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Citadins et citoyens dans la Chine du xxe siècle

 | 
Yves Chevrier
, 
Alain Roux
, 
Xiaohong Xiao-Planes

Deuxième partie. Guerres, révolutions, dictatures : des citoyens d’entre-pouvoirs

11. ‘Liberation’

The Shanghai Police, 1942-1952

Frederic Wakeman Jr.

Texte intégral

The army, police and court of the state are instruments for
classes to oppress classes. To the hostile classes, those instruments are instruments of oppression.
They are violent not benevolent things. Mao Zedong
‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’
1949

  • 1 Wakeman, ‘Policing Modern Shanghai’, The China Quarterly, 115 (1988), p. 408-440.
  • 2 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai (1995a).
  • 3 Ibid.

1During early Nationalist rule, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau became a case for testing the new regime’s ability to rule effectively while modernizing the municipal administration and striving to regain sovereign rights over the foreign concessions.1 Although the Nationalists did succeed in suppressing the Communist movement in Shanghai, by the time they were driven out of the city by the Japanese in August 1937 they had failed in both latter respects.2 The puppet regime of Wang Jingwei 汪精卫 ostensibly recovered sovereignty over the entire city, but the price was rampant corruption and degrading collaboration under the de facto occupation of the Japanese.3 Paradoxically, after Japanese military forces seized the International Settlement on December 8, 1941, the puppet administration tightened Chinese police control over the urban population while the Communist Party was simultaneously discovering fresh opportunities to expand its underground activities within the city.

Tightening Control

  • 4 Jingcha faling 警察法令 (Police laws). Nanjing: Ministry of Interior, 1944.
  • 5 Ibid. This exceptionality probably reflected the wishes of the Japanese Gendarmerie (Military Polic (...)

2On October 13, 1943, the Wang Jingwei government’s Ministry of the Interior promulgated a set of twenty-eight organizational regulations (Neizheng bu zuzhi fa 内政部组织法) that brought internal affairs under the Ministry (Article 1), and placed all police matters throughout occupied China under its Police Administration Office (Jingzheng si 警政司, Articles 4 and 8).4 This move toward greater national police integration – a policy that Chiang Kai-shek’s police officials had been unable to implement between 1934 and 1937 – meant that all municipal police forces had to report directly to the central government. The sole exception to this nationalization policy of the Wang regime was the Shanghai police force, which remained under the control of the municipal government and which reported directly to the Mayor of Shanghai (Articles 1 and 3 of the ‘Shanghai tebie shi di yi jingcha ju zanxing tiadi 上海特别市第一警察局暫行條例 Temporary regulations of the Number One Police Bureau of Shanghai Special Municipality).5

  • 6 Ibid., p. 1-2.

3According to the legalistic governing philosophy of the Wang Jingwei regime, and appropriate to its highly coercive nature, all social activities were the concern of the police and were necessarily determined by laws. ‘A philosopher once said, “We humans live by laws, act by laws, survive by laws”.’ The rule of law itself was divided into the realm of fa (laws as such), and the realm of ling (decrees), issued by administrative (xingzheng 行政) organizations. The one cannot contradict the other, and while the police are concerned with the administration of all the internal affairs (neiwu 内务) of a nation, they must observe this general legal domain as well.6

  • 7 Wakeman op. cit., (1995a).
  • 8 London, Her Majesty’s Public Record Office (BFOR), China Intelligence Wing Report No. C-35-85 (May (...)
  • 9 Wakeman, op. cit., (1995a).

4In practice, however, the Shanghai puppet police force was much more concerned with controlling its civil population by organizational devices than with curbing crime. To begin with, the Wang Jingwei government was a ‘Monte Carlo regime’, dependent for a good portion of its revenue on the sale of narcotics, the licensing of prostitution, and fees and kickbacks from gambling casinos.7 As the war took its devastating economic toll, moreover, street crime increased – partly because of the extensive electricity blackouts during winter months and the year-round severe food and fuel shortages.8 Food shortages incited crime, but they also were used as a means of coercion by the Japanese and puppet authorities to enforce their authority upon the baojia 保甲 (mutual responsibility household registration) system that was imposed upon native and foreign residents of Shanghai after the wartime occupation began.9

  • 10 Wakeman, ‘The Evolution of Local Government in Late Imperial China’ (1975).
  • 11 Chen Ching-chih, ‘The Japanese Adoption of the Pao-chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945’, Journal of As (...)

5In Taiwan the Japanese colonial authorities had perfected their own version of baojia, which they called hoko, much earlier in the twentieth century. The key difference between their Taiwanese adaptation and the original Chinese version of this ancient mutual responsibility and local control system was its linkage with a modern, professional police system.10 Instead of functioning as a kind of self-governing unit, with responsibility invested in a rotationally appointed headman, the hoko system required that the Taiwanese chief of the unit report regularly and directly to the local kôban 交番 or police box, manned by a resident Japanese colonial policeman.11

  • 12 Frederica M. Bunge and Rinn-Sup Shinn (eds.), China: A Country Study (1981).

6The Japanese military brought hoko to North China in 1937. Severe restrictions were imposed upon the population, which had to undergo a census and maintain a wooden tablet on residential and commercial doors with the names of all inhabitants. Anyone missing during spot checks was presumed by Japanese troops to be a guerrilla. When the system was transferred to South China, however, the occupation authorities did not have enough soldiers to police the rural areas; and consequently had to rely upon local hoko leaders (who were in effect collaborators) to participate in local administration and establish self-defense corps.12

  • 13 Chen Yung-fa, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945, (1 (...)

7In November 1940 the deputy chief of staff of the imperial headquarters in Tokyo, Lieutenant General Sawada Shigeru, was transferred to Eastern China to command the Thirteenth Army. Wang Jingwei’s puppet troops were still unable to control the countryside, even just outside the capital at Nanjing. General Sawada was eager to pacify the region, and so turned to Lieutenant Colonel Haruke Yoshitane, a counterinsurgency specialist on Major General Kagesa Sadaaki’s staff, for a pacification plan. Colonel Haruke had closely studied Zeng Guofan and Chiang Kai-shek’s suppression campaigns, and he proposed the establishment of ‘model peace zones’ (mohanteki wahei chiku) with the help of Chinese collaborators who would build a primary or grassroots level political system based upon ‘self-government’ (jichi 自治), ‘self-defense’ (jiei 自卫), and ‘economic self-improvement’ (jisei 自济). The model peace zone would be created, after Japanese mop-up operations, by walling off the subjugated area with bamboo palisades, electrified barbed wire, and watchtowers. Within the zone, would be baojia with Chinese collaborators, a police system, a secret service system, and a self-defense corps.13

  • 14 Yeh Wen-hsin, ‘Dai Li and the Liu Geqing Affair: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service during the W (...)
  • 15 Chen Yung-fa, op. cit., p. 83-88.

8The first model peace zone was to comprise the five counties of Changshu, Jiangyin, Kunshan, Wuxi, and Taicang, just west of Greater Shanghai. Although this plan received the support of General Hata Shunroku, China Theater Commander, the Wang Jingwei regime wavered. A rural pacification committee was not formed until May 22, 1941, by which time initiative for the venture had slipped into the hands of Police Minister Li Shiqun 李士群, who had masterminded the assassination wars in Shanghai between his notorious henchmen at 76 Jessfield Road and the agents of Dai Li, head of Chiang Kai-shek’s secret police.14 Working under Colonel Haruke, who installed an office in Suzhou, Li Shiqun brought in some of his agents from Shanghai to form an intelligence network and trained five thousand cadres and police, most of whom came down from North China to collaborate with Li Shiqun and puppet governor Gao Guanwu. With the help of Japanese soldiers, the police and cadres suppressed most of the Guomindang Loyal and Patriotic Army (Zhongyi jiuguo jun) and at least one-quarter of the Communist New Fourth Army units in the zone. Households were registered under the baojia system, and all males between 14 and 45 were enlisted in a self-defense corps, which was not, however, allowed to carry guns on patrol.15 In the end, as Japanese military fortunes tumbled elsewhere, the local collaborators who were crucial to the system ceased cooperating, but at least until late 1942 the model peace zone system constituted a rural model adapted for parallel control mechanisms in urban centers including Shanghai.

  • 16 Oakes, Vanya, White Man’s Folly (1943), p. 360.
  • 17 BFOR, FO371/24663.

9After 1937, the Japanese and puppet authorities had thoroughly enforced the household registration system developed by the Nationalist police in the Special Municipality of Shanghai (that is, the Chinese-run sectors of the city north, south, and west of the concessions) during the Nanjing decade. They had also linked together urban baojia units and the police, which in addition permitted them to command the food rationing system for each neighborhood in the city. The Japanese used rice as a weapon to dominate Shanghai much as Hitler used the control of food supplies to subjugate Europe. For example, Chinese rice grown in the provinces was used to feed the Japanese army and the civilian population in Japan. Cities such as Tianjin and Shanghai, therefore, had been living on rice imported from Indochina, so that ‘when Japan secured control of Indochina’s entire output of nearly 6 million tons, she naturally came into possession of a weapon with which to force ‘cooperation’ upon Occupied China’.16 This weapon was used very concretely to subdue the populace. For example, there were five cases of Japanese being shot between September 29 and October 18, 1940. In retaliation, the Japanese Military Police sealed off the lanes of suspected areas, and ‘subjected [them] to a vigorous blockade, which in some sections was sustained long enough, according to current reports, to cause several deaths through starvation’.17

  • 18 Tao Juyin, Tianliang qian de gudao (The Isolated Island before Daybreak), (1947), p. 50-51. In Febr (...)
  • 19 Tao Juyin, op. cit., p. 50-51.

10The baojia control system had never been applied to the foreign settlements in Shanghai. In fact, because the International Settlement and French Concession did not have a household registration system, the Japanese authorities which seized command of the police in February 1942 had to launch an initial census of their own, using figures on grain allocation and tax payments to get a rough fix on the population.18 Despite difficulties in conducting the census the government announced by February 19 that there were 1,586,021 Chinese and foreigners residing in the Settlement, and 854,380 people living in the French Concession. South City (Nanshi) had a population of 647,411.19

  • 20 Wakeman, (1995a), op. cit.
  • 21 ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’. Confidential letter from Shanghai Municipal Council to the Commissio (...)

11The baojia system was primarily used for social control. During the previous four years Shanghai’s citizenry had undergone wave after wave of terrorism, with most of the pro-Chongqing bombers and assassins sallying forth from the two foreign settlements to maim and murder the Japanese and their quislings.20 Shortly after the census figures were announced in mid-February, there was another attack on the Louza (Laozha) Road police station. Two Chinese collaborators, Jiang Tingyao 蒋廷耀 and Xu Chang 许昌, promptly petitioned the Japanese, requesting that baojia be imposed upon the foreigners. The Chinese, they said, had experienced ‘indescribable’ sufferings at the hands of the Western imperialists. For too long the concessions had been a sanctuary for criminals and ‘a paradise for the wealthy’. The time had come to bring ‘peace and good order’ to the Settlement by instituting baojia.21

  • 22 Each residence, shop, temple, and so on, was known as a hu with one chief. Ten hu formed a jia with (...)
  • 23 Ibid, 1, 4-6; ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’, 1-5; cf. White, Lynn T. III, ‘Non-governmentalism in t (...)

12After the Laozha Road bombings the police announced plans to extend baojia to the International Settlement; they blockaded all alleyways with iron, wooden, and bamboo gates; closed major intersections with barbed wire; and installed siren alarm systems along Chengdu and Bubbling Well roads. On March 16, a preparatory committee was set up in the Ningbo tongxiang hui 宁波同乡会 (Ningbo Fellow Countrymen’s Association); and that was succeeded in turn by a regular baojia office, which opened its doors at 200 Fuzhou Road on April 24 to issue citizenship certificates. The area south of Suzhou Creek was divided into seven baojia districts, congruent with police precincts: e.g. Central district, with 4 sections, 35 bao, 600 jia, and 6,355 hu (households)22. The heads of these various levels in the control system were recommended by constituent members, but the actual appointment was to be made by the police.23

  • 24 Shanghai Municipal Police Files. Microfilms from the U.S. National Archives. N-1437, April 30 to Ju (...)

13The system was dominated by Japanese police advisors, whose salaries came out of the general baojia budget. In addition, more than 400 staff persons had to be hired, fed, and provided with supplies, office rent, utilities, and so on, at a total cost of $550,000. Members of the still existent Shanghai Municipal Council [SMC] proposed that this ‘huge sum of money’ be raised by imposing an Emergency Rate on Shanghai taxpayers. Given the strident opposition of Japanese ratepayers to increased municipal taxes, however, the only realistic way of financing baojia had to be by levies on Chinese-owned firms and shops. These assessments, which were collected by the bao and jia chiefs themselves, were nominally loans; but as far as we can ascertain, the monies were never refunded by the Shanghai Municipal Council [SMC].24

  • 25 ‘Pao Chia System-Regulations’, 1, 11-13; J.V. Davidson-Houston, op. cit., p. 176-179.

14The SMC, still led by British and American elected officers, resisted both manda-tory levies and compulsory service. But in July 1942 the Japanese required all British officers to resign from the Settlement police and the force was reorganized along Japanese lines. At the same time, the occupation authorities pressed ahead to implement the new baojia system by conducting a census, issuing identity cards, and creating a self-defense corps.25

  • 26 ‘Progress Re Enforcement of Pao Chia System in the Settlement’, 2; ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’, 8 (...)

15Baojia officials, under the supervision of the SMP [Shahghai Municial Police], began taking the census early in March 1942. Using specially prepared forms, they had each head of household (huzhang 户长) in the same jia sign a mutual guarantee and joint responsibility bond. When the census was completed, a baojia certificate was issued to each household to be affixed in a conspicuous position outside the main entrance to the premises. Thereafter, each huzhang had to report to the jia head – in addition to births and deaths in the family – whenever a suspicious person entered the household, whenever a guest spent the night, and whenever a family member went away overnight.26

  • 27 ‘Interview with Mao Tsu-p’ei’. Report from Harold Wiens, OSS Headquarters, Chungking. OSS report XL (...)

16During the census, each hu member was issued with a ‘citizen’s card’ (liangminzheng 良民证) stamped by the regular police and by the Japanese Military Police. That card had to be carried on the person all the time. ‘Checks are made daily in restaurants and other public places, and waiters and servants are questioned by the police and plainclothesmen regarding customers and establishment’.27

  • 28 ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’, 2-4; ‘Progress Re Enforcement of Pao Chia System in the Settlement’, (...)

17After the census was completed, a People’s Self-Protection Corps was formed. Bao heads prepared a roster of all males between 20 and 45, and forwarded it to police headquarters. Members of the corps were, in effect, police auxiliaries, operating under their local baojia direction bureau (which normally had a Japanese advisor or two in tacit command along with an intelligence officer) to assist during blockades, apprehend criminals, and man wooden kiosks at important road crossings. Their skills were periodically tested by Japanese military policemen disguised as terrorists in plainclothes. Their expenses, which were borne by the local baojia committee, were not inconsiderable, since the veritable army of corpsmen in the seven police districts of the Settlement totaled 86,921, with approximately 13,000 on duty every day.28

  • 29 Jingcha faling, p. 107-119.

18The Shanghai baojia system thus developed apace, growing evermore complex – and more bureaucratic – over the remaining years of the war. The thirty-nine article baojia regulations issued in February 1944 by the municipal government stipulated proper functions, duties, procedures, and attitudes for members of this urban militia.29 And though the auxiliary police corps was disbanded when the Nationalists liberated the city in 1945, the control system remained intact. Identity cards (shenfenzheng 身份证) were issued by the GMD authorities, and the household registration infrastructure survived, just as it would persist through 1949 and the ensuing period of Communist liberation as well.

Preliminary Communist Infiltration

  • 30 Wan Ren, ‘Guomindang Shanghai jingchaju li de dixia gongzuo’ (Underground work in the police force (...)
  • 31 Wakeman (1995a), op. cit.
  • 32 Liu Feng, (1979), ‘Zai wei jingchaju li de douzheng’ (The struggle in the collaborationist police f (...)

19The class background of the patrolmen of the Shanghai Municipal Police was mixed, but according to Communist Party organizers, most were from peasant and worker families, and some were either petty urbanites (xiao shimin 小市民) or former vagabonds (liumang 流氓).30 Since the police authorities frequently recruited in the North, a large number of patrolmen came from Hebei and Shandong, which were base areas occupied by the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance.31 Their own dependents, therefore, were living under the protection of Communist forces. Policemen like these, consequently, were particularly prone to recruitment by underground Communist cadres; and by December 1942 there were at least forty Party members in underground cells operating within the Shanghai Police force. Initially responding to the leadership of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the CP (i.e. Liu Changsheng 刘长胜 and Liu Ning Liv 刘宁), these clandestine Communist policemen were by 1943 under the direction of Shao Jian 邵坚, who reported to the Urban Workers Section (Cheng gong bu 城工部) of the Central China branch of the Party.32

  • 33 ‘Zhonggong zai Jiangsu zhi zuzhi yu huodong’ (The organization and activities of the Chinese Commun (...)

20After the Pacific War erupted, a prime effort of the Shanghai branch of the CCP was to direct this clandestine police campaign while also strengthening connections and forming front groups with former National Salvation Association members active in cultural, press, and art circles. This responsibility fell to the head of the Shanghai Communist Party Youth Special Services Brigade (Hu Zhongdang qingnian tewutuan 沪总党青年特务团), Pan Hannian 潘汉年.33

  • 34 White, ‘Bourgeois Radicalism in Shanghai’, (1984), p. 153.
  • 35 Li Zhaochun, ‘Shenfen fuza de Pan Hannian’ (1978), p. 114; Yu Maochun, ‘American Intelli gence: The (...)
  • 36 Yang Fan, ‘Yang Fan zai jingtao hailong zhong (xia)’ (Yang Fan in the midst of terrifying waves and (...)

21Pan Hannian joined the Communist Party in 1925 and by 1933 had become chief of intelligence in China for the Comintern. He subsequently conducted intelligence work for the Comintern and Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong and Shanghai, where he developed extensive connections with ‘bigshots’ (wenren 文人) in gangster circles, as well as leading members of the city’s financial and cultural coteries.34 A complex political figure with many cross-cutting contacts, Pan Hannian oversaw virtually all of the Party’s underground activities in Shanghai from his headquarters in the New Fourth Army base north of the Yangzi River near Yangzhou.35 He was aided in this work by Yang Fan 扬帆, who had been responsible, as deputy chief of the Army Legal Department (Junbu junfa chu 军部警法处), for ‘meting out punishment to special agents and spies, attacking local ruffians and hooligans’, in the New Fourth Army base area.36 The two men – the one supple and enigmatic, the other rigid and straightforward – would be assigned the task of taking over Shanghai’s police if ever the city were liberated by the Communists.

The Nationalists Liberate Shanghai

  • 37 Donald B. Gillin with Charles Etter, ‘Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-19 (...)

22After VJ Day the Nationalists liberated Shanghai from the Japanese, who reluctantly turned the city over to Chinese troops when they would have preferred to surrender to the Americans, they regarded as the real victors.37

  • 38 Shen Zui, Juntong neimu (The inside story of the Military Statistics [Bureau]) (1984), p. 186-187; (...)

23The first Chinese troops actually to enter the city were units of Dai Li’s Loyal and Patriotic Army (Zhongyi jiuguo jun 忠义救国军), trained and armed by the U.S. military and police instructors of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO – Zhong-Mei hezuo suo 中美合作所). Many of these were carpetbaggers loyal only to themselves.38

  • 39 Zhang Weihan, ‘Dai Li yu Juntong ju’ (Dai Li and the Military Statistics Bureau), (1982), p. 148.

24On September 5, 1945, the Nationalists established a Party and Government Committee for Expropriation (Dangzheng jieshou weiyuanhui 党政接收委员会) under General He Yingqin 何应钦. Provincial and urban branches were set up under each military district’s commander. Almost as soon as the committees were announced, Nationalist underground special operations agents came forward and announced themselves to be the jieshou dayuan 接收大员 (property collection officials) authorized by the GMD to confiscate the goods of puppets and collaborators. These carpetbaggers seized vast amounts of private property, so that people began speaking of their jieshou 接收 (confiscation) as jieshou 劫收 (plundering), and newspapers wrote of a ‘tragic’ or ‘calamitous victory’ (cansheng 残剩). The saying went: 天上来地下来老百姓活不来Tianshang lai, dixia lai, laobaixing huobulai’ (Heaven arrives, the underground arrives, ordinary people won’t survive).39

  • 40 Ch’i, op. cit. (1982), p. 222.

As soon as the advanced parties of the KMT [GMD] government reached the port cities, they immediately embarked on a confiscation spree that completely devastated the economic structure there. First, the exchange ratio between the currencies of Free China and the puppet regime was put at 1:200, which overnight wiped out the lifelong savings of the urban middle classes. Second, the new masters proceeded to confiscate or lay claim to commercial and industrial assets of all descriptions on grounds that they were enemy properties or their owners had collaborated with the enemy, which included practically everybody. While the ministries of economic affairs and finances (organs controlled by K’ung and Soong) should have jurisdiction over the disposition of such properties, it was in fact the CC [clique] and the Fu-hsing-she [Fuxingshe] (particularly the Bureau of Military Statistics [MSB]) that played the key roles.40

  • 41 Huang Kangyong, ‘Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li’ (The Dai Li that I knew), (1982), p. 170. Shang hainese a (...)
  • 42 White, (1984), art. cit., p. 147.
  • 43 XL24030, October 15, 1945, OSS.

25In Shanghai, much of the carpetbagging was conducted under the authority of Dai Li. His secret police lieutenants, men like Deng Baoguang 邓葆光 and Zhou Haoliang 周浩亮, wantonly ‘took the five zi’: fangzi 房子 (houses), chezi 车子 (cars), tiaozi 条子 (gold), piaozi 票子 (bank notes), and nüzi 女子 (women); and their mistresses or concubines were called ‘Japanese wife’ (Riben furen 日本妇人), ‘Victory wife’ (Shengli furen 胜利夫人), and ‘Confiscation wife’ (Jieshou furen 接收夫人).41 The regular Shanghai police also shared the spoils. Under Nationalist laws, a patrolman could at any time go into a private shop or home for a regular or irregular visit, which provided ample opportunities for extensive extortion.42 According to U.S. intelligence reports, graft ‘has reached a fantastically high point’, with officials at the top ‘selling key positions’ in the police force, even in one case putting out for bid the control of a district station. Station inspectors had no conception of their duties, and armed robberies, especially in the former ‘Badlands’ in Huxi, were increasing.43

26Meanwhile, the morale of the police who had served on through the war was extraordinarily low.

  • 44 XL24030, May 15, 1945, OSS.

In the middle and lower ranks of the force are many Chinese who were trained, at great expense to the former SMC, in modern police methods at the time when Britons headed the important divisions of the police. Most of these English-speaking Chinese remained loyal to the central government, and some served as intelligence agents of Chungking [Chongqing] throughout the period of Japanese occupation.44

  • 45 They were threatened with arrest if they tried to resign because the Guomindang could not dispense (...)
  • 46 XL24030, May 15, 1945, OSS.

27Yet these officers were now being excoriated as collaborators and traitors, on the one hand, while, on the other, not being allowed to resign.45 The result was a kind of police gridlock, with bars, cabarets, and brothels opening up on all sides, while Shanghai’s traffic problems grew worse from day to day and the sidewalks became virtually impassable.46

  • 47 XL24032, October 15, 1945, OSS; Wilkinson, ‘Leave Us Alone!: Sino-American Conflict in Pre-Liberati (...)
  • 48 Xuan Tiewu, ‘Fakanci’ (Foreword), in Zhu Yisheng (ed.), Shanghai jingcha (Shanghai Police) (1946), (...)

28This had not failed to escape the attention of the authorities in Chongqing. By October 1945 the Nationalists were willing to admit that there had been many illegal confiscations and unauthorized arrests in Shanghai. And by May 1946, the government had appointed a new American-trained mayor, Wu Guozhen 吴国桢 (K.C. Wu), and was bent upon reform of the police.47 The new chief of police, Xuan Tiewu, announced that, ‘We must all have forward-looking thoughts, a revolutionary spirit, and exert ourselves for the nation’. Now that the war was over, a ‘new age’ had arrived, and the time had come to ‘build up the country’ (jianguo 建国).48

  • 49 The Nationalists brought all of the police stations in Shanghai under the direction of the Shanghai (...)
  • 50 Liu Feng, op. cit., p. 185; Wan Ren, op. cit., p. 24.

29Though the press fixed the blame for corruption upon Chongqing’s newly appointed regular police officials who were identified with the secret police’s carpetbaggers, the Nationalist Ministry of Interior assigned culpability to the Wang Jingwei holdovers within the municipal force.49 Despite his efforts, Chief Xuan could not entirely rid his force of Wang Jingwei holdovers, so he decided to form a cadre of ‘new police’ whose duties, status, and assignments would be different from the ‘old police’. This was partly also a matter of security and reliability. Chiang Kaishek himself told his police officials that he was concerned about Communist infiltration of the existing Wuxi and Shanghai Police forces, which ‘were not very reliable’, and he ordered the establishment of a special Legal Investigation Office (Facha chu 罚查处) to help settle the matter. Meanwhile secret service elements were strengthened within the Shanghai Police by appointing ‘backbone cadres’ (gugan 骨干), who were graduates of the Hangzhou and Chongqing police academies, as inspectors (duchayuan 督察员) and political police (zhengzhi jingcha 政治警察) on the Shanghai force. They in turn instituted a system of political and military affairs training and of ‘partyfied education’ (danghua jiaoyu 党化教育), which produced a corps of ‘police personnel’ (jingyuan 警员): the so-called ‘new police’ as opposed to regular ‘policemen’ (jingcha 警察), who were the ‘old police’. At the same time Chief Xuan introduced a new system of ‘police management zones’ (jingguan qu 警管区), which permitted him to segregate most of the ‘old police’ in the Laozha and Huangpu precinct stations by way of diminishing overall solidarity among the two groups.50

  • 51 The ‘old police’ objected to the jingguan qu: ‘Implementing police management [zones] is breaking t (...)
  • 52 Jingzheng jianshe wunian jihua (The Police administration office establishes a five-year plan), Num (...)
  • 53 Ge sheng shi jingcha xuexiao zuzhi guicheng (Organizational regulations for each province and munic (...)
  • 54 Ge sheng shi jingcha xuexiao yuan jing xunlian yueban dengjibiao (A Tabular representation of the p (...)

30After some of the ‘old police’ threatened to demonstrate on June 2, 1947, Shanghai’s precinct chiefs promised that the entire police force would be given the opportunity to become jingyuan.51 The Ministry of Interior drew up a five-year plan to place the municipal police forces that had been centralized by the Wang Jingwei government directly under each municipality, and ordered each province and city to establish a Police Training Institute (Jingcha xunliansuo 警察训练所).52 Later, on May 1, 1948, the institutes were ordered to change their name to Police Academies (Jingcha xuexiao 警察学校), and the Shanghai police of course complied.53 By the following year, just before Shanghai fell to the Communists, the Nationalist police academy there had a total of 1,661 police instructors who had helped train more than 16,000 policemen and policewomen.54

Nationalist Police Measures, 1945-1949

  • 55 Jing zheng faling, p. 52-58, 84-86.
  • 56 Liu Feng, op. cit., p. 187; White, ‘Deviance, Modernization, Rations, and Household Registers in Ur (...)
  • 57 White (1981), op. cit., p. 51.

31It virtually goes without saying that one of the first measures taken by the Shanghai police in 1945 was to order that each household compile a register and affix a placard (menpai 门牌) to its door.55 The efficiency of the Wang Jingwei/Japanese urban baojia system impressed upon the Nationalist police the importance of using household registers and personal identity cards (shenfenzheng) to maintain the ‘public order’ (zhixu 秩序) Chiang Kai-shek demanded;56 and special urban districts (shiqu 市区) were delineated in April 1946 in order to establish a public security system through household and street groupings.57

  • 58 Wakeman, ‘Licensing Leisure’ (1995b).
  • 59 Jing zheng faling, p. 45-48.
  • 60 A. C. Scott, Actors Are Madmen: Notebook of a Theatregoer in China (1982), p. 70.

32‘Public order’ also meant – especially if the Shanghai police took its pre-war activities as a standard – licensing entertainment, curbing vice, and suppressing narcotics.58 In February 1946, laws were passed regulating theaters, music halls, movies, dance halls, opera houses, ice skating rinks, pool parlors, and so forth. All of these amusement halls would have to be licensed, and then policed in order to prevent drunkenness, brawling, and other unseemly public behavior.59 The following year the Nationalist government banned dance halls, and 200 000 Shanghai taxi dancers threatened to march on Nanjing.60

  • 61 Jing zheng faling, p. 25, 32.

33As late as December 1945, the Shanghai police were saying that all opium addiction must be eradicated within two years of the end of the war. On January 12, 1946, the authorities announced their intention to stop the sale of drugs in Shanghai altogether, and addicts were given until March to report themselves. Nothing more was done.61

  • 62 ‘Yewu jilu’ (Record of affairs) 1946, in Zhu Yisheng, op. cit., p. 53.
  • 63 Sun Guoqun, ‘Lun jiu Shanghai changji zhidu de fazhan he tedian’ (On the development and characteri (...)

34On October 16, 1945, the Shanghai municipal authorities announced a ‘Plan for Straightening out Prostitutes in Shanghai Municipality and Temporary Regulations for Prostitutes’ (Zhengli Shanghai shi changji jihua ji guanli changji zhixing banfa 整理上海娼妓计划及管理娼妓执行办法). A limit of 1 000 brothels and 10,000 prostitutes was proposed – all of these to be licensed and located in special red light districts like Tilan qiao, where prostitutes could only conduct business inside the bordello. However, at that time the police estimated that there were over 100,000 prostitutes in Shanghai ‘who sell their smiles for a living’. To prohibit their activity would cause enormous unemployment and thereby ‘affect social peace’. Consequently, the police time and again postponed the deadline for registering prostitutes, repeatedly requesting deferral because of the ‘special nature’ of the Shanghai environment.62 When the Communists took over the city in May of 1949 there were still over 40,000 licensed and unlicensed prostitutes in Shanghai.63

  • 64 During the first half of 1946, more than 1,600 factories in Shanghai closed their doors. More than (...)
  • 65 Ibid., p. 183-185.

35One reason for the police force’s fitful, halfway measures was its preoccupation with the visible shortcomings of the immediate post-war economy, including runaway inflation. For, maintaining ‘public order’ meant as well coping with the social consequences of the massive unemployment that forced more than a 100 000 indigents to try to survive as sidewalk peddlers (tanfan 摊贩) in the city.64 In July 1946 the police announced that they would no longer permit sidewalk vending, but patrolmen did not start making arrests until August 1946. By November about 1,500 sidewalk peddlers had been arrested, which led to a demonstration by about 3,000 hucksters outside the Huangpu district police station on November 30. The demonstrators battled military police and guardsmen, throwing sticks and stones until the police opened fire, killing 7 and wounding many more while the rioters overturned a firetruck. The next day at 2:00 in the morning, a crowd of approximately 5,000 surrounded Huangpu station while another mob attacked the Laozha district police station. This time the municipal government sent in troops and police with fire hoses, tear gas, and machine guns. Ten were killed and more than 100 wounded. To protest against police brutality that same day the trams and buses stopped running. After dismissing Du Zhun 杜准, the head of the Huangpu station, the Nationalist police released the prisoners and allowed the vendors to resume earning their livelihood.65

  • 66 Jing zheng faling, p. 49; White (1984), p. 148. The newspapers were shut down in May 1947.
  • 67 Sima Lu (1967), p. 181-183, quoted in White (1984), p. 148.

36None of these activities helped improve the image of the law enforcement authorities in the eyes of the public, who resented their censorship and feared their secret agents. It was the police, after all, who tore down dissenting political postsers and kept careful watch over the walls where they might be affixed; and it was the police who also closed down liberal newspapers such as Wenhui bao 文汇报, Xinmin bao 新民报, and Lianhe bao 联合报, and who censored other public media.66 The public had no way of knowing, needless to say, that the person responsible for much of this censorship was an underground Communist Party agent who admitted after the Communist takeover that he ‘had done [his] job so as to maximize bourgeois resentment against the KMT [GMD], without harming crucial CCP activities’.67

  • 68 Liu Feng (1979), p. 190-191. The Communist prisoners were killed by their captors on the eve of the (...)

37But no one was unaware of the ubiquitous Nationalist secret police, especially after the Communist Party announced the slogan, ‘Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, Liberate all of China’, in November 1947. Mao Sen 毛森, once one of Dai Li’s closest lieutenants and now both a top leader of the Bureau to Preserve Secrets (Baomi ju 保密局) and chief of the Shanghai Police, boasted in return: 上海有一千条马路我有一千个特务 (Shanghai you yiqian tiao malu. Wo you yiqian ge tewu: Shanghai has one thousand streets. I have one thousand special agents). Under Mao Sen’s direction, secret policemen were sent into factories, schools, and businesses to try to root out Communists. The police themselves instituted a special system of ‘policemen putting policemen under strict surveillance’ (jingcha chu yanmi jianshi jingcha 警察处严密监视警察), which led to the arrest of more than 50 officers, at three of whom were important underground Party members.68

38The public’s fear of the police did not attenuate its contempt. In their own civic rhetoric, starting with Xuan Tiewu in 1946, successive Shanghai Nationalist police chiefs openly recognized this deprecation, while continually stressing what a good Chinese policeman should be:

  • 69 Su Shouzu (1946), p. 31-34.

The people’s teacher and society’s nursemaid; The government’s intermediary and the nation’s representative; A model for the nation and a standard for the masses; The main force for bringing peace to the interior and a backup force for resisting external aggression; The nursemaid of local self-government and the foundation of all administration; The benevolent man (ren ren 仁人) who rescues one from disaster and saves one from danger; and A scholar of resolve (zhishi 志士) who risks danger to carry out his duties at all costs.69

  • 70 Ibid., p. 35; Xuan Tiewu, ‘Renshi jingcha’ (Know the police) in Zhu Yisheng (ed.), op. cit., p. 15- (...)

39They admitted that in the past the public had ‘deprecated the position of the police and police organs’; first, because the police had often abused their official authority vis-à-vis the people; and second, because like ‘yamen runners’ (yamen de chayi 衙门的差役) the modern Chinese police had come to be identified with the very criminal element they opposed. This was all the more the case in Shanghai, where the International Settlement’s constables (daibu 逮捕) before the war, and the puppet government’s policemen during the war, had behaved so abominably (eliehua 恶劣化).70

  • 71 NCDN (July 29, 1947), p. 1-2.
  • 72 Chungking News Agency (February 18, 1946) in U.S. Consulate General (Beiping) Chinese Press Review; (...)

40However much despised and held in contempt, the Shanghai Police earned a small measure of public sympathy when they ran afoul of the Nationalist Military Police, who also patrolled the city. Relations between the Chinese Military Police and the regular Shanghai police were strained. The ‘old police’ on the force could well remember the clash in 1944 between police and soldiers at the Great World Emporium on Tibet Road.71 The ‘new police’, on the other hand, knew that the Nationalist Military Police had absorbed a full corps of the Wang Jingwei regime’s puppet gendarmerie in February 1946 and came in turn to blows with MPs in July 1947 at the Golden Castle movie theater.72

The Establishment of Communist Cells within the Nationalist Shanghai Police

  • 73 Ibid., p. 178.
  • 74 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, in Shanghai wenshi ziliao xuanji, p. 106.
  • 75 Liu Feng (1979), p. 178-179.
  • 76 Wan Ren (1983), p. 20.

41The Chinese Communist Party had organized cells within the Shanghai Municipal Police (International Settlement) and the Shanghai Police (Special Municipality) in the late 1930s.73 There were but a handful of members, steadfastly and clandestinely following Party Center’s policy of ‘undercover crack troops, lying in ambush for a long period, accumulating strength, awaiting the opportune moment’ (yincang jinggan, changqi maifu, jixu liliang, yidai shiji 隐藏精干长期埋伏积蓄力量以待时机).74 In deep cover, this small group of stalwarts followed the ‘three diligents’ (san qin 三勤): ‘diligently study’ (qin xue 勤学) Mao’s ‘On Protracted War’ and other rectification materials, ‘diligently follow your profession’ (qin ye 勤业) so as to use your position as a cover for Party work, and ‘diligently befriend’ (qin you 勤友) to create a network of supporters and future allies.75 The War of Resistance Against Japan offered an opportunity for expansion, and by the time the Pacific War broke out, there were about 40 Party members.76

  • 77 Ibid.; Liu Feng (1979), p. 179-180.

42From 1942 to 1945 the CP’s Jiangsu Provincial Committee was moved to the Huai’an base area, where a Central China Bureau was put in charge of Shanghai’s underground work. The handful of cadres working within the Shanghai police, such as Shao Jian 邵坚 and Liu Feng 刘峰, were brought back to the base area one by one, sometimes with their families, to train and study in the Central China Party School (Huazhong dangxiao 华中党校) before moving back into Shanghai and taking over one of the ten Party branches (which were actually cells) within the police. By then there were about 100 underground Party members heeding the command of a Police Party Committee (Jingcha dangwei 警察党务 – Party Secretary Shao Jian), which in turn reported to the underground municipal committee, represented by Wan Ren 万任.77

  • 78 These included Zhang Yunxiao 张云晓, Wu Fupei 吴佩孚, Zheng Zhenhua 郑振华, and Yuan Kuntian袁锟田. Ibid., p. 1 (...)

43Wan Ren was originally put in charge of the Sino-French Alumni United Friendship Society (Zhong-Fa xiaoyou lianyi hui 中法校友联谊会), which had a small number of Communists working for the French Concession police as officers and translators. Wang Dachao 王大超 carried out the same kind of Party work in the International Settlement police force. Recruitment was tricky, and based entirely upon personal friendships.78

44Despite the Communist Party’s artfulness, the Japanese police authorities in Shanghai deeply suspected their Chinese collaborators as being ‘not reliable’. Mainly this was because of lingering loyalty to the Westerners who had led the SMP, so that the Japanese frequently enjoined the policemen who collaborated with them to ‘eradicate English and American thought’. By the end of 1944 over 2,000 policemen had been washed out of the force. A few of these were Communists, and when they left the force they also left Shanghai to join the New Fourth or Eighth Route Army.

  • 79 Liu Feng (1979), p. 180.

45Nonetheless, by the end of the war, the New Police Colleagues Association still had 200 members.79

  • 80 Li Zhaochun (1978), p. 116-117.
  • 81 Because of this, Wan Ren was later accused during the Cultural Revolution of having devel oped ‘ill (...)
  • 82 Ibid., p. 20.

46In 1945, after the war was over, Pan Hannian returned to Shanghai and resumed his intelligence activities. He soon went on to Hong Kong, where he worked with Third Force groups (Minmeng 民盟 Democratic League, Minge 民革 Democratic Revolutionary Group, Minjin 民进 Democratic Progressive Group), and recruited professionals (mainly physicians) among overseas Chinese abroad, and arranged transportation for leading intellectuals and financiers to attend the first session of the Political Consultative Conference (Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 政治协商会议) in Pingshan (Hebei) before the civil war was over.80 In his stead, Wan Ren was given responsibility by the Chinese Communist Shanghai Office (Zhonggong Shanghai ju 中共上海局) and the Shanghai Party Committee to lead underground work in the Guomindang Shanghai Police force.81 He remained in that position all the way up to the eve of Liberation, when responsibility for the police was handed over to the Municipal Public Security Bureau Party Committee under Li Shiying 李石英.82

  • 83 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 62. Xiao was an ‘intelligence cadre’ (qingbao ganbu 情报干部) responsible for Shan (...)

47The Communists not only recruited new Party members; they also worked closely with sympathizers or fellow travelers within the police force but outside the Party. Lu Dagong 陆大公, the inspector general (duchazhang 督察长) of the Shanghai Police, was just such a person. Yang Hu 杨虎, the former head of the Shanghai Garrison Command, had already long been in touch with the Communist underground, and the Revive China Study Society (Xing Zhong xuehui 兴中学会) he led was a prominent front organization for the CP. Through Yang Hu and Wang Jiyi 王寄一 (head of the organization department of the Zhongguo nong-gong minzhu dang 中国农工民主党 Chinese Peasants-Workers Democratic Party), Lu Dagong became a member of the Xing Zhong xuehui, which put him in touch with Xiao Dacheng 肖大成, a leading Communist agent, who persuaded him to accept the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party and ‘stand on the side of the people’.83

  • 84 Wan Ren (1983), p. 23.
  • 85 Liu Feng (1979), p. 182-183.

48Working underground with the Guomindang Police during the civil war was a harrowing experience, requiring the greatest caution and an extraordinary attention to secrecy.84 There were moments when the Party members inside the Shanghai Police cautiously engaged in public movements in order to gain wider ‘mass support’: the opposition to the ‘differentiation’ (zhendie 侦谍) policies, including efforts to get the International Settlement pension plan carried over and applied to postwar police circumstances; or support of workers’ strikes such as the labor demonstration at the Shenxin textile mill in February 1948 when three workers were killed by the Nationalist authorities.85

Preparations for Liberation

49Preparations for turning Shanghai’s Police over to the Communists were carried out in two venues: within the Shanghai Police force, and outside the city in ‘liberated’ zones already controlled by the PLA.

  • 86 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 104.

50The external work was relatively straightforward, comparable to the advance work done by ‘civil affairs’ units of any occupying army but much more thorough. When Party Center announced on New Year’s Day, 1949, that the preparation work for crossing into Jiangnan was underway, steps were immediately taken to rehearse the invasion. On February 13, the deputy director of the Social Affairs Department of the East China Bureau (Huadong ju shehui bu 华东局社会部), Yang Fan, led 60-odd cadres (including a radio transmission team) to Huaiyin to gather intelligence and ‘incite defection’ (cefan 策反) in Shanghai. In addition to printing mate-rials to hand out to cadres moving into the city, the Huaiyin team organized a group of cadres to analyze the military and civilian intelligence sent them by Shanghai underground agents, and then to prepare highly specific materials on Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou to be printed up for distribution to ‘liberation cadres’.86

51Meanwhile, the East China Bureau’s Social Affairs Department had also opened up an East China Police Officers’ School (Huadong Jingguan xuexiao 华东警官学校) in Ji’nan (Shandong), which recruited over 1,000 young students. Their task was to take over the Shanghai police force and organize a People’s Public Security Organ (Renmin gong’an jiguan 人民公安机关) thereafter.

  • 87 The ‘Huadong ju guanyu jieguan Jiangnan chengsh de zhishi’ (Information concerning the takeover of (...)

52By now the training group was in Danyang, and name lists were already being prepared for assignments to departments, bureaus, offices, and even specific precincts once they took over Shanghai. Chen Geng 陈赓, one of the Party’s security specialists who knew Shanghai well from his underground days and was now garrison commander and political commissar of the Second Guerrilla Fourth Military Group (Erye sibingtuan silingyuan 二野四兵团司令员), was appointed shadow head of Shanghai’s Department of Public Security, whose deputy chiefs were Yang Fan and Li Shiying. The take-over group was thoroughly briefed (Communist Party members of the Shanghai police were spirited north to Danyang, ostensibly on home leave, to fill in the now-assigned police officials on the specific details of their units), and each cadre knew exactly what his or her post was to be.87

  • 88 Wan Ren (1983), p. 212-213. The Party branch in Shanghai’s main jail consisted of 30-odd members an (...)

53Within the Shanghai police force, CP cadres also commenced preparing for the take-over. By then there were a total of 19 Party cells through out the 20,000 member police force. Under the direction of Shao Jian and the central police Party committee, each of the 500 CP members was assigned to link up with local district Party committees throughout Shanghai, and to prepare to mobilize the more than 2,000 ‘external activist elements’ (waiwei jijifenzi 外围积极分子) in the Shanghai Police force once the Communists arrived. Their greatest concern, of course, was to keep the departing Nationalists from destroying industrial machinery and killing off political prisoners.88

  • 89 Liu Feng (1979), p. 191; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 107.

54In April 1949 the Communists in the Shanghai police force organized People’s Security Teams (Renmin baoan dui 人民保安队) under a special Preservation Committee (Baoguan weiyuanhui 保管委员会). Five officers formed a zu and 10 a dui to protect archives and preserve firearms as the end of the Guomindang’s rule drew near. At the same time they also investigated the location of secret service units, and drew up detailed reports on the crimes of police officers and secret agents. This register was later handed over to PLA officers.89

  • 90 Scott (1982), p. 140-141; Percy Finch, Shanghai and Beyond, (1953), p. 273; Henriot, ‘Le gouverneme (...)
  • 91 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 3, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review, #904 (June 3, 1949), p. 1-2
  • 92 Liu Feng (1979), p. 191; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 106-107.

55On April 21, the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] issued a general order to its advancing armies to cross the Yangzi, which provoked the Nationalists into destroying industrial equipment and arranging for their own flight to Taiwan. On April 24 the Nationalist general at the Jiangyin forts, which commanded the defenses of Nanjing, ordered his men to withhold fire while the Communists crossed the Yangzi. A young officer loyal to Chiang Kai-shek shot the general in the back but by then it was too late: the PLA was on its way to the Nationalist capital.90 From there three Communist armies converged on Shanghai following the railroads and highways. On April 25, Chairman Mao Zedong and Commander-in-Chief Zhu De also issued the 约法八章 (yuefa bazhang) – the famed Eight Regulations, which were to become the charter of the new Shanghai municipal government.91 The Shanghai Police party committee instantly went to work under Shao Jian’s direction, printing up great quantities of the announcement to be mailed to the homes of GMD police and secret agents. Since many of the Nationalist police officials had recently moved in order to slip away from Communist surveillance, even receiving these notices of the fate that they might encounter was profoundly unsettling, and there was a great furor and panic within the Shanghai police force in the days that followed.92

  • 93 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 107.

56The diehard secret police element – many of them Chief Mao Sen’s followers – within the Shanghai Police’s Political Investigation Department (Zhengzhi diaocha ke 政治调查科) was determined to round up as many suspected Communists as possible before the city fell. The CP, however, had four underground agents in this unit, and they were able to gain access to reports coming into police headquarters from special service units throughout the city. Whenever they came across detailed arrest plans, they tried to notify the suspects (both Party members and ‘progressive’) soon enough for them to get away. Many lives were saved as a result.93

  • 94 Finch (1953), p. 337-338; Yuan Lizhuang and Li Nianpei, ‘When Shanghai Was Liberated’, China Daily (...)

57By then, Chen Yi’s forces had taken Hangzhou, and a line of Communist troops was advancing along the Nanjing-Shanghai and Shanghai-Hangzhou highways. Mayor Wu Guozhen (K.C. Wu) had already fled Shanghai, leaving his secretary, General Chen Liang, in charge. Chen Liang 陈亮, in turn, handed the mayor’s seal over to the Cornell-trained engineer who directed the Bureau of Public Works, Zhao Zukang 赵祖康, who reluctantly agreed to become acting mayor both because he had no party affiliations and because he possessed a strong sense of public responsibility. Although the military was responsible for maintaining social order, the Nationalist army was already unraveling. Chiang Kai-shek had stopped off in Shanghai on his way to Taiwan in his private C-47 (reputedly with 200 million dollars in U.S. gold reserves), and entrusted the defense of Shanghai to Premier He Yingqin and General Tang Enbo 汤恩伯. But by May 24, the Shanghai newspaper article reiterating He Yingqin’s determination to defend the city had a little box in the middle of the story, explaining that He had already left by plane for Canton. And, though General Tang held a victory rally that morning, marching past posters that announced ‘We will fight to the last drop of blood, Shanghai will be the Communists’ graveyard’, he was nowhere to be seen by mid-afternoon.94

  • 95 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 63-64.

58Mao Sen, the chief of police, seemed determined to stay until the very end. Ever suspicious of Lu Dagong 陆大庚, General Mao held a meeting of his own secret service backbone cadres, and proposed that Lu Dagong be killed because he knew too much about Nationalist secret police activities. Mao was dissuaded by his own followers, who argued strongly for keeping Lu alive and using him as an intermediary with the incoming Communists.95

  • 96 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 109-110, 112-113. There was a total of 8,520 guns in the hands of th (...)
  • 97 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 65.

59Early on May 24, 1949, the PLA took Shanghai’s suburbs. At 10:00 that morning Mao Sen ordered Lu to report to his office. When Lu appeared, Mao told him that reinforcements from Taiwan had not yet arrived and that the leadership was going to have to retreat. He asked Lu to continue to serve as deputy police chief in order to ‘maintain local order’ (weichi difang zhi’an 维持地方治安). Military deserters and local ‘ruffians’ (daitu 歹徒) posing as Communists had already appeared in several precincts carrying banners inscribed ‘Zhonggong dixiajun’ 中共地下军 (Chinese Communist Underground Army), trying to take over the police stations and their arsenals.96 Commands were subsequently given to all precinct chiefs to heed Lu Dagong’s orders.97

  • 98 A small number of case files were burned in the personnel office and investigation section (diaocha (...)
  • 99 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 66-67; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 107.

60As soon as he could get away, Lu got in touch with the Communist Party underground and reported what had happened. The Party sent Xiao Dacheng to tell Lu that it approved of his appointment as temporary police chief. Tensions rose. At 3:00 p.m., one of Mao’s assistants telephoned Lu Dagong and told him that the time had come for [him] to take over formally as chief of police. Lu returned to the station with Xiao Dacheng, disguised as a regular Shanghai policeman, in tow. Mao Sen, however, tarried, as though reluctant to leave. Ordering that the police department’s household registration registers be destroyed (an order Lu secretly countermanded), Mao Sen was still occupying his office at 7:00 p.m.98 At that point, Lu told him that PLA units had already reached Zhaofeng Park (present-day Zhongshan Park). Mao panicked, ordering Lu to have the motorized brigade send several armored cars to protect him as he fled. The motorized brigade was already suborned, however, and in the end Mao Sen and his bodyguards had to flee for the docks and the next boat out to Taiwan in two ordinary automobiles.99

  • 100 Ibid., p. 108; Lu Dagong (1981), p. 68.

61Now in full charge, Lu Dagong spoke with the acting mayor of Shanghai, Zhao Zukang, who advised him to do all that he could to maintain order in the city. Lu promptly declared a curfew. His second act was to send garrison officers to go along with CP intelligence cadre Xiao Decheng to the mobile brigade to make certain that the paramilitary units were under control. A handful of Communist Party agents were brought in that night to headquarters to coordinate the takeover. The management committees (baoguan weiyuanhui 保管委员会) set up by the CP were also activated in each precinct station, which lowered their Guomindang flags and sent up white banners of surrender.100

  • 101 Ibid., p. 68-69.
  • 102 Ibid., p. 69.

62One of the first discoveries Lu Dagong made after taking over the Shanghai police were 9 bloody corpses of prominent political prisoners in the holding cell of the headquarters. He quickly moved to prevent other killings.101 He also issued orders to his precinct captains to be prepared to receive PLA units with hands in the air, shouting touching 投诚 surrender).102

  • 103 Yuan and Li, art. quoted above, n. 94.
  • 104 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 69.

63At 9:00 p.m. on the night of May 24, 1949, the PLA launched a general offensive on Shanghai, coming at the double out of the West through the French Concession. Tang Enbo’s troops put up token resistance to cover withdrawal to their ships in the Huangpu and Yangzi rivers. Many Nationalists surrendered.103 At five minutes past midnight on May 25, Deputy Police Chief Lu was notified by telephone that the PLA had reached the Changshu district police office, which surrendered. Other stations called in with similar reports in the early hours of that same morning, and Lu Dagong prepared to receive the PLA cadres.104

64The entry of the long, disciplined columns of rawboned, weathered country boys into downtown Shanghai has been described by many who also witnessed the public jubilation of the city’s populace. One of the best descriptions of this final liberation was Percy Finch’s:

  • 105 Finch (1953), p. 339.

Communist partisans went wild with enthusiasm. The Great World in the French concession, the city’s largest amusement resort, hosted a mammoth picture of Mao Tse-tung, which obviously had been weeks in the making. The red flag appeared over buildings and flew outside stores which twenty-two years earlier had quite as enthusiastically flown the Kuomintang flag. Sympathizers who found themselves without Communist emblems hastily manufactured them by tearing the blue sky and white sun quarter from the red field of the Nationalist flag. Madly jubilant and easily moved students danced the yang-ko in the streets, welcoming Mao’s men with all the fervor another generation had welcomed Chiang’s. It was like a Hollywood remake with Marxian inflections.105

  • 106 Acting Mayor Zhao Zukang had already met with Communist negotiators and agreed imme diately to rele (...)
  • 107 Ibid., p. 69-70.

65Whatever public gawkiness the PLA cadres may have displayed, their organizational takeover was brilliantly executed.106 At 10:00 on the morning of May 25, the PLA vanguard arrived at Shanghai police headquarters. Lu Dagong was standing outside in plainclothes. He stepped forward and announced: ‘I am Lu Dagong, the acting chief of the Guomindang Shanghai Municipal Police. I have come especially to welcome the Liberation Army, which is here to occupy our police station, and I will respectfully obey your orders’. The PLA commander instantly ordered him to replace the guard post at the front of the station with a simple PLA soldier. To Lu, deeply moved, this shift represented the moment when power passed from ‘imperialism and the reactionaries’ to the People’s government.107

  • 108 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 113-115.

66The Communist cadres moved swiftly. On May 25-26, the ‘shadow police’ mustered in Danyang were brought by train to Shanghai, where they were matched up with the members of the CP underground committee within the police force. The ‘special personnel to take over control’ (jieguan zhuanyuan 接管专员) then moved into their various positions in the precinct stations and police headquarters. Repeating the Eight Regulations, they ordered all personnel to stay at their posts, and to carry out the orders of the People’s Government while their individual cases awaited ‘disposal’ (chuli 处理).108 That term had a slightly ominous ring to it, and many officers were considerably relieved when Zhong Xidong, the Political Commissar of the PLA’s 27th Army, addressed a meeting of police section and bureau chiefs, saying:

  • 109 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 70.

In the past you served the reactionary regime and did some bad things. This time you were able actually to respond to the PLA’s appeal in the Eight Regulations and not stubbornly resist or destroy things. You also did a good job of preserving local order (difang zhixu 地方秩序) and welcomed liberation. This is your political awakening. You handled this affair well. You did it correctly.109

  • 110 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 9, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #908 (June 9, 1949), p. 9. S (...)
  • 111 Wei, Henry, ‘Courts and Police in Communist China to 1952’, p. 48.
  • 112 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 109.

67General Chen Yi, the new mayor, also addressed 2,800 of Shanghai’s police officers during a three-hour meeting held in the Tianshan Theater on the morning of June 8, asking merely that they compare the behavior of their Communist liberators with the Guomindang’s carpetbaggers and draw their own conclusions. ‘He exhorted the old personnel to change their old thoughts and ideas, to understand the meaning of the victory of the people’s democratic revolution, and to support the People’s Government. They should reform themselves, and at the same time carry on their work without undue anxieties’. Chen Yi also promised that if a policeman was able to serve the people conscientiously, then he would be encouraged to continue to serve on the force.110 The truth of the matter was that the Communists who now ruled the city had little choice but to try to re-educate these former Guomindang and puppet policemen into becoming conscientious security cadres, committed – in the words of Article 10 of the Common Program – ‘to defend the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of China, and to defend the revolutionary gains and all legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese people’.111 Throughout all of China, there were only 80,000 police officers in 1949-1950, so that, apart from certain cities in the Northeast, approximately 60 % of the Nationalist regime’s policemen and women were kept on after being subjected to ‘educational reconstruction’. This policy was called chai wu chong jian 拆屋重建 (dismantle the house and build again): that is, destroy the old police department, but retain the individual policemen themselves after they had been investigated and reassigned.112

  • 113 Yuan and Li, art. quoted above, n. 94; Robinhood (tabloid), Shanghai (May 31, 1949), trans. in Chin (...)
  • 114 Ibid.

68On May 28, the day Chen Yi took over as mayor, Li Shiying and Yang Fan formally assumed control of police headquarters, renamed the Public Security Bureau [PSB] on May 31.113 As a security bureau they were subordinate to the Public Security Department (Gong’anbu 公安部) of the East China Military and Political Commission, whose head was Chen Geng, Communist security expert and commander of the expeditionary forces of the PLA.114 Commissioner Chen Geng and Deputy Commissioner Yang Fan (who was also deputy chief of police) were in turn subordinate to the Municipal Military Control Committee (Shi jun guanhui 市军管会), which was chaired by Mayor Chen Yi and which was Shanghai’s highest authority during the early period of Communist rule.

  • 115 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 3, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review, #904 (June 3, 1949), p. 1.

After the wiping out of the military forces of the Guomindang reactionaries, a period of military control must be exercised in the principal city... This system will prove useful to the task of the continuous fight for the obliteration of the remnant reactionary forces and the protection and consolidation of the people’s own interest. For this reason, during the period of military control, the Military Control Committee is the highest authority in the city. The municipal government is the principal constituent portion of the Military Control Committee.115

  • 116 Ibid. (June 15, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #912 (June 15, 1949), p. 6; ‘Cuihui jiu jingc (...)
  • 117 Dagong bao, Shanghai (June 15, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #912 (June 15, 1949), p. 6.

69Although Li Shiying and Yang Fan’s positions were confirmed on June 2, Yang Fan replaced Li Shiying as chief of the Shanghai police eight days later when all Nationalist-appointed chiefs and deputy chiefs at the central and precinct levels handed over their commands to Communists.116 On June 15, 1949, the new Public Security Bureau was reorganized into 7 departments, each with a Communist cadre as its head: secretariat, administration (traffic, peace preservation, marriage examination, business control), criminal police (judicial, fingerprints, ballistics, political, investigation), social affairs, fire brigade, and logistics.117

  • 118 Li Zhaochun (1978), p. 117. See also Aspects of Shanghai, Shanghai (June 1949), trans. in Chinese P (...)

70Yang Fan’s appointment as chief of police coincided with Pan Hannian’s return from his security work in Hong Kong. Now 46 years old, the distinguished looking former Comintern representative returned to assume a variety of high-level tasks in 1949 and the early 1950s, among them: deputy mayor and secretary general of the Shanghai People’s Government (Shanghai shi renmin zhengfu 上海市人民政府), chief of the CCP Central Committee’s Eastern China Bureau (Huadongju 华东局), head of the United Front Department (Tongzhanbu 统战部), delegate to and national committee member of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, and member of the East China Military and Political Committee (Huadong junzheng weiyuanhui 华东军政委员会).118

71Chen Yi’s regime both celebrated the Communists’ victory and warned of enemies still at hand. Jiefang ribao 解放日报 jubilantly proclaimed the positives:

  • 119 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (May 28, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #900 (May 28, 1949), p. 2.

At this moment of the liberation of Greater Shanghai, standing as we do on the threshold of this great turning point in Chinese history, let us be joyful, let us be triumphant. Look! The history of an old China that had been the object of aggression is now ended, and the history of a new China, independent and free, now begins. History has already testified to the heroism and strength of the revolutionary creative powers of the Chinese people. It has also testified to the meagerness and weakness of the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his gangsters.119

72But it warned darkly of the negatives:

  • 120 Ibid., (May 18, 1949), in ibid., p. 2-3.

The enemy political and military forces have been defeated but the enemy is very wily, and he is experienced in his counter-revolutionary activities. He knows how to put on the false mask of democracy. He knows how to undertake secret acts of sabotage. He knows how to utilize ‘leftist’ terms, or to spread rumors to fool those within the revolutionary ranks whose political consciousness has not been awakened to a high degree. And more than all, he knows how to pick out the weaknesses within the revolutionary camp and to attack where there is opportunity and thereby attempt to work havoc.120

  • 121 Dagong bao, Shanghai (May 26, 1949); Shanghai renmin (May 26, 1949); Jiefang ribao (May 28, 1949), (...)
  • 122 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 13, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #910 (June 11-13, 1949), p. (...)

73While the regime assigned itself three great imperatives to destroy remnant Guomindang elements, safeguard freedom and democracy, and recover economic production – everyone agreed that the overriding necessity was to maintain order (zhixu).121 This mission – which was also, incidentally, the primary assignment of the Guomindang Public Security Bureau in 1927 when it took over Shanghai’s Chinese sectors – was assigned to a special Peace Preservation Commission (Zhi’an weiyuanhui 治安委员会) under the leadership of the Military Control Committee with the participation of the Garrison Command (Jingbei budui 警备部队), the Public Security Bureau, and the People’s Government.122

  • 123 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 111-117.

74Primary responsibility for the maintenance of orderliness fell upon the Public Security Bureau, which worked closely with military and civilian authorities through an Army-Police-People’s [Government] Joint Office (Jun-jing-min lianhe banshichu 军警民联合办事处), chaired by General Song Shilun 宋时轮. Under this broad rubric the PSB set its own priorities: establish social order, suppress bandit or robber activities, and eliminate special service elements.123

Social Order

  • 124 Public health issues also played a role in this regard. Fearful of epidemics, the Military Control (...)
  • 125 At the time of Communist liberation, there were 150,000-160,000 peddlers in Shanghai, filling all t (...)
  • 126 Ibid., p. 112.

75Social disorder was epitomized for the Communists – as it was for the Nationalists in 1927 and again in 1945 – by Shanghai’s turbulent and rowdy traffic. ‘Traffic order’ (jiaotong zhixu 交通秩序) simply had to be enforced on streets stuffed with hucksters’ stalls and along waterways jammed with boats.124 A spate of new rules and regulations for both land and water traffic was issued, and then enforced by special traffic control stations under the command of the PSB, the Garrison Command, the Customs, and so forth.125 In contrast to the Nationalist police takeover, however, the Communists strongly emphasized, first, propaganda education, and, second, the organization of peddlers into local street associations. On July 11, a meeting of the organization of street peddler organizations for the entire municipality was convened in the Tianchan Dancehall. Together, and through voting, the conference decided to register all hucksters (tanfan), to issue permits for peddling in legalized locales, and to organize small groups (xiaozu 小组) of vendors to meet and review the situation periodically. At the same time, the total number of peddlers was reduced to around 84,000, and plans were initiated – and fairly rapidly implemented – to regulate and reduce the size of the illegal kiosks on city sidewalks.126

  • 127 Dagong bao (June 8, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #907 (June 8, 1949), p. 1.

76This was the key difference between the two sides, which is no surprise to any who study modern China. When it came to mobilization, the Nationalists exhorted, passed down decrees, and herded. The Communists’ instinct was to commence participation at the primary or grass-root level, calling on the ‘masses’ to collaborate actively. This was the primary significance of the meetings of various ‘circles’ in Shanghai during late May and early June 1949. The stated objective of the meetings was to unite all classes under the banner of the New Democracy so as to study and promote activities for the building of a ‘new China’. This practice is different from that pursued by the Guomindang reactionary government of the past. The latter formulated its policies and measures only on the basis of the interest of a very small minority of the people.127

77When it came to organization, however, there was much more similarity between the two regimes, connected as they were by mutual responsibility and household registration systems mediated via the hoko system imposed by the Japanese on Shanghai during the wartime occupation. In fact, we can go so far as to say that the Communist Public Security Bureau more or less inherited the Nationalists’ urban baojia system of police-supervised household registration, keeping it intact while adding an important new ingredient of cohesive mass participation. Put simply, the new Shanghai PSB yoked organization to mobilization.

  • 128 Fei bao (tabloid), Shanghai (June 8, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #907 (June 8, 1949), p. (...)
  • 129 White (1977), p. 155.

78Initially, the Military Control Committee and Public Security Bureau were concerned about getting their records straight, and that meant being sure that the census reports of the Guomindang’s Civil Affairs Bureau were preserved. As soon as they took over that bureau they discovered the records to be intact, though there had been a last-minute attempt to burn them.128 Using those as a basis, the Communist authorities re-instituted the household registers (hujibu 户籍簿), which ordinarily had one page for each member of a house (which could be extended to include a collective living unit like a company dormitory or an apartment house, or even a hospital). That page, as Lynn White has explained, included entries for name, birthdate, occupation, place of work, family background (jiating chushen 家庭出身), individual status (geren chengfen), education level, marital status, religion, and ancestral place of origin. Whenever one of these categories altered, the head of household had to note the change in the register and report it to the local PSB station.129

  • 130 Ibid., p. 157-158.

79Because the Communists had been so critical of the Nationalists’ system of control, they did not issue personal identity cards. Instead, the head of household was given a residence card (juminzheng 居民证). However, that did not spare the individual resident from surveillance by the ‘census police’ in the ‘household registration section’ (hujike 户籍科) of each police station.130 In its fully developed form:

  • 131 Ibid., p. 155.

This registration system is far more than a continuous census. Its functions extend far beyond ordinary public security and the control of clearly criminal deviants – although it is of use for these regular police tasks. Its more important functions apply to all citizens of a city, not just criminals and political dis-contents. Valid household registration is necessary for any urban resident who wishes to obtain a regular job, school admission at any level, housing, or rationed food and clothing.131

  • 132 Gail Hershatter, ‘Regulating Sex in Shanghai: The Reform of Prostitution in 1920 and 1951’ (1992), (...)
  • 133 Victor H. Li, ‘The Public Security Bureau and Political-Legal Work in Hui-yang Hsien’ (1968-1969), (...)

80Though the Shanghai puppet police had supervised the rationing and distribution of food during the war, neither it nor the Nationalist police had such an extensive swayorscopeof control.TheCommunistPSBhouseholdregistrationsystemdiffered in one other extremely fundamental way as well: even though Neighborhood Committees (Jiedao weiyuanhui 街道委员会), with their ‘bound-feet police’, were not set up in Shanghai until 1954, mass participation in this surveillance system was encouraged from the very beginning and from the bottom up. As Gail Hershatter has recently pointed out, it was ‘with popular support and participation’ that the police built ‘in the lanes of Shanghai...a network of mutual supervision...both wide and deep’.132 Especially as the mass campaigns began in 1950-1951, security defense committees and militia committees helped investigate crimes, report illegal travel, mediate neighborhood disputes, and supervise people ‘under control’ (guanzhi 管制).133

81It is important to note the voluntary quality of this mass participation. Shanghai’s citizens were obsessed with social order, while undergoing Nationalist bombing raids (the January-February 1950 air raids that left hundreds dead did much to attract positive support for the new regime) and witnessing the capture of Guomindang secret agents week after week in the pages of Liberation Daily. Furthermore, they found on the part of the Public Security Bureau a degree of responsiveness – in work style, at least – that contrasted sharply with the Nationalist police. The government ostensibly encouraged citizens to write to newspapers such as Shenbao with complaints that could be forwarded to the offending authority. Many of these were intended for the police, and they apparently had a beneficial effect.

82Policemen apologized in public print for failing to adjust to the new circumstances of Communist rule.

  • 134 ‘Renzhen zhengdun gongan renyuan de gongzuo zuofeng’.

I am a holdover from the old regime (liuyong renyuan 留用人员) [wrote Gao Changbao 高长宝 after treating Yuedong Tobacco Factory workers disparagingly], and ever since liberation, even though I’ve undergone more than a year of study, my level [of understanding] policy is still very low. [...] First of all, my speaking in this way shows how little progress I’ve made after more than a year of study. I have not understood policy nor familiarized myself with the country’s laws, to the point that I was able to utter such extremely reckless comments. Second, even though my comments were not meant to ridicule, in fact they must have made a bad impression on the minds of the other party. In addition to a thorough self-examination and renewed efforts to correct my errors, I especially want to extend a deep apology to my fellow workers at the Yuedong Tobacco Factory.134

  • 135 Wakeman (1995b), op. cit.

83In my reading of reports about the Shanghai police from the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, I cannot recall anything at all similar to this practice of inviting, and then responding to, popular complaints. Thus, even though the Guomindang police were much less invasive than their Communist counterparts, interfering primarily in public life along the streets and in places of entertainment, they seemed to remain much more aloof, feared, and unresponsive to public opinion.135

  • 136 Dagong bao, Shanghai (May 29, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #901 (May 29-31), p. 14 -15.

84Not that the Communist authorities failed to interfere in public life. Two days after it took power, the Military Control Committee promulgated publication regulations that ostensibly promoted free speech but were actually designed to curtail it. The first article read: ‘In order to protect the freedom of speech in publications of the people and to suppress all counter-revolutionary speeches and publications, all newspapers and periodicals which will be published or will resume publication, and news agencies which are operating or will start operation or will resume operation, are required to apply to the committee for registration in accordance with these regulations’.136

  • 137 Ibid. (June 1, 1949) and China Daily Tribune (May 31, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #902 (J (...)
  • 138 Jiefang ribao (June 16, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #913 (June 16, 1949), p. 10; Ibid. (J (...)

85By June 1, a cultural and educational control committee had been set up under Chen Yi’s chairmanship, Xia Yan 夏衍 being a deputy chair among others.137 That committee proceeded on June 15 to annex National Jiaotong University, and on June 24 to appropriate Ji’nan University.138 The Guomindang never went so far so quickly, even at the height of ‘partyfication’ (danghua 党化); and in no other sphere at this point was there such a contradiction between rhetoric (protect freedom) and reality (seize universities).

  • 139 Hershatter, op. cit., p. 114; C. Henriot, ‘La Fermeture: The Abolishing of Prostitution in Shanghai (...)
  • 140 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 113.
  • 141 Jiefang ribao (June 3, 1949); Dagong bao (June 3,1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #904 (June 3 (...)
  • 142 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 114; Xinwen ribao (June 30, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #9 (...)

86Nonetheless, the efficacy of the Shanghai control system was impressive, especially when it came to curbing Shanghai’s traditional vices by forcibly educating prostitutes, gamblers, and drug addicts into becoming productive members of society.139 And the vigorous willingness of the police to intervene effectively in such malodorous manipulations as currency speculation – which had virtually brought down the previous regime despite Jiang Jingguo’s gold yuan reforms in 1948 – also attracted public support. The ‘silver oxen’ (yin niu 银牛) had reappeared early in June 1949, just after the Communist takeover. They manipulated silver dollar quotations (the public had lost all confidence in gold yuan notes) on the currency exchange, pushing up commodity prices three-fold and threatening to cause financial panic by blatantly announcing that the Communist Party did not have any experience in economic administration.140 The new government denounced this ‘evil currency inflation’ and the manipulation of the market by financial capitalists, which they associated with Guomindang subversives, but by June 8 1 silver yuan dollar had inflated to the value of 2,000 renminbi.141 On June 10, at 10:00 a.m., Chief Li Shiying led PSB plainclothesman and Garrison Command soldiers to surround the currency exchange, which they sealed off after arresting a large number of speculators. This reportedly won the support of most of Shanghai’s populace and rapidly led to a stabilization of prices after the silver yuan deflated by one half.142

Suppressing Crime

87Crime, especially armed robbery, was the second priority of the Public Security Bureau. Two major problems had to be solved: clogged legal dockets and the public disorder associated with refugees and demobilized Nationalist soldiers.

  • 143 Wei, op. cit, p. 8. The central government’s instruction to judicial officials on November 3, 1950, (...)
  • 144 Ibid., p. 19.

88The Communist regime had abrogated all Nationalist laws. Article 17 of the Common Program read: ‘All laws, decrees, and judicial systems of the Guomindang, the external government which oppressed the people, shall be abolished. Laws and decrees protecting the people shall be enacted and the people’s judicial system shall be set up’.143 There was a national judicial conference in August 1950 to discuss a new set of laws, but there seemed to be no urgency to draft them.144

  • 145 Thomas R. Stephens would disagree: this was not a new but an entirely familiar order of ‘discipline (...)
  • 146 See in this respect, Pitman B. Potter, ‘Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao (...)
  • 147 André Bonnichon, Law in Communist China (1956), p. 4, 6-7, 14-15; Robert Guillain, ‘China Under the (...)

89According to Father André Bonnichon, dean of the law faculty at the Université Aurore, which had trained so many Chinese lawyers since the 1920s, the Communists instilled an entirely new legal culture in Shanghai.145 Bonnichon, who suffered imprisonment for ten months in 1953-1954 and whose judgment should be weighed in that regard, claimed that the urban professionals of Shanghai expected new but familiar legislation after May 1949 and only gradually came to realize that the change to come was of a much more radical nature. There would be no penal code, only regulations.146 The stated rationale was to supplant unfamiliar ‘bourgeois’ procedures with a system of justice understandable to litigants who before 1949 had not realized the class-imbeddedness of the law. Judges were no longer to be independent arbiters, but rather officials who contacted the appropriate government department before announcing a decision. The decision itself – announced by joint tribunals in place of single judges and endorsed by a Party authority – was to be guided by secret circulars not available to the public.147

90As Bonnichon’s own experience attested, along with those of a host of other prisoners both foreign and Chinese, the accused had to wait a long time – often many months – for a first judicial interrogation after being arrested. The judge would then simply state:

  • 148 Bonnichon, op. cit., p. 8.

You are guilty because the government has not arrested you without considerable investigations and deliberations. Therefore, two ways lie open to you: either you confess and implore the clemency of the government; in which case the government will be lenient. Or you resist and subject yourself to the severest of punishments.148

  • 149 Ibid., p. 7.

91Prisoners were then judged by analogous reasoning, being accused of sabotage, feudalism, reactionary tendencies, and counter-revolutionary activities because of their background or current class identity. ‘Judges rarely say: “You have committed this or that act.”’ They say rather, “You are a reactionary. You are a foreign agent”’.149

  • 150 Ibid., p. 3-7, 11-13.

92In that way, under these new legal dispositions, the state prosecutors did not have to name any infraction at all. The arrested person was simply told to yield rather than defend, which effectively displaced Shanghai’s many lawyers and made statutes irrelevant. Thinking ‘right’ became, in effect, a juridical obligation throughout China, and this in return enforced the omnipotence of the state and its courts, which no longer defined offenses, judged proof, or legally considered confessions in the light of plausibility.150

  • 151 Shang bao (June 16, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #913 (June 16, 1949), p. 7.
  • 152 Jiefang ribao (June 18, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #915 (June 18-20), p. 7. The Mili tar (...)
  • 153 On the relationship between Public Security, Procuracy, and People’s Court, see Li, ‘The Public Sec (...)
  • 154 Wei, op. cit., p. 53.
  • 155 Ibid., p. 50.
  • 156 Ibid., p. 13.
  • 157 Ibid., p. 16.

93In Shanghai proper, until then, the PSB handed culprits over to the old courts’ detention bureaus.151 On June 17, 1949, Deputy Mayor Pan Hannian convened a meeting of jurists and lawyers who proposed the organization of a formal People’s Court for Shanghai, that would take place once the legal archives were usable.152 Legal work would continue to be dominated by the Public Security Bureau, as was true elsewhere in China, but the Communists’ tribunals did succeed – albeit in ways that contravened any contemporary notion of civil rights – in clearing the city’s docket, which in February 1950 amounted to 10,962 accumulated cases.153 The following month over 4,000 male and female inmates of the jails attached to the Shanghai Municipal People’s Court were sent to Dongtai (Northern Jiangsu) to undergo ‘reform through labor’.154 By August, the Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing police could claim to have solved an average of 95 % of the robbery cases and 80 % of the theft cases in their respective jurisdictions.155 To clear the remaining backlog, the Government Administration Council and the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing issued instructions in October 1950 to decide ‘vicious’ cases according to the laws governing suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, and to have the remainder determined at various government levels by the People’s Government.156 Thus, by the first half of 1951, the courts in Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chongqing, and Wuhan had handled 95,983 cases, of which about 35,000 were criminal and 61,000 were civil.157

  • 158 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 113; Jiefang ribao (June 15, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review # (...)
  • 159 Dagong bao (June 25 and 29, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #921 (June 28, 1949), and #922 (J (...)

94It was important, at the same time, to attack the roots of such banditry: demobilized soldiers and refugees. On June 13, 1949, the Garrison Command ordered former Nationalist soldiers and ‘roving braves’ (youyong 有用) to present themselves at several ‘concentration’ (jizhong 集中) points around the city to be registered. Those who refused would be punished by the PSB and Garrison Command. During the next week, 7,832 people, including one general, 10 major generals, and 17 full colonels turned themselves in. Another 3,000 former troops reported also. Their weapons were handed over, and they were sent back to their original place of registry to assume productive roles in society.158 At the same time, starting on June 29, the first tens of thousands of hut dwellers and refugees were repatriated to their native villages.159

Suppressing Counter-Revolutionaries

  • 160 Jiefang ribao (May 28, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #900 (May 28, 1949), p. 2-3.
  • 161 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 117.

95As we have seen, the jubilant announcement of the final liberation of Shanghai was tinged with fearful warnings of Guomindang counter-revolutionary activities.160 This was neither paranoia nor propaganda: the city was filled with special service agents left behind by the Baomi ju 保密局 (Bureau to Preserve Secrets) and other secret service units of Chiang’s regime. As soon as the new Public Security Bureau was constituted under Communist leadership, the authorities announced, at the behest of the Military Control Committee, that reactionary organizations were against the law, that all special service (tewu) units were to be dissolved, and that their illegal weapons and radio transmitters were to be seized.161

  • 162 Ibid., p. 118. See also Jiefang ribao (May 28, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #900 (May 28, (...)

96During the next six months, vividly documented in Shenbao, 1,499 Nationalist spies were captured along with hundreds of radio sets, guns, and ammunition. Some of these special service elements had been left behind when the Nationalists had decamped. Others were sent in from Taiwan and Zhoushan (Chusan), which the Guomindang still held. Assassins bent upon killing Chen Yi were captured, saboteurs planning to blow up airplanes were arrested, and numerous Nationalist agents carrying out destabilizing missions (robbing banks, killing soldiers and policemen, and so on) were seized.162

  • 163 Dagong bao (June 8, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #907 (June 8, 1949), p. 8.
  • 164 Jiefang ribao (June 15, 1949), trans. in ibid. #912 (June 15, 1949), p. 1.
  • 165 See, e.g. Jiefang ribao (June 24, 1949), trans. in ibid. #919 (June 24, 1949), p. 7.

97On June 6, 1949, the Shanghai Military Control Committee issued a public notice dissolving all Nationalist special service organs.163 Nonetheless, the authorities believed that the Nationalist secret service would go underground and continue to try to create a state of confusion in order to further their own plans for ‘a miracle [that] will come to save them from extinction’.164 Newspapers list thereafter case after case of arrests of former GMD military or secret service officers caught with false documents, arms, and other incriminating material.165

  • 166 Jiefang ribao (June 29 and 30, 1949), trans. in ibid. #922 (June 29, 1949), p. 7, and #923 (June 30 (...)

98At 4:00 a.m. on June 29, therefore, the PSB launched a series of raids on suspected safe houses throughout the city. They arrested 317 Nationalist soldiers and secret agents (some belonging to Jiang Jingguo’s Jiuguotuan 救国团), along with a handful of weapons and pistols. Though the yield was small, the propaganda was expansive, and it helped establish the sense in Shanghai that the enemy was everywhere, eternal vigilance was vital, and that your next-door neighbor could easily be a spy. This attitude, of course, persisted well into the Cultural Revolution and led to many of the bizarre accusations of that dreadful period.166

  • 167 Ibid., p. 56.
  • 168 Ibid., p. 29.
  • 169 Ibid., p. 30.
  • 170 Luo Ruiqing, Minister of Public Security, reported the arrest of more than 13,000 secret agents thr (...)
  • 171 New China News Agency, Shanghai (June 17, 1951), p. 14; Wei, op. cit., p. 39.

99This general paranoia was dramatically accelerated by the Korean War.167 On July 23, 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 issued general instructions to suppress counter-revolutionaries by life imprisonment or execution.168 These instructions were bolstered during a conference in October 1950, which declared that policy towards counter-revolutionary elements had been too magnanimous.169 The campaign that followed was intensely formative.170 It introduced Shanghai’s populace to ‘the processes of institutionalized violence, both physical and mental, which are essential components of the political style of the regime’. Like the later Sanfan 三反 and Wufan 五反 campaigns, the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries weakened primary allegiances and introduced the urban population to ‘struggle’. According to Pan Hannian, who spoke on December 14, 1951, after orchestrating the campaign in Shanghai, over 3,200 accusation meetings had been held, and investigation committee members had collected material on more than 40,000 individuals. Hundreds of these were subsequently killed and thousands jailed.171

Finale: The Pan-Yang Affair

  • 172 Li Zhaochun (1978), p. 117.
  • 173 He spent a long time in a niupeng 牛棚 or ‘cow shed’, Ibid., p. 114.
  • 174 Ibid., p. 114.
  • 175 Yu (1994), p. 8.

100From March 21-31, 1955, the Chinese Communist Party held a National Representatives Meeting (Quanguo daibiao huiyi 全国代表会议) to discuss reports by Deng Xiaoping on the Gao Gang 高岗 and Rao Shushi 绕漱石 case. After the Party decided to cap the Gao-Rao conspiracy with harsh verdicts, it went on to set up a special committee to investigate the extent of this ‘anti-Party clique’ within the Party, including the presence of hidden ‘counterrevolutionary elements’ (fangeming fenzi 反革命分子).172 On April 7, at the seventh meeting of the first National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the People’s Procurator General ordered that Pan Hannian and Yang Fan be arrested on charges of collusion with the ‘Gao-Rao Anti-Party League’ (Gao-Rao fandang lianmeng 高绕反党联盟), of being Guomindang secret agents, and of carrying out counterrevolutionary activities. On July 7, these charges were confirmed by the Minister of Public Security, Luo Ruiqing 罗瑞卿, who also accused Pan Hannian of protecting a number of other counterrevolutionaries during the 1950-1951 campaign. On these grounds Pan and Yang were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. Pan Hannian died in a Hunan labor camp on April 14, 1977.173 Yang Fan survived and was released after both men enjoyed a preliminary pingfan 平反 (reversal of verdict) in 1979.174 Pan’s innocence was fully acknowledged by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on August 23, 1982.175

  • 176 White (1984), p. 153.
  • 177 Loh and Evans (1962), p. 159.

101The Pan Hannian affair remains a great mystery, partly because of Pan’s closeness to Zhou Enlai, whose papers remain completely closed to historians. Did Pan work too closely with the puppets and Japanese during the war, preparing for the takeover of Shanghai? Was it true that a Japanese Communist told Mao that Pan was a double agent, and that Mao turned the case over to Kang Sheng? Did Pan simply move too slowly against the Shanghai bourgeoisie in 1951 and 1952 to suit more radical Communists?176 At the time, Pan Hannian’s arrest certainly shocked Shanghai business circles, who felt that they had lost a protector. Some tried to leave China. Others continued to hope for the best.177

  • 178 Michael Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to The People’ (1992), p. 340. S (...)

102What is at least certain is that Pan’s role in consolidating the Public Security Bureau’s rule over Shanghai helped convey aspects of the Nationalist police force (baojia, social paternalism, obsession with public order) to the new Communist Public Security Bureau. The key to the latter’s success in momentarily cleaning up crime, corruption, and confusion, was a combination of self-control and openness to mass organization. Though the organizations of urban regulation clearly went back to the Nationalists and the Japanese occupation, the fundamental additive was the Communists’ unique ability to mobilize the people, gain their confidence, and engage their support. That ability, combined with a ‘piecemeal redeployment’ of more and more comprehensive systems of neighborhood and work-place policing, eventually spread the ‘carceral’ into the social sphere through new forms of community regimes that at once both educated and coerced the populace.178

103The Nationalist police force had succumbed to Shanghai’s blandishments within a decade. The Communist security authorities managed not only to resist those selfsame blandishments but also to subdue them in less than ten years. The city was thereby forever changed, but the appetites for private gain – and the instincts for corruption that accompanied them – turned out to be only momentarily stayed. Indeed, the Communists’ replacement of private and public structures by a single collective joining of the two dramatically stifled individual scruples and effaced group inhibitions once the city began to restore its pre-socialist transactions and market exchanges after the reforms began in 1979.

  • 179 ‘China to Abolish City Hu-kou (2-tier registration) System’. Wall Street Journal (April 26, 1944).
  • 180 China Focus (1 December, 1994), p. 1; ‘Lawlessness in Countryside Getting Serious’. China News Dige (...)
  • 181 Jing Bowei, ‘Nongmin fanzui chao yu moshi qinghuai’(Peasant crime in the shadow of the millennium), (...)

104Today, the street associations and household registration systems are about to be dissolved.179 The police have lost any sense of a division between public and private domains.180 And crime rates are soaring.181 Both Nationalist and Communist police regimes in Shanghai were in their time coercively effective but civically marred. Times changed for both. Will the current Shanghai Public Security Bureau follow the Guomindang police force’s path into rampant corruption and criminal complicity? That, of course, remains to be seen.

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Notes

1 Wakeman, ‘Policing Modern Shanghai’, The China Quarterly, 115 (1988), p. 408-440.

2 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai (1995a).

3 Ibid.

4 Jingcha faling 警察法令 (Police laws). Nanjing: Ministry of Interior, 1944.

5 Ibid. This exceptionality probably reflected the wishes of the Japanese Gendarmerie (Military Police) and the Special Organ (Tokumu jikan 特务机关) of the Imperial Japanese Army. The various offices (chu ) – general affairs, police defense (including air defense), economic peace preservation, peace preservation administration, judicial affairs, fire protection, and inspector general – included one for baojia and a special higher office (tegao chu 特高处) responsible for political police affairs, foreign affairs, propaganda, and special services (tewu 特务). ‘Shanghai tebieshi diyi jingchaju zhanxing’, Article 7.

6 Ibid., p. 1-2.

7 Wakeman op. cit., (1995a).

8 London, Her Majesty’s Public Record Office (BFOR), China Intelligence Wing Report No. C-35-85 (May 8, 1944) in FO371/41680. By December 1943, individuals were only permitted to use 25 units of light and 8 units of power per month. Trams stopped running at 8.30 in the evening. Eggs cost $5.50 a piece, rice was $2.500 a picul, there was no coal, and firewood was selling for $500 per hundred catties, BFOR, in FO371/41680 (April 26, 1944).

9 Wakeman, op. cit., (1995a).

10 Wakeman, ‘The Evolution of Local Government in Late Imperial China’ (1975).

11 Chen Ching-chih, ‘The Japanese Adoption of the Pao-chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945’, Journal of Asian Studies, 34 (1975).

12 Frederica M. Bunge and Rinn-Sup Shinn (eds.), China: A Country Study (1981).

13 Chen Yung-fa, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945, (1986), p. 81-82.

14 Yeh Wen-hsin, ‘Dai Li and the Liu Geqing Affair: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service during the War of Resistance’, Journal of Asian Studies, 48/3, (1989), p. 553; Shi Yuanhua, ‘Li Shiqun’, (1986).

15 Chen Yung-fa, op. cit., p. 83-88.

16 Oakes, Vanya, White Man’s Folly (1943), p. 360.

17 BFOR, FO371/24663.

18 Tao Juyin, Tianliang qian de gudao (The Isolated Island before Daybreak), (1947), p. 50-51. In February 1942, the commander of the Shanghai Municipal Police, Colonel Smyth, and the British commander of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, Colonel Mann, were forced by the Japa nese to resign. See Davidson-Houston, J. V. Yellow Creek: The Story of Shanghai. (1964), p. 178.

19 Tao Juyin, op. cit., p. 50-51.

20 Wakeman, (1995a), op. cit.

21 ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’. Confidential letter from Shanghai Municipal Council to the Commissioner of Police (August 21, 1942), in SMP (International Settlement) Files, N-1437-1(11). Microfilms from the U.S. National Archives, p. 2.

22 Each residence, shop, temple, and so on, was known as a hu with one chief. Ten hu formed a jia with one chief. Large buildings such as hotels, apartments, and factories could be considered as one or more jia, the size of which was adjustable. ‘Progress Re Enforcement of Pao Chia System in the Settlement’. Report (April 7, 1942), Shanghai Municipal Police [SMP] (International Settlement) Files, N-1437-1 (6). Microfilms from the U.S. National Archives, p. 2.

23 Ibid, 1, 4-6; ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’, 1-5; cf. White, Lynn T. III, ‘Non-governmentalism in the Historical Development of Modern Shanghai’ (1981), p. 50.

24 Shanghai Municipal Police Files. Microfilms from the U.S. National Archives. N-1437, April 30 to June, 1942.

25 ‘Pao Chia System-Regulations’, 1, 11-13; J.V. Davidson-Houston, op. cit., p. 176-179.

26 ‘Progress Re Enforcement of Pao Chia System in the Settlement’, 2; ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’, 8-9.

27 ‘Interview with Mao Tsu-p’ei’. Report from Harold Wiens, OSS Headquarters, Chungking. OSS report XL-10952, 31/5/45. Office of Strategic Services Archives, War Department. U.S. National Archives, Military Reference Division.2 [OSS]; ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’, 2; White, ‘Deviance, Modernization, Rations, and Household Registers in Urban China’ (1977), p. 157.

28 ‘Pao Chia System–Regulations’, 2-4; ‘Progress Re Enforcement of Pao Chia System in the Settlement’, 3, 10; SMP, N-1437 (April 30 to May 31, 1942). The French Concession also organized a civil policing corps on the basis of the baojia system. SMP, N-1437 (December 8, 1942).

29 Jingcha faling, p. 107-119.

30 Wan Ren, ‘Guomindang Shanghai jingchaju li de dixia gongzuo’ (Underground work in the police force of Guomindang Shanghai), (1983), p. 22-23.

31 Wakeman (1995a), op. cit.

32 Liu Feng, (1979), ‘Zai wei jingchaju li de douzheng’ (The struggle in the collaborationist police force), p. 178.

33 ‘Zhonggong zai Jiangsu zhi zuzhi yu huodong’ (The organization and activities of the Chinese Communist Party in Jiangsu). Bureau of Investigation archives 270.21/815/7302-C.1, p. 20-21.

34 White, ‘Bourgeois Radicalism in Shanghai’, (1984), p. 153.

35 Li Zhaochun, ‘Shenfen fuza de Pan Hannian’ (1978), p. 114; Yu Maochun, ‘American Intelli gence: The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in China’, (1994), p. 7-8; Warren Kuo, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party, (1968), p. 554; White (1984), op. cit., p. 266.

36 Yang Fan, ‘Yang Fan zai jingtao hailong zhong (xia)’ (Yang Fan in the midst of terrifying waves and perilous billows) (1989), p. 30

37 Donald B. Gillin with Charles Etter, ‘Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949’ (1983).

38 Shen Zui, Juntong neimu (The inside story of the Military Statistics [Bureau]) (1984), p. 186-187; Wakeman, ‘American Police Advisers and the Nationalist Chinese Secret Service, 1930-1937’ (1992) and (1993). Ch’i Hsi-sheng, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-1945 (1982), p. 222.

39 Zhang Weihan, ‘Dai Li yu Juntong ju’ (Dai Li and the Military Statistics Bureau), (1982), p. 148.

40 Ch’i, op. cit. (1982), p. 222.

41 Huang Kangyong, ‘Wo suo zhidao de Dai Li’ (The Dai Li that I knew), (1982), p. 170. Shang hainese also spoke of ‘passing the examination with five zi’ (wu zi deng ke 五子登科). All the zi were the same except for jinzi 金子 (which also means ‘gold’) being substituted for tiaozi. Liu Feng, art. cit., p.181.

42 White, (1984), art. cit., p. 147.

43 XL24030, October 15, 1945, OSS.

44 XL24030, May 15, 1945, OSS.

45 They were threatened with arrest if they tried to resign because the Guomindang could not dispense with their expert knowledge of local conditions. Lu Dagong. ‘Shanghai jingzheng daquan hui dao renmin shouli’ (The authority of police administration in Shanghai returns to the hands of the people), (1981), p. 62.

46 XL24030, May 15, 1945, OSS.

47 XL24032, October 15, 1945, OSS; Wilkinson, ‘Leave Us Alone!: Sino-American Conflict in Pre-Liberation Shanghai’, (1990), p. 6.

48 Xuan Tiewu, ‘Fakanci’ (Foreword), in Zhu Yisheng (ed.), Shanghai jingcha (Shanghai Police) (1946), 1, p. 1-2.

49 The Nationalists brought all of the police stations in Shanghai under the direction of the Shanghai Municipal Police Headquarters (Shanghai shi jingcha zongju上海市警察总局) on Fuzhou Road. Zhu Yisheng, ‘Shanghai jingcha yange shi’ (History of the evolution of the Shanghai Police) in Zhu Yisheng (ed.)., op. cit., p. 5.

50 Liu Feng, op. cit., p. 185; Wan Ren, op. cit., p. 24.

51 The ‘old police’ objected to the jingguan qu: ‘Implementing police management [zones] is breaking the rice bowl’; ‘If you want to reform, then everybody should be reformed’. A meeting was called on June 2, 1947, at the Waitan 外滩 (she Bund) which coincided with a one-day national student strike against civil war. This prompted the precinct chiefs’ announcement. Liu Feng, op. cit., p. 185.

52 Jingzheng jianshe wunian jihua (The Police administration office establishes a five-year plan), Number Two National Archives [NTNA], Nanjing, People’s Republic of China. 12/459.

53 Ge sheng shi jingcha xuexiao zuzhi guicheng (Organizational regulations for each province and municipal police academy), NTNA, 12/635, 1948; Shanghai shi jingju shishi jianjing fang’an xianzhuang jindu (Current state and progress of the plan to establish police to be carried out by the Shanghai Municipal Police Bureau), NTNA, 12/660, July 7, 1948.

54 Ge sheng shi jingcha xuexiao yuan jing xunlian yueban dengjibiao (A Tabular representation of the police training units and police school personnel registered in each province and city), NTNA, 12/668, 1949; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou, baowei renmin zhengquan’ (Smashing the old police organs, protecting the people’s sovereignty), in Shanghai wenshi ziliao xuanji (Selection of historical materials on Shanghai) (1984), p. 108.

55 Jing zheng faling, p. 52-58, 84-86.

56 Liu Feng, op. cit., p. 187; White, ‘Deviance, Modernization, Rations, and Household Registers in Urban China’ (1977), p. 157.

57 White (1981), op. cit., p. 51.

58 Wakeman, ‘Licensing Leisure’ (1995b).

59 Jing zheng faling, p. 45-48.

60 A. C. Scott, Actors Are Madmen: Notebook of a Theatregoer in China (1982), p. 70.

61 Jing zheng faling, p. 25, 32.

62 ‘Yewu jilu’ (Record of affairs) 1946, in Zhu Yisheng, op. cit., p. 53.

63 Sun Guoqun, ‘Lun jiu Shanghai changji zhidu de fazhan he tedian’ (On the development and characteristics of the prostitute system in old Shanghai), (1988), p. 5.

64 During the first half of 1946, more than 1,600 factories in Shanghai closed their doors. More than 300,000 workers were said to be unemployed, cf. Liu Feng, op. cit., p. 183.

65 Ibid., p. 183-185.

66 Jing zheng faling, p. 49; White (1984), p. 148. The newspapers were shut down in May 1947.

67 Sima Lu (1967), p. 181-183, quoted in White (1984), p. 148.

68 Liu Feng (1979), p. 190-191. The Communist prisoners were killed by their captors on the eve of the PLA’s liberation of the city. Their mutilated corpses were found later.

69 Su Shouzu (1946), p. 31-34.

70 Ibid., p. 35; Xuan Tiewu, ‘Renshi jingcha’ (Know the police) in Zhu Yisheng (ed.), op. cit., p. 15-16.

71 NCDN (July 29, 1947), p. 1-2.

72 Chungking News Agency (February 18, 1946) in U.S. Consulate General (Beiping) Chinese Press Review; Liu Feng (1979), p. 188; NCDN (July 29, 1947), p. 1-2.

73 Ibid., p. 178.

74 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, in Shanghai wenshi ziliao xuanji, p. 106.

75 Liu Feng (1979), p. 178-179.

76 Wan Ren (1983), p. 20.

77 Ibid.; Liu Feng (1979), p. 179-180.

78 These included Zhang Yunxiao 张云晓, Wu Fupei 吴佩孚, Zheng Zhenhua 郑振华, and Yuan Kuntian袁锟田. Ibid., p. 19.

79 Liu Feng (1979), p. 180.

80 Li Zhaochun (1978), p. 116-117.

81 Because of this, Wan Ren was later accused during the Cultural Revolution of having devel oped ‘illicit relations’ with the Guomindang. Wan Ren (1983), p. 19, 22.

82 Ibid., p. 20.

83 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 62. Xiao was an ‘intelligence cadre’ (qingbao ganbu 情报干部) responsible for Shanghai in the Intelligence Division (Qinbao bumen 情报部门) of the CCP’s Central Social Affairs Department (Zhonggong zhongyang shehui bu 中共中央社会部). ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou,’ p. 107.

84 Wan Ren (1983), p. 23.

85 Liu Feng (1979), p. 182-183.

86 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 104.

87 The ‘Huadong ju guanyu jieguan Jiangnan chengsh de zhishi’ (Information concerning the takeover of Jiangnan cities) contained extremely specific details on police forces, and especially on Shanghai’s police. ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 105.

88 Wan Ren (1983), p. 212-213. The Party branch in Shanghai’s main jail consisted of 30-odd members and about 20 ‘front work’ (waiwei 外围) sympathizers. On May 23, they got the permission of the warden to close down the front door. On May 24 a Communist team seized the armory. On May 25, when Suzhou was liberated, the other guards laid down their weapons. On May 27, they welcomed the PLA. Guomindang orders to kill all political prisoners notwithstanding, the Communists had managed to save the lives of the ‘progressives’ interred therein. Liu Feng (1979), p. 192-193; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’ p. 107-108.

89 Liu Feng (1979), p. 191; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 107.

90 Scott (1982), p. 140-141; Percy Finch, Shanghai and Beyond, (1953), p. 273; Henriot, ‘Le gouvernement municipal de Shanghai, 1927-1953’, (1983) p. 335.

91 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 3, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review, #904 (June 3, 1949), p. 1-2.

92 Liu Feng (1979), p. 191; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 106-107.

93 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 107.

94 Finch (1953), p. 337-338; Yuan Lizhuang and Li Nianpei, ‘When Shanghai Was Liberated’, China Daily (February 12, 1987), p. 6.

95 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 63-64.

96 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 109-110, 112-113. There was a total of 8,520 guns in the hands of the police, plus 60 artillery pieces, 18 cannons, 29 armored vehicles, and 8, 283, 698 rounds of ammunition. People continued to pose as ‘takeover personnel’ during the first few weeks of Communist rule. Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 3, 1949) trans. in Chinese Press Review # 904 (June 3, 1949), p. 2.

97 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 65.

98 A small number of case files were burned in the personnel office and investigation section (diaocha ke 调查科), but the rest of the police archives were preserved. ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 109.

99 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 66-67; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 107.

100 Ibid., p. 108; Lu Dagong (1981), p. 68.

101 Ibid., p. 68-69.

102 Ibid., p. 69.

103 Yuan and Li, art. quoted above, n. 94.

104 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 69.

105 Finch (1953), p. 339.

106 Acting Mayor Zhao Zukang had already met with Communist negotiators and agreed imme diately to release political prisoners. Yuan and Li 1987, art. quoted above, n. 94.

107 Ibid., p. 69-70.

108 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 113-115.

109 Lu Dagong (1981), p. 70.

110 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 9, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #908 (June 9, 1949), p. 9. See also Wakeman (1995a), Chapter 19.

111 Wei, Henry, ‘Courts and Police in Communist China to 1952’, p. 48.

112 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 109.

113 Yuan and Li, art. quoted above, n. 94; Robinhood (tabloid), Shanghai (May 31, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #901 (May 29-31, 1949), p. 8.

114 Ibid.

115 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 3, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review, #904 (June 3, 1949), p. 1.

116 Ibid. (June 15, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #912 (June 15, 1949), p. 6; ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou,’ p. 109. Shao Jian, former party secretary of the CP Committee in the police, was made assistant head of the Political Department (Zhengzhi bu) of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau. He was cruelly treated by the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution, and died as a result. Wan Ren (1983), p. 20.

117 Dagong bao, Shanghai (June 15, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #912 (June 15, 1949), p. 6.

118 Li Zhaochun (1978), p. 117. See also Aspects of Shanghai, Shanghai (June 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #923, p. 12

119 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (May 28, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #900 (May 28, 1949), p. 2.

120 Ibid., (May 18, 1949), in ibid., p. 2-3.

121 Dagong bao, Shanghai (May 26, 1949); Shanghai renmin (May 26, 1949); Jiefang ribao (May 28, 1949), all trans. in Chinese Press Review #899 (May 25-27, 1949), p. 1 and 3, and #900 (May 28, 1949), p. 2.

122 Jiefang ribao, Shanghai (June 13, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #910 (June 11-13, 1949), p. 8.

123 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 111-117.

124 Public health issues also played a role in this regard. Fearful of epidemics, the Military Control Committee decided to act where the Guomindang had only propagandized. During the first eight days of June, the committee had the army remove 38,000 tons of garbage from the city’s streets. Dagong bao (June 16, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #913 (June 16, 1949), p. 3.

125 At the time of Communist liberation, there were 150,000-160,000 peddlers in Shanghai, filling all the major streets, including Nanjing Road, Tibet Road, and Jinling Road. ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 111-112.

126 Ibid., p. 112.

127 Dagong bao (June 8, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #907 (June 8, 1949), p. 1.

128 Fei bao (tabloid), Shanghai (June 8, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #907 (June 8, 1949), p. 9.

129 White (1977), p. 155.

130 Ibid., p. 157-158.

131 Ibid., p. 155.

132 Gail Hershatter, ‘Regulating Sex in Shanghai: The Reform of Prostitution in 1920 and 1951’ (1992), p. 41.

133 Victor H. Li, ‘The Public Security Bureau and Political-Legal Work in Hui-yang Hsien’ (1968-1969), p. 26. People ‘under control’ were usually persons who had narrowly escaped labor reform or execution in 1951. They were typically given a lowly position, and their employers addressed them only to give orders and wrote weekly reports on their behavior. The ‘controlled’ person had to go to the police once a week with a written expression of gratitude to the Party for its leniency. Needless to say, this Orwellian nightmare owed very little to the Nationalists and often resulted in suicide. Robert Loh and Humphrey Evans, Escape from Red China (1962), p. 69.

134 ‘Renzhen zhengdun gongan renyuan de gongzuo zuofeng’.

135 Wakeman (1995b), op. cit.

136 Dagong bao, Shanghai (May 29, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #901 (May 29-31), p. 14 -15.

137 Ibid. (June 1, 1949) and China Daily Tribune (May 31, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #902 (June 1, 1949) p. 4.

138 Jiefang ribao (June 16, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #913 (June 16, 1949), p. 10; Ibid. (June 25, 1949) #922 (June 29, 1949) p. 13.

139 Hershatter, op. cit., p. 114; C. Henriot, ‘La Fermeture: The Abolishing of Prostitution in Shanghai, 1949-1958’, unpublished paper (1994), p. 3-13, 20, 23; Wei, op. cit., p. 30; Dagong bao (June 27, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #921 (June 28, 1949), p. 9.

140 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 113.

141 Jiefang ribao (June 3, 1949); Dagong bao (June 3,1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #904 (June 3, 1949), p. 1-2, and #907 (June 1949), p. 2.

142 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 114; Xinwen ribao (June 30, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #923 (June 30, 1949), p. 3. Rationing of various daily necessities and the payment of half a worker’s wages in rice also helped stabilize commodity prices. Dagong bao (June 13, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #910 (June 11-13, 1949), p. 8.

143 Wei, op. cit, p. 8. The central government’s instruction to judicial officials on November 3, 1950, read: ‘All the laws of the Guomindang reactionary government are tools of the minority reactionary group to oppress the great majority of the people’. Ibid., p. 8-9.

144 Ibid., p. 19.

145 Thomas R. Stephens would disagree: this was not a new but an entirely familiar order of ‘discipline’ rather than ‘law’, that ‘spelled the end of all pretense to the reception of Western jurisprudence in China’. That is, the Communist government ‘returned officially to what the Chinese people had never in reality departed from or wanted to depart from, that is, dispute resolution, criminal administration, and the enforcement of order in disciplinary tribunals subject to political direction in all things’. Stephens, Order and Discipline in China: The Shanghai Mixed Court, 1911-1927 (1992), p. 120.

146 See in this respect, Pitman B. Potter, ‘Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China’ (1994), p. 329.

147 André Bonnichon, Law in Communist China (1956), p. 4, 6-7, 14-15; Robert Guillain, ‘China Under the Red Flag’ (1950), p. 105-106. ‘The Communists allowed the Public Security to take over more and more of the criminal process because they distrusted some judges and felt that others were too unskilled’. Li, ‘The Role of Law in Communist China’ (1990), p. 98.

148 Bonnichon, op. cit., p. 8.

149 Ibid., p. 7.

150 Ibid., p. 3-7, 11-13.

151 Shang bao (June 16, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #913 (June 16, 1949), p. 7.

152 Jiefang ribao (June 18, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #915 (June 18-20), p. 7. The Mili tary Control Committee announced that a court would be established just as soon as the city’s legal archives were put in order. Shang bao (June 16, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #913 (June 16, 1949), p. 7.

153 On the relationship between Public Security, Procuracy, and People’s Court, see Li, ‘The Public Security Bureau’ (1968-1969), p. 4-7.

154 Wei, op. cit., p. 53.

155 Ibid., p. 50.

156 Ibid., p. 13.

157 Ibid., p. 16.

158 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 113; Jiefang ribao (June 15, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #912 (June 15, 1949), p. 2. On June 23 the PSB also took measures to register weapons in the hands of the police volunteers, watchmen, and private individuals. Dagong bao (June 23, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #918 (June 23, 1949), p. 9. This was done with the help of local residents. Jiefang ribao (June 26, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #920 (June 25-29, 1949), p. 9.

159 Dagong bao (June 25 and 29, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #921 (June 28, 1949), and #922 (June 29, 1949).

160 Jiefang ribao (May 28, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #900 (May 28, 1949), p. 2-3.

161 ‘Cuihui jiu jingcha jigou’, p. 117.

162 Ibid., p. 118. See also Jiefang ribao (May 28, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #900 (May 28, 1949), p. 2.

163 Dagong bao (June 8, 1949), trans. in Chinese Press Review #907 (June 8, 1949), p. 8.

164 Jiefang ribao (June 15, 1949), trans. in ibid. #912 (June 15, 1949), p. 1.

165 See, e.g. Jiefang ribao (June 24, 1949), trans. in ibid. #919 (June 24, 1949), p. 7.

166 Jiefang ribao (June 29 and 30, 1949), trans. in ibid. #922 (June 29, 1949), p. 7, and #923 (June 30, 1949), p. 7. In East China, between June 1949 and June 1950, 11,097 ‘subversives’ were arrested, and 306 radios were confiscated. Wei, op. cit., p. 29.

167 Ibid., p. 56.

168 Ibid., p. 29.

169 Ibid., p. 30.

170 Luo Ruiqing, Minister of Public Security, reported the arrest of more than 13,000 secret agents throughout China. In Shanghai, at least, the launching of the campaign led to the kind of interrogation, writing of countless confessions, and humiliation, that produced numerous suicides. See, for example, Pan Ling, Old Shanghai: Gangsters in Paradise (1984), p. 227-229.

171 New China News Agency, Shanghai (June 17, 1951), p. 14; Wei, op. cit., p. 39.

172 Li Zhaochun (1978), p. 117.

173 He spent a long time in a niupeng 牛棚 or ‘cow shed’, Ibid., p. 114.

174 Ibid., p. 114.

175 Yu (1994), p. 8.

176 White (1984), p. 153.

177 Loh and Evans (1962), p. 159.

178 Michael Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to The People’ (1992), p. 340. See also Wakeman, (1995b), op. cit., p. 291.

179 ‘China to Abolish City Hu-kou (2-tier registration) System’. Wall Street Journal (April 26, 1944).

180 China Focus (1 December, 1994), p. 1; ‘Lawlessness in Countryside Getting Serious’. China News Digest (May 3, 1994), p. 1.

181 Jing Bowei, ‘Nongmin fanzui chao yu moshi qinghuai’(Peasant crime in the shadow of the millennium), Minzhu Zhongguo (Democratic China), November 26-29, 1994, p. 26; Marlowe Hood, ‘China’s Secret Crime Wave’, Sunday Morning Post, Spectrum, May 31, 1992, p. 1; ‘China’s Fiscal Black Hole’. Renmin zhengxie bao (People’s Political Consultative Conference News), May 22, 1993, in Inside China Mainland, September 1993, p. 56.

Auteur

(Author deceased September 14, 2006)(L’auteur est décédé le 14 septembre 2006)
Professor, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, États-Unis.

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