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Patronages et clientélismes 1550-1750 (France, Angleterre, Espagne, Italie)

 | 
Roger Mettam
, 
Charles Giry-Deloison

III. Église et armée

The English Military Clientele 1542-1618

Simon Adams

Texte intégral

  • 1 R. ASCH, "Krone, Hof und Adel in den Ländem der Stuart Dynastie im Frühen 17. Jahrhundert", Zeitsc (...)
  • 2 See Simon ADAMS, "The Patronage of the Crown in Elizabethan Politics: the 1590s in Perspective", i (...)

1Over the past two decades a scholarly consensus has formed over the way in which the clientele evolved in England between 1500 and 1640. During the sixteenth century, it is claimed, a "bastard feudal" network of aristocratic affinities was replaced by clienteles formed by court-based patronage1. This argument has its attractions, but it is based on a limited appreciation of the function of the patronage of the crown in the sixteenth century. The study of the Tudor military clientele suggests a process both more complex and more idiosyncratic. The period 1470 to 1542 saw the creation of a royal affinity from the patronage supplied by the revenues of the crown estate. This affinity both provided the central military forces of the crown and marked the final stage of bastard feudalism. In 1542 a series of diplomatic miscalculations led Henry VIII to blunder into a war with both Scotland and France. The remainder of the decade saw a major military effort that transformed the Tudor military clientele. Not only did the strategic and tactical context of the Eight Years' War produce a new type of soldier, but by bringing the crown to near-bankruptcy it forced a re-structuring of its finances that in turn reshaped its patronage during the latter half of the century2

2To the effects of the Eight Years' War were joined two unexpected consequences of the death of Henry VIII in 1547. Not until the latter decades of the seventeenth century did another monarch with serious military interests or ambitions come to the English throne. In the interval (with the obvious exception of the Interregnum) military leadership devolved on several generations of aristocratic military patrons. Secondly, the growing religious division at all levels of society transformed the functioning of the clientele, which increasingly took on a religious bias. This was further strengthened by the general direction of Elizabethan foreign policy and its culmination in the Anglo-Dutch alliance. The Anglo-Dutch military connection between 1585 and 1618 created a new military ethos, infused by a strong and self-conscious religious and political allegiance. It also saw the further transformation of the aristocratic clientele into a quasi-republican professionalism. This military ethos both influenced and was influenced by an equally self-conscious classicising of English politics, detectable in the 1590s. These complex reshapings of English political culture cannot be reduced to "court-based patronage".

  • 3 The only substantial Tudor employment of mercenaries occurred in the 1540s, see G. J. MILLAR, Tudo (...)
  • 4 W.J. TIGHE, The Gentlemen Pensioners in Elizabethan Politics and Government, University of Cambrid (...)
  • 5 Sir John Fortescue: De Laudibus Legum Anglie, ed. Stanley B. CHRIMES, Cambridge, Cambridge Universi (...)

3The significance of these wider trends is best appreciated if the basic details of Tudor military organization are re-examined. The main distinction between the military "Systems" of the early Tudor monarchs and their major continental contemporaries lay in the latter's massive employment of mercenary troops3. With regard to native standing forces the differences were less extreme. In the first half of the sixteenth century there were three main types of standing forces-the guard, the gendarmerie de l'ordonnance and the garrisons of frontier or recently obtained provinces-all of which had been pioneered by the French crown. The period saw some interesting English attempts to adopt French practice. The king's spears, a "cavalry of the guard" copied from the gentilshommes de la maison du roi of Louis XII, existed from 1509 to 1516. A similar body, the gentlemen pensioners, was founded in 1539, and a further one, the gentlemen at arms, in 1544. These experiments may be attributed to the personal interest of Henry VIII, but in 1551-1552 a version of the gendarmerie de l'ordonnance also enjoyed a brief existence. All were brought to an end by fmancial retrenchment, although the gentlemen pensioners and the gentlemen at arms, amalgamated in 1550, survived in a ceremonial form4. Their short life suggests that they were not considered essential enough for the crown to make financial sacrifices in other areas to maintain them, though it is also possible to detect the influence of a political tradition that regarded the French gendarmerie as an instrument of tyranny5.

  • 6 PRO, S.P. 84/104/189-90. For frontier garrisons, see Simon ADAMS, "Tactics or Politics? The Milita (...)
  • 7 For Ireland in 1558, PRO, S.P. 63/1/8; for the 1590s, J.J. McGURK, The Recruitment and Transportin (...)

4Frontier garrisons present a different picture. The Calais Pale, a fortified zone with a standing garrison, provided a model for a second pale at Berwick after 1482, and a third in Ireland after the 1530s. Major, if short-lived, garrisons were placed in Boulogne between 1544 and 1550, and in Scotland between 1547 and 1551. Ireland and Berwick remained after the loss of Calais in 1558, but the latter diminished in importance after 1570. 1585, however, saw the initiation of a new version of the garrison policy when 7,500 English troops were based in the Netherlands so long as the Dutch Revolt lasted. After 1604 most of these troops were taken directly on to the Dutch establishment; the remainder followed after the surrender of the "Cautionary Towns" in 1616. In 1621 there were four English and two Scottish permanent regiments in the Dutch service: 13,000 men, nearly half the peacetime strength of the Dutch army6. The mid-Tudor garrisons were smaller individually, though not necessarily in aggregate. In 1546-1548 the Boulogne garrison was in the region of 3,500; the Scottish garrisons had a total strength of nearly 8,000; in 1559, the height of its importance, Berwick had a garrison of 1,850. The permanent garrison of Ireland in the early years of Elizabeth was just under 2,000, though it rose to 17,000 in 15997.

  • 8 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade? The Composition of the Earl of Leicester's Expedition to the Neth (...)
  • 9 W.J. TIGHE, op. cit., pp.30, 34-36; Dale E. HOAK, "The King's Privy Chamber, 1547-1553", in Tudor (...)
  • 10 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade?", art. cit., pp. 10-11.

5Size was not the only measure of the importance of the mid-Tudor garrisons. The new artillery fortifications of the period forced the replacement of the longbow by the arquebus, and these garrisons were the first English troops fully equipped with firearms. The garrisons thus provided a reservoir of trained professionals, and were carefully employed in this role during the period 1550-15708. After 1585 the troops in the Netherlands were similarly employed by both Elizabeth and James I. The Boulogne garrison also contained a standing force of heavy cavalry. It may have been recruited from Henry VIII's gentlemen at arms; after Boulogne was surrendered in 1550 its men formed the gendarmerie bands of 1551-1552.9. It is possible to trace, therefore, the existence of a small but continuous military establishment from the garrisons of the 1540s, through the Berwick and Irish garrisons of the first half of Elizabeth's reign and the voluntary troops recruited by the Dutch between 1572 and 1585, to the earl of Leicester's expedition to the Netherlands in 1585. These men were the central figures in the mid-to late Tudor military clienteles10.

  • 11 Ibid, p. 15. For examples of the new attention paid to the militia in 1558, and Elizabethan impress (...)

6The great majority of Tudor armies were, however, composed of units levied for a specific expedition and then disbanded after its conclusion. By constitutional tradition service overseas was voluntary, but a major innovation occurred in 1544 when Henry pressed men for service at Boulogne. Impressment for service overseas appears to have become established in the Le Havre expedition of 1562, but until the 1590s Elizabeth's military demands were limited. The use of impressment coincided with a new interest in the militia. Under the militia statutes of 1558 not only were its organization and administration reformed, but for the first time firearms were included among its weapons11. The new importance assigned to the militia led to its substantial rearming with firearms during the first decades of Elizabeth's reign. After 1570 attention was concentrated on the trained bands, that part of the militia that could be adequately armed and equipped.

  • 12 Kenneth B. MACFARLANE, England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays, London, Hambledon, 1981 (...)
  • 13 Chris GIVEN-WILSON, The Royal Household and the King's Affinity; Service, Politics and Finance in (...)
  • 14 See John A. GUY, The Cardinal’s Court: The Impact of Thomas Wolsey in Star Chamber, Hassocks (Suss (...)

7It is in this wider military context that the demise of bastard feudalism should be examined. Bastard feudalism is usually associated with the indentured and liveried retaining used to recruit armies for the Hundred Years’ War. There is general agreement that the practice declined during the course of the sixteenth century, and that by the beginning of the seventeenth it was more or less extinct12. The immediate cause lay in a legislative campaign that began in the reign of Richard II and culminated in two statutes of Edward IV and three of Henry VII, which were confirmed by Henry VIII and Elizabeth I in proclamations of 1511, 1514, 1572, and 1583. It has long been noted that this legislation did not abolish retaining entirely, but attempted to control it by limiting it to immediate household servants and to licences granted by the crown. In part the legislative campaign reflected a dislike of unlimited retaining by members of the House of Commons, but the crown also possessed its own motives. The passing of statutes against retaining coincided with attempts by the crown (in the reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Edward IV and Henry VII) to create its own affinity13. It is revealing that the most serious of the crimes created by the statutes was the retaining of officers, servants or tenants of the crown, and that the best known examples of punishment for illicit retaining fell into this or related categories14.

  • 15 For general discussions, see John A. GUY, Tudor England, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp (...)
  • 16 The statute of 1495 (11 Henry VII, c.18) is quoted in Helen MILLER, Henry VIII and the English Nob (...)

8The importance of the royal affinity to the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII has been explored by David Starkey and John Guy15. The affinity was created by the patronage provided by the crown estate: in particular the granting of stewardships and other offices on the crown estate to trusted members of the household and court. Stewardships of crown lands were perhaps the main form of royal patronage under the first two Tudors. A primary responsibility of the steward was the manrede or leading of the men under his rule. The major burden of military service thus fell on those holding offices under the crown, an obligation Henry VII made explicit in a statute of 149516. The retinues they raised from their own estates and from the tenants of the crown lands they administered made up the king's army.

9The expedition to Boulogne in 1544 was the last (and possibly the greatest) occasion the royal affinity went to war; it was also the last occasion an English monarch commanded in the field until 1642. Thereafter the royal affinity disappeared as a significant military force. In the short term, it was unsuitable for the demands of garrison warfare, for men raised in this way had neither the experience of firearms nor the desire to serve for more than one campaigning season. In the longer term the diminution of the crown estate caused by the war inspired a policy of managing it more economically and freeing its revenues from the burden of surplus officers. In Elizabeth's reign a search for new sources of patronage and reward was initiated.

  • 17 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade?", art. cit., pp. 15-17. For two further Marian examples of recrui (...)
  • 18 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade?", art. cit., pp. 17-22, and "The Gentry of North Wales and the Ea (...)
  • 19 Quoted in Mervyn JAMES, op. cit., p. 424.
  • 20 PRO, S.P. 12/213/40, to Walsingham, 24 July 1588.

10There was an initial revival of the employment of private retinues after 1547. The army raised for the St Quentin campaign in 1557 was recruited in this way. So too was the cavalry of the earl of Leicester's expedition to the Netherlands in 1585, but after 1559 impressment was used increasingly to recruit the foot, the more so since militia service could now be expected to provide some experience with firearms17. More difficult, however, was the role of formal retaining in this process. Mary granted a number of licences and Elizabeth fifteen in the period 1559 to 1572, but what use was made of them remains unknown18. While examples of formal retaining late in Elizabeth's reign do survive, the extent of the practice remains unclear, the more so given the near ubiquitous use of the description "servant". Thus when Leicester wrote 200 circular letters to "my servants and sundry my friends" in 1585, whether the recipients can be described as retainers is an open question. Two reasons for the ultimate demise of retaining may be suggested. The first was the continued prohibition of retainers holding offices or commissions under the crown; thus in 1595 the earl of Essex admitted that he had ceased to retain gentlemen because doing so would bar them from serving as justices of the peace19. Similarly, there were growing objections to the exemption of retainers from mustering with the militia. The fear of invasion in 1588 appears to have led to a burst of patriotic retaining; this was opposed quite strongly by none other than Leicester, on the ground that it was disrupting the mobilization of the militia20.

  • 21 JRL, Leigh of Lyme Correspondence, folder I, Derby to Sir P. Leigh, 23 October 1585. For examples (...)

11It is also difficult to resist the suspicion that the smooth demise of retaining reflected the fact that it was no longer necessary. On one level the aristocratic affinity continued to operate through less formal if no less powerful bonds of friendship. On another level it was still possible to recruit widely from tenants; in some cases military service obligations were included in leases. The extent of this practice is also unknown, although it appears to have been more prevalent in the lordships of the Welsh and Scottish Marches. Thus the earl of Derby, when supplying Leicester with a band of archers "from my own tenants and friends" in 1585, requested Sir Piers Leigh of Lyme "as with other my friends and servants" to furnish a man from among his tenants21.

12However, the decline of the royal affinity did not simply return military recruiting to a number of noble affinities. The Eight Years' War saw the emergence of two large military clienteles, those of Edward Seymour, duke of Somerset and John Dudley, duke of Northumberland, whose influence was to be felt for the remainder of the century. On one level they were to some degree ad hoc affairs, for there was no central military authority with similar powers to the lord admiral of England. One great office of State (the earl marshal) and several household offices (the master of the horse, and the newer masters of the ordnance and the armoury) possessed some military responsibility, but their permanent staffs were too small to provide much patronage and they had no direct influence over appointments to standing garrisons.

13In Northumberland's case his lieutenancy of Boulogne in the winter of 1544 may have played an important role, but other than that both men depended on their success as commanders in individual expeditions and their political power in the minority of Edward VI. Both were newly ennobled and thus could not rely on extensive established landed interests or inherited relationships. Their relatively brief periods of eminence afforded little opportunity for their clienteles to consolidate. The way in which Northumberland's clientele was formed can be gauged from a later "memoir of service" by Sir James Croft, one of the leading military officers of the middle decades, which gives the following account of his early career:

  • 22 "The Autobiography of Sir James Croft", ed. R.E. HAM, BIHR, 1977, t. L, p. 50.

"[Having found favour from Dudley in 1543] for my lady his wives sake, to whom I was a poore kinsman... I... thought it good to offer my service under so noble a man, myself having no charge nor entertainment but as a privat man [on the expedition to Leith in the spring of 1544]... after that journey ended, he drew me with him to Bullen, where he gave me the charge of an 100 of his household men with the allowance of a captain... thus continuing the siege of Bullen and in Bullen itself until the death of one Browne which was waterbailiff there, whose office his lordship procured to me..."22

  • 23 BL, Egerton Ms. 2815, account of John Pickarell, 18 May 1553. For Northumberland's household, PRO, (...)

14The surviving sources do not make possible the delineation of the extent of their patronage. The only guides even to their households are lists drawn up when they were paid off after their respective executions. Somerset's household list is the more comprehensive and contains not only a category of "servants" (many of whom can be identified as military officers), but also a further twenty-five "men at arms of the late duke's retinue" (some of whom were also included among the "servants"), which suggest that they may have been in his gendarmerie company23.

  • 24 For the early-Tudor Somersets, see Helen MILLER, op. cit., pp. 135, 137, 144, 146. Captain Francis (...)

15A further complication is caused by Northumberland's part in the overthrow of Somerset in 1549, and Somerset's role in the "conspiracy" against Northumberland that led to his execution in January 1552. This raises the question of the extent to which they were rival patrons. Certainly the fall and later execution of Somerset caused some of his clients to become open enemies of Northumberland. On the other hand, the two clienteles also shared a common Protestant orientation. The process is not a clear one for there is no evidence that either deliberately sought to build a religiously exclusive following, nor that their followings were in fact religiously homogeneous. Nevertheless a bias is detectable. It was strengthened by a corollary: the elimination of strong Catholics from positions of military importance, initiated under Edward VI and confirmed under Elizabeth. A good example is provided by the south Wales family of the Somersets, earls of Worcester, prominent in the royal affinity of Henry VIII, but absent after the 1560s24.

  • 25 For a full discussion, see Simon ADAMS, "Dudley Clientele", art. cit.

16The extent of the transformation becomes clearest after Northumberland's collapse in 1553. Former members of Northumberland's military clientele were central figures in the rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyatt in 1554 and the other conspiracies of Mary's reign, particularly Sir James Croft and a number of former Boulogne offïcers. Yet such was their professional importance that, despite their obvious political unreliability, they could not be dispensed with. The point was clearly appreciated by Philip II, who deliberately cultivated them after his arrival in England, in many cases obtaining their release from imprisonment and their pardons. In exchange he obtained their services in the war against France and Scotland of 1557-155825.

  • 26 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade art. cit., p. 11.

17The same body of men was central to the major military expeditions of the first three decades of Elizabeth's reign. The Dudley clientele was "restored" following Elizabeth's appointment of Northumberland's sons Lord Robert and Lord Ambrose Dudley (the future earls of Leicester and Warwick) as masters of the horse and the ordnance soon after her accession. According to diplomatic observers Lord Robert Dudley was the major patron of the officers of both the Scottish expedition of 1560 and the Le Havre expedition of 1562. The evidence for the former is not conclusive, but for the latter (which was commanded by Warwick) it is extensive. Thereafter the Dudley clientele provided the core of the officers who accompanied Leicester's brother-in-law Sir Henry Sidney to Ireland in 1566. Subsequent commanders in Ireland (with the sole exception of Sir Edward Fitton in 1573) and a sizeable number of the officers of the garrison were followers of Leicester. Leicester was also the leading patron of English soldiers serving in the Netherlands after 1572. His advocacy of military assistance to the Dutch rebels led to his proposed expedition to the Netherlands in 1577 and the ultimately successful one of 1585. There have been attempts to see in the clashes between Leicester and his chief subordinate in the Netherlands in 1586, Sir John Norris, a tension between the noble amateur and the professional; these, however, have failed to take into account the fact that Norris himself, like many other "professionals", had previously been a client of Leicester26.

  • 27 Simon ADAMS, "Stanley, York and Elizabeth's Catholics", HT, 1987, t. XXXVII, pp. 46-50.
  • 28 For Pelham, see Simon ADAMS, "Faction, Clientage and Party: English Politics, 1550-1603". HT, 1982 (...)
  • 29 Burghley's most prominent military client was his relative Barnaby Goodge. Brief references to Sus (...)

18Leicester's near monopoly of military patronage in the thirty years between 1558 and his death can be explained partly by the inherited connection, partly by his own energy as a patron, but also through two further considerations. It is under Leicester that the Protestant orientation of the military clientele became most pronounced-the notorious exception of Sir William Stanley, proving, as it were, the rule27. This may have been in part by design, but it also reflects the fact that the main military expeditions of the reign (with possible exception of the Irish campaigns) were in aid of Protestant rebels on the Continent that Catholics would find morally unpalatable. Leicester also had no serious rival. Potentially the most significant was the Seymour revival of the first years of the reign, which threatened to reopen the Edwardian antagonisms. However, the earl of Hertford's ill-advised marriage to Lady Catherine Grey in 1561 eliminated the Seymours as a serious political force for the remainder of the reign. Thereafter former Seymour military clients, like Sir William Pelham, are found in the Dudley network, as are the former followers of the first earl of Pembroke (Sir John Perrot, Thomas Morgan and Roger Williams) after Pembroke's death in 157028. Neither Burghley nor Walsingham were patrons of more than a handful of officers, while members of the older nobility, the fourth duke of Norfolk, or, perhaps more significantly, the third earl of Sussex, were too much out of sympathy with the trend of policy to act as effective rival patrons29.

  • 30 For Essex's influence in Wales, see H. A. LLOYD, The Gentry of South West Wales, 1540-1640, Cardif (...)
  • 31 Only the recruiting for the Normandy campaign has been studied; H.A LLOYD, The Rouen Campaign 1590 (...)
  • 32 For a contemporary impression of Essex's clientele, see, Elizabeth of England, Certain Observation (...)

19Leicester's ultimate successor was his stepson, the second earl of Essex, general of the cavalry in the Netherlands in 1586, who remained the unchallenged leader of the former Dudley military clientele until his disgrace in 1600. As a patron, however, Essex resembled Somerset and Northumberland more than Leicester. His estate was small for an earl and burdened with debt, and he possessed only a minimal hereditary clientele30. He depended on his success as a commander and his political influence for his patronage. His relatively short period of power gave little time for his clientele to consolidate. His patronage was therefore most manifest in the four major military expeditions he commanded: Normandy in 1591, Cadiz in 1596, the Islands Voyage of 1597 and the Irish campaign of 159931. On the other hand, he was also the only Elizabethan who sought to create a primarily military clientele, and the only one to hold all the potential military offices. Master of the horse from 1587, he became master of the ordnance in 1597 and Earl Marshal at the beginning of the following year32

  • 33 J.J.N. McGURK, th. cit., p. 503, notes that 475 captains served in Ireland in 1590s.
  • 34 E.g, HMC, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Bath, Lardon, H.M.S.O., 1980, vol. V, p. (...)
  • 35 For an example of the neo-classical atmosphere surrounding Essex, see L. JARDINE and A. GRAFTON, " (...)

20The nature of Essex's clientele also reflected a shifting political context. During the 1590s the war against Spain was less the religious conflict it had appeared to be in the 1580s than a war against a Spanish imperial design, and it was far easier for those of Catholic background to take part. Furthermore the extensive campaigning since 1585 had produced a much larger body of officers and gentlemen in search of promotion and patronage33. Thus the scale of Essex's potential clientele was much greater than the Dudley affinity had been. His aggressive recruiting also went far beyond previous practice. Leicester's 200 letters of 1585 were a modest effort compared to the broad circulars Essex dispatched to his clients34. Essex was also able to generate an enthusiasm among his clients that was a novelty for the reign. However, this was also a weakness; what kept the clientele growing was the belief in Essex's eventual success. When his career was checked, as in 1600, the momentum was lost. This clientele was neither a bastard feudal revival, nor was it united by religious allegiance in the way that Leicester's had been; its models were, if anything, classical. For all Essex's pandering to Elizabeth's taste in Spenserian chivalry, his own political views displayed a classical influence quite different from Leicester's35. It was precisely because Essex could be seen as a new Scipio, Pompey or Caesar, that his military clientele was seen as a potential political danger.

21Following the death of Essex, late Elizabeth campaigning was reduced to two main theatres - the Netherlands and Ireland - and his military clientele was similarly divided. The Irish segment was inherited by Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, who between 1601 and 1603 revealed himself to be the most successful of the Elizabethan commanders. But Mountjoy never became a military patron on the earlier scale: in part this was due to the fact that the Irish establishment was wound down dramatically after 1603, in part the result of his own early death in 1606.

  • 36 Simon ADAMS, The Protestant Cause: religions alliance with the West European Calvinist Communities (...)
  • 37 On Pembroke, see A. GEBAUER, Von Macht und Mäzenatentum; leben und werk William Herberts, des drit (...)
  • 38 Roy STRONG, Henry, Prince of Wales and England's Lost Renaissance, London, Thames & Hudson, 1986, (...)

22The reduction of the Irish garrison (and the elimination of Berwick) provided a new military context for the reign of James I. Only the Netherlands army was left. In 1604 it was transferred to the Dutch establishment, but its officers and men swore a dual allegiance both to James and to the States-General. It was never considered to be a mercenary army, but an English strategic reserve maintained at Dutch expense. Moreover, the Dutch connection limited its officers to men who supported the Anglo-Dutch alliance and its Protestant associations. The Dutch regiments thus had more in common with Leicester's rather than Essex's clientele. Many of the leading officers had begun their careers in the Leicesterian period, and family traditions were maintained. But the Dutch service also broke with the precedent of aristocratic leadership. The only peer serving after 1604 was Robert Sidney, Viscount Lisle, the governor of Flushing, and he, as the holder of an office in the queen's household, was an absentee. The dominant figures were the two Vere brothers, Sir Francis (until his death in 1609) and then Sir Horatio. The Dutch connection also served to isolate the English regiments from the politics of the English court. Although Sir Edward Cecil was believed to owe his colonelcy to his kinship to the earl of Salisbury, until 1618 court factions and army factions were generally distinct36. There was some attempt to persuade the third earl of Pembroke, as the leading descendant of the Tudor military peerage, to assume the role of patron, but, despite close relations to a number of the army's officers, Pembroke's real interests lay at court37. Similarly, Prince Henry, had he lived beyond 1612, might have become a major influence38. But in the event the Dutch service remained relatively free from the court until 1618.

231618 marks a turning point, because the rise of the future duke of Buckingham revived the connection between military and court politics, and the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War created a new military and political context. It was in these years that the third earl of Essex began to revive the military reputation of his father. The 1620s and 1630s thus saw military patronage reemerge as an issue and become a factor in the wider political dissension. By this stage, however, the English regiments in the Netherlands had fully adopted Dutch methods and organization as well as a particular ethos of military professionalism and political allegiance that later informed the parliamentary armies. It is understandable that the idiosyncratic evolution of English military organization should be attributed in the first instance to the ability of an island to escape the military pressures experienced by the continental monarchies. But no less important was the absence after 1547 of direct military leadership by the crown and the impact of religion on English politics and foreign policy. The Dudley and Essex military clienteles were the result.

Notes

1 R. ASCH, "Krone, Hof und Adel in den Ländem der Stuart Dynastie im Frühen 17. Jahrhundert", Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 1989, Bd 16. Hft. 2, p. 186; Mervyn JAMES, Society Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modem England, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

2 See Simon ADAMS, "The Patronage of the Crown in Elizabethan Politics: the 1590s in Perspective", in The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade, ed. John GUY, Cambridge, University Press, forthcoming

3 The only substantial Tudor employment of mercenaries occurred in the 1540s, see G. J. MILLAR, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries 1485-1547, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1980.

4 W.J. TIGHE, The Gentlemen Pensioners in Elizabethan Politics and Government, University of Cambridge Ph.D. Dissertation, 1983,pp. 12-15,18, 30, 34-36.

5 Sir John Fortescue: De Laudibus Legum Anglie, ed. Stanley B. CHRIMES, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1942, pp. 81-82; A Discourse of the Commonweal of this Realm of England, ed. M. DEWAR, Charlottesville, Folger Library, 1969, pp. 92-94.

6 PRO, S.P. 84/104/189-90. For frontier garrisons, see Simon ADAMS, "Tactics or Politics? The Military Revolution and the Hapsburg Hegemony, 1525-1648", in Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-1871, ed. J.A. LYNN, Urbana, University of Illinois, 1990, p. 38.

7 For Ireland in 1558, PRO, S.P. 63/1/8; for the 1590s, J.J. McGURK, The Recruitment and Transporting of Elizabethan Troops and their Service in Ireland, 1594-1603, University of Liverpool Ph.D. Dissertation, 1982, pp. 115-126; for Boulogne, G.J. MILLAR, op. cit., p. 167, and BL, Harleian Ms. 353; for Scotland, Michael L. BUSH, The Government Policy of Protector Somerset, London, Edward Arnold, 1975, p. 28; for Berwick, The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler, ed. A. CLIFFORD, Edinburgh, 1809, vol. II, pp. 3-4.

8 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade? The Composition of the Earl of Leicester's Expedition to the Netherlands, 1585-86", in The Dutch in Crisis, 1585-1588: People and Politics in Leicester's Time, ed. P. HOFTIZJER, Leiden, Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1988, p.9.

9 W.J. TIGHE, op. cit., pp.30, 34-36; Dale E. HOAK, "The King's Privy Chamber, 1547-1553", in Tudor Rule and Revolution: Essays for G.R. Elton from his American Friends, ed. D.J. GUTH and J.W. McKENNA, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 92.

10 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade?", art. cit., pp. 10-11.

11 Ibid, p. 15. For examples of the new attention paid to the militia in 1558, and Elizabethan impressment, see the two orders to the Justices of Peace of Herefordshire in 1558 and 1560: PRO, C. 115/M21 [Duchess of Norfolk's deposit, Scudamore papers] /7605-7606.

12 Kenneth B. MACFARLANE, England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays, London, Hambledon, 1981, introduction and ch.2; J.P. COOPER, "Retainers in Tudor England", in Land, Men and Beliefs: Studies in Early-Modern History, London, Hambledon, 1983, pp. 78-96.

13 Chris GIVEN-WILSON, The Royal Household and the King's Affinity; Service, Politics and Finance in England 1360-1413, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1986, ch. 4, esp. pp. 241-243; Jack R. LANDER, Politics and Power in England, 1450-1509, London, Edward Arnold, 1976, p. 34.

14 See John A. GUY, The Cardinal’s Court: The Impact of Thomas Wolsey in Star Chamber, Hassocks (Sussex), Harvester, 1977, pp. 31, 74; cf. Stanley B. CHRIMES, Henry VII, London, Eyre Methuen, 1977, pp. 187-191.

15 For general discussions, see John A. GUY, Tudor England, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 165-168, and The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War, ed. David STARKEY, London, Longman, 1987, pp. 87-91. For examples, see Eric W. IVES, "Patronage at the Court of Henry VIII: The Case of Sir Ralph Egerton of Ridley", BJRL, 1969-1970, t. LII, pp. 346-374, pp. 350, 363; S. J. GUNN, "The Regime of Charles, Duke of Suffolk in North Wales and the Reform of Wesh Government, 1509-25”, WHR, 1985, t. XII, pp. 462464; J.J. GORING, The Military Obligations of the English People, 1511-1558, University of London Fh.D. Dissertation, 1955, pp. 160-169.

16 The statute of 1495 (11 Henry VII, c.18) is quoted in Helen MILLER, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 133-134.

17 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade?", art. cit., pp. 15-17. For two further Marian examples of recruiting within "rules and offices", see Ms. Tanner 90, f° 198, and Soc. Antiq., Ms. 818 (J.E. JACKSON, Wiltshire Collections, vol. I), n.f., earl of Pembroke to Giles Gore and Roger Blake, 12 April 1554; compare with the post 1558 examples cited in note 11 above.

18 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade?", art. cit., pp. 17-22, and "The Gentry of North Wales and the Earl of Leicester's Expedition to the Netherlands, 1585-1586", WHR, 1974, t. VII, pp. 137-138. A list of Marian and Elizabethan licences to retain can be found in BL, Lansdowne Ms. 14, f° 1-1 v°.

19 Quoted in Mervyn JAMES, op. cit., p. 424.

20 PRO, S.P. 12/213/40, to Walsingham, 24 July 1588.

21 JRL, Leigh of Lyme Correspondence, folder I, Derby to Sir P. Leigh, 23 October 1585. For examples of leasehold and other tenurial military obligations, see J.P. COOPER, op. cit., esp. pp. 91-92; Lawrence STONE, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 214-216; Simom ADAMS, "Military Obligations of Leasehold Tenants in Leicesterian Denbigh" TDHS, 1975, t. XXIV, pp. 205-208; J.J. GORING, op. cit., pp. 93,146,149.

22 "The Autobiography of Sir James Croft", ed. R.E. HAM, BIHR, 1977, t. L, p. 50.

23 BL, Egerton Ms. 2815, account of John Pickarell, 18 May 1553. For Northumberland's household, PRO, LR 2/118. See also Simon ADAMS, "The Dudley Clientele, 1553-1563", in The Tudor Nobility, ed. George W. BERNARD, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992, pp. 241-265.

24 For the early-Tudor Somersets, see Helen MILLER, op. cit., pp. 135, 137, 144, 146. Captain Francis Somerset, a Berwick officer and the last member of the family to serve Elizabeth, was killed at Le Havre in 1563: HMC, Sixth Report, 1877, vol. II, p. 453.

25 For a full discussion, see Simon ADAMS, "Dudley Clientele", art. cit.

26 Simon ADAMS, "A Puritan Crusade art. cit., p. 11.

27 Simon ADAMS, "Stanley, York and Elizabeth's Catholics", HT, 1987, t. XXXVII, pp. 46-50.

28 For Pelham, see Simon ADAMS, "Faction, Clientage and Party: English Politics, 1550-1603". HT, 1982, t. XXXII, p. 37. For Morgan, BL, Cottonian Ms. Titus B VH, f° 38, to Leicester, 2 June 1581.

29 Burghley's most prominent military client was his relative Barnaby Goodge. Brief references to Sussex's military clientele in Ireland at the beginning of the reign can be found in Nicholas J. CANNY, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, Hassocks (Sussex), Harvester Press, 1976, pp. 42-43, 52-53.

30 For Essex's influence in Wales, see H. A. LLOYD, The Gentry of South West Wales, 1540-1640, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1968, pp. 112-118.

31 Only the recruiting for the Normandy campaign has been studied; H.A LLOYD, The Rouen Campaign 1590-1592, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973, ch. 5.

32 For a contemporary impression of Essex's clientele, see, Elizabeth of England, Certain Observations concerning the Life and Reign of Queen Elizabeth by John Clapham, ed E.R. and C.READ, Philadelphia, Uhiversity of Pennsylvania Press, p.94.

33 J.J.N. McGURK, th. cit., p. 503, notes that 475 captains served in Ireland in 1590s.

34 E.g, HMC, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Bath, Lardon, H.M.S.O., 1980, vol. V, p. 263, J. Baskerville to G. Meyrick, 30 April 1596.

35 For an example of the neo-classical atmosphere surrounding Essex, see L. JARDINE and A. GRAFTON, "Studied for Action: how Gabriel Harvey read his Livy", P & P, 1990, t. CXXIX, pp. 30-78.

36 Simon ADAMS, The Protestant Cause: religions alliance with the West European Calvinist Communities as a political issue in England, 1585-1630, University of Oxford DPhil Dissertation, 1973, pp. 438 et sq.

37 On Pembroke, see A. GEBAUER, Von Macht und Mäzenatentum; leben und werk William Herberts, des dritten Earls von Pembroke, Heidelberger Forschungen, 1987, vol. XXVIII, pp. 106-107.

38 Roy STRONG, Henry, Prince of Wales and England's Lost Renaissance, London, Thames & Hudson, 1986, p. 70.

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University of Strathclyde

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