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Protest and Punishment

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Gérard Delechelle

Aspects de la protestation anti-nucléaire

Intellectuals, Protest and Nuclear Weapons: the dons of war

Stephen Kirby

Texte intégral

  • 1 Set "Intellectuals", The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, (London, Fontana Books, 1977), pp. 3 (...)

1However one may cefin intellectuals, an "culture-beaters", as "critically" thinking individuals" or, more generally, as the custodians of the traditions of creative and critical thinking1, it is clear that there have been substantial changes in the organisation and nature of intellectual life in the twentieth century. During the First World War intellectuals were increasingly involved in support of, and in opposition to both governments and the state and this trend has continued and intensified. At the same time there has been the development of new technical and scientfic skills of a highly specialist nature which have contrasted strongly with the more philosophical and generalist skills of earlier generations of intellectuals. The active involvement of intellectuals in the great political issues of the day and the distinction between the new scientific intellectual and the more traditional philosophical intellectual have been expressed nowhere more clearly than in the contemporary "nuclear debate".

The Intellectual and Politics

  • 2 Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intelectuals, (New York, William Morrow, 1928), pp. 29-37. There a (...)
  • 3 Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Kan of Knowledge, (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 19G8), p. (...)

2The growing involvement of the intellectual in the affairs of: the state has been cormtented upon by many authors. Julien Benda in his book La Trahison des clercs notes that intellectuals such as philosophers, men of religion and artists had traditionally been "strangers to political passion" and had acted as a restraint upon governments, but that from the end of the 19th century they began to play the political game and to introduce "political passion" into their work. This, for Benda, was the "treason of the intellectuals" which finally expressed itself in the support of the "clercs" for the strong state.2 Florian Znaniecki in his study of the social role of the man of knowledge has also noted that "Kings, [and] war lords… have been using experts for many centuries", but that the work of "experts" was limited because their role was defined by the interests of their sponsors and the results of their research had to be known in advance to be relevant to the practical tasks of the political leader. The role of technical advisors to governments and politicians has developed rapidly in modern society in response to the need for someone to act as a "guide" in thinking about new political, social and cultural problems. This new kind of intellectual Znaniecki calls the "sage" whose main task is to "rationalise andjustify intellectually the collective tendencies of the party"3

  • 4 Quoted in Noam Chomsky, Intellectuals and the State, (Het Wereldvenster Baam, 1978), p. 16.
  • 5 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969), p. 22.

3In several important studies Noam Chomsky has noted how intellectuals were enlisted in the justification and running ol America's wars. John Dewey and his supporters were the willing accomplicies ol President Wilson's administration in its effort to enter the First World War. Once in, Dewey and like-minded intellectuals were prepared to engage in "historical engineering" by "explaining the issues of the war that we might the better win it."4 Dewey had noted the ability of governments to "take hold of human affairs and manage them", and he believed that the central question after 1918 was "whether the intelligent men of the community really want to bring about a better reorganised social order". Chomsky's studies of the Vietnam war revealed the full extent to which the American intellectual community had become absorbed into the state's decisionmaking structure to the point where Connor Cruise O'Brien's warning that declining standards of scholarly integrity were leading to the development of "a society maimed through systematic corruption of its intelligence" had come to pass in America.5

  • 6 See Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society: Part I", The Public Interest, No. 6, (1967) (...)

4Bakunin was the first to warn of the rise of a "new class" which might use its control of technical knowledge to set up "the reign of scientific intelligence", and Daniel Bell has developed the theme to suggest that as western states move towards a "post-industrial society" so leadership will rest "with the research corporation, the industrial laboratories, the experimental stations, and the universities." Bell argues that "not only the best talents, but eventually the entire complex of social prestiege and social status, will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific communities"6 These fears were unfounded in so far as the "new class" became either the providers of expert services to the state or the rationalisers and justifiers of the power held by other elites but not power holders themselves, but these studies clearly mark the rise of a new kind of technical or functional intellectual.

5Edward Shils has traced these changes in the United States and in "the Western countries" since 1945 and has observed that they took place,

  • 7 Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1972), p (...)

"not as a result of ideological considerations… but because of the increased military and industrial importance of science, changing intellectual interests, new techniques of inquiry and the emergence of new forms and high scale of financial support."7

  • 8 Bell, op.cit., passim.
  • 9 Shils, op.cit., p. 74.

6Bell also links the rise and the political role of a functional intelligensia to the military affairs of the state, and he observes that "it has been war rather than peace that has been largley responsible for the acceptence of planning and technocratic modes in government."8 This process has led to the "disproportionate growth" of the technological sector of the intellectual community and it is characterised by highly specialised training and professional activity, and by "a very attenuated contact with the inherited traditions of humanistic and scientific thought."9

  • 10 ibid., p. 76.
  • 11 See Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Barbarism of 'Specialisation'", in Huszar, op.cit, pp. 176-197. The (...)

7The rise of the functional intellectual developed hand in hand with the emergence of new kinds of skills, technology, applied sciences, management and public administration, that reflect the tendency of modern developed states to call upon the talents and the services of the intellectual conmunity. Shils argues that these-new "'functional intellectuals" are integral to a modern economy and are indispensible to a modern military establishment. They are trained to carry out the rational-empirical tasks of the state and are "more specialised and less attached to the literary and philosophical traditions of earlier generations of intellectuals."10 Jose Ortega γ Gasset made a similar point when he saw in the rise of the middle class to political power in the 20th century the vital role played by the "technicians" such as engineers and financiers, but pre-eminently by the "man of science". Although a specialist, indeed precisely because of his specialisation, the "man of science" knows only his tiny corner of the universe but is ignorant of all the rest11

8Max Ascoli notes how functional intellectuals have played a role in 20th century democracy when,

"groups of… determined men may stand, working through propaganda and pressure, and assuming the representation of society through default of other pretenders. These group badly need the help of intellectual technicians."

  • 12 See Max Ascoli, "Intellectuals and Democracy", in Huszar, op.cit., pp. 298-301

9The decline of intellectual robustness and independence into political functionalism and nationalisation and, in ambition, the faliure to realise political changes which locked possible after the midale of the last century." are explained by Ascoli not just by the rise of the intellectual technician, but also "to a great extent thanks to the softening of intellectual vigor brought about by scholastic pedentary and by journalism."12 Hofstadter's distinction between "intellect", which refers to the creative and critical tradition of thought, and "intellegence", which is adjustive, manipulative and practical, typifies the division between the traditional and the functional intellectual communities.

10Despite the rise of the "functional" intellectuals and despite their integration into daily politics, the older tradition still survives in the work of "self-supporting intellectuals", "the private scholar" and the "independent author". This older tradition is characterised by,

  • 13 Shils, op.cit., p. 16.

"… the search for truth, for the principles embedded in events and actions, or for the establishment of a relationship between the self and the essential, whether that relationship be cognative, appreciative, or expressive."13

  • 14 ibid, p. 7.
  • 15 ibid, p. 17.
  • 16 See Znaniecki, op.cit., Chapter 4, passim

11In so far as this tradition relates to the state and society, it is marked not just by the willingness and ability to serve, but also by an inclination to examine the value orientations that are embodied in institutions and expressed in policies. The focus of this tradition is essentially upon those who exercise authority - political, military, social and economic - since they are the "custodians of the central institutional system." The role of this tradition has been both to underwrite the legitimacy of the "system" and also to criticise, elaborate and develop its potentialities. In this way the traditional intellectual "supplies the important function of molding and guiding the alternative tendencies which exist in any society."14 This function also explains the tension that often exists between members of the traditional intellectual community and those in political authority, a tension that reflects the attempt to resist or condemn authority if it betrays "the highest values", and one that springs from "the constitutive orientation of the intellectuals toward the sacred."15 Znaniecki, too, comments upon the intellectual tradition that stands in opposition to the "sage" and the "technical expert"; this is the trasition of the "creter of new knowleige" who never beyond justification and rationalisation to set up new cultural ideals, and beyond the receiving and transmission of doctrines to develop those doctrines and forge new ones.16

Anti-nuclear Protest and the Intellectuals

12The revival of anti-nuclear protest in Britain, Europe and the United States began in the Spring of 1980 as a response to NATO's decision of December 12th 1979 to "modernise" its theatre nuclear weapons by siting American Cruise and Pershing II missiles in several European countries. However, as the protest movement has gathered momentum, the number and nature of the issues that concern it have changed and there is now protest about all nuclear weapons committed to NATO and the Warsaw Pact and also about developments in Soviet and American strategic doctrines. This debate has provided the most thorough and exhaustive public examination of defence and strategic issues that has ever taken place in Britain, and it addresses both the contemporary situation and the intellectual, political and military developments that have created and maintain it. In the course of that examination it has become clear that intellectuals have played a vital part not only in the protest movement itself, but also in the creation of the weapons, strategies and political conditions that are the subject of protest. Indeed, the central core of the debate may been seen as a confrontation between the "functional" and "traditional" intellectual communities, or at least between the modes of thought and traditions of enquiry that each represents. This article examines the criticisms made by the anti-nuclear protesters of the functional intellectuals and their contribution to the weapons, strategies and poitical justifications of the nuclear age.

  • 17 See for example Ε. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, Protest and Survive, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1 (...)

13Contemporary anti-nuclear protest is focused primarily on the nuclear weapons and strategic policies of western governments and upon the deployment of American and Soviet nuclear forces in Europe. But the leaders of anti-nuclear protest, like Ε. P. Thompson, Alva Myrdal, Noam Chomsky, Dan Smith and Mary Kaldor, argue that in order to understand the nature of contemporary nuclear weapons systems and their associated strategic doctrines, it is necessary to analyse the political, military and scientific developments that have thought them about.17 Such an analysis slows that in each area 'functional' intellectuals have played a central and crucial role, and their contribution has teen particularly marked in the fields of applied nuclear science, strategic theory and in the mobilisation of political support for nuclear defence policies. These contributions have become a focus of criticism for the protest movement.

Applied Nuclear Science

14The contribution of scientist and technologists to the Manhatten programne for the production of an atomic weapon is now a mattter of record. A letter sent to President Rooseveldt by Albert Einstein on 11th October 1939 began a chain of events that led to the formation of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development in June 1941, which together with the War Department was given responsibility in early 1942 to produce an atomic bomb. The project was under the directorship of J. Robert Oppenheimer who, apart from his role as director, was assigned the task of separating uranium 235 from natural uranium. Enrico Fermi, along with many other prominent scientists, was also drawn into the project and was given responsibility for the production of a controlled, self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction; a task that he achieved at the Stagg Field laboratory of the University of Chicargo on December 2nd 1942. The hall-mark of the Manhatten Project was that Oppenhiemer, Fermi and other scientists were assigned tasks by the goverment for the accomplishment of an end that was given. Neither the end, the atomic bomb, nor the use that the American government was to make of it were questioned by those who provided the means until long after the project had been succesful; and then only by a handful. The majority of the Manhaten scientists were content to meet the rational/empirical tasks set them by state.

  • 18 Chomsky, op.cit., p. 11.

15To accept, as many of these scientists were to claim, that theirs was simply a technical contribution to a programne authorised by government is to abdicate both emotional and moral responsibility, and to assess the role of the scientist at this level alone is to risk becoming involved in what Chomsky has called a "morass of insane rationality."18 His comments were directed at other policy areas but apply equally well to theManhattan Project;

  • 19 ibid, p. 11.

"By entering into the arena of argument and counter-argument, of technical feasability and tactic, of footnotes and citations, by accepting the legitimagy of delate on cetain issues, one has already lost one's humanity."19

16One ought not to be cool, scholarly and objective, nor control elementary human reactions when assessing contributions to a project for the construction of a weapon of unimaginable human destructiveness.

17Indeed, after the war there has been just such an "elementary human reaction" from several of the scientist who were involved in nuclear and other weapons programmes. In response to a call by Einstein and Russell the first Scientific Conference on Disarmament and World Security was held in Pugwash. Nova Scotia during July 1957. The Pugwash conferences now have a broad scope but retain the central theme of examining the social responsibility of scientists towards world problems, and this Kind of concern can also be found in the editorial policy of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and similar scientific publications and organisations. Nevertheless, the Pug-wash scientists remain in a minority and the "functional" scientist and technician continues to make a major contribution to the scientific-military establishment of the modern state. A contribution which is seen by the protest movement to be integral to the development and the continuation of the nuclear arms race.

18Lord Zuckennan, a former chief scientific advisor the the British government, said in an address to the American Philosophical Saciety on November 8th, 1979 that,

  • 20 Lord Zuckerman, "Defeat is Indivisible", in Lord Mountbatten, Lord Noel-Baker and Lord Zuckerman, A (...)

"The scientist and technologists were the ones who initiated the new developments; who without any coherent concern for political values or goals, created new demands; who warned the public about new hazards. They were the ones who, at base, were determining the future. The nuclear world, with all its perils, is the scientists' creation; it is certainly not a world that came about in response to any external demand."20

  • 21 L. I Thompson, Zero-Option, (London, The Merlin Mess, 1982), p. 46.
  • 22 Zuckerman, op.cit., p. 24.

19In this analysis the scientific and technological establishment no longer simply contributes to policy goals defined by the politicians but has produced a technological momentum that politicians themselves can no longer control. Ε. P. Thompson describes the process of weapons innovation as self-generating and endorses Deborah Shipley's belief that institutional pressures for new system. produce a uncontrollable "weapons creep".21 The process is evident on both sides of the nuclear balance so that "The men in the nuclear weapons laboratories of both sides have suceeded in creating a world with an irational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built."22 The protest movement argues that those "realities" have been shaped in large part by another type of functional intellectual; the academic military analyst and strategist.

Strategic Theory

  • 23 Philip Green, Deadly Logic, (Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. xiii.
  • 24 ibid, p. xi.
  • 25 Reported in Clarence A. Robinson, "Pentagon Backs Strategic Modernisation", Aviation Week and Space (...)
  • 26 Green, op.cit., p. 5.
  • 27 Thompson, op. cit., p. viii.

20Philip Green notes in the preface of his seminal work Deadly Logic that "The growth of the academic literature of military strategy has been one of the major intellectual phenomena of the cold war era in the United States."23 Indeed, Green's book, published in 1966, marks the end of a ten year period that has become known as the golden age of nuclear strategy in which authors like Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger and Thomas Schelling collectivly became "the vanguard and foremost representatives of a new element in the councils of American government: the Academic Strategists." Green notes that deterrence theorist claim the "mantle of scientific expertise", but that the claim produces "a feeling of strangeness" since, although almost all the works of the academic strategists were invested with a tremendously authoritative and scholarly air, they "produced policy proposals and arguments that one felt absolutly no urge to agree with." Green's lack of agreement arose from the questionable and sometimes absurd assumptions that are integral to all such theorists such as "the casual assumption that the 'rational' response to a nuclear strike on one's cities is a counterstrike on the attackers cities."24 A more recent example of strategic absurdity is the claim of General James Stansbury that "… an eight hour nuclear war is no longer an acceptable concept"25 because deterrence requires that America must have the capacity to fight a much longer nuclear war. Clearly any deterrence theory that requires such a capacity can lay no claim to be a theory of rational bargaining beyond this, there are several assumption that genenration of academie strategists have shared. Creen identifies deterrence as theorists as those "who reject both a disarmament strategy and a win-the-war nuclear stategy, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union",26 and Thompson extends this point to show that for these theorists "The ineuctable condition of bloc antagonism is taken, unexamined, as the premise from which all else flows."27 This assumption reinforces the effect of the weapons scientist since,

  • 28 ibid, p. ix.

"Politics is… walled out by the first premise of deterrence theory-that the two blocs are in a state of perpetual armed hostility and must ever continue to be so. Hence any attempt at a political resolution is postponed, and weapons serve as a substitute.28

  • 29 Raymond Williams, "The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament", New Left Review, No. 124, (November/Decemb (...)

21Thompson argues that deterrence theories lock the superpowers and their allies into a "deep structure of mutual fear", and Raymond Williams assesses the effect of deterrence theory on arms control and disarmament. To maintain weapons equality, deemed vital by deterrence theorists, states persue multilateral and limited agreements which usually accept a "balance" at the level of the most advanced of the participants thereby pushing the arms spiral up rather than down, so that "To a very large extent… 'multilateralism' is in fact a code word for continued acquiescence in the policy of military alliances and the arms race."29

22There has also been an important academic contribution to the development of new deterrence theories based upon a capacity to fight nuclear war which first became official US policy in the early 1970s with the Schlesinger Doctrine. That doctrine sought to provide the United States with "selective nuclear response options" so that there could be an alternative to what President Nixon described as the

  • 30 Richard Nixon, A Report to Congress: US Foreign Policy for the 1970s = A Strategy for Peace, (Febru (...)

"… single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans."30

23Once again the original policy and the alternative to it rested on the unexamined assumption of implacable opposition of the superpowers at a time when, parodoxically, detente was loudly proclaimed and well established. Detente notwithstanding, the Schlesinger Doctrine was extended even further in the "counterveiling" strategy introduced by Carter and carried on by Reagan.

  • 31 Lawrence Freedman, "Europe and the United States", International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, (Sumner 1 (...)
  • 32 See for example Kenneth Pridham, "The Soviet View of the Current Disagreements between the United S (...)

24The development of this strategie doctrine was promotes by the USSR'S achievemnet of strategic parity, growing political strains within the Atlantic Alliance, and the percieved "adventurism" of the USSR in the 1970s, all of which led the academic strategists to raise questions about the credibility of America's nuclear guarantee to Europe and questions about what could be done if deterrence failed. "American strategists, displaying a rather clinical and apolitical approach to their subject" decided that either America must reacquire its strategic superiority or that NATO must reinforce the lower levels of its escalation ladder; or that both should be accomplished. In the event the needs of deterrence were deemed to require both even though "[t]he strategic logic of this line of argument is not matched in political logic",31 for the simple reason that even in the early 1980s the actual state of East/West relations made the prospect of a Soviet invasion of western Europe or a Soviet first strike against the USA highly unlikely.32

  • 33 See for example Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War", (...)

25Nevertheless, the new "deterrent" strategy requires that the us must have the ability to fight nuclear war for at least several days the better to deter the USSR, and its intellectual origins may be found in the work of defence research institutes like the RAND Corporation, but especially in the theories of academic strategists like Colin S. Grey, Richard Pipes, Lawrence J. Korb and Eugene Rostow, many of whom promoted their view through the lobby group The Committee on the Present Danger, and all of whom became advisors to or members of Reagan's administration.33 The annual bombardment of Congress and Pentagon by defence analysts, consultants and strategists such as these, as well as by research institutes, veterans associations and defence industrial interests, all with their own specialists and experts represents,,for the protest movement, functional intellectualism gone mad.

Political Mobilisation

26The transition from the policies of detente, launched by Nixon and handled in a very uncertain fashion by Carter, to those of nuclear rearmament promoted by the Reagan administration owe a good deal to service lobbying and to changing congressional attitudes, but the most significant change was in the Americanpublic's vieuw of the need for a more powerful and asssertive defence policy. President Reagan's election promise to make "America strong again" was a response to this mood. It is important to note, however, that the mood itself was not spontaneous but was developed after unremitting work by several influential lobby groups each represented by defence intellectuals.

27Academic institutions like the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the Hoover Institute and the American Institute for Public Policy Research (ΑΕΙ) were, and are, weighty opponents of detente and were mainly responsible for the view that America's land based ICBMs were vulnerable and should be replaced, and later publicised the case for the introduction of Cruise and Pershing II missiles into Europe. These, essentially academic, institutions not only acted as lobbyist and populisers of new defence policies, but also activly participated in the political process. David Abshire, the Chairman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, was head of the Reagan transition team for a short period and has been a frequent witness before congressional defence committees to advocate strong defence and war fighting deterrence. There has also been a whole host of conservative pressure groups that have worked directly to influence the public and congressional mood on defence. The Heritage Foundation published a 20 volume study "Mandate for Leadership" which was a blueprint for conservative government and strong defence, and it supported its policies with a pool of 1,000 conservative academics who were avilable to give evidence to congressional committees and the media.

28Throughout the Carter administration two groups, the Committee on the Present Danger and the American Security Council, were particulary effective critics of defence policy, and many of the academics from these groups have taken posts in the Department of Defense and other defence related agencies of the Reagan administration. The Committee on the Present Danger, founded and supported by such academic luminaries as Eugene Rostow, Richard E. Pipes and Ada B. Bozeman, was a major opponent of SALT II ratification and was the co-architect with Senator Sam Nunn of barganing the Senate's approval for ratification against carter's willingness to raiseefence spending. The vatican Security Council, another private defence lobby group, was also very successful in influencing congressional and public attitudes about defence, and was judged by an officer of the Anns Control and Disarmament Agency to have played a "key role" in shaping opinion against the SALT II treaty and for a larger defence effort including new strategic weapons.

29To a much less, but still significant, extent intellectuals have been involved in the "nuclear debate" in the United Kingdom, and in one notable event the conflict between the new functional intellectual and the traditional school was demonstrated most clearly. The BBC invited E.P. Thompson, a leading nuclear disarmer and member of END, to deliver the Reith Lectures of 1981, but the invitation was later withdrawn and extended to Professor Lawrence Martin, vice-chancellor of Newcastle University and ex-professor of War Studies at London University. Martin's lectures were critical of the nuclear disarmament movement and supported the British government's case for replacing the independent deterrent and supported NATO's decision to place cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe.

  • 34 Ε. P. Thompson, "A mid-Atlantic Moderate", in M. Clarke and M. Mowlam, (eds.). Debate on Disarmamen (...)

30In a reply to these lectures Thompson not only challenges Martin's arguments - these cannot be covered here - but also draws a sharp distinction between his own intellectual approach to defence issues, derived from history, to those of Martin based upon strategic studies. Martin he claims has "acquired the hubris of the academic, but without acquitting himself in any recognisable academic discipline", and the judgement rests as much on the assessment of the new science of strategic studies as it does on Martin's use of its "insights". Thompson argues that "Strategic studies, if they are not admixed with a reputable discipline - of the economist, the political theorist, or the historian-are a non-discipline. They are the apoligetics of military power." Thompson shows that much of Martin's argument rests on simple assertion and that his work reflects mone of the reputable disciplines. "Professor Martin" he concludes "is a new kind of intellectual creature. He has prospered as a courtier to the nuclear weapons systems and their defence establishments."34 A more explicitcondemnation of a 'functional' intellectual who rationalises and justifies the collective tendencies of his party could not be made.

Conclusion

31The nuclear debate is sure to engage the public's attention for as long as it takes western governments to deploy the current generation of nuclear weapons. But past experience suggests that once a deployment has taken place public interest and protest will receed. However, the analysis of the anti-nuclear movement suggests that the real object of protest should be not just contemporary governments and nuclear weapons but, more importantly, the insane rationality of those scientists and technologists who produce ever more destructive generations of weapons and the functional intellectuals who's theories and rationalisations have attuned minds so that they have become, in Thompson's words, "habituated to the vocabulary of mutual extermination."

32October 1983

Notes

1 Set "Intellectuals", The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, (London, Fontana Books, 1977), pp. 314-315.

2 Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intelectuals, (New York, William Morrow, 1928), pp. 29-37. There are extracts from Benda's work in George B. de Huszar, The Intellectuals, (Illinois, Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 217-232.

3 Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Kan of Knowledge, (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 19G8), p. 72.

4 Quoted in Noam Chomsky, Intellectuals and the State, (Het Wereldvenster Baam, 1978), p. 16.

5 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969), p. 22.

6 See Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society: Part I", The Public Interest, No. 6, (1967), pp. 24-35.

7 Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 74.

8 Bell, op.cit., passim.

9 Shils, op.cit., p. 74.

10 ibid., p. 76.

11 See Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Barbarism of 'Specialisation'", in Huszar, op.cit, pp. 176-197. The quotation may be found on p. 177.

12 See Max Ascoli, "Intellectuals and Democracy", in Huszar, op.cit., pp. 298-301

13 Shils, op.cit., p. 16.

14 ibid, p. 7.

15 ibid, p. 17.

16 See Znaniecki, op.cit., Chapter 4, passim

17 See for example Ε. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, Protest and Survive, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1980), Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament, (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1977), and Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, Disarming Europe, (London, The Merlin Press, 1982).

18 Chomsky, op.cit., p. 11.

19 ibid, p. 11.

20 Lord Zuckerman, "Defeat is Indivisible", in Lord Mountbatten, Lord Noel-Baker and Lord Zuckerman, Apocalypse Now, (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1980), p. 16.

21 L. I Thompson, Zero-Option, (London, The Merlin Mess, 1982), p. 46.

22 Zuckerman, op.cit., p. 24.

23 Philip Green, Deadly Logic, (Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. xiii.

24 ibid, p. xi.

25 Reported in Clarence A. Robinson, "Pentagon Backs Strategic Modernisation", Aviation Week and Space Technology, (October 26th 1981), p. 53.

26 Green, op.cit., p. 5.

27 Thompson, op. cit., p. viii.

28 ibid, p. ix.

29 Raymond Williams, "The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament", New Left Review, No. 124, (November/December 1980), p. 34.

30 Richard Nixon, A Report to Congress: US Foreign Policy for the 1970s = A Strategy for Peace, (February 18th 1970), p. 122.

31 Lawrence Freedman, "Europe and the United States", International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, (Sumner 1982), p. 404.

32 See for example Kenneth Pridham, "The Soviet View of the Current Disagreements between the United States and Western Europe", International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1, (Winter 1982/83), pp. 17-31.

33 See for example Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War", Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1, (July 1977), pp. 21-34, and Colin Grey, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory", International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 54-87.

34 Ε. P. Thompson, "A mid-Atlantic Moderate", in M. Clarke and M. Mowlam, (eds.). Debate on Disarmament, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 199 and p. 120.

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