to restore and sustain peace in countries affected by conflict, human security must be guaranteed just as military security must. This is where peace building comes in: as a package of measures to strengthen and solidify peace by building a sustainable infrastructure of human security. Peace building aims to put in place the minimal conditions under which a country can take charge of its destiny, and social, political, and economic development become possible.23

20The concept of human security underlines a fundamental change in the twenty-first century security environment. As the Kosovo bombing campaign shows, territorial integrity and sovereignty can be subordinated to issues of human rights. During the Cold War, territorial integrity superseded human rights. Now the tide seems to have turned in favour of human rights. The Kosovo campaign also shows, however, that human rights have to be robustly defended. What, therefore, is the role for Canada's military in advancing human security interests?

21As noted by many, we have a good network of memberships in powerful and comparatively exclusive clubs – G7, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), G-20, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These memberships, combined with being in the more universal clubs such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Organization of American States (OAS) for example, give us forums for advancing our human security interests. However, we also have to remember that, in contrast to other countries such as the US, the UK, or France, our military instrument is weak, being proportionately smaller, and more poorly funded and equipped. Canada's military continues to innovate in order to use most effectively what little military assets they have. Future governments will have to balance the military's capacity to participate in human security efforts and collective security operations. In order to do so, we will have to tailor our commitments to our resources, instead of always expecting the opposite – i.e. committing the military to an operation and expecting them to come up with the human and material resources to realize it.

  • 24 We have already made some efforts in this, for example, the Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordinating C (...)

22If Canada is going to support this package of measures to solidify peace, then interagency co-operation and civil – military co-operation will be an even more important component of peace operations in the future. Non governmental organizations (NGOs) are emerging as important social actors in peace efforts. These actors have become very skillful in adapting to the circumstances and have gained in international influence. The recent NGO protests in Seattle and Washington during the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings are an example of this. Non governmental organizations, humanitarian agencies, local representatives, and the military will all have to collaborate closely in future efforts to restore and maintain global peace.24

The National Context

  • 25 See G. Kummel, Morale in the Armed Forces (Strausberg: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Re (...)

23The attitudes of society towards its military are subject to various influences depending on the climate within society or the viewpoints of the members of society on questions of war and peace.25 In Canadian society, social, cultural, and legal changes provide a less robust supporting framework for the core values of military culture. We can say that Canada is not a militaristic society and it is unlikely to become one in the future. Neither can we say that patriotism as it might be expressed in “proud service to one's country” is widespread. Indeed, the new generations of prospective recruits will likely be less accepting of some of the traditional demands of a military way of life.

  • 26 Among the important pieces of legislation affecting the Canadian Forces are: The Canadian Human Ri (...)

24The military is going to have to adapt to a society that is becoming more individualistic (for example, people wish to be actively involved in how their working lives are structured and expect employers to respect their private and family commitments), egalitarian, and litigious. A higher value is now placed upon social equality and citizens are more disposed to enforce their rights in the courts. Thus, the Canadian Forces have been subject to a number of important legislative acts that have forced change upon the organization. For example, the Canadian Forces were among the first to be fully bilingual and have done away with barriers to homosexual and female participation in all job qualifications, including combat.26

25Deference to authority figures – especially in institutional organizations – has waned: authority has to be earned and not taken for granted. This trend poses challenges for the armed forces with their highly structured authority relations. Should Service personnel have the right to air and represent their grievances in forums that are outside the formal chain of command? One response has been to set up the Office of the Ombudsman for National Defence and the Canadian Forces that stands outside the military chain of command.

  • 27 This is not only true for Canada, in the USA the House of Representatives had 320 veterans in 1970 (...)
  • 28 Quoted in N. Ovenden, “‘MPs Know Nothing about Defence’: Study,” in The Ottawa Citizen (5 November (...)

26In Canada, the number of people with direct experience of military affairs has dwindled. Along with the long-term decline in the size of the military establishment has come a corresponding diminution in the number of military and ex-military personnel in society. In addition, with base closures and rationalization, the ‘footprint’ made by the military on society has diminished. The number of people – especially opinion formulaters – who can speak knowledgeably about the Services has declined in recent decades. In Canada, Members of Parliament (MPs) have little direct experience with the military.27 According to a survey conducted by Dr. Douglas Bland of the Centre for Defence Management Studies at Queen's University, the Canadian MPs responsible for approving $CDN9.5 billion in annual military spending often know little about Canada's defence needs or objectives. Bland commented about the results of his study: “Defence is the only government policy where the government is prepared to deliberately spend the lives of people to accomplish policy ends. You would think if they're going to send people out to get killed, they should think about it.”28

27The families of military members are changing as well. Increasingly, both parents work, placing increased demands on employers for career breaks and more flexible working practices. Demands of the growing number of single parent families must be taken into account. Much work is still to be done in the Canadian Forces to provide more flexible working conditions and to recognize that women are no longer prepared to place their own career second to that of their military partners. Women, of course, are pursuing careers in the military. Career paths will have to take into account the female life cycle, allowing breaks for pregnancy, and ensure career development after women return to work.

28While the wider employment of women is still an ongoing process, focus on equal opportunities in the armed services has shifted to address race and ethnicity. Society is also more ethnically heterogeneous than it was twenty years ago, raising issues of equal opportunities for all employing organizations and the need to ensure that the Services are broadly representative of the society they are supposed to defend. A good deal of discussion has centered on the need for the armed services to be broadly ‘representative’ of Canadian society.

  • 29 Sir Michael Howard, “Armed Forces and the Community,” RUSI Journal 141 (4) (August 1996): 10.
  • 30 This point raises difficult and complex issues, especially the extent to which an inclination not (...)

29The key question is whether representativeness is achievable. The idea of representativeness can be given at least two rather different interpretations. First, one can refer to a socio-demographic match between the military and society. In this context, representativeness would require the military to match the statistical profile of the wider population – a goal achieved through planned targets if not quotas. As Sir Michael Howard has pointed out, this is very much an American value.29 Second, one might argue that the armed services should subscribe to core societal values such as equality of opportunity, decency, fairness, careers open to all, and merit-based advancement in the organization. Thus, the Services could feel relatively comfortable about explaining the mismatch between their profile and that of society with but one proviso. The gap would need to be explained, not by the failure to have an effective equality of opportunity programme, but rather by the propensity of particular groups to select certain kinds of occupations, military or civilian.30 Given this differential propensity rate amongst groups in society, it is most unlikely that the services would be able to achieve the goals of representation in the first sense of that concept. Reaching such a goal would require programmes of affirmative action that are illegal in Canada. One possible result might be that service in the Canadian Forces would become a niche employment for Canadians of British and French ancestry.

  • 31 In England, the work of Lt. Col. Stuart Crawford is particularly noteworthy in this connection. Th (...)
  • 32 J. Verdon, Capt. N.A. Okros and T. Wait, “Some Strategic Human Resource Implications for Canada's (...)

30Other commentators have identified a number of reasons why meeting equal opportunity objectives is a desirable goal from the point of view of the operational effectiveness of the armed services.31 First, it provides improved access to a wider recruitment pool as the armed services compete with civilian companies for scarce labour, both in terms of quantity and quality. In Canada, though currently there are twice as many people under fifteen years old as there are over sixty-five, by 2030 the dependent elderly (aged over sixty-five) will outnumber dependants. This trend, combined with declining fertility rates, means that immigration is the only way to maintain or increase the population.32 Immigrants may come to outnumber those born in Canada and in the future might constitute the major source of recruits – a very different picture from the predominantly European origin, white force of today. Future forces may become multilingual.

31If a force representative of social diversity is achieved, the demands of individual rights, and member-defined fair treatment will become more and more of a challenge. Thus, the supportive links between armed forces and society must be cultivated. Doing so can actually strengthen the Services. In a healthy democracy, it is vital that the armed forces not remain too distant from the society they are charged to defend. After all, society funds them and bestows on them their legitimacy; and it is society from which they recruit and to which their personnel return to continue their lives as civilians.

Conclusions

32It is impossible to know for certain what security threats Canada will face in the twenty-first century. We have, however, noted a few significant trends related to international and national developments. In terms of conflict we have noted the increasing importance of technology and the high costs associated with keeping up with high tech weaponry and defence systems. Will Canadians be willing to invest in these costly projects? How can we afford not to? Globalization means not only increased opportunity for investment, but also increased security risks since the stability of Canada's economy can be affected by events in far away places.

33What will Canada's defence and security policy be in the twenty-first century? Will we be part of a ‘fortress North America’ protected by a US defence system? Or will we choose to be an international leader of human rights and security? This entails many elements, from peace operations to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, foreign aid, election monitoring, democracy building, post-conflict reconstruction of infrastructure and social institutions, and preventative diplomacy. It also means a shift from peace operations with a predominantly military focus to a form of new coalitions with NGOs, civilian peacekeepers, human rights monitors, and so on. This makes the task of determining what role the armed forces should play in the future all the more difficult. Not only will decisions have to be made about appropriate equipment, debate is needed on appropriate skill sets and training for future missions. But who can carry out the debate? If Canadian MPs are becoming less familiar with the military, how can they take appropriate decisions? These are some of the challenges facing not only the Canadian military but also the Canadian political leadership.

Notes

1 W. von Bredow, “Global Street Workers? War and the Armed Forces in a Globalizing World,” Defence Analysis 13 (2) (1997): 169-180.

2 W.L. Hauser, “The Will to Fight,” in Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Volunteer Military, ed. S.C. Sarkesian (London: Sage, 1980): 200.

3 US Major R. Peters, cited in Morale in the Armed Forces, G. Kummel (Strausberg: German Armed Forces Research Institute, 1999): 11.

4 Canada, Department of National Defence, A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa, 1999): 7.

5 Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence Performance and Outlook 2000: Making a Difference at Home and Abroad (Ottawa, 2000): 3-5.

6 A.G. Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper.” Paper presented at the conference on Canadian Security and Defence Policy: Strategies and Debates at the Beginning of the 21st Century (Vancouver, 1999): 7.

7 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 5.

8 Canada, A Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services (June 1986): 34.

9 For details, see Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper.”

10 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 14.

11 H. Wiseman, “United Nations Peacekeeping and Canadian Policy: A Reassessment,” Canadian Foreign Policy 1 (3) (Fall 1993): 138.

12 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 6.

13 M. Shadwick, “Canadians and Defence,” Canadian Military Journal 1 (2) (Summer 2000): 109.

14 D. Copeland, quoted in Marcus Gee, “World's Poor Overlooked as Foreign Aid Stays Low,” The Globe and Mail (18 February 1999): A20.

15 Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 21. IFOR stands for the NATO-Led Peace Implementation Force for Joint Endeavour in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 For a review of the debate surrounding soft power in Canada, see D. Oliver, “Soft Power and Canadian Defence,” Strategic Datalinks, no. 76 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, February 1999).

17 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “oreign Policy in the Information Age,” Policy Statement 96/53 (Ottawa: December 1996).

18 Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in “We're Doing Things Nobody Else Could Do,” Ottawa Citizen (5 April 1998): A7.

19 Lloyd Axworthy, quoted in M. Trickey, “Canada, Norway Change Their Ways,” Ottawa Citizen (28 May 1998): A18.

20 For an excellent critique of the soft power see D. Oliver, “Soft Power and Canadian Defence: Square Pegs in Round Holes?” Paper presented to the Centre for International and Security Policy (York University, Toronto, 22 January 1999).

21 The Canadian defence budget fell from $CDN12 billion in 1994 to $CDN 9.25 billion in 1999. This represents a 25 per cent reduction in fiscal outlays, which have resulted in force reduction. Between 1989 and 1999 there was a 30 per cent force reduction. The Canadian Forces have gone from 126,000 in 1962 to 100,000 in 1968 to 80,000 in 1975 and were at 60,600 in 1999. The Land Forces now total 20,900. See Sens, “The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,” 19.

22 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992): 32.

23 Lloyd Axworthy, “Building Peace to Last: Establishing A Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative,” Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs (York University, 30 October 1996): 2.

24 We have already made some efforts in this, for example, the Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordinating Committee, the joint working groups of the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. In addition, the military is building its civil military co-operation expertise. They now have an exchange with the non governmental organization, CARE, in which an officer is attached to the organization on a six-month basis to learn more about the way NGOs operate.

25 See G. Kummel, Morale in the Armed Forces (Strausberg: German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research 1999): 28.

26 Among the important pieces of legislation affecting the Canadian Forces are: The Canadian Human Rights Act, 1978; the equality section (Section 15) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which came into effect on 17 April 1985; and the Employment Equity Act, 1996 which determined that every Canadian citizen has the right to discrimination-free employment and promotion and that public institutions will strive to be representative of the public they serve.

27 This is not only true for Canada, in the USA the House of Representatives had 320 veterans in 1970, but fewer than 130 in 1994. In 1997, for the first time ever, neither the Secretary of Defence, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, nor any of their deputies had ever been in uniform. J. Hillen, “Must US Military Culture Reform?” Orbis, 43 (1) (1999): 54. See also M. Shields, “When Heroes Were Ordinary Men,” Washington Post (3 August 1998).

28 Quoted in N. Ovenden, “‘MPs Know Nothing about Defence’: Study,” in The Ottawa Citizen (5 November 1999): A4.

29 Sir Michael Howard, “Armed Forces and the Community,” RUSI Journal 141 (4) (August 1996): 10.

30 This point raises difficult and complex issues, especially the extent to which an inclination not to pursue a military career is the result of perceived or real racism in the prospective employing organization.

31 In England, the work of Lt. Col. Stuart Crawford is particularly noteworthy in this connection. The arguments developed here draw on Crawford's work and on a number of conversations with him over the past two years. See Crawford's “Racial Integration in the Army-An Historical Perspective,” British Army Review 111 (December 1995): 24-8. His Defence Fellowship thesis on this subject is not published to date, therefore not available to the public.

32 J. Verdon, Capt. N.A. Okros and T. Wait, “Some Strategic Human Resource Implications for Canada's Military in 2020.” Paper presented to Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (Baltimore, MD: October 1999): 11-12.

Auteur

Award-winning anthropologist and currently Chair of the Department of Cultural Anthropology/Sociology of Development, at the Faculty of Social-Cultural Sciences, Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam (The Netherlands). Prior to this appointment she was Associate Professor at the University of Ottawa where she directed the Program for Research on Peace, Security, and Society at the Centre on Governance, in addition to co-ordinating the Military Officer Degree Program. She received her PhD from l'Université de Montréal. From 1995 to 1997 she served as a technical advisor to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia and published the book The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry (1997). Her current research involves issues of globalization and localization, development, peace, and security

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