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Back to Old Habits

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Renaud Egreteau
, 
Larry Jagan

Chapter Three. The Politics of “Isolationism without Isolation”

Texte intégral

  • 99 See MYA MAUNG, “The Burma Road to the Past…”, 1999.

1There is an interesting parallel with the historical period preceding the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885) that can be made with the current geopolitical situation in Burma. Since the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-53), the Burmese monarchy had been cut off from any access to the sea by the British and withdrawn to the heart of the Burman country with Mandalay as its prestigious capital. While the “white foreigners” (kala phyu) were dominating Rangoon, Akyab and Moulmein, internal feudal rivalries decimated the royal palace in Mandalay. The British public was indeed extremely fascinated in the early 1880s by the stories of King Thibaw’s legendary bloody cleansing of his entourage99. Isolated, Thibaw (1878-1885) nonetheless tried to establish cordial, if not tactical, relationships with its neighbours others than the British, starting with the French colonialists in Indochina, but avoiding direct confrontation with others as its predecessors did in Manipur, Arakan or China in the late 18th and early 19th century. For many, the comparison with today’s Burma with an internally divided military junta entrenched in Naypyidaw and courted by India and China is obvious.

  • 100 See for instance AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979: Socialism with Foreign Aid and Strict Neutrality”, Sout (...)

2But General Ne Win too opted for the same policy approach from the late 1960s, once the brutal autarchic decisions of his Revolutionary Council had dramatically damaged the country’s economy and society. Though shunning external influence and contacts since 1962, he had nevertheless developed discreet, but crucial, partnerships with a few countries willing to give economic and humanitarian assistance (Japan, West Germany…) or to offer direct financial and military relationships (USSR, United States in anti-drug cooperation, Yugoslavia, Poland…) to sustain the rapidly declining Burmese economy100.

3The main argument put forward hereafter is that the current Burmese junta now favours, and even more follows, the same isolationism-type diplomacy that dates back to both the Ne Win era and stems originally from the Burmese royal traditions, but without being completely isolated from the regional scene. This is a smart strategy well-suited to an authoritarian regime that remains insensitive to external condemnation. This skilfully calculated “isolationism without isolation” seems to have been acutely mastered by the Burmese generals since the early 2000s. Like the Burmese kings, the SPDC moved away and hid from the pressure of outsiders by creating a new capital in Naypyidaw, though the current junta strategically chose to move and was not forced to directly flee from Rangoon by external forces. Like Ne Win’s regime, it managed to “bunkerize” its centre of power, where access is now reduced to the will and whims of the Military leadership, enabling it to be in a position to choose its vital diplomatic partners by only letting those in who they want to and thereby exert greater control of their influence.

4In spite of being conscious of the necessity to get vital support from its immediate neighbours as well as a few other regional powers, the Burmese military seems to be taking greater care not to be too dependent on any of them, including China, as the regime’s gradual withdrawal from the international community after 2000 clearly illustrates. The first implication of this policy might be the temptation for the SPDC to back away from the ASEAN club -- which they believe is too closely linked to the Western powers especially in its economic activities – and move closer to India, Russia and individually Singapore, with the added advantage of counter-balancing Chinese influence. Yet, the nationalist and xenophobic tendencies of both a regime and a society marked by years of colonialism, political instability and Ne winian internal autarchy still constitutes a more powerful tool to effectively resist the outside world, including the immediate Indian or Asian neighbourhood, as the failure of the “Saffron Revolution” (September 2007) and the disastrous impact of Cyclone Nargis (May 2008) recently proved.

1 - Backing away from ASEAN (2006-2007)

  • 101 Cambodia’s Foreign Minister, Hor Nam Hong, described Burma’s relationship with ASEAN as a brother (...)
  • 102 For further academic analysis on the external pressure the ASEAN has faced in its dealing with Bur (...)

5The diplomatic option SLORC clearly favoured during the 1990s, integration into the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), gradually became a burden for the Burmese regime. For its part the regional bloc found Burma’s political stalemate obviously more and more embarrassing since Aung San Suu Kyi’s third arrest in 2003101. Not only did the Burmese issue hinder ASEAN’s internal institutional functioning, but it also impeded most of ASEAN’s efforts to foster its relationships with partners external to the region, especially the Western powers102.

  • 103 SEEKINS (Donald M.), “Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire”, Asian Survey, Volume 37, no6, Jun (...)
  • 104 Interview with Poksak Nilubol (Ambassador of Thailand to Burma, 1994-98), Bangkok, September 27, 2 (...)

6When it was originally established in 1967, ASEAN was deliberately rebuffed by General Ne Win who perceived the new regional association as too pro-US and out of sync with Burma’s self-isolated diplomatic stance. However, the regional geopolitical watershed of the early 1990s led both the new Burmese leadership and ASEAN’s six existing members to reconsider their strategic perceptions in face of the risks posed by a new Burma falling increasingly under the Chinese sphere of influence103. Common interests then imposed a tactical rapprochement between the ASEAN and the new Burmese junta. Though often seen as pro-China (he being ethnic Chinese) former Burmese Chief Intelligence General Khin Nyunt was one of the key architects of Rangoon’s entry into ASEAN, a policy that was also in ASEAN’s eyes supposed to counterbalance China’s influence both in Burma and the region. The organization also floated a few other incentives to accelerate Burma’s political transition into the region through its policy of “constructive engagement” with the junta. After harsh protracted negotiations104, Burma joined the ASEAN club in 1997.

7But both external and internal events helped undermine the development of a trustful osmosis between the ASEAN and the Burmese regime. By 1997-98, the objective of helping Burma slide away from China and towards Southeast Asia was significantly challenged. Indeed, Southeast Asia was devastated by a dramatic financial crisis in July 1997 at the very same time Rangoon was joining the Association. And China appeared to be the sole credible regional power that could help prevent Burma from being severely affected by the crisis, far from seeing it sliding away from the Burmese strategic field. Since then, Burma’s membership has been a major thorn for every party concerned: Burma itself, ASEAN and its diplomatic and commercial partners, especially the Western ones.

  • 105 Interview, Embassies of Thailand and Singapore in Burma, Rangoon, November 2007 and February 2008.
  • 106 VATIKIOTIS (Michael), “ASEAN key to Myanmar change”, Asia Times, October 24th, 2007.

8A thorn first in ASEAN’s diplomatic spirit, as the policy of “constructive engagement” with the Burmese military proved less than successful in the past decade. ASEAN indeed failed to lead Burma towards a credible path of transition and liberalization, as for instance post-Suharto Indonesia managed to do after 1998 (though the ASEAN role in the Indonesia case is all but minor). Aware of their decreasing political leverage over the Burmese junta compared to the 1990 decade, ASEAN’s leaders tended to rely more on bilateral relations to exert low-key pressure, especially Bangkok and Singapore – two of Burma’s most involved partners105. Yet for many observers, the engagement policy should not be abandoned but be pushed further, in more effective ways. Simply reverting to the sanction-cum-ostracism option prophesied by the Western powers would indeed be much detrimental to what has been built in the past fifteen years according to ASEAN diplomats, as it would increase the Burmese junta’s wishful isolation106.

  • 107 Burma is not exactly a model of combined strong political authoritarianism and successful economic (...)
  • 108 The International Herald Tribune, Historic Asean charter reveals divisions, November 20th, 2007.

9A thorn too in ASEAN’s internal functioning. The nine other members of the Association (since 1999) appear today to be much more divided over the Burmese issue than ten years ago. Malaysia and Singapore, first supporters of Burma’s integration into the ASEAN in the 1990s have dropped their rhetoric on the “Asian Values”, which seems unsuited to the Burmese appalling internal situation107. With Indonesia, they have been more critical of Naypyidaw since 2003, and their outspoken embarrassment contrasts sharply with the discreet positions of Hanoi, Vientiane or even Phnom Penh, which tend to be less prone to condemning the authoritarianism showed by the Burmese generals. The ASEAN Charter drawn up in 2007 (which Burma nevertheless signed in July 2008) and the Human Rights issue linked to one of its chapters, has illustrated those internal dissensions that the Burmese case rekindles at every ASEAN inter-governmental meeting108.

  • 109 Xinhua News Agency, ASEAN boycott of EU meeting a matter of principle, September 17th, 2005.
  • 110 Interview, Singaporean Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, March 6th, 2006.

10It has certainly also been a significant thorn in ASEAN’s relations with the Western powers, especially the United States and the European Union. Since 2003, every Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) has been undermined by the “Burma Question”. In September 2005, the ten ASEAN members boycotted the ASEM economic ministers’ meeting in Rotterdam after the Dutch hosts had refused to provide visas to the Burmese delegation in accordance with the EU visa-ban policy. This clearly highlighted the diplomatic and moral-oriented gridlock in which the Europe-ASEAN relationship had become stuck109. Above all, it also showed that ASEAN was ready to move on without the support of their European partners if the multilateral dialogue was to continue to be trapped by the Burma issue110.

  • 111 Various interviews with UN and Asian diplomats, Bangkok and Rangoon, 2003-2004.
  • 112 Interview, Thailand Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, February 27th, 2008.

11A thorn finally for the SPDC itself, which finds it more difficult to accept the growing pressure coming from ASEAN as an institution, which had first warmly welcomed it, but gradually offered less and less in return to the regime and tends to focus outspokenly on its “internal affairs”. If Burma needs bilateral commercial partnerships with each of the ASEAN members, it does not see the Association itself as a source of crucial interests. As proof, Senior-General Than Shwe himself, though Head of the Burmese State, has missed most of the recent ASEAN meetings. He indeed ordered first Khin Nyunt in October 2003 and then late Prime Minister Soe Win, followed by Prime Minister Thein Sein to represent him at each Summit. Some analysts even believe that Than Shwe created the post of Prime Minister in 2003 specifically to avoid going to ASEAN summits where he would be face-to-face criticised or pressured by his ASEAN counterparts111. This is extremely symptomatic of a strategy of gradually backing away from ASEAN, which most of the other ASEAN members are now well aware of112.

  • 113 JAGAN (Larry), “Rangoon lets Asean off the hook”, The Bangkok Post, July 29th, 2005.

12Interestingly, the ASEAN chairmanship issue -- Burma was scheduled to chair the Association for the year 2006 -- was even more illustrative of this tendency. After months of pressure from an international media campaign, led by Burmese exiled groups, Human Rights organisations and few Western chanceries, the Burmese regime decided to relinquish its right to the 2006 ASEAN presidency in July 2005113. While the activist community hailed it as a victory, the junta’s decision to withdraw itself reflected far more its isolationist tendencies than the effect of external pressure and lobbying. By opting for the easiest solution, Burma avoided being made the centre of constant and media-oriented pressure for a whole year. More crucially, it allowed the regime to transfer its own capital to Naypyidaw without any interference between 2005-2006. Sweeping the problem under the carpet, all ASEAN members informally agreed to wait for another alphabetical round before Burma (or “Myanmar” more precisely) could effectively chair the Association, possibly in 2015.

  • 114 Interview with Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, Bali, July 6, 2003.
  • 115 Various discussions with Indonesian, Cambodian, Malaysian and Singaporean diplomats based in Rango (...)
  • 116 Reuters, Laos and Cambodia slam Myanmar sanctions, November 18th, 2007.
  • 117 The Irrawaddy-On-Line, Burma remains the bad boy in the ASEAN family, November 16, 2007, available (...)

13As a consequence, though politically isolated, Burma remains a member of ASEAN. But it is not without its cost. It pays a huge annual fee as a contribution and has to bear the expenses of its officials attending the Organization’s numerous meetings every year. Given Burma’s “pariah” status on the international scene, there have been suggestions that the group might expel Burma on several occasions since Burma joined it. In principle, all it would take is for the other nine countries to agree114. But this is highly unlikely that the ASEAN Club will go that far115. Indeed, the risk of setting an institutional precedent is very high, and in so doing would potentially threaten other member states. Why not then expel Laos for its harsh treatment of the H’mong ethnic minority, Singapore for its restrictions on political opposition and freedom of expression, Vietnam for its lack of free and fair elections? Few countries would feel comfortable. Non-interference in each other’s affairs remains a crucial settlement on which the ten members have always agreed116. So the “bad boy”, Burma stays in the ASEAN family117.

  • 118 Reuters, Myanmar may free Suu Kyi in six months: Singapore minister, July 20, 2008.

14Beside, ASEAN’s leverage over the Burmese regime should not be overestimated, for is not in Burma’s immediate and vital interests to stay in the Association. In the 1990s, it offered the junta important diplomatic contacts, but since then, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and the two former Foreign Ministers U Win Aung (fired in 2004) and U Ohn Gyaw (previously sacked in 1998) who had been appreciated for their diplomatic overtures and networks are now out of the regional picture. ASEAN offers much less utility to a military regime that tends basks in its own isolationism, as we have demonstrated. The new Burmese leaders, most of who came up through the ranks as infantry soldiers, are not versed in diplomatic rhetoric and games (late General Soe Win, General Thein Sein, as well as the new Foreign Affairs Minister since 2004, General Nyan Win illustrate this image of soldiers-turned-“diplomats”). They obviously do not enter with the same diplomatic spirit, taking no individual initiative (especially during informal discussions at these international summits or giving press interviews). After a dinner of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 2008, the Singaporean George Yeo revealed what he understood as a confidence offered by his counterpart General Nyan Win: the near liberation of Aung San Suu Kyi118. The misunderstanding was swiftly addressed and corrected by Naypyidaw. Nyan Win had no power to announce such a high-stake political decision. All Burmese diplomats answer directly to the junta’s top leadership, denying the ASEAN leaders when they meet any direct potential leverage.

  • 119 Kyodo News, ASEAN has better way to deal with Myanmar, Indonesian envoy says, September 15, 2004.

15Whereas ASEAN, as an Association, offers little directly to the Burmese regime, maintaining close bilateral relationships with its members remains essential for it. The three Indochinese states (Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia) and Brunei undeniably offer Burma tacit support on the strict implementation of “non-interference” in each other’s internal affairs (thereby avoiding any possible backlash). Since Dr. Mahathir’s retirement in 2003, Malaysia has become much less influential in Burma and dropped its rhetoric on Asian values – especially on the Burmese issue -- thus receiving much less emphatic signs from the Burmese who see a former ally keeping its distance. Indonesia too seems to be in the same position: though willing to push for internal reforms in Burma, since its own transition started in 1998, Jakarta has been facing increasing internal and external difficulties and tends to be left aside by the junta, as the failure of Ali Alatas successive missions showed. The Indonesia Special Envoy while Jakarta was chairing ASEAN in 2004 has gained very few promises from the Burmese leadership119. The fact that Indonesia joined the UN Security Council in 2007 had though seen Jakarta pursuing its leading diplomatic activities dealing with the Burmese issue. On their side, the Philippines remain the junta’s most vocal opponent, thus having no potential influence within the country. That leaves Thailand and Singapore as the most crucial partners of the Burmese regime. However, frustration remains also in the diplomatic and commercial elite of the two countries.

  • 120 Various fieldwork conducted in the border areas from Tachileik/Mae Sai to Kawthaung/Ranong (2003-2 (...)
  • 121 Discussion with Pr. Sunait Chutintaranond, Head of the Southeast Asian Studies Center, Chulalongko (...)

16With India and China, Thailand is Burma’s third most important neighbour, but it might be the most economically vital, especially along the dynamic Thai-Burma borders120. Despite traditionally estranged bilateral relations, influenced by a historical arch-rivalry, Thailand and Burma actively benefit from each others’political and economic situation121. Cross-border trade (both legal and illegal, of licit and illicit products) is essential to the vitality of the whole region. The Thai economy – with more or less no qualms – makes the most of the presence of some 2 million Burmese migrants on its soil and Burma largely takes profit from various formal and informal investments made by Thai investors in the country since 1989. Billions of US$ are traded every year in a larger way than between Burma and China or even India. As a matter of fact, this dynamism is partly due to the Thai and ASEAN opposition to the sanctions policies imposed on Burma by the West, as well as the “frontier” geopolitical configuration of the border areas.

  • 122 GANESAN (N.), “Thai-Myanmar-ASEAN Relations: the Politics of Face and Grace”, Asian Affairs, Vol. (...)
  • 123 Interview with Poksak Nilubol (Ambassador of Thailand to Burma, 1994-98), Bangkok, September 27, 2 (...)

17But in spite of this overwhelming economic leverage potential, Bangkok has never been regarded as a critical diplomatic partner by the Burmese military regime122. There is a traditional distrust of the Thai authorities that have always kept an interested eye on the non-Burman insurgent groups operating at its borders (Karens, Karennis, Mons, Shans…), that welcomed thousands of Burmese exiled activists in Bangkok, Chiang Mai or Mae Sot, and is subject to a strong Western cultural influence. It has consequently always deterred the Burmese junta from getting too close to its eastern neighbour. Rangoon’s entry to the ASEAN in the mid-1990s had been rigorously negotiated with Thai diplomats123, and Burma has since then demonstrated its reluctance to follow any of Thailand’s political incentives or initiatives as the failure of the Bangkok Process in 2004 or the difficulties former Prime Minister Thaksin faced clearly demonstrates. Furthermore, the Thai Military has always played a key role in the development of Thailand’s Burma policy, regularly bypassing the Thai Foreign Ministry or even the Prime Minister’s Office, given the strategic issue involved along the borders.

  • 124 One month after Thaksin’s latest visit to Naypyidaw: The Nation [Thailand], Thaksin’s Burma trip a (...)
  • 125 AFP, Thai PM’s Myanmar visit invites uncomfortable comparisons, November 23rd, 2006.
  • 126 AFP, Thai junta leader arrives in Myanmar, August 27th, 2007.
  • 127 The Straits Times [Singapore], Thai PM defends investments in Myanmar, March 25th, 2008.
  • 128 Interviews, Embassy of Thailand in Burma, Rangoon, November 13th, 2007 and February 27th, 2008.

18Bilateral dialogue remains shrouded in secrecy. As an example, five days before the elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown by a military coup in September 19th, 2006, the Royal Thai Army leader, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, paid an official visit to Burma124. But obviously, no change of policy had been planned between the countries, in spite of the regime change in Bangkok. Quite the opposite, military-to-military relations were strengthened. Afterwards, Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, leader of the Thai junta since September 2006 was invited to Naypyidaw in November 2006125 while the Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief General Sonthi paid another visit to Burma in late August 2007126. The return of civilian rule in Thailand after the December 2007 elections won by Thaksin’s supporters did not alter the pace of bilateral relations either. In March 2008, newly-nominated Prime Minister Samak paid its first official trip to Burma to confirm commercial connections were more crucial than political tensions127. As proof, Thailand was able to send medical aid and rescue teams to Burma after the Cyclone Nargis devastated parts of the country in May 2008. However, being able to effectively press the Burmese military regime for smoother liberal decisions or to accelerate the internal transitional process following the most recent model offered by the Thais (in power since the September 2006 coup, the Royal Thai Army went back to its barracks after the December 2007 democratic elections) remains a too utopian way for a yet strategic neighbour128.

  • 129 ASHTON (William), “Burma receives advances from its silent suitors in Singapore”, Jane’s Intellige (...)

19If not Thailand, many observers have thought Singapore might have the most effective leverage over Burma within the ASEAN. Since the early 1990s, this successful city-state has been largely investing in the still state-controlled Burmese economy, bargaining crucial commercial deals (including alleged underground ones129) and participating under the influential Lee family to give substantial diplomatic support to the junta in the international and regional arena. By welcoming SLORC’s new philosophy modelled on Chinese and Singaporean authoritarian and capitalist systems soon after 1988, Singapore has subsequently enjoyed strong and valuable linkages with the whole Burmese economic, military and political structure, which for its part embraced the spirit of the “Asian Values” argued by Lee Kuan Yew and its Malaysian counterpart Dr. Mahathir in the early 1990s.

  • 130 Including Lee Kuan Yew himself: The International Herald Tribune, Report: Singapore leader critici (...)
  • 131 Various discussions with successive Singaporean Ambassadors and diplomats posted in Burma, as well (...)
  • 132 Discussions with various Burmese academics working in Singapore, September 2005.

20However, a decade or so afterwards, Burma failed to reach the level of development militarized countries like South Korea or Taiwan (or even Chile or Argentina in Latin America) achieved in the 1980s following the same ideology of accelerated authoritarian liberalization. Obviously disappointed by the lack of progress and the incapacity (or unwillingness) of the new Burmese regime to follow the same path, many Singaporean leaders have gradually expressed their embarrassment in the past few years130. A source of concern for the city-state in its dealing with the West, Burma became soon was seen as a diplomatic burden; it also became a hardship posting for Singaporean diplomats as Burma lost its image as a new commercial frontier where myriads of (easy) investments opportunities are to be found131. Furthermore, with the purge of General Khin Nyunt’s “MI” in 2004 and the “retreat” of the regime to Naypyidaw a year later, Singapore too witnessed the Burmese regime backing away. Nevertheless, most of the leverage the city-state has on Burma is built up through personal connections within Singapore, and not Burma itself. Whether for diplomatic, military, banking or medical reasons, regular visits of Burmese officials to Singapore have eased the bilateral linkages and maintain a dialogue well-sought by Singaporean leaders unenthusiastic at the idea of Burma sliding back towards China or even India while withdrawing itself like in the 1980s132.

21As a consequence, Singapore has been giving a tacit support to the Burmese junta’s Road Map. At least the SPDC agenda offers a possible way out of the political stalemate think the Singaporean’s Burma watchers. If well and carefully implemented, the 7-step political programme of the Burmese regime would satisfy its partner, which had thus been diplomatically discreet and vague in its rhetoric describing (and welcoming) the May 2008 referendum and the announcement of elections for 2010 in Burma. After a couple of years marked by the passionate international debate around Burma’s potential chairmanship of the ASEAN, then the failure of the “Saffron Revolution” and more recently the cyclone Nargis, Singapore paid the price of its close partnership with the junta in terms of diplomatic image on the international scene. The city-state is often considered as the Asian “Switzerland” of the Burmese regime, turning a blind eye to the wide fortune the Burmese leaders have accumulated there.

  • 133 Reuters, Singapore distancing itself from Myanmar–analysts, October 30th, 2007.

22Pressure was exerted on the Singaporean leaders, especially through strong American diplomatic lobbying, in order to get them to participate in more globally effective sanctions against the Burmese regime after the 2007 and 2008 crises in Burma. There were visible consequences, including the difficulties faced by the Burmese tycoon Tay Za, whose links with the Burmese top leadership are well known133. However, Singapore’s leverage on Burma is limited by its reluctance to both ostracize Burma and at the same time to reveal its own lack of ability to efficiently influence it (thus “losing face”). Also, Singapore might try to influence the junta and achieve concrete results in terms of diplomatic and commercial opening-up but not as far as Burma’s internal affairs are concerned. An acceleration and credible implementation of the Burmese regime’s Road Map would suit the small Southeast Asian State, but beside it, could Singapore really be in position to advice the Burmese regime to free Aung San Suu Kyi, liberalize the society, adopt a free and fair democratic system with freedom of expression, gathering or creation of political parties, while itself not fully guarantying those basic civil liberties?

2 - Limits to the Sino-Burmese partnership

  • 134 U Nu, September 5th, 1950, quoted by THOMSON, John S., “Burmese Neutralism”, Political Science Qua (...)

23If the ASEAN Club appears to be, as a regional institution, much less crucial to the Burmese junta’s primary diplomatic interests than bilateral relations with (some of) its members, establishing valuable partnerships with the two other big Asian neighbours that adjoin Burma has become essential for the regime. In the past, each time Burma alienated itself from either India or China, or even both of them, the state was threatened and the economy weakened. Back in the 1950s, Prime Minister U Nu used to describe his country as “hemmed in like a tender gourd among the cactus”, forced to constantly take into account its geographical position134. When the implementation of Ne Win’s radical “Burmanization” policies led to the deportation of nearly 300,000 Chinese and Indian traders, shop-keepers, landlords and money-lenders between 1962-1965, both Beijing and New Delhi strongly loathed the new Burmese autarchic regime, which for its part suffered terribly from the harsh economic consequences of such an anti-China and anti-India global approach.

  • 135 DESHPANDE (G. P.), “India and Burma: Two More Steps to End Insurgency”, China Report, Vol. 4, May- (...)
  • 136 EGRETEAU (Renaud), “India and China Vying for Influence in Burma: A New Assessment”, India Review, (...)

24Befriending at least one of its two strongest neighbours remains indeed essential to Burma, regardless of the nature of its regime. In 1967-68, Ne Win managed to overcome the crisis born out of Burma’s strong rejection of the Chinese Cultural Revolution’s forays into Burma, by moving closer to Indira Gandhi’s India, which opted for a punctual cooperation, especially against the Naga rebels along the Indo-Burmese border135. Two decades later, when New Delhi was at the forefront of the international opposition to the newly installed SLORC during the summer 1988, Rangoon easily turned towards China to find a vital helping hand. But when this Sino-Burmese partnership grew unbalanced, with Beijing getting an overwhelming toehold in Burma, India appeared, like ASEAN, as a credible counterweight for the Burmese regime. Since the early 2000s, Burma has proved to be in position to find in both Beijing and New Delhi, two regional powers willing to engage the regime (each in its own way), establish military cooperation, exploit the country’s resources, and if the case arose, checkmate the regional influence of the other rival’s, and all this in the interest of the regime136.

  • 137 TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Myanmar and China: A Special Relationship?”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2003, (...)

25Despite occasional misunderstanding and a growing frustration perceptible in Beijing’s higher political spheres, loyalty and fidelity have always been paramount in the strong Sino-Burmese partnership ever since 1988137. Yet the most influential and powerful regional power in and around Burma, China has however recently experienced several setbacks in its close relationship with the Burmese military regime. In 2004, the sacking of General Khin Nyunt, Prime Minister and head of the dreadful Military Intelligence Services (MI) came as a bombshell for many Chinese officials. With the purge of hundreds of MI officers and agents in October 2004, China lost a critical network within the Burmese regime, a network that had been built up since 1988 through personal relationships, high-rank visits of Burmese Intelligence and Foreign Affairs, Chinese Communist Party officials, and a deep understanding of each other’s needs and interests, both on the regional and internal political scene.

  • 138 Interviews, Chinese diplomats, Rangoon (2005-2008).
  • 139 MALIK (Mohan J.), “Regional Reverberations from Regime Shake-up in Rangoon”, Asia Pacific Center f (...)

26Many Chinese diplomats have already expressed their frustration in front of the gap that had widened between them and the junta’s decision-making centre since 2004138. Once the nationalist hardliners of the Tatmadaw had got the upper hand after the MI purge, China bitterly measured how fundamental were its links with the Burmese Intelligence, more pragmatic and outward-looking, but not with the Burmese Army’s power centre. However, although the ousting of Khin Nyunt sent a clear message to Beijing139, the “China card” has still been very much played by the SPDC since 2004, even if General Than Shwe or Maung Aye had never showed any sinophile tendencies. Many reassurances have been given to the Chinese by the Burmese top leadership, with late Prime Minister Gen. Soe Win visiting China in November 2004, November 2005, and February 2006, his successor Gen. Thein Sein also paid an important/first leading official trip to Beijing in June 2007. Gen. Than Shwe himself had talks with the Chinese President Hu Jintao in Jakarta during a Asia-Africa Summit held in April 2005.

  • 140 MYA MAUNG, “On the Road to Mandalay: A Case Study of the Sinonization of Upper Burma”, Asian Surve (...)
  • 141 Reuters, China expresses surprise at Myanmar capital move, May 23rd, 2007.
  • 142 JAGAN (Larry), “China’s uneasy alliance with Myanmar”, Asia Times, February 24th, 2006.
  • 143 Interviews, Embassy of China in Burma, Rangoon, November 9th, 2007 and February 26th, 2008.

27Despite being vital to Burma and its regime, the Chinese partnership had, in the eyes of the Burmese Military, to be balanced and not out of control. The sinophobic propensity of the Burmese society revived by the overwhelming presence of new Yunnanese migrants in Northern Burma and the predatory relationship established by China throughout the 1990s140 had already sparked a reassessment of the need and patterns of the bilateral relationship in the 2000s. After the MI purge, the transfer of the capital from Rangoon to Naypyidaw in November 2005 further participated to this strategy. Like the sacking of Khin Nyunt, it too came as a shock to China, obviously unprepared for this new astounding decision of the Burmese regime141. Unwilling to move its Rangoon embassy there, though it is not definitely ruled out, China has witnessed a further alienation of the Burmese regime, whose top leadership clearly opted for a strategic entrenchment that concerned the Chinese too, and not only distrusted UN Agencies, Western embassies and NGOs settled in Rangoon142. Access to the leaders of the Burmese junta or the Tatmadaw has now been far more complicated for the Chinese, although the Ambassador, Political Counsellors and Military Attaches are regularly brought to Naypyidaw on special aircrafts for regular meetings with the junta’s representatives143.

  • 144 “A victory for the Burmese junta”, The Nation, January 16th, 2007; “UN veto on Myanmar could embol (...)
  • 145 Xinhua News Agency, Construction of China-Myanmar oil pipeline expected to start this year, April (...)
  • 146 JAGAN (Larry), “China’s thumb in every Burmese pie”, The Bangkok Post, June 21st, 2007.
  • 147 JAGAN (Larry), “Generals express interest in Chinese-style government”, Inter Press Service, July (...)

28On January 12th, 2007, China proved to be once more a crucial ally when it vetoed, along with Russia, a US-led resolution aimed at condemning Burma at the United Nations Security Council144. For many observers, Burma rewarded the spectacular (though predictable) move of its principal support by letting a Chinese state-controlled Oil company (China National Petroleum Corp.) sign an exploration deal involving three offshore blocks off the Arakan coast four days later, while a 1-billion US$ pipeline project linking Western Burma and Yunnan was agreed between Beijing and Naypyidaw in April 2007145. Despite frustration and lack of progress in internal Burmese politics, China remains an “all-weather friend” on which the SPDC can rely if the latter gives back valuable incentives146. But the Chinese embarrassment has become increasingly evident in face of the stagnation of economic and political reforms in Burma. Though having strong interests in following the Chinese model of political authoritarianism mixed with liberal economic opening-ups147, the Burmese generals have failed to efficiently implement it in the past two decades. Burma remains far behind its neighbours or ASEAN partners in terms of development and economic progress, which hinders Beijing’s global ambitions in the region.

  • 148 Reuters, China urges Myanmar to pursue ‘democracy process’, September 14th, 2007.

29China however clearly supports the junta’s Road Map, finding in it a political agenda that presents a viable way to overcome the current internal gridlock and ease Burma’s relationship with the outside world -- thus taking a huge diplomatic weight off Beijing’s shoulder. A Khin Nyunt initiative announced in August 2003, but taken over by General Than Shwe’s entourage after the former Prime Minister was sacked, the 7-point Road Map towards a “disciplined democracy” would fulfil China’s political interests in Burma, only if the junta’s programme was implemented accordingly. The long drawn out process kicked off with the reconvening of the National Convention (from May 2004 to September 2007) and the seemingly endless constitutional drafting appeared to have embarrassed the Chinese authorities148. But the speeding up of the process, after the political crisis as a result of the monk-led demonstrations in September 2007 and the organisation of the referendum that approved the new constitution in May 2008 certainly satisfied Beijing.

  • 149 As confirmed by I. Gambari himself during a phone interview, November 26, 2007.
  • 150 Interviews with Chinese diplomats, Bangkok, October 2007, and Rangoon, November 9th, 2007. In the (...)

30The two crises borne out of the monks demonstrations and the cyclone Nargis highlighted again the peculiar Sino-Burmese relationship, as Beijing was seen by the international community as the sole regional power able to exert any real influence on the Burmese junta, in order to prompt it to moderation. No other country, even Thailand or Singapore, appeared to be in position to influence in 2007 or 2008 the military regime, unwilling to publicly face international pressure on what it considered to be internal matters. China’s role proved to be crucial in the very first days following the brutal crackdown of the swiftly-called “Saffron Revolution”. It is clear that Beijing facilitated the UN Special Envoy for Burma, Ibrahim Gambari’s first visit to Rangoon (between September 29 and October 3, 2007) since November 2006149. The appeasement was brought about by the mediation of Chinese diplomats and officials in New York, Beijing and Naypyidaw (to where the Chinese Ambassador in Rangoon had been flown in regularly since the beginning of the crisis150). The Chinese were also influential in arranging further official trips to Burma by Mr. Gambari between November 5-10, 2007 and by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights for Burma, Paulo S. Pinheiro (November 11-15, 2007)–his first time since November 2003.

  • 151 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s Stonewall”, The Bangkok Post, March 6th, 2008 and JAGAN (Larry), “Swansong (...)
  • 152 United Press International, China arms Myanmar Military, March 14th, 2008.
  • 153 Interview, Embassy of China, Rangoon, February 26th, 2008.
  • 154 Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Premier expects Myanmar to care about overseas Chinese, February 15th, (...)
  • 155 Reuters, Chinese influx stirs old-age hatred in Myanmar, March 12th, 2008.

31A third trip to Rangoon of Ibrahim Gambari, a visit also facilitated by China was organised between March 7-10, 2008, but without much tangible progress being made. Not only did Mr Gambari not meet the Burmese top leaders during his days in Naypyidaw, but his fifth mission to Burma ended clouded in suspicion that the United Nations’ could not help solve Burma’s current political deadlock151. Though China gained the assurance of seeing the Sino-Burmese partnership furthered152, the diplomatic embarrassment caused by the pressure of Western powers, which considered Burma as a Chinese pawn that could be easily manipulated by its “patron” and allowed the ASEAN countries to off-load their responsibility or Burma onto Beijing irritated many Chinese officials153. The gradual isolationist withdrawal of the Burmese generals once the immediate problems of the September 2007 crisis vanished -- a policy that has proved very effective over the last two decades, illustrated the limits of China’s overall influence on Burma’s leaders. The Chinese awareness of the dormant sinophobia inherent to both the Burmese regime and society impedes the development of a stronger stance by China towards the Burmese junta, yet frustrated and annoyed Beijing may be154. Despite common ideas that a sinophobic outburst is always on the brink even today155, anti-China attitudes in Burma had been so far “managed” since the early 1990s as no anti-Chinese pogroms similar to the ones that erupted in 1967 had been witnessed.

3 - Cautiously gentling with India

  • 156 Egreteau (Renaud), Wooing the Generals…, 2003.
  • 157 LALL (Marie-Carine), “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy”, Contemporary South (...)

32India too has proved its willingness to engage Burma whatever the cost may be in terms of international image. Since its policy shift of the early 1990s, when it opted for a gradual “engagement” of the SLORC, India has developed a peculiar relationship with its eastern neighbour. Trying to emulate China’s Burmese strategy to gain a sound foothold in a country whose history is intimately linked to the Indian subcontinent, New Delhi has conducted in the past fifteen years a velvet policy towards the Burmese junta, mixed with commercial opportunities, mutual understanding on security issues, and diplomatic mutism on every matter considered as internal affairs156. Confirmed throughout the 2000s, India’s new Burma Policy has not been merely focusing on the development of bilateral economic relations, with new Indian ambitions in the Burmese energy sector, as well as on a nevertheless awkward military cooperation along the porous Indo-Burmese border157. Though having achieved only limited success in the past few years, the bilateral trade has still not reached 1 billion US$ in 2007, with India only dominating the Burmese pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors. Three major Indian Oil companies have however been at the forefront of foreign investments in Burma in 2007 (ONGC-V, GAIL and Essar Oil).

  • 158 EGRETEAU (Renaud), “India’s Ambitions in Burma: Towards an Overpriced Relationship?”, Asian Survey(...)

33However, the cautious attitude of the Indian authorities towards the Burmese regime as well as the commercial and military incentives India has been offering its neighbours have not facilitated a credible thrust of India’s interests throughout/in Burma, as was the case for China in the early 1990s. Even if New Delhi has brought a well-needed balance in Burma’s geopolitical landscape, especially in the Western reclusive areas (Sagaing Division, Arakan State), in the eyes of the Burmese regime it remains at a much lower level of strategic importance compared to China. India indeed does not boast a veto power at the UN Security Council. It also suffers from a strong geographical constraint with the Patkai, Naga and Lushai Hills offering a much more substantial obstacle to the East-West trade corridor in face of the logical North-South commercial corridor along by the Irrawaddy River running from the Yunnan borders to the Indian Ocean. And finally the Indians have to take into account a strong cultural image deficit in a country bruised by a century of British colonisation during which the Indian community (the “Kalas”) were perceived as even more predatory than the Europeans colonialists. The new Indo-Burmese partnership wished by New Delhi, though much unbalanced appears thus to be more profitable to Burma than to India158.

  • 159 The Hindustan Times, Myanmar requests SAARC membership, India backing it: report, May 20th, 2008.

34The Burmese junta indeed takes great care to offer the Indian authorities a seductive face, even if China remains the main loyal partner. Burma has continued to play this “India card” ever since the first two landmark visits of General Maung Aye to India in 2000. But Burma has defined its Indian policy according to its own interests, thus not letting India alone delineate the Indo-Burmese partnership on its own terms. For the Burmese regime, it remains crucial to secure much needed investments in the key-sectors (Natural Gas, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure with the construction of roads and ports, where the Chinese or Thai neighbours are not investing), valuable military cooperation from one of the strongest regional armed forces (especially along the Indo-Burmese borders where anti-Indian and anti-Burmese insurgents have established strong underground networks) and a tacit silence on its internal affairs, avoiding disturbing diplomatic criticism from an emerging regional power that had pushed for a further integration of Burma into the regional institutional scene through the BIMST-EC and MGC organisations, and to a lesser extend, the SAARC159.

  • 160 The New Light of Myanmar, Senior General Than Shwe receives Indian External Affairs Minister, Marc (...)
  • 161 The New Light of Myanmar, Vice-Senior General Maung Aye receives Minister for External Affairs of (...)
  • 162 Indo-Asian News Service, Differing from West, India expands ties with Myanmar, April 12th, 2007.

35As a consequence, Naypyidaw regularly welcomes at the highest possible level every Indian delegation that visits Burma. While usually extremely conscious of protocol, the Burmese top generals and ministers often meet Indian officials, even if they have a lower function or grade. General Than Shwe met the visiting Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Natwar Singh in March 2005, whereas he usually snubs other leading foreign diplomats (apart for the Chinese)160. As the SPDC’s Vice-Chairman, General Maung Aye saw Singh’s successor, Pranab Mukherjee, in January 2007161. The Burmese junta appears to know how to cultivate its links with this neighbour, which is nevertheless still considered as a potential threat, politically -- as it was after the 1988 uprising –, culturally and socio-economically. Well aware of India’s strategic agenda in the region, with an Indian policy and ideology that differs from those of the political democracies (West, Japan…162), Burma has proved it is ready to align itself with its neighbours in few areas of strategic importance, but at its own pace. Sending mixed messages to their Indian interlocutors, the Burmese generals tend to let India come into the Burmese strategic field while balancing the Indian ambitions through a resurgence of traditional “indophobic” sentiments within the Burmese regime and a careful redefining of its other partnerships, especially with China.

  • 163 See for instance: RAMACHANDRAN (Sudha), “Myanmar power play leaves India smiling”, Asia Times, Oct (...)
  • 164 KUPPUSWAMY (C.S.), “Myanmar: Visit of the Indian President”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. (...)

36In October 2004, General Than Shwe’s visit to India just a week after he ousted his own Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt (who was perceived as one of the most pro-Chinese elements of the junta), was swiftly interpreted by Indian analysts as a positive sign for New Delhi163. In retrospect, the previous official trip to Burma of the Indian President Abdul Kalam, (in 2006) and then of General Maung Aye to New Delhi, (in 2008) still fuels perceptions that there is a pro-India faction within the Burmese Army164. But most signs are that the Indo-Burmese partnership was fragile and not based on mutual understanding as it was officially pretended, and that pro-Indian circles within the junta were merely nationalist elements willing to back away from the Chinese influence by getting closer to a logical neighbouring counterweight. This was however not the only strategic option open to the SPDC as the rapprochement with Russia and the maintenance of its crucial relationship with Singapore has illustrated in recent years.

  • 165 The Indian Express, Fleet expansion in mind, Myanmar looks to India for expertise, January 13th, 2 (...)
  • 166 See for instance the declarations of the Indian Defence, then Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee: A (...)
  • 167 Various personal interviews with Indian diplomats working in or on Burma made between 2002 and 200 (...)
  • 168 The Hindu, Myanmar: Rhetoric and reality of Indian democracy, August 9th, 2007.

37If India has been willing to get closer to Burma in terms of military cooperation (maritime collaboration, sales of weapons, training of Burmese officers165) and economic assistance while avoiding taking a publicly critical stance on the SPDC’s political management of any internal affairs166, India appears as an emerging regional democratic power in an awkward position since the turmoil in Burma in August-September 2007. Indian diplomats and policymakers are usually prickly about the new orientation of New Delhi’s Burma approach and tend to suffer criticism badly, especially from the Burmese and pro-democracy activist community or from Western chanceries167. The discreet position New Delhi took during the monk-led demonstrations in Burma (September 2007) and the subsequent repression by the military regime illustrated India’s difficulties in defining a realist neighbourhood policy without suffering a loss of credibility as a great and responsible power. Nonetheless sensitive to internal forces driven by a vibrant Indian civil society that has embraced Burma’s democratic struggle since 1988168 and to Western pressure, India was quick to isolate itself from the Burmese turmoil, and was obviously embarrassed by the unpredictability of its crucial neighbour.

  • 169 The Indian Express, Myanmar burning, MEA told Deora: we need to visit but keep it low-key, Septemb (...)
  • 170 AFP, India on defensive as pressure mounts over Myanmar, September 14th, 2007.
  • 171 MOHAN (C. Raja), “South Block’s Burma Shell”, The Indian Express, September 28th, 2007.
  • 172 Various interviews with foreign diplomats based in Rangoon, November 2007. See also the Bangkok Po (...)

38It too has regularly sent the wrong signals to Burma watchers and the international community when a previously planned official visit to Naypyidaw led the Indian Minister for Petrol and Natural Gas went ahead right in the middle of the “Saffron Revolution” (September 25-26, 2007169) or when it refused to openly compel Burma to accelerate its transition process and liberalization, by sheltering behind a sacro-saint diplomatic principle of “non-interference in other’s internal affairs”170. After all, India has a long history of politically and militarily interfering in the internal affairs of its immediate neighbourhood, from Bangladesh (1971) to Sri Lanka (1987-90), the Maldives (1988) and Nepal in the last few years171. The image of a greedy India rushing into Burma before the Chinese rival get too much of a stronghold, while showing little interest in the Burmese internal upheavals, has been widely diffused (and accepted as such) in international diplomatic, political and economic circles172.

  • 173 The Hindustan Times, India tells Myanmar to probe crackdown on protest, October 2nd, 2007.
  • 174 Various interviews with Western and Asian diplomats based in Rangoon, February 2008. Even Rangoon- (...)
  • 175 The Hindustan Times, India votes against UN resolution on Myanmar, November 21st, 2007.

39Though the Indian Foreign Minister has attempted to clarify and revise India’s position by asking the Burmese authorities to set up an inquiry into the brutal repression of the “disturbances” of late September 2007173, India has had very limited leverage over the SPDC’s internal strategy. During the crisis, many Western powers and UN officials saw New Delhi as one of the few credible powers, along with China, able to temper and influence the Burmese government given the growing Indo-Burmese economic and military cooperation. The UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and his team paid several consulting visits to India after September 2007, while Indian diplomats regularly discussed Burma in New York or during other intergovernmental gatherings. But Beijing appeared to have been the sole power in a position to be listened to, though partially and reluctantly, by the Burmese junta174. In November 2007, only a few days after the visits of Mr. Gambari and then Paulo S. Pinheiro, UN Rapporteur on Human Rights, to Burma, the Indian representative to the UN General Assembly voted against a resolution condemning the repression of the Burmese monks’ demonstrations which had been sponsored by Western countries175.

  • 176 SRIVASTAVA (Siddharth), “India lays out a red carpet for Myanmar”, Asia Times, April 5th, 2008.
  • 177 Interview with Rajiv Bhatia, Ambassador of India to Burma, Rangoon, May 9th, 2004.

40Internal dissensions in India’s political elite have gradually emerged. Sensitive to Indian public opinion, which heavily favours India supporting the rise of democratic ideals in Burma, but aware of the catastrophic consequences of a strategic shift in policy that would discard fifteen years of engagement with a strategic neighbour, India’s central policymakers have been increasingly embarrassed to face such a serious quandary. However, the landmark visit to India of the Burmese junta’s Vice-president, General Maung Aye in April 2008 proved India had no choice but to further its relationship with a military regime even more firmly entrenched than before the “Saffron Revolution”176. The focus was on economic cooperation, with the signature of the Multi-modal project of the Kaladan River, about which the Indians have been extremely enthusiastic since 2004177.

41India’s discreet position had somehow paid dividends, according to some Burma watchers after the devastating impact of Cyclone Nargis in Rangoon and the Irrawaddy Delta in early May 2008. By not posing itself as a direct enemy of the Burmese regime unlike the United State or the United Kingdom whose hostile position on the SPDC is well known, India manages not to completely alienate itself from the Burmese top leadership. As the junta shunned most of the humanitarian aid offered by the international community after Nargis, fearing both a military invasion (the French and US “warship” fleets sent near the Burmese coastal waters materialized this fear) and an uncontrollable wave of foreigners entering the country through NGOs, international medical and rescue teams, assistance from China (though struck by another natural catastrophe at the same time with the earthquake in Sichuan), Thailand and consequently India were cautiously accepted.

  • 178 Xinhua News Agency, Second foreign medics allowed in cyclone-hit Myanmar, May 17th, 2008.
  • 179 EGRETEAU (Renaud), “India’s Ambitions in Burma: Towards an Overpriced Relationship?”, Asian Survey(...)

42Along with the Thais, Indian medical teams were the first to be granted visas and allowed onto Burmese soil. Several tonnes of humanitarian assistance were also sent from India to Rangoon178. Even Bangladesh and Laos were able to send vital aid and personnel to Burma in May 2008, while most Western countries were kept at bay by the regime, extremely suspicious of any assistance proposed by the Powers that had always publicly wished its collapse amid vitriolic criticism. Although its diplomatic caution is often interpreted as tacit support, India was able to get aid and medical teams through Burma’s tightly controlled doors during the post-cyclone crisis period. But this remains a meagre consolation. India’s frustration with the global Indo-Burmese partnership has been too evident. New Delhi has not so far achieved all its expectations in the Burmese field, while the Burmese government has been getting much more than a viable counter-balance to China’s overwhelming presence179. By letting India in, but controlling nonetheless all the Indian tentative thrusts in various key sectors of Burma’s landscape (energy, commerce, military affairs), the junta has mastered a smarter perspective on the way it manages its geopolitical background.

4 - Diversifying its partnerships outside its direct neighbourhood

43Fostering its strategic agenda based on its capacity of “being isolationist without being isolated”, Naypyidaw went even further with a constant attempt at diplomatically diversifying its support and partnerships outside its own neighbourhood. Apart from China, India, and to some extend Thailand and Singapore, the Burmese regime has been carefully developing a valuable network of cordial, if not friendly, relations with Russia, a few Eastern European countries, Pakistan -- but also more peculiarly Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Israel and even Taiwan.

  • 180 Interview, Russian Embassy in Burma, Rangoon, November 14th, 2007.

44Russia has become in recent years another key partner for the Burmese junta. Although having very little economic presence in Burma, a humanitarian assistance much lower than during the Soviet Union period and military cooperation limited to only a few sectors (notably the Air Force), Moscow has acquired a crucial importance for Naypyidaw as it offers strong support in all international organisations where Russia is still influential180.

  • 181 Various discussions with Chinese diplomats, Bangkok and Rangoon, 2006-2007.
  • 182 BLAGOV (Sergei), “From Myanmar to Russia with love”, Asia Times, April 12, 2006, available online (...)

45Critically, Moscow became a valuable diplomatic ally in the United Nations’ various agencies, where Russian influence is still very strong. In 2005, when a US-led diplomatic coalition first attempted to bring Burma before the UN Security Council, the SPDC swiftly sought Moscow’s support to prevent it, beside Beijing unchallenged position. The SPDC sought to further the Russo-Burmese partnership with China’s help, to get Moscow to agree to effectively use its veto as a permanent of the Security Council during the Burmese Prime Minister Soe Win’s visit to Beijing in February 2006181. This resulted in the regime’s second strongest military ruler Maung Aye travelling to Moscow for further discussions in April 2006182.

  • 183 Eight MiG-29B and two MiG-29UB according to NOVICHKOV, Nikolai, “Myanmar signs for surplus MiG-29s (...)
  • 184 Interview, Russian Embassy in Burma, Rangoon, April 25th, 2005.

46The Russian veto power at the UN Security Council, which was then openly used in January 2007 to block a Western-led resolution condemning Burma, appears to be essential for the Burmese generals. Russia has been courted by the Burmese junta since the early 2000s. The sale of a squadron of MiG-29 fighters (prestigious buying, yet not adequately answering Burma’s strategic threat perceptions) and the 5 million US$ contract on a nuclear reactor have thrown light on a partnership that had faded away after the collapse of the USSR183. Under Vladimir Putin’s presidency, Moscow had been trying to regain the influence it had during Ne Win’s era (as the huge Russo-Soviet embassy in Rangoon exemplifies), especially since the Western powers had been completely out of the Burmese field and the Chinese well entrenched there184.

  • 185 JAGAN (Larry), “Myanmar woos China, Russia”, Asia Times, April 12th, 2006.

47The rapprochement became more obvious when General Maung Aye visited Moscow in April 2006. Likewise China, Russia was now openly ready to support Burma through a strict non-interference policy, provide an important helping hand at the United Nations, and the offer of commercial, technical and military assistance185. Since then, many Russian private or state delegations have been touring Burma. About one thousand Burmese students are enrolled each year in Russian universities or technical institutes, while 400 pupils learn the Russian language in Rangoon, Pyin-U-Lwin, Kalaw and Meiktila where Russian instructors have been spotted. But a close partnership with the Burmese does not appear that crucial for strategic circles in Russia. Moscow’s elite is more influenced by Western views on Burma (and thus react in the exact opposite way) than by credible local linkages, ground analyses and viable inside networks that could offer the Russians a credible leverage over the Burmese regime. But it remains enough for both countries, each of them having interests in developing this partnership more in order to counterbalance a rival or potential threats (in the form of China and the West) than really increase bilateral connections.

  • 186 LINTNER (Bertil), CRISPIN (Shawn W.), “Dangerous Bedfellows”, Far Eastern Economic Review, Novembe (...)
  • 187 AUNG ZAW, “Burma’s North Korean connection”, The Bangkok Post, August 3rd, 2006.
  • 188 Xinhua, Myanmar names first ambassador to DPRK after resumption of ties, August 1st, 2007.
  • 189 SELTH (Andrew), “Pariah Partners in Arms”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 2004 and LINTNER ( (...)

48Apart from the crucial support of these key players, the Burmese generals have been patiently developing others linkages with a few strategically chosen countries willing to enter Burma’s opportunist market, get closer to a little-known country or establish important strategic connections with another authoritarian military regime. Relations with North Korea, Asia’s other “pariah state”, have gradually been re-cultivated in the past few years. Diplomatic relations were cut-off between Ne Win and Kim Il-Sung’s similarly autarchic regime, following the 1983 Rangoon bombings of a South Korean delegation visiting Burma by North Korean agents. However, after two decades, the “retirement” of Ne Win and the death of Kim Il-Sung (1994), many logical incentives led to a gradual underground rapprochement of the two ostracized countries which both benefited from the support of their Chinese patron186. Discreet commercial links, agricultural assistance, technical advice, alleged military cooperation and illicit trafficking of legal and illegal products would have been profitable for both the junta and the communist regime187. The ousting of General Khin Nyunt accelerated the pace of rapprochement to the point where diplomatic relations were reestablished and official envoys sent to each other’s capital in 2007188. There have been many reports about the growing military exchanges, the sale of North Korean weaponry to the Tatmadaw and a possible nuclear linkage which have embarrassed Western and Asian powers wary at seeing North Korea get a toehold in Southeast Asia189. Nonetheless, the nature of the North Korea-Burma partnership is not likely to go past the mere tactical rapprochement, given the wide international focus the two pariah regimes have drawn.

  • 190 Xinhua, Myanmar forges diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, September 1st, 2004.
  • 191 Xinhua, Myanmar to open embassy in Saudi Arabian capital, July 30th, 2007.
  • 192 Interview of a Burmese Muslim journalist, Rangoon, October 18th, 2005.
  • 193 Discussions with various workers of international NGOs working in Muslimdominated areas in Burma ( (...)
  • 194 Five aircrafts were sent to Rangoon according to the Saudi Ambassador to Burma; The Myanmar Times, (...)

49In 2004, Saudi Arabia opened an embassy in Rangoon190 -- an outlandish move on the part of a Muslim country close to the United States; more notably though in a Buddhist-dominated region, this decision was perfectly comprehensible. Not only has Saudi Arabia been keeping a wary eye on the situation of the Sunni-dominated Burmese Muslim community (around 5% of Burma’s total population) since the late 1970s, but the Burmese generals were keen to establish a dialogue with key a non-Asian Muslim country (apart from Pakistan). The construction of a Burmese embassy in Riyadh was agreed in 2007191. Recurrent crackdowns on the Rohingya minority, a 800,000-odd Sunni community of Chittagonian origin that inhabits the swampy Bangladesh-Burma borders has consistently drawn the attention of Gulf countries, especially after the two mass exoduses of 1978 and 1991. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar have welcomed few refugees on their soil in the last three decades. Many Rohingyas who settled there have since been able to invest back in Burma thanks to their new nationality and created a small thriving commercial community, especially in Rangoon’s construction sector192. Through these new networks, Riyadh or Doha have been logically trying to enter the region. Besides, the Burmese military authorities allow the right to Burmese Muslims to travel to Mecca for the Haj pilgrimage; they even sponsor every year a select group of 300 Muslims from the Rohingya-dominated areas, as a way to ensure social peace through the local elite193. Finally, in the aftermath of Nargis cyclone, Saudi Arabia as a result of its cordial and non-confrontational approach to Burma, was also allowed to provide much-needed humanitarian and technical assistance to the country while the Western countries were kept out of Burma194.

  • 195 KOZICKI (Richard J.), “Burma and Israel, A Study in Friendly Asian Relations”, Middle Eastern Affa (...)
  • 196 Interview, Israeli Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, March 7th, 2006.
  • 197 ASHTON (William), “Myanmar and Israel develop military pact”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, (...)

50Other close bilateral relations, inherited from U Nu’s period of promoting Asian Solidarity and Non-Alignment, are still cultivated by the current Burmese junta as they were during Ne Win’s era in spite of Burma’s drastic autarchic system. More interestingly Israel has kept its embassy in Rangoon since it opted for a decisive rapprochement with non-Arab Third World countries in the 1950s. Beside diplomatic “entente”, agricultural, technical and educational cooperation were particularly sought195. The Burma-Israel collaboration has been maintained ever since, though at a much lower level, 150 Burmese students being trained every year in Israeli universities, technical institutes or even kibbutz196. At the same time, a more secretive partnership in military affairs has been reportedly conducted since the late 1980s. Israel has indeed often been accused by activists groups (indifferently Burmese, Israeli or Western…) to have participated in the modernization and strengthening of the Tatmadaw and its Intelligence Services through various training schemes in Israel as well as the sales of Israeli armament197.

  • 198 Although any tangible proof of it hasn’t come out: The Jerusalem Post, Rattling the cage: Shalom, (...)
  • 199 GEE (John), “Israel seen as Burmese regime’s ‘open door’ to the West”, Washington Report on Middle (...)

51These accusations resurfaced in September 2007 when the Israeli public opinion got concerned about the possible use of Israeli weapons in the military crackdown on the Burmese monks’ demonstrations198. They remain though more the result of global negative perceptions of both the Burmese junta and Israelis ambitions outside the Middle Eastern region than an illustration of a credible policy pursued by Israel in Burma or a cleverly bargained assistance sought by the Burmese armed forces from Tel-Aviv. However, Israel offers the Burmese regime an original access to the Western developed world, even an “open door” as publicly declared by the SPDC199. Interestingly, Tel-Aviv has always opposed the Western-led sanctions against Burma, refusing to isolate the military regime by imposing a global visa-ban, boycotting the Burmese economy or even meddling in internal affairs. Although in stark contrast to the United States, Israel’s “all-weather” friend on the international scene, this engagement approach has produced few tangible gains for Tel-Aviv, for Israeli officials have a complete lack of access to the Burmese leadership nowadays. Yet, a deeper Israeli involvement in the country might prove to be a realistic first step to reconciliation between the West and an execrated Burmese military regime.

  • 200 ASHTON (William), “The Kiev Connection”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 4, April 2004.
  • 201 The Taiwan Journal, Relief efforts to assist Myanmar get under way, May 16th, 2008.

52Finally, other countries have too been on the Burmese agenda in the past two decades, in order to enable it to diversify its military sources, commercial dependencies and diplomatic support. Ukraine has been a non negligible partner200 as well as Poland or Serbia (the latter having a representative in Rangoon since Tito’s period). Egypt, Sri Lanka or Cuba were all important supporters when the newly-installed SLORC decided to return to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1992, after Ne Win belligerently quit it in 1979. Taiwan, though the Burmese generals have always made it clear to Beijing that the “One China Policy” was the only one they supported, is also an important trading and humanitarian partner. Most of the commercial exchanges between the two countries are informal, often inherited from the Kuomintang’s presence in the Shan State and along the Thai-Burma borders in the 1950s, but Taipei has been offering welcomed economic assistance in the past years through its NGO and business toehold in Thailand. Taiwan was also part of the Asian solidarity that followed the devastation of Nargis cyclone in May 2008 and generously donated201.

  • 202 One can read daily in the state-controlled New Light of Myanmar many articles dealing with the US, (...)
  • 203 Interview, Embassy of the United States in Burma, Rangoon, January 26th, 2005.
  • 204 Xinhua News Agency, US, Myanmar officials hold talks: spokesman, June 29th, 2007.

53Eventually, Burma does not appear to be as isolated as it is commonly perceived in the West, or even among Asian regional powers. The Burmese junta has carefully chosen to diversify its partnerships, whether military, commercial or diplomatic, so as to increase its opportunities to benefit from a helping hand when it needed. The crises borne out of the “Saffron Revolution” in September 2007 and then the Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 illustrate perfectly how Naypyidaw managed to make the most of its cordial relationships with a few countries beside China to counter the diplomatic and media-oriented pressure from Western countries. Initiating reconciliation between the West and the Burmese regime would be very difficult as neither the main Western powers, nor the junta would find common grounds from which they can start. As a consequence, neither the European Union, nor the United States or even Australia has any potential leverage on the country. Yet, a sort of fascination of the US -- a mighty power with huge military strength and cultural appeal -- has developed among the Tatmadaw and the Burmese elite in the past years, combining admiration and fear or even hatred202, though no real linkages were built-up. The arrest of Khin Nyunt in October 2004 also led the Americans to lose significant entry points in Rangoon203. A change in the Washington Administration after 2008 might prompt the United States to reconsider its approach, especially if Senator B. Obama who has already expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue with what the Bush Administration labelled “rogue states” (starting with Iran), wins. Tentative talks were offered through Chinese diplomacy, which managed to gather senior American and Burmese officials in Beijing in June 2007204. But the US’s critical reaction to the September 2007 repression and May 2008 referendum sank this initiative, though a similar round of talks in the future has not been completely ruled out.

  • 205 JAGAN (Larry), “EU envoy on Burma has nothing to offer the democratic process”, Mizzima News (Comm (...)

54On its side, the European Union, remains stuck in its common position impossible to revise unless the 27 countries accept it unanimously. Given the strong commitment of few Northern or Eastern Europe countries to completely isolate the Burmese junta, a position strongly favoured by European public opinion over sensitive to the views of the pro-democrat movements, efforts to engage the Burmese regime are likely to be severely hindered. The poor record of the Piero Fassino mission, the former Italian minister of Justice who was appointed as the European Union Special Envoy for Burma in November 2007, shows the lack of credibility of this European initiative. Unable to get access to the Burmese leadership (or even a Burmese visa) and trapped by internal divisions within the EU, Fassino has an impossible mandate to pursue, thus drawing much criticism205.

  • 206 Various discussions with European expatriates working in Rangoon (Embassies, NGOs, UN agencies, ac (...)

55Individually, the European states boast no more influence. While the United Kingdom remains the indefectible supporter of the Burmese opposition groups, starting with Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), Germany, Italy and France (the other three major countries with embassies in Rangoon), have been tempted to pursue smoother and discreet approaches at the lower levels of the Burmese administrative and political structure (the only ones really accessible to “white” foreigners or “kala phyu”). But the move to Naypyidaw, the critical reactions of the European capitals to the repression of the “Saffron Revolution” and the xenophobic withdrawal of the Burmese regime snubbing western humanitarian aid after Cyclone Nargis have proved to be quite detrimental to their position within the country. Vitriolic declarations from British, French or German leaders -- “crime against humanity”, “irresponsible decisions” and “inhuman response” to the crisis of the Burmese junta -- have had little or no effect on the regime, apart from a stronger alienation and resentment206. The difficulties of Western NGOs based in Burma are facing in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in May 2008 were aggravated by the acerbic positions taken by the chanceries back in Europe or Washington. It indeed participated in the revival of Burmese nationalism (anti-neocolonialism) as seen through the state-controlled media, the xenophobic trends observed within the Burmese Society and the fact that successive regimes since the Independence have always seen it as the most effective tool for Burma to resist external pressures.

Notes

99 See MYA MAUNG, “The Burma Road to the Past…”, 1999.

100 See for instance AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979: Socialism with Foreign Aid and Strict Neutrality”, Southeast Asian Studies, 1980, p. 93-117.

101 Cambodia’s Foreign Minister, Hor Nam Hong, described Burma’s relationship with ASEAN as a brother or sister suffering from a serious illness, and while the family doesn’t become sick it severely affects it; personal discussion, Phnom Penh, December 2007.

102 For further academic analysis on the external pressure the ASEAN has faced in its dealing with Burma’s regime in recent years, see: GANESAN (N.), “Thai-Myanmar-ASEAN Relations: the Politics of Face and Grace”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 3, Fall 2006, p. 131-149.

103 SEEKINS (Donald M.), “Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire”, Asian Survey, Volume 37, no6, June 1997, p. 525-539.

104 Interview with Poksak Nilubol (Ambassador of Thailand to Burma, 1994-98), Bangkok, September 27, 2005.

105 Interview, Embassies of Thailand and Singapore in Burma, Rangoon, November 2007 and February 2008.

106 VATIKIOTIS (Michael), “ASEAN key to Myanmar change”, Asia Times, October 24th, 2007.

107 Burma is not exactly a model of combined strong political authoritarianism and successful economic development as Singapore for instance, or even China.

108 The International Herald Tribune, Historic Asean charter reveals divisions, November 20th, 2007.

109 Xinhua News Agency, ASEAN boycott of EU meeting a matter of principle, September 17th, 2005.

110 Interview, Singaporean Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, March 6th, 2006.

111 Various interviews with UN and Asian diplomats, Bangkok and Rangoon, 2003-2004.

112 Interview, Thailand Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, February 27th, 2008.

113 JAGAN (Larry), “Rangoon lets Asean off the hook”, The Bangkok Post, July 29th, 2005.

114 Interview with Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, Bali, July 6, 2003.

115 Various discussions with Indonesian, Cambodian, Malaysian and Singaporean diplomats based in Rangoon, October 2005 and March, 2006.

116 Reuters, Laos and Cambodia slam Myanmar sanctions, November 18th, 2007.

117 The Irrawaddy-On-Line, Burma remains the bad boy in the ASEAN family, November 16, 2007, available online at <http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9344>.

118 Reuters, Myanmar may free Suu Kyi in six months: Singapore minister, July 20, 2008.

119 Kyodo News, ASEAN has better way to deal with Myanmar, Indonesian envoy says, September 15, 2004.

120 Various fieldwork conducted in the border areas from Tachileik/Mae Sai to Kawthaung/Ranong (2003-2008).

121 Discussion with Pr. Sunait Chutintaranond, Head of the Southeast Asian Studies Center, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, November 9, 2005.

122 GANESAN (N.), “Thai-Myanmar-ASEAN Relations: the Politics of Face and Grace”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 3, Fall 2006, p. 131-149.

123 Interview with Poksak Nilubol (Ambassador of Thailand to Burma, 1994-98), Bangkok, September 27, 2005.

124 One month after Thaksin’s latest visit to Naypyidaw: The Nation [Thailand], Thaksin’s Burma trip a disgrace, August 5th, 2006 and The New Light of Myanmar, Goodwill delegation led by Commander-in-Chief of Royal Thai Army General Sonthi Boonyaratglin concludes visit, September 14th, 2006.

125 AFP, Thai PM’s Myanmar visit invites uncomfortable comparisons, November 23rd, 2006.

126 AFP, Thai junta leader arrives in Myanmar, August 27th, 2007.

127 The Straits Times [Singapore], Thai PM defends investments in Myanmar, March 25th, 2008.

128 Interviews, Embassy of Thailand in Burma, Rangoon, November 13th, 2007 and February 27th, 2008.

129 ASHTON (William), “Burma receives advances from its silent suitors in Singapore”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1998, p. 32.

130 Including Lee Kuan Yew himself: The International Herald Tribune, Report: Singapore leader criticizes Myanmar junta for mismanaging economy, October 10th, 2007 and Reuters, Singapore’s Lee criticises Myanmar rulers, January 8th, 2008.

131 Various discussions with successive Singaporean Ambassadors and diplomats posted in Burma, as well as with Singaporean or Indian businessmen working for Singapore-based companies in Rangoun (2004-2007).

132 Discussions with various Burmese academics working in Singapore, September 2005.

133 Reuters, Singapore distancing itself from Myanmar–analysts, October 30th, 2007.

134 U Nu, September 5th, 1950, quoted by THOMSON, John S., “Burmese Neutralism”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 2, June 1957, p. 266.

135 DESHPANDE (G. P.), “India and Burma: Two More Steps to End Insurgency”, China Report, Vol. 4, May-June 1968, p. 9 and 17.

136 EGRETEAU (Renaud), “India and China Vying for Influence in Burma: A New Assessment”, India Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, January-March 2008, p. 38-72.

137 TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN, “Myanmar and China: A Special Relationship?”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2003, p. 189-210.

138 Interviews, Chinese diplomats, Rangoon (2005-2008).

139 MALIK (Mohan J.), “Regional Reverberations from Regime Shake-up in Rangoon”, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 1-5.

140 MYA MAUNG, “On the Road to Mandalay: A Case Study of the Sinonization of Upper Burma”, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1994, p. 447-459.

141 Reuters, China expresses surprise at Myanmar capital move, May 23rd, 2007.

142 JAGAN (Larry), “China’s uneasy alliance with Myanmar”, Asia Times, February 24th, 2006.

143 Interviews, Embassy of China in Burma, Rangoon, November 9th, 2007 and February 26th, 2008.

144 “A victory for the Burmese junta”, The Nation, January 16th, 2007; “UN veto on Myanmar could embolden regime: analysts”, AFP, January 16th, 2007.

145 Xinhua News Agency, Construction of China-Myanmar oil pipeline expected to start this year, April 22nd, 2007.

146 JAGAN (Larry), “China’s thumb in every Burmese pie”, The Bangkok Post, June 21st, 2007.

147 JAGAN (Larry), “Generals express interest in Chinese-style government”, Inter Press Service, July 2nd, 2007.

148 Reuters, China urges Myanmar to pursue ‘democracy process’, September 14th, 2007.

149 As confirmed by I. Gambari himself during a phone interview, November 26, 2007.

150 Interviews with Chinese diplomats, Bangkok, October 2007, and Rangoon, November 9th, 2007. In the days before I. Gambari was granted a visa, while waiting in Singapore en route to Rangoon, the Burmese ambassador to China was called to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs several times a day to meet the Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss the visa issue.

151 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s Stonewall”, The Bangkok Post, March 6th, 2008 and JAGAN (Larry), “Swansong visit for UN’s Myanmar envoy”, Asia Times, March 7th, 2008.

152 United Press International, China arms Myanmar Military, March 14th, 2008.

153 Interview, Embassy of China, Rangoon, February 26th, 2008.

154 Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Premier expects Myanmar to care about overseas Chinese, February 15th, 2006.

155 Reuters, Chinese influx stirs old-age hatred in Myanmar, March 12th, 2008.

156 Egreteau (Renaud), Wooing the Generals…, 2003.

157 LALL (Marie-Carine), “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 28, No. 3, December 2006, p. 424-446.

158 EGRETEAU (Renaud), “India’s Ambitions in Burma: Towards an Overpriced Relationship?”, Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 6, forthcoming November-December 2008.

159 The Hindustan Times, Myanmar requests SAARC membership, India backing it: report, May 20th, 2008.

160 The New Light of Myanmar, Senior General Than Shwe receives Indian External Affairs Minister, March 27th, 2005.

161 The New Light of Myanmar, Vice-Senior General Maung Aye receives Minister for External Affairs of the Republic of India, January 22nd, 2007.

162 Indo-Asian News Service, Differing from West, India expands ties with Myanmar, April 12th, 2007.

163 See for instance: RAMACHANDRAN (Sudha), “Myanmar power play leaves India smiling”, Asia Times, October 21st, 2004 and KUPPUSWAMY (C.S.), “Myanmar: the shake-up and the fall out”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1161, November 9th, 2004.

164 KUPPUSWAMY (C.S.), “Myanmar: Visit of the Indian President”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1732, March 13th, 2006 and LEVESQUE (Julien), “Maung Aye’s India Visit”, IPCS Article No. 2549, April 15th, 2008.

165 The Indian Express, Fleet expansion in mind, Myanmar looks to India for expertise, January 13th, 2006, The Hindu, India to supply military equipment to Myanmar, January 22nd, 2007, BEDI (Rahul), “Indian transfers more Defenders to Myanmar”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 16th, 2007 and Indian Defence, India to transfer three Islanders aircrafts to Myanmar; Train Myanmarese Officers at Kochi Naval Base, June 24th, 2007.

166 See for instance the declarations of the Indian Defence, then Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee: Associated Press, India won’t export democracy to Myanmar, June 3rd, 2006, and The Hindu, India not interested in exporting ideology: Pranab, January 20th, 2007.

167 Various personal interviews with Indian diplomats working in or on Burma made between 2002 and 2008 in New Delhi, Rangoon, Mandalay, Bangkok, Beijing or Paris.

168 The Hindu, Myanmar: Rhetoric and reality of Indian democracy, August 9th, 2007.

169 The Indian Express, Myanmar burning, MEA told Deora: we need to visit but keep it low-key, September 28th, 2007 and The New Light of Myanmar, MOGE, Indian oil company sign production sharing contracts, September 26th, 2007.

170 AFP, India on defensive as pressure mounts over Myanmar, September 14th, 2007.

171 MOHAN (C. Raja), “South Block’s Burma Shell”, The Indian Express, September 28th, 2007.

172 Various interviews with foreign diplomats based in Rangoon, November 2007. See also the Bangkok Post, Visiting Indian hits storm of Burma critics, September 14th, 2007.

173 The Hindustan Times, India tells Myanmar to probe crackdown on protest, October 2nd, 2007.

174 Various interviews with Western and Asian diplomats based in Rangoon, February 2008. Even Rangoon-based Indian diplomats recognized it (Interviews, Rangoon, November 14th, 2007 and February 26th, 2008).

175 The Hindustan Times, India votes against UN resolution on Myanmar, November 21st, 2007.

176 SRIVASTAVA (Siddharth), “India lays out a red carpet for Myanmar”, Asia Times, April 5th, 2008.

177 Interview with Rajiv Bhatia, Ambassador of India to Burma, Rangoon, May 9th, 2004.

178 Xinhua News Agency, Second foreign medics allowed in cyclone-hit Myanmar, May 17th, 2008.

179 EGRETEAU (Renaud), “India’s Ambitions in Burma: Towards an Overpriced Relationship?”, Asian Survey Vol. 48 forthcoming 2008…

180 Interview, Russian Embassy in Burma, Rangoon, November 14th, 2007.

181 Various discussions with Chinese diplomats, Bangkok and Rangoon, 2006-2007.

182 BLAGOV (Sergei), “From Myanmar to Russia with love”, Asia Times, April 12, 2006, available online at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HD12Ae01.html>.

183 Eight MiG-29B and two MiG-29UB according to NOVICHKOV, Nikolai, “Myanmar signs for surplus MiG-29s”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11th, 2001. See also SELTH (Andrew), Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and Perceptions, Griffith Asia Institute, Regional Outlook, Paper No. 12, 2007.

184 Interview, Russian Embassy in Burma, Rangoon, April 25th, 2005.

185 JAGAN (Larry), “Myanmar woos China, Russia”, Asia Times, April 12th, 2006.

186 LINTNER (Bertil), CRISPIN (Shawn W.), “Dangerous Bedfellows”, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 20th, 2003.

187 AUNG ZAW, “Burma’s North Korean connection”, The Bangkok Post, August 3rd, 2006.

188 Xinhua, Myanmar names first ambassador to DPRK after resumption of ties, August 1st, 2007.

189 SELTH (Andrew), “Pariah Partners in Arms”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 2004 and LINTNER (Bertil), “North Korea’s burden of crime and terror”, Asia Times, April 20th, 2007.

190 Xinhua, Myanmar forges diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, September 1st, 2004.

191 Xinhua, Myanmar to open embassy in Saudi Arabian capital, July 30th, 2007.

192 Interview of a Burmese Muslim journalist, Rangoon, October 18th, 2005.

193 Discussions with various workers of international NGOs working in Muslimdominated areas in Burma (Arakan State), October 2007.

194 Five aircrafts were sent to Rangoon according to the Saudi Ambassador to Burma; The Myanmar Times, Saudis send machinery, Vol. 22, No. 421, June 2-8, 2008.

195 KOZICKI (Richard J.), “Burma and Israel, A Study in Friendly Asian Relations”, Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1959, p. 109-116.

196 Interview, Israeli Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, March 7th, 2006.

197 ASHTON (William), “Myanmar and Israel develop military pact”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 2000.

198 Although any tangible proof of it hasn’t come out: The Jerusalem Post, Rattling the cage: Shalom, Myanmar, October 2nd, 2007.

199 GEE (John), “Israel seen as Burmese regime’s ‘open door’ to the West”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 2007, p. 33-34.

200 ASHTON (William), “The Kiev Connection”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 4, April 2004.

201 The Taiwan Journal, Relief efforts to assist Myanmar get under way, May 16th, 2008.

202 One can read daily in the state-controlled New Light of Myanmar many articles dealing with the US, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or America…

203 Interview, Embassy of the United States in Burma, Rangoon, January 26th, 2005.

204 Xinhua News Agency, US, Myanmar officials hold talks: spokesman, June 29th, 2007.

205 JAGAN (Larry), “EU envoy on Burma has nothing to offer the democratic process”, Mizzima News (Commentary), January 30, 2008.

206 Various discussions with European expatriates working in Rangoon (Embassies, NGOs, UN agencies, academics…), November 2007 and February 2008.

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