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Rethinking Canadian Aid

 | 
Stephen Brown
, 
Molly den Heyer
, 
David R. Black

Section II: The Canadian Context and Motivations

Chapter VII. Continental Shift? Rethinking Canadian Aid to the Americas

Laura Macdonald et Arne Ruckert

Texte intégral

1One of the defining features of the Harper government’s development assistance program, and of its foreign policy more broadly, has been a strong rhetorical shift towards an emphasis on Canadian economic interest in the promotion of foreign ties and in the delivery of foreign assistance. The Americas as a region has tended to serve as a proxy for this shift in focus. The higher levels of economic development of the region as a whole and growing Canadian trade and investment interests in the region, particularly in the mining sector, mean that increased aid to the Americas is commonly portrayed as a response to cold, hard Canadian self-interest, as opposed to the soft-hearted benevolence of assistance to Africa. Indeed, the Conservative government’s Americas Strategy, launched in 2007, represented a partisan exercise insofar as Harper wished to distance himself from the Liberal governments under Chrétien and Martin, which emphasized Africa in an effort to focus on the poorest countries and to improve aid effectiveness, in line with the criteria of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (Cameron 2007). Canadian development assistance to Latin America thus represents a good test case for the proposition that we have seen increased emphasis since 2007 on the economic self-interest of Canadians and Canadian firms, and less on the longer-term promotion of development and the well-being of the world’s poorest citizens.

2This article examines the case of Canadian development assistance to the Americas, with a focus on the policies of the Harper government. This case study represents a useful contribution to the debate on the domestic determinants of aid and the role of partisan motivations in shifting aid levels and priorities. We believe a study of the aid policy of a single state towards a single world region provides important insight into the complex and often contradictory motivations that shape aid policy, as well as more scope than purely quantitative analysis for understanding the ideational and discursive dimensions of governments’ shifting priorities. In the case of Canadian development assistance to the Americas, we argue, quantitative analysis, which does not show the African region losing out to the Americas under the Harper government, needs to be supplemented with a more nuanced portrayal of changes in aid recipients and forms of assistance. We also suggest that Harper’s transformation of Canadian aid policy has been incremental in nature, with a number of small but significant shifts accruing over time. More than seven years after Harper’s ascendancy to power, we identify a marked shift in Canadian aid policy, with private-sector development and investment (especially in mining) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Latin America as strong areas of interest. This is not surprising, given some of the findings in the aid literature that highlight the institutional and cultural path-dependency of aid programs, which prevent drastic changes in aid delivery when opposition parties come to power (Thérien and Noël 1994).

3The chapter begins with a short overview of debates regarding the motivations of development assistance policy, followed by a summary of the evolution of Canadian assistance in the Americas. We then provide more detail about current Canadian policies, focusing on three case studies: CIDA-supported partnerships between development NGOs and mining companies in Peru; Canadian assistance to Haiti, the biggest aid recipient in the region; and finally the controversial case of Honduras. We have selected these cases because they represent three of the most important aid recipients in the region and illustrate some of the competing logics behind Canadian aid. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this analysis for rethinking Canadian development assistance policy.

Interests and Ideas in Development Assistance Policy

  • 1 Van der Veen argues that the main function of frames is “to organize different pieces of informati (...)

4There is a long-running debate over governments’ motives for delivering development assistance and the relative weight given to various factors in determining the nature of development policy. Van der Veen (2011) argues that analysts of aid often go astray by assuming that there is only one dominant motivation for aid, with the debate often polarized between advocates of self-interest and advocates of humanitarian principles. In addition, he argues, it is useful to use the concept of framing, with seven frames dominating policy makers’ efforts to explain and defend aid policy: security, power, economic self-interest, enlightened self-interest, reputation/self-affirmation, obligation/duty, and humanitarianism (van der Veen 2011, 9–10).1 Multiple frames can coexist, state motivations can shift over time, and some countries are more prone to certain motivations than others. Over the long term, national historical backgrounds play an important role in development assistance policy, but the ideological character of the party in power also influences shorter-term changes in style or direction.

5It is commonly assumed that parties on the left are more generous in their development assistance policies than right-wing parties (Thérien and Noël 2000, 152). Much of this literature argues that right-wing parties are less likely to provide aid, implicitly assuming that aid is motivated by humanitarian motivations or at least long-term enlightened self-interest, overlooking the role of other factors like security or economic interest. However, Thérien and Noël (1994) carry out a quantitative analysis of donor assistance levels over several years and find no significant link between partisan orientation and foreign aid effort. They argue instead that a country’s longer-term development of welfare-state institutions plays a more important role in explaining welfare state and aid spending patterns. Goldstein and Moss (2005, cited in Tingley 2010, 41) suggest that, in the United States, Republicans may be more generous towards Africa than Democrats because they may more effectively make the link between foreign policy objectives such as security interests and foreign aid. Fleck and Kilby (2006) similarly argue that while Democrats tend to be more driven by development concerns, Republicans are more driven by commercial interests. An analysis of the changing profile of Canadian development assistance to the Americas provides better insight into the competing motivations for aid and how the framing of aid motivations changes over time.

The Harper Government and Development Assistance to the Americas

6Despite early expectations of some commentators (see Black and Tiessen 2006, 197), the Harper government has not reduced overall development assistance levels. In fact development assistance increased by 4.1 percent in real terms in 2012 over 2011, before the government’s freeze came into effect (NSI and SELA 2013, 17). Nevertheless, the Tories have carried out an important shift in their framing of the aid program, capped by the incorporation of CIDA into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) in 2013.

  • 2 The list included fourteen countries from Africa, six from Asia, four from the Americas, and Ukrai (...)

7Historically, levels of aid to the Americas were extremely low, as a result of the limited ties between Canada and Latin America (although ties with the Caribbean were stronger). By the 1990s, bilateral aid levels to the Americas increased as a result of instability in the Central American region and democratization and liberalization throughout the Americas (Cameron 2007, 237). However, the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin downplayed Canada’s role in the Americas in both foreign and development assistance policies. The International Policy Statement (IPS) issued by Martin’s government in April 2005 explicitly committed Canada to focus on Africa in its development assistance, including a commitment to double 2003–04 levels of ODA to that region by 2008–09 (Cameron 2007, 231). Also as part of the IPS, the government committed itself to increased concentration of aid, identifying a list of twenty-five “development partner” countries, justified largely on the basis of the level of poverty of the recipient.2 Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, which had been prominent aid recipients, were omitted from this list and classified as “failed and fragile states”; however, four countries in the Americas that were among the top twenty-five recipients of ODA were included (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guyana) (Cameron 2007, 233–4). Senior CIDA officials stated that the agency did not have much of a future in the Americas (Cameron 2007, 235). Nevertheless, overall aid levels remained relatively constant (Cameron 2007), reflecting a path dependency dynamic.

8Since Harper was elected, Latin America and the Caribbean have been highlighted again as an area of priority for Canadian foreign policy, but reflecting very different motivations and framing strategies from those of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The prime minister’s extensive visit to the region in 2006 demonstrated his rapidly growing interest in hemispheric affairs, followed by the launch of a new “Strategy for the Americas” focused on three “interdependent strategic objectives or pillars”: increasing economic prosperity, reinforcing democratic governance, and advancing common security (DFATD 2011a).

9The government justified the Americas Strategy primarily in terms of advancing Canadian interests and values, rather than contributing to poverty reduction or development in the region. It identified the “prosperity pillar” as the “keystone” of the strategy. The proportion of Canada’s overall trade going to the Americas increased from 1.7 percent in 2004 to 2.6 percent in 2009 (DFATD 2011a). As a result of the emphasis on the prosperity pillar, the main tangible outcome of the strategy has been the signing of a series of free trade agreements with countries in the Americas, including Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Honduras.

  • 3 In June 2014, the government further amended the list, expanding it to twenty-five countries, to w (...)

10The government initially designed the Americas Strategy as a “whole-of-government” approach to the region, incorporating efforts by a wide range of federal government departments, with DFAIT as the coordinating ministry and under the political leadership of the Minister of State for the Americas. However, an internal DFAIT evaluation carried out in 2011 states that there is not much evidence that the whole-of-government approach has been implemented effectively, with few signs of greater cooperation and synergy across government departments, with the exception of the response to the Haitian earthquake. It identifies the lack of new dedicated funding to support the initiative as an important obstacle for the participation of most government agencies (DFATD 2011a). In this context, changes in allocation of ODA assume particular prominence and CIDA did receive new resources to support aid to the region (DFATD 2011a). In 2009, Minister Bev Oda announced a new list of countries of concentration, which signalled a shift in focus from Africa to the Americas as part of the government’s “aid effectiveness agenda.” Eighty percent of Canadian bilateral ODA would focus on these twenty countries. The new list included only seven African countries (down from the earlier fourteen and excluding some of the continent’s poorest countries), five Asian countries, and six from the Americas (adding Peru and Colombia, and including the whole Caribbean region instead of just Guyana). In particular, the inclusion of Peru and Colombia, both middle-income countries with which Canada has signed free trade agreements, suggested a move from an emphasis on the needs of the poorest towards building relationships with countries that will benefit Canada’s commercial interests (Berthiaume 2009).3

11Canadian development assistance to the Americas is not justified in terms of poverty reduction, social assistance, or reduction of inequality, but primarily in terms of support to private sector development. The description of the Inter-American Regional Program on the DFATD (2012) website states,

CIDA focuses on strengthening the region’s enabling environment for economic growth and helping governments and private sector organizations connect to global markets. This includes standardizing and harmonizing investment and taxation policies, and regulatory frameworks so that the private sector can operate within a common set of rules and regulations, as well as strengthening public financial management by training public officials. (DFATD 2013a)

12Despite these changes in justification for aid decisions and in aid recipients, as well as the greater rhetorical emphasis on the Americas, overall levels of ODA channelled to Africa did not decrease (see Figure 1). Latin America and the Caribbean did receive a greater share of Canada’s aid budget, with the main loser being Asia, due mainly to the scaling down of aid to Afghanistan. Total assistance to the Americas has grown from around C$260 million in 2000 to over $800 million by 2010. Total assistance to countries of concentration increased from C$215 million to $570 million in this period (Blouin, Lopez Giral, and Bhushan 2012, 7). Both Africa and the Americas saw aid levels rise by about 2 to 3 percent between 2009 and 2012, while the share of aid to Asia declined in the same period, from 25 percent in 2009–10 to 20 percent in 2011–12 (NSI and SELA 2013, 18). Nevertheless, the high level of aid can be largely explained by the increase in assistance to Haiti, which was also the largest recipient of Canadian aid in 2009–10. The decision to increase aid to Haiti does not, as we discuss below, conform to the economic self-interest frame. Apart from Haiti, the share of the ODA budget has remained relatively constant for most recipients in the region, while absolute numbers have tended to increase.

13Overall, development assistance policies under Harper have not thus far resulted in a significant increase in assistance to the Americas or reduction of aid to Africa. However, we have seen important changes in how aid is justified to the public, in the designation of recipient countries in the Americas, and in forms of assistance. An examination of the cases of three priority recipients – Peru, Honduras, and Haiti – reveals some of the complexity of motivations shaping aid decisions.

Figure 1: Canadian ODA to Different Regions in C$ Millions and Percentages

Figure 1: Canadian ODA to Different Regions in C$ Millions and Percentages

Source: CIDP (2013)

The Case of Peru: Promoting Extractive Industries and CSR

14Peru arguably represents the best example of Canada’s incremental shift in aid engagement in the Americas towards privileging private sector investments. Canada has significant mining interests in Peru, with Goldcorp, Barrick Gold, Candente Copper Corp, and various smaller companies operating in the country. In 2009, as part of CIDA’s aid effectiveness agenda, Canada designated Peru as one of its twenty focus countries, despite its status as an upper middle-income country. As shown in Figure 2, this was followed by a rapid expansion of aid flows to Peru, from less than C$15 million in fiscal year 2009, to close to $30 million by 2012. The programming focus of Canada’s newfound engagement with Peru lies in the areas of education and sustainable economic development, with the latter becoming the central focus in 2012. In fact, a quick scan of DFATD’s project browser reveals that almost all projects (six out of eight) approved in 2012 and 2013 focus on private sector development and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the mining sector (DFATD 2013b).

15The government describes the overall goal of this engagement as “fostering the sustainable development of the extractive/natural resources sector to benefit all segments of the population and increasing government capacity to reduce social conflicts” (CIDA 2011a). This focus is part of the larger reorientation of aid policy under the Harper government towards CSR as a central area of concern, with initiatives that, DFATD claims, will contribute to sustainable economic growth, creating jobs and long-term poverty reduction (DFATD 2011b). In 2009, the government adopted a CSR strategy for the Canadian international extractive sector, with the objective of improving the competitive advantage of Canadian international extractive sector companies by enhancing their ability to manage social and environmental risks in developing countries (DFATD 2009). The CSR strategy is based on four pillars: to support initiatives aimed at enhancing the capacities of developing countries to manage the development of minerals and oil and gas, and to benefit from these resources so as to reduce poverty; to promote the widely recognized international CSR performance guidelines; to set up the Office of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor; and to support the development of a CSR Centre of Excellence (DFATD 2009; see also Goyette, this volume).

16As part of a broader CSR pilot project to promote partnerships between civil society organizations and Canadian mining companies, DFATD is currently investing in a partnership in Peru between World Vision and Barrick Gold. The program focuses on increasing the income and standard of living of one thousand families affected by mining operations in the mining community of Quiruvilca. According to World Vision, the program “will help residents of Quiruvilca, Peru, especially women, youth, and people with disabilities, become more involved and influential in their own community planning. In addition to providing loans for people to start small businesses, there will be capacity-building for local leaders to ensure Quiruvilca follows a path of sustainable development in the long-term” (World Vision, cited in DFATD 2011b). In addition to such individual initiatives in Peru, there is also a host of regional initiatives under implementation, for example, the Andean Regional Initiative for Promoting Effective Corporate Social Responsibility. This initiative in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia aims to strengthen the capacity of local governments and communities to implement sustainable development projects for the well-being of people living near extractive operations, and the sponsors claim it will improve dialogue between communities and the private sector. However, the real question is whether CSR projects are about ensuring better development outcomes for vulnerable populations, as claimed by its proponents.

17Critics have raised a number of serious concerns regarding the quick proliferation of CSR initiatives. First and foremost, they question the need and desirability to subsidize CSR activities by some of the most profitable Canadian corporations, and suggest that such activities help the mining industry to put a positive spin on their negative environmental and human rights records (Carin 2012; see also Brown, this volume). It is also notable that the Canadian mining industry has intensely lobbied CIDA to fund CSR projects at mine sites and is now praising DFATD for doing so (Mining Watch Canada 2012). This is presumably related to the reputational problems of Canadian mining companies abroad. As Mining Watch Canada noted, “there is reason to believe that CIDA’s funding of CSR projects at mine sites is a poorly articulated attempt by the Government of Canada to help mining companies appear to offset the development deficits they are creating at local and national levels” (Mining Watch Canada 2012, 8). Others see CSR initiatives as a reflection of an ongoing trend that has deepened under the Harper government, towards aggressively advancing the interests of Canadian multinationals in the global South and as a recipe for more violence and social conflict (Gordon 2012).

Figure 2: Canadian ODA to Peru (by Donor Source in C$)

Figure 2: Canadian ODA to Peru (by Donor Source in C$)

Source: CIDP (2013)

The Case of Haiti: Complexity of Aid Motivations

18In contrast with the case of Peru, which appears to conform clearly to the frame of self-interest, the case of Haiti directly speaks to the complexity of Canadian aid motivations and raises questions about the oft-recited claim that Harper’s aid policies in the Americas are solely driven by commercial self-interest (Gordon, 2012). Moreover, it shows that under Harper there is some programming continuity in the Americas with previous Liberal governments. Since Canada has few commercial interests in Haiti, the strong Canadian aid presence in that country must be explained by a combination of other factors (cultural and institutional), including the historical legacy of Haitian immigration to Canada, especially in Quebec, and the role that Haiti has played in Canada’s focus on fragile states in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Since 2004, Haiti has been Canada’s most important recipient of development assistance in the Americas, with annual allotments of more than C$100 million. In fact, under Harper, aid flows to Haiti (as documented in Figure 3 below) have more than doubled, reaching $250 million by 2010 (CIDP 2012).

19Historically, Canadian assistance to Haiti has sought to promote sustainable development and human security, but since 2003 the focus has been predominantly on institutional strengthening and peacebuilding (Shamsie 2012). However, in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake of 2010, the focus has shifted towards rehabilitation and reconstruction, with programming in the areas of food security, health and education systems strengthening, and participation of vulnerable population in economic development through the provision of microcredit and financial services (CIDA 2011b). The fact that Haiti has remained the largest recipient of Canadian aid in the western hemisphere, despite its irrelevance to the Canadian economy, must be understood in relation to the support that the fragile state agenda has received from the Harper government.

20While the focus on state fragility dates back to the International Policy Statement (discussed above) and as such represents a partisan effort by the previous Liberal government, CIDA under Harper has continued its engagement with fragile states, for example, through Canada’s financial commitment to Afghanistan. As discussed above, in 2009, Haiti officially became a country of focus for Canadian aid efforts, yet funding started to drop in 2010, with cutbacks intensifying in fiscal year 2012 (see Figure 3). In January 2013, then Minister of International Cooperation Julian Fantino announced that funding for new development projects in Haiti would be frozen pending a review, expressing a frustration with the lack of progress in the country: “Canada expects transparency, accountability from the government of Haiti in exchange for future commitments” (Blatchford 2013). The reason for this decision is unclear, but in addition to concerns with lack of development progress and corruption, the Conservatives may have decided that they have little chance of gaining electoral benefits from increased assistance to Haiti in ridings with a large Haitian presence, particularly in Quebec. However, it could also be seen as a sign of a closer alignment of aid flows with commercial interests in the region.

Figure 3: Canadian ODA to Haiti (by Donor Source in C$)

Figure 3: Canadian ODA to Haiti (by Donor Source in C$)

Source : CIDP (2013)

The Case of Honduras: Political Alliance Building

21The case of Honduras further exemplifies the complexities and competing motivations for Canadian aid in the Americas. While Canada has a longstanding engagement in the country, reflecting its historically high levels of poverty, Honduras caught the attention of the Harper government in the aftermath of the 2009 coup d’état, during which Liberal president Manuel Zelaya was removed from power. Over a short period of time, aid to Honduras almost tripled, reaching C$40 million by 2012 (see Figure 4 below), making it the second-largest aid recipient in the region.

22The programming focus in Honduras has traditionally been in the areas of food security and children and youth, with a special emphasis on reduction of maternal and child mortality and health information strengthening (CIDA 2011c). In the aftermath of the political instability associated with the constitutional crisis of 2009, some aid money has also been invested in the strengthening of the Honduran electoral system. The rapid increase to the Honduran aid envelope between 2008 and 2012 raises the question of what is driving the Canadian interest in Honduras.

23On one hand, the focus on Honduras fits in well with the argument that, under Harper, Canada is slowly realigning its aid program with Canada’s commercial interests. Canadian corporations are major economic players in Honduras, especially in mining, banking, and apparel manufacturing. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, since the mid-1990s Canada has consistently been one of the largest foreign investors in Honduras, accounting for almost 20 percent of all foreign direct investment in 2011 (ECLAC 2011). Mining companies like Goldcorp, Yamana, and Breakwater Resources have benefited from a mining law passed in 1998 that strongly favours foreign corporations. Like in Peru, the mining law and Canadian investments, particularly Goldcorp’s San Martin open pit mine, have been the target of large protests by indigenous peoples and small farmers whose lands and livelihoods are threatened by the expansion of Canadian mining (Gordon 2009). However, unlike in Peru, the programming focus has not (yet?) shifted towards CSR initiatives. Canada also concluded negotiations in 2011 on a free trade agreement with Honduras, which aims to strengthen commercial ties between the two countries.

24On the other hand, Canadian support for Honduras must also be seen as a partisan effort to prop up a country that, after the ouster of the left-leaning Zelaya, is ideologically in line with Harper’s rightwing political agenda. It is notable that Canada and the United States were the only countries in the western hemisphere to recognize the legitimacy of Porfirio Lobo as the new president of Honduras after his conservative National Party won the highly contested elections in the wake of the coup d’état. For some, this signified a stamp of approval on the coup and the elections, made worse by the fact that the majority of the Honduran population boycotted the election, which was held under conditions that cannot be certified as meeting international standards of democratic fairness and freedom (Cameron and Tockman 2012). The wave of electoral successes of left-of-centre parties all over Latin America throughout the 2000s has meant that Harper has been increasingly isolated politically in the region and was looking for new partners in the hemisphere, which he found in post-coup Honduras. Nevertheless, the high rates of violence in the country and widespread human rights violations, as well as the questionable manner in which the Lobo government came to power, reveal the lack of emphasis on the democracy pillar in the government’s Americas Strategy. The Honduran experience thus shows Harper government’s political and economic interests conflicting with its espoused commitment to promoting democracy.

Figure 4: Canadian ODA to Honduras (by Donor Source in C$)

Figure 4: Canadian ODA to Honduras (by Donor Source in C$)

Source: CIDP (2013)

Conclusion

25This analysis of Canadian development assistance to the Americas under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper suggests several lessons for the study of development assistance. While these conclusions may not be entirely generalizable, given the small number of case studies presented here, they do provide interesting indications of possible directions for future study. First, our analysis indicates the importance of unpacking simplistic assumptions like the idea that Conservative governments automatically wish to cut aid or that aid to Africa under the Liberals can be associated with selfless motivations, while a shift to an emphasis on the Americas under the Conservatives reflects a clear about-turn in Canadian government priorities towards commercial self-interest. As Stephen Brown points out, the “new policy blueprint” in the Martin government’s 2005 International Policy Statement contained mixed messages and clear contradictions, with a strong emphasis on Canadian interests and support for neoliberal economic policies, while mentions of ethically based arguments were scarce (Brown 2007, 215). As well, the strong support for Haiti by the Conservatives, at least until 2013, challenges the assumption that ODA directed towards the Americas is entirely driven by selfish motives, since Canada has few economic interests in Haiti.

26As such, our analysis provides considerable support for Thérien and Noël’s (2000) argument in favour of the importance of path dependency and the relative immunity of development assistance policies from sharp U-turns in policy in the short term. This is particularly clear in terms of quantitative evidence, with the Harper government’s increase in overall aid levels (until fiscal year 2011) and the relatively stable and increasing levels of aid for both Africa and the Americas. Nevertheless, a closer qualitative analysis of trends in choice of aid recipients and the character of aid to individual countries reveals an increasing use of ODA to the Americas in support of a conservative ideological agenda, particularly since Harper won a majority government in the 2011 elections. Although the government has increased aid to Haiti for reasons that are not framed in partisan terms, the cases of aid to both Peru and Honduras do, as we have discussed, display strong partisan motivations. Canada has signed free trade agreements in both countries and Canadian mining companies stand to benefit from greater cooperation with both of them, while Canadian support for Honduras reflects the Harper government’s pursuit of ideological alliance building as a strategic objective pursued through rapid increases in aid. The intensification of self-interested behaviour under the Harper government in its development assistance policies towards the Americas thus reflects a gradual but strong movement away from the altruistic motives for aid and risks discrediting Canada as a relatively caring donor. Finally, our analysis supports van der Veen’s constructivist approach and his emphasis on the importance of donors’ framing strategies. While our study reveals that multiple and competing frames do exist within Canada’s development assistance program, the evidence points to an important shift under the Harper government towards a strategy based on commercial self-interest.

Acknowledgments

27We are grateful to Megan Pickup for her research assistance for this article. Thanks to Stephen Brown, Pablo Heidrich, and Jacobo Vargas Foronda for their helpful comments. We also thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support.

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Notes

1 Van der Veen argues that the main function of frames is “to organize different pieces of information in a coherent fashion.” Frames “help actors understand the world around them, can specify goals, and determine interests” (van der Veen 2011, 29).

2 The list included fourteen countries from Africa, six from Asia, four from the Americas, and Ukraine.

3 In June 2014, the government further amended the list, expanding it to twenty-five countries, to which 90 percent of bilateral aid would be directed. The only change in the Americas was the dropping of Bolivia as a country of focus.

Table des illustrations

Titre Figure 1: Canadian ODA to Different Regions in C$ Millions and Percentages
Légende Source: CIDP (2013)
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/129/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 75k
Titre Figure 2: Canadian ODA to Peru (by Donor Source in C$)
Légende Source: CIDP (2013)
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/129/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 78k
Titre Figure 3: Canadian ODA to Haiti (by Donor Source in C$)
Légende Source : CIDP (2013)
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/129/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 79k
Titre Figure 4: Canadian ODA to Honduras (by Donor Source in C$)
Légende Source: CIDP (2013)
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/129/img-4.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 90k

Auteurs

Professor in the Department of Political Science, and the Director of the Institute of Political Economy at Carleton University. She has published books and articles on North American relations, civil society, development and democratization, Canadian foreign policy toward Latin America, and Mexican social policy

Research Associate at the University of Ottawa’s Institute of Population Health, researching health equity in the Globalization and Health Equity research unit. His principal areas of research include the international financial institutions, the international aid architecture, the financial crisis and health equity, and global health governance and diplomacy. He is co-author of Globalization and the Health of Indigenous Peoples (Routledge, 2015) and co-editor of Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas (Palgrave, 2009), and has published widely in academic journals in the area of global development and health

© Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa | University of Ottawa Press, 2015

Conditions d’utilisation : http://www.openedition.org/6540