Version classiqueVersion mobile
OpenEdition Books

Rethinking Canadian Aid

 | 
Stephen Brown
, 
Molly den Heyer
, 
David R. Black

Section II: The Canadian Context and Motivations

Chapter VI. Mimicry and Motives: Canadian Aid Allocation in Longitudinal Perspective

Liam Swiss

Texte intégral

Introduction

1There is no consensus over the first principles of Canadian foreign aid. If anything, ideas about the principles of Canadian aid have become more fragmented since 2006. Does Canada provide aid to help the neediest? Is Canada simply trying to ensure access for its multinational firms abroad? Is Canadian aid little more than a blunt tool of foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of our understanding of the first principles of Canadian aid. Indeed, the motives that underpin Canadian foreign aid have garnered significant attention in the media and the research literature since 2010. Gone are the days when Canada would be counted as one of the states operating its aid program primarily on a “moral vision” (Lumsdaine 1993). Running the gamut from humanitarian solidarity to the most capricious forms of national self-interest, Canada has been lumped into every category of donor, depending on the perspective of the critic or author and the various incidents or cases studied (Brown 2007; Morrison 1998; Pratt 1994b; Sumner 2012; Swiss 2011, 2012ab). A common feature of these sorts of studies has been their use of comparative cases to situate Canada among other donors (Action Aid 2010; Gulrajani 2010). By examining how Canada compares to other donor countries – often to the perceived “leading” donors – analysts and critics alike point to positive behaviours or “best practices” for Canada to emulate (Gulrajani 2010; McGill 2012; Pronk 2001). These comparisons tend to be qualitative, small-N, and cross-sectional (stationary in time) research, yielding recommendations for Canada based on a limited set of comparators and a short period of time. From the perspective of trying to shape policy, these approaches are often warranted, but they overlook lessons that can be drawn from a larger-scale comparison of Canada to other donors over a longer period.

2This chapter, by way of contrast, uses a novel quantitative approach with a large-N sample of bilateral aid flows over a fifty-year time period. By examining patterns of aid allocation over time, I uncover new information about where best to situate Canada among other donors and discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of the motives underpinning Canadian aid. Where Canada more closely resembles humanitarian-inspired donors, one might infer more humanitarian motives, while instances where Canada falls in line with more self-interested donors suggest more realist motives behind Canada’s aid. My findings suggest that although Canada’s mimicry of other donors has shifted significantly over time from a more humanitarian set of donors to those motivated by self-interest, the evidence of these realist motives shaping aid flows at the recipient country level are less clear.

Aid Allocation: A Matter of Principle?

3Examining the allocation of Canadian aid reveals important evidence about the motives and first principles that support it. By following the flow of money, and not just the press releases, policy statements, or country strategies developed by donors, a macro perspective shows how a donor allocates funds on the global level and what this indicates about its aid. In the case of Canada, this chapter uses aid allocation patterns to do two things: (1) discern which other donor countries Canada’s aid allocation most closely resembles over time to identify which countries and, in turn, motives Canada may be emulating in its aid practices; and (2) examine several key factors underpinning the provision of aid to recipient countries on a dyadic basis to highlight the motives that drive Canadian aid relationships over time.

4Using aid allocation to examine what motivates the foreign aid process has been one of the major threads of foreign aid research since 1990 (Tierney et al. 2011). In an oft-cited example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) use cross-national statistical analysis to argue that patterns of aid allocation highlight a realist motive for aid: Donors provide aid based on self-interest. More recent research on aid allocation has also used large-N statistical analysis to examine how aid is allocated and the motives behind various donors’ aid programs (Clist 2011; Dreher et al. 2011; Neumayer 2003). Likewise, other research has used small-N comparative case studies to arrive at similar conclusions (Schraeder et al. 1998; Woods 2005). Similar analysis has also examined the Canadian context, concluding most often that the Canadian aid program reflects a tension between realist and humanitarian motives (Macdonald and Hoddinott 2004; Morrison 1994; Noël et al. 2004; Pratt 1994ab; Thérien and Noël 1994).

5For the purposes of this chapter, I will examine aid allocation patterns using network techniques and cross-national statistical models to identify which donors Canada most closely emulates and whether Canada considers similar or differing criteria when providing aid to developing countries when compared with other donors. These features of Canadian aid allocation provide valuable evidence regarding the motives behind Canada’s aid and how they have changed over time.

6Mimicry is a technique used by many organizations to attempt to gain greater certainty within the context of their organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). My earlier research has indicated the role mimicry plays in shaping bilateral donor policies in the cases of security sector reform (Swiss 2011) and gender equality (Swiss 2012). In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which Canada’s aid allocation is marching in lock step with other donors and mimicking factors used by a wide range of other donors to determine such allocation. Looking at what other donors Canada is emulating at various points in time provides a better understanding of how mimicry reflects aid motives at a given point in time. Asking these questions using longitudinal analysis will help explain how both mimicry and motives shift over the longer term.

Keeping Up with the Joneses

7To examine Canadian aid allocation over time at the macro level, I compiled a network dataset of all bilateral aid flows included in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) QWIDS database from 1960 through 2010 (OECD 2013). This dataset captures the bilateral aid ties of all members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and a select few other donors with all recipient countries in each year over the fifty-year period. Examining the data using UCINet social network analysis software reveals patterns of the overall aid network at the global level, as well as for individual donors’ networks. The first part of my analysis relies on this full dataset to examine the Canadian bilateral aid network and how it compares to other DAC donors over time.

Figure 1. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 1960

Figure 1. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 1960

Figure 2. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 1985

Figure 2. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 1985

Figure 3. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 2010

Figure 3. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 2010

8Figures 1 through 3 depict the scope of Canada’s bilateral aid ties in 1960, 1985, and 2010, respectively. Every recipient country noted in the network diagram in a given year is a net positive recipient of Canadian bilateral ODA. Examining these network diagrams in isolation, one can simply conclude that the scope of Canadian aid widens significantly over the time period of my analysis. More detailed analysis of this sort of network data is possible, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is sufficient to note that every other bilateral donor in the world in a given year has a potentially similar network of aid ties that can be depicted in the same fashion.

9Using social network analysis tools, it is possible to take a single country’s network in a given year and compare it to every other donor’s network in the same year. Rather than examining every network diagram individually, one can quantify the aid ties of each donor and mathematically compare the similarity of each donor’s network. Many such measures of similarity exist, but in this analysis I opt to use the Jaccard coefficient as a measure of similarity. This coefficient reflects the percentage of all possible aid network ties that a pair of donors have in common in a given year. This measure incorporates both similar positive ties (both donors give) and similar negative ties (neither donor gives). An index ranging from 0 to 1 permits the comparison of any country’s network to every other donor, with values nearer to 1 reflecting the greatest similarity.

10By calculating Jaccard coefficients to measure the similarity of the Canadian aid network to all other DAC donors every five years over the period from 1960 to 2010, I map out which donor countries Canada most closely resembles in terms of aid allocation. Figure 4 depicts these coefficients in a heat map table: those countries most similar to Canada have a coefficient closer to 1 and are depicted in a darker shade of grey; countries most dissimilar to Canada have index scores closer to zero and are in lighter shades of grey. These measures indicate not only similarities in terms of countries Canada provides ODA to, but also those it does not.

Figure 4. Similarity of Canadian Aid Networks to Networks of Other Donors, 1960–2010 (Jaccard Coefficients)

Figure 4. Similarity of Canadian Aid Networks to Networks of Other Donors, 1960–2010 (Jaccard Coefficients)

Figure 4. (continued)

Figure 4. (continued)

11In the earlier period of my analysis, Canada clearly has a network of aid recipient countries that stood apart from those of many other donors, with only the UK and the US sharing more than half of network ties in common in 1965 and no countries sharing more than 80 percent of ties until 1990. The most similar comparator in the sample is seen in the year 2000, when Canada and the United Kingdom mirrored more than 88 percent of ties in their respective aid networks. In the most recent panel year, 2010, Canada’s network most closely resembles that of the United States. In earlier years, however, Canada’s pattern of aid allocation more closely resembled that of countries such as West Germany (1970), the Netherlands (1985), and Sweden (1995).

12What does it mean that, in its aid allocations, Canada resembles countries such as the UK, the US, Sweden, and the Netherlands more closely than countries such as France or Australia? One might expect Canada’s aid provision to parallel closely the UK and the US, given our past colonial and geographic ties. It would not be surprising, for instance, to see Canada and the UK providing aid to all the same countries in the Commonwealth. More curious, however, is the fact that in the 1980s and 1990s Canada’s aid network most closely resembled donors such as Sweden and the Netherlands. This speaks to an alignment of interests between Canada and these smaller donor countries – something commonly referred to as the “like-minded” group of donors, including Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Neumayer 2003). These donors have traditionally been seen to allocate aid based on recipient need and merit rather than in terms of donor political or commercial interests (Dreher et al. 2011). By emulating these like-minded donors in this period, Canadian aid motivations would more closely align with principles of humane internationalism.

13From 2000 onwards, the similarity of Canada’s aid network to those of this like-minded group diminishes. Instead, Canada’s aid appears to become more generic – more like that of a larger number of donors – as well as falling much more closely in line with American aid patterns. This might result from an overall intensification of the international aid regime in this period, or from pressures to standardize and harmonize aid practices (witness the Paris Declaration), but it might also speak more simply to shifting Canadian aid motivations. Reasons for this might be found in Canada’s shift in focus (at least rhetorically, see chapter by Macdonald and Ruckert in this volume) in the latter part of the 2000s to a greater focus on the Americas, but also may speak to a shift in attitude or first principles from those indicated by the like-minded group of donors in the 1980s and 1990s to a more self-interested form of aid by Canada in the 2000s. One need only look at Canada’s list of “countries of focus” to see how ties such as trade and political interest are informing our aid allocation in this period.

14Examining the similarity of the Canadian aid network over the fifty-year period shows that Canada has experienced a shift in which countries it most resembles in terms of aid allocation. Indeed, Canada has emulated several other donors in different periods. This is not surprising – the use of mimicry as an organizational tool has long been understood to play a role in bureaucracies and other institutions globally (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Having the most in common with the UK and the US in its early years as a donor, Canada then began to more closely parallel the like-minded group of donors, before again following a path where its aid allocation matched most closely the US and the UK. This preliminary analysis suggests that, rather than strike a maverick path of its own and allocate aid along a uniquely Canadian set of criteria, Canada has been a mimic over the years. To examine this further, I turn in the next section to a comparison of which recipient country factors serve as criteria to provide aid to a country and how Canada’s criteria compare to the criteria of the rest of the major Western donors.

Breadcrumbs and Yardsticks

15In this section, I use a subset of the larger dataset, encompassing the quantity of aid flows between Canada and all its recipient partner countries from 1960 to 2010, to determine which criteria are most closely associated with receiving Canadian aid over time and how these vary by period. A sample of 6,324 dyad years reflect all bilateral ODA flows between Canada and a recipient country partner in this period, illustrating the flow of Canadian aid to 148 different recipient countries. I then compare the same criteria to a sample of all other donor ties, as well as to four individual donors (Norway, Sweden, UK, and the US) in the same period, drawing from a sample of 68,775 dyad years. To assess the factors contributing to the presence of any aid ties, I employ a longitudinal analysis using random effects panel regression. This technique allows me to analyze the change in relationships between certain country factors and the level of ODA Canada or another donor provides to a given country in a given year, and how the effect of these factors on aid flows change over time.

16Along with the network data above on the presence or absence of Canadian and other bilateral ODA, I compiled additional variables used to measure the criteria/factors that contribute to the provision of aid. These variables were derived from extant data sources, including the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, the Polity IV database and the Correlates of War dataset (Marshall et al. 2009; Pevehouse et al. 2004; World Bank 2012). Measures incorporated into the models below include: the distance between Ottawa and recipient country capital cities; recipient country population; total trade between Canada and the recipient country; recipient country GDP per capita; total ODA received by a country; the Polity IV measure of autocracy/democracy; whether a recipient country was affected by disaster; and whether a recipient country was affected by intrastate conflict.

17Using a sub-sample of 3,587 country-years for which all data was available for Canada, I first model the effect of the above factors on the continuous measure of net dyadic ODA flows (millions of constant 2000 USD). I lag all independent variables five years to account for temporal priority and the time needed to plan and implement new aid programming. Table 1 shows the results of these models for the full sample (Model 1) and then for each decade from the 1970s onward (Models 2–5). The results show the effect of each covariate on dyadic aid flows between Canada and each recipient country.

Table 1. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Canadian Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

Table 1. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Canadian Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001

  • 1 I do not discuss the effects of the lagged dependent variable, as it is included in the models pri (...)

18Model 1 shows that in the full sample, several criteria are associated with an increased amount of aid flow between Canada and a recipient country. These include higher levels of existing ODA provided to the country by all donors, and a greater recipient country population.1 In contrast, only one factor decreases the odds of a country receiving Canadian aid: higher levels of economic development as measured by recipient country GDP per capita. Throughout the full fifty-year period of my study, Canada is likely to provide more aid to poorer, more populous countries, with a preference for donor darlings that receive more aid from other donors, all else being equal.

19Models 2 through 5 show how these criteria vary over the decades. A few interesting patterns emerge when the various time periods are taken into account. No criterion is statistically significant in its association with aid provision in all decades. In the 1970s, more democratic states were likely to receive more aid, while wealthier countries received less. In the 1980s, only larger population and total aid received are associated with higher levels of aid from Canada. The 1990s model shows only the effect of conflict on Canada’s aid: those countries in conflict would receive on average $3 million less in aid than those at peace. Finally, in the 2000s, the only factor significantly associated with dyadic aid flows is the level of a country’s economic development. Overall, these results show little consistency over time for the factors determining Canadian aid, but raise the question of how these factors compare to other donors overall and over time.

  • 2 Full model results for each of these donors can be found in Appendix Tables A1–A4.

20Does Canada employ the same aid allocation criteria as the rest of the donor community? Figure 5 compares Canada’s results on five measures from Table 1 to identical analyses for Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US for the same period of time.2 Figure 5 shows the calculated coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for each factor when all other variables are held constant. Coefficients significant at the p<0.05 level are labelled. Comparing Canada’s results in this manner reveals which donors Canada resembles in a given period in terms of the factors shaping Canada’s aid allocation and volumes. The figure illustrates the statistically significant factors Canada shares in common with other donors, and the factors that are not significantly associated with aid allocation. In the 1970s, for several donors, including Canada, the only factor increasing aid flows is the Polity IV score, which measures levels of democracy and autocracy. All five donors in this period provided more aid to more democratic recipient countries. Several other factors increase other donors’ aid flows at various points in the analysis, but Canada has none of them in common with other donors – suggesting a diversity of motives within the comparison group. In contrast, the only factor Canada appears to have in common with other donors in reducing aid flows is recipient country GDP per capita, evident both in the full sample and in the 2000s.

Figure 5. Comparison of Determinants of Foreign Aid Flows, Five Donors

Figure 5. Comparison of Determinants of Foreign Aid Flows, Five Donors

Millions of dyadic aid flows (constant 2000 USD)
● Canada191 Norway190 Sweden112 UK207 USA
* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001

21Counterintuitively, one can make the argument that Canada shares in the non-effects of several determinants of their aid flows with other donors. Trade levels and disasters seem to have little consistent effect on any of these donors’ aid flows. Apart from the UK, democracy has no measureable effect in all time periods aside from the 1970s. In terms of conflict, the evidence is mixed, with some donors providing greater aid to conflict countries at various points, but with Canada reducing aid in this instance in the 1990s. This suggests one can infer common motives through the absence of an effect of these factors – simply put, these factors did not shape Canadian or other donor aid flows to such an extent that the correlations are statistically significant.

22Comparing Canada to the other donors reveals two interesting conclusions about the factors that contribute to Canadian provision of aid to a country. First, the only consistent factor over time appears to be a country’s level of economic development. The poorer a country, the more aid it will receive. This holds for both Canada and the majority of the donors in my sample. In this sense, Canada is following the pack and providing aid along the lines of helping those most in economic need. Likewise, Canada resembles other donors in terms of what appears not to matter: trade, democracy, disaster, and conflict – none of these factors are robustly associated with multiple donors’ aid allocation over time.

23These results suggest that Canada is similar to the rest of the donor community in terms of the criteria affecting its decisions to maintain an aid relationship with a developing country. There is no massive discrepancy between the Canadian and other donor models, except that in the full sample Norway appears to take a more principled humanitarian stance, favouring those countries recovering from disaster and conflict. Emulating much of what is seen in the rest of the donor community, Canada’s motives echo those of other comparable donors.

What Does Mimicry Say about Motives?

24My findings suggest that, though the donors Canada has most closely resembled have varied over time, its patterns of aid allocation show that mimicry plays a strong role in shaping its aid programs. Indeed, since 1995, the extent to which Canada’s aid network closely resembles other donors is on the increase. These similarities speak to motive behind Canada’s provision of aid, in the sense that different donors carry reputations – deserved or not – for providing aid on a continuum of motives from realist national interest to humane internationalism. Analyzing Canada’s changing aid allocation patterns reveals that, although there was a time in the 1980s and 1990s when Canada’s aid allocation was most similar to the more humanitarian-oriented group of like-minded donors, that era has passed. Since 2000, the UK and the US have been the donors with which its aid allocation is most aligned – donors more closely associated with more realist interests.

25This finding suggests a possible shift in the first principles of Canadian aid away from helping the neediest in an altruistic fashion to a more self-interested or commercially driven form of aid. Yet, in my cross-national analysis of the criteria most closely associated with the provision of Canadian aid, the self-interested factors seem less central. Indeed, none of trade, democracy, or conflict reduction featured as key factors explaining Canada’s aid flows in the full sample of Canada’s aid from 1965 to 2010.

26This raises a possible contradiction or limitation within my study. The assumption that I can discern motive or principles from Canada’s aid allocation based on which countries its aid network is most similar to takes for granted that Canada would be aiding recipient countries for the same motives as other donors in each case. This may not be valid. Perhaps Canada provides aid to a given country not because of a past colonial tie or a high level of trade between countries, but instead purely out of recipient need. These sorts of contradictions are more difficult to discern at the macro level and require a more detailed country-by-country micro-level analysis to flesh out specific motives. Still, my study, though exploratory, sheds new light on Canadian aid allocation over time and how that allocation helps explain the first principles of Canadian aid.

27Though that is not a satisfying conclusion in terms of identifying any one motive underpinning Canadian aid, this chapter provides definitive empirical evidence of the shifting and varied nature of the motives of Canadian aid over time and how they can be discerned through examining which donors Canada resembles. By showing that Canada has mimicked other donors at different points by allocating aid based on different criteria, I have revealed new patterns of how Canada has positioned itself as a donor vis-à-vis other donor countries. The value of a long period of study with a larger number of data points, as employed in this chapter, is that, unlike the short-term cross-sectional approach more common to the Canadian aid literature, it shows how the patterns of allocation and the factors that shape aid flows are in flux. This chapter also reveals that, in spite of Canada’s mimicry of other donors and shifting from a more humanitarian set of donors to those motivated by self-interest, the evidence of realist motives shaping aid flows at the recipient country level is less clear. It is this contradictory and dynamic aspect of Canadian aid programs and allocation that will require future researchers to continue to undertake crucial empirical analysis – even of the exploratory kind – using a wide array of data over a long period of time. Only by examining Canada’s aid programs over the long term can something that might appear static be recast as a phenomenon that is dynamic. The fact that the donors Canada mimics have changed frequently over the past fifty years is perhaps not surprising, but the ability to discern the shifts in motives that changing aid allocation patterns suggest is a valuable contribution to expanding our understanding of Canadian aid.

Appendix – Table A1. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Norwegian Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

Appendix – Table A1. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Norwegian Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001

Appendix – Table A2. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Swedish Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

Appendix – Table A2. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Swedish Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001

Appendix – Table A3. Random Effects Models of Determinants of British Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

Appendix – Table A3. Random Effects Models of Determinants of British Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001

Appendix – Table A4. Random Effects Models of Determinants of American Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

Appendix – Table A4. Random Effects Models of Determinants of American Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010

* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001

Bibliographie

References

Action Aid. 2010. Real Aid: Ending Aid Dependency. London: Action Aid.

Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 5, no. 1: 33–63.

Brown, Stephen. 2007. “‘Creating the World’s Best Development Agency’? Confusion and Contradictions in CIDA’s New Development Policy.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. 28, no. 2: 203–18.

Clist, Paul. 2011. “25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity?” World Development, vol. 39, no. 10: 1724–34.

DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review, vol. 48, no. 2: 147–60.

Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele. 2011. “Are ‘New’ Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries.” World Development, vol. 39, no. 11: 1950–68.

Gulrajani, Nilima. 2010. “Re-imagining Canadian Development Co-operation: A Comparative Examination of Norway and the UK.” Toronto: Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation.

Lumsdaine, David Halloran. 1993. Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Macdonald, Ryan, and John Hoddinott. 2004. “Determinants of Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations: Humanitarian, Commercial or Political?” Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 37, no. 2: 294–312.

Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers, and Ted R. Gurr. 2009. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2007.” Electronic Dataset. Center for Systemic Peace.

McGill, Hunter. 2012. “Canada among Donors: How Does Canadian Aid Compare?” In Stephen Brown, ed. Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid. Montreal and Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press: 24–52

Morrison, David R. 1994. “The Choice of Bilateral Aid Recipients.” In Cranford Pratt, ed. Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press: 123–55.

Morrison, David R. 1998. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Neumayer, Eric. 2003. The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance. London: Routledge.

Noël, Alain, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Sébastien Dallaire. 2004. “Divided over Internationalism: The Canadian Public and Development Assistance.” Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques, vol. 30, no. 1: 29–46.

OECD. 2013. “QWIDS: Query Wizard for International Development Statistics.” Paris: OECD. Internet, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Accessed August 10, 2013.

Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2004. “The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 21, no. 2: 101–19.

Pratt, Cranford. 1994a. “Canadian Development Assistance: A Profile.” In Cranford Pratt, ed. Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press: 3–24.

Pratt, Cranford. 1994b. “Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development Assistance Policies.” In Cranford Pratt, ed. Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press: 334–70.

Pronk, Jan P. 2001. “Aid as a Catalyst.” Development and Change, vol. 32, no. 4: 611–29.

Schraeder, Peter J., Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor. 1998. “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows.” World Politics, vol. 50, no. 2: 294–323.

Sumner, Andy. 2012. “Where Do the Poor Live?” World Development, vol. 40, no. 5: 865–77.

Swiss, Liam. 2011. “Security Sector Reform and Development Assistance: Explaining the Diffusion of Policy Priorities Among Donor Agencies.” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 34, no. 2: 371–93.

Swiss, Liam. 2012a. “The Adoption of Women and Gender as Development Assistance Priorities: An Event History Analysis of World Polity Effects.” International Sociology, vol. 27, no. 1: 96–119.

Swiss, Liam. 2012b. “Gender, Security, and Instrumentalism: Canada’s Foreign Aid in Support of National Interest?” In Stephen Brown, ed. Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid. Montreal and Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press: 135–58.

Thérien, Jean-Philippe, and Alain Noël. 1994. “Welfare Institutions and Foreign Aid: Domestic Foundations of Canadian Foreign Policy.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 3: 529–58.

Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. Nielson, Darren G. Hawkins, J. Timmons Roberts, Michael G. Findley, Ryan M. Powers, Bradley Parks, Sven E. Wilson, and Robert L. Hicks. 2011. “More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData.” World Development, vol. 39, no. 11: 1891–1906.

Woods, Ngaire. 2005. “The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid.” International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 2: 393–409.

World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Notes

1 I do not discuss the effects of the lagged dependent variable, as it is included in the models primarily to account for serial autocorrelation from year to year.

2 Full model results for each of these donors can be found in Appendix Tables A1–A4.

Table des illustrations

Titre Figure 1. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 1960
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 155k
Titre Figure 2. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 1985
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 340k
Titre Figure 3. Canadian Aid Recipient Network, 2010
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 326k
Titre Figure 4. Similarity of Canadian Aid Networks to Networks of Other Donors, 1960–2010 (Jaccard Coefficients)
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-4.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 283k
Titre Figure 4. (continued)
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-5.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 225k
Titre Table 1. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Canadian Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010
Légende * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-6.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 181k
Titre Figure 5. Comparison of Determinants of Foreign Aid Flows, Five Donors
Légende Millions of dyadic aid flows (constant 2000 USD)● Canada191 Norway190 Sweden112 UK207 USA* < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-7.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 164k
Titre Appendix – Table A1. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Norwegian Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010
Légende * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-8.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 343k
Titre Appendix – Table A2. Random Effects Models of Determinants of Swedish Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010
Légende * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-9.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 196k
Titre Appendix – Table A3. Random Effects Models of Determinants of British Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010
Légende * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-10.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 347k
Titre Appendix – Table A4. Random Effects Models of Determinants of American Bilateral ODA Flows, 1965–2010
Légende * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/127/img-11.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 183k

Auteur

Assistant Professor of Sociology at Memorial University. His research examines foreign aid, international development, globalization, and gender and has appeared in journals such as American Sociological Review, International Sociology, and Social Forces. His current research project examines the global foreign aid network and aid’s role in the diffusion of global norms and policy models. He is a past President of the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development (CASID) and worked previously at the Canadian International Development Agency on Canada’s aid program to Pakistan

© Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa | University of Ottawa Press, 2015

Conditions d’utilisation : http://www.openedition.org/6540