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Sylvie Perrier

12 – The Politics of Sources and Definitions

Cristina Bradatan

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Theory of Demographic Transition

1Demographic transition is a well-known theory in demography, and it is still considered one that is “alive” (Hirschman, 1994). The ideas of a changing demographic pattern as societies modernize appeared sometime at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Among the first who gave a shape to this theory were Notenstein (1953) and Davis (1963). They observed that fertility and mortality decreased in most of the industrialized world and noted the relationships between these demographic phenomena and some other components of social life, such as modernization and economic development. The classical form of demographic transition states that industrialization and urbanization created the new ideal of the small family. An increasing level of women’s education, a lower pressure for traditional behaviour, and a growing cost of rearing children were among the main factors which permitted the emergence of this new ideal of family. Another version of demographic transition theory-Davis’ theory of change and response (Davis, 1963)-explains the change in fertility as an effect of population pressure that resulted from a decrease in mortality. The population can respond to this pressure through migration, by decreasing fertility, or by using both of these methods.

2Demographic transition theory, with its various versions, initially created a lot of excitement among researchers, and for a number of years there were few voices criticizing it. That was a time when little empirical data was available so it was almost impossible to falsify it. However, during the 1960s, more data became available, and contradictory results appeared. Leasure, for example, found out that the decline of fertility in Spain was not a simple result of increasing levels of urbanization and education and changes in occupational structure (Coale, 1986: xx). Other researchers showed that countries at various economic levels shared a similar pattern of declining marital fertility: “They [Iskandar and Knodel] found a somewhat puzzling pattern in which the timing of the decline in marital fertility in England and in Hungary was only slightly different, despite the very different levels of education, mortality and stage of industrialization in the two countries. Another puzzling parallel in marital fertility occurred in Norway and Rumania” (Ibid).

3In 1963, the Princeton Population Office, together with other research units from Western Europe, began to put together and analyze data regarding the fertility transition in Europe. The conclusions of this project showed that the decline in fertility cannot be related to economic development in a straightforward manner because the interaction level between people from different regions plays an important role. Regions that shared a common language tended to behave similarly with respect to fertility decline, and their behaviour was different from those who did not share the same languages (Watkins, 1991: 7). Some other factors, such as the economic circumstances and the moral milieus of the household, also had an influence on the pace of the fertility decline (Lesthaeghe and Wilson, 1986: 272).

4The period prior to the Princeton Fertility Project was, probably, the highest point attained by the demographic transition theory. Then, the fall began: several researchers began to criticize the theory from various points of view. Some adjustments to, or replacements of, demographic transition theory appeared, and some of them were quite successful. Despite these critics, demographic transition theory is still a useful tool because it synthesizes well the demographic evolutions of the last hundreds of years. Hirschman (1994) argues that demographic transition theory needs to improve by getting more “flesh,” that is, it has to be discussed more in particular contexts, taking into account the society’s life in a certain period. Even if all regions did not evolve in a similar way, all modern societies decreased their fertility and mortality levels. Modernization may not have played the most important role. Maybe other factors are more important, but only studies done in particular cases can show which were relevant.

Eastern Europe from the Demographic Transition Perspective

5There is a generally human, permanent need for grouping things together in order to understand them. It is a truism to say that this need manifests itself in the study of Eastern Europe, too. The 1990s political changes in the Communist Bloc ruled out the nicely packaged idea of a world divided into East and West, communist and capitalist, or centralized and free-market economies. There is no longer a clear-cut manner of grouping together the former communist countries; some of them are now rich and became part of the European Union, whereas others are still poor and hardly surviving the transition to a free-market system. So some other way of grouping these countries must be employed. This is one of the reasons why former “Eastern Europe” has been replaced by “Central Europe,” “Balkan region,” or “Southeastern Europe.” The idea of Central Europe directly related to the former Habsburg Empire is relatively old, but was resurrected in the 1970s in an attempt to make people aware of the significant differences between Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other. The “Balkan” nations seemed to share only the fate of having been, for some 100 years, vassals of the Ottoman Empire, and renowned as a “barbarous” region especially during the Balkan War at the beginning of the twentieth century.

6Although it is not always obvious which nations belong to which region, and many of the Balkan countries refuse to be considered Balkan, it is generally accepted that Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece belong to the Balkan region. Some studies have also included Hungary in the Balkans (Todorova, 1997), although in the case of Hungary there are good reasons to consider it as part of Central Europe. The inclusion of Greece in the same group with some former communist countries makes the discussion about the Balkans particularly interesting. Greece was never part of the Communist Bloc so its “likeness” to the other countries from the region could only be a result of having been part of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, it would be problematic to affirm that fifty years of completely different historical courses did not affect the alleged resemblance between Greece and the former communist countries from the Balkan Peninsula.

  • 1 The following states were part of Warsaw Pact: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Po (...)

7In the following, I will use Eastern Europe for countries that belonged during the Cold War to Warsaw Pact,1 because this was the initial meaning of this term throughout much of the Cold War. Some statistics include the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In such cases, I was not able to distinguish between USSR and Eastern Europe, but I do note if both are included. Most of the statistics do not include Eastern Germany after reunification.

8Generally speaking, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans in particular, are rather unstudied areas from the point of view of historical fertility changes. The focus of the Princeton Fertility Project was on Western Europe because fertility began to decline there. The statistics published by the Princeton Fertility Project on Eastern Europe are mainly results of computations using a model for a stable population (Coale, 1986: 170).

9For Romania, for example, the Princeton Project used data for 1899, 1930, and 1956 and they were adjusted for under registration using the West model of stable population with life expectancy at birth equal to forty-five. (Ibid: 173) Definitions of the regions are missing from the conclusions of the Princeton Fertility Project, and this is very important because regions often changed their boundaries in this part of the world. Dobrogea, for example, a South Eastern region in Romania, had a different configuration before and after 1918 as a result of incorporating Cadrilater, a former part of Bulgaria inhabited mainly by Bulgarians and those of Turkish origin.

  • * GDP levels are measured using a standardized currency (Geary-Khamis dollars) which permits compari (...)
  • ** Eastern Europe includes Russia

Graph 1.1 GDP* per capita, Eastern Europe** versus Western Europe

Graph 1.1 GDP* per capita, Eastern Europe** versus Western Europe

Source: Angus Madison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995), 56

  • 2 For example, Şerbu (2000) showed the fertility decline in Romania was not a result of a decline in (...)

10Fertility evolved very differently in Eastern than Western Europe (for instance, the fertility decline began later, but the decline was shaper). Moreover, the relationships between fertility decline and other population phenomena are not easily understandable.2 As such, the studies done in Western Europe cannot be simply used for the eastern part of Europe.

11Historically, Eastern Europe was poorer than the Western part of the continent, and the difference in wealth between the two regions increased during the first part of the twentieth century (Graph 1.1).

12During the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries, population increased at a higher rate in Eastern than in Western Europe, mainly because of a higher rate of fertility in Eastern European countries. Although at the beginning of the 1800s, there were fewer people living in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, by 1870 Eastern Europe was more populated than Western Europe (Graph 1.2).

  • * Eastern Europe includes Russia

Graph 1.2 Population in Eastern and Western Europe, 1820-1950*

Graph 1.2 Population in Eastern and Western Europe, 1820-1950*

Source: Madison, Monitoring the World Economy, 56

13In comparison with Western Europe, Eastern Europe began to record a decrease in fertility relatively late, and several explanations were advanced for why this happened. One of them is related to poverty which resulted from lack of modernization; as Graph 1.1 shows, Western Europe was always richer than the eastern part of the continent. A second explanation refers to the different types of families in Eastern and Western Europe. Although demographers talk about the existence of a “European pattern of family,” they always refer to Western Europe. Eastern Europeans seem to have historically a different type of family relationship, one similar to the Asian model.

14Hajnal agues that the Western European pattern of household formation is a very particular case, completely different than that in all other parts of the world. This pattern emerged earlier than the seventeenth century and it is characterized by late marriage for both sexes (over 26 for men and over 23 for women) and separate households for married couples (separate from the parents’ household) (Hajnal, 1982: 452).Children from poor and landless families were sent, at a certain age, to be servants in another household; after they saved enough money they married and established households separate from their parents.

15Eastern European populations are described as having a joint household system. Men and women married early (the mean age for men being around 26 and for women 21), started life in the household of an older couple and, after a while, a household with too many incorporated couples split into two or more households. This system of family helped fertility to remain at a high level, while the Western European system was an impediment to having many children. Hajnal uses data from the 1787 Hungarian census as proof of the existence of such a system (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Households in 1787

Population (000s)

Persons per Household

Married Men per household

Hungary Proper

6,085

5.22

1.05

Transylvania

1,372

5.03

1.03

Croatia

617

833

1.7

61 "Free Royal Cities"

485

4.45

0.84

Source: John Hajnal, “Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household Formation Systems,” Population and Development Review 8, no. 3 (1982): 469

16Although Hajnal’s ideas are still very popular, other researchers presented different arguments. Sklar (1970) discusses some of the problems in establishing a “family pattern” for Eastern European countries. The geographic criterion is not a very good one for classifying and describing populations, especially in regions where the populations are very different with respect to history and culture. Eastern Europe, she says, does not seem to have been a coherent and homogeneous region from a demographic point of view. If we look only to the percentage of never-married women in various countries of Eastern Europe, it can be seen that heterogeneity rather than homogeneity characterizes the region. The percentage of never-married females is, for example, much higher in Poland than in other Eastern European populations (Table 1.2).

17Age at marriage also varies between countries. As Table 1.3 shows, regions such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland had a high age at marriage for males as well as for females, and their pattern is more similar to Sweden and England than to Romania and Serbia, for example.

Table 1.2 Percentage of Never-Married Women in Selected Eastern European Countries

Table 1.2 Percentage of Never-Married Women in Selected Eastern European Countries

Source: June Sklar, “The Role of Marriage Behavior in the Demographic Transition: The Case of Eastern Europe around 1900,” Population Studies 28, no. 2 (1974): 234

18Such data led Sklar to believe that the Eastern European countries did not have a single type of family system. At least two different types of families characterized this region. Balkan countries were characterized by the existence of zadruga, an “extended household of two or more nuclear families related by blood or adoption owning land, livestock, and tools in common, and sharing a common livelihood and residence” (Sklar, 1974: 235), while the other countries outside the Balkan peninsula had a more ‘Western’ type of family system.

19Religion is considered an important factor in shaping households in Eastern European countries. Balkan countries are mostly Eastern Orthodox and Muslim, but Czechs and Poles are Catholic and Lutheran. For the Catholics, Sklar says, the church competes with kin authority because, by asking those who become priests and nuns to not marry, family and marriage are devalued. On the other hand, Islam and the Eastern Orthodox Church proved favourable to extended kinship because they do not have a separate or celibate clergy or a Church organization that can rival kinship (Sklar, 1974: 237). Czech, Baltic, and Polish regions were also characterized at the beginning of the century by high out-migration (about 130,000 between 1900 and 1914), which was much higher than Balkan countries’ emigration (around 8,000). Sklar argues that this out-migration also has an important impact on the supply of mates for marriage. A rural woman who could not find a mate would go to work in the town, so she would often deliberately postpone marriage.

20Botev (1990) focuses intensively on Sklar’s arguments when he discusses characteristics of the family system and fertility evolution in Balkan countries during the twentieth century. He advanced another hypothesis for why fertility declined later in Eastern Europe (especially the Balkans) than in Western Europe. The most important feature of the fertility transition in the Balkan countries, he says, is a much faster decline in fertility than in Western Europe, despite the relatively low economic development of the Balkan countries.

Table 1.3 Age at Marriage for Regions of Eastern Europe

Table 1.3 Age at Marriage for Regions of Eastern Europe

Source: Sklar, “The Role of Marriage Behavior in the Demographic Transition,” 233

21The rhythm of fertility decline is somewhere between the pace of Western European countries and those of Asia. On the other hand, during the demographic transition, the Balkans had a high rate of population growth, much higher than in the rest of Europe (with the exception of Russia)-between 12-15 per 1,000, and sometimes over 20 per 1,000 (Botev, 1990: 121). Botev thinks that, after the liberation of Balkan countries from the Turks’ domination, a lot of land began to become available to the native people (land which was previously owned by the Turks). This permitted them, for a while, to have many children without falling into poverty. However, land eventually grew scarce and in the absence of an out-migration tradition, people limited their births drastically. Although this explanation is interesting and very original, it is sustained only with data for Bulgaria, and it cannot be applied to other countries that did not have similar conditions (in Romania, for example, where Turks did not have land because it was only a vassal country).

22On several points, Botev does not agree with Sklar’s ideas. First, he is not convinced that zadruga was a frequently encountered type of family in the Balkans. He argues that zadruga was proven to exist only in a very limited territory of the former Yugoslavia and the western part of Bulgaria (Botev, 1990: 112) and, even there, nuclear families were not rare. Hammel shows that between 40 and 82 per cent of the families in different samples of the west Balkan population (regions where zadruga was considered to be predominant) were nuclear. Botev emphasizes that even if the people did not live in the same house, the proximity of the families made the familial relationships very strong. These strong kinship relations allowed people to marry young and have many children but did not require the existence of zadruga.

23Sklar’s arguments regarding religion (Muslim and Eastern Orthodox) as playing an important role in maintaining higher fertility levels in the Balkans in comparison with other European regions are also rejected by Botev. Using data on the average size of households in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Table 1.4), he shows it was larger for Catholics than for Muslims in all regions, thus suggesting that a higher percentage of Muslims in the Balkans cannot explain the higher fertility. However, he thinks that religion played an important role in the sharp decrease of fertility in the Balkans during the twentieth century. The Orthodox Church, Botev says, has a much more liberal ethical conception than the Roman Catholic Church by placing primary responsibility on the husband and wife for making conscientious decisions about birth control (Botev, 1990).

Table 1.4 Mean Household Size in the Provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1870

Table 1.4 Mean Household Size in the Provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1870

Source: Nikolai Botev, “Nuptiality in the Course of the Demographic Transition: The Experience of the Balkan Countries,” Population Studies 44, no. 1, (1990): 116

24In 1986, Jean Claude Chesnais published The Demographic Transition in which he tracked such change in sixty-seven countries from 1720-1984. He argues that in European countries there were several types of demographic transition. Romania, Bulgaria, and the former USSR are included in the same group, characterized by very high levels of pre-transitional growth, a rapid mortality decline, fairly high maximum levels of natural increase and a very short demographic transition of seventy years (Chesnas, 1986: 251). Central Europe (including Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Poland) experienced a plateau of growth which was: (1) later than in northern Europe; 2) centred around 1900; and 3) relatively brief (only ten to twenty years) (Ibid., 1992: 231). Chesnais’ work is impressive because he provides an immense volume of data, but it is not always very clear what sources he uses. For example, he includes statistics about fertility in Romania during the Second World War, although during that time there were no demographic or economic statistics recorded in Romania.

Demographic Transition in Romanian Provinces

25Data referring to the evolution of fertility in Romanian regions are mainly provided by the various censuses taken during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Valachia and Moldavia, censuses were taken in 1860, 1899, 1912, and 1938. For Transylvania there are two censuses that are mostly used: 1910 and 1930. However, not all these censuses recorded the number of children in the household, and there are good reasons to believe the data is not very accurate (Chesnais, 1992).

26Most of the studies argue that the fertility decline in Romania began after the First World War, and attained replacement level around 1950. The decline of fertility followed the decline of mortality that began around 1880. However, until around 1920, the decrease in the birth rate was less than ten per cent from the initial rate so, as also indicated in the Princeton Fertility Project, the fertility transition had not begun. Other authors (Ghetau, 1997) contend that the decline in fertility began around 1885, much earlier than is commonly believed.

27The studies done on this area do not show how much heterogeneity existed in the Romanian territories. Romania, as all other countries from Eastern Europe, changed boundaries many times during 1850-1950. Actually, until 1859 there was no Romania, only separate regions where the majority of the population spoke Romanian: Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, Besserabia and Bukovina. The first two regions were vassals of the Ottoman Empire; Transylvania, and Bukovina were Austro-Hungarian provinces; and Bessarabia was part of the Russian Empire. In 1859, Moldavia and Wallachia were unified and formed Romania (usually called the “Old Kingdom”). In 1918-1919, the other three regions joined the first two. A part of Bulgaria (Cadrilater) also became part of Romania. However, during the Second World War, Bukovina and Besserabia became parts of USSR; Besserabia remained part of USSR until 1990 when it became part of the Republic of Moldova.

28Therefore, when one talks about fertility transition in Romania it is essential to be precise. Does this mean present-day Romanian territory? Romania at the beginning of the century? Some studies refer to nowadays Romania (Ghetau, 1997), while other authors use for each period whatever Romania meant at that time (Chesnais, 1992). Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. For the first method the most important disadvantage is the lack of appropriate data. The second method can give very biased results because the changes in territory added or took apart very heterogeneous populations. To give only one example, after 1918 four new territories were added to the “Old Kingdom” of Romania: Transylvania, Bukovina, Besserabia, and Cadrilater. The new territories added many minorities too, so that by 1930, nearly one-third of the population was Hungarian, German, and Jewish. Table 1.5 presents the composition of the Romanian population for “new” and “old” territories in 1930.

Table 1.5 Population by Ethnicity (Selected Ethnic Groups) in the New and Old Territories, 1930

Table 1.5 Population by Ethnicity (Selected Ethnic Groups) in the New and Old Territories, 1930

Source: Romanian Yearbook, 1935-1936: 38

29The new territories had, in some cases, more than half of the population with a non-Romanian ethnicity. This is not a problem for studying changes in fertility if different ethnicities had a similar fertility behaviour. However, this was not the case for Romanian provinces. As Table 1.6 shows, the ethnic profile of a region shapes fertility behaviour. The average general fertility rate (the number of live births per 1,000 females between the ages of 15 and 44) for areas with a Romanian majority was, in 1932, 190.4 for old territories and 175.0 for new territories. The average for areas with a Hungarian majority was 142.8 and 112.7 for areas with a German majority.

Table 1.6 General Fertility Rate for Districts Where the Majority has a Certain Ethnicity, 1932

Districts where the majority are:

, General Fertility Rate

Romanians

190.4

Germans

142.8

Hungarians

112.7

Ukrainians

132.4

Bulgarians

216.5

Turks

243.4-

Source: D.C. Georgescu, La fertilité différentielle en Roumanie (București: Institutul Centra] de Statisticâ, 1940), 16

30In conclusion, the Eastern European demographic transition had different characteristics for Balkan countries and Central European countries. Central European countries followed closely the Western European pattern of demographic transition (Chesnais, 1992: 231). However the Balkan countries began the transition later, and the decrease in fertility was sharper than in Western Europe. The demographic transition was also shorter in the Balkans than in Western Europe. As data for Romanian regions show, a deeper study of what happened in Eastern Europe has to take into account that various populations living in the same region have different demographic transition patterns, and that changes in regional boundaries that occurred several times during the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries strongly affect the viability of studies.

Bibliographie

References

Botev, Nikolai. 1990. “Nuptiality in the Course of the Demographic Transition: The Experience of the Balkan Countries,” Population Studies 44 no. 1, 107-26.

Bucur, M. 2002. Eugenics and Moderniization in Interwar Romania, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Carlson, Elwood, Meguni Omori. 1998. “Fertility Regulations in a Declining State Socialist Economy: Bulgaria, 1976-1995,” International Family Planning Perspectives 24, no. 3, 184-87.

Chesnais, Jean Claude. 1992. The Demographic Transition. Stages, Patterns, and Economic Implications. A Longitudinal Study of Sixty-Seven Countries Covering the Period 1720-1984. Translated by Elisabeth and Philip Kreager. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coale, A.J. and S.C. Watkins, ed., 1986. The Decline of Fertility in Europe. The Revised Proceedings of a Conference on the Princeton European Fertility Project. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Costa-Foru, Xenia. 1945. Cercetarea monográfica a familiei. Bucuresti: Fundatia Regele Mihai I.

Davis, Kingsley. 1963. “The Theory of Change and Response in Modem Demographic History,” Population Index 29, no. 4, 345-366.

Georgescu, D.C. 1940. La fertilité différentielle en Roumanie. București: Institutul Central de Statisticâ.

Ghetau, V. 1997. Evolutia fertilitatii in Romania. De la transversal la longitudinal. Bucuresti: CIDE.

Hajnal, John. 1982. “Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household Formation Systems,” Population and Development Review 8, no. 3, 449-94.

Hirschman, Charles. 1994. “Why Fertility Changes,” Annual Review of Sociology 20, 203-33.

Hitchins, Keith. 1994. Rumania 1866-1947. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lesthaeghe, Ron and Chris Wilson. 1986. “Modes of Production, Secularization, and the Pace of the Fertility Decline in Western Europe, 1870-1930,” The Decline of Fertility in Europe. The Revised Proceedings of a Conference on the Princeton European Fertility Project. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Madison, Angus. 1995. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Paris: OECD.

Serbu, G.R. 2000. “Evolutia fertilitâtii populatiei feminine din R.P.R. in perioada 1900-1960,” Populatie şi societate 4-5, 2-9.

Sklar, June. 1974. “The Role of Marriage Behavior in the Demographic Transition: The Case of Eastern Europe around 1900,” Population Studies 28, no. 2, 231-47.

Stahl, Paul H. 2000. Triburi si Sate din Sud-Estul Europei. Bucuresti: Paideia.

Todorova, Maria N. 1993. Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern: Demographic Developments in Ottoman Bulgaria. Washington: American University Press.

Watkins, Susan. 1991. From Provinces into Nations: Demographic Integration in Western Europe, 1870-1960. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Notes

1 The following states were part of Warsaw Pact: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania.

2 For example, Şerbu (2000) showed the fertility decline in Romania was not a result of a decline in nuptiality, because nuptiality actually increased after 1900.

Notes de fin

* GDP levels are measured using a standardized currency (Geary-Khamis dollars) which permits comparisons between countries

** Eastern Europe includes Russia

* Eastern Europe includes Russia

Table des illustrations

Titre Graph 1.1 GDP* per capita, Eastern Europe** versus Western Europe
Légende Source: Angus Madison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995), 56
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/1078/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 48k
Titre Graph 1.2 Population in Eastern and Western Europe, 1820-1950*
Légende Source: Madison, Monitoring the World Economy, 56
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/1078/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 47k
Titre Table 1.2 Percentage of Never-Married Women in Selected Eastern European Countries
Légende Source: June Sklar, “The Role of Marriage Behavior in the Demographic Transition: The Case of Eastern Europe around 1900,” Population Studies 28, no. 2 (1974): 234
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/1078/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 71k
Titre Table 1.3 Age at Marriage for Regions of Eastern Europe
Légende Source: Sklar, “The Role of Marriage Behavior in the Demographic Transition,” 233
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/1078/img-4.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 233k
Titre Table 1.4 Mean Household Size in the Provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1870
Légende Source: Nikolai Botev, “Nuptiality in the Course of the Demographic Transition: The Experience of the Balkan Countries,” Population Studies 44, no. 1, (1990): 116
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/1078/img-5.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 80k
Titre Table 1.5 Population by Ethnicity (Selected Ethnic Groups) in the New and Old Territories, 1930
Légende Source: Romanian Yearbook, 1935-1936: 38
URL http://books.openedition.org/uop/docannexe/image/1078/img-6.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 33k

Auteur

Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Central Florida. Her areas of interest are ethnicity, migration, and family dynamic in Eastern Europe

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